Talk:Controversies surrounding Robert Falcon Scott

Creation of article
This is a sub-article to the Robert Falcon Scott biography page, dealing with the controversies around his reputation which developed in the last quarter of the twentieth century and which have remained a fertile area for debate among polar historians. The amount of available relevant material easily justifies a separate article, and to judge from the main article's talkpage there is significant interest.

The article has been created as an outline, based on the main polar literature. It has in general been lightly cited, since the content might expand and change considerably. The article structure is provisional and can likewise change.

It may eventually be appropriate to transfer additional material from the main article, to avoid duplication. Brianboulton (talk) 17:04, 19 April 2009 (UTC)

Some additions and changes
I have taken the freedom to change the introduction a bit. While "The Last Place on Earth" follows generally Huntford's narrative, it seems to me that the authors of the docudrama also consulted a variety of other sources. At least it can be said that it attenuates some of Huntford's most questionable allegations. E.g. it doesn't seem to make references that Clements Markham was gay and that Kathleen Scott had an affair with Nansen. But above all, Huntford suggests that Scott preferred to let his two companions alongside him instead of letting them go on alone because he had nothing to look forward to if they would make it back. Such unfounded speculation to destroy Scott's reputation is largely absent in the docudrama. Another point I have added is the book Diana Preston. It is used as a source in articles related to the Terra-Nove-expedition. She defends Scott so consequently that it gives the impression that this is her main objective. --Hansbaer (talk) 07:46, 14 June 2011 (UTC)

Krzysztof Sienicki's Work
As mentioned in the Robert Falcon Scott Talk page, I have added, sourced, and expanded on Sienicki's work. I handled it as carefully as I could, given the shattering implications of his conclusions. 96.42.255.124 (talk) 23:48, 2 November 2011 (UTC)

It is interesting that Sienicki's results are roughly in line with the Cherry-Garrard measurements at One Ton. Solomon in "Coldest March" quotes only 3 C-G temperatures below -30 F (C-G in fact recorded _only_ 3 sub -30 temperatures while at One Ton - See Simpson "Meteorology, vol III"), but she completely ignores the fact that C-G was also recording temperatures 10-20 degrees higher than those recorded by Scott on the same days at the same times of day. Solomon claims that the 3 measurements "...provided proof beyond a reasonable doubt that temperatures had indeed been persistently below -30ºF." It has always been very difficult to see how this could be so when the data as reported by Simpson directly contradicts her claim. Also, as Solomon notes, C-G did not think March 1912 was particularly severe. It is Simpson who makes the claim that the March weather was unusual. However, Simpson bases this partially on C-G average temperatures in which Simpson excludes all of the C-G mid-day temperature measurements (typically the warmest of the day) as he explains in "Meteorology, vol I". He does this because C-G did not make use of a minimum thermometer to get the lowest night temperatures while at One Ton, and Simpson feels that including the mid-day temperatures would bias the average temperatures too warm. As far as I am aware, no one has ever been able to reconcile the C-G One Ton data with Scott's data without claiming that one, the other, or both falsified their data. (PH012 (talk) 00:21, 27 November 2011 (UTC))

It's now a bit moot, because I've now removed the section, after waiting over a month for my request on the Talk:Robert Falcon Scott page to have my additions here be removed, as they were not judged good enough for the main page. 96.42.255.124 (talk) 20:24, 8 December 2011 (UTC)

Sienicki's Work Now Published In Peer-Reviewed Journal
Sienicki's recent research about Captain Scott's weather has now been published as part of a collection of notes about polar meteorology in PROBLEMY KLIMATOLOGII POLARNEJ (The Issues of Polar Meteorology), a peer reviewed journal about polar meteorology produced by Gdynia Martitme University.

Link to abstract: http://ocean.am.gdynia.pl/p_k_p/pkp_21/21-a02.html Link to PDF: http://ocean.am.gdynia.pl/p_k_p/pkp_21/Sienicki-pkp21.pdf

Now that his work has been published in a peer reviewed journal, I believe that we should reconsider it for inclusion in this article and the Robert Falcon Scott article. 96.42.255.124 (talk) 16:52, 3 January 2012 (UTC)

Semi-protected
I have semi-protected this article and the related Robert Falcon Scott article for a month, as an IP user (who is quite probably a sock puppet of the blocked User:Calamitybrook) has been making disruptive edits on both. I am aware that this IP user thinks anyone else who edits here is me, sorry about that. If another admin wants to unblock (since I am tangentially involved), I will not wheel war (though I would appreciate a detailed explanation why). Thanks to everyone who keeps this article free from vandalism, and sorry I am not around on WP much anymore. Ruhrfisch &gt;&lt;&gt; &deg; &deg; 17:28, 29 January 2017 (UTC)

...and blocked again. Ruhrfisch &gt;&lt;&gt; &deg; &deg; 20:39, 13 March 2017 (UTC)

Ruhrfisch's faulty assumption
Ruhrfisch's judgment, in this case at the very least, is demonstrably at fault. I'm the "sock puppet" of the blocked user "Calamitybrook" and I haven't visited this article in many many moons until today!!

