Talk:Broad front versus narrow front controversy in World War II

Final sentence in lead?
Hi - can you clarify the final paragraph in the lead? After the war, Chester Wilmot's The Struggle For Europe (1952) argued that Eisenhower prevented Montgomery from winning the war in 1944. Few historians on either side of the Atlantic accept that this was possible. The final sentence is somewhat ambiguous as to what is actually being implied as impossible: Eisenhower preventing Montgomery from winning the war? Montgomery winning the war in 1944? Or the war being won in 1944? The AJP Taylor quote in the controversy section makes it clear, perhaps that could be used in the lead. Regards,--Goldsztajn (talk) 23:20, 6 March 2021 (UTC)


 * Re-worded as suggested. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  23:34, 6 March 2021 (UTC)

Article structure
The article is unclear about what the controversy actually is - was it a war-time disagreement on strategy between rival Allied governments, or a war-time disagreement on priorities between rival Allied commanders, or a post-war dust-up between rival historians? I would submit that it was all of the above, but they are different in character, and should be explained separately. Also the reasons behind the various "stances" are not fully explained yet. This article is not really structured logically - it would be more clear to the novice reader if the info was grouped a bit differently, and the overlaps removed or explained differently. In addition the Background section contains a lot of irrelevant info, but does not properly explain the most import underlying facts, on which the decisions were ultimately made.

A substantial copy-edit is needed to properly explain the topic. I am happy to make a start. Any comments or suggestions please? Wdford (talk) 16:26, 25 September 2021 (UTC)


 * There was little disagreement between governments; their objectives were closely aligned but not identical. So there was:
 * The wartime disagreement about strategy. The difficult part about describing this is the change over time between end August - start of September - mid September, when the operational situation changed.
 * There was a disagreement about logistics, whether any of the proposed operations was feasible. The Overlord plan was based on assumptions that no longer held true, hence the debate
 * There was the post-war debate, which arose from frustration with the post-war world order. It seems to me that the end of the cold war took the wind out of it.
 * The article grew organically, and I am not invested in the structure, but if you could detail here what you propose, and we can agree on it, then that may save a lot of to-and-fro editing. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  20:14, 25 September 2021 (UTC)


 * Cool. I propose that the Background section should go up to about mid-September perhaps?
 * We don't need to rehash so much of Overlord – just a few sentences, with the appropriate links.


 * The Background section should include a background on British political objectives, such as:
 * Churchill was fixated on Italy and the Balkans, and was opposed to Overlord. Churchill wanted a British general to capture Berlin ahead of the Soviets, even though he would need a huge American army to achieve this;
 * A mention of the imperial requirement and grand strategy imperative to uphold British "prestige" for future geopolitical reasons;
 * Britain was running out of men, and they needed a British victory with a British general commanding American troops.


 * The Background section should include a background on US political objectives, such as:
 * USA wanted to finish the war and move on to Japan and the peace, with minimum cost in lives;
 * USA needed Stalin's help in Japan, and were quite happy to give Stalin the glory of capturing Berlin in exchange;
 * USA had agreed to the Occupation Zones, and they were reluctant to pay the huge price to gain Berlin then give it straight back to the Soviets anyway;
 * American public opinion was not happy to have huge American armies commanded by British generals, or to have the American armies operating in support roles so that the British army could get all the US supplies.


 * On logistics, we should mention:
 * After Overlord, the unexpectedly rapid German retreat to the WestWall, and the Allies having to choose between capturing ports and maintaining the momentum;
 * The Allies chose to prioritize momentum, and they out-ran their supply-chain;
 * Monty had enough supplies to support his British Army, and he "avoided" opening Antwerp;
 * We should also mention Operation Dragoon as part of the logistics background.


