Talk:Consciousness/Archive 5

Let's talk, please
There has been quite a bit of editing on this article recently, and it seems to have turned into a back-and-forth that is verging on edit-warring. Most of the changes seem reasonable to me, although I wouldn't necessarily make them myself. Can we please discuss issues rather than simply reverting back and forth? Edit summaries are not a substitute for proper discussion. (For what it's worth, well over half of the current text is my work, but I don't want to behave as though I "own" the article.) Looie496 (talk) 13:31, 15 June 2014 (UTC)


 * Looie496, first, many thanks for all your work! Perhaps the one substantive change I'd consider making is splitting off Nagel's paper "What is it like to be a bat?" to its own section. Despite its suggestive title, Nagel isn't discussing just nonhuman animals and the methodological difficulties that the study of their consciousness poses. Rather, the paper is part of Nagel's attack on scientism and (as he puts it most recently) "Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False". --Davidcpearce (talk) 15:54, 15 June 2014 (UTC)


 * Hi David. I was aware that Nagel's aims were broader, but I was thinking about this from a different direction.  If the goal is to write a section about the question of consciousness in animals, is there a better way to frame it?  After all, even if Nagel's aims were broader, he did very specifically treat the problem of animal consciousness in that article.  Regards, Looie496 (talk) 12:12, 16 June 2014 (UTC)


 * By the way, no serious treatment of the topic of animal consiousness can ignore the thesis expouned in John McDowell's magnum opus Mind and World (Lecture VI). John McDowell's views are among the most widely discussed in Analytic philosophy. --Omnipaedista (talk) 16:49, 16 June 2014 (UTC)
 * Sounds good. Can you add a summary? --Epipelagic (talk) 20:54, 16 June 2014 (UTC)
 * I also note that Cassandra3001 never gave an explanation for their actions . Users who force their controversial edits without negotiating are commonly called POV pushers. --Omnipaedista (talk) 16:56, 16 June 2014 (UTC)


 * @Looie496: Since you appear to have endorsed Cassandra's edits, I'll give some background reasons for my reversion. Cassandra's main activity appears to be replacing references to "animals" with "nonhuman animals". She has been trying to edit war these changes into place on articles such as Emotion in animals, Pain in animals and Animal consciousness. Her talk page history shows her record of declining to discuss her edits. She usually deletes attempts to engage her. The issue has been discussed in some detail here. There are hundreds of articles on Wikipedia which are about nonhuman animals. Cassandra seems to want to override the generally accepted convention that "nonhuman animals" are referred to as "animals" when the context is clear. Davidcpearce has been supporting Cassandra in this endeavour. Because of the number of articles involved, this is not a matter that should be decided by individual editors on specific articles. It is a matter better decided at a more general level, perhaps by WikiProject Animals.
 * Another difficulty with Cassandra's edits is that she takes succinct statements and, citing no sources, turns them into something gratuitously prolix. Finally, there is her addition, "drug discrimination studies are used in biomedical research to determine if animals distinguish between novel psychoactive substances and known drugs of abuse", again uncited, and quite unclear as to what it might mean in the context of consciousness. --Epipelagic (talk) 20:51, 16 June 2014 (UTC)


 * I didn't actually mean to endorse anybody's edits. Looie496 (talk) 21:23, 16 June 2014 (UTC)


 * Well you made your intervention after Davidcpearce reinstated Cassandra's edits which, to me, suggested tacit approval. --Epipelagic (talk) 22:34, 16 June 2014 (UTC)


 * Epilegagic, please assume good faith. I delete ad hominem attacks, but I'm happy discuss any substantive points here. Drug discrimination studies are a staple of biomedical research. See any standard text, e.g.http://eu.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-0470433523.html


 * And yes, I believe scientific accuracy should be preferred - even at the price of "prolixity". — Preceding unsigned comment added by Cassandra3001 (talk • contribs) 06:29, 17 June 2014 (UTC)


 * A unilateral global search-and-replace ('animals' -> 'nonhuman animals') is against fundamental Wikipedia policies: enforcing a marginal terminology and making blind substitutions of words violates MOS:QUOTE, WP:INTEGRITY and, above all, WP:RS/AC. Presenting the issue as some kind of Wikipedia community bias or stylistic preference is deeply misleading.


 * Regarding Cassandra3001 actions, her latest response to attempts by other editors to engage her in discussion was "Please get this junk off my page ..." and "misc junk deleted". --Omnipaedista (talk) 12:38, 17 June 2014 (UTC)


 * , Omnipaedista, by omitting the remaining words of my sentence, i.e. "...and at least consider discussing the substantive issues on Talk instead." you have inverted my meaning. --Cassandra3001 (talk) 14:11, 17 June 2014 (UTC)


 * Cassandra appears to have deleted the messages on her talk page in an attempt to hide them. This is because an editor who recently reverted her pointed out to her in his edit summary that "User:Cassandra Talk page is currently on notice for edit warring WP:EW and for violating WP:BRD by 2 other editors. You are required to make consensus by BRD on Talk prior to further edits."
 * By the way, where is the "junk" you refer to Cassandra? --Epipelagic (talk) 15:33, 17 June 2014 (UTC)


 * Epipelagic, if an editor had deliberately omitted half the worlds of your sentence so as to reverse its meaning, I think you might feel aggrieved too. Regardless, can we now focus on the substantive issues for the article. What do you believe is the original research? If you don't see why drug discrimination studies are relevant to consciousness in nonhuman animals (and consciousness in humans lacking verbal competence), I'm happy to explain. But the research certainly isn't original to me.  --Cassandra3001 (talk) 16:21, 17 June 2014 (UTC)


