Talk:Burden of proof (philosophy)/Archive 1

agnostic position
How is "I don't believe that X is true" an agnostic position? An agnostic position is "I don't know if X is true".--178.203.192.197 (talk) 16:05, 12 January 2014 (UTC)
 * Agreed. Improper use of the word -- and it makes an already convoluted explanation even more confusing. --&mdash;  Rhododendrites talk  |  18:17, 12 January 2014 (UTC)

Rewording for clarity
I took a stab at rewording some of the sections for clarity. Hope someone will correct me if I've changed the meaning in a detrimental way, but I hope you'll do something to improve the text other than revert. --&mdash;  Rhododendrites talk  |  19:05, 12 January 2014 (UTC)

Moved Content
This page was created in an effort to distinguish between the quite disparate Legal Burden of Proof, and the Philosophic Burden of Proof. After discussing this on the talk page for "Burden of Proof", it was decided that we would reduce the Burden of Proof article to a short article on the general meaning, migrate all the actual content to this new article called Philosophic Burden of Proof and to another new article called Legal Burden of Proof, then link to these 2 new articles from the abbreviated old one. I've only taken the 1st step in creating this page as I write. Philocentric (talk) 16:56, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

I've now completed the entire migration project Philocentric (talk) 17:20, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

Dissension
It was noted that someone had appended an essay dismissive of the notion of Burden of Proof. It seemed to be focused on arguments centered around religious issues. I'm not sure if a 3rd category of Burden of Proof that is focused on religious issues is warranted, but this can be discussed. In any event, because burden of proof is thought to be a central concept thrown about on many controversial topics, it would not be proper in the article to instantiate the application of burden of proof with any extant controversy. Philocentric (talk) 17:29, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

This entire article has some major problems. It needs a re-write. Look for the word "often" and try not to puke.

This is a recipe for groupthink -- that is, if something is widely believed it does not necessarily mean that the group is right. In cases of unjustified group belief in ideas that are provably false (demonstrable myth), the burden of proof is a ridiculous idea, as it tends to reinforce groupthink/myth. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.45.14.103 (talk) 22:11, 28 August 2010 (UTC)

Determination of the Holder of the Burden of Proof
This is not very well defined. It would be more apt and succinct if it was said that the burden of proof lies on the more extraordinary or exceptional claim. For instance there are negative claims, "the sun did not rise in London at any time yesterday" is more deserving of the burden of proof then that claim's counterpart. --Ursus Lapideus (talk) 07:39, 3 March 2010 (UTC)
 * How is what you've described different from what is described in "Holder..."? Piratejosh85 (talk) 20:51, 3 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I just made a tweak to "Holder...". What feedback do you Gentlemen have? Philocentric (talk) 07:46, 5 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I'm fine with it. I'll just move some of the commas around--Ursus Lapideus (talk) 07:54, 5 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I also moved a "that", just grammar.--Ursus Lapideus (talk) 08:01, 5 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Thanks. I'm preparing other modifications and references now. I hope to get these up within a week. Cheers. Philocentric (talk) 05:44, 6 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Cool. Looks great.  Piratejosh85 (talk) 23:09, 6 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I tweaked and referenced. Feel free to clean up, modify or protest. ;) Philocentric (talk) 09:15, 8 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I protest! Just kidding :)  Looks great.  Keep up the dilligent, great work, Philocentric Piratejosh85 (talk) 18:14, 8 March 2010 (UTC)

The quote from the source of footnote 3 does not refer to ontologically positive claims, thereby invalidating the reference. Footnote 4 does not establish that the single individual referred to holds a "typical" view. 76.95.5.37 (talk) 04:11, 9 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Thanks. I moved these 2 references to more appropriate contexts. Philocentric (talk) 03:29, 10 March 2010 (UTC)

Tone or Style
As of this comment, we still have a box header to the article stating that we may need to clean up the "tone or style". Any suggestions on this? Who determines when this box header can be removed? Philocentric (talk) 03:32, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * It seems User:79.67.246.166 put up that box.   It seems like he has a very short history on wikipedia, spanning only two months, and in fact, the posting of that box was his first edit.  []  So, i'm not sure the box is completely appropriate.  I think someone should review the style guide (I don't know where it is), re-read this page, and take down the box.Piratejosh85 (talk) 06:45, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * It looks like the style and tone guidelines are found at the following link.. Since I am a heavy contributor to the actual content, perhaps someone else could give it a look over and make changes/suggestion so we can remove the box. Philocentric (talk) 07:49, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I'll do it. But I can't get it done until the end of tomorrow, so it's going to have to wait two days.  Piratejosh85 (talk) 17:57, 10 March 2010 (UTC)
 * okay, it's done, but w/ much more. See below.

Tone or style revision, and much more
Okay, first off, I did the tone revision. There wasn't much to do there. Mostly, it was organizing to place important things up front. I also removed talk that sounded too personal and talk that sounded like a guidebook. I also did quite a bit more. I'm going to explain it all without differentiating what was tone work and what I did just thinking it was plain better.

lead
I added concepts from below to the lead to make it represent more of the article.

Asymmetry
I renamed this section because that's what it seemed to be about. It also didn't seem to be very unified. I tried to pull it together into one body. In essence I tried to unite the section under the principles that the two main things affecting the burden asymmetry are: conventional wisdom and a claim's status as ontologically positive or negative. Also, some other information from other sections found its way into this section because it seemed to fit here. This was by far the most drastically edited section and represents quite a bit of new work.

The value
I moved this section up. It seems like the value of the topic of the page should be moved up so that readers know why it's important. It seems to be very well writen. So, I just added a lead and a counterpoint or when it isn't necessary. As a note, I totally deleted the examples in metaphysics section and put the little useful information here. That little useful information now comprises the "when not necessary" section.

The fallacy of demanding negative proof
This section seemed like it was simply stapled on de facto. So, I took out all the redundant info (90%) and fleshed out what the fallacy actually is.

Examples in Science
Left untouched.

Examples in Metaphysics
I totally deleted this section because it seemed like a reitreration of what the page had already said, albiet couched in philosophic terms. I took the tiny bit of unique and useful information and stuck it into the earlier section "the value..." under "when not nec..." The preserved text was: "For claims outside the realm of logical possibility, burden of proof need not be invoked. If a claim contains an absurd or illogical concept such as the claim of a square circle, the entire claim can be dismissed on the grounds of logical incoherence without any need to invoke burden of proof."

any other questions?
just ask: i'm puting this summary together after I did the edits. And, as per the initial reason for the edit, I've removed the box in question Piratejosh85 (talk) 02:31, 11 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Thanks! I'm going back tomorrow with my own tweaks. Philocentric (talk) 08:16, 11 March 2010 (UTC)

WP:Cir. & Misplaced Quotes
The quote in footnote 5 doesn't refer to 'ontologically positive' claims and footnote 4 is WP:CIRCULAR. 76.95.5.37 (talk) 04:20, 14 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I moved the footnotes in question to more appropriate locations. Philocentric (talk) 07:00, 14 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Eh? They're the same as they were before and the circularity violates policy regardless of where it's moved. I can remove the citations and footnotes if you'd prefer. 76.95.5.37 (talk) 01:19, 15 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Sure. Remove anything you deem inappropriate. If you know of any other relevant references, that would be much appreciated. And if you could get a username so we know whom to address in the future about related issues, that would be great. Thanks. Philocentric (talk) 04:50, 15 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Instead of just deletion, could you work on cites you feel are better? Piratejosh85 (talk) 18:01, 15 March 2010 (UTC)

Clarification
Piratejosh85, I'm not clear about the sentence "It is only when one begins to form beliefs or is attempting to persuade others to form beliefs, that the burden of proof is activated." Could you elaborate on how you feel BoP contributes to the formation of beliefs? Cheers. Philocentric (talk) 01:42, 16 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Sure. Let me do my best.  Although, let me admit at the outside, I don't fully understand your question.


