Talk:Douglas Haig, 1st Earl Haig/Archive 1

To Do
This is the basic outline of what needs to be done.

World War I
Early encounters text needs to be substantiated with references; I adapted much of the text from John French, 1st Earl of Ypres.
 * Early Encounters
 * Tensions quickly arose between Haig and French. Haig and Lord Kitchener, who was now Secretary of State for War, clashed with French over the positioning of the BEF. French argued to the war council) that it should be positioned in Belgium, where he had confidence in the country's many fortresses, while Haig and Kitchener proposed that the BEF would be better positioned to counter-attack in Amiens, stating that the BEF would have to abandon its positions in Belgium once the poorly-equipped Belgian Army collapsed, forcing the BEF into retreat with the loss of much of its supplies. During an inspection of Aldershot, Haig told King George V that he had "grave doubts" about French's competence.


 * Stalemate (maybe another name)
 * 1915-early 1916


 * The Somme and Passchendaele


 * Spring Offensive


 * Counter-offensives: The final months (might need a better title)
 * Second Battle of the Marne and Hundred Days Offensive — Preceding unsigned comment added by SoLando (talk • contribs) 12:05, 1 November 2005 (UTC)

Style issue discussion
There is a discussion going on here whether or not the first sentence of a biographical article should contain the full name of the individual and include any post nominal initials (eg. VC, KCB, OBE) or whether these should be relegated to later in the article. I have tried to point out that this is standard style and part of their full titles but there are “readability” concerns. This arose because of the Richard O’Connor featured article and one possible solution, a biobox, is now in place on that page. Please make your opinions known.Dabbler 12:25, 2 January 2006 (UTC)

Haig's post-war charity
Haig's treatment of ex-servicemen post-World War I certainly contradicted his actions during the war. His dedication to the welfare of ex-servicemen post-war certainly contrasted with his apparent lack of compassion and understanding of what they were enduring when he was Commander-in-Chief of the BEF. Why the sudden change? Guilt, perhaps?? SoLando (Talk) 14:17, 30 October 2005 (UTC)


 * I think you're right, it was guilt from a man who led so many of his countrymen to death. 147,000 Scots died I believe, which made Scotland second only to Serbia in terms of deaths per head of population. He couldn't have failed to have noticed the devastating effect this had on the country, particularly on rural communities. In every village in Scotland, no matter how small, there is a memorial listing the names and the lists always seem to be huge for the size of the communities. Leithp 14:48, 30 October 2005 (UTC)

This is disgusting to read. Why would there be a need for Haig to feel any more guilty for his actions than other Commanders from any other country in WW1? Why can't credit be given to the man for doing something good without finding a reason to denigrate him. It's a good thing this is on the talk page and not in the article. Anomaly 54 19:01, 11 September 2006 (UTC)


 * About the only good thing I can say for butcher Sir Doug, is that there were worse commanders in that war than him. For instance- Robert Nivelle, Charles Mangin were argueably worse. One could also point to any number of lesser known, Italian, Turkish, Austrian or Russian commanders who were worse than Haig as well. But Haig remains very much a 19th century general in a 20th century war. He might have been great at Waterloo or on the Alma or at Ulundi, but on the Somme and at 3rd Ypres (or "Wipers" as the Tommys called it) he was a disaster. Though it may be highly inapproriate here to make a reference to light opera, I cannot help but think of Gilbert and Sullivan's Major General Stanley-"For my military knowledge, though I'm plucky and adventury, Has only been brought down to the beginning of the century...". So in this, I think Haig was more like unto Stanley than General Melchett. He certainly did not want or intend to become a "butcher", but he was thrown into circumstances for which his tactical mindset was unsuited, so he unwillingly became one. And it haunted him the rest of his days--R.D.H. (Ghost In The Machine) 16:36, 30 October 2005 (UTC)


 * Can I just thank both of you (yet again! :-)) Yes, his post-war knowledge of the sheer extent of the United Kingdom's losses (especially Scotland) must have had a tremendous effect on him, not to mention the fact that Haig was (I think) deeply religious. I hear his diaries give a fascinating insight into the man (if only they could be accessed online!). Speaking of when/where Haig could have been a "good" commander, do you think Haig might have had reasonoble success in the Middle East? His experience with the cavalry could have bore him in good stead in a region where the cavalry still maintained its importance. Though, of course, he'd of never accepted commanding such a "lowly" theatre. Well, the article is looking much better than it did a mere week ago. If you guys don't want to delve further into the article, I'll most certainly understand :-) Thanks for your work, guys! SoLando (Talk) 05:17, 31 October 2005 (UTC)


 * I doubt that he would have been better than Allenby in the middle-east. Haig was, famously, quite dense and I don't think he would have been as innovative or diplomatic as Allenby. That said, Haig was confined by the nature of the technology available to him and even the best WWI commanders took horrific casualties on the western front. Leithp 08:52, 31 October 2005 (UTC)


 * Allenby and Haig did seem to share one unfortunate trait, which Haig has often been criticised about - the inability to verbally communicate what they wanted in an understanble manner. This is from Haig's intelligence chief John Charteris (who is just as controversial - known, among other titles, as Haig's "evil counsellor"):


 * ''Allenby shares one peculiarity with Douglas Haig, he cannot explain verbally, with any lucidity at all, what his plans are. In a conference between the two of them it is rather amusing. D.H. hardly ever finishes a sentence, and Allenby’s sentences, although finished, do not really convey exactly what he means. Yet they understand one another perfectly; but as each of their particular Staffs only understands their immediate superior a good deal of explanation of details has to be gone into afterwards and cleared up.


 * I remember hearing Lord Kelvin lecture. He had just the same peculiarity and had a sort of Greek chorus in the form of an assistant who explained in very broad Scotch exactly what Lord Kelvin meant. The only difference then was that the comments and chorus went on at the same time as the main motif. At these Army conferences no on dares to interfere, and all clearing up has to be done afterwards. All the same, Allenby’s preparations are as perfect as anything can be in war, and the Chief looks forward to a very big local success to-morrow.


 * It's quite an ironic statement when you considered they seemed to be such rivals, yet seemingly (at least according to Charteris) knew exactly what each other was attempting to convey. If Allenby really did suffer from this, which no commander wants, then he circumvented it through iniative, vision, charisma and the adoption of more innovative tactics - just like you said Leithp :-) Haig's lack of tact created too many acrimonious relationships, which blighted him throughout his tenure as Commander-in-Chief. I personally think he could have had success in the Middle East region - maybe Mesopotamia. Though Charles Townshend seemed to be a good commander (though his experiences as a POW contrasted predictably with that of his troops), he didn't appear to wield enough influence to prevent himself being pressured by the Indian Government into a push on Baghdad, while Haig had the ear of King George V (I hope that doesn't prompt any jokes relating to Haig's nickname ;-)). Yes, I know i'm clutching at straws here, but I always want to see the best in someone, that every indivudual has their worth - even "Butcher" Haig. SoLando (Talk) 10:47, 31 October 2005 (UTC)


 * This inability to communicate is, I think, something of a trait among British WWI and WWII commanders. In WWII Wavell (Allenby's biographer oddly enough), Auchinleck and Alexander were all accused of it. The best of the British generals in WWII learned from the mistakes of WWI and made a point of explaining plans clearly to their officers and soldiers. Montgomery, Slim and Horrocks being notable examples of people who were able to communicate clearly. Sorry if this is a bit off-topic. Leithp 11:20, 31 October 2005 (UTC)


 * Considering that, I'm amazed there was never anything during the period along the lines of: "Be a Loyal Briton - Don't Talk Coherently!" (Could have been part of the whole "Careless Talk Costs Lives" series in WWII :-D) Speaking of Slim, he is personally my favourite general. His article really needs expanding. It's quite remarkable how The Auk, Wavell and Alexander (if they really did "suffer" from this trait") circumvented communication problems to be (IMO) really capable commanders. By the way, I love to regularly get off-topic (who doesn't? ;-)). Regarding this article, I was going to put one of those "to-do" templates on here, but I think there only needs to be a new section below. SoLando (Talk) 12:05, 1 November 2005 (UTC)

Winter
Whatever one thinks of Winter's book, it is widely read, and meets Wikipedia requirements for being a reliable source. "Wikipedia articles should cover all major and significant-minority views that have been published by reliable sources."--Toddy1 (talk) 06:52, 3 July 2009 (UTC)
 * I do not currently have access to Correlli Barnett's article in the Times Literary Supplement (19 April, 1991) where he criticises Winter's methods, which included "the misidentification of documents, misquotation of documents, the running together of passages from different documents without identification in any form that the material is from  different sources, and misdating of material" in order to make them fit his thesis. Other historians further corroborated Barnett's criticisms. Surely that means it is not a reliable source?--Johnbull (talk) 11:20, 7 July 2009 (UTC)
 * Barnett's hardly one to talk - he's gone on record that in his earlier works he got things wrong (he started out as an "Easterner"), and when his methodology and research for The Desert Generals came under attack from Nigel Hamilton (the biographer) he dismissed it as "nonsense" without explanation. I will see, however, if I can dig out the T.L.S. entry you refer to. --Simon Harley (talk | library | book reviews) 12:53, 7 July 2009 (UTC)

Football Team
The link to the disambiguation page reads "For other persons named Douglas Haig, see Douglas Haig (disambiguation)." - but the only other wiki article linked on the disambiguation page is about a lower league Argentine football team.

Should the link therefore read "For other uses, see Douglas Haig (disambiguation)."? This is used elswhere on wiki - but its not completely consistent from the small number of pages i've looked at. Is there any particular style protocol which would apply here?82.39.190.209 (talk) 22:47, 20 January 2010 (UTC)

Mess/POV
This article has two sections labelled "popular opinion", neither of which contain popular opinion, but rather the views of politicians and others. Then there is a separate section on popular views of Haig. I will consolidae these. Paul B (talk) 13:39, 9 February 2010 (UTC)
 * I think this article has actually gone "down hill" considerably in the last year or so. It used to address Haig's biographical details with a focus on his legacy that had most of the POV as to his reputation reasonably well balanced. This article now reads instead like a piece written by a bunch of apologist fanboys. While I'm not a strict subscriber to the Anti-Haig camp, I believe things have been skewed far too much, and this article is neither balanced nor NPOV. I'd place a Neutrality tag, but the article has been protected Xlh (talk) 09:21, 31 May 2010 (UTC)


 * I am requesting a Neutrality tag be placed on this semi-protected article and for there to be some restoration for some of the more negative critique of Haig that has been removed - As it stands the current pro-Haig bias in this article makes it seem more like an essay or blog in his defence. There at the very least needs to be some more substantial detailing of exactly why his reputation remains controversial, which means detailing those criticisms of his performance during the Great War without it being immediately followed by some selectively POV text as to why those criticisms aren't valid. Xlh (talk) 07:50, 1 June 2010 (UTC)

Not done: The editsemiprotected template is for non-autoconfirmed users. Is there something preventing you from making these changes yourself? Celestra (talk) 12:26, 1 June 2010 (UTC)
 * Apologies Celestra, I misunderstood the level of protection on the page... My bad :) Xlh (talk) 12:28, 4 June 2010 (UTC)


 * User:Xlh's comments are inflammatory and complete nonsense. Its can easily be cited. Then the tag can be removed. What you believe is irrelevant. I'm citing it from now one, so any complaining can be avoided. Dapi89 (talk) 20:59, 29 June 2010 (UTC)
 * The notion that simply because an article can be correctly cited, that automatically means it's free of POV is what I would call complete nonsense. What I believe is not any more or less irrelevant than what you do. If you can explain as to why this article hasn't become POV by logically explaining point-by-point why the criticisms of Haig have been deleted one-by-one then by all means, remove the tag. Otherwise you're just as inflammatory and as nonsensical as you accuse me of being. I'm not after an article which crucifies the man. Neither he, nor his legacy deserve that. But some balance would be nice. Xlh (talk) 07:38, 14 July 2010 (UTC)

Nickname
This article currently has two nicknames for Haig which has a dead link reference. A WP:RS reference from the National Army Museum attributing Haig with the nickname "Butcher" keeps getting removed and labelled POV. Perhaps those that continue to do this could explain their actions here. Part of the mission statement for the museum says The National Army Museum presents historical fact and it seems that one of these facts is that Haig's nickname was Butcher. Bjmullan (talk) 22:06, 21 February 2011 (UTC)
 * Whether it is a fact needs proper sources - such as published books. The web pages of many organisations are done by the office junior, whom may have some inflated job title such as "senior analyst".  Key questions about any nickname are:
 * Who used this nickname?
 * When did they use it?
 * What is the evidence that they used it?
 * The nickname his colleagues used for him when he was a subaltern might be entirely different from one his troops used in 1918. Nicknames invented for propaganda purposes probably don't belong in the infobox but could be mentioned in the text providing the context was explained, for example "British Marxist revolutionaries in their propaganda in 1917..."


