Talk:China brain

Untitled
I've made some changes to avoid the conclusion that the China brain argument is successful. The success of the argument is controversial, so we ought to avoid taking sides. Alienus 03:31, 27 January 2006 (UTC)

Is the "Liberalism" section actually a criticism of the China brain argument? It doesn't seem to be to me... —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.9.149.41 (talk) 10:10, 14 August 2008 (UTC)


 * I don't get it: what the "Chauvinism" section has to do with chauvinism? GregorB (talk) 21:51, 27 January 2009 (UTC)


 * 'Chauvanism' and 'liberalism' are both used in non-standard (yet well-established) senses within the literature. A theory is 'too liberal' if it ascribes something (e.g. mental states) to things which don't have it. It is 'too chauvanistic' if it restricts its ascriptions to something (e.g. only those things with identical neurophysiology to humans). The Block article uses both these terms in advancing its argument. DACrowe10 (talk) 02:17, 1 June 2011 (UTC)

Lawrence Davis
Does this article link to the right Lawrence Davis? It seems unlikely to me. —Preceding unsigned comment added by George Richard Leeming (talk • contribs) 12:02, 6 December 2010 (UTC)
 * CharlesGillingham (talk) 19:32, 6 December 2010 (UTC)


 * I presume it didn't and that is why the link was removed. All the same it would be nice to have a link to the correct Lawrence article inserted. I wasn't familiar with an instance of the Chinese Mind argument before Block. DACrowe10 (talk) 02:17, 1 June 2011 (UTC)

Simulated Mind
I find this topic fascinating because it leads to the debate of simulated consciousness vs. true consciousness. Where is the line drawn? How can we tell the difference? Is it morally right to create a simulated consciousness so complex that even its creator sees it as a true mind? This topic should be added to a robotics section for this reason, but I don't know how to do that. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 72.219.180.181 (talk) 19:38, 4 December 2013 (UTC)

==== This really puts too much emphasis on qualia. The objections discussed here are not versions of the absent qualia objections. As I understand it, Block would contend that the Chinese nation does not collectively believe that, say, the moon revolves around the Earth or desire that the bus arrive on time. That is, the counterexamples are supposed to be quite general objections to a functionalist account of mental states and minds. (Block does raise objections concerning qualia, but the China example targets mental states *generally*.) In addition, the absence of qualia does not a zombie make. Conscious experience is not constituted solely by quales or, if it is, that is a substantive and controversial philosophical claim and not something which should be taken for granted. (It seems very implausible.) 62.255.73.246 (talk) 01:53, 22 May 2017 (UTC)