Talk:Douglas MacArthur/Archive 2

NPOV Tag
I've tagged this article, because as it is currently written it is hagiography. In the entire article, only one criticism of Macarthur has been left to stand. Even his removal by Truman is treated as if it were a mistake by the President that resulted in thousands of needless deaths. This is a a world removed from historical consensus. Sadly, it is only one of many ommissions - and in many cases active deletions - by editors who seem more bent on canonization of Macarthur than on a balanced review of his life and work.RichardH 12:37, 4 February 2007 (UTC)

I agree that this article is very out of balance. Where is mention of his 180 odd press releases complimenting himself and the practicly non existant US forces in Papua New Guinea in 1942/3. Where is mention of his lack of use of available intelligence to forestall the Japanese advance across the Owen Stanley's? Where is mention of his false assertion that he commanded forces from a base in New Guinea in 1942, when he was only there for a few hours in 1943? MacArthur needlessly sent thousands of his forces to their deaths due to incompetence. Sugested reading "Bastard of a Place" Peter Brune.

Yes I agree I think their needs to be some mention of his seeming refuesel to use non us forces in the war in any kind of capacity including when they were vastly more experianced then his own troops. I think a new section critism of MacArthur would be nice 08:20, 9 May 2007 (UTC) Mark

General MacArthur did command SWPA from Port Moresby from 7 November 1942 to 8 January 1943 during the Papuan Campaign, and again from 26 August 1943 to 23 September 1943 during the New Guinea Campaign. He paid General Blamey a flying visit in Port Moresby from 2 to 4 October 1942, carried out an inspection tour of Port Moresby, Buna, Dobodura, Oro Bay and Milne Bay from 27 June to 6 July 1943, visited Port Moresby from 12 to 13 October 1943, and carried out another inspection tour of Port Moresby, Goodenough and Finschhafen from 13 December 1943 to 4 January 1944.

While in New Guinea, MacArthur was out of touch with Brisbane, Canberra and Washington. Messages for Port Moresby could be radioed using an unreliable technique involving bouncing the message off the ionosphere. Or they could be couriered from Brisbane by air, which took a couple of days. In late 1943, the Australian Army ripped up a submarine cable in the Bass Strait and relayed it from Queensland to Port Moresby. So in December 1943, it became possible to pick up the phone and call Port Moresby.

On 24 April 1943, there 58,809 Australian troops in New Guinea, fighting alongside 30,058 Americans.

Hawkeye7 21:54, 9 May 2007 (UTC)

To the above statements of Hearsay and opinion! There are so many biographer's and Critic's trying to Rewrite History when it comes to the General. Many have an agenda politically motivated, and others slam him for alleged comments he made about FDR etc... The Article on the whole is Negative and there is a high amount of Hearsay. This medium is discredited when the facts are not confirmed, and when opinion and jaded memories of past enemies are accepted as truth.

No question, this article as it currently exists is riddled with language that suggest a bias in favor of Macarthur. It reads more like hagiography than history. Remarks in this Discussion section confirm that this is what was intended by some of the people who have worked on the section. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.77.137.57 (talk) 19:53, 1 October 2007 (UTC)

I agree that the article is more or less intentional hagiography, especially as evidenced by the hostile comments referencing those attempting to "rewrite history," A more nuanced approach to this highly controversial man is sorely needed. Lee-Anne (talk) 19:27, 20 November 2007 (UTC)

MacArthur's Blunders not mentioned
Bradley is *NOT* wildly popular with all Americans. Some of us think he was an ordinary man, desperately out of his depth in a time, place and role so far beyond his modest abilities as to be far more dangerous to his friends than his enemies. Amccray 00:13, 7 September 2007 (UTC) (son of a WWII vet who served in Europe)

Not my primary interest in posting here, nor an area where I claim any significant knowledge or expertise, but I thought that MacArthur's contributions in WWII were widely understood and not especially controversial. He was a strange man in his personal life, with many of the problems mentioned here, and probably more. So what? So are most men of great accomplishment--Roosevelt, Eisenhower, Marshall, Patton, et. al., just to stick to the same era, nationality, and profession (OK, Roosevelt was an unindicted politician, but he is frequently characterized as a "war leader."). He (we're back to MacArthur now) got clobbered at the start, just like everybody else in the Japanese' way. When he had some resources, he came roaring back, with, I thought, far less loss of (American and Allied) life per reconquered sq. mi. (or hectare, or square furlong, or whatever unit is popular this week) than any other (Allied) general in the war. Did I read the wrong biography, or are you guys talking about somebody else? Korea--well, a different story, perhaps. He got suckered, and that's not good, for a general and theater commander. But again, what was the loss of life on his watch (including the clobbering) vs. his successor's (Ridgway--or maybe Truman)? Anyway, the man picked a fight with his boss, and--surprise!--he lost. But in all seriousness, didn't he do a pretty good job, overall, in comparison with other Allied commanders? My main (sole?) source is Manchester's biography; note that Manchester was a (severely wounded) Pacific war veteran, and no hagiographer. Amccray 00:13, 7 September 2007 (UTC)

'''Saying that Macarthur was solely responsible for this defeat is opinion and not fact. The post below drips with personal bias and spin.''' Macarthur was certainly a flawed man with ego problems but this poster (below) would reverse the entire article and make it into an unjustified smear. By the way-- in war, battles are lost at times even by great generals. Grant lost many battles but he also forced Robert E Lee to surrender and ended the Civil War. In spite of his defeats, MacAurthur made great contributions in the Pacific theater of World War II against the Japanese, and perhaps an even greater contribution as the post-war governor of Japan. McArthur was forced out of the military but was heralded by the people in the U.S because of his imense popularity. He was to egotistical to be a good leader. He felt he knew what was best, but he was wrong.

Sean7phil 07:04, 29 January 2007 (UTC)

Sean7phil 07:02, 29 January 2007 (UTC)

Lots of praise in the article. But, MacArthur was responsible for the worst defeat in US military history (largest number of soldiers surrendered). MacArthur was also responsible for the biggest retreat in US military history (Korea). These facts do not square with all the praise.

MacArthur boasted before the war that he would be able to defend the Philippines from the Japanese and changed the US Army's plans for preparation for the war. He also distributed supplies throughout the Philippines rather than keeping the supplies in Manila. As a result, the supplies were quickly lost during the early stages of the war.