 * Then the Monty proposal section, which can now be quite short;
 * Then the Bradley/Patton proposal section, which can now be quite short;
 * Market Garden was an attempt by Monty to "prove" to Ike his narrow-front "dagger thrust" policy, so it should get a short section, with appropriate links;
 * Then Ike's decision, and his reasons – which will be based on the Background as well;
 * In August, northern Germany was undefended, but without Antwerp, they could not support a viable thrust into German territory. By the time Monty finally got Antwerp harbor working, the Germans had regrouped, and a northern thrust would have been cut off, starved out and shattered.
 * The controversy on the battle-field finally ended with Monty's attitude after the German narrow-thrust effort in the Ardennes, so it should get a mention in this section too, with appropriate links;
 * Then the post-war media/historian flustering section, much as it already is. I agree about the frustration with the post-war world order and the Cold War. However I don't really understand why the US general election was considered to be an issue - if FDR lost, Dewey was as solid on anti-Hitler and anti-Japan and anti-Communism, and was unlikely to change anything in the SHAEF. In June this was still a major issue, but after Dewey beat Taft to the nomination, it was no longer an issue. Is this really relevant?


 * Thereafter we can edit the Lead a bit further, to summarize the article.


 * How about that as a rough skeleton? Wdford (talk) 22:31, 25 September 2021 (UTC)

Let's take these points one-by-one:

Hawkeye7  (discuss)  00:48, 26 September 2021 (UTC)
 * I tried to keep the one-paragraph description of Overlord down to what is required to follow the subsequent article.
 * Churchill was fixated on Italy and the Balkans, and was for a time opposed to Overlord, but that's not relevant here. The idea that Vienna could have been reached first from Italy was one of Wilmott's ideas, not relevant here.
 * Getting to Berlin before the Soviets wasn't a concern; Churchill had already agreed to it being in the British zone. That's another one of Wilmott's ideas, not relevant here.
 * Both sides wanted to finish the war, but the British needed it done at low cost in lives; Americans care less about lives; they live in a country with a huge population, and were willing to expend them.
 * "American public opinion was not happy to have huge American armies commanded by British generals, or to have the American armies operating in support roles so that the British army could get all the US supplies." That's absolutely correct, although I don't understand why. If you have a source explaining this, I would be grateful
 * This is where the American election year is relevant, according to the sources. Roosevelt wanted American success on the battlefield. Perhaps more could be said; but you are right that a Dewey victory would not have changed much.
 * The Allies did not have to choose between pursuit and ports. The American commanders neglected the ports in their eagerness to seize operational opportunities. Partly that was because they were poor at logistics, and partly because logistics was not their concern; it was Lee's job.
 * Montgomery had sufficient supplies for his army group. He didn't "avoid" opening Antwerp; he was not ordered to do so.
 * Market Garden's implementation was intended to demonstrate the narrow front concept, but its purpose was to remove the V-weapon threat to the UK. By the time it was launched, neither the broad nor narrow front was viable.
 * Antwerp was not captured until September, and not be used for some time. It was no use in early September. Concentration on Antwerp would have meant abandoning the broad and narrow fronts, and accepting that the war would continue into 1945 (which is what happened).
 * I don't want to get sidetracked on the Ardennes and Montgomery's final push to be named ground forces commander. It isn't relevant to the broad front vs. narrow front, which refers only to the events of August and September 1944.


