Talk:Decline and fall of Pedro II of Brazil

Military decline section
There a few points in the military deterioration section that I'd like you to make a few changes:


 * 1) "However, most did so as members of the Conservative Party and Liberal Party. This meant that their political careers were apt to come into conflict with their duty as officers to act in subordination to the civilian government, which could be in the hands of their political opponents." Well, that's is quite correct. For example, in the War of the Triple Alliance, the Duke of Caxias, who held the commander in chief of the allied forces suffered heavy critics in the newspapers from the liberal, who also were in power at that point, only because Caxias was a conservative. However, perhaps you could expand that sentence by adding that that "mix" of military and politician carrer did not harm the Brazilian political stability. What I mean is that in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Colombia, Venezuela and other Spanish-American countries when the military got involved in politics they did it with threats to democracy: they conspired to take power, to lauch coups, to stabilish dictatorships, etc... In Brazil, on the other hand, a military who was also a politician did not truly blend his both careers. When he went to the senate, he acted as a politician, not as a military. He did not threaten the government nor democracy. Ow, I just remembered some good examples: George Washington, Ulysses S. Grant and Dwight D. Eisenhower were all military officers but none of them ever threatened using troops to take power or to use against political enemies. One thing was their political career and another one was their military career. Got it? So, you could you somehow explain that in the text a little better?
 * 2) "Until this point Brazilians, both civilians and military, shared a sense of pride in the nation's political stability and for having avoided the caudillos, coups, military dictatorships and rebellions that characterized other Hispanic-American countries." You put an "other" word when you wrote "other hispanic-american countries". You should remove it because someone who reads it will believe that Brazil is an hispanic-american country when it is in fact a Portuguese-American country. Its neighboors are hispanic-american countries.
 * 3) "They were completely unprepared for the military life and saw their superiors as their owners or foremen." Could you somehow expand this one? The historian from where I got this information meant that the non-officers, that is, the soldiers were mainly poor Brazilian with little education and little capability of understanding civics. A poor Brazilian from the northeast would see his harsh superior and officer as nothing more than a henchman of the political boss from the region he came from. An ex-slave would see his harsh superior and officer as nothing more than a man who acted as his former owner or as a foreman (a henchman from slave owners who kept an eye on slaves). That is, they were man who weren't capable of understanding that they would be part of a coup, nor that they would act against the emperor, nor that they would create a dictatorship. They just blindly followed orders and hoped that they wouldn't be punished for any mistake.

That's it! I hope someone who never read about the subject could be capable of understaning it. Neither the emperor nor the politicians were capable of perceiving that things were changing. From inside a kind of virus was undermining from the foundation to the top of the military. Insubordinate military became more and more audacious while the politicians refused to see it as a true issue believing that they were isolated problems. An old emperor who did not care to rule anymore, a weak and careless heir who did not care for her own future reign and politicians that were too busy focusing on the slavery or anti-slavery campaging were too late to notice that the military had became a threat for democracy. The young cadets that learned from Benjamin Constant the positivism ideals of a republican dictatorship were the same who later as generals would lauch the 1930 coup who would make Getúlio Vargas a dictator for 15 years. And the cadets of 1930 who followed their generals would later be the generals who would lauch the 1964 coup that would create a dictatorship that would last for 21 years. It is all connected, as you can see. Unfortunately, I don't have the time to write about the history of Brazil as a republic. But if you are curious, it was Ernesto Geisel, son of German immigrants and fourth president of the 1964 military dictatorship who ended military anarchy in Brazil.But that is going to be the work of someone else to write about it! Regards, --Lecen (talk) 19:53, 25 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Those are interesting observations. I have changed "Hispanic countries" to "neighboring countries" and want to ask about your other points when I have time later today. &bull; Astynax talk 22:30, 25 March 2010 (UTC)