MacArthur's ineptitude is evidenced by the fact that the Japanese quickly overran the Philippines when MacArthur was in charge. Yet when the war was over, Japanese were still fighting in the Philippines.

MacArthur should have been sacked on the first day of the war. In spite of notification that Pearl Harbor was attacked, MacArthur did nothing further that day to prepare for the coming Japanese raid on the Philippines that occurred later in the same day. The military leaders at Pearl Harbor were sacked, but MacArthur had a days warning and did nothing.

Not true.

For example, MacArthur (as the article mentions) ordered the moving of American aircaft. That many were caught on the ground was, in part, bad luck.

It you what to have a look a real incompetance you should examine the British campaign in Malaya and Singapore. The British and allied forces greatly outnumbered the Japanese and were totally defeated. That was followed by deŮfeat in Burma. Even "Uncle Bill" (General Slim) who was virtually the only British commander left in the area admitted that it took him a long time to understand the Japanese way of warfare - and Slim was the best British Army commander of World War II (much better than Monty - a man who had a habit of taking the credit for other commanders work).

By the way I am British.

I am supprised you have not mentioned the accusation of unsound mind that Bradley made about MacArthur. The article gives the impression that this was a comment from a friendly observer - it was not.

O.B. had a habit of snearing at other Generals as crazy (he did it with Patton), although he tended to be nice to someone's face he enjoyed undermining people behind their backs. I know Bradley is wildly popular with Americans, but he was a more complicated character than the "what a nice guy" myth.

Paul Marks. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 193.63.48.48 (talk • contribs) 17:20, 31 May 2006.

Here is the official US Army version if you have any questions: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-PI/ —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 204.233.233.180 (talk • contribs) 21:23, 10 April 2006.

How can you begin to say that MacArthur was responsible for the United States' worst defeats? You obviously have never heard of the American Civil War. Furthermore, the quote "biggest retreat in US military history" is not only entirely subjective, but you don't even begin to explain what you mean. It obviously isn't the longest-distance retreat, because Korea is only about the size of New York State, and it's not the largest number of troops retreated, because over the duration of both the Vietnam War and the Civil War (of which you appear to be completely ignorant) more troops retreated. Your "facts" are ridiculous so I agree with you on one thing, the "facts" don't square with his praise; MacArthur's campaign from Australia to Tokyo lasted roughly three years and covered an area several times the size of the United States, and suffered fewer casualties over those years than the United States' army during the isolated, three-month long Battle of the Bulge.

In addition, I would like to compliment you on your hindsight. You would be a brilliant general if only you had some sort of time machine to travel 60 years in the future and evaluate your decisions. MacArthur's decision to spread supplies throughout the Phillipines was partly to create the possibility of extended guerrilla warfar in the occupied Phillipines, and you have absolutely no mention of the resources MacArthur laid away at the fortresses at Bataan and Corregidor. Since you seem to think so highly of your hindsight, tell me why would MacArthur stockpile a poor, vulnerable harbor city like Manila which the Japanese would surely overwhelm with a powerful army when he had strongholds like Bataan.

How can you say that MacArthur evidenced any "ineptitude" when faced with the military might of Japan? Would you please cite the statistics on both MacArthur's and Japan's forces in the Philippines? Or do you know them already and refuse to cite them because they override your ridiculous slander.

Here's a good idea. Fire everyone in the army, when, after years of paying them to sit around, you actually need them. "MacArthur should have been sacked on the first day of the war"? What? —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Andepans (talk • contribs) 05:27, 30 April 2006.

Sorry if any of my remarks seem caustic to you, it only seemed fair that since you are so critical of MacArthur, I could give you a little of your own medicine. Except you can defend youreself. MacArthur can't. Because he dedicated his life to our country and now he's dead. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Andepans (talk • contribs) 05:33, 30 April 2006.
 * "MacArthur's decision to spread supplies throughout the Phillipines was partly to create the possibility of extended guerrilla warfar in the occupied Phillipines"? Only after he had made conventional operations impossible, by not making arrangements to have available food supplies moved out of reach of the Japanese.
 * "when faced with the military might of Japan"? When he landed at Lingayen Gulf, Yamashita was outnumbered about 2:1.
 * MacArthur had the best intelligence available to a commander in the field, the top priority in the Pacific (over Pearl, contrary to popular myth), and over 8 hours' warning, yet he lost half his bomber force on the ground. He rejected "a plan that MacArthur had labeled suicide"? Unescorted ops were USAAF doctrine at the time, & they were in the prewar plan for the defense of the Philippines, which MacArthur approved. (Postwar, he lied.) He had no orders to attack? He'd gotten express orders from DC (Postwar, he lied about that, too.), he knew Pearl had been attacked, what did he need, an engraved invitation? "The Brereton account of these events is largely discredited"? MacArthur's is fiction (and Manchester was an avowed admirer). Perret's biography sounds like another apology for MacArthur's incompetence. At the very least, it's a bit POV for an encyclopedia article; as it is, it reads like a PR release from Bataan. Trekphiler 13:49, 29 December 2006 (UTC)

RE: Philippines
For what it is worth, I have personally visited the Philippines numerous times, and the average Filipino does not even know who MacArthur is.

http://www.thingsasian.com/goto_article/article.1650.html '''
 * Erm, for what it is worth, I'm Filipino and everyone in my family, including and especially those in the Philippines, knows who MacArthur is.''' 81.156.192.122 23:32, 27 January 2007 (UTC)

Sean7phil 07:14, 29 January 2007 (UTC)

I agree with Sean7phil. The Philippines has a major public highway, and among other places named after MacArthur. Perhaps you should not assume that a few Filipinos speak for the 80 million populace. Or maybe you ARE right, and the average Filipino doesn't know who MacArthur is, because he doesn't even know his own nation's history.

That's how pathetic the country is right now, but then again, that's another topic on yet another messageboard.

203.215.116.211 20:19, 1 July 2007 (UTC)KRONOS251 July 2, 2007

USMA
I am personally annoyed by all the times I see USMA as U.S. Military Academy. My father went to West Point and I know I have never heard it called U.S. Military Academy. It's always USMA or West Point. That would be my personal opinion on the subject. If anyone has a good reason for this, please tell me.