 * Cassandra3001, I have added an ellipsis, provided a link to the whole sentence, and provided an edit summary of yours in which you repeat the "junk" accusation. Before any constructive discussion can take place, it would be advisable to elaborate on what you mean by "junk" . --Omnipaedista (talk) 16:27, 17 June 2014 (UTC)


 * That's not at all likely to lead to a constructive discussion. Let's just treat it as a poor choice of wording and move on. Looie496 (talk) 12:36, 19 June 2014 (UTC)

Back to improving the article...does anyone else worry that citing drug discrimination studies involves original research? I hope the link I provided sets Epipelagic's mind at rest, but I can provide others if neded. --Cassandra3001 (talk) 18:51, 18 June 2014 (UTC)


 * I'd also add a mention of the mirror self-recognition test - which undermines all but radical scepticism about the existence of self-consciousness - let alone simple consciousness - in some nonhuman animals. Also, Wikipedia's own hot-linked entry "What Is It like to be a bat" gives a lucid account of what Nagel is arguing. But I haven't got the energy for an edit war if anyone wants the existing paragraph text to stand. :-) --Davidcpearce (talk) 11:56, 19 June 2014 (UTC)


 * It's just not that simple David. There are robots that can recognise themselves in mirrors. I think you should discriminate between real world scepticism and logical scepticism. In this area I am a logical skeptic but not a real world skeptic. In the real world I take it for granted that children and animals are conscious. At a personal level I do not doubt that the many children and animals I have had close relationships with are conscious. And I do not doubt that I, personally, am sometimes conscious. But I am highly skeptical about flawed and sloppy arguments being presented as "proof" that animals (including humans and including myself) are conscious. Perhaps the issue is not resolvable by logic or science. Perhaps as some analytical philosophers suggest, the issue is that there isn't really an issue at all, but we're just caught up in language games. Anyway I'm out of here as well. Cassandra and Looie can decide together what they want for the article. --Epipelagic (talk) 19:04, 19 June 2014 (UTC)


 * Epipelagic, I agree with you: it's not possible to prove that anyone else is sentient. That was what I meant by "...undermines all but radical scepticism". But sometimes specific skeptical worries are raised about subjects who don't use language. Passing the mirror test is widely regarded in the scientific community as evidence of self-consciousness. Unfortunately, some authors use "conscious" when they mean self-conscious - which muddies the issue further. --Davidcpearce (talk) 20:15, 19 June 2014 (UTC)


 * The mirror test is meant to be a test of self-awareness, not self-consciousness. I doubt many animals are self-conscious, though the common usage of all these related terms is muddy. --Epipelagic (talk) 20:28, 19 June 2014 (UTC)


 * Insofar as we distinguish self-consciousness from self-awareness, I agree. --Davidcpearce (talk) 20:53, 19 June 2014 (UTC)


 * I am not sure if it is helpful to argue on and on from "first principles"; we should look at what reliable sources say about these matters. One can find plenty of them in the article about mirror test. Regarding the whole "human animal" debate, please see Tryptofish's comment in Talk:Pain in animals regarding RGW. --Omnipaedista (talk) 07:41, 27 June 2014 (UTC)


 * Omnipaedista, if an article says "he" when "he or she" is intended, then the reader can often infer the writer's intention. Yet it's still good editorial practice to use an accurate, gender-inclusive term over the traditional (ab)usage. This does not mean that we are each obliged to comb Wikipedia for sexist language. Likewise, correcting "animals" to "nonhuman animals" may strike some folk as pedantic. But a useful rule-of-thumb for encyclopedia editors is "If in doubt, prefer accuracy." --Davidcpearce (talk) 10:17, 27 June 2014 (UTC)


 * Drawing analogies between sexism and speciesism is historically inaccurate, highly misleading and misses the point. --Omnipaedista (talk) 19:24, 29 June 2014 (UTC)


 * Omnipaedista, you said above that John McDowell's views on animal consciousness were among "the most widely discussed in Analytic philosophy", and that "no serious treatment of the topic of animal consciousness can ignore [this]". Would you mind summarizing this influence, or at least pointing to key sources supporting your statement. --Epipelagic (talk) 15:16, 27 June 2014 (UTC)


 * See, e.g., John McDowell: Experience, Norm, and Nature by Jakob Lindgaard (2009), p. xviii. --Omnipaedista (talk) 19:24, 29 June 2014 (UTC)

Misleading addition
I reverted this edit by. The fifth scenario he added, involving the "first animals with nervous systems in the late pre-Cambrian", is not mentioned at all in the cited article. Indeed, the word "Cambrian" appears nowhere in the article. I am noting the matter here, because when I noted it on his talk page he removed the entry with the edit summary troll deleted. --Epipelagic (talk) 20:54, 20 August 2014 (UTC)

Anognosia
I believe that the section on anognosia incorrectly refers to the right side of the affected person's body, since it is the right hemisphere manages the entero- and exteroception of the left side. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.39.5.60 (talk) 19:35, 1 October 2014 (UTC)

Additional final paragraph under Biological function and evolution - refers to a new theory of the nature and function of consciousness
Brian Earl proposed that consciousness—one’s ongoing experience—functions as the data input to the neural mechanism(s) that generate nonautomatic, “intentional”, relatively flexible responses (the ‘‘flexible response mechanism’’, FRM). He supported this proposal with evidence that: (1) The properties of consciousness are such that it can only contribute to biological fitness as input to processes that determine behavior. (2) Various properties of consciousness correspond to the expected data input requirements of the FRM. And, (3) other properties of consciousness are explicable in terms of consciousness being input data to the FRM. However, the question remains why the input to the FRM is conscious. Consciousness is a very complex biological property with many interrelated components, and together with other evidence, this tells us that consciousness is almost certainly adaptive. Therefore, even though we do not know how consciousness could have functions which cannot be performed by nonconscious neural structures, it is good science provisionally to assume that consciousness is adaptive, and try to determine why its biological function might require that it be conscious. In the past that approach has been a successful strategy in biology[108]. Consciousness carries information, and information always has to be in an appropriate form to be usable, so it may be that the FRM input is conscious because qualia are a functional form for these data.