 * In response to your initial points:
 * I would trim a lot of the Overlord material out of the Background section, where it adds little or nothing to understanding this topic, and move some paragraphs from other sections into the background section instead, so that the reader sees all of them at the beginning rather than finding them mixed up in the subsequent material.
 * There's only one paragraph on Overlord, and it is needed to set the scene. It's important that the reader understands the situation at the start of September. Leave it as it is for now. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  21:41, 27 September 2021 (UTC)
 * My point is that Churchill was fixated on keeping the USSR as far eastward as possible, and he felt that this strategy required an Allied invasion through the Balkans. When he didn’t get this wish, he wanted a western army – preferably Monty – to do a narrow thrust to Berlin and "win the race" against the USSR. Churchill makes this point many times in his own memoirs, as does Monty. By his own admission, Churchill was still pestering Ike about this as late as March 1945. It was a main driver of the British "narrow thrust" thinking, and it didn't end in September 1944.
 * The article is about the controversy in September 1944. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  21:41, 27 September 2021 (UTC)
 * Churchill in his own memoirs stated that even in September 1944 he "much desired" that Alexander should reach Vienna through the Adriatic ahead of the Russians. Wilmot may have picked up on it too.
 * Yes, but you haven't tied it to the controversy. Let's keep it focused. Consider writing a separate article on the "Soft underbelly" controversy. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  21:41, 27 September 2021 (UTC)
 * The Australian newspaper you cited from the 1950's also quotes Rundstedt saying he expected the Allies to strike across northern Germany, as demanded repeatedly by Churchill and Montgomery, based on the assumption that the Allies would "do everything in their power to reach Berlin before the Russians … and to prevent the Russians from advancing too far to the west over the Oder." A very interesting assumption. Once again, a German general who as a prisoner after the war collaborated with Basil Liddell Hart, comes up with an amazing statement that directly supports Montgomery's actions. What an amazing coincidence.
 * Yeah, that hasn't escaped notice by historians. It seems that they told him - or he reported - what he wanted to hear. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  21:41, 27 September 2021 (UTC)
 * Of course, the Allies did in fact hit the Siegfried Line at Aachen, at almost exactly the time Rundstedt claimed to have been reaching this profound conclusion. After being held up in street-fighting for three weeks against a scratch battle-group, and discovering that tanks don’t work well in narrow medieval streets, they had to pause to deal with the threat of the Germans cutting their supply lines by flooding the rivers behind them. All of these experiences spoke loudly against attempting a narrow-front attack deep into Germany, but Monty was blind to the lessons.
 * The pause was mainly due to supply shortages. The Siegfried Line was or could have been breached in places. Bradley chose to attack at Aachen. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  21:41, 27 September 2021 (UTC)
 * Of course both sides wanted to finish the war. However it is ridiculous to suggest that the USA was careless with the lives of their men. They were willing to take risks when the outcome required it, but they avoided losses where possible. Ike cited this as a major reason why he declined to race the Russians to Berlin, despite constant pressure from Churchill.
 * I would not go so far as to call it "careless", but the US made little effort to avoid losses compared to the British, and this shows up in the casualty figures. The Americans did not see the bottom of their manpower barrel until 1945. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  21:41, 27 September 2021 (UTC)
 * Churchill mentions the need to uphold or restore "British prestige" on many occasions in his memoirs – specifically including the capture of Berlin via a Monty "narrow-front thrust".
 * Yes, the need for prestige (preserving Britain's major power status) was the major objective, not specifically tied to the narrow front, but difficult for Montgomery to implement in view of the diminishing resources of the UK in manpower and money. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  21:41, 27 September 2021 (UTC)
 * It is certainly true that the British were running out of men. Even with Canadian help they were short on resources. This required Ike to lend them the entire US 9th Army, to make up their numbers. Monty's proposed narrow-front charge to Berlin envisaged a lot of US units participating, under his British command.
 * The Canadian Army was also running out of men. Ike loaned the Ninth Army, but that was for the 1945 campaign. In September 1944 it would have meant the First Army. Using American resources under British control was part of the British plan. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  21:41, 27 September 2021 (UTC)
 * I also don't have a source specifically explaining WHY American public opinion was not happy to have huge American armies commanded by British generals, or to have the American armies operating in support roles so that the British army could get all the US supplies. Perhaps it was simply national pride? After all, the British press were livid when Ike replaced Monty in France. Or maybe, after Monty's performance at Caen and his subsequent dissembling, the American people anticipated more bogging down and bloody attrition under his leadership? Who knows?
 * I don't have a source either. National pride was obviously one factor. I linked the The New York Times editorial by Hanson W. Baldwin, but it doesn't seem as strident as it is often depicted. Clearly in conflict with the British desire to be seen as prominent as possible. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  21:41, 27 September 2021 (UTC)
 * Obviously FDR wanted a military victory to bolster his own election chances, but that could have been any American victory – Patton or Hodges or Truscott in a narrow thrust, or all of the US armies on a broad front. It could have been Clarke in Italy on the Gothic Line, or Nimitz taking the Marianas Islands in the Pacific, or successes in any of the various phases of the long Philippines campaign. Apart from an understandable desire to avoid a massive defeat, the "election" issue did not affect the broad-front vs narrow front decision. Perhaps Ike and FDR feared (quite rightly) that a narrow thrust would result in a massive defeat – as did actually happen on the small-scale test-case at Arnhem?