 * The official name is the United States Military Academy at West Point. USMA stands for United States Military Academy.  True, USMA and West Point are the more common (and better known) names for the institution, but it is neither inaccurate nor unreasonable to call it the United States Military Academy or U.S. Military Academy.  Anyway, 99% of Americans people who see "U.S. Military Academy" know it means West Point, and frankly, for non-Americans, "U.S. Military Academy" is certainly more descriptive and therefore more helpful than "West Point." Jrkarp 17:37, 8 Feb 2005 (UTC)


 * For the record, I attended West Point and calling it the U.S. Military Academy is fine. I do it all the time when talking to non-graduates.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.80.212.130 (talk) 00:17, August 30, 2007 (UTC)

Why all the Praise
I read somewhere that FDR and Gen Douglas MacArthur were related, cousins of some sort. It is my asumption that this relationship saved MacArthurs's butt and reputation several times, including his leading the assault in washington on the World War I Veterans in the Bonus Army march on Washington, and his strategic loss of almost every asset supplied him in the Phillipines before the Japanese invasion. FDR had diverted almost every bomber produced to MacArthur in the Phillipines, yet they were on the ground and destroyed there when the Japanese arrived at lunch time. Instead of being at least reprimanded, he was saved by Presidential order and let Wainwiright take the rap for the fall of the Phillipines. I further understand that at the surrender of Japan, MacArthur turned his back on Wainwright for lsoing the Phillipines, a command he had deserted. Though his Far east command area of Operations was much smaller than either that of Nimitz's or Stillwell's,and the number of battles much less, history seems to act as if he alone defeated the Japanese.


 * What I heard was that his mother was active in the Washington DC scene, and ran interference for him in political circles. She had died when the Korean incident occurred and could not save him from being relieved. Also my understanding is he was ordered to leave the Phillipines, not desert.


 * Something else left out about his dismissal was he had ordered supply dumps in China to be bombed, this was one of the concerns by President Truman. But it can be shown this had a dramatic effect on Red China's participating in the war. The Red Chinese were without supplies and started surrendering.

"He helped rebuild Japan after the war played a key role in stopping the Communist takeover of Korea with his brilliant Inchon landing. " POV? Rouge8 17:36, 23 October 2005 (UTC)


 * I again agree that the NPOV marker should NOT be removed, but on behalf of the SWPA (and not explicitly for MacArthur), i cannot let the following go:


 * his Far east command area of Operations was much smaller than either that of Nimitz's or Stillwell"


 * There is no land campaign in the entire POA (King/Nimitz) that engaged more Japanese troops than in the SWPA's New Guinea campaign (400,000 IJA troops) or in the reconquest of the Philippines (420,000+ IJA). Yamashita's three groups in the main island of Luzon alone, an aggregate of some 375,000 men by late 1944, outnumbered the combined defenders of Okinawa, the Marianas (Saipan, Tinian, Guam), and all the Mandates (Gilberts, Marshalls).


 * But it is correct that Vinegar Joe did lead armies in southern China that dwarfed either the SWPA and POA complement, but these were Chinese Nationalist armies. Opposing IJA forces in China numbered in the millions.Pottersville 00:11, 23 April 2006 (UTC)


 * Get a clue. Nimitz' POA covered 15.5million km2, far & away the largest theatre of war. Trekphiler 13:34, 29 December 2006 (UTC)

FDR fans and/or MacArthur fans should not have a monopoly on this page. The truth is, FDR was sending "almost every bomber produced" to Europe, which is ultimately what led to the disaster the Philippines more than anything else. (He was doing so even before Pearl Harbor, but that's a different story) MacArthur made some mistakes during the early part of the war, but with the "Europe First" policy it was a wonder he secured the South Pacific at all. Liberals and others who hate him for various reasons will write anything to discredit himShield2 04:33, 21 September 2006 (UTC)


 * "Liberals ...will write anything to discredit him"? The Brits agreed to reduce the number of B-17s they purchased, despite an agreed higher priority, so more could be sent to the Philippines, where they'd be destroyed on the ground. "Brereton account of these events is largely discredited"? MacArthur's is a fiction. MacArthur's unpreparedness led to "disaster the Philippines more than anything else": no medicines, no defensive positions, no ammo stocks, no plans for moving (available!) food... And MacArthur, unlike Kimmel & Short, had full access to Purple. (So much for the conspiracy theorists.) If not for his mania to "return", the war would easily have been 6mo shorter (the time it took to clear the Philippines), & less diversion of effort into SWPA would have strangled Japanese commerce months earlier, which could only have shortened it still further. That, however, falls into original research... Trekphiler 13:34, 29 December 2006 (UTC)


 * I agree. "Liberals"?  Since when is defending incompetence a conservative virtue. Epstein&#39;s Mother 13:20, 3 January 2007 (UTC)

I'd just like to point out that the Bonus March that MacArthur attacked occurred during Hoover's presidency. So the comment above about MacArthur's relationship to Roosevelt is meaningless.

Congressional Medal of Honor
The way this article is written, it appears that MacArthur was awarded the CMH in 1945. I believe it was actually awarded to him in April 1942 after he was evacuated from the Philippines. Also the article claims that the CMH was awarded for his command of Southwest Pacific theater (SWPA). I believe this is also erroneous. If I recall correctly, the CMH was awarded to MacArthur for organizing the defense of the Philippines and specifically, for his actions on the Bataan Peninsula. Somebody might want to look this up to confirm & edit that part of the article.

--VeniceBruin 01:35, 17 Jun 2005 (UTC)

He never deserved the Congressional Medal of Honor either. Giving him the Congressional Medal of Honor was just a PR stunt by Roosevelt to raise the morale back in the States.

"Congressional" Medal of Honor? It is "Medal of Honor"144.139.175.228 02:23, 25 June 2006 (UTC)


 * The C in CMH stands for Congressional...68.227.84.134 02:15, 17 March 2007 (UTC)


 * Yup, but the actual name of the award is "Medal of Honor" .....no 'Congressional' in there. CMH is an unofficial name or nickname or what have you. DMorpheus 03:03, 17 March 2007 (UTC)

From the official US records at: http://www.army.mil/cmh/html/moh/wwII-m-s.html MacARTHUR, DOUGLAS

Rank and organization: General, U.S. Army, commanding U.S. Army Forces in the Far East. Place and date: Bataan Peninsula, Philippine Islands. Entered service at: Ashland, Wis. Birth: Little Rock, Ark. G.O. No.: 16, 1 April 1942. Citation: For conspicuous leadership in preparing the Philippine Islands to resist conquest, for gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action against invading Japanese forces, and for the heroic conduct of defensive and offensive operations on the Bataan Peninsula. He mobilized, trained, and led an army which has received world acclaim for its gallant defense against a tremendous superiority of enemy forces in men and arms. His utter disregard of personal danger under heavy fire and aerial bombardment, his calm judgment in each crisis, inspired his troops, galvanized the spirit of resistance of the Filipino people, and confirmed the faith of the American people in their Armed Forces.