BrianEarlcs (talk) 08:07, 7 January 2015 (UTC)


 * Interesting paper, but in my view it has not yet received enough attention to require coverage in this article. When it hits the 100 citation mark, it will be time to reconsider. Looie496 (talk) 17:38, 7 January 2015 (UTC)

Picture of Monk is Misleading
The picture of a monk and it's description appears to suggest that meditation is a "state of conciousness" however, according to this article, this is disputed. Here I quote: "It has been disputed, however, whether there is enough evidence to count these as physiologically distinct states of consciousness". In my own opinion, I think meditation itself is more religion than science, and best be kept out of the scientific section of this article. Smk65536 (talk) 00:39, 10 January 2015 (UTC)


 * Meditation is a practice which can result in various states of consciousness. It may or may not be practised in connection with some religion. But meditation is a practice (like distance running) and is not itself a religion (which is a belief structure). What is disputed in the source cited in the article is merely whether meditative states of consciousness are physiologically different from the states of consciousness that can occur when people relax. The source does not imply that states of conciousness do not occur during meditation (or relaxation for that matter). There is, in fact, a large scholarly literature which discusses states of conciousness in connection with meditation. You could have simply checked this yourself. --Epipelagic (talk) 02:28, 10 January 2015 (UTC)

Is this quote appropriate?
An IP editor added to the lead this line: Dr. Ver Hoef of University of Alabama at Birmingham has described consciousness as "living on the razor's edge between coma and seizure.", without giving a source or edit summary. I reverted, with an edit summary saying "not a useful quote, particularly at this point in the article". The line was then reinserted, again without edit summary. I am convinced the quote does not belong, as (a) the author is not especially notable, and (b) the quote doesn't bear on the content of the paragraph it was added to. My policy is not to carry on one-on-one edit wars, so I am raising the issue here in the hope that somebody else will step in. Looie496 (talk) 15:31, 12 August 2015 (UTC)

AI and conciousness
In the article it says that AI is working with consciousness but I have to disagree on that point. So far I know AI is trying to reproduce the human way to think. But is that really the same as creating a consciousness and even if it was how would you know if you had succeed?/81.170.158.36 (talk) 20:29, 26 October 2015 (UTC)

Why not mention that consciousness may be stored in microtubules?
Orch-OR. Socialistguy (talk) 17:25, 25 February 2016 (UTC)
 * That's mentioned in the Mind-body problem section -- briefly, but I'm not sure anything more extensive is justified. Feel free to make suggestions, though. Looie496 (talk) 21:30, 25 February 2016 (UTC)

Why not mention that consciousness may be stored in microtubules?
Orch-OR. Socialistguy (talk) 17:25, 25 February 2016 (UTC)
 * That's mentioned in the Mind-body problem section -- briefly, but I'm not sure anything more extensive is justified. Feel free to make suggestions, though. Looie496 (talk) 21:30, 25 February 2016 (UTC)

Reflection
Everything is space is united because space can't have holes, so how can things move if everything is united, is just consciousness what connect with the totality of smaller parts that form space so is life, our loved god who move things in the universe, and nothing can move and leave the nothing where it was, so only can be consciousness that have a injectivity with every part of space what move things. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 190.36.232.4 (talk) 22:31, 11 June 2016 (UTC)

Consciousness vs. awareness
The definition of consciousness is inaccurate and should be improved by taking into account the cited work of Giulio Tononi. My suggestion is to add the text "Consciousness is the readiness for receiving information. " and cite the quoted text. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2804:14C:8780:A082:8D38:5779:CC:6168 (talk) 03:06, 1 July 2016 (UTC)


 * But the source you refer to doesn't support that. It does say: "According to the theory, consciousness corresponds to the capacity of a system to integrate information". That is not the same as "Consciousness is the readiness for receiving information". When my computer is connected to the internet it is in a constant state of "readiness for receiving information". But that doesn't make it "conscious". You have inserted your own original research, and cited it with a source that doesn't support your position at all. --Epipelagic (talk) 03:23, 1 July 2016 (UTC)

When you say 'But that doesn't make it "conscious"', that is an idea of consciousness in conflict with Tononi's theory, which actually implies that "even a simple system such a single photo diode will be conscious to some degree if it not contained within a larger complex" (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/#InfAcc). — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2804:14C:8780:A082:8D38:5779:CC:6168 (talk) 04:16, 1 July 2016 (UTC)

And readiness for receiving information is the *minimal* capacity of a system to integrate information. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2804:14C:8780:A082:8D38:5779:CC:6168 (talk) 04:35, 1 July 2016 (UTC)


 * This seems more about artificial consciousness than the wider issues of biological consciousness and the hard problem of consciousness. Tononi reduces the issue until consciousness is purely to do with the integration of information and can be described mathematically as an information-theoretic property of systems. He seems to endorse the idea that consciousness is not confined to biological organisms, but functions in artefacts to the point where even a single photo diode can operate consciously. That is hardly a mainstream position, though perhaps some autistics might find it natural. It would be lacking balance to add his definition so prominently at the beginning of the general article on consciousness, as you have done, implying that his view is currently the dominant global view. However, his views seem to get some traction, particularly in the area of artificial intelligence, and you could perhaps add something appropriate about them in the section on artifact consciousness. Please sign at the end of your posts by typing 4 tildes, ~ . Thanks. --Epipelagic (talk) 07:20, 1 July 2016 (UTC)