 * A military victory in Europe would be better than one in the Pacific or Burma - some place Americans had heard of, like Rome. The liberation of Paris was the big story. There was a debate between Eisenhower and Montgomery as to whether anyone would care who won the victory. Ironically, it was Montgomery who said it wouldn't matter and Eisenhower who disagreed. Your point about the possibility of a defeat is a good one which could be developed. (When Roosevelt met MacArthur in September 1944, Mac, seeking to make small talk, asked him how the re-election campaign was going. Roosevelt said, "Doug, you know I'm too busy running the war to worry about that." Whereupon both men roared laughing.) Hawkeye7   (discuss)  21:41, 27 September 2021 (UTC)
 * Where it ties into the issue at hand is that at this critical juncture, Montgomery is superseded by Eisenhower, who is unable to control a fast-moving land battle, not inclined to force his subordinates to do what he wants them to, and is even injured, restricting his mobility still further. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  21:41, 27 September 2021 (UTC)
 * Yes, logistics was Lee's job. The original Allied plan was for Patton to liberate the Brittany ports, and for Monty to open the Channel ports – such as Le Havre. When they finally got out of the bocage, Patton achieved unexpectedly huge success, and the plan was changed to send him to destroy the German capability rather than to immediately pursue the fortified Brittany ports. Then Monty delayed closing the Falaise Gap, and things unfolded. Churchill himself wrote that "The Brittany ports, when captured, would be even more remote [than Normandy] but the Channel ports from Havre northwards, and especially Antwerp … were prizes of vital consequence". (Triumph and Tragedy, 2014, pg 192).
 * Some historians, including Blumenson, have argued that Patton could have captured the ports intact, but was restrained by Bradley. Harold L. Mack, who served on Lee's staff, called this The Critical Error of World War II. The arguments here are complicated; it wouldn't have helped Bradley's proposed narrow thrust. The article has to emphasis that in the Overlord plan the Channel ports were earmarked for British not American use. Trying to keep the article focused. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  21:41, 27 September 2021 (UTC)
 * After noting the extent of defense and destruction at Cherbourg harbor, US high command responded with Operation Dragoon to obtain the extra logistical capacity of the less-fortified Mediterranean ports - once again in the face of huge British resistance.
 * This was a last-ditch effort by Churchill to thwart Dragoon. He proposed using the resources for an amphibious attack on Brittany. It was not known that the Mediterranean ports would be less fortified or less damaged.
 * It is ridiculous to suggest that the Master of the Battlefield was justified in not opening Antwerp simply because he didn’t get a direct order to do so. Monty was complaining constantly about a lack of supplies, he knew the Antwerp shipping channel was unusable, he knew his Canadians were right on the spot already, but he chose to ignore Antwerp and focus on selling Ike his narrow-thrust plan. Monty's delays at Antwerp stalled the advance in 1944, but as usual he blamed a "lack of support" for his failure. Even his patron Brooke wrote in his diary: "I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault. Instead of carrying out the advance to Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp".
 * Yes, and Montgomery agreed with that assessment. However, the British forces could be supplied through the Channel ports, as they were in World War I, and did not themselves need Antwerp. Historians like John Buckley have agreed that capturing Antwerp was a better idea, but it would not have led to a quick opening of the port, nor to the capture of the Ruhr, and there would have been no prospect of an end to the war in 1944. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  21:41, 27 September 2021 (UTC)
 * The objective of Market Garden was to establish a bridgehead over the Rhine, and to set up a strike at the Ruhr. This is not in contention. The V-weapon threat was also important, but that was to be addressed by the Canadians sweeping up the coast in parallel - a V-2 rocket could not reach London from Arnhem. Monty claimed this V-weapon rationale as an additional selling point in his memoirs, to further support why Ike should have given Monty "total priority" at the expense of his US "rivals".
 * Yes. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  21:41, 27 September 2021 (UTC)
 * The narrow front idea was never viable – defending the flanks of that long corridor would take too many divisions, as Ike warned Monty before Market Garden, and as Market Garden proved. However when Market Garden was launched, everyone from Churchill on down at least hoped to acquire a bridgehead over the Rhine, as a future jumping-off point.
 * Yes. Bradley relied on air power to cover his southern flank, and this worked out well. It is also true that the at Market Garden the road was cut at aone point, halting the operation for a time. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  21:41, 27 September 2021 (UTC)
 * The Allies were never going to conquer Germany in 1944. The only chance of the war ending in 1944 was for the Germans to sue for peace when the Allies crossed the border, and that required either that Hitler died or the Allies dropped the unconditional surrender demand. The Allies were in Aachen in October already, but the Nazis fought to the death for seven more months, even with the Russians raping and burning city after city. Ike knew that this would happen, and he said as much to reporters as early as August 1944. Monty was just blowing smoke.
 * Yes, and the article says this in the final section. However Ike did not know this in September 1944. For a moment, it looked like Germany would surrender. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  21:41, 27 September 2021 (UTC)
 * Aachen to Berlin is over 600kms, and in September 1944 the logistics were still severely hamstrung by the situation at Antwerp. Even the scratch German defenders were still resolute, as was proved at Aachen, and the massive Ardennes attack force with its veteran panzer armies was already being assembled in secret nearby to Aachen. Rundstedt obviously knew all about that – he commanded the Ardennes attack force. Monty's "thrust" would have been cut off and slaughtered. Ike realised that, and warned Monty, but Monty (and Churchill) had a narrow-front fixation. Ike didn't like to give direct orders to his Army Commanders, but with the Ardennes he put his foot down hard, on Bradley and Monty, and Monty sulked forever after.
 * The immediate objective was the capture of the Ruhr, and it was encircled by narrow thrusts in 1945. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  21:41, 27 September 2021 (UTC)
 * What say I start by cleaning up the Background and moving some stuff around, then we can reassess and add more material as Phase 2? Wdford (talk) 13:28, 27 September 2021 (UTC)
 * The article covers all the points already, so there is little to be gained by moving stuff around. It needs to stay focused on September 1944. Consider writing a separate article on the "Soft underbelly" controversy. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  21:41, 27 September 2021 (UTC)