-- Lee-Anne (talk) 19:15, 20 November 2007 (UTC)

Shameless POV
From the article:

"General Bradley later speculated that MacArthur's disappointment over his inability to wage war on China had "snapped his brilliant but brittle mind."[1] Of course, mediocre generals such as Bradley had always been jealous of MacArthur and his spectacular accomplishments. Bradley also said similar things about Patton, the best tank-commanding leader America probably ever had."

I'm removing the bolded portion of the paragraph. Whatever one's feelings on Bradley (and mine aren't at all benign), this kind of POV pushing is disgraceful.--201.243.52.105 20:32, 16 February 2006 (UTC) I agree. Bradley was indeed a snake who was jealous of superior generals(my opinion), but this is seems amatuerish and stupid to write such a POV thing. On the other hand, Bradley's opinions shouldn't be taken at face value or added without noting that many feel this way about him.Shield2 04:39, 21 September 2006 (UTC)

The fact that Bradley didn't care much for either MacArthur or Patton isn't a great secret. He also wasn't all that fond of Eisenhower. However, Bradley's talents as a General shouldn't be minimized. Let's don't forget he was one of Marshall's favorites and was good enough to make five stars. --Thesurveyor 04:54, 1 July 2007 (UTC)

Not quite on the same level, but are these sentences from the "Dismissal" section NPOV?

''MacArthur by this time had not been back to the United States for more than twenty years and suffered from paranoia, self-destructive impulses, and political aspirations, he had visions of running against Truman in the 1952 elections[citation needed]. Surrounding himself with sycophants and publicity spinners, MacArthur effectively cut himself off from Washington and ignored suggestions and even orders from superiors, as he felt that none were superior to him.'' Mingusboodle (talk) 17:59, 6 December 2007 (UTC)

Rotary Membership
MacArthur received Honorary membership from Rotary International. See 'Famous Rotarians' link, where he is with a full collection of conservative politicians. Manchukuan victims of Japanese imperiaslism are not near to receive a pardon request from their killers...

PierreLarcin, pierre.larcin@ifrance.com

Sorry to disappoint, but Douglas MacArthur didn't receive his membership from R.I. He was inducted as an honorary member of the Rotary Club of Manila at it's last official meeting before the WW-II interruption (May 6, 1942). That meeting was held on Corregidor. The club was formally reorganized in September, 1945. -- Thesurveyor 04:51, 1 July 2007 (UTC)

Serious concerns with this article
I have some serious concerns with this article, and I'm about to add the tag to it until the record is corrected. My concerns lie with McArthur's command in Australia and his actions with Australian troops in New Guinea. Many, many Australian historians would dispute that "Australian and American forces under MacArthur's command eventually achieved success, overrunning Japanese resistance in 1943 and 1944, by over-coming a divided Pacific command and with an almost complete lack of naval resources, by utilizing the Australian soldiers, pilots and airplanes to unprecedented advantage." Most take equal opportunity to point out that it was amazing that Australia was not overrun and give both MacArthur and General Blamey equal bollocking for their cockups, arrogance and poor judgement.

There is a line in the article that says: "1942 - 1943: Begins the conquest of New Guinea and is generally credited with halting an invasion of Australia by Japanese forces". He is not general credited this by most Australian military historians. - Ta bu shi da yu 14:24, 20 April 2006 (UTC)
 * The Japanese never planned to invade Australia. But the Australians did not know that and needed outside help fast. MacArthur was the symbol and reality of American protection. Rjensen 17:51, 20 April 2006 (UTC)
 * Well, that's debatable. They certainly wanted to gain access to Sydney so they could gain a foothold in the Pacific. MacArthur may have been the symbol of American protection, and America certainly gave Australia a large boost in the Second World War, but the reality was that it was the Australians in the field who fought the Japanese and they largely prevailed despite the actions of the command in Australia. I suggest you read the article Kokoda Track campaign which actually does document MacArthur and Blamey's short-sightedness. - Ta bu shi da yu 09:31, 21 April 2006 (UTC)


 * Have you seen this: Planned invasion of Australia during World War II? I make no claim as to the veracity or verifiability contained therein.  I just happened by the discussion and remembered that it existed.  --Easter Monkey 10:06, 21 April 2006 (UTC)


 * Yes, I have read about this before and with an extremely small amount of digging (when I get a chance, I have to write about the USA PATRIOT Act) I'm sure I can dig out more information from the State Library of NSW. I would agree with this as it was most likely that they just wanted to isolate Australia. I should note that it would have been sheer madness for them to have attempted an invasion from Darwin, because the Australian government had already decided that if an invasion occured from there they would make a "Brisbane line" and pull back. Then the Japanese would have had to cross the Australian desert which would have severely strained their supply lines. Attacking through New Guinea, to be honest, would have been the only way to invade Australia successfully. There is no doubt in my own mind, however, that it would have eventually been a springboard to invasion of Australia had not the Japanese had so many disasters in other Naval battles. - Ta bu shi da yu 10:29, 21 April 2006 (UTC)

