Talk:Chanak Crisis

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I had to change the first paragraph where it was stated that allied troops were threatened by attack from Turkish troops fleeing the Greeks, as by september 1922 the Greeks were defeated and expelled from Smyrna the above claim is nonsense. [unsigned]
 * The events described in the article did happen. However the article says far too little about the background, which seems to be the Occupation of Constantinople and a neutralised territory along the Dardanelles.  It also says too little on the military events and a comparatively large amount on the political implications (which are important).  My source (probably accurate, but not strictly WP:RS) indicates that the British reinforced their garrison with a battalion, and then a few months later both the British and French withdrew.  The article also does not deal with when this occured.  Peterkingiron (talk) 18:46, 26 December 2011 (UTC)

There is something of a gap here. First, the article could mention Horace Rumbold's role in the crisis, when he delayed delivering the ultimatum ordering the Turks back, and quite literally stopped a war from breaking out with only 13 minutes to go. Second, the article could mention Lloyd-George's Hellonphillia, which made him determined to intervene on the Greek side, despite the way that majority of British public opinion did not want to rescue the Greeks from the war they had just lost. Third, the article misrepresents the French as being against the Turks, when the French had already come around to an understanding with the Turks. Had Britain gone to war with Turkey in 1922, the French would had not supported them.

And finally, the most important long-term consequence of the crisis from the British viewpoint was henceforward, British decision-makers knew that they could not longer count automatically on Dominion support in the event of a war, which did have important consequences for British foreign policy in the 1930s. British decision-makers were the Dominions made crucial contributions to the Allied victory in 1918 and would Britain would not have the war without the Dominions. In 1936, when Germany violated the Treaty of Versailles by sending troops into the Rhineland, Britain decided not to go to war. At least one of the reasons for this decision was all that of the Dominion prime ministers made it clear that they would not follow Britain into a war over the Rhineland issue. It is striking that in 1938 when war was threatened over German claims to the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia and then in 1939 over the Free City of Danzig, that the British went out of their way to keep the Dominion prime ministers "in the loop" and how much the Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain consulted with the Dominion prime ministers during both crisises of 1938 and 1939. The fact that all of the Dominion prime ministers were opposed to going to war with Germany over the Sudetenland was an important reason for the Munich Agreement. Later in 1939 that some of were more supportive of Britain was an important factor in British decision-making. All of this is the legacy of the Chanak crisis when it was first established that the Dominions would not automatically follow Britain into a war, which was a very rude shock to the British government in 1922.--A.S. Brown (talk) 22:03, 2 July 2018 (UTC)
 * Why are almost none of the works in the further reading section, most of which are specialist works dedicated to this event, used as sources. And why are the actual sources used all either general works or works which only incidentally deal with this incident, plus an arguably invalid source in the form of an unpublished PhD thesis? (Of that phd thesis, I did not read it further than its abstract where the author confuses the meaning of "former" with "latter") 88.108.85.107 (talk) 15:46, 29 August 2019 (UTC)