I'm not against altering the structure. See if I can summarise:

Hawkeye7  (discuss)  21:55, 27 September 2021 (UTC)
 * The Background current contains two introductory paragraphs. The first sets the scene, the second introduces the players. Then there is a paragraph each on British and American objectives. So it matches your structure, but is there more that should be said here? Subheadings?
 * Are you proposing that this be followed by a section on logistics?
 * The Montgomery proposal section is already very short.
 * Give Bradley/Patton proposal a short section of its own?
 * SHAEF perspective?
 * Eisenhower decision?

Also: British logistics in the Siegfried Line campaign is currently up for review at WikiProject Military history/Assessment/British logistics in the Siegfried Line campaign. Consider contributing a review. Hawkeye7  (discuss)  21:57, 27 September 2021 (UTC)


 * I think we are substantially in agreement, on almost everything. However there are a few key points where we might still differ:


 * You seem to be saying that the "controversy" lasted only in September 1944, and the article should focus only on that month. However it is very clear that the controversy between Ike and Churchill continued to the end of the war, it really flared up publicly after the war, and it continues in some places even today. The full extent should be covered here.
 * I only meant the controversy about the events of September. Debate continued, and is covered in the final section. Much of the wind has gone out of it since the end of the Cold War though. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  19:50, 29 September 2021 (UTC)


 * As I see it, there are two core aspects, which obviously overlap. One, could the war have been ended in 1944 if Monty was given control of all resources and allowed to do his narrow-front attack to Berlin; and Two – would the subsequent Cold War have been easier if the western Allies consequently beat the USSR to Berlin?


 * Sure.


 * All evidence suggests that a narrow-front attack to Berlin in September – or anytime subsequent – would have failed badly, and that casualties would have far exceeded what was actually suffered to end the war – as bad as those casualties were. All evidence suggests that capturing Berlin was not possible, but that if it had happened, the Yalta agreements would have been enforced anyway, and the Cold War would not have changed for the better. In fact if Britain had made a military pitch against Stalin, the Cold War would probably have been much worse – and may even have turned into a Hot War – with Britain getting crushed. This is not properly explained yet, and these issues are at the core of the topic.