 * The onus should be on people who want to add a nickname to provide adequate justification.--Toddy1 (talk) 13:55, 22 February 2011 (UTC)


 * On the other hand, your rather pompous views on the mechanics of website creation only have credence if such websites are not actually read by anyone more senior on the staff, which seems somewhat unlikely. Under normal circumstances the NAM citation would be regarded as perfectly acceptable - that you personally don't like it is immaterial. Nick Cooper (talk) 14:18, 22 February 2011 (UTC)


 * This is controversial - the NAM citation would be regarded as perfectly acceptable for something non-controversial.


 * Please do not make personal attacks on people you disagree with.--Toddy1 (talk) 23:40, 22 February 2011 (UTC)


 * But it's OK for you to pompously denigrate those who work on websites? Yeah, that makes sense.... Nick Cooper (talk) 10:55, 24 February 2011 (UTC)

I found a proper source (i.e. a book) for the nickname "The Chief": Winter, Denis, Haig's Command, a Reassessment, pub Penguin, 1992, ISBN 0-14-007144-X, p13: "'Dined with Haig and Braithwaite', wrote Guy Dawnay, GHQ's Deputy Chief of Staff in 1918. 'Chief in good humour. He is, however, the most inarticulate man I have ever met.'" Winter's book is one of the most biassed anti-Haig books available. This has been reverted by IP editor 82.43.153.113.--Toddy1 (talk) 23:39, 26 February 2011 (UTC)

A page of the website www.national-army-museum.ac.uk has been used as a source for the nickname "Butcher of the Somme" - The page cited does not use that phrase.--Toddy1 (talk) 23:56, 26 February 2011 (UTC)

Execution of 'cowards'
This guy signed the death warrant of Private Harry Farr, a man who was shot to death for having a medical problem, and likely many others. This probably deserves a mention in this article, it can't just be all praise. —Preceding unsigned comment added by TheJoak (talk • contribs) 04:41, 26 February 2009 (UTC)

Given the scale and length of the war it was inevitable that there large numbers of court martials for various offences, including cowardice in the face of the enemy. In a few cases the court martial convicted innocent people, just as civilian trials today sometimes convict innocent people. Haig had to sign the death warrants of soldiers sentenced to death. Haig took this very seriously, and apparently considered each case on its merits. This saved a great many lives as Haig refused to sign the warrant in cases where he thought that the convicted soldier did not deserve to have been shot.

The 'pardon' given to Harry Farr by Des Browne was purely symbolic. It was one given to all those executed regardless of the individual merits of the case. Des Browne told BBC Radio 4's Today programme that, after 90 years, "the evidence just doesn't exist inside the cases individually". However it was made clear that the pardon "does not affect any conviction or sentence."

Harry Farr was not "to death for having a medical problem", any more than Jean Charles de Menezes was "shot to death" for being Brazilian. The execution of Harry Farr was in some people's opinion a mistake. The evidence does not exist any more so we cannot be certain whether Farr's conviction was an error of justice. However, at the time when the evidence did exist, various people were 100% certain that Farr was guilty. These included: Maybe they were all mistaken, maybe not. However the evidence available to them at the time convinced them that Farr was guilty and deserved to be shot.--Toddy1 (talk) 05:26, 26 February 2009 (UTC)
 * Those who took the decision to arrest and prosecute Farr.
 * The court martial that convicted Farr.
 * Field Marshal Haig.

At the time individuals who were found to have deserted were shot unless there were clearly extenuating circumstances - eg. shell shock. Front line soldiers didn't have much sympathy for "deserters" either. Harry Farr is now thought by modern medical opinion to have been suffering from agonising pain caused by inner ear damage.Paulturtle (talk) 16:50, 26 June 2011 (UTC)

Reputation
The section on Reputation contains weasel words and at least one logical fallacy in attacking Churchill's comments. the article is about Haig, not Churchill. The section needs to be cleaned up and well cited. Qwy47 (talk) 17:51, 13 May 2009 (UTC)

Hang on - Churchill's comments are his opinion about Haig. The context and/or fairness of the opinion are important too - though they need citations.--Toddy1 (talk) 18:52, 13 May 2009 (UTC)

The context is that Churchill was still a major politician in the early 1920s when he wrote "The World Crisis" (unlike Lloyd George - whose serious career was pretty much over and who was just score-settling and trying to write the first draft of history when he wrote his War Memoirs in the mid-1930s - the chapter on Haig is a masterpiece of snideness and faint praise). Churchill had to be polite about Haig, who was still alive, fill his book with the sort of impractical "If I were in power I would have done X" suggestions traditional in books written by politicians, and devote as much of the book as he decently could to justifying the Dardanelles - which had been a fiasco, had almost destroyed Churchill's career and had discredited political interference in strategy. In other words he had to acknowledge that there was a case for what Haig had done, but without writing that either he or Haig had been completely right or wrong. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 171.192.0.10 (talk) 10:32, 20 May 2009 (UTC)

And, it should be added, "The World Crisis" contains a fair bit of tendentious argument about Western Front casualty statistics, for which Churchill was taken to task by Sir Charles Oman, but designed to prove that Haig was wasting human resources as we would nowadays say. The historiography of WWI statistics deserves an article to itself, but the Churchill figures were resurrected by John Mosier ("Myth of the Great War") at the start of this decade. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 171.192.0.10 (talk) 14:07, 21 May 2009 (UTC)

A good source on all this is Robin Prior's 1983 analysis "Churchill's World Crisis as History" (long out of print), which points out that Churchill was keen to praise Haig and Rawlinson for their successes in 1918 (by which time Churchill was of course a minister again), and in collaboration with the official historian Edmonds he toned down some of the criticism of the Somme (there is curiously little about Passchendaele in "The World Crisis", perhaps as Churchill was a minister by then and that offensive was a great source of vacillation and hand-wringing by the Lloyd George government). As far as impractical suggestions go, Churchill exaggerated the efficiency of the WW1 tank and made preposterous claims for how effective it could have been in 1917, and called for a second landing at Gallipoli in 1916, the latter a suggestion so absurd that he did not even make it at the time. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 171.192.0.10 (talk) 17:29, 24 May 2009 (UTC)

Very disappointed to see that a minor edit I made – including Denis Winter's name and book in the main article, rather than confining him to the booklist – has been reversed. Why? Clearly someone watching over this page thinks Winter is "unscholarly" but that is not a criticism of Winter's arguments per se; it's an ad hominem statement. Winter is using good soources (including the Australian version of various war diaries which, unlike their British counterparts, were not weeded or edited), and, so far as I can see making good use of them. It seems as though some think that anyone with a distinct point of view has "an axe to grind." I've read Winter's book through several times, and while I'm not entirely convinced there was any sort of conspiracy to conceal the truth, there is undeniable evidence he presents that various people "cleaned up" the official records of the Army in WW I, or made materials difficult to find. The evidence he does cite, in the main part of his book, shows that Haig was not just a fallible commander (which is not a mark against him necessarily; one wouldn't expect every General to be always in the right) but that he showed very little capacity to learn from his mistakes because he was, in a word, vainglorious, and therefore more concerned to protect his reputation than either to learn or to get things right. He not only tolerated officers who were not particularly good at their jobs, if he didn't like an officer, he tended to shunt them away from command and no matter whether they were good at their jobs or not. Since those who were in the front lines and were good at their jobs tended to be the ones who criticized his decisions the most, this virtually guaranteed a situation where the worst choices – or at least, not so good tactical choices as could have been made – were not only made, but made repeatedly. Haig may not have been a bad man, in any conventional sense, but his lack of intelligence, his incuriosity, his lack of real battlefield experience, his discouragement of innovation in either tactics or technology, his tendency to support and promote "gentlemen" rather than officers of proven talent and ability, are what led to the appallingly high level of casualties, and the repeated failure to devise tactics sufficient to break through the German lines. That in turn led to millions of dead. If his reputation is to be properly assessed, I think Winter's book and its criticisms need to be more thoroughly integrated into this section of the article. A paragraph ought to be enough, but to simply delete anybody's attempt to put Winter's thesis in, on the grounds that he is "unscholarly" is, to be blunt, Haigism at its worst: incuriosity masquerading as caution and scholarly good manners. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Theonemacduff (talk • contribs) 00:07, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

"(Haig')s lack of intelligence, his incuriosity, his lack of real battlefield experience, his discouragement of innovation in either tactics or technology." - whatever your opinions of Haig's (or Winter's) other merits, all of this is demonstrably false. For example Sir Douglas had served with distinction in the Boer War, whereas in the German Army you had to be Hindenburg's age (ie. called out of retirement) to have served as a junior officer in 1866 or 1870-1 - most German officers had precisely zero battlefield experience in 1914 (which perhaps saved them from making wrong deductions about the importance of shrapnel). In 1914-15 Haig commanded a corps and then an army without the tantrums exhibited by French and Smith-Dorrien, and was considered so valuable in that role that he was ruled out as Chief of Staff BEF and then as CIGS, and was an obvious choice as CinC BEF.Paulturtle (talk) 16:50, 26 June 2011 (UTC)

"what led to the appallingly high level of casualties, and the repeated failure to devise tactics sufficient to break through the German lines. That in turn led to millions of dead." Not really. Devising tactics which worked was a slow process and not as obvious they appear with hindsight. But even when skilled commanders like Plumer, Monash or Currie were in charge the casualties were much the same (contrary to myth). The difference was that as the war went on commanders got better at making at least some progress and killing Germans. In WW2 there were far more soldiers killed - but we tend to forget them, because most of them spoke Russian.Paulturtle (talk) 16:50, 26 June 2011 (UTC)

Of course records were weeded. They always are. Enormous amounts of paper are produced, and only some of it can be stored in perpetuity. Sometimes very bad choices are made in weeding. In addition, sometimes very senior officers get people to weed out inconvenient information. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Toddy1 (talk • contribs) 06:52, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

Academic Opinion
This section needs to be at least partially rewritten. Take this sentence as an example: "some of Haig's critics - who remain obsessed with the tank and the machine gun - fail to understand that throughout World War I, battles were dominated by artillery and the struggle to coordinate infantry and artillery attacks." Hardly objective. And hardly factual, too, as other commanders - e.g. Arthur Currie - managed actual successes with (by WWI standards) minimal casualties despite being ordered by Haig on suicide missions to take strategically unimportant objectives. 70.49.240.156 (talk) 23:31, 7 January 2010 (UTC)
 * I hadn't spotted that. But Haig was no fool, and missions were not "suicide". Haig didn't order any offensive without proper strategic plans. Unlike the Germans you wasted nearly 700,000 men in 1918 in an operation that had no strategic principles whatsoever. Yet their Generlas escape scrutiny. You're buying into the myth. Dapi89 (talk) 00:01, 22 January 2010 (UTC)
 * There is a swathe of academia who would agree Haig was no fool. There's also a swath of academic opinion that isn't limited to a few choice revisionists, who still maintain that while not dull or an idiot or even unimaginative, that Haig was indeed single-minded, supported true morons in the chain of command beneath him, and that while he should not be burdened with all of the ills of the British Army High Command in the Great War, he is at least partly answerable for some of it's failings. Not that you'd know it from this article, which has over the past year or so been hijacked by revisionism for revisionism's sake and turned into a big Haig-love-in. If you'll pardon the colloquialism, as it stands now, the article is POV, and looks more like a blog entry written by Fanboys. I'll note that every edit I've made to this article to insert some balance backed by notable, verifiable and reliable sources has since been deleted by mindless apologists, or the one or two remaining sentences, butchered until they no longer make sense. Not that I can so much as throw an Neutrality tag up because the article is protected. Xlh (talk) 09:29, 31 May 2010 (UTC)