This article is still not NPOV. See my comments above. Rjensen removed the NPOV tag, I have put it back till my issues are addressed. - Ta bu shi da yu 08:02, 22 April 2006 (UTC)
 * OK, there are a number of issues that must be addressed before the NPOV tag is removed:
 * MacArthur appointed General Blamey, a political soldier, in charge of the troops fighting along Kokoda. Blamey supplied him with inaccurate information, and caused countless problems for troops in the field. MacArthur didn't fly in to New Guinea until well into the fighting to determine what was going on. He was not kept fully apprised of the situation, and in my opinion derelict in his duty to the men who served along the Kokoda track. It is a matter of fact that MacArthur lied about when he moved his HQ to New Guinea.
 * There are a number of instances where men in the field were undermined by MacArthur. During the battles in New Guinea, the Australian 16th Brigade reached Templeton's Crossing on October 11th, where Japanese troop reinforcements had been increasing over some time and had already dug themselves in and were well prepared for any offensive that may occur. Here the 16th dug in and under thick jungle terrain, with no maps to guide them, fought a well prepared enemy. Both sides inflicted significant casulties on each other. On the 19th they releaved the AIF's 25th Brigade, who had been fighting since September. The casualties in this offensive were: 18 killed, 2 wounded, with 1 sick men. This made a total of 68 killed men, 135 wounded and 771 seriously ill men in the 25th Brigade. MacArthur's response to this was that this the casualties were extremely light. MacArthur also stated that the progress along the trail was not satisfactory. Clearly the man had no idea of the terrain or the conditions the men were fighting under. He should have known, and he should have appraised the situation. There is no excuse for him not to have. General Arthur Allen, in the field, is recorded as saying that "I was determined not to murder my men by letting MacArthur-Blamey put me in a panic" and that the MacArthur seemed to believe that the terrain was "only undulating and I could have swept around the flanks with a brigade". How a Commander could not know the terrain is totally unexcusable.
 * When the Australian militia was fighting a desperate battle against the Japanese, the AIF had returned from the Middle East. MacArthur kept them in Queensland doing light training and building airfields for three months. They should have been in New Guinea, considering the great threat posing Australia from the Japanese.
 * Paul Ham writes in his book Kokoda that "In Papua he failed. He misudged Japanese plans for a land invasion; he failed to lead the American army to a successful outcome; he viciously disparaged battle-weary Australian troops; he sough scapegoats for his own errors...nor did he, as he later claimed, single-handedly rouse Australians to the offensive. It was simply untrue that he switched the offensive from Australia within days of his arrival in Melbourne." (pg 524).
 * 'Doug's Communiques' were misleading. One example is the communique where he calls the battle of Sanananda as a "mopping up" operation. Sanananda lasted 10 days, killed 2186 American and Australian soldiers and about 1600 Japanese soldiers. Such is the lies and mistruths told in his communiques, told to a Washington that desperately wanted good news. MacArthur's most famous line "I came through and I shall return" is interesting in that he stated that he was ordered to come to Australia "for the purpose of organising American offense against Japan.". Interesting that. It was the Australians who largely fought on the Kokoda track. The Americans came later, and as they were inexperienced actually initially hindered the Australians more than they helped them (this is not their fault, the conditions in Kokoda were horrific and the Australians found it just as tough going). Later on they did much better. Sorry, I should have noted this and have corrected my comment. I am not disparaging American troops. My sole focus is on the way that MacArthur is portrayed in this article, with respect to the New Guinea campaign.
 * There are more issues, but you can see why I'm not terribly impressed with this article's neutrality. MacArthur has been justifiably criticised by more than one historian. This article has been written from the POV that MacArthur could do no wrong. It's not accurate, and it's not neutral. - Ta bu shi da yu 16:30, 22 April 2006 (UTC)


 * "generally credited with halting an invasion of Australia by Japanese forces"? Not by anybody who knows what he's talking about. The Japanese lacked the capacity to invade, in transport shipping or manpower. (Notional plans don't count.) If anybody should be "credited with halting an invasion of Australia", it should be Tojo. I don't discount the tough fighting by the Auzzies & Kiwis, just their bad leadership; what few realize is, Japan's was worse (hard as that is to believe). Trekphiler 14:25, 29 December 2006 (UTC)

As an Australian, I'd like to respond to this:

Yes, Australians seem to be hung up on Kokoda. The whole idea of a Kokoda Campaign is new. Until the 1990s, it was bundled with Milne Bay and Buna as he Papuan Campaign. I fear that it is because it is the only battle that people in Australia have heard of. The battles of 1943 and 1944 (not to mention 1945) remain in the proverbial Green Hole.

The level of a theatre commander is where military issues tend to merge with political ones. Yet labelling Blamey as a "political soldier" requires qualification. In many ways he was personally disinclined to play the politician. MacArthur was far more comfortable with the political aspects of his role. Of course, MacArthur had the advantage of having his political masters on the other side of the world, whereas Blamey's could drop in on him at any time. It has to be remembered that the intended recipients of the Communiques were the public in America; not the public in Australia, and especially not the troops in SWPA. American and Australian troops alike thought the Communiques were so much B*S but the Australian government was happy with the way that they drummed up American support.

MacArthur ordered Blamey to take over command of New Guinea Force because he had confidence in Blamey, and had lost confidence in Blamey's subordinates. It's also the American Way of doing things: send in a man, and have him relieve officers until things improve. This is what MacArthur did with the 32nd Infantry Division at Buna, and what Bradley did with the 90th Infantry Division in Normandy.

Blamey did manage to turn the situation around. He was, after all, the most experienced general in the theatre, and as a corps commander, showed a sound understanding of logistics, which was what was most required. It was true that certain tactical deficiencies of the Australian and American armies were revealed in the Papuan Campaign. However, these were dwarfed by the logistical ones.

There's a cultural issue here, one which I think Australians and Americans have in common: a tendency to rely on (or blame) the man in charge rather than the system. The US Army believed that the 32nd Infantry Division's training was adequate, but it wasn't. The Australian Army knew that its logistical units were inadequate, but had no choice but to try to build them and use them at the same time.

Among journalists in recent years, there has arisen a notion that The 7th Division should have been in New Guinea, considering the great threat posing Australia from the Japanese. Blamey should have put the 7th Divvy on the beach at Buna and ambushed em! But in what ships was the division, its equipment, and its stores to move to Papua? And when it got there, how was it ever going to move over the trail? There were solutions to these problems, but they took time to devise and implement.