 * regarding 1: I am not certain that I see the difference clearly enough to make an explanation. Nations deal with the potential for military interference in different ways. In the U.S., military officers who oppose or campaign against their Commander-in-Chief (the President) are regarded as commiting insubordination. Officers who are seen as doing that can be dismissed (viz. Douglas MacArthur). Active duty members of the military are prohibited from engaging in political activities, and leave the military before seeking office (including Washington, Grant and Eisenhower).
 * I don't know what the Brazilian laws said during that time. But I am thinking that the principle was perhaps similar, even if the rules are different. Under Brazil's constitutional monarchy, I am assuming that a cabinet minister was not the top commander, but rather that the Emperor was the ultimate military commander. So perhaps it was OK to criticize some politicians, but it was not OK to broadly criticize the government (and by implication the Emperor) or decisions personally endorsed by the Emperor. This seems to me to be a reason that statements were often made which were critical of policies, but made a part of language supporting the Emperor? I don't know if the Brazilian Empire had laws prohibiting lèse majesté, which might be another reason? Or perhaps it was only the loyalty of the older generals which prevented political involvement from becoming a problem, and only later this became a weakness when officers did not have a personal attachment to the Emperor and the constitutional system?
 * regarding 3: I think you put it very well yourself. I've shortened your comments a bit, and think that replacing that sentence with something like this might work...
 * They were completely unprepared for the military life and had little education and little concept of civic responsibility or government. A poor Brazilian from the northeast viewed his military commanders in the same light as the henchmen of the political bosses at home. An ex-slave would saw his harsh superior officer as differing little from his former owner and taskmasters. They had no means of understanding that they were being used to effect a coup, that their orders put them in rebellion against the emperor, or that their actions would lead to a dictatorship. The average recruit blindly followed orders and hoped to avoid punishment by his superiors for any mistake.
 * Comments are welcome. &bull; Astynax talk 07:00, 26 March 2010 (UTC)