" "some of Haig's critics - who remain obsessed with the tank and the machine gun - fail to understand that throughout World War I, battles were dominated by artillery and the struggle to coordinate infantry and artillery attacks." Hardly objective." Not so. I recognise that as a quote from some book of John Terraine's but I can't remember which one - it is a fair summary of the popular myth view - inspired a lot by the tragedy of 1 July 1916 - that Haig (and the other "donkeys") were idiots who sent their men to be mown down by machine gun fire because they put their faith in ineffective artillery bombardments and were too dense to wait for the tank to be invented or whatever. In fact, more intense and sophisticated artillery fire was what broke the deadlock as the war dragged on, with better-trained infantry the secondary factor. It is also the case that 60% of WW1 casualties were caused by artillery, and about 30% by machine guns.Paulturtle (talk) 16:50, 26 June 2011 (UTC)

"And hardly factual, too, as other commanders - e.g. Arthur Currie - managed actual successes with ... minimal casualties". As noted above, even when skilled commanders like Plumer, Monash or Currie were in charge the unit casualty rates were much the same (it is a myth that their casualties were "minimal"). The difference was that as the war went on commanders got better at making at least some incremental progress and killing Germans as well as killing their own men.Paulturtle (talk) 16:50, 26 June 2011 (UTC)
 * Smoke and the Fire: Myths and Anti-myths of War, 1861-1945 by John Terraine. In this war the opposition weren't Iraqi children, they were German soldiers. For as long as they could contain Allied attacks by military means they did. It was only after ermattungskrieg wore the German army and German society down, that the army collapsed (like the Russian, Austria-Hungarian, Ottoman and to a lesser extent Italian and French armies before them). PS the mud, blood and poetry school is the revisionist one, the only war fought without voice control (so a war bedevilled by communications failures) school is the original one to which academic historians have pretty much returned.Keith-264 (talk) 23:03, 15 November 2011 (UTC)
 * Casualties; Shell or trench mortar 58.51%, rifle or machine-gun bullet 38,98%, bombs or grenades 2.19%, bayonet 0.32% - p.282 OH 1916 I, fn1.Keith-264 (talk) 23:33, 15 November 2011 (UTC)

1917 and Haig's intentions for 3rd Ypres.
1 May 1917, Haig diary note of letter to War Cabinet,


 * The enemy has already been weakened appreciably, but time is required to wear down his great numbers of troops. The situation is not yet ripe for the decisive blow. We must therefore continue to wear down the enemy until his power of resistance has been further reduced.


 * The cause of Gen. Nivelle's comparative failure appears primarily to have been a miscalculation in this respect, and the remedy now is to return to wearing-down methods for a further period, the duration of which cannot yet be calculated. I recommend that the pause which is forced upon us in vigorous offensive operations is utilised to complete measures for clearing the coast this summer. Success seems reasonably possible. Powell, G. Plumer The Soldiers' General (1990, 2004 edn) p. 169. Keith-264 (talk) 10:06, 18 November 2011 (UTC)

Vice versa
"It has been pointed out that we do not have figures for men who were shot on the spot by officers and NCOs for "cowardice in the face of the enemy" or vice versa."

'Vice versa' added to remind the reader that informal killings weren't recorded so it is unwise to assume that men didn't shoot officers and NCOs for the same reason.Keith-264 (talk) 16:00, 18 November 2011 (UTC)

Thank you for the explanation. Although I now understand this I still think it ought to be made more explicit. This meaning isn't at all obvious, IMO. Britmax (talk) 20:04, 18 November 2011 (UTC)

I was wondering too, but wanted to wait until I got home to check the Holmes book from which that section is largely sourced. The book only makes mention of killing of soldiers by officers and NCOs, which was doubtless more threatened than done - but it's not an analogous situation as an officer was actually entitled to shoot a man for cowardice (still is, I was assured about 15 years ago, by a colleague who'd attended Sandhurst). I assumed you meant fragging - murdering of overzealous, vainglorious or incompetent officers by soldiers. I've only heard a few stories about this happening in the army in WW1. There were stories of it happening in the German army from the Somme onwards, doubtless seized on with relish by Haig and Charteris in their reports.Paulturtle (talk) 23:26, 18 November 2011 (UTC)
 * The point I tried to make (succinctly) was that if the article should contain speculation about informal killings, it would be wrong to assume that such a crime would only be committed by officers and NCOs, since anyone with a gun 'could' do it for any reason. I didn't much like the top-down assumption that the practice (if it happened) would parallel the official chain of command or that squaddies were mute witnesses rather than agents in their own fate. 'Fragging' connotes a dereliction of duty by the perpetrator but again that's assuming that the chain of command is functioning properly. Keith-264 (talk) 08:43, 19 November 2011 (UTC)

It might be best to find a book which mentions soldiers murdering their superiors. Holmes contains some anecdotes about officers shooting men for "cowardice in the face of the enemy" - not murder under the letter of the law as he was within his rights. Apparently there are some anecdotes about fragging in "Shot at Dawn" but I don't have access to a copy. As for soldiers murdering cowardly officers, ???Paulturtle (talk) 14:53, 20 November 2011 (UTC)
 * If I see any I'll let you know but I expect that there is even less on record than on informal killings by the management. The point I'm making is that summary acts aren't dependent on official authority.Keith-264 (talk) 16:29, 20 November 2011 (UTC)
 * How are you getting on with the reading?Keith-264 (talk) 16:30, 20 November 2011 (UTC)

He should not be praised. He led 60,000 to their death in one day alone. All while he sat in his comfy bed, eating the finest food and living in luxury. He was a fool. It was his fault that the Somme was a failure. No argument can excuse his blatant ignorance and lack of respect for his troops — Preceding unsigned comment added by 94.192.108.75 (talk) 18:59, 11 October 2011 (UTC) FUNNY, WEEKS AGO I HERE POINTED AT THE FACT THAT THIS IDIOT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR HALF A MIO. MEN'S DEATH IN FIRST WW — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.126.255.198 (talk) 13:14, 3 December 2011 (UTC)

Recent edits
There's some interesting stuff tending to contradict Travers here, The Operational Role of British Corps Command on the Western Front, 1914-18 Andrew Simpson pp. 171-177, published and also free on ethos http://ethos.bl.uk/Home.do

British Intelligence and the German Army, 1914-1918 James Beach pp. 239-253 is also interesting (same source).Keith-264 (talk) 14:14, 14 February 2012 (UTC)

http://frontforum.westernfrontassociation.com/viewtopic.php?f=42&t=510 This is the review of the Harris book.Keith-264 (talk) 14:14, 14 February 2012 (UTC)

Section on 1917 describes Currie refusing to attack Passchendaele Ridge - then attacking it for a loss of 16,000 men as predicted. Contrast this with the stunning success of the capture of Messines Ridge in June for a loss of... 24,000 men and Canadian Corps's casualties at Vimy Ridge 7-14 April of 11,297. Considering that Passchendaele Ridge was the most defended part of the German western front in late 1917, it seems just as easy to read the British operation to capture it (the Second Battle of Passchendaele) as somewhat economical in men at least as far as the Canadian Corps is concerned.Keith-264 (talk) 08:26, 24 February 2012 (UTC)

James Marshall-Cornwall's criticisms of Charteris are refuted in Armour Against Fate: British Military Intelligence in the First World War and the Secret Rescue from Russia of the Grand Duchess Tatania by Michael Occleshaw as is the myth that Haig wielded the dagger in French's dismissal.Keith-264 (talk) 08:37, 10 March 2012 (UTC)

MEMORIALS
I suggest that, in addition to mentioning the statue of Haig in Whitehall, there should also be mentioned the fine bronze equestrian statue of Earl Haig in his home city of Edinburgh. It stands close to Edinburgh Castle, and was the gift of Dunjibhoy Bomanji.M24M24M (talk) 21:03, 8 March 2009 (UTC)

Suggestion: Add Earl Haig Public School, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, built 1922. I attended this school and there is a bust of Earl Haig in the school lobby. Note that this school is different from Earl Haig Secondary School. Link to school webpage: http://www.tdsb.on.ca/SchoolWeb/_site/ViewItem.asp?siteid=9989&menuid=6057&pageid=5262

Thank you. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Unknownfte (talk • contribs) 17:12, 20 March 2012 (UTC)

Field Marshal Haig as a Great British Soldier
On this subject, I agree with RCPaterson. MacLennan123Maclennan123 (talk) 18:06, 1 May 2012 (UTC)

Australian and Canadian units
Seem to be described in terms of allied units rather than part of the BEF. Keith-264 (talk) 20:39, 4 July 2013 (UTC)


 * I don't understand what you're getting at. Do you mean the fact that had become semi-autonomous by 1918? If you make your point a little more clearly, I'll have a look at it.Paulturtle (talk) 08:48, 6 July 2013 (UTC)


 * They were corps in the British army not allied armies. Dominion contingents were not "semi-autonomous" by 1918 (although Dominions were) they were under the command of the British army same as metropolitan corps. Delegation of command in 1918 followed FSR 1909 not a political agenda.Keith-264 (talk) 08:57, 6 July 2013 (UTC)
 * That is an exaggeration. I'm not sure about the relevance of FSR 1909 - Haig was fond of quoting it when it suited him - and also capable of interfering when it suited him, although often not in in writing and admittedly not so often by this late in the war. The Dominion Corps were under the command of their own generals by this stage and answerable to a certain extent to their own governments, who had manpower issues of their own and were in separate contact with the British government. It was dotted-line reporting in modern corporate parlance - Mr Haig, the London manager, would have to be a bit wary in his dealings with Mr Currie on secondment from the Canadian office and regularly reporting back to Toronto - Mr Currie would be expected to cooperate and do as he is told within reason, but Mr Haig could not simply order him around on pain of sacking the way he could Mr Haking or any other British colleague, lest Mr Currie complain to his boss in Toronto, who would in turn have words with Mr Haig's boss. This was true even of the final attack on Passchendaele, where Haig had to ask Currie to do the attack as a favour rather more politely than he would have asked a British general. Anyway, this is one of those interminable and ultimately fruitless arguments - if this were a battle article they would be shown as little flags indented under the British one. People would certainly, and rightly, object if they were written about as if they were simply an integral part of the British Army the same as British corps.Paulturtle (talk) 09:37, 6 July 2013 (UTC)


 * The Dominion corps commanders had a right of review by their governments as Haig had one to London vis-a-vis Joffre and Foch but the non-OZ and Canadian commanders were as willing to question Haig's orders as Monash, Currie and the commanders of the metropolitan corps. No doubt every subordinate chafes at "interference" from above and every superordinate resents "insubordination" from below but when Haig gets criticised for not "gripping" Rawlinson on the Somme for his laissez-faire management and for not gripping Gough for dictatorial methods (often by the same writers) I'm reminded of why military historians are derided as third-rate intellects in a third-rate branch of the trade. If Haig really asked a favour of someone you quoted refusing the gig, why did Currie relent? As for the CC's casualties in the 2nd Battle of Passchendaele, they're comparable to Canadian loss rates at Hill 70 in August, fought in sunshine. There's a debate about infobox flagicons if you're interested and although there may have been some differences between metropolitan and colonial corps they were under command and that applies to the German kingly armies too. Keith-264 (talk) 10:01, 6 July 2013 (UTC)
 * Debates about Rawlinson and Gough are not really pertinent to this discussion, but leaving aside for a minute debates about how dictatorially-run the BEF may or may not have been, any sensible boss, in any walk of life, allows a certain amount of debate, banter and giving of unsolicited advice from his direct reports provided the job gets done and direct orders are carried out - it's how man-management works. The point is that by the late stages of the war Haig could not simply have fired Currie or Monash the way he could in extremis have sacked a British general. If he had done, or if Currie had not been given the resources he wanted to attack Passchendaele Ridge, there would have been political trouble. Anyway, I really don't see what purpose this discussion is serving. And no, I'm not interested in a debate about infobox flagicons, other than to observe once again that people - not all of them Australian and Canadian - would sooner or later would, quite rightly, complain if the Australians and Canadians of 1918 were being written about as if they were exactly the same as British units.Paulturtle (talk) 10:36, 6 July 2013 (UTC)