Hawkeye7 21:08, 6 March 2007 (UTC)

MacArthur and Insuboration and self justification

 * MacArthur seems to have had an ingrown habbit on insuboration/self justification to his surperiors during moments of delicate crisis:
 * He was gassed in World War I because of his refusal to wear a gas mask
 * He did lead cavalry and tanks against the Bonus Army of 1932 and tried to justify his actions by repeating the FALSE claim that these Veterans were "Communists" who tried to overthrow the Goverment. They were not-they were poor desperate Veterans whose petitions for relief were passed in the House of Represenatives but blocked by Hoover.
 * His actions during the Phillippines and Australia 1941-1942- and Korea 1950-1951 his grandise self-justicfication statements certainly didn't help fight the enemy forces. Interestingly it was other persons who had to beat the enemy-while MacArthur got the glory:
 * it was George Kenney who helped forge the Air forces to fight the Japanese-not MacArthur;
 * it was the Australians {Army and Navy} and US General Walter Kruger Army and the Marines and the NAvy under Nimitz who had to fight the Japanese in Islands;
 * it was Matthew Ridgeway who had to forge the beaten 8th Army into a force to beat the Chinese Army.
 * In Movie MacArthur Truman is heard grumbling about what a mistake it was for FDR to have recalled MacArthur instead of Wainwright. The movie takes liberty of placing this remark of Truman during Korean War ; although Truman said this 1945-in view of MacArthur Insoboration in 1950-1951 HST probably felt the same about "Mac" in 1950-1951 as he did in 1945!!
 * See 32nd Infantry Division (United States) and Battle of Buna-Gona about what happens when a undertrained unit with neither air or artillery support is sent in by MacArthur--and expected to fight a battles aginst a fanatic professional enemy!!


 * Taking a wild stab at it but I think our friend here was going for the word "insubordination" in the rant above. 65.69.81.2 16:57, 17 May 2007 (UTC)

Good!
The state of oour Union was in good hands with MacArthur now that he was fired and deceased our military will stagger to the depths. So far the Muslims in Other countries like Iraq and Iran are ahead of us in missle warfare, and this is unaceptable for this to happen!

Dude. That is the stupidest thing I've ever read. Neither of those countries have conventional weapons that could hit outside of the middle east.

I am with the second guy. (first of all, you spelled "our" with two "o"s, and your first sentence is a fragment, but I will ignore that.) Second, Iran doesn't even have a functioning nuclear weapon because they have to enrich their own uranium 235 from nuclear power reactors since their whole country is too cheap to buy any pre-enriched uranium because the world hates them. Third, the only thing Iraq has to threaten Americans are soviet 155mm howitzer shells rigged to go off with cell phone detonators because their whole army consists of peasant farmers teaching their six year old sons to fire AK-47's at anyone who resembles an American. (However, these types of weapons are becoming obsolete because the people using them do not know how to aim, so the only way they can take out our soldiers is to get so close they have to blow themselves up in the process.) Fourth of all, MacArthur was a great general no matter how much flak he gets from people who have nothing better to do than downgrade our american military leaders.

First of all, first guy's sentence wasn't a fragment, just needed a punctuation and spelling change and a few words added in. It should have looked like this: The state of our Union was in good hands with MacArthur, but now that he is fired and deceased, our military will stagger to the depths. Apart from that I'm with the second and third dudes. Adolph172

You're a whiz with the grammer guide. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Aaronofkent (talk • contribs) 22:49, 29 December 2007 (UTC)

Rank
Because the above section leaves the impression that MacArthur would outrank George Washington, I'm adding this brief explanation. In 1919 a special rank, General of the Armies of the United States (superior to the five star General of the Army (United States) and therefore equivalent to six stars, was created specifically to honor John J. Pershing. In 1976 a special Act of Congress conferred this same rank on Washington, with a Date of Rank of 4 July 1776, thus making him senior to all other US Army officers. An equivalent Naval six star rank Admiral of the Navy has been held only by George Dewey. Dan D. Ric 10:04, 2 January 2007 (UTC)

Anti-MacArthur POV
The part about the occupation of Japan, like much of the stuff written about Douglas MacArthur, looks like it was written by an angry ex-mistress of his. It twists the facts to make it look like Marshall and Kennan were equally important in the rebuilding of Japan, which is absurd. And that's not even based on my opinions of MacArthur or of those two men. There are some things I like about Marshall and somethings I don't like at all, but overall I think he was overrated and not enough of a man of action to warrant a strong opinion. Kennan, on the other hand, was a wise and underrated statesman who deserves more credit than any other leader besides MacArthur for America's victory in the Cold War. But you have to remember that, while anti-communist to the core, MacArthur didn't really support the idea of a Cold War in the way it was carried out. The instances in which MacArthur's own controversial geo-political goals were successful, which is about half of them, tipped the balance of power in favor of the United States on a macro-historical scale. He won the Cold War, but he didn't support it. But strong opinions and claims about him aside, this section is biased and distorts history.

The section, quoting MacArthur-bashing guru Michael Schaller, who concedes that his extremely negative opinion of MacArthur stems from the fact that MacArthur's ever-controversial actions and leadership during the Korean War led to the diplomatic isolation of Mao's China for two decades, makes it appear as though his reforms in Japan were somehow detrimental to the struggle against the Soviet Union. Actually he warned the Soviets to stay away from Japan and considered defending Japan from the communists a top priority. Never one to wait on politicians and beauracrats, he set about reforming Japan as quickly and efficiently as he could under his de facto independent authority. After all was said and done, Marshall and Kennan were in a convenient position to later decide some of MacArthur's reforms needed to be revised to better suit their vision of a Cold War that combined economic and military containment of the Soviet Union, a notion that the more "Old Right" MacArthur did not share. But they weren't on the ground, they weren't the ones making the crucial life-or-death decisions. They had the luxury of improving upon those kinds of decisions, after MacArthur had made them.

That is why the section distorts history. You cannot, for example, say that whoever wrote the later amendments to the U.S. Constitution were as important to the history of that document as the Framers. You can conveniently look back and say that the part about a slave being 3/5's of a human being is absolutely vile and reflects poorly on the characters of the Framers, but you cannot say the authors of the amendments which made such passages obsolete were as important to the document's history as the Founding Fathers. And the page on the Framers and the Founding of the United States certainly shouldn't include such a lengthy explaination of how the later amendments came about. The part about Marshall and Kennan's adjustments to MacArthur's reforms should be shortened.

There are more weasel words and subjective claims that compromise the section's neutrality. "While initiating some policies and merely implementing others, by force of personality MacArthur became synonymous with the highly successful occupation." He pushed for the new Consitution, rejecting the first one proposed by the Matsumo Commission and had his staff write an entirely new, more democratic one. The articles on the American Occupation of Japan and the Japanese Consitution are more neutral and more informatve. I think we should just link to those.