But he needn't apologize for being "not around on WP much any more."

Really I don't care much about this article, though I noticed under the heading "reasons for criticism" there was a recent editing issue. Somebody (Ruhrfisch?) wants to include under this heading, "reasons for NOT criticizing, " -- which seems illogical, assuming acceptance of the existing structure.

The entire business here about conflicting points of view here is unsurprising. Hundreds of thousands of people have seen the artistically powerful BBC docudrama based on Huntford's book. Many have also read "Worst Journey in the World." Both involve the reader/viewer on an emotional level.

Then there's the Boy Scout-Queen & Country contingent, probably a smaller group, but on average, more committed.......

What I object to here currently is misunderstanding this vaguely "post-modern" view of history cited by the article, AS IF it were saying there's no "truth" to be found in history, and this somehow lets Scott off the hook. What I'm unsure of is whether this misunderstanding stems from the authors cited, or the readers doing the citations. Badiacrushed (talk) 21:04, 27 February 2017 (UTC)

Regarding the "discovery" of Scott's Instructions for the dogs in Evans Book: South with Scott

 * I doubt you'll find anyone else more willing to wade through these incoherent screeds to try and work out what on earth you're on about, but any other editor reading this talk page can comment. Pinkbeast (talk) 23:41, 9 April 2017 (UTC)

Again with the personal attacks.... I guess that this can be summarised and the rest deleted.

Regarding the quotations used from Evans book South with Scott.

Scott did not issue any "orders" for the dogs.

He issued a series of instructions which he made clear were to be interpreted according to circumstances.

"In all that follows I want you to understand clearly that you should proceed according to your own judgement rather than the letter of these instructions, where the further information you possess may cause it to be more expedient."

The quote widely circulated by Karen May is misleading when taken out of context from Scott's entire notes.

About the first week of February I should like you to start your third journey to the South, the object being to hasten the return of the Southern unit and give it a chance to catch the ship.

The date of yor departure must depend on news recieved from returning units, the extent of the depot of dog food you have been able to leave at One Ton Camp, the state of the dogs, etc.

Assuming the ship will have to leave the Sound soon after the Middle of March, it look as though at present you should aim at meeting the returning party about March 1st in Latitude 82 or 82.30"

Scott continues by placing a lower priority on this task than that of provisioning One Ton Depot with rations.

You will of course understand that whilst the object of the third journey is important that of the second is vital At all hazards three X.S. units of provision must be got to One Tom Camp by the date named, and if the dogs are unable to perfom this service, a man party must be organised" This is really the only part of his entire instructions for the dogs that reads as a direct command.

By omitting this passage from her observations Karen May paints a false picture of what Scott had directed others to do.

As it turned out, these rations were taken to One Ton Camp by man hauling, presumably as Meares and the dog teams returned from the South much later than was originally planned, because Scott took them an extra 400 miles South.

Scott's directives regarding the Dogs are titled 4. Instructions for Dogs Teams. this is not my invension is is factually accurate, if anyone would care to actually read the book. There can be no citation for the claim that these were written as orders. Therefore it would be correct to change the word orders to instructions in the main body of the text.

If anything the reading of South with Scott reveals more about Scott's failure to communicate concise instructions to his subordinates, to establish a clear plan for his own return and allow any kind of safety margin in his provisions.

Regarding "unseasonally low temperatures"
"Analysis of March 1912 meteorological data has been used to suggest that Scott and his party might have been primarily the victims of unusually severe Antarctic weather rather than of bungling and incompetence." Is there a source for this?

Referring once again to Edward Evans' South with Scott the following passage would appear to contradict the above theory and would have certainly made Scott aware of the conditions he should have been prepared for.

"What strikes me here is the dreadful similarity in weather condition, wind, temperature etc., surface and visability to that which culminated in the great disaster of our Expedition and resulted in poor Scott's death exactly a year later. Here is a day taken haphazard from my diary.

From corner camp to Hut Point March 18th 1911

Called the hands at 6.15 and after a fine warming breakfast started of on ski. The light was simply aweful and the surface very bad, but we did six miles, then lunched. After lunch carried on with a strong wind blowing, but after very heavy dragging we were forced to camp when only nine miles had been laid behind us- we really couldn't see ten yards. Just after we camped the wind increased to about force 6, alternately freshening up and dying away, and a good deal of snow fell. 32.5 below zero.