Misrepresenting Tononi's idea, published in a neuroscience journal, as *artificial*, *unbalanced* and *autistic* is in disagreement with Wikipedia's rules of neutrality and fairness. The definition in the article is inaccurate (and obsolete, actually), and that the issue. 2804:14C:8780:A082:5C8E:6766:D669:2B30 (talk) 13:59, 1 July 2016 (UTC)


 * If you disagree then please try and respond to specific points with some measure and reason, and leave the party political style to more appropriate platforms. It is your own determined and continuing misrepresentation of what I say, such as you did here, that is the larger problem. --Epipelagic (talk) 19:08, 1 July 2016 (UTC) --Epipelagic (talk) 19:08, 1 July 2016 (UTC)

Philosophy vs. Science
The intro to this article, and perhaps the article as a whole, seems to emphasize philosophy of mind over the hard sciences. For example, the second paragraph calls out various issues of concern in the study of consciousness as questions, but some of those questions have largely been answered by the sciences. I'm not too familiar with philosophy of mind, but in other areas of philosophy I've noticed that it seems to take a long time for philosophers to integrate scientific discovery into the development of their investigations. I don't have the domain expertise to tackle it myself, but perhaps the article could be better served by approaching the subject from the perspective of the hard sciences, with the philosophical aspects covering the history of the study of consciousness along with the areas that have not yet been answered by science. Just my two cents, for what it's worth.  Sparkie82 ( t • c )  19:42, 14 August 2016 (UTC)


 * Hard sciences involve information gathered through the five senses followed by thinking. For example, subject areas such as physics and chemistry involve visual observations followed by thinking (often involving complicated analyses) – all this happens within the observers’ consciousness. In other words, the study of consciousness goes beyond the ‘hard sciences,’ and therefore, ‘philosophy of mind’ is very important for this page.

Nandinik (talk) 16:10, 15 August 2016 (UTC)

Stuart Sutherland part...
...Is completely worthless obscurantism that says nothing and I'd prefer it removed. It adds 0 to the understanding of the term. There's enough vagueness and confusion in philosophy without adding to it.Vree (talk) 22:17, 18 August 2016 (UTC)

Philosophy is mostly crap
Lots of words are thrown around a very simple idea without ever quite pinning it down. Consciousness is the mind's ability to reason about itself. Certainly someone else must have realized that by now? I would have thought the dictionary definition gave it away.

This mechanistic description clearly allows for non-human consciousness, as long as whatever type of entity we're considering is able to rationalize itself. The mirror test is a great way to determine that an animal at least knows about its own body, implying a sense of self. If animals can "hold beliefs about things they cannot directly perceive" then they have the ability to reason abstractly. All that's needed is to bring the two together.

I would imagine this is possible at various levels, introspection being one of them. I've never heard of a whale wanting to redefine himself, for instance. Except in cartoons. But I have heard of orcas saving people, and of tangled humpbacks seeking assistance from divers. When we eventually develop a test for consciousness, I'm fairly optimistic these animals will pass.

I know other people are conscious because it's evident that they reason about themselves when we talk, especially the more self-centered jerks who mostly talk about themselves. You know I'm conscious when I tell you that list includes me. We can't talk to elephants or dolphins yet, but they obviously communicate with each other. So I don't really see consciousness or language as being so high on the list of superior human traits in contrast to, say, empathy, not to mention all the typically cited skills like toolmaking and the ability to record knowledge.

Consciousness is a probable evolutionary advantage because it allows for communication between individuals to concern itself with a subject very pertinent to their survival, namely themselves. There's likely a rationale regarding individual decisions as well. In terms of computational theory, reasoning about one's self elevates the level of complexity. It's cases along these lines which make the halting problem impossible to solve, and these kinds of statements which drive Godel's incompleteness theorem.

In order to reason about itself, a conscious entity must first realize what its own self is. It must have agency to act and sentience to observe the results of its actions, plus the awareness to link these two together. You could input into a computer its own technical specifications, but how would a program running those calculations understand what it was reasoning about?

There's your blueprint for a zombie. Take something that has a developed consciousness and strip away the ability to further reason about itself, leaving all the other machinery intact. The result would appear to be conscious, given that it mimics systems known to be conscious by making decisions that affect its own state. However, without the ability to alter its decisions via observations of its own actions, in a new environment for instance, it would not truly be reasoning about itself. DAVilla (talk) 00:39, 19 September 2016 (UTC)


 * Well there you go. Philosophy departments around the world need notifying about your arrival here on earth, and may need a period mourning before they can adjust to being so thoroughly cast aside. Exciting as this may be, this is perhaps not the best place for these revelations. Wikipedia is not a forum. Personal opinions not supported by reliable sources are regarded as original research and tend to be ignored. --Epipelagic (talk) 06:05, 19 September 2016 (UTC)


 * Yeah, I knew I couldn't put even the one line definition on the page without sources. I'm just surprised that there's nothing as definitive already there. I came here after replying several times to clueless posts on Facebook linking to the most ridiculous articles on this topic, wondering what was in the literature to back me up. This can't really be that original, can it? I mean, nearly half of what I wrote just seems so obvious, and the rest is speculation around some of the questions raised on the page, really just to expand on the thought so as to make it clearer.
 * I called philosophy mostly crap, but in truth my only introduction to the subject was a proof I'm sure you've heard of, which assumes that before every instance in time there is a previous instance, and goes on to conclude that there must be a God, followed by another proof making exactly the same assumption and concluding that there is no God. I don't know about you, but when I see A implies B and A implies not B, I think not A. From what I could tell, the arguments that continued didn't deviate much but still centered around B. So I stopped reading. DAVilla (talk) 10:11, 19 September 2016 (UTC)