But what's worse is the irrelevant information that some members of his staff claimed he was rebuilding Japan because he wanted to run for President, or made statements that some interpret as suggesting so. If I went to the Eisenhower page and inserted any of the many comments by Patton claiming the only thing Ike ever gave a damn about was his political career, which I believe are far more easily and justly supported by actual facts than such claims about MacArthur, people would rightly accuse me of having an anti-Eisenhower POV. It's out of place, and like many of the claims made by the Douglas MacArthur Sucks Club, contradictory. If he only cared about running for president, than why didn't he simply give into the demands of nearsighted and noose-happy Americans and other victims of the Japanese, as many feel Eisenhower did in Germany? A lot of people wanted Hirohito executed, but MacArthur would have none of it. The Japanese were far more hated than the Germans, even by many of the American soldiers who fought in Germany. Strong anti-German sentiment died down throughout most of the country following the war, but hatred of the Japanese persists among the World War II generation even today. "MacArthur for President- he really gave those Jap devils what they deserved." A winning campaign slogan, and yet he insisted on winning the respect of his former enemies instead.

Or was it because of his family background? Contradicting the suggestion that MacArthur rebuilt Japan to better his political career, someone (The same person? I wouldn't be surprised) wrote, "MacArthur must have seen himself as a second 'opener' of Japan rather than the nation's conqueror. Of course it must be remembered that MacArthur himself was a descendant of the Massachusetts Perry family and a cousin of the commodore." The self-appointed shrink who wrote that reveals as much about his or her view of the world as about MacArthur's. "A descendant of the Massachusetts Parry family and a cousin of the commodore, MacArhur must have seen himself as a second 'opener' of Japan rather than the nation's conquerer" would be a better way of explaining his motives. Still subjective, as it's impossible to entirely not be so, but not biased. The way it is written now inadvertantly reveals that MacArthur's nastiest critics have an entirely different ethos and definition of what constitutes patriotism not only from his admirers, but from most soldiers and probably most Americans. Patriotism is personal and it's about one's family. Idealism for its own sake is B.S. and is not related to true patriotism. Kennan would agree with that as much as MacArthur would, if not even more. It's only disaffected intellectuals and professional critics such as Schaller who live in a universe where such an outlook is objectionable. Whoever wrote those sentences unwittingly provided a strong argument against claims that MacArthur's motives were insincere, but they should be either reworded or deleted because they make an outspoken value judgement.

I'm putting up a NPOV tag until this section is fixed, probably by shortening it and linking to other pages dealing with the subject. As it is, it's seething with catty hostility toward the man and his legacy which doesn't belong here. 04:19, 24 January 2007 (UTC)

- I can't comment on the accuracy of the article in the Occupation and Inter-war sections, however the criticisms of MacArthur made in the sections of this article dealing with the Second World War and the controversy leading to his removal during the Korean War, as harsh as they are, are factually correct, widely recognised (not just by Australian or US historians either), and more importantly sourced and qualified. That means that regardless of what you or I think of the man and his legacy Shield2, the criticisms belong in the article. If you wish to ensure NPOV, feel free to add details of what his supporters would've argued in response to his detractors. But I'd avoid making broad supporting statements about his performance and stick to specifics. Historians such as Sir John Keegan to name one would likely beg to differ. And I'd challenge you to label historians of his calibre as 'disaffected' and concurrently retain any sort of intellectual credibility. 203.217.3.94 15:18, 31 January 2007 (UTC)

In this case I was referring only to the part about Occupied Japan. The edits I have since made to that section made it more concise, coherent, and neutral. The other parts may take more time.

I have not read any response to Sir John Keegan's views on MacArthur in particular, but the excellent rebutals to his ignorant opinions of Carl von Clausewitz call his credibility as an unbiased authority on warfare into question. While he is a talented writer, Keegan's worldview is clearly of the standard politically correct "world betterer" variety. It is no more likely for such an author to display a positive opinion of MacArthur than it is for a Muslim historian to heap praise upon Charles Martel or Isabella of Castile, or a Jewish historian to praise the latter's leadership. This does not take away from Keegan's professional credibility, but he is a historian who fits historical figures and facts into his worldview, not one who simply writes about them for the sake of informing the uninformed. 05:38, 3 February 2007 (UTC)

I have supplied the requested source references and removed the POV tag from the legacy section. Hawkeye7 14:14, 26 May 2007 (UTC)

THE EXONERATION OF THE IMPERIAL FAMILY
It is very clear from the works of Dower and Bix that Mac Arthur and his staff made everything possible to exonerate Hirohito and his family DESPITE the first wil of Truman. Fellers was even brought back to Washington when Eisenhower discovered he was hiding facts from him. --Flying tiger 15:15, 8 February 2007 (UTC)


 * The Post WWII section of this article contains entirely too much commentary on this single aspect of the occupation of Japan -- over half that section. It really belongs on the Occupied Japan page, but the "purging of war criminals" section over there is completely dominated by that topic too.   This singular focus is not encylopedic.  jhf 17:40, 6 March 2007 (UTC)

Sorry, but it is a very important aspect of the occupation and, as the root of the negationist policies in present-day Japan, I do not think 6 sentences is "too much". You just have to read the comments made this week by Abe about the comfort women to appreciate the implications. --Flying tiger 19:04, 6 March 2007 (UTC)

History is Alive & Well
I find this article interesting and provocative. The discussion is proof that history & lives of historical figures are not dead. The opinions of some here show a depth of knowledge in particular campaigns that I find exciting.

For me it would be interesting to take MacArthur and Nimiz put them side by side and analyse their effect on the pacific theater of operations. Irville A Sargent 22:57, 19 April 2007 (UTC)


 * Effect? MacArthur spent three years trying to get back to the Philippines, while tying up considerable resources that may have hampered Operation NEPTUNE, while Nimitz ignored Japanese lines of communication in favor of close blockade by submarine. Between them, they lengthened the war by over a year, & cost hundreds of thousands of casualties, including huge numbers of Japanese civilians. If the delay was enough to provoke use of the atomic bomb, it can be argued they managed to avoid World War 3 & a nuclear holocaust as a result, when the Soviet Union saw the U.S. was willing to use it. See Alperowitz, Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb; Blair, Silent Victory; Willmott, Barrier & the Javelin; Weapons that Wait (& Skates, Invasion of Japan?). Trekphiler 05:28, 20 April 2007 (UTC)

Vandalism
I have noticed some vandalism going on in this article, apparenty by anti-MacArthur advocates. Today there were comments pasted on this article with nonsense like he was a recipient of the "Medal of scaredycat" in the infobox. Other strange notes were all over the article and I do not have enough Wikipedia or MacArthur knowledge to fix all the edits, so can someone plz help? -=LEGENDARY MASTER=- 18:20, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