 * I shall go by points:
 * Active duty members of the military are prohibited from engaging in political activities, and leave the military before seeking office (including Washington, Grant and Eisenhower).
 * And so Brazil after it became a Republic. Military officers can not engane on political activities while staying on active duty.
 * Under Brazil's constitutional monarchy, I am assuming that a cabinet minister was not the top commander, but rather that the Emperor was the ultimate military commander.
 * Well, let's say that the chain of command was something like "Emperor -> President of the Council of Ministers -> Minister of the War -> Military officers" In the War of the Triple Alliance, when Pedro II went to Rio Grande do Sul oversee the campaign operations on first hand, he took with him the then minister of the War to countersign whatever orders he gave. The relation between the emperor and the cabinet and the military officers is not a simple one. The emperor avoided giving orders or taking actions without the consent of the cabinet. Both decided together what should be done. Even so, as "civilians", they did not interfer in the military strategies. That is, they gave a general order like "You must subdue the rebellion in Pernambuco must have to be careful to calm down everyone and not to make the conflict a true bloodbath". How the military would conduct the military operations was up to them. If a general would send a batallion through area A instead of area B that was his own problem. The cabinet and the emperor would, at most, ask the general to hurry or complain if the campaign was not going as they expected or similar.
 * So perhaps it was OK to criticize some politicians, but it was not OK to broadly criticize the government (and by implication the Emperor) or decisions personally endorsed by the Emperor.
 * No, no, it was ok to do all that. For example: the duke of Caxias as a senator but also a marshal of the army could make critics to the liberal cabinet in a session of the senate. However, what changed in the 1880s was that the military were not making only criticisms. The Viscount of Pelotas, also a senator and also a marshal of the army, (there were only seven marshal of the army in the Empire) went as far as to walk in the tribune and in a session threat the cabinet and the emperor by saying that he would be capable of using troops to overthrown the monarchy if he felt the need. Here is what it says historian José Murilo de Carvalho:
 * "He [Pelotas] extrapolated all limits when he declared in the senate, backened by his political office, that the military did not had any confidence anymore in the government and in their name threatened the emperor himself with expulsion from the country, if their demands were not accepted. The situation was an absurd and unacceptable: Pelotas felt offended as a military and used the political shield of the senate tribune to threat, with military force, the country institutions. The autority of the government became demoralized." (Carvalho, 2007, p.198)
 * As you can see, things had changed. Until then, the military who were politicians could support or criticize the government. The difference now was that some threatened the country institutions. And they did that openly. The emperor and the government mistake was to believe that was nothing more than boasting. When the emperor heard that the military had launched a coup in 15 November, what did he say to his wife? "I know my countrymen, when I arrive there it will all be over". Times had clearly changed. He was not capable of noticing that. Worse: he always, always refused to do anything against the insubordinate military. He even helped them! Once, a young cadet called Euclides da Cunha broke his sword when the minister of the war was visiting the military college and yelled "Hail to the republic!". He was expelled from the school and the emperor when he heard about it put the young man in another college, but this one, civilian. No wonder that they loved and respected the emperor even though they were republicans.
 * Or perhaps it was only the loyalty of the older generals which prevented political involvement from becoming a problem, and only later this became a weakness when officers did not have a personal attachment to the Emperor and the constitutional system?
 * That is also true. But as you will see once I begin working on the "Exile and death of Pedro II" article that many military stood by the emperor's side and several rebellions were caused by them as they tried to reinstate the monarchy. Not all were republicans and/or insubordinate.
 * I don't know if the Brazilian Empire had laws prohibiting lèse majesté, which might be another reason?
 * Yes, there were. However, the emperor never allowed anyone to be persecuted for that. Republicans were seen throughout the country not only speaking about republic in the streets but also calling for the death of the imperial family by a fire squad. Many complained with the emperor that that was something that could not continue but he did not care. Why he did not care? Several reasons: he did not care about the monarchy anymore; he was himself a republican (yes, Pedro II was a republican and I will touch on that on the "last year" section); he did not believe that anyone could act against him, etc...
 * I think you put it very well yourself. I've shortened your comments a bit, and think that replacing that sentence with something like this might work...
 * Yes, you could put that in there. Regards, --Lecen (talk) 15:20, 26 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Thanks for these additional points. I should have remembered that the Emperor was personally shy and did not like to enforce his perogatives. I will try to make a suggestion later tonight when I have some time. &bull; Astynax talk 18:45, 28 March 2010 (UTC)
 * How about expanding the existing sentence to something like the following...
 * This meant that their political careers were apt to come into conflict with their duty as officers to act in subordination to the civilian government, which could be in the hands of their political opponents. Earlier involvement in politics by members of the military had not threatened the stability of Brazil's institutions, due to pervasive loyalty to the monarchy and constitution. The conflict of interest in mixing military and political spheres became more obvious and threatening as support for the constitutional establishment eroded among some elements within the military, although neither the emperor or government seem to have grasped the extent and implications of the increasing involvement of members of the military as political dissidents.
 * Is that supported by the sources already used for this paragraph? &bull; Astynax talk 08:08, 29 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Not in such a precise and direct way as you wrote, but yes, it is supported. In fact, what you wrote explained very, very well. --Lecen (talk) 13:13, 29 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I have put it into the first paragraph of the section. The wording is somewhat awkward, but it is not a simple idea. Perhaps another editor will stop in and make it easier to read, or maybe I will look at it again later. &bull; Astynax talk 06:32, 31 March 2010 (UTC)


 * I believe it is well written. I'll try to begin working on the remaining sections later on. --Lecen (talk) 13:54, 31 March 2010 (UTC)

Economic growth
Does anyone know whether the amounts given by Soder are in 1880s money or in today's reais for the growth in Brazil's international trade and national revenue? This is in the first part of the "Decline" subsection. &bull; Astynax talk 16:38, 6 April 2010 (UTC)