Talk:Cult of the offensive

Ferdinand Foch
Doesn't the page on Foch say that he was against the cult of the offensive, and that he was horrified that people used his ideas to support them? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.4.200.52 (talk) 02:40, 18 March 2008 (UTC)

Schlieffen Plan - cult of the offensive?
To characterise the Schlieffen Plan as an example of the cult of the offensive is to miss the key strategic element of the plan. The aim was to avoid fighting on two fronts by securing victory in the west before Russia could complete mobilisation. Rjm at sleepers 06:36, 17 September 2007 (UTC)
 * This is, however, what our refs state: .--Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus 14:30, 17 September 2007 (UTC)
 * That reference says, "The Schlieffen Plan, names after the Chief of Staff who took the position in 1909, envisioned a rapid victory against Belgium and France, giving German forces time to move across to the East in order to confront Russia before it had time to fully mobilise." Incidentaly, the writer of that reference does not actualy agree that the cult of the offensive was a primary cause of World war I. Rjm at sleepers 06:08, 18 September 2007 (UTC)

Well, the Schlieffen Plan was certainly offensive since it envisioned a quick knock-out of France. Made on a very wide scope of the war it could be considered defensive, but as a campaign it was offensive.

Origins
More could be said about the origins of the cult. Specifically, military theorist like Jomini and Clausewitz (who preferred the defensive, but still thought attacking was the key to victory). Also, the lessons of mobilization from the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian wars, which taught you had to mobilize quicker than the enemy and attack him first if you wanted any chance of victory.

There were also societal and cultural implications in how the military viewed the usefulness of the average conscripted soldier.

I was extremely surprised to not see Tim Traverse "The Killing Ground" listed as a reference. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.146.15.198 (talk) 20:16, 25 September 2012 (UTC)

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Probably needs to be split into neater sections
This article significantly conflates and bounces around among probably three distinct levels of what it means to have a "cult of the offensive" and how this term has been used historically.

1. International relations- offensive realism and the idea of the preventive war for political/economic/strategic reasons. For example, as Germany we know Russia is industrially developing fast and getting richer by the day and their rail network and military capacity to concentrate troops in the west is getting stronger. France is weaker than us but they have Russia as an ally and are getting close to the British. We have failed or are for structural reasons unable to break that coalition. We must beat them now and reshape the world in the aftermath. Or many historical variations of the theme. This is at the geopolitical/geostrategic and grand strategic level.

2. Top-level war planning- The enemy mobilizes slower than us so we must attack to take advantage. Or the enemy mobilizes faster but will attack in sector b and we have an opportunity to attack first in sector a, catching them off guard. Or we have two enemies and attack one of them to kill them first and then tackle the probably harder enemy. Or, we have numerically inferior forces but we can concentrate local or regional superiority but must attack fast to take advantage. This is from the grand strategic through the strategic to the operational level. Or, we have a lot of stuff stockpiled and can win if we attack first without let up, but our enemies would eventually grind us down if we don't kill them first.

3. Assumptions about the effectiveness of weapons and tactics- eg. local concentrated force will always break the lines. ARtillery will always break the lines allowing our forces a breakthrough. Cavalry will always overcome the enemy's positions/lines. Offensive force firepower from artillery down to automatic weapons will overcome the same forces playing defense. Tanks will always overcome defenders, even other tanks. To paraphrase Patton, "Fixed fortifications are monuments to the stupidity of man. If mountain ranges and oceans can be overcome, anything built by man can be overcome." Or, indeed, the bomber will always get through.

You see that there IS significant crossover among these three levels, and any one country and its forces can have all three, or any two, or degrees of any or all of them at any given time. But they also are not the same and they often are not found together.

In WW1 the Germans and the French had all three, but the Germans skewed more to 1 and 2 and less to 3, the French less to 1, and a but more to 2 and far more to 3. Random noter (talk) 20:19, 19 March 2019 (UTC)