 * First, I want to be very clear about the meaning of that sentence. You asked how the BOP "contributes" to the formation of beliefs.  The BOP doesn't directly "contribute" to the formation of beliefs; the BOP doesn't facilitate the formation of beliefs.  Rather, the BOP directs, or specifically, constrains the formation of beliefs to those which fit within the demands on logic.


 * Next, as another section points out, one who holds no beliefs about the topic and is not attempting to do so cannot be subject to the BOP. As I said earlier, the BOP doesn't facilitate the formation of beliefs, but merely constrains the formation of beliefs.  It keeps us from forming whatever beliefs occure to us or are presented to us, without regard for the evidence.  As such a mechanism, one who is not attempting to form a belief cannot be subject to constraints on the same.


 * Next, maybe you have a question about why I used "form beliefs." The answer to this would be I'm sure that a more technically correct word for "form beliefs" in this sentence would be "aquire knowledge."  The sentence then would be

"'It is only when one begins to form knowledge or is attempting to persuade others to form knowledge, that the burden of proof is activated.'"


 * This sentence is a correct formulation as can be seen by comparing it to the definition in the lead:

Philosophic Burden of Proof is the obligation on a party in an epistemic dispute to provide sufficient warrant for their position.


 * I believe that "their possition" is so clearly equal to the "knowledge" they advocate, the proposition goes without further proof. So, then, the question remains of whether "form a belief" is equal to "aquire knowledge."  In a technical sence, no it is not.  According to the popular definition, knowledge is a statement (i) justified (ii) true and (iii) believed.  In a strict sence, beliefe is not equal to knowledge.  So, on the one hand, I agree that "form a belief" is not technically correct.


 * However, I still like "form a belief" for the following reasons. It seems that popular use of form a belief is equal to aquire knowledge.  Few people talk about forming beliefs absent any justification or evidence of its truth.  Even the religious talk about justification and truth (though scientists dislike their forms of justification and truth).  So, I used "form a belief" as a stand-in for aquire knowledge.  I think it's justfied.


 * Maybe not though. And, I admit, I don't fully understand exactly what the question is.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by Piratejosh85 (talk • contribs) 20:29, 16 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Thanks for that clarification, Josh. I'm going to suggest that when you say the BOP "...keeps us from forming whatever beliefs occur to us or are presented to us, without regard for the evidence", that this may more reflect "standards of evidence" accepted by a private mind rather than 2 parties engaged in an epistemic dispute. While standards of evidence certainly play a role in BOP, in order to keep our article on BOP focused, I'd like to suggest we eliminate the mention of the formation of beliefs. This is largely because BOP involves 2 parties whereas standards of evidence reflect only a private commitment. I think it may be too indirect and confusing to the readers. How do you feel about this? Philocentric (talk) 01:38, 17 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Hmm. Good point.  I see the distinction you're trying to make.  I'de like to point out that when one forms "a private commitment," this is tantamount to engaging in a sort of private, internal debate in which a single mind is forced to play both sides of the argument.  In this regard, BOP still might make sense.  However, I can see the distinction you're making and I'de be fine with the change, especially if you feel it would clarify the matter. Piratejosh85 (talk) 02:30, 17 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Thanks. Let me ponder it for a day, then make a few changes. Cheers. Philocentric (talk) 03:11, 17 March 2010 (UTC)

This article smacks of personal opinion in essay form
Take the Asymmetry section. It consists of a long essay on who has the burden of proof and why in terms of ontological commitment and claims that the person who claims "Fairies exist" has more burden than the person who claims "Fairies do not exist." This appears perfectly silly to me, but perhaps the claim has nonetheless been defended by respectable authors. Unfortunately, I can't find a single citation in that section. Instead, the section comes off as a skeptical crutch, so that the person who claims that there are no fairies somehow has a lesser requirement to argue for his claim than his credulous counterpart.

The text also seems to be confused about the difference between the burden of proof and what counts as proof. The person who claims "Fairies probably exist" has no less burden (i.e., normative requirement) to prove his claim than the person who claims "Fairies exist." The difference is merely that the difficulty of proving the former statement is less than the difficulty of proving the latter (presumably). Nonetheless, the burdens are equal: if one asserts P, then he ought to be prepared to give evidence for P.

Let's have some citations for these dubious claims about asymmetry. Until then, this section should be considered WP:OR and we should consider removing it. Phiwum (talk) 13:26, 19 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Hi Phiwum. Could you use the example on fairies to explain what it is about asymmetry that you find dubious? Thanks. Philocentric (talk) 18:31, 19 March 2010 (UTC)


 * First, let's make clear: that I find the claim of asymmetry dubious is largely irrelevant. My opinion is worth doodlysquat.  What matters is whether there is any published account of this asymmetry that agrees with the picture painted here.
 * As far as my own personal (and irrelevant) opinion: I see no reason at all to believe that the person claiming fairies do exist has a stronger duty to provide evidence for his claim than the person claiming that there are no fairies. In each case, a claim is made and in each case, evidence should be provided by the claimant.  In fact, the person claiming that "probably, fairies do not exist" has exactly the same burden (that is, normative requirement) to provide evidence for his claim.  The only difference is that the evidence needed to prove his claim is rather less than the evidence needed to prove either the existential claim (we must find a fairy or evidence thereof) or its negation (we must somehow prove or give good evidence that there are no fairies anywhere).
 * Anyway, these comments are only half-thoughts that should not be taken too seriously. Let's dwell on the real issues regarding the Wikipedia article.  Is there any published source that analyzes burden of proof as this article does?  I don't know of any. Phiwum (talk) 19:10, 19 March 2010 (UTC)


 * I would like to begin by saying to Phiwum that I find your tone totally revolting. It is not the tone of one who works cooperativly, but one who bullies his opinion to the fore by force of language.  I say this in the most accusatory manner possible, alleging a total violation of WP:civility.  Statements such as "Let's have some citations for these dubious claims," and "this article smacks..." could be reformulated to convey the same information without the verbal edge.  I mention this at the outset to simply state my distaste and move on to the actual question of the content of the article.


 * IMHO, there is a good reason for the asymmetry as discussed. On the other hand, I would like to qualify my endorsement of the discussion by saying it is a veiled discussion not of some preexisting real asymmetry, but rather a discussion of the fact that BOP is never actually perfectly symmetrical as applied.