 * What you are describing is religion, not philosophy. If you want to further study reductionist philosophy (where you could consider emergent properties of complex systems, without a strong need for a primal cause) you might want to consider reading Dennet's Consciousness Explained. Arnoutf (talk) 13:49, 19 September 2016 (UTC)

The introduction and the whole tenor of the page
64.134.147.82 (talk) 22:25, 20 October 2016 (UTC)In an attempt to broaden the discussion beyond the narrow 'philosophy of mind' adherents, I added the following from a recent excellent chapter:

Paul James and Manfred B. Steger identify four kinds of consciousness: 1. sensory experience, "the phenomenal sense that something exists in relation to, or has an impact on, a person. The concept of ‘affect’ attests to this kind of consciousness, as does ‘sense data'’"; 2. practical consciousness, or "knowing how to do things, knowing how to ‘go on’. As writers as different as Wittgenstein and Marx have elaborated, it is basic to human engagement"; 3. reflective consciousness, "the modality in which people reflect upon the first two forms. It is the stuff of ordinary philosophy and day-to-day thinking about what has been done and what is to be done''; and 4. reflexive consciousness, or "reflecting on the basis of reflection, and interrogating the nature of knowing in the context of the constitutive conditions of being".

It was deleted as being unsuitable for the lead. I will add it lower down, but it is almost impossible to find a good place in an entry that is so narrowly conceived.


 * If that is the way you feel, then edit the article to broaden it - we are all here to create good articles. DrChrissy (talk) 22:33, 20 October 2016 (UTC)


 * There are dozens of aspects to consciousness or ways consciousness can be viewed or defined. Your addition mentions just four of what you call "forms" of consciousness. Each of those forms has been long recognised and extensively discussed by well established authors on the philosophy of mind. You have introduced nothing original apart from the quaint idea that these forms are some special preserve of sociology. The only source you cite is very recent and, as of the time of writing this comment, lacks even one citation. It is not that you are "broadening the discussion" beyond what you call "the narrow philosophy of mind adherents". It is rather that you just seem unfamiliar with the philosophy of mind. --Epipelagic (talk) 08:55, 21 October 2016 (UTC)
 * although I edited the section "Forms of consciousness", I had doubts when doing this. I noticed the recency of the citation, I noticed there was just a single citation and I also noticed it is potentially close paraphrasing.  If you wish to edit the section, perhaps even delete it, I will not challenge you on this. DrChrissy (talk) 18:18, 21 October 2016 (UTC)

greetings
I don't know how many people realize that the human brain creates the colors we see. Our brains falsely colorize the objects in the world. No light reaches brain. The only thing that reaches our brain is an electrical signal. Our brains take electrical signals and create a seamless virtual reality. Nothing we experience is real. At best, everything we experience is an analog of something real in a universe that in some way is analogous to world our brains create for us. We feel hot, cold, rough, smooth, sweet, sour, sounds, music etc. None of these things really exist in the real world, if there is real world. If we could see what we really look like we would freak out. We look like alien monsters. If we could see atoms, molecules, cells, mitochondria, DNA, RNA, electrons, protons, neutrons, quarks, pions, pi-mesons, hormones we would see a completely different world. We would be able to see right through people. We could could see the atoms of food in their digestive system. Nothing would be still. We would see electrons circling atoms. We would see the electromagnetic force-fields around every object. And we would see how every particle is spread-out through all space-time according to its quantum state. Instead of seeing different colored light, all light would be the same color. The only difference between one ray of light and another would be its frequency. We would actually see the frequency of light not some analog representation that corresponds to its frequency. Blue light is not a solid blue, it something that move from one place to another. It has an amplitude and a wavelength. The colors we see stationary. They are aren't moving anywhere. We can't see any amplitude or wavelength in them. A neurologist can make us see the color blue in a completely dark room room simply by touching an electrical probe to a part of our brain responsible for creating the color blue.

There is a movie called Total Recall. Just like the guy in the movie, we have no way of knowing if the reality we experience is real or not. Of course, most mammals are conscious since their brains are similar to ours. The reality they experience may be very different than our own. We can't have any idea of what it is like to be another another animal. But I think with cats and dogs we have some idea. The further away we move from human beings the harder it is to know just what kind of consciousness animals have. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2601:586:C806:900:51CA:2C54:C4E3:7779 (talk) 23:20, 10 November 2016 (UTC)
 * The OP may care to read our Animal consciousness article. DrChrissy (talk) 00:00, 11 November 2016 (UTC)


 * None of this seems directly relevant to improving the Wikipedia article, but I'll suggest that the commenter give some thought to what the word "real" means. It might seem obvious, but it isn't actually at all. Looie496 (talk) 05:21, 11 November 2016 (UTC)

new
i just read this article and i think it's useful http://www.upi.com/Science_News/2017/04/19/Neuroscientists-measure-higher-state-of-consciousness/8051492612093/ — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.184.190.7 (talk) 13:18, 4 May 2017 (UTC)

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circular reasoning
In the intro consciousness is declared as "the state or quality of awareness". Then awareness is referred to as "the state of being conscious of something". This is a circular definition. 82.217.111.143 (talk) 15:37, 14 August 2017 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.217.111.143 (talk)
 * Yes, you are right, but it is nearly impossible to define consciousness without circularity. I have tried to write that part in a non-circular way, but every time I change it, other editors come along and add "clarifications" that are actually circular.  I have given up on fixing this, but you are welcome to try if you like. Looie496 (talk) 19:11, 14 August 2017 (UTC)