The article is full of anti-MacArthur propaganda. It needs to be cleaned up. Jtpaladin 23:45, 16 May 2007 (UTC)

It's not "boneheaded" or a "haligraphy," whatever that means in smarter-than-plenty-of-Americans land. Actually, praise and/or defense of his remarkable achievements seems to be out of fashion, and has been for decades now. LEGENDARY MASTER and JtPaladin are correct. 23:08, 22 May 2007 (UTC)

It is true that MacArthur made mistakes, but he oversaw a Pacific War effort altogether more successful than the war in Europe (both militarily and politically), despite receiving far less support from the government. His self-promotion during World War II, far from being detrimental to the war effort, was quite helpful from a viewpoint of the Pacific War and was initially done in part for that purpose. Also, while it is true that he owed much of his success to the Navy, the opposite is also true. He often dragged the more conservative Navy into decisive battles that it would not have even been engaged in had it not been forced to support his plans. He even once said, "I seem to have more confidence in the Navy than the Navy has in itself." As controversial as it was, even his decision to hold Bataan months after he knew it had been lost bought the U.S. Navy valuable time and seriously disrupted the ranks of the Imperial Japanese Navy. He deserves as much credit for the destruction of the Imperial Japanese Navy as any admiral, not to mention the early destruction of the Japanese Army Air Service. He always valued the advice of his brilliant airman and was George C. Kenney's dedicated advocate at a time when no one else truly understood the importance of air power. MacArthur appreciated air power more than any other Allied general because he'd made mistakes before. Ernest King and Chester Nimitz had their strengths, but they did not give air power top priority because they understandably clung to old naval traditions. Also, the Japanese military deaths of natural causes (over a million, up to a million and a half) were not a coincidence, they were part of MacArthur's "whither on the vine" strategy accelerated by naval victories he contributed to. Even FDR's decision to support King's plan at Guadalcanal was due in part to earlier public and private pressure by MacArthur to support the New Guinea campaign and the Pacific War in general, thus Washington was caught between political pressure from two rivals and forced to support the neglected Pacific effort. These are only some of his World War II accomplishments. His landing at Inchon was brilliant and was the last great tactical victory by any major Western military force. If he should share credit for his accomplishments, he should also share blame for his mistakes. The possibility of Chinese or Russian involvement in the Korean War was as serious an issue when Truman decided to wage it without the consent of Congress as it was after Inchon. Anyway, I don't see this as a hagiography, haligraphy, or whatever MacArthur's most rabid critics choose to call it. 08:00, 29 May 2007 (UTC)

I agree wholeheartedly with this, except for the part about a "whither on the vine strategy ", which I consider to be a misconception. MacArthur's strategy was to drive the enemy out by maneuvre, through outflanking and envelopment by land, sea and air as appropriate. He considered this to be the exact opposite of "island hopping". MacArthur never expected that bypassed enemy garrisons would simply wither away and die -- and they most certainly didn't. While he didn't have the resources to eliminate them all, MacArthur still intended to seize "every opportunity for the destruction of hostile forces". Hawkeye7 12:31, 29 May 2007 (UTC)


 * He then turned to clear the Dutch East Indies ("still intended to seize 'every opportunity for the destruction of hostile forces'"?), rather than move north to defeat Japan.


 * "His landing at Inchon was brilliant"? It was damn lucky, & owes more to the Coast Guard boat pilots than to him.

Sutherland was an example of one of MacArthur's biggest flaws- undeserved loyalty to unworthy subordinates. His judgement of subordinates, like everything else about his career, was often excellent but by no means consistently so. Actually Sutherland was worse than Willoughby, who sort of gets picked on for reasons that have nothing to do with his abilities (not that he was that great, but he wasn't as bad as people make him out to be).


 * Sutherland also gets picked on for personal reasons that have nothing to do with his abilities, particularly his affair with Captain Elaine Clarke. Hawkeye7 22:01, 1 July 2007 (UTC)

Which does not absolve MacArthur of responsibility the whole disaster, but the problem was not that his staff should have been listened to, but that they should have been fired. Sutherland was nowhere near as brilliant as Kenney and I don't even think anyone actually believes he was, unless believing so supports an assertion designed to discredit MacArthur.

While the mistakes MacArthur made in preparation for the attack are ones he will never live down, his retreat to Bataan was praised as brilliant even by those who despised him. This manuever allowed him to hold the line long enough for the Navy to prepare itself, for the South Pacific to be saved from being overrun, and perhaps most beneficial of all to the Pacific War effort, for FDR to dig himself into a hole and his lack of concern for the Pacific War effort to be exposed to the public. This, and perhaps the fact that he had been given such an unusual "Rainbow Five" order, made MacArthur deservedly more powerful after Washington decided to keep him alive. King could not have gotten logistical support for Guadalcanal if MacArthur hadn't decided on the campaign to "defend Australia in New Guinea" that also needed support, since FDR was more interested in supporting the North African Campaign at that point but conscious of political pressure to support the Pacific. It is a complete myth that his Philippines campaign stalled any viable plan. King's Formosa plan was originally conceived to invade Mainland China. When that no longer appeared to be an acceptable idea, the entire plan fell apart because its advocates were not even consistent in their support of it. It may be that there was a better plan than MacArthur's, but no one came up with one. The invasion itself was eventually agreed upon for strategic reasons by Nimitz, then finally by King. In fact, I'd say the Leyte invasion does not need any defending and one could not blame the Navy if they claimed they had agreed with it or thought of it- it's his later battles that are more controversial. First of all, Japanese trade was virtually unprotected after Leyte Gulf- the kamikaze attacks were effective terror tactics but strategically the Japanese were destroyed. If he deserves blame for the Navy's subsequent losses at the Philippines, he also deserves credit for triggering that decisive battle (or more accurately, four battles) in the first place. The Japanese shared MacArthur's "obsession" with the Philippines, which accounts for why they wasted so many fleets at Leyte Gulf, and also why the Philippines Campaign turned out to be more difficult than expected. The drain of Navy resources wasn't on nearly as great a scale as the success at Leyte Gulf.

As for the subsequent Philippines Campaign, while it didn't accomplish any important strategic goals like Leyte Gulf did, it did not stall anything that would not have been far bloodier from an American standpoint and it was a great tactical success when you look at the whole SWPA. Because the