 * Definitions of pertinence aren't really your province, particuarly when I replied to your question. I will look on your Haig page efforts with interest but stop bothering you with constructive criticism.Keith-264 (talk) 10:55, 6 July 2013 (UTC)


 * Charming.Paulturtle (talk) 12:40, 6 July 2013 (UTC)

Comments

 * Douglas Haig, 1st Earl Haig Another British Field Marshal. Please update assessment. Thanks. Dormskirk (talk) 21:44, 29 June 2013 (UTC)
 * The Haig biog is still a bit of a work in progress - there is minimal coverage of the Somme and Third Ypres, for the simple reason that it was getting very long. Somebody has kindly "created" the detailed sub-article for 1918 which was lurking in cyberspace for the last year, but the sub-articles for 1916 and 1917 aren't really ready yet. My plan was to slim the coverage of 1918 in the main article down to easy-to-read summaries some time in the next week or two. But if somebody wants to do an interim assessment, be my guest.Paulturtle (talk) 22:48, 29 June 2013 (UTC)
 * Thanks. I think it would still be very useful to have an assessment of the article as it stands now (having undertaken a load of work to improve the referencing). If you subsequently want to slim down the 1918 section I certainly would not have a problem with that. My focus is on getting the article up the quality scale. Best wishes. Dormskirk (talk) 23:14, 29 June 2013 (UTC)
 * Where's Gary Sheffield when you need him? Basically, it's B class, but very uneven. For example, it says far too much about Cambrai, and not nearly enough about the other fighting in 1917. You probably should put it up for Peer review, but I'll post more extensive commentary on the talk page on the weekend. Hawkeye7 (talk) 22:10, 4 July 2013 (UTC)
 * I had a shufti at the 1916 and 1917 sections and felt that they leaned too heavily on de Groot and Travers. I think their views are fair enough as views but not in isolation.Keith-264 (talk) 22:26, 4 July 2013 (UTC)
 * It would be great to have the assessment and the commentary. Many thanks for reviewing it. Dormskirk (talk) 20:56, 5 July 2013 (UTC)
 * Those are all (or mostly) fair comments, but there is a good reason for all of them. 1916 and 1917 are - as discussed above - simply not finished and can eventually be rewritten when the blow by blow sub articles for those years are ready (I tend to flit between biog projects for the sake of my own sanity and boredom threshold). The reason Groot was used as the main hook for the narrative was that he is a critical academic biographer and before I began work on it (spring 2011 iirc) the article had been tagged for pro-Haig bias, and I deliberately wanted to make sure the (informed) case for the prosecution was properly covered rather than building on a haig-iographer like Sheffield or Terraine. As so often in WW1 studies, and especially when looking at the top level of decision-making, one does at some point have to outgrow "revisionism" and recognize that the myths, if not strictly true, did in fact grow up for a reason. If you check out the detailed 1918 sub-article you'll see Sheffield used very extensively there. And there are plenty of other good books to be gone through as well - as I said, it's still a work in progress really.Paulturtle (talk) 08:39, 6 July 2013 (UTC)


 * I would like to see those sections develop to describe the spectrum of views so that the reader can decide. I don't think Sheffield or Terraine are Haig-ographers so much as sympathetic within the context of the "traditional" sources of information, as P&W, Harris or Travers aren't. I'm much more convinced by the work of Simpson, which exploded the myth of a totalitarian army manipulated by an inept puppet master by lookiing at contemporary records, Brown who did the same to explicate the supply difficulties and remedies of the BEF, Beach who used them to take BEF military intelligence out of the Charteris ghetto and Green who went some distance in rehabilitating the OH as a credible source (he's as useless and anti-Haig as Sheffield on 3rd Ypres). There's a little more writing in English now about the German army, which has changed it from an anonymous monolith to something which can be used as a comparison. With Philpott resurrecting the French on the Somme, Sheldon shedding light on the Germans and Bean proving an unexpected trove of verbatim translations of German writings (among his other qualities) a comparative analysis can at least be attempted (Sheldon's Cambrai book makes the "ubermilitary" German General Staff look like refugees from a soap opera.).

The description of top-level decision-making in de Groot could be true for all I know but the sections beg the question of environmental constraints - politics, production, manpower, climate, incompatible weapons and equipment, differing capability and differing rates of change of capability in the French and British armies etc. I gave up trying to find a published mainstream on matters like this because there isn't one. I'd like to get away from "pro- or anti- Haig" by emphasising description (wie es eigentlich gewesen) and keeping historiography and explanation seperate. I think the Haig page is a lot better than when I first looked at it and made my earlier comment in that vein.Keith-264 (talk) 09:41, 6 July 2013 (UTC)
 * This discussion is getting rather lengthy, and should probably be moved to the article's talk page at this point. Thanks. Parsecboy (talk) 10:41, 6 July 2013 (UTC)


 * Agreed, and many of the arguments, new as they may seem to some, have been raging since 1916, so I’ll try to be brief. Terraine was notorious for his special pleading and highly selective presentation of evidence. Sheffield (at least in books aimed at the general reader) suffers from this to some extent, although not so badly. The sort of books discussed above do tend to give a superficial impression that all was hunky dory in the BEF stable, but the criticism of Haig’s decisions is there for those who care to read more closely (e.g. Beach discusses extensively how Third Ypres was conducted on the basis of “sexed-up” intelligence that Germany was on the verge of cracking, Sheffield & Todman discuss how both the Somme and Third Ypres went on too long, how Charteris was too busy looking for “strategic” intelligence of German manpower breakdown, how reports of the muddy ground at Third Ypres reached GHQ but were not acted upon as others were telling Haig what he wanted to hear – a classic example of a supposed “WW1 myth” which probably actually isn’t, or at least not entirely).


 * I agree about keeping facts and analysis separate as far as possible – there is, or will be, plenty of discussion about historians’ analysis. I certainly don’t regard myself as either pro- or anti-Haig – anyone calling him an incompetent moron will get short shrift from me, but then so will anyone who is so dazzled by the “revelation” that the Germans suffered casualties on the Western Front, that he hasn’t yet noticed the elephant in the room, namely that by the end of 1917 the Western Front was at last accepted on both sides to have reached stalemate until the Americans were ready (instead the Germans attacked first to pre-empt this) and that Britain’s western front commitment (relative, at any rate, to what was politically feasible in the UK, and in the end events took a different turn) was about to be scaled back drastically. That is why the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of the 1916-17 offensives has always been open to debate and they have never been defended unequivocally by historians – and into that gap grew up the myths that they were “disasters” or that Haig was a moron.


 * There actually is a lot of common ground in Haig biogs these days once one gets beneath the differences in tone – he deserves a lot of praise for presiding over the development of the BEF into a highly effective fighting force, a certain amount of praise for the Hundred Days (but only a certain amount as he had shouted the odds several times too many in previous years), and a certain amount of valid criticism for his command record before that, even if one accepts (as I do) that he also did a lot of things right and strategically was stuck between a rock and a hard place.Paulturtle (talk) 12:40, 6 July 2013 (UTC)


 * "Third Ypres was conducted on the basis of “sexed-up” intelligence that Germany was on the verge of cracking" Ludendorff, Rupprecht and Kuhl thought the same, hence planning to abandon the channel coast. Beach described an ebb and flow of battlefield gleanings, which flooded in during offensives and long-range inference about Germany being debated with the War Office, not Charteris being a popinjay. Somme and 3rd Ypres - Ancre was as big a success as Broodseinde and Ludendorff treated the "disaster" of Poelcappelle as part of the Black Day period of early October. "Reports of the muddy ground at Third Ypres reached GHQ but were not acted upon" really? Why did the offensive stop until 20 September and from 12 October - 26 October? Why did Haig note weather conditions in his diary? If 3rd Y "went on too long", how did the BEF bring off Cambrai and the Italian job? Attacking the Germans forced costs on them which were winning the war, stopping allowed at least a partial recovery. Terraine used the information widely available at the time - OH, divisional histories, memoirs, biographies and autobiographies, same as everyone else. What you can claim about him I can claim about Lloyd George and Churchill. Sheffield does much the same, as does Harris but with some reference to relatively recent research from archive material and with more reference to the Germans. If there was a consensus in 1917 that the western front was a stalemate I'd like to see it, the sources seem to me to describe a dynamic equilibrium dependent on the rest of the war (Russia especially) that was breaking down - ermattungskrieg was bringing Germany to defeat and the eastern front peace dividend offered a last throw of the dice. This process began long before Haig's command and the British contribution was less than those of France and Russia, which makes some of the English-language writers look a little provincial. Tidying the Somme page the other day left me acutely aware of the mutual influence of Verdun, Brusilov and the Somme on the Allies and the Germans. With Foley, Philpott and Doughty available ( a small but valuable field) and the Canadian translation of Der Weltkrieg still possible, there may be room for a comparative history of late 1916. Keith-264 (talk) 13:22, 6 July 2013 (UTC)

Marshall-Cornwall
I suggest that Beach pp.229-232 could be a useful source on the tale of Charteris's role in the Cambrai counter-attack.Keith-264 (talk) 14:58, 6 July 2013 (UTC)

Scrambled copy
Passchendaele: 'The first of his objectives was to commit a large contingent the German Army to Belgian Flanders, away from the Aisne sector in France, where the aforementioned mutiny was worst, in order to give the French time to recover.'Clarification, please. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Valetude (talk • contribs) 10:54, 24 July 2013 (UTC)


 * As discussed above, the 1916 -17 coverage is nowhere near finished, but have tidied a little (I never wrote that bit in the first place). It refers to the claim that Third Ypres was necessary to pin German resources in Flanders - not just infantry but shells and the railway resources needed to move them, as battles by then had become giant artillery duels - to stop them attacking the French Army, who had "mutinied" - in practice, gone on strike, threatened their officers, and refused to make any more pointless attacks - in the spring. The need for Britain to launch some kind of attack was a certainly a factor in political-military discussions in May-June, but on the other hand Haig's ambitions for Third Ypres were a lot more grandiose than that - he hoped to put the cavalry through and liberate the Belgian Coast within weeks, along with a seaborne landing, and he hoped that German manpower would run out altogether and enable him to win the war by the end of the year. Haig later claimed that the French had been begging him to carry on attacking in the autumn of 1917, for which claim solid evidence has never really been found. The problem is that there is little evidence that the Germans ever knew much about the French mutinies or planned a major offensive (iirc they cancelled one or two smaller ones, but we're not talking Verdun here), Haig's writings at the time show him mentioning that the French were in a fit state to defend, and indeed the French mounted some successful limited offensives later in 1917. So "it's complicated" - he didn't completely invent that motive as his critics, even as far back as the 1920s, alleged, but it probably wasn't his primary aim either.Paulturtle (talk) 11:09, 27 July 2013 (UTC)
 * It wasn't the campaign details that I was concerned about -  only a sentence that didn't make sense. It appears to say that Haig had to 'commit a large contingent the German Army to Belgian Flanders', when it was clearly not for Haig to commit the Germany army to anything. Probably just an incomplete sentence. Valetude (talk) 14:20, 27 July 2013 (UTC)

No worries.Paulturtle (talk) 22:55, 28 July 2013 (UTC)

Conscience/consciousness
The following passage contains the phrase "faint stirring of consciousness", which seems to make no sense in context. Either it's an error for "faint stirring of conscience" or is shortened from "consciousness of guilt" or some similar phrase. I don't have access to the source text:
 * Lloyd George's biographer John Grigg (2002) attributed his vitriol to a guilty conscience that he had not intervened to put a stop to the Passchendaele Offensive. John Terraine also found some "faint stirring of consciousness" in the "shrill venom" with which Lloyd George sought to "exculpate himself", after he had destroyed trust between politicians and soldiers by the Nivelle Affair,

The source should be checked, if anyone has access to it. Paul B (talk) 22:30, 4 March 2014 (UTC)


 * "consciousness" (of how he had destroyed trust between politicians and soldiers by the Nivelle Affair) is correct. "Consciousness of this", in fact. Paulturtle (talk) 22:31, 19 April 2014 (UTC) Now amended.Paulturtle (talk) 12:30, 22 April 2014 (UTC)

Summary of historiography needs attention from an expert
This article remains heavily biased in favour of its subject. Unfortunately, this seems to be an irremediable flaw with Wikipedia. Articles about controversial characters are guarded by dedicated apologists. If you look at the comments, the number of times that (generally unspecified) criticisms of Haig are accused of being "lies" or "myths" tells its own story. There are also a large number of patronising comments about how "proper" or "professional" historians are more positive about Haig. This the "all true Scotsmen" fallacy. AJP Taylor and Adam Hochschild (for example) are, whether wrong or right, unquestionably professional historians who are unremittingly scathing about Haig. Finally, throughout the comments there are references to Haig having "won the war" (presumably, through his decisions to mount large scale attacks). This is at best one thesis, and a controversial one. Some historians may say this, whilst others say (for example) that German defeat was primarily an unexpected and unintended consequence of Germany's inability to obtain resources, or of their own irrational and disastrous decisions to launch attacks.