 * (e/c) It's a good point. But Wikipedia aims to present matters only as they appear in reliable sources. It is in this literature itself that vague handwaving and conceptual duck-shoving often occurs when attempts are made to define consciousness. Typically, a vague appeal is made to link consciousness to something to do with awareness or being aware. And as you have discovered, the matter is not advanced much by examining the same literature for definitions of awareness. But the reasoning is not explicitely circular within the Wikipedia article on consciousness, and the article is faithful to what is found in reliable sources. Do you have any suggestions for improving the matter without resorting to original research? --Epipelagic (talk) 19:39, 14 August 2017 (UTC)


 * I guess it may be a good idea to mention the circularity of reasoning in both introductions 82.217.111.143 (talk) 17:57, 18 August 2017 (UTC)


 * Well it's surely obvious that defining consciousness as some form of "awareness" is just duck shoving. Difficulties in defining the concept are already discussed at length in the article on consciousness in the sections titled In the dictionary and Philosophy of mind, including the issue of circularity. The matter is also discussed in Animal consciousness. If you want to add material you need to find good review articles you can cite as reliable sources. But I don't think it belongs in the lead. For many reader, delving into such matters so prematurely in the lead is going to result in gratuitous confusion. --Epipelagic (talk) 00:56, 19 August 2017 (UTC)


 * I don't think the issue is whether the lead should discuss the problem of circularity, but rather whether it is okay for the lead to give a "definition" that is actually circular. Looie496 (talk) 02:39, 19 August 2017 (UTC)
 * I think the problem lies mostly in the definition of awareness. I will try to edit that article and point to the circularity there. 82.217.111.143 (talk) 23:23, 17 September 2017 (UTC)

Why was my edit deleted?
Hello Looie496: I would like to know why the reference I added was deleted – it is not spam (it is published in a peer-reviewed academic journal). Sandyshore (talk) 03:00, 27 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Edits are often reverted and standard procedure is for anyone proposing a change to present a case for why the edit is desirable, not the reverse. The two edits in question are diff. Consciousness would have been described in many ways—how WP:DUE is the proposed text, and how suitable is a work on meditation as a reference? Johnuniq (talk) 03:35, 27 September 2017 (UTC)
 * "Refspam" means making an edit solely for the purpose of getting a reference to a particular paper into an article, without any concern for its impact on the quality of the article. That's clearly what was happening here. (It happens a lot.) Looie496 (talk) 04:06, 27 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Hi Looie496 and Johnuniq: Thank you for your reply. Perhaps I can add more details on what is presented in the article I added - I do not think it is of low quality. It explores an entirely different epistemology to understand consciousness. There are two main paradigms of inquiry – namely the conventional paradigm and the constructivist paradigm. The conventional paradigm (which is the scientific method) is about collecting systematic knowledge through observation and experimentation. Constructivist paradigm, on the other hand relates to the phenomenological or hermeneutic epistemology, where the inquirer is considered as being interlocked with the item under inquiry. Aristotle made a distinction of these two different epistemologies, where he referred to them as ‘phronesis’ and ‘sophia’  [see: Trowbridge, R. (2011). Waiting for Sophia: 30 years of conceptualizing wisdom in empirical psychology. Research in Human Development, 8, 111–117]. Sandyshore (talk) 14:23, 27 September 2017 (UTC)
 * An article like this needs to be selective about its sources, because literally hundreds of thousands of things have been written about consciousness. A source should only be used if there is evidence that it is widely known or has been influential, or comes from an author who has been influential.  This paper was just published and has never been cited. Looie496 (talk) 17:19, 27 September 2017 (UTC)
 * If there is bias in terms of only ‘influential papers’ by ‘influential authors’ are allowed to be listed in a Wiki page – then there won’t be much progress in the field! Unless people know that other types of analyses exist (i.e., constructivist paradigm) for consciousness – it would not get widely known or become influential (because no one knows it even exists!). Therefore, I think the paper should be incorporated somewhere in the Wiki page (perhaps under the subsection "Stream of Consciousness"). Sandyshore (talk) 18:15, 27 September 2017 (UTC)
 * As an encyclopedia / tertiary source it is explicitly not the purpose of Wikipedia to work towards progress in the field. It is the purpose of such an encyclopedic work to present current mainstream consensus or important and influential dissensus. Your argument above, is therefore an extremely good rationale in favour of removal of your edits. Arnoutf (talk) 19:07, 27 September 2017 (UTC)
 * So, what are the criteria by which you decide what articles “present current mainstream consensus” or “important and influential dissensus”? Sandyshore (talk) 22:54, 27 September 2017 (UTC)
 * First of all, you claimed this article is not such, as your motivation is to influence the field. So you yourself have identified the paper as non-mainstream. Which makes your question moot before I even answer.
 * Personally I would consider something mainstream if the majority (>50% of all scientific papers agree with position), I would consider something important alternative view if a sizable proportion of a field (say >10%) has adopted opposing positions, and has done so for a substantial number of years (at least 10) and the position is maintained after it has been challenged by opposing scholars, while the scholarship of those bringing the point is generally acknowledged even by its opponents. But that is my personal idea. In any case, a minority view presented in a 2017 paper (as your source is) would definitely not qualify. Arnoutf (talk) 17:15, 28 September 2017 (UTC)