 * I believe that a proposition given in a "beliefs clean room," or one taken in total isolation of either preexisting beliefs or social norms would entail a perfectly even BOP such as the one you suggest. However, the asymmetry discussion affirms the reality that this simply is rarely the case - preexisting beliefs always taint the allocation of the BOP.  So, the proposition that fairies are real entails an equal BOP.  But as soon as this is uttered as a proposition for actual consideration, other knowledge comes into play.  This could be a priori knowledge (if there is such a thing) or a posteriori knowledge (scientific, folk wisdom, etc.).  The asymmetry discussion affirms the inevitable fact that as soon as a proposition is posited for consideration, past knowledge steps in to affect the BOP.


 * I would like to finish by noting that even even in a case in which a totally novel claim was posited for adoption (i.e. one in which no prior knowledge existed) society, by normative convention, has elected to place the initial BOP on him making the ontologically positive claim. Of course this has been criticised; any philosopher worth his salt is aware of the criticisms with this convention.  But it is the convention: the BOP does lie w/ him making the ontologically positive claim.  I find these to be good reasons why the burden is asymmetrical.  Thoughts?


 * Lastly, I would not want to be guilty of that of which I have complained. I would like to carry this discussion on in a civilized manner.  Piratejosh85 (talk) 01:16, 20 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Sorry you find my tone uncivil. In any case, I don't care to comment on your opinions regarding the burden, since these opinions don't have much to do with the real problem with the section, namely, the lack of sourced arguments.  You and I could argue back and forth all day, but these arguments really have no bearing on the future direction of the article (though they may be personally satisfying and interesting). Phiwum (talk) 04:56, 20 March 2010 (UTC)


 * I have been doing some research and have added 3 references (NASA, Lewis and Grice), but I hope to do a bit more research on this over the weekend. I'm giving Phiwum the benefit of a doubt and am taking his comments as constructive criticism. Philocentric (talk) 02:04, 20 March 2010 (UTC)


 * I will try to have a look at your references some time soon. I appreciate the effort. Phiwum (talk) 04:56, 20 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Hi again, Phiwum. Could you cite a few sources for your take on burden of proof. I may be able to access them and compare them to what I've already researched. Thanks. Philocentric (talk) 02:45, 20 March 2010 (UTC)


 * I have no references, which is why I said that my opinions are irrelevant for the purposes of the article. To be honest, I have never seen a philosophical discussion on the burden of proof &mdash; have you?  I imagine they must exist, but I've missed them.  (A cursory glance does not reveal whether the current list of references are really about burden of proof.)
 * To be sure, the fact that I haven't seen a proper philosophical discussion on burden of proof is slim evidence of anything. Phiwum (talk) 04:56, 20 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I've located a couple of papers that deal with the topic including this one available publically (http://www.stanford.edu/~bailenso/papers/informal.pdf.) You might have better access to such papers, and if you do and have time to search them and pass any relevant papers on, that would be much appreciated. Some of what I wrote was perhaps tenuously extrapolated from various sources, but seem to me be an accurate representation of the general stance. If you disagree, I certainly see nothing wrong with you deleting what you deem insufficiently substantiated, and letting us take another shot at it with you on board. I think I'll have a bit more time this next week for research and writing. Cheers. Philocentric (talk) 06:33, 21 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I've only skimmed the linked paper, but it does seem interesting and likely relevant to our topic. Note, however, that it is about psychology and not philosophy.  The authors describe how people have apparently placed the burden in various situations, not how they should place the burden.  Surely, we can all agree that the guy who "goes first" has (or should have) no greater burden than the guy who goes second, but according to these authors, nonetheless people seem to respond otherwise when questioned.
 * My point is that if we cite this paper, we have to make clear that it is descriptive, not prescriptive.
 * As far as whether the asymmetry section is, as you say, "an accurate representation of the general stance", I'll have to wait and see what citations we can find. I hope that it is not generally accepted by logicians, rhetoricians and epistemologists that existential claims require a greater burden than universal claims &mdash; at least, I can't imagine why this should be so.  In my experience, claims like this seem common in non-academic discussions but I haven't seen a published defense of such a claim (though I wouldn't be too surprised to find one or two).
 * I am not very active in research, but I have some access to academic journals and the like. If you find a citation you'd like me to check out, let me know. Phiwum (talk) 14:23, 21 March 2010 (UTC)
 * This looks like a good starting point for a reference for this article (though whether it says anything about asymmetry is unclear from the abstract). The author (Douglas Walton) is a well-respected philosopher.  I'll try to remember and look it up tomorrow. Phiwum (talk) 19:01, 21 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Check out Walton's site for freely downloadable papers that may serve some purpose for this article. A few seem to be about burdens of proof.  I don't think I'll have any opportunity to really look at this stuff for quite some time, I'm afraid, but I hope you can find something worthwhile there (as well as pointers to related articles by other authors).  I hope as well that these articles are relatively accessible. Phiwum (talk) 21:08, 21 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Thanks for that link, Phiwum. Any other opinions you have or research you can dig up is also highly appreciated. I'm juggling work and a new girlfriend, but I'll see about getting some articles read and getting started on a rewrite of the article soon. Cheers. Philocentric (talk) 10:21, 22 March 2010 (UTC)

I too am a little confused regarding the distinction between positive claims. I'm really not trying to argue from authority here, but in all my studies as a philosophy major I've never come across where the burden is exclusive to a particular type of claim. I've never seen anyone argue that an ontological claim somehow has a greater burden than an epistemological one. If you say that fairies exist or that fairies are illusionary, I really don't see how you can make the claim that someone the former has a larger burden.AsadullahAli (talk) 03:02, 9 April 2010 (UTC)


 * In all my studies as a Philosophy PhD in a Logic program, I've never seen any such claim either. I think this article is pure nonsense as it stands. Phiwum (talk) 19:18, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

Fallacy of demanding negative proof?
I can't see anything to this fallacy, aside from Argument from Ignorance. The term "Fallacy of Demanding Negative Proof" seems to be a wordy neologism invented by someone unfamiliar with the historic term "Argument from Ignorance", near as I can figger.