More specifically 1) the historiographical summary at the start seems to be contradicted by the article itself. It says: "Haig has since the 1960s become an object of criticism for his leadership during the First World War. Some called him "Butcher Haig" for the two million British casualties under his command, and regard him as representing the very concept of class-based incompetent commanders, stating that he was unable to grasp modern tactics and technologies." "However, Major-General Sir John Davidson, one of Haig's biographers, praised Haig's leadership[9] and since the 1980s some historians have argued that the public hatred[6] in which Haig's name had come to be held failed to recognise the adoption of new tactics and technologies by forces under his command".

This implies a development in thinking about Haig from negative (60s) to positive (80s and after). Yet the main work cited in Haig's defence (Terraine) is from 1963. Surely it would be better to say. "Haig's decision-making in World War 1 has been highly controversial since the 1920s".

2) The article repeatedly asserts that Haig was positively regarded in his lifetime. This may be generally true. However, all statements to the effect that noone thought badly of him before then ought to be deleted. For example, "Criticism of Haig began in the memoirs of politicians". This is not true. Anti-war campaigners criticised Haig during the war. Censorship prohibited most public criticism of the war effort, and organised propaganda promoted a positive view. However, even some soldiers nevertheless criticised him. The article points out that Lloyd George wanted to accept his resignation in April 1918. It is therefore not feasible that "criticism began in the memoirs of politicians". — Preceding unsigned comment added by PTSN (talk • contribs) 10:30, 16 May 2014 (UTC)


 * Do you have any references to support your views? It seems to me that there is truth in the historiographical claim that until the late 20s the orthodoxy was that the war against Germany was a great test of state and society, that the buck-passing game began after Haig died, resumed after the other war and has been steadily superseded by a counter-revisionist thesis, which takes into account information not available to earlier writers, such as intelligence information, empirical studies into ways and means, analogies with WWII and the emotional distance that a century can bring. Lloyd George is an unreliable narrator, particularly in his own cause (as is Churchill); publishers like nice little earners and don't want them to be upset by better sourced and researched writing which questions the mud, blood and futility narrative and German and French writing on the war is rarely used by English speaking writers, with exceptions like Philpott, Foley, Humphries & Maker.Keith-264 (talk) 12:35, 16 May 2014 (UTC)

I'm not making an argument about Haig or  the war, I'm making an argument about the article. The article appears to have a historiographical thesis to do with changing trends in the perception of Haig. If this is all true, it surely merits a separate article (at least a separate section) with all the relevant attestations. I think this would require the citing of scholarly works that deal specifically with the issue of Haig's supposedly changing reputation. This article would, no doubt, address the question of the massive campaign of propaganda and censorship during the war that e.g. resulted in the Daily Mirror reporting Passchendaele as a "Complete Success". It's well beyond my powers, and would require an expert. If we are merely concluding ourselves, based on the works cited as examples of the trend, that there is a trend, this is original research.

I quote the absurd statement in the article "Criticism of Haig began in the memoirs of politicians" to point out how far the historiographical thesis has been pushed. As well as not really belonging in the article, the thesis is stretched beyond reason. To be retained, this statement would be need to be footnoted with a work that has concluded that there was no prior criticism of Haig. How this work would deal e.g. Milner's description of Haig's plans for 3rd Ypres as "really lunatic", or soldier's letters, I'm not sure.


 * Go to it! I don't know much about Milner apart from him being willing to sell out South Africans to the Boers but if he wrote that he was an ignoramus. I suppose it needs a decision as to how serious criticism was - normal moaning about the management, opportunistic manoeuvrings, considered strategic differences. During the war who would be privy to such information? Certainly not squaddies. Passchendaele was a tactical and operational success but a strategic failure, which may have succeeded had the weather been better, certainly in August when it was exceptionally wet. I have some reservations about the page but Wiki writers are limited by their sources. The changes in the scholarly and writerly views of the war and of Haig's place in it do roughly fall into three periods so any article based on such sources will need to acknowledge them. If you want to revise the section with better ones, no-one will moan (much). ;O) Keith-264 (talk) 16:15, 19 May 2014 (UTC)

I've done a drive-by c.e. of that section and think that it could be improved by a section on his wartime reputation first, which would meet some of your objections. I think that that the chronological survey is OK except for the usual misunderstanding about the difference between knowing what to do and having the means to do it. Fire-power warfare isn't brain surgery, the French had most of the answers by the spring of 1915 (see Second Battle of Artois for But et conditions d'une action offensive d'ensemble [16 April 1915] and Note 5779) and attrition warfare was much less bloody than the manoeuvre warfare of 1914 and 1918. History of the Great War has an essay on 3rd Ypres and the historians who've analysed it; Travers is nearly as wrongheaded as Winter by the way.Keith-264 (talk) 17:03, 19 May 2014 (UTC)

PTSN: “This article remains heavily biased in favour of its subject. Unfortunately, this seems to be an irremediable flaw with Wikipedia. Articles about controversial characters are guarded by dedicated apologists.”


 * That’s not the case here - nothing should be going in the article unless sourced to reputable books. The problem with Haig was that he was calumnied in popular mythology in recent decades, although that seems to have died away a bit lately, but nonetheless any article based on actual history attracts occasional complaints (bit like Oliver Cromwell) from those who come here and don’t find what they want to find. He was also overpraised by dafter military history enthusiasts, who in every generation usually imagine that they are studying the latest “research” even if what they are reading is largely a rehash of the exaggerated claims made by Haig and his apologists during and after the war. To put my own cards on the table, I remember ranting on some internet site about fifteen years ago about how Third Ypres was necessary because of the French mutinies, and people who knew the subject better than me explained as patiently as they had to that there is little evidence (if not quite none) that this is so and plenty that Haig had deluded himself, on the basis of dodgy intelligence, that Germany was about to run out of men and that he could win the war that year. I thought it was the most ridiculous conspiracy theory I’d ever heard – and yet it is perfectly well-documented and has been public knowledge since the 1930s. People who study the First World War tend to follow a notorious learning curve from Haig-basher to “revisionist” to mature understanding, and it’s usually blatantly obvious what stage people are at.

“If you look at the comments, the number of times that (generally unspecified) criticisms of Haig are accused of being "lies" or "myths" tells its own story. There are also a large number of patronising comments about how "proper" or "professional" historians are more positive about Haig. Finally, throughout the comments there are references to Haig having "won the war" (presumably, through his decisions to mount large scale attacks). This is at best one thesis, and a controversial one. Some historians may say this, whilst others say (for example) that German defeat was primarily an unexpected and unintended consequence of Germany's inability to obtain resources, or of their own irrational and disastrous decisions to launch attacks.”


 * Many of the things popularly believed about Haig are myths – e.g. that he was an opponent of the development of tanks, machine guns or other technologies – the exact opposite is in fact the case. The article does not specifically claim that Haig “won the war”, nor would it be appropriate for it to do so, although occasionally military history enthusiasts fall into the trap of making this assertion. As you quite rightly say, the implosion of Germany in the second half of 1918 had many causes, and the degree to which Haig’s western front offensives (with which Milner and the rest of the British government had completely run out of patience by the end of 1917) contributed towards it remains a matter of debate, and probably always will.

"Criticism of Haig began in the memoirs of politicians"


 * This was just sloppy writing, although it is fair to say that criticism really got going in the interwar period.

“The article appears to have a historiographical thesis to do with changing trends in the perception of Haig. If this is all true, it surely merits a separate article (at least a separate section) with all the relevant attestations. I think this would require the citing of scholarly works that deal specifically with the issue of Haig's supposedly changing reputation. This article would, no doubt, address the question of the massive campaign of propaganda and censorship during the war that e.g. resulted in the Daily Mirror reporting Passchendaele as a "Complete Success". It's well beyond my powers, and would require an expert.”


 * The historiographical thesis is broadly correct and belongs in the article as it tends to be discussed in biographies of Haig. What is missing, and should redress the balance of the article a bit, is the informed critique of Haig’s record in the middle years of the war. As discussed above, modern biographies of Haig (Sheffield, Harris, Reid, Mead etc) tend, whatever their stance on the man, to concur that 1. Far from being the cretin of popular myth, he was an able man (key jobs before the war, helped set up the TA, calm commander in 1914 retreat and First Ypres, got on well with the French despite privately venting in his diary, enthusiast for new technologies, important work with the British Legion in the 1920s) 2. He deserves a certain amount of credit for the Hundred Days, but only a certain amount as he had shouted the odds a few times too many in previous years and 3. He made a series of important mistakes in the middle years of the war, most of which boil down to overestimating how close Germany was to defeat and Britain’s capacity to bring about that defeat. That doesn’t make him “incompetent”, but it does mean that few historians – even people like Sheffield and Philpott nowadays - have ever really defended his command record at the Somme and Third Ypres unequivocally. This, and his lack of a charismatic public persona, made him an Aunt Sally and in recent decades a public hate figure.


 * I have a sub-article about his reputation brewing, but it’s not going to get finished just yet. A number of the biogs of WW1 generals (French, Robertson, Wilson, Gough) are almost entirely written by me, although whether I’m an “expert” I’ll leave to others to judge.

Keith:

“the usual misunderstanding about the difference between knowing what to do and having the means to do it. Fire-power warfare isn't brain surgery, the French had most of the answers by the spring of 1915 (see Second Battle of Artois for But et conditions d'une action offensive d'ensemble [16 April 1915] and Note 5779) and attrition warfare was much less bloody than the manoeuvre warfare of 1914 and 1918.”


 * This is nonsense, and the misunderstanding is yours. The point is that only lip service was paid to French best practice, and under Haig’s leadership the British followed overly ambitious plans, making the offensives in the middle years of the war costlier and less effective than they needed to have been. Surely you are aware that at the Somme Rawlinson wanted to attack the German second line a few days after the first, and Haig - based on the supposed nearness of breakthrough at Loos - wrote "we can do better than this", and ordered the shelling of both lines in the hope of attacking the second line on the afternoon of the first day (admittedly you have to read the documents closely in places), and that this was the single most important cause of the catastrophe which befell the northern sectors of the British attack? That, along with the pressure which he put on Gough at Third Ypres, goes to the heart of the informed critique of Haig, although how far it was personally his fault and how far part of the culture of the British Army of the time is obviously open to debate, and indeed Haig's tactical views were sometimes a bit more subtle than that. You can’t dismiss the slow adoption of realistic tactics (the “learning curve” if you like) and boil the history of the First World War solely down to the gradual assembly of sufficient artillery or any other “external factor” (see the intro to Nick Lloyd’s 2006 book on Loos for a good discussion of this).

1. British plans for the Somme were determined by the state of the French, German and British armies. The plans were rewritten several times as the majority French contribution diminished to reinforce the Verdun front, intelligence estimates of the capacity of the German army on the Somme varied and the reality of the state of the British army as opposed to earlier estimates of its readiness (particularly in equipment and training).

2. The British made their main effort in the north for obvious reasons when you look at the terrain and so did the Germans. Haig wanted an attack on the German second line in this area, also for obvious reasons but it is facile to assume a la Prior and Wilson that this meant that the artillery was spread evenly on the larger area rather than biased towards the closer objectives - even J. P. Harris says so.

3. The cause of the catastrophe astride the Ancre was the German army.

4. As for 3rd Ypres see here History of the Great War and note that Green has a dim view of Travers too.

5. How can you adopt realistic tactics when you don't have the equipment to implement them? How do you account for the evolution of tactics in SS 109, 119, 135 and 143? Compare the weaponry available to the French Sixth Army and the British Fourth and then compare the organisation of the French to make the most of its equipment and the experience of 1915.