 * To add to that, the journal (current psychology) aims at "rapid dissemination of information and research results at the cutting edge of psychology". Where cutting edge indicates it is about disseminating new ideas (ie not mainstream). Arnoutf (talk) 11:06, 29 September 2017 (UTC)
 * When it comes to consciousness, I don't think there actually is a mainstream -- it's more like the Nile delta, with a braided network of interwoven channels. But there are certainly people like Descartes, Locke, Dennett, Chalmers, Block, etc., whose views are very widely known, even if many people disagree with them. Looie496 (talk) 16:53, 29 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Agree completely. But in that metaphorical Nile delta the provided source contributes about as much as a leaking tap rather than anything more. And obviously leaking taps in Cairo are not added to maps of the Nile Delta (to push the metaphor). Arnoutf (talk) 17:00, 29 September 2017 (UTC)

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Hippocampal theory of consciousness
This article has recently seen repeated attempts by an IP editor to add material on the "hippocampal theory of consciousness", all of which have been reverted. There are two basic problems with the material: (1) it is not written neutrally (see WP:NPOV); (2) it is not notable enough to belong here. Although the sources meet our criteria for reliability, they have not received a great deal of attention, as judged by their citation counts. In an article of this breadth, only material that has received very broad attention belongs. Please do not attempt to add this material again without first discussing it here and obtaining consensus from other editors. Looie496 (talk) 15:39, 29 January 2018 (UTC)
 * Fully agree. For such a complex and much discussed topic we should cover the main approaches and not spend too much (if any) space on novel theories supported and developed by only few scientific authors. Also I agree the tone of writing is more like a persuasive pitch than a neutral presentation and for that fact alone the text would not be acceptable. Arnoutf (talk) 22:09, 29 January 2018 (UTC)
 * The same problem is repeated in the Hippocampus entry. I think the virtually identical material needs to be removed from there, I have posted on its talk page about this.
 * TonyClarke (talk)


 * The contribution that was eventually accepted as a stand-alone entry outside major and established entries (Hippocampus, Neural correlates of consciousness, or Consciousness) had undergone several revisions in response to the feedback received. It represents a novel perspective on a scientifically and philosophically important topic of wide interest. It was previously discussed in notable, relatively high-impact peer-reviewed journals.

Proposed merge with Hippocampal theory of consciousness
This appears to be largely based on the theory and publications of one person, Ralf-Peter Behrendt. It'd probably be better covered here until and unless that theory is accepted as central to our understanding of the phenomenon. Justlettersandnumbers (talk) 01:17, 16 February 2018 (UTC)


 * As long as it is a new, not widely supported theory it should not be dealt with any detail in the overview article of such a complex, old and comphrehensive topic as consciousness. Full merger into the current article would give that undue attention, thus making the current article worse rather than better (unless could be probably be abbreviated to one line at most). So I would not applaud merger. Arnoutf (talk) 11:45, 16 February 2018 (UTC)


 * If merger were felt to be a good idea, then the theory would be better placed within the entry Neural correlates of consciousness. Perhaps cross references suffice.


 * My view is exactly the opposite of this proposal. If a topic meets Wikipedia's notability criteria (which basically means the existence of proper sources), I don't have any problem with a separate article about it -- it's not as though we are short of space for new articles. To be covered in a broad article like this, though, the topic must be notable enough in the literature for WP:UNDUE not to apply. Looie496 (talk) 15:33, 16 February 2018 (UTC)


 * The main problem, as noted before, is that the article was written by, and is about a theory by, Ralf-Peter Behrendt. The other problem is that it is not widely supported within the scientific community. It should therefore be deleted per WP:PROMO and WP:FRINGE. If no one objects, I will nominate it for deletion. David. moreno 72    01:28, 18 February 2018 (UTC)
 * I'd like to make clear, as I should have done before, that I wasn't proposing merging all the content of that page here – I had in mind more one brief sentence or so. But deletion seems to me – who has no expertise at all in this area – a reasonable alternative, and would have my support. Justlettersandnumbers (talk) 09:52, 18 February 2018 (UTC)


 * Deletion of the article means that a theory that has gone through multiple peer-reviews and that has the potential for integrating data on hallucinations and other conscious phenomena with what we know about neurobiology of episodic memory processes will continue to be ignored. I would suggest that before deletion is enacted, the article is given due consideration in its own right. There is a lot of indisputable knowledge of the working of the cerebral cortex and hippocampus presented in a lucid way and illustrated with a clear diagram. The theoretical implication of CA3 in consciousness takes up only part of the article and can be further discussed, but such discussion already takes place at length in the referenced articles in what are considered reputable journals.195.226.152.202 (talk) 14:11, 19 February 2018 (UTC)


 * that discussion is for that article and not here. Take it there please. Arnoutf (talk) 15:46, 19 February 2018 (UTC)

Erroneous definition of "philosophical zombie"
The first section includes this passage:

"the philosophical zombie, which is defined as a being whose behavior and function are identical to one's own yet there is "no-one in there" experiencing it."

Philosophical zombies are not about whether or not there is "anyone in there". It is not even clear if this means anything.

A philosophical zombie is defined as a being whose behavior appears identical to a normal human being from the outside, but who has no experiences. (Not whether there is "anyone in there".)

I hope someone who is expert on the subject will fix this.2600:1700:E1C0:F340:EC07:25F3:43AA:4398 (talk) 21:02, 21 July 2018 (UTC)


 * I think you are right, and my solution is to simply get rid of that sentence. It was added by an IP editor in 2016, and I never thought it was very helpful for explaining the concept of consciousness. In any case zombies are dealt with in other parts of the article in a way that I hope you will think is more valid. Looie496 (talk) 22:56, 21 July 2018 (UTC)

Observer
From the article: "Consciousness may have a determinative role in quantum mechanics. Since consciousness is the primary aspect of an observer"

Even wikipedia page Observer (quantum physics) says: ''In quantum mechanics, "observation" is synonymous with quantum measurement [...] A number of new-age religious or philosophical interpretations of quantum mechanics, notably "consciousness causes collapse", give the observer a special role, or place constraints on who or what can be an observer. There is no credible peer-reviewed research that backs such claims.'' Observer is not a conscious human, it's a measuring device. Humans cannot even possibly directly observe micro-level quantum effects without mechanical help. Machine does the measuring which causes a wave function to collapse. Then, say, it can print the results of observations for you if you wish. And only then you, a conscious human, will finally see them. But clearly a function collapsed long before that.