Is there any good reason to keep the less well-known term as primary and pretend that "Argument from Ignorance" is a special case, as the article currently does? Phiwum (talk) 13:31, 19 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Yes, this "fallacy of demanding negative proof" could be deemed a bit redundant since it is covered indirectly in other parts of the article. However, it is a commonly committed fallacy, and I doubt that "argument from ignorance" captures the entire essence of this fallacy. What is it you specifically recommend about "fallacy of demanding negative proof"? I agree that the section is unclear, but would like to clearly understand your point before making any changes. Thanks. Philocentric (talk) 18:54, 19 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Why don't you tell me how this fallacy differs from argument from ignorance? I can see no difference.  Argument from ignorance is the fallacy of concluding X on the basis that there is no refutation of X.  In other words, I will assert X unless you can provide a proof that X is not true.  If that's not the same thing as the fallacy of demanding negative proof, then I've no idea what the latter fallacy means. Phiwum (talk) 18:59, 19 March 2010 (UTC)


 * I've a few points to add.
 * First, a wikipedia redirect seems to agree that the falacy of demanding negative proof is the same thing as the argument from ignorance. See Negative proof.
 * Second, I don't agree that "The term 'Fallacy of Demanding Negative Proof' seems to be a wordy neologism invented by someone unfamiliar with the historic term 'Argument from Ignorance'." Rather, I find it to be an apt description of the problem, especially considering the title of the entry refers not to ignorance, but to proof.  Further, the term fallacy of demanding negative proof returns many results on wikipedia, and is refered to often.
 * Third, I find this to be a vital part of the article. The article is about the need to present proof.  As the section points out, the falacy is the doppleganger of the BOP.  As is written, it shed light on the essential relationship between the two: "The fallacy of demanding negative proof is a fallacious inversion of the burden of proof principle." Piratejosh85 (talk) 01:25, 20 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I agree that it's an important part of the article. I'm merely suggesting a terminology change.  Is there any difference between "Fallacy of Demanding Negative Proof" (hereafter, FODNP) and "Argument from ignorance" (hereafter, AFI)?  If so, please enlighten me.  If not, AFI is clearly the more conventional term.  (See, for instance, the following two Google Scholar searchers: one and two.)
 * In the spirit of disclosure, I should point out that I redirected Negative Proof to AOI some time ago, for reasons that can be found at Talk:Negative proof. Phiwum (talk) 05:07, 20 March 2010 (UTC)


 * It might elucidate what Phiwum feels is inappropriate if he could give an example where demanding a negative proof is not a fallacy. Thanks. Philocentric (talk) 02:12, 20 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I'm not sure why you think I've said demanding a negative proof is not a fallacy. My claim is that the "fallacy of demanding negative proof" is simply a non-traditional name for argument from ignorance.  We do the readers no favor when we use an uncommon name and then give the impression that argument from ignorance is a special case of demanding negative proof. Phiwum (talk) 05:07, 20 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I think I understand your perspective, Phiwum. I'll go in and modify that later this week. Cheers. Philocentric (talk) 06:22, 21 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Wonderful! Thanks for volunteering to put in the work.  That's more than I expected.  Phiwum (talk) 14:25, 21 March 2010 (UTC)

It's been a little while, so I've decided to make the edits myself. Since the previous text relied rather heavily on the alleged asymmetry regarding "ontologically positive claims" and this view remains uncited in the relevant literature, I've rather drastically pruned the section, removing all controversial claims and stating only the obvious. If someone can find a source discussing this asymmetry, please re-add the material. Phiwum (talk) 02:24, 6 April 2010 (UTC)
 * Thanks, Phiwum. I've been distracted recently, but hope to get back to a bit of research on BOP soon. Cheers. Philocentric (talk) 01:11, 13 April 2010 (UTC)

I just want to make a side note that this fallacy does not apply to axioms. —Preceding unsigned comment added by AsadullahAli (talk • contribs) 03:54, 9 April 2010 (UTC)

Adler's discussion of burdens.
I removed the following text:
 * (Though some, such as Adler, contend that challengers to the ontologically positive claim also carry some, though a lighter, burden. ) 

When one reads Adler (I've only skimmed the relevant page), it appears that he is speaking of one's "duty"(?) to believe what another says, absent a "specific reason to challenge him". There is nothing here about "ontologically positive claims" at all, but rather that the hearer (and not, surprisingly, the speaker) has some sort of moral burden of refuting the claim or accepting it.

I've placed this note here partly to explain my deletion, but more importantly to suggest that Adler's text appears interesting and relevant and perhaps should be cited &mdash; but we should do so accurately and with context. It's not about ontologically positive claims and it's not (I think) about epistemological or rhetorical issues, so much as about morality and trust in accepting the testimony of others. Phiwum (talk) 03:23, 6 April 2010 (UTC)

-- -- References -- -- I'm brand new at this, so please excuse me if I don't follow the protocols. I am writing a paper on the features of a convincing case, and have found the material on this page ideal. it's just that I would like to find the most authoritative possible reference from the conventional literature to cite for the statement at the very start of the article:“This burden …demands an amount of evidence.. To be considered adequate, this evidence must be: “… established or accepted by convention or community standards.”

at the moment there is not a citation at this point.

I would be much obliged for any help with this.

User:Sounder91 —Preceding unsigned comment added by Sounder91 (talk • contribs) 08:53, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

Several months on, and the article still reads as original research.
No significant changes in the Asymmetry section, I see. No clear indication where the table comes from, nor what authors support this view that "ontologically positive" claims require a greater burden of proof than their counterparts. There are only two citations in this long section, and it's not at all clear that either of these authors speak at all about ontologically positive claims, rather than conventional knowledge.

I have considered deleting the section entirely, pending some proof that it is not WP:OR. I have not done so (yet), because I really don't want to get too deeply involved in this article. Phiwum (talk) 20:06, 19 August 2010 (UTC)


 * DONE. Phiwum (talk) 19:22, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

Problems, but still relevant
User:Becritical has condemned more than half this article. I believe that some it should be saved. He's right that there's problems with parts. But that means they should be fixed, not just deleted. For example, the discussion on the the argument from ignorance is pertinent to this article. I believe some of the old article, last at 3 Feb 2011, should be saved.Piratejosh85 (talk) 03:15, 7 February 2011 (UTC)

Argument from Ignorance Revisited
First, I would like to state that this is the very first time I've contributed anything to Wikipedia, so please forgive me if I do something wrong. With that said, I felt the need to revisit the argument from last year about whether demanding negative proof is different from argument from ignorance; it is my understanding that there is a difference, which I will attempt to elucidate.

In the argument from ignorance (AFI from hereafter), the basic gist is that if X lacks sufficient proof to the positive, it is presumed false, and if X lacks sufficient proof to the negative, it is presumed true. This is simply a case of the observer making a judgment on the truth of a given argument based upon their perspective of the evidence, and then affirming whether or not the burden was met, thereby arbitrarily assigning a black and white truth value. The AFI does not reference the form specifically taken by the person making the argument, which is where demanding negative proof (DNP) comes into play. In the sense of the judgment on the argument's truth value, yes, the arguer is making an implicit or even explicit assumption in truth due to a lack of negative proof. However, because this is a fallacy specifically related to the person making an argument, I would suggest that there are salient differences.

Consider the following argument: Person A claims that gravity exists, while Person B disbelieves that claim. Person A says, "Prove that gravity does not exist." Now, notice the implication here: if Person B cannot prove that gravity does not exist - and proving a negative is a difficult thing to do in the best of circumstances - then he will have weakened his own argument, regardless of the proof that Person A has to validate their positive claim. If Person B says that he cannot, then he must either commit an AFI himself by conceding his own position, or else he must insist that even though he cannot prove that gravity exists, he still holds that belief. Because a belief without proof is seldom taken seriously, his position in the argument has been neutralized, despite the fact that his only position is skepticism about the positive claim that was initially made. If he demands proof from the person making the positive claim, then that person can either commit another AFI, or else can give a weak or illogical argument, and still be superior in the argument.