6. Notice that in OH 1916 I, Edmonds has a paragraph on over-laden infantry carrying 66lb of equipment and then 150-odd pages on the local variations in equipment and tactics depending on the division. Notice that many of the divisions in the first day have histories which describe the different methods used to attack and that even Prior and Wilson demolish the myth of infantry lumbering forward.

7. The battle of the Somme went on for another 140 days and there were no more First Days for the rest of the war. If the army was hopeless, Haig worse and the Germans ubersoldiers, why not?

“A section on his wartime reputation first”.


 * Fair comment, except that there’s not really a lot to say. He wasn’t a charismatic general.


 * There's plenty among the high politicals, enough for a paragraph describing views about Haig 1915-1918.

“Travers is nearly as wrongheaded as Winter by the way.”


 * Travers is a serious historian, who at least made an attempt to elucidate why the British Army was a bit slow to adapt to the realities of WW1 warfare. He is overly reliant on gossipy stories, and not all his conjectures can be accepted unequivocally, but that doesn’t make him wrongheaded.

“I don't know much about Milner apart from him being willing to sell out South Africans to the Boers but if he wrote (of Haig's plans for 3rd Ypres as "really lunatic") he was an ignoramus.


 * It actually refers to Haig’s wish to renew the Ypres Offensive to “pin down the Germans” early in 1918, when it was clear that a massive German offensive was brewing - the sort of wish which makes one realise why the politicians had grown so fed up with the lack of judgement of which he was sometimes capable (like his infamous demand to "send every available man" to Third Ypres in the autumn of 1917, which was regarded with dismay even by generals in London). Milner was certainly not “an ignoramus”.

“It seems to me that there is truth in the historiographical claim that until the late 20s the orthodoxy was that the war against Germany was a great test of state and society, that the buck-passing game began after Haig died.


 * There were books written by people like Boraston, Buchan and Conan Doyle in the 1920s. They were not of great merit and are now forgotten. Nowadays Churchill and Liddell Hart tend to get a poor press, so it’s easy to forget that they nailed a lot of the porkies told by Haig’s apologists (the attempts to massage the German casualty figures upwards, the claim that no breakthrough had ever been intended)


 * Thousands of books were written in the 20s, many by Germans, some of which were translated and many of which were referred to in the OH and other British writing, not just en passant.


 * Rogers (ed.), D. (2010). Landrecies to Cambrai: Case Studies of German Offensive and Defensive Operations on the Western Front 1914–17. Solihull: Helion. ISBN 978-1-906033-76-7, translations of published German accounts.

“Lloyd George is an unreliable narrator, particularly in his own cause (as is Churchill)”


 * True, but much of what he wrote about Haig, if bitchy, contains a lot of truth, and his memoirs sold like hot cakes because a lot of people could see that he was discussing important points.

“publishers like nice little earners and don't want them to be upset by better sourced and researched writing which questions the mud, blood and futility narrative and German and French writing on the war is rarely used by English speaking writers.”


 * You should not assume that writing which gives you a warm feeling inside is better researched than any other kind. Churchill, Liddell Hart and Lloyd George all made use of documents leaked to them. Churchill’s considerable merits as an historian have been discussed by a number of modern historians (Robin Prior, David Reynolds, Peter Clarke, Norman Rose). Much of what he wrote about his own tenure of the Admiralty is unreliable, but much of what he wrote about the Somme (e.g that the Anglo-German casualty rates were about 2:1, making it open to question whether it was much of an attritional “success”) and Haig was spot on, despite the attempts by supposed professional historians (e.g. Oman) to rubbish him. You should not be taking Philpott’s misrepresentations at face value.


 * Military history has the reputation of an inferior scholarly field, populated by inferior scholars, much of it deserved as can be seen by the amount of derivative hack-work about the Great War on offer from commercial publishers, which compares unfavourably with many recent PhDs available through Ethos, which use contemporary records for empirical studies.


 * Simpson, A. (2001). The Operational Role of British Corps Command on the Western Front 1914–18 (2005 ed.). London: Spellmount. ISBN 1-86227-292-1 this one slipped through the net of mediocrity but costs a bomb.


 * Beach, J. (2004). British Intelligence and the German Army 1914–1918 (Ph.D.). 2004: London University. OCLC 500051492.


 * Brown, I. M. (1996). The Evolution of the British Army's Logistical and Administrative Infrastructure and its Influence on GHQ's Operational and Strategic Decision-Making on the Western Front, 1914–1918 (Ph.D.). London: London University. OCLC 53609664.


 * For the first time the Germans were engaged by a third million-man army, while busy at Verdun and Galicia. The inefficiency of the British was relative and comparable to the other two Entente armies at comparable stages of development. You might look at


 * Verdun: The Longest Battle of the Great War, Jankowski P. (2014) OUP ISBN 978-0-19-931689-2 for a differing view of Churchill's analysis of French losses in 1916 and contemplate the implications for his conclusions about the Somme.


 * As for Philpott writing about the French and Germans, that is indeed one of the better features of “Bloody Victory”. However, cherry picking “German” evidence – often certain well-worn quotes plucked out of context – to exaggerate the effectiveness of the Western Front offensives is hardly new, and you should also be aware that earlier in his career Philpott was taken to task by Liz Greenhalgh (whose “Victory through Coalition” gives a very different take on things to British MilHist) in their "War in History" spat for making poor use of French sources. Ho hum.


 * Did you notice that Philpott recounted Joffre giving Foch a directive on how to fight the battle, which was similar to the one Haig gave to Rawlinson and which has been called a "Boy's Own" guide to running a battle? No-one seems to have noticed that if the British were so rubbish and the French effortlessly superior, why this happened.


 * Duffy, C. (2006). Through German Eyes: The British and the Somme 1916 (Phoenix 2007 ed.). London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson. ISBN 978-0-7538-2202-9, more German testimony about facing the British part of the offensive.


 * Sheldon, J. (2009). The German Army at Cambrai. Pen & Sword. ISBN 978-1-84415-944-4. Written by a German-speaker with copious translations of German writing on the effect of the Somme Offensive.

Paulturtle (talk) 00:50, 20 May 2014 (UTC)


 * Greeting Paul, please remember Civility. We've been through this before and can both demonstrate sources in support but surely by now you admit that the historical tide of revisionist criticism has ebbed?Keith-264 (talk) 08:33, 20 May 2014 (UTC)

Indirect criticism
18:48, 23 May 2014 (UTC)The Wikipedia page footnote 225 references page 400 of "Douglas Haig, 1861-1928" by Gerard de Groot (Unwin Hyman, 1988). In fact even de Groot does not make a claim that Haig asked for £250k. He notes that it was Sir Philip Sassoon who had the figure in mind when he discussed the pension and peerage issues with Lloyd George. De Groot got his information from pages 357-8 Robert Blake's "Private papers of Sir Douglas Haig" (Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1952), quoting Sassoon's notes from the meeting. Blake quotes Sassoon saying that he made the suggestion to Lloyd George.

So, Tom, you can stop worrying about whether Haig was "divorced from reality" in regard to this matter. The "he had asked for £250k" is the invention of an ill-researched or malicious editor of the Wikipedia page18:48, 23 May 2014 (UTC)

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=211953#entry2094169

Worth another look?Keith-264 (talk) 18:48, 23 May 2014 (UTC)


 * It's a minor error in transcribing information from the book; accusations of malice are unwarranted. Given that Haig reproduces Sassoon's memo without comment one way or the other, the demand for £250,000 does not appear to have met with his disapproval. J.P.Harris states that Sassoon was negotiating on Haig's behalf, which as on a number of occasions appears to be a case of Harris speculating slightly further than the evidence warrants, although as on many (but not all) of those occasions rather less so than Haig-iographers would have us believe.Paulturtle (talk) 00:19, 27 May 2014 (UTC)


 * "Ill-researched or...." NPOV "appear" "speculating" hat's all inference. Can you cite it?Keith-264 (talk) 06:40, 27 May 2014 (UTC)


 * There is no POV one way or the other; it is simple fact that Sassoon asked for £250,000. No further citations are needed for what is in the article.Paulturtle (talk) 08:08, 27 May 2014 (UTC)

Dinner at Brasenose, 24 June 1919
Not worthy of comment in the main article, but perhaps of interest to a passing researcher, might be that, on 24 June 1919, the “The King’s Hall and College of Brasenose” (Oxford) held a “Dinner in Honour of Fld-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, O.M., Etc.” The list of toasts includes “Brasenose and The War”. (My pictures #8094-6.) JDAWiseman (talk) 22:11, 18 July 2015 (UTC)


 * Actually it's mentioned in the recent Gary Mead biog (p361), in the course of a few pages mentioning how many public dinners he attended in these years when he was a respected figure. It says it was for 300 people and at Oxford Town Hall, and he was awarded an honorary doctorate of law two days later. Brasenose took down his portrait in the 1970s iirc when somebody wrote "murderer of a million men" on it.Paulturtle (talk) 01:51, 19 July 2015 (UTC)


 * Correction welcomed—thank you. (I’m writing a book on vintage port, which leads me to unusual references to people, which I add to talk pages. Re which also see the VP.) JDAWiseman (talk) 11:21, 19 July 2015 (UTC)


 * No mention of port, but apparently a fine 1912 sauterne was served, and the dinner cost 30s a head, which at £60+ at today's prices (www.measuringworth.com) is about what formal dinners normally cost today, although rather less affordable relative to average earnings. I dare say the college opened its wine cellars as Oxbridge colleges tend to do for alumni events. If you want a port link for Brasenose, when Haig was at Brasenose in the early 1880s, the then master, one Dr Craddock, is said to have told his contemporary the future Lord Askwith "Drink plenty of port sir, you want plenty of port in this damp climate". That one is usually mentioned in Haig's biographies (pp36-7 of the Walter Reid biog).Paulturtle (talk) 12:11, 19 July 2015 (UTC)


 * I have a picture of the menu:
 * • Sherry. Amontillado, 1912.
 * • Sauterne. Chateau Yquem, 1912.
 * • Burgundy. Corton, 1912.
 * • Champagne. George Goulet, 1911.
 * • Port. Martinez, 1896. JDAWiseman (talk) 15:12, 19 July 2015 (UTC)

General Haig's treatment of men accused of cowardice and desertion
General Haig repeatedly misled the House of Commons when questioned about men accused of cowardice and desertion by saying they were examined by a Medical Officers and that no soldier was sentenced to death if there was any suspicion of him suffering shell shock. The fact is most accused soldiers were not examined, in the the few cases where a medical diagnosis of shell shock was made, the Medical Officers were rubbished or ignored and the men convicted and shot anyway. General Haig not only signed all the death warrants but when questioned later on this issue lied repeatedly. General Haig's behaviour in choosing to murder his own men places him in the category of war criminal. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 94.72.236.203 (talk) 09:04, 21 October 2012 (UTC)

Regardless of the merits of the cases themselves, those men were tried and convicted by Courts Martial and were excuted. They were not murdered and a legal execution is not a war crime. You might have your own moral stance on this but morality and legality are not the same thing. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.94.84 (talk) 00:36, 4 December 2015 (UTC)

Douglas Haig-a great British soldier.
I think this article is a fair and reasonably objective summary of Haig's career. It should be said, though, that it has taken decades to clear away the lies and misconceptions-refelected in some of the silly comments on this page-that have precluded a proper understanding of his achievments as a soldier.

The war, as Haig understood, could only be won by defeating the main German army on the Western Front. The problem was that all commanders-and Haig was initially no exception to this rule-tend to base their tactics on those used in previous wars. In 1914 nobody understood the kind of war that was about to unfold. By 1918, however, the British command on the Western Front was deploying tactics that was to do much towards defeating the Germans. Gone were the lengthy artillery barrages followed by wave after futile wave of infantry advances. By ensuring close cooperation between the artillery and infantry, Haig made steady and relentless progress against the Germans, and the British army made advances far greater than those of its French and American allies.

I have absolutely no hesitation in making the claim that the British Army had become one of the best in the world, largely owing to the leadership of Douglas Haig. A remarkable achievment when one considers that the country had little in the way military tradition, and that for several generations before 1914 the army's experience was confined, for the most part, to stamping out colonial bush fires. The 'contemptable little army' of 1914-numbering only four divisions-had come a long way.