 * The evidence does not point that way. The first phase would have been the advance on the Ruhr. It is possible that its earlier capture might have shortened the war. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  19:50, 29 September 2021 (UTC)


 * We would need very strong sources to say that "the US made little effort to avoid losses". I have seen sources that are totally to the contrary.
 * So we're not going to say that. Just the British aversion, for which French pp. 23-24, D'Este pp. 261-268. This allowed the Americans to be more aggressive. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  19:50, 29 September 2021 (UTC)


 * I think the Background section needs to be cleaned up, and more added. The first paragraph can certainly be retained, but aspects like Operation Fortitude, or the Associated Press correspondent etc may be colorful but they are not relevant to the topic. On the other hand there is more Overlord material which must be added into the Background section, such as the unexpected speed with which the German defense retired after Falaise, and the impact thereof on the Allied supply chain, as well as a lot more about logistics. Logistics were a key decision-driver at this point. Some of this material is already scattered elsewhere in the article, and merely needs to be concentrated in the Background section.


 * Okay. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  19:50, 29 September 2021 (UTC)


 * The reason for moving some stuff around is to put the background facts in the Background section, as they applied to all the "proposals", and leaving things as is does not give readers a clear idea of what really underpinned the various decisions.


 * The separate sections for the Monty Proposal, Bradley Proposal and Ike Response should not contain background material, this should be moved to the "joint" background section.


 * Sure. I still think a separate logistics section is warranted, but it's up to you whether it should be before or after the proposals. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  19:50, 29 September 2021 (UTC)


 * It's a stretch to say that the Ruhr was "encircled by narrow thrusts". The US 9th Army ground around the northern reaches of the Ruhr, and the US 1st Army ground around the southern reaches. Simultaneously the British 2nd Army provided cover on the northern flank with their general advance, the US 3rd Army provided cover on the southern flank with their general advance, and the US 7th Army was advancing in parallel further south, engaging whatever resources the Germans might have had left down there. That is the very definition of a broad-front advance.


 * Ike knew in August already that the Germans were not going to simply collapse in 1944, and he said so publicly. See eg here


 * That's a great find; I don't have that book. It should be added to the article. Hawkeye7   (discuss)  19:50, 29 September 2021 (UTC)


 * A separate article on the "Soft underbelly" controversy is a good idea – definitely one for the near future. I'm not sure it was a "controversy" as such, rather than just a clash between British long-term objectives and US medium-term objectives. However let's clean up this article first – it is easily done.


 * I will look at the British Logistics article when time permits - thanks for pointing this out.


 * Wdford (talk) 21:23, 28 September 2021 (UTC)
 * One last question: the article is already a Good Article and an A class article. Is it your intention to take it to FAC? Hawkeye7   (discuss)  19:50, 29 September 2021 (UTC)


 * Certainly the early capture of the Ruhr "might" have shortened the war. It would certainly have disrupted war production, although the bombing was already wreaking havoc on the factories and the civilians. Whenever Montgomery pushed for a narrow front advance on Berlin, Ike always told him that we should take the Ruhr first, and then we can talk about Berlin.
 * When the US armies attacked the Siegfried Line at Aachen, they had the Ruhr as their objective. However even after Aachen fell, capturing the Ruhr was still impossible – partly due to the fierce German resistance, and partly because Antwerp was not yet receiving cargo.
 * The Ruhr is a huge and heavily populated area. It is very spread out, and a narrow thrust would not have been effective. It was also heavily defended, by in excess of 400,000 troops, and the Ardennes assault force was gathering nearby. In September Monty did not have the logistics to push enough force forward to capture and hold the Ruhr, far less advance to Berlin.
 * Achieving FAC would be very nice indeed. However it is my current intention just to clarify and expand the material. Once that is done, I'm sure even more issues will present themselves. However, every journey begins with the first step. We begin today :) Wdford (talk) 14:06, 3 October 2021 (UTC)


 * I have done most of what I had intended, as a first phase. A lot of polishing remains to be done. Then we should fix the lead as well - it is not a good reflection of the article. Wdford (talk) 21:07, 3 October 2021 (UTC)


 * Still polishing. In addition I would like to add this issue as a final section before "Postwar". I see it being closely related to the overall narrow-thrust controversy, where Monty wanted to "thrust" to Berlin, and almost certainly it contributed to the subsequent fuss. See pages 94 and 95 here . Wdford (talk) 16:57, 4 October 2021 (UTC)

I have tweaked the lead section, and apart from Churchill's nagging in 1945 about beating the Soviets to Berlin (which he included in his memoirs as well), I think its basically finished. What do you think still needs to be done before attempting FAC? Wdford (talk) 16:25, 18 October 2021 (UTC)