In the above situation, the DNP acts as a way to neutralize the opposition without actually defending one's own position. The arguer never has to claim that because there is no proof otherwise that their own positive is necessarily or even probably true, because the damage has already been done. This is in the same type of poor arguing as straw men, or red herrings - it says, "look at the other side - they have nothing!" Evading the burden of proof is a poor form of argument, and is nothing more than shifting the focus away from the actual assertion.

Unfortunately for me, the above is all original research, so I can't add it myself. Perhaps if someone who is more familiar with how Wikipedia works agrees with the above, they will know what to do with it. I will assist where I am able, if anyone is willing to point me in the right direction. VertigoPhase (talk) 04:01, 18 February 2011 (UTC)


 * I must say that I'm unpersuaded that there is a logical difference between these "two" fallacies, though there may be a rhetorical difference. But, no matter, since, as you say, this is original research.  We'd need some reliable source drawing the line where you suggest. Phiwum (talk) 04:26, 19 February 2011 (UTC)
 * All right, I've done some digging, and have found a few things. First, this online textbook says here that "The burden of proof is always on the person making an assertion or proposition. Shifting the burden of proof, a special case of argumentum ad ignorantium, is the fallacy of putting the burden of proof on the person who denies or questions the assertion being made.  The source of the fallacy is the assumption that something is true unless proven otherwise." This would suggest that, although the foundation is in AFI, it is distinct enough to at least warrant a mention in this specific iteration. Now, my question for you is, do you agree that this justifies a section that properly conveys the notion that, while the two are related, demanding negative proof is a distinct subset of the argument from ignorance? VertigoPhase (talk) 05:14, 23 February 2011 (UTC)
 * Wow, is this a late reply! Sorry for overlooking your post earlier.
 * I simply don't see how the quoted material supports the claim that demanding negative proof is notable enough as a subset of AFI to bother introducing in this article. Sorry, I just don't get how you infer that from a quotation that mentions AFI and not negative proof. Phiwum (talk) 13:57, 19 November 2012 (UTC)

I would like to remark that the formula "The burden of proof is always on the person making an assertion or proposition" is imprecise. "The gravity does not exist" and "the Moon is not made of blue cheeze" are both assertions/propositions. However I vaguely feel they are somehow different from the point of view of "burden of proof". 99.107.86.46 (talk) 18:57, 26 April 2011 (UTC)

Proposed Edits
The word [in the title] "Philosophic" is wrong, should be deleted:burden of proof is a Latin LAW principle that has been adopted in modern democracies and in epistemology. If you want to leave that article we ought to delete *philosophic* and add (fallacy) and/or [shifting the]. This article should be linked to the heading "[shifting the] burden of proof" which is now in red in the List of fallacies article. It is necessary also to correct the same mistake on the disambiguation page, Burden of proof leaving "legal" and correcting *philosphical*.

I believe it is necessary to make a new article "Onus probandi" to provide a right link to that heading in List of fallacies article. We can copy the current explanation there and then expand on the stub, relating it to the article "shifting the]burden of proof and to the "Legal burden of proof.- posted (with minor grammatical fixes) by Wikipelli on behalf of an IP editor. 93.43.231.129 (talk)


 * I agree since the scope of this article is clearly broader than philosophy. I agree, and would encourage you to do it. Piratejosh85 (talk) 18:25, 13 October 2011 (UTC)

Would it not make sense to amend the sentence "When debating any issue, there is an implicit burden of proof on the person asserting a claim" to "When debating any issue, there is an implicit burden of proof on the person asserting a POSITIVE claim" to circumvent the issue regarding the definition of AFI & make this point explicit from the outset? Darque Warrior13 (talk) 18:53, 6 June 2013 (UTC)
 * No, please don't try to make a distinction between so-called "positive" and "negative" claims regarding the burden of proof, absent some authoritative source supporting the distinction. I've seen a few folks claim that somehow positive propositions have a higher burden than negative, but I've never seen a single respected argument to this effect.
 * Honestly, the asymmetry seems to be a misplaced intuition, not an insightful principle, from where I sit.
 * Regardless, such claims require citation. phiwum (talk) 03:18, 14 September 2013 (UTC)

Contradiction in the article? / Proving a negative
The section Holder of the burden contains: "When debating any issue, there is an implicit burden of proof on the person asserting a claim."

Then, in the Proving a negative section: "If this negative assertion is in response to a claim made by another party in a debate, asserting the falsehood of the positive claim shifts the burden of proof from the party making the first claim to the one asserting its falsehood"

So the burden is on the person asserting EITHER A POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE CLAIM, but if it IS a positive claim and the response is a negative, the burden does move to the latter? How is this not contradictory? --&mdash;  Rhododendrites talk  |  19:05, 12 January 2014 (UTC)


 * Seems to me that both parties have a burden to prove whatever they are asserting. So, the guy that says, "X!" ought to give reasons to believe X, and the guy who responds, "NOT X!" ought to give reasons to disbelieve X.  The article currently gives the impression that, at any given time, only one of the disputants has a burden to prove his claims.
 * That said, my opinions don't matter much. We'd have to find a source that agrees with what I've said.  But you're right that the apparent contradiction needs to be fixed. Phiwum (talk) 12:32, 13 January 2014 (UTC)


 * So I agree the "Proving a negative" section has some problems. My revised version below corrects the problem that Rhododendrites and agrees with what you say (however it still does not have a source). Another problem with the section is the statement "When the assertion to prove is a negative claim, the burden takes the form of a negative proof, proof of impossibility, or mere evidence of absence." I believe this is incorrect. The claim "Pandas exist" is a positive claim, while the identical claim "It is NOT the case that pandas do NOT exist." is a negative claim. The point is, you can express any claim as a negative claim using double negation. See "You Can Prove a Negative" here http://www.skeptic.com/eskeptic/07-12-05/. What that means is, as noted above, "there is no logical distinction between positive and negative claims". So trying to support a negative claim does not imply that you have to use a proof of impossibility or evidence of absence. We could retitle the section "Proving nonexistence" or "Proving impossibility"? It also might be useful to add a section to explain the positive/negative claim issue that we are discussing.


 * Also I wanted to change the key sentence:


 * "When debating any issue, there is an implicit burden of proof on the person asserting a claim."


 * to


 * "When debating any issue, there is an implicit burden of proof on the person asserting the truth or falsity of a proposition."