Let alone the fact that the very statement "consciousness is the primary aspect of an observer" is wrong. I can stare blankly but still be an observer (in its common meaning). My eyes will still receive beams of light and process them into signals, it's just these signals won't be immediately analyzed since the brain is busy thinking about something else. Representation of consciousness from the seventeenth century by Robert Fludd, an English Paracelsian physician

I removed this part, you're right, it was complete nonsense. Seirl (talk) 17:03, 22 February 2019 (UTC)

/*/*Change first lead sentence*/*/
Change: Consciousness is the state or quality of awareness or of being aware of an external object or something within oneself. Change to: Consciousness is observation of one's inner and outer life. (semantically comprehensive meaning), go for the consensus, thanks...Arnlodg (talk) 00:21, 23 March 2019 (UTC)

Beyond the term?
What of conceptions on what we know as consciousness that predate modernity and the etymology of the Latin based term? While the modern concept of consciousness is most precise and current, doesn't the object of its semantics and of modern philosophy and psychology also appear in different ways in earlier conceptions of our perception and being? Reading Plato's Republic, for example, he appears to present the soul as composite of reason and the senses, or consciousness plus whatever other aspects the corresponding Greek term (psyche?) may imply. Who is like God? (talk) 06:54, 25 June 2019 (UTC)

make page: Inner experiencing or experiencing
Consciousness is the result of a process of informational interactions.

You mean "inner experiencing".

You confuse "inner experiencing" ενδοβιωματικότητα, εσωτερική βιωματικότητα with consciousness / συνείδηση / συνειδητότητα.

consciousness is the process

and inner experiencing is the way it is experienced by the individual.

Naming things is extremely important in order to understand them.onsciousness is the result of a process of informational interactions.

You mean "inner experiencing".

You confuse "inner experiencing" ενδοβιωματικότητα, εσωτερική βιωματικότητα with consciousness / συνείδηση / συνειδητότητα.

consciousness is the process

and inner experiencing is the way it is experienced by the individual.

Naming things is extremely important in order to understand them. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.84.218.128 (talk) 18:41, 11 July 2019 (UTC)

Something "it is like" ???
These are the first two sentences of the first section:

"Consciousness is the state or quality of sentience or awareness of internal or external existence. It has been defined variously in terms of qualia, subjectivity, the ability to experience or to feel, wakefulness, having a sense of selfhood or soul, the fact that there is something 'that it is like' to 'have' or 'be' it, and the executive control system of the mind."

The fact that there is something "it is like" to have or be it??????????

It's fine to quote Thomas Nagel or the innumerable people who have also quoted his saying that there is "something it is like" to be a bat or whatever.

It is not fine to call that a fact when it's not even clear that it means anything at all.

Please don't call that a "fact" unless you can back that up. It might be possible to back that up with evidence or logic. BUT: It is certainly not in the slightest bit even clear what that means no less whether it is true.

It is a fact that that phrase is often quoted. That is very far from showing that it has any meaning, no less anyone's knowing what it means, no less whether its meaning is a fact.

And no, I'm not just being picky.

Please!2600:1700:E1C0:F340:950:A92F:9ED1:E535 (talk) 04:33, 9 September 2019 (UTC)


 * Sentence starts "It has been defined ...."   We are not commenting on what is right or wrong - did you have an alternative proposal? -Snowded TALK 05:34, 9 September 2019 (UTC)

Intro is hung up on "definitions"
1. WPedia is not a dictionary, so there is no obligation to start an article with a simplistic definition, especially when a couple of sentences later it becomes 'difficult to define'. The so-called 'phenomenon' of Consciousness is difficult to describe or explain, and I think that's what the intro should emphasize. 2. Does any author's name deserve to be in this Intro? I think the "familiar...mysterious" quote can be used more economically without mentioning names. Horsense (talk) 13:33, 17 September 2019 (UTC)

Merge articles
The articles defines consciousness as being synonymous with awareness and attention, with links to the respective articles. But if they are synonymous shouldn't those articles be merged? Since this article seems to be the most complete one (and even goes on to cover the content of the others) shouldn't the other articles be deleted and substituted by a redirecting to this one? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 201.150.156.54 (talk) 00:11, 6 September 2020 (UTC)

Insights which might be worth considering are at SentientArtificialIntelligence.com / IshikiAI.com.
I offer a systemic core mechanism theory for consciousness plus artificial conscious entity engineering details at SentientArtificialIntelligence.com / IshikiAI.com. While I'm confident in the insights I present there, as the author of the site I can only suggest others consider whether the work is worth reviewing in this talk page or mentioning in the article in some measure.

The engineering details section of my site is incomplete but may be mature within a couple of weeks. I expect to begin software development work as I complete the final section's composition work. Cheers! -- H Bruce Campbell (talk) 10:46, 21 February 2021 (UTC)

Indian Philosophies on Conciousness
there has been no mention of Indian philosophies like Advait philosophy given 1000 years back talking about conciousness. Ashup987 (talk) 17:51, 6 June 2021 (UTC)

Internalism and externalism
Philosophy link in Wikipedia 75.82.19.242 (talk) 22:14, 7 July 2021 (UTC)