One year later Scott was facing weather conditions almost identical but the difference lay in that he has marched more than sixteen hundred miles, was short of food, and his party was suffering from the tragic loss of their two companions"

Evans further adds "When Scott found that we sledgers were getting temperatures as low as minus forty he decided to discontiue slegding rsther than risk anything in the nature of severe frostbight assailing the party and rendering them unfit for further work."

In all fairness to the events that unfolded, Scott did not intend to remain exposed to the elements beyond March 15th. That he did so is central to the controversies that this wiki page addresses. However,it is remiss to make the claim that he was subject to unusual weather conditions that he would not have been aware of.

Oates, badly suffering from frosbite died on March 17th The other 3 struggled on making 5 miles a day until their final camp on March 21st also suffering from severe frostbite that Scott had taken precautions against the year before.

I notice that this page is semi protected now and I am aware that I am not well practiced in making edits myself. So I would ask that those who are able to edit to look upon this information and use it to produce a more balanced view of this subject based on available verifiable sources and without subjecting myself or amyone else to scorn or personal attacks.

I realise ther eis more information here than is practical to insert into the article but I have quoted the relevant passages from the book in their entirity to avoid any continued back and forward disputes.

If someone is interested enough to find a source for the original statement in the article and produce a concise counter view based on Evans own observations I have posted here, I think that it would lend more accuracy to the page. 86.165.179.188 (talk) 10:48, 9 April 2017 (UTC)

We took risks and we knew we took them.
Scant attention has been paid to Scott's last message to the public in the issue between"Scott the bungler" and "Scott the meticulous planner" There is the evidence of "Scott the self admitted, calculated risk taker"

"The causes of the disaster are not due to faulty organisation, but to misfortune in all risks which had to be undertaken. 1. The loss of pony transport in March obliged me to start later than I had intended, and obliged the limits of stuff transported to be narrowed."

This was a risk not taken lightly. To delay the start meant that missing the arrival of the refief ship was a real concern. Even if they reached the Pole first, Amundsen might get back to the outside world with his version of events 12 months earlier. On March 17th 1911 Teddy Evans recorded temperatures on the barrier of -32.5f. When the temperature quickly fell to -40f Scott then decided to call a halt to further barrier travel to prevent a real threat of severe frostbite. The earliest Scott planned to return to Cape Evans was March 10th with the aid of the dogs. By foot he was not expected until March 18th. The very day that he had determined that there was a real threat of severe frostbite the year before and the very day that he became virually incapasitated by it. Scott could not afford to lose a single pony before he had made sufficient progress South. The Motor Party and dogs left on October 24th, the Ponies on Novemeber 1st. Even when the motors broke down early on route, Scott sent men out to assist in moving the loads rather than risk the ponies. This cost him 8 days, increasing his planned return from earliest 2nd March (The day Oates first suffered from Frostbite) - the later March 10th (The day Cherry-Garrard left One Ton Depot) His options were to leave early and risk total failure or to arrive back later and hope that the weather remained exactly the same as the year before and that his men were still able to cope until the very last day. Scott trusted the strength of his men at the end of the journey rather than the strength of his ponies at the start of his journey. Alternatively he was prepared to risk his men returning at all, than risk having to abandon the attempt prematurely.

2. The weather throughout the outward journey and especially the long gale in 83.s stopped us. This is less clear. Scott continued beyond 83s and to the Beardmore Glacier with food spare to take an extra man to the Pole. He was ahead of schedual when he returned to 82.0 S on February 27th. No doubt with perfect weather he would have been able to arrive there faster, but perfect weather should not be the contingency plan. Low Temperarues set in about 14 days earlier than the previous year. This both affected the progress of the dogs beyond Hut Point after February 13th and the progress of the men beyond 82.0s after February 27th. These are the risks Scott alludeds to at the very last. Risks he took with eyes open rather than blundering into. He speaks of hardihood, endurance, courage to stir the heart of every Englishman, but it was in these qualities that his risk taking proved he and his men unable to match the demands placed upon them. 109.155.245.118 (talk) 16:52, 5 March 2018 (UTC)

Please let go of your British pride
And please, take the arguments in this talk-page serious. You have to live with the facts. 1. that R. F. Scott was not a great organizer. 2. That he was not a great leader. You all know that Nansen tried to convince the British as far back as Shackletons "Nimrod"-expedition, that they should use dogs for transport. You all know Scotts reaction. The whole expedition shows only the immense British hubris at this point in history. I don't know if they even tried out their motor-slegdes in similar environment, e. g. in Greenland. 80.108.31.28 (talk) 16:25, 10 January 2024 (UTC)