 * This is so readers don't get confused about "claim" and "proposition" being used interchangeably. Also, it stresses that regardless of whether you claim a proposition is true or false, you still assume the burden of proof. It's so important to the article that I thought I would ask for feedback first. balljust (talk) 23:00, 6 April 2014 (UTC)


 * What would "trying to support a claim" with an odd-number of ontological negatives be other than the provision of evidence of absence? Or "trying to support a claim" with an even-number of ontological negatives be other than 'evidence of presence,' for that matter? 108.184.67.185 (talk) 04:55, 11 April 2014 (UTC)


 * I understand the point you are making and agree to an extent, but you are basically playing with the definition of a "negative claim". You are defining a "negative claim" to be "any claim have an odd-number of ontological negatives". By using "ontological" you only look at only claims about being/existence. By using "odd-number" you look at only claims about nonexistence. Then you make the point that if we are trying to prove a "negative claim" (now defined to be a claim about nonexistence) you must appeal to evidence of absence. I agree with you completely, but the problem is I'm not familiar with a standard definition of a "negative claim" and the article doesn't provide one. I was interpreting "It is NOT the case that pandas do NOT exist." to be a negative claim, but this would obviously conflict with your definition. My definition of negative claim is supported here http://www.skeptic.com/eskeptic/07-12-05/, which is about the only reference I could find (but I understand it is not the most academic). balljust (talk) 00:16, 19 April 2014 (UTC)

I found the "Proving a negative" section to be difficult to understand. Also, it contained a run-on sentence. Taking into account this discussion I propose the following rewording:

Change title to "Proving nonexistence"

When a person claims the nonexistence of something, satisfying the burden of proof requires a proof of impossibility or evidence of absence. Claims of nonexistence are often made in response to a claim of existence made by another party in a debate. However, both the person asserting nonexistence as well as the person asserting existence carry the burden of proof. The crucial distinction arises from the difference between the position "I do not believe that X exists", which does not carry the burden of proof, and the position "I believe that X does not exist", which does carry the burden of proof.

Let me know what you think. balljust (talk) 01:21, 2 April 2014 (UTC)

Ok I'll ask
"Philosophic burden of proof" returns precisely two hits on Google Scholar, both of which are scant mentions in books against religion (not that the subject of the books matters). I appreciate wanting to separate it from legal burden of proof, but Wikipedia requires the subject of the article to establish notability in significant reliable secondary sources (not just some of the substance of the subject's meaning).

While you can talk about various epistemological understandings of the burden of proof, isn't the broader subject more closely aligned to rhetoric, philosophy of science (scientific burden of evidence exists but redirects to scientific method which doesn't mention it in those terms), or both? Neither of those preclude mention of epistemological understandings, but this article seems to be going for something more specific than the generally understood term "burden of proof".

Apologies for creating three talk page sections at once :)

--&mdash;  Rhododendrites talk  |  19:10, 12 January 2014 (UTC)


 * I searched Google Scholar for "Burden of proof philosophy" and see a few relevant hits on the first page, i.e., philosophical discussions of the appropriate placement of the burden by respected philosophers like Walton. If your point is that the title of this page is a bit weird, because no one seems to really refer to a "Philosophic Burden of Proof", I'll readily concede the point.  But I think it's reasonable to have a discussion of prevailing views of the burden of proof from a philosophical/critical reasoning perspective -- at least insofar as we can produce a well-cited article that does a good job of presenting these views.
 * I have to say that the article is currently in much better shape than it has been previously. Phiwum (talk) 12:28, 13 January 2014 (UTC)

Illustrative Example
I added a new example that I found extremely helpful, when considering the topic of burden of proof. Let me know what you think. Balljust (talk) 02:06, 31 January 2014 (UTC)


 * Balljust, I'm having a problem with the statement "we are forced to either believe or not believe". This appears to be saying that believing there are an odd number of balls in the jar is a rational position in the absence of evidence. Isn't the only rational position in the absence of evidence to have no degree of belief or disbelief? Could you clarify? Philocentric (talk) 06:23, 23 March 2014 (UTC):


 * Philocentric, I'm not sure if I entirely understand what you mean. According to the law of excluded middle, we can construct an absolute dichotomy by giving the two options "X" and "not X". Here I have used "belief" and "not belief". They are absolute, discrete terms. The law of excluded middle guarantees that there is no third option, only "belief" or "not belief". The law of excluded middle means that it is impossible to be in the state of having "no degree of belief or disbelief". I want to clarify that "not believe" simply means the lack of belief and nothing more. "Not belief" in claim 1 does not imply or suggest "belief" in claim 2. Since there are only two options ("belief" or "not belief") per claim, there are a total of 4 possible positions a person could take on the two claims given in the article:


 * 1) "Belief" in Claim 1 and "Belief" in Claim 2: Always irrational due to the law of noncontradiction


 * 2) "Belief" in Claim 1 and "Not Belief" in Claim 2: Rational if you have evidence meeting the burden of proof for Claim 1


 * 3) "Not Belief" in Claim 1 and "Belief" in Claim 2: Rational if you have evidence meeting the burden of proof for Claim 2


 * 4) "Not Belief" in Claim 1 and "Not Belief" in Claim 2: Rational if you do not have evidence meeting the burden of proof for Claim 1 and you do not have evidence meeting the burden of proof for Claim 2 (this is where we should lie in the absence of any evidence)


 * Hopefully this is clear and let me know if you disagree. balljust (talk) 00:46, 2 April 2014 (UTC)


 * If by "Not Belief" you mean "believe to be false," then you would commit yourself to believing the logical negations of Claims 1 and 2 to be true both without justification and contra the law of noncontradiction at that. Ergo, I disagree. 108.184.67.185 (talk) 04:55, 11 April 2014 (UTC)


 * You've hit on the issue exactly! "Not believe" and "believe to be false" are distinct and separate positions. This is crucial to the concept of the burden of proof. Position 4 is the "I'm not sure" position. It's possible that I just don't have enough info to establish anything about the claim. The positions of "believing a claim to be false" and "believing a claim to be true" both carry the burden of proof. However, neither "not believing a claim to be false" nor "not believing a claim to be true" carry the burden of proof. Does this make sense to you? Should something to this effect be added to the article? balljust (talk) 17:32, 13 April 2014 (UTC)


 * Balljust, it sounds as if you are treating belief as binary; either one believes or they don't. We both agree that the truth values of propositions are discrete and binary; they are either true or they are not. But that holds only for the objective truth value of propositions. Epistemic actions are inherently subjective, and performed by fallible subjective beings who, if they wish to be rational, attempt to map their degree of belief to the degree of the evidence available to their fallible and finite minds. Confirming/disconfirming evidence for inductively assessed propositions inherently falls on a gradient. If belief is to rationally map to the evidence, it also must fall on a corresponding gradient. Right? Perhaps I'm not understanding your position. Does not belief for inductively-assessed propositions inherently fall on on a gradient since it must map to the degree of the evidence, evidence which can never reach the level of deductive proof? To reify the linguistic artifact of semantic binary categories of belief is to invert the proper relationship between the concept and the term employed to represent the concept, right? Terms don't inform our ontology, concepts do, right? Consider the words "like" and "dislike". The fact that they are semantically opposite and, on face value, categorical does not lead us to believe that aesthetic values must fall into only one of 2 boxes; either you like or dislike X. Right? In the same way, belief, if it is to be rational, inherently falls on a gradient, and can not be treated as if it were binary. But perhaps I misunderstood what you were trying to say. Philocentric (talk) 12:42, 22 April 2014 (UTC)