In my estimation Haig, along with Sir William Slim of Burma, deserves to be ranked amongst the greatest British commanders. Rcpaterson 23:20, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

Have you read "Haigs Command: A Reassessment", Dennis Winter, Penguin 1999? He suggests that most of British WW1 history, including the official history, are based on heavily doctored evidence. His claims are based on a comparision of documents held in the usual British repositories (IWM, PRO etc) and duplicates made immediately after WW1 and held in Ottawa and Canberra. His key thesis is that following the end of the war, the Committe on Imperial Defense ordered a large scale cover-up and rewrite of British poilitical and military policy of the war. Matthew Donald 08:47, 14 May 2006 (UTC)

Denis winter's work on Haig, is one of the most unscholarly texts produced on the subject, Laffin at least stuck to proper historical research. winter on the other hand, would synthesize sources to suit his thesis. it's all very well for a member of the pulic to read an agree with it, but when a histoian picks it up, the bulls**t shines through. i suggest going out and reading the vast array of criticism towards winter's book, from top scholars, many of whom are no fans of Haig, but dislike winter's sloppy tactics in what can only be seen as a vicious personal attack by someone who apparently has an axe to grind. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.42.124.19 (talk) 16:23, 18 March 2008 (UTC)

I have not; but I will-thanks. I will let you know what I think in due course. Rcpaterson 22:55, 14 May 2006 (UTC)

Winters' analysis of Hiags' command is devestating. He provides compelling evidence of monumental logistical stuff-ups, of a magnitude that lead to the failure of entire campaigns (eg Battle of the Somme). Some of Winter criticisms are probably unimportant - so what if Haig was a bisexual who was promoted through the patronage of Lord Escher (an Edwardian eminence grise who had a weakness for dashing hussars). Haigs legacy is dictated by his competence (or lack thereof), not his sexuality. Winter makes a good case for the lack of competence.

While I don't agree with everyting Winter proposes (especially his conspiracy theories), he does provide solid evidence of a cover-up following the end of WW1. The reasons and aims of the cover-up are another matter. There is far more work required comparing the offical histories with unmodified source documents than Winter has done (or had the time to do - there is many years work required here) before any conclusions on motives can be made. Matthew Donald 20:43, 16 May 2006 (UTC)

Thanks for that useful summary. I have to say that, as a gut reaction, the alarm bells may not be ringing but they are certainly starting to swing! Haig, I know, remains a controversial figure, but it sounds as if the author of this book started with an 'agenda' and a fairly clear slate of preconceptions, which is the worst possible way to begin any form of historical research. Having said this, it would be wrong to pass a final judgement before reading the book. I promised to do this, and I will. The fact remains, however, that the British Army's achievment in both holding the Michael offensive, and in launching a sweeping counter-attack was remarkable. I personally can find no better assessment of Haig than that of Black Jack Pershing, who described him as the soldier who won the war. As for Haig's alleged incomptetence I am reminded of Abraham Lincoln's response when he was told that U. S. Grant was a drunk-'let me know what brand of whiskey he drinks and I'll send it to my other generals.' Rcpaterson 02:05, 17 May 2006 (UTC)

Apparently Correlli Barnett published a devastating indictment of the sloppy research, verging in some cases on deceitful quotation of sources, in Winter's "Haig's Command", in some literary journal back in the early 1990s. Have never seen a copy, though. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 171.192.0.10 (talk) 16:55, 27 January 2007 (UTC)

Hi Guys. I've made a slight cleanup, as I think this article had over-corrected and perhaps become a little apologist. I entered another citation and referenced it and made some cleanup. Main push of my edit is that although Haig should not be demonised for everything that he often is and although historians cited are correct in pointing out some of the difficulties Haig had to work with, he wasn't the great innovator the article was picturing him as, and is support of some of the war's genuine morons really does need to be answered for... Innovation credited to Haig in the article as it stood instead goes to subordinate generals such as Plumer - Haig's good work and "imagination" comes in ensuring these commanders had the support they needed from 1917 onwards, with the development of Bite and Hold, and Currie and Monash's work on combined arms later in the war. Xlh 14:07, 2 April 2007 (UTC)

Have deleted: "Additionally, Haig's supporters have made the point that when it came to the battles waged by Haig between the 1916 Somme Offensive, and 1917 Passchendaele campaigns, Haig was largely hamstrung into committing to these battles due to the need to support French initiatives endorsed by Lloyd George." A mistaken view I think, unless somebody can come up with some serious citation. Lloyd George committed the British forces to supporting the Nivelle Offensive, but had deep misgivings about the Somme and Passchendaele (though he did little besides wringing his hands rather than asserting Cabinet authority over the generals). Haig and Robertson were both committed to major offensives on the Western front as the only way to defeat Germany. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 171.192.0.10 (talk) 17:01, 30 June 2007 (UTC)

A couple of points. The French and British agreed to no large-scale offensives in 1918 so the prerequisite ineffective bombing was not used, but had it been abandoned as a tactic? And as to holding the St.Michael offensive. It can be said the rout of Gough's forces luckily resulted in an over extention of the unsupported German line. Not the first case of an effective German advance turning against themselves. It seems to me that both French and Haig were incompetent. Everyone initially waged an old world war, but the Germans adapted. Take Bruchmuller's artillery in the German 1918 offensive as opposed to Haig's at Passchendaele.Bostoneire 18:53, 26 September 2007 (UTC)

The Michael Offensive, for whatever reason (British losses in 1917, Lloyd George hoarding manpower in the UK) enjoyed far greater numerical superiority - about fifty or sixty divisions hit Gough's Army - than Haig ever enjoyed. The British "adapted" their tactics in 1916, arguably a bit more slowly than the French and Germans, but then they'd been doing less fighting up until that point. The key point about bombardments was that what mattered was their intensity - tonnage of shell per square foot - not their length, and it took everybody a while to figure this out. Ironically the British had got the intensity right by accident at Neuve Chapelle early in 1915, but at the Somme they shelled for a week over too wide an area (because they wanted to get a wider breakthrough). So by the late war you would have 1) a brief (a few hours?) but intense bombardment, using High Explosive and poison gas to shock the defenders, then 2) the attackers would advance behind a creeping barrage. By 1917 the Germans were defending against these tactics using pillboxes and fortified zones rather than the trench "lines" of earlier in the war. The other key thing to grasp is that a great deal of battles like the Somme and Passchendaele then consisted of incessant German counterattacks by fresh divisions shuffled into the battle, which is why the casualties were much nearer parity than the one-sided slaughter of 1914, 1915 or the First Day of the Somme. The attackers would be protected from this by 3) a standing barrage. All this took much more co-ordination than had been the case earlier. You would also have shelling of German reserves moving up to the front, and counter-battery fire to knock out German guns, using sound-ranging and air spotting. By 1917-18 most of the time generals had a reasonable idea how much shelling would be needed (and Currie was able to predict the casualties in taking Passchendaele Ridge). For a good summary of the improvements made by British artillery by 1917, see the opening chapters of Prior & Wilson on Passchendaele (they also make the point that the Germans at Verdun had made a similar mistake of spreading their artillery too thin in a vain attempt to widen the offensive). For British infantry tactics (light machine gunners, grenadiers etc using tactics similar to the German stormtroopers, rather than the lines of riflemen of the early war) see Paddy Griffith. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 212.134.22.112 (talk) 23:56, 3 October 2007 (UTC)

Date of Death
I have changed the date of death from 28 January to 29 January, in accordance with the Britannica entry on Haig. Danny 10:57, 25 July 2007 (UTC)

Casualties
The debate over proportionate casulaties in Normandy and the Somme seems to have been settled. The point is that after the number of troops and the length of time have been considered casualties were lower in WW1. Also the proportion of infantry was lower in WW1 than WW2. If you were a junior infantry officer or rifleman you were safer on the Somme. The essential point is that warfare between technically advanced armies in the twentieth century invariably resulted in large casualties on both sides and Haig was as subject to this as anyone else. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.2.197.213 (talk) 11:02, 15 September 2007 (UTC)

Indeed, and the casualties of 1916-18, when infantry and artillery tactics had become more sophisticated, were nothing like as one-sided as those of 1914-15 (IIRC the French had 500,000 killed in the five months' fighting of 1914 alone; Britain had 750,000 killed in the entire war, or 900,000 if you include Canada & Australia). The daily loss rates at Arras in 1917 (but of course Allenby was able to achieve great success when transferred to the different circumstances of the Middle East) were actually worse than those of the Somme or Passchendaele, and those of 1918 worse still. The sheer scale of the WW1 Western front often isn't fully appreciated - it needs to be compared to the battles of the Eastern Front in WW2 for a proper comparison. That's not to say that there aren't legitimate debates to be had about whether the British forces adopted new infantry and artillery tactics quickly enough, or whether Germany could have been defeated sooner by making greater effort on other fronts, but there was little alternative to the size of the butcher's bill on the Western Front. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 171.192.0.10 (talk) 17:46, 22 September 2007 (UTC)

I think the flaw in this arguement of casualites being an inevitable result of 20th century warfare and Haig being subject to this supposition is in the fact that both French And Haig continued to support failing offensives without successful results.Bostoneire 19:06, 26 September 2007 (UTC)

The inevitability of a vast butcher's bill is probably nearer a statement of fact than an "argument", unless somebody has an overwhelming tactical advantage which enables them to win a quick victory (Germans in 1940, Israelis in 1967, USA in 1991 etc). In WW2 the Soviets, not the Western Allies did literally 80% of the land fighting - nearly a million Soviet troops were killed (not casualties) in the battle of Moscow (winter 1941/2) alone, and other battles were almost as large. As to why Haig/Robertson carried on with "failing" offensives, it wasn't as obvious in (say) summer 1917 how much longer the war was going to go on as it is with hindsight. The state of German morale was a matter of some debate in western intelligence (it is true they had an inflated idea of German losses at the Somme), Russia had just become a democracy but it wasn't clear yet whether Russia would be invigorated or drop out, the French were being secretive about the extent of their mutinies but might perfectly easily have dropped out (see Terraine: "Road to Paschendaele" for a detailed documentary treatment of the political origins of this offensive). In the end Passchendaele turned into a mess (although, as with the Somme, the Germans were hurt pretty badly by it as well), but the British could hardly sit idly by and wonder whether the French and Russians were or weren't going to carry on fighting, or whether the Germans could have been defeated with one more push. And yes, you can make an argument that Passchendaele should have been called off at least a month sooner. Ultimately you don't often win wars without taking the offensive. Haig was always looking for a spectacular breakthrough - he was wrong in 1916 and 1917, but right in 1918, when the war ended faster than many others thought it would. Conversely Petain was right to be a pessimist in earlier years, but wrong in 1918, and found himself sidelined by Foch. Were there any cheaper ways of fighting? According to Prior & Wilson on Paschendaele, the casualty rates were actually little different when the "skilful" Plumer was in charge from when Gough had been looking for a great breakthrough earlier on. Or, as the French General Mangin put it: "Whatever you do, you lose a lot of men". —Preceding unsigned comment added by 195.40.200.91 (talk) 20:59, 3 October 2007 (UTC)
 * I notce that you mention lower casualties 1916-1917 than in the Hundred Days - Arras had the highest casualties measured by total divided by the number of days of battle. you might find this discussion interesting http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?s=b14e07473e3b275f0e21d43eeb141664&showtopic=159151&st=0 Keith-264 (talk) 09:20, 27 October 2011 (UTC)

Somme 2,943/day, Arras 4,076/day, P'daele 2,323/day, 100 Days 3,645/day, p. 190 Forgotten Victory.Keith-264 (talk) 09:44, 27 October 2011 (UTC)

Yes, was aware of the Arras casualties and have added them in now. Stuck in a pile of books on the Somme and Third Ypres at the moment ... Paulturtle (talk) 15:28, 15 November 2011 (UTC)
 * I'm gatting ready for another splurge on the P'le page, air operations this time.Keith-264 (talk) 15:38, 15 November 2011 (UTC)

Question
Could someone please tell me something? Two armies, as relatively well-matched (all things considered) as any in the history of modern warfare, bashing each other's brains out in a miserably unintelligent and tactically Neanderthal slugging match, led by some of the worst examples of "political generals" seen since the Napoleonic or American Civil Wars, until one side managed to get a boost in raw material that allowed them to "have the last 10,000 soldiers left alive", allowing them to essentially pass out on top of their opponent and suffocate him, could possibly label the man most directly responsible for this doctrine as "the man who won the war"?