 * Your point is very tricky/good, so we should discuss it a bit. I'm going to divide my reply into three sections (but you can probably skip the first two):
 * 1) We also both agree that the truth values of propositions are discrete and binary; they are either true or they are not. Therefore we agree that the proposition "The number of gumballs is even" is either true or false. Do you also agree that the proposition "Jim believes the number of gumballs is even" is either true or false?
 * 2) How do you define "belief"? I definitely agree with you that, I am defining "belief" to be a discrete, binary quantity. I also agree that reality is super messy, but I disagree that belief “cannot be treated as if it were binary”. I think that, fundamentally, belief is something artificial that humans have invented because it is extremely useful. In reality humans map the sum of our experiences (and also technically genetics) to actions, like (experiences) -> (actions). Humans have invented the concept of beliefs and stuck it in between to produce (experiences) -> (beliefs) -> (actions). This enables us to ask questions like “Do you believe in evolution?” (hence, getting information about someone else’s brain state), rather than asking “What evidence concerning evolution have you experienced?” and then trying to guess how they will use those experiences. Basically, what I am saying is that any definition of “belief” that isn’t “the state of all the neurons in a person’s brain” will be an approximation to reality. We don’t define “belief” this way and instead choose to approximate reality because we find it to be more useful for predicting the actions of others. You probably wouldn’t protest if someone told you “I don’t believe unicorns exist”, even though, strictly speaking, the statement isn’t justified given an analog definition of “believe”. I claim many definitions of “belief”, both binary and analog, are commonly used and are generally distinguished by context. The analog definition is a better approximation to reality, but sometimes the binary one is more useful.
 * 3) Let’s look at the Dillahunty example and try to adjust it for an analog definition of "belief”. Basically, I think it still works if we cast the analog definition into a binary one. Like if we thought “belief” could be represented by a single real number between 0 and 100 (so complete disbelief would be 0% belief and certainty would be 100% belief), then everywhere in the example where it says “belief” we would substitute “have 50% or more belief”. The substitution only needs made three times: twice in the second sentence after the claims and once in the parenthesis of the fifth sentence. The burden of proof then becomes the burden that must be overcome to persuade someone to “have 50% or more belief”. Obviously I think doing this confuses the example immensely, but I want to show that everything is consistent with an analog definition of “belief”.
 * Sorry I wrote so much text. balljust (talk) 01:24, 25 April 2014 (UTC)


 * Balljust, I believe we both agree that to use the binary and discrete belief/disbelief is a linguistic shortcut that is at best a low-resolution representation of the concept of belief which is inherently gradient. The full-resolution concept of belief is inherently gradient since rational belief must map to evidence, and evidence is inherently gradient. For this context, I'd like to see the full-resolution representation of belief employed so as to avoid distortion and misunderstanding. Unless you can come up with a way to rewrite the Dillahunty example to reflect the full-resolution representation of belief, I'm inclined to delete it. Agreed? Philocentric (talk) 14:15, 27 April 2014 (UTC)


 * In section 3 of my most recent comment I propose a method to rewrite the Dillahunty example to reflect an analog (or what you are calling gradient) definition of belief. I disagree that "belief" is "inherently gradient". If you want we can discuss why our viewpoints differ further, but I propose we compromise. I would really like to keep the example. It proved very useful to myself and I think it reveals the crucial realization for the burden of proof. Specifically, that disbelief in one of two mutually exclusive claims does not entail belief in the other. Anyways I'm sure some readers will have both of our perspectives and a compromise can be made that would likely improve the example. Below is a modified version designed to accommodate an analog definition of belief. Changes are in bold. Any suggestions/criticisms?


 * Matt Dillahunty gives the example of a large jar full of gumballs to illustrate the burden of proof. It is a fact of reality that the number of gumballs in the jar is either even or odd, but the beliefs a person could hold are more complicated. We can choose to consider two claims about the situation, given as
 * The number of gumballs is even.
 * The number of gumballs is odd.
 * These two claims can be considered independently. For each claim, because of the law of excluded middle, we are forced to either have some degree of belief or no belief at all. Before we have any information about the number of gumballs, we have no means of distinguishing either of the two claims. All of the information we have applies to claim 1 in exactly the same way it applies to claim 2. Therefore, we must have the same degree of belief in both. Due to the law of noncontradiction we would not hold belief in both of the two mutually exclusive claims, so we must completely reject both. This is the default position, which represents the null hypothesis. The justification for this position is only ever the lack of evidence supporting a claim. Instead, the burden of proof, or the responsibility to provide evidence and reasoning, lies with those seeking to persuade someone holding the default position.
 * Balljust, I'm still trying to process what you are trying to say. For now, I'm going to simply remove the reference to the "null hypothesis" statement since a null hypothesis refers to possible correlative/causal relations, plus make a few other tweaks. I'll revisit this when I have time. At this point I see Matt's example as exceptional since most propositions assessed in the real world deal with incremental additive/subtractive confirming/disconfirming bits of evidence instead of a single conclusive evidentiary discovery such as the last gumball in the jar. You might consider the movement of rational belief up the epistemic gradient as it maps to the accumulative evidence on the evidentiary gradient for whether a coin being flipped and consistently turning up heads is actually a 2-headed coin rather than a regular coin. Perhaps others can offer their opinions. Philocentric (talk) 05:53, 29 April 2014 (UTC)
 * And Balljust, could you explain why you hold rational belief is not necessarily gradient? If the evidence lies on a gradient, must not also the belief that must map to that evidence?


 * I don't like this version as much as it is more complicated and less clear because it uses a more complicated definition of "belief". However, I suppose it would be less likely to be rejected outright because the reader disagrees with a binary definition. balljust (talk) 01:16, 29 April 2014 (UTC)

The Scientific Burden of Proof ?
quote: article: When debating any issue, there is an implicit burden of proof on the person asserting a claim. Talk: This page was created in an effort to distinguish between the quite disparate Legal Burden of Proof, and the Philosophic Burden of Proof. end quotes

So he who asserts "Evolution Theory" carries the burden of proof!? Oops, begin the unneeded gymnastics.

I tend to think of the "philosophy of science" (or the logic of science) as a pragmatic version of philosophy. Any disagrement?...that Kuhn & Popper were to Science what Einstein was to Physics? ...as in revolutionary? ...as in day and night?

As I recall, according to them, (most explicitly in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,) barring overwhelming evidence, the burden of proof lies with he who challenges the scientific consensus ("paradigms" Kuhn calls them). This makes no claim to philosophical rightness, it's simply a practical matter —and the way science actually works in the real world. (He who claims or asserts "Evolution Theory" need not back it up with evidence. He who claims or asserts perpetual motion will be ignored or worse.) Science's version in my mind, that makes forcing the "burden of proof on the person asserting a claim" to not only sound silly, but arbitrary according to vague and rather gymnastic linguistic convolutions. --Cryptic unneeded jargon, at best? IOW, both in definition and logic, Kuhn & Popper remove this discussion from eternal "dancing on the head of a pin" into something solid and common sense, —that can be tested (as science must). Why is Science ignored here? To me this precision pin-dancing looks like Daly's "misplaced concreteness."

Where am I off-base here? --71.133.254.31 (talk) 23:09, 24 March 2014 (UTC)Doug Bashford


 * As stated above, under 'OK, I'll Ask,' scientific burden of evidence redirects to scientific method, an article with no mention of the term "burden." As best as I can tell the article here is more concerned with justifications for propositions along with some side issues of ontological positivity/negativity. If you'd like to expand it with some views of Kuhn or Popper, presumably cited as such rather than presented as results of peer reviewed scientific research, I suspect there's no objection. 108.184.67.185 (talk) 04:55, 11 April 2014 (UTC)


 * Yes, I think that the person who asserts evolutionary theory does have the philosophical burden of proof (which is the title of the article). This isn't a problem though because there is lots of compelling evidence in peer-reviewed journals to overcome this burden. Also, to be honest, I've never heard of the scientific burden of proof. Do you have a page number or quote from Kuhn or Popper? At this point I don't see any motivation to bring this perspective into the article, but maybe I'm misunderstanding you. I don't really have a good idea of what you want added? balljust (talk) 23:48, 18 April 2014 (UTC)

Dillahunty Citations
These appear to be self-'published' and are contrary to Wikipedia's citation standards. 108.184.67.185 (talk) 05:24, 11 April 2014 (UTC)


 * Okay, let me know what you think should be done. I think the citations as they stand are acceptable (optimal even) because I am supporting that Matt Dillahunty did indeed give this example. Wikipedia's citation standards, as I interpret them here (see the subsection "Self-published doesn't mean a source is automatically invalid"), allow for self-published sources to be used this way. The Atheist Experience is a public access television show. The shows are screened live on blip.tv and are subsequently uploaded via the official youtube channel of the show. I cited youtube because I felt it was most accessible and familiar to the readers. If you don't like youtube, other options include citing blip.tv or the Atheist Experience website directly. balljust (talk) 17:53, 13 April 2014 (UTC)


 * I'd like to eliminate the Dillahunty section since the odd/even example is absent the element of background information that is present for the vast majority of real-world inquiries, and this normally present background information is a very relevant consideration in determining Burden of Proof. Philocentric (talk) 08:45, 12 August 2014 (UTC)


 * I agree, for those reasons and because I don't see as the section meets the citation standards set forth in the policies.108.184.67.185 (talk) 01:35, 15 August 2014 (UTC)

Citation needed ?
Why is there a "citation needed" mark after "there is an implicit burden of proof on the person asserting a claim" when reference 3 states "usually one who makes an assertion must assume the responsibility of defending it" ? It's the same thing said in different ways, that is, the burden of proof is with the one who first makes a claim/assertion. Clausgroi (talk) 05:39, 15 July 2015 (UTC)
 * That is not what the cited article dictates and that is not often the case until someone is asked to substantiate a claim. Ephemerance (talk) 11:55, 29 July 2015 (UTC)

When is burden implied?
"There is an implicit burden of proof on the person asserting a claim."

Implied by whom? This statement is not necessarily true, not used in practise, and there is no literature cited to support it. In fact, burden of proof is typically requested or desired when a claim is out of the ordinary - not for every claim made. Provide a citation for the current phrasing please. Ephemerance (talk) 08:44, 27 July 2015 (UTC)


 * One way to make sense of it is this: the claimant has a prima facie burden in every case. For claims of common knowledge, this burden is trivially satisfied, since all parties acknowledge the truth of the matter.  The claim burden is only substantial when its content is disputed.


 * As far as your suggestion goes, it is difficult to see what you mean by "out of the ordinary", unless you mean a claim which is disputed. But if that is what you mean, the above analysis gets to the heart of the matter, I think.


 * That said, I agree that we need a citation to the effect that the burden is on the claimant, even though I think this is a nigh-universally accepted claim. I am away from my texts at the moment, so can't give the citation.  I might well ask why you think the presence of a burden has to do with the "ordinariness" of the claim.  Is there a citation for this interpretation?  Thanks. Phiwum (talk) 14:19, 27 July 2015 (UTC)


 * In defense of Ephemerance's stance, and contrary to my stance and that of the article, see Robert Brown's article titled "The Burden of Proof" (from American Philosophical Quarterly, 1970). I have only skimmed the article, reading snippets here and there, but Brown seems to suggest that the burden of proof lies on the claim which currently appears less plausible.  I don't think this is an appropriate notion of the burden of proof, as seen in the consequence of its application: Brown argues that the existence of physical stuff is more or less settled simply by pointing at one's hand.  By this act, the burden shifts to the doubter.  I am unpersuaded (though I haven't given the article the respect of a reading yet, so my opinion means bupkiss). Phiwum (talk) 02:34, 28 July 2015 (UTC)


 * And now for the other side. James Cargile "On the Burden of Proof" explicitly says that the burden of proof always lies with the affirmative [i.e., the one who is affirming; he rejects the notion that it depends on whether the claim is "positive"].
 * "It is sometimes said that one who makes a claim contrary to received opinion has the burden of proof. This may be encouraged by the fact that one who accepts received opinion is not thereby making a claim, but rather, is just going along with one.  So he does not qualify for the burden of proof by the common principle, while the defier of popular opinion does.  But it is not being opposed to popular opinion that should bring the burden, but rather being committed to a position.  If Brown holds that there are ghosts, and Black holds there are no ghosts, it is not correct to rule that in general, the burden of proof must fall on Brown and not Black.  If Black is very positive about there being no ghosts, then it may be his obligation to know a good deal of the basis for the general opinion in favour of his position.  Perhaps he will merely appeal to (good) authorities.  But that it is easier to defend his position does not mean that he has less of an obligation to defend it."
 * So, there's your citation. Phiwum (talk) 02:55, 28 July 2015 (UTC)
 * Thanks for taking the time to dive into this and find a citation, Phiwum. I'm still trying to find a full version of the James Cargile article (a preview of page 59 is what I have found). The page speaks of shifting conventions and what has been and currently can be called upon to provide the burden of proof. The common undertone seems to be that when a proponent of a claim is asked to prove, justify or substantiate their position that they assume a burden of proof. I edited the phrasing in the main article to reflect this. I'm hoping there is consensus to that modification. Cheers Ephemerance (talk) 12:13, 29 July 2015 (UTC)
 * I found a copy on JSTOR, but evidently my school doesn't have the rights to it. I was able to read it online, but I hate reading philosophy articles on a computer screen, so again, I have only skimmed it.  It looks like a good article (i.e., it fits my biases), so maybe I'll do an interlibrary loan request.
 * I think it's fair to say that the phrase "burden of proof" is typically applied only when a claim is disputed. If both parties in a discussion accept a claim, then there is no such burden.  This is more or less what you said, but I've reworded your edit to make the context a little more explicit.  Phiwum (talk) 12:50, 29 July 2015 (UTC)
 * Excellent rephrasing. Well done, Phiwum. Ephemerance (talk) 14:25, 29 July 2015 (UTC)
 * You're very kind. Especially since I thought we began on different sides of the fence.  Phiwum (talk) 23:10, 30 July 2015 (UTC)