As a student of military history, I'm the last one to say "You can't win a war anymore than you can win an earthquake", but considering the careful and deliberate strategy of Douglas Haig, I can safely and honestly say that he had nothing to do with winning World War I any more than the forest could be said to "win" a forest fire when the fire manages to die before every last stinking shred of vegetation does... Bullzeye (Ring for Service) 11:10, 15 October 2008 (UTC)

And so what would you have suggested he do instead if you were stood next to him in 1916 after Gallipolli and with Britian deeply in debt and her Navy playing chess with the German Navy and the French constantly nagging him to support them all the time and this being the first time in 50 years that Britain had engaged in large scale warfare and the first time ever that anything on this scale had happened and with an enemy equally as strong as his and heavily entrenched? Admittedly he could of done something but who's to say it wouldnt have ended up like Gallipolli or worse?Willski72 (talk) 18:01, 4 May 2009 (UTC)

@Bulleye - you're mischaracterizing the First World War. You're vastly underestimating the difficulty in fighting this kind of positional warfare, one in which the combination of poor communications relative to the huge sizes of the forces, and a vulnerable attacking arm relative to the strength of the defences (i.e infantry vs entrenched machine guns supported by artillery) make any kind of tactical flair impossible. No matter what you do it's going to be a grind, just like storming a breach in a siege. The flashiest things got was the 'Hundred Days' in 1918, which was still essentially a series of set-piece attritional attacks. It is also crucial to consider that warfare in WWI was all new to the commanders - this was the first war of its kind and everything had to be learned the hard way, in the field, against determined and evolving opposition. You're also ignoring the constant tactical and technological innovations made by all sides, without which the later battles could not have been conducted. There are those who will claim that the Entente could simply have sat in their trenches and starved the Central Powers out without doing much fighting, but this is unrealistic - the Germans would have knocked the Russians out of the war, then pressed the French until they collapsed. Finally, your claims abotut "worst examples of political generals" are hyperbole to an extreme degree. With the possible exception of his Field Marshall's baton (presented to him by the King, though that doesn't automatically preclude merit), Haig was promoted on merit, not nepotism. Even Lloyd George couldn't find a suitable replacement for Haig, despite his (largely misplaced) contempt for the man. Wully Robertson (Chief of the Imperial General Staff) had risen up through the ranks from starting as a private. Plumer, Rawlinson, Allenby, Monash, Currie - all the same story in that none of these are "political generals". It's also clear from military records that officers who didn't measure up were replaced very quickly.

Haig can be said to be the winner of the war because a) he was a key figure in doctrinal and orginazational reforms, b) a key supporter of technologies such as the tank, machine gun (yes, I said the machine gun) and aircraft, c) recognized that the Western Front was where the war would be decided and oversaw the battles that did just that, and d) was able to coordinate well with the French and Americans.

The single foremost reason Haig has such a poor reputation today is squeamishness over the huge casualties. Anyone would be horrified by that amount of death, that's just normal. But to shy away from it and claim it was all futile and unnecessary, and that things could and should have somehow been done in some manner that magically avoids many hundreds of thousands of deaths - that's where the squeamishness lies. People lack a sense of perspective. Just look at the USSR's casualties on the Eastern Front in WWII - 10 million military dead, over 10 times that the British suffered in WWI. That's because fighting in the main theatre of a World War will cost millions of lives. It's an inevitable fact. The British still lost some 385,000 dead soldiers in WWII, mostly from secondary theatres, without facing the German Army on head-on like it did in WWI except for the disasterous and very brief campaign in France in 1940. So this idea that because millions died, Haig is somehow a butcher, is founded purely on squeamishness. Yes he did make some mistakes, and in some cases took more casualities than he had to - but we have the benefit of hindsight, which he did not. In the end Haig did learn how to fight successfully, ground down the German army over 1916-17, and was a key figure in comprehensively defeating the Germans in 1918. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.94.84 (talk) 00:26, 4 December 2015 (UTC)


 * Interesting and knowledgeable discussion. But Wikipedia talk pages are, IIRC, for discussion of the article rather than discussion of the subject of the article. JDAWiseman (talk) 09:31, 4 December 2015 (UTC)

Was Field Marshal Haig the Butcher of The Somme?
A popular argument. Was Haig a mass murderer? Or an excellent military leader that performed his duties to the best of his ability?

Should this argument be contained within the wikipedia article —Preceding unsigned comment added by 90.240.203.252 (talk) 14:49, 8 February 2009 (UTC)

Erm... yes. He was a mass murderer. War is one thing. But butchery is quite another. Haig (and his ilk) ought to have been prosecuted and hung. Next question? 213.114.44.178 (talk) 11:48, 13 June 2015 (UTC)

Suspected missing half sentence (section Junior Officer)
I suspect that the second sentence of this passage is missing its first part before mentioning Haig's arrival in India:

''He was also the Founder of the Indian Polo Association. then saw overseas service in India (sent out November 1886), where he was appointed the regiment's adjutant in 1888''. Cloptonson (talk) 20:02, 28 February 2016 (UTC)


 * Sorted. Somebody had inserted a load of information about his polo-playing a bit clumsily.Paulturtle (talk) 06:51, 1 March 2016 (UTC)

Age of wife at marriage
I note her life years in brackets are bracketed 1879-1939. I wonder if the birth year is correct, as she would have been remarkably young at marriage in 1905, when she turned 16 (by then the legal age of consent). I hesitate to describe her as 16 years old in case it transpires the stated birth year is an error. Can anyone check this up?Cloptonson (talk) 20:24, 28 February 2016 (UTC)


 * No, that makes her 25-6, which seems about right. Haig was in his mid forties, a not uncommon age gap in marriages where the husband had served abroad for years. Gary Mead says that she was 18 years younger than her husband, the same age gap as Haig's own parents, and that Haig's older sister Henrietta was twice her age.Paulturtle (talk) 00:46, 1 March 2016 (UTC)


 * I stand corrected - I miscalculated the years 10 years short, and was about to withdraw my question when I saw your reply. I note your comments about age gaps, Baden Powell married Olave, half his own age, for similar background reasons.Cloptonson (talk) 21:34, 3 March 2016 (UTC)


 * Baden-Powell is perhaps not the best example as he married very late indeed and his sexuality has, rightly or wrongly, been called into question (Haig, who was very handsome as a young man, attracted the attentions of Lord Esher but I don't think anybody has seriously suggested that he was gay). Smith-Dorrien, on the other hand, also had a much younger wife.Paulturtle (talk) 06:43, 5 March 2016 (UTC)

Problems in the lead
The lead is reliant on over-quotation and presents a pretty substantial POV in the introduction. Unless someone strenuously objects, I will be trimming those quotes. DaltonCastle (talk) 02:25, 12 June 2016 (UTC)


 * Well, I think somebody else put the quote in the intro and I then expanded it a bit to ensure that J.P.Harris' views were summarised fairly and accurately. It's not POV (or at any rate no more so than a lot of the rest of the intro), it's simply presenting the informed case for the prosecution, namely that Haig, based in large part on dodgy intelligence, seriously overestimated his chances in the middle years of the war and that his overly-aggressive operational plans, sometimes adopted in the teeth of wiser counsel from others, made his offensives somewhat costlier and less effective than they needed to be. Furthermore, having shouted the odds for years and claimed a lot of credit for finally being right like a stuck clock in August 1918 (I'm playing devil's advocate here to a certain extent ...) he then had a hard-to-explain wobble in the autumn when the Germans actually were almost on their last legs. All of the above is perfectly easy to substantiate when one starts to read in more detail, and I say that as somebody who was defending Haig's reputation against ignorant people a generation ago. Harris is an imperfect book in places, with an annoying number of mistakes, oversimplifications and moments of supposition, although perhaps no more annoying than other books are in other ways, but having said that despite attempts to shout it down from certain quarters is a proper heavyweight book by a proper heavyweight Sandhurst lecturer, and a useful corrective to the sort of Sheffields and Philpotts of this world who are quite fashionable at the moment. A good and balanced review of Harris' book by the excellent Stephen Badsey can be found online somewhere, or could a few years ago.


 * But I'm not going to argue about what goes in the lead at this instant, unless it's complete rubbish. To be honest, there is a great deal of common ground amongst Haig biographers these days. No matter how pro- or anti-him they are they tend to a certain extent to agree that 1. he did the "administrative" aspects of his job very well - getting on with politicians and French generals, encouraging the development of new technologies like tanks and what he called "airo-planes" (he was not the cretin of popular myth), that 2. he deserves a certain amount of credit for sensing that the German bubble was about to burst in August 1918, and that 3. he made important mistakes at the Somme and Third Ypres. I've got a lot of Haig work in the pipeline but regrettably it may not be finished before 1 July.Paulturtle (talk) 16:37, 12 June 2016 (UTC)

Requested move 2 November 2016

 * The following is a closed discussion of a requested move. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on the talk page. Editors desiring to contest the closing decision should consider a move review. No further edits should be made to this section. 

The result of the move request was: NOT MOVED. (non-admin closure) Iazyges   Consermonor   Opus meum  22:04, 9 November 2016 (UTC)

Douglas Haig, 1st Earl Haig → Douglas Haig – WP:COMMONNAME and WP:NCPEER. He is far better known as Sir Douglas Haig, C-in-C of the British Expeditionary Force, than as the Earl Haig, C-in-C Home Forces and founder of the Haig Fund. Opera hat (talk) 15:42, 2 November 2016 (UTC)


 * Support. In general, people who were very famous and then got a peerage after their reason for fame during their retirement are unlikely to have the peerage be the common name, and it can be misleading and suggest the subject was a peer during the period of their main achievements.  SnowFire (talk) 16:31, 2 November 2016 (UTC)
 * Oppose As neither title particularly better known so for us to make that assumption is WP:OR. Note also that focussed google-searches result in 383,000 results for "Earl Haig" and 169,000 results for "Sir Douglas Haig." Muffled Pocketed  17:23, 2 November 2016 (UTC)
 * Comment I think it's pretty non-controversial that 98% of the ink written on Haig has to do with his service in WWI, and books on WWI use "Haig" or "Marshal Haig" and rarely use the future title of "Earl".  Comparison to "Sir Douglas Haig" is probably not the best measure here but rather "Earl Haig" vs. "anything at all that just uses Haig, or Douglas Haig, or a rank + Haig."  SnowFire (talk) 18:21, 2 November 2016 (UTC)


 * Oppose No overwhelming reason to move this page from its current location. Dormskirk (talk) 23:37, 2 November 2016 (UTC)
 * Oppose because he is widely referred to as Earl Haig as well as the other names mentioned above MrStoofer (talk) 14:45, 3 November 2016 (UTC)
 * Oppose as per MrStoofer. Subject is far more widely known as "Earl Haig" over "Douglas Haig." Page name should reflect useage and title. Nick Cooper (talk) 15:48, 3 November 2016 (UTC)
 * Oppose Members of the Peerage are usually mentioned with their title, particularly in the case where the peerage is hereditary. ViennaUK (talk) 13:42, 7 November 2016 (UTC)
 * Oppose common name is "Earl Haig". Jonathan A Jones (talk) 09:50, 9 November 2016 (UTC)


 * The above discussion is preserved as an archive of a requested move. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on this talk page or in a move review. No further edits should be made to this section.

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"An hussar"
User Roger8Roger, rather than abide by WP:BRD has just undone my revert of his usage of "an hussar". This usage, if it was ever current, is surely not viable in the 21st century. It is at best a ridiculous affectation. DuncanHill (talk) 23:05, 2 July 2018 (UTC)
 * Why not just say both versions out loud, preferably as part of a longer sentence, and decide which sounds more natural and which sounds forced and unnatural? Also, do the same for: "A(n) hi'story book" and "A(n) histo'rical book" and decide which sounds better - the principal is the same. Roger 8 Roger (talk) 00:08, 3 July 2018 (UTC)
 * "An hussar" sounds extremely forced and unnatural. The same for history, etc. DuncanHill (talk) 00:14, 3 July 2018 (UTC)
 * See Hussar too Roger 8 Roger (talk) 05:21, 3 July 2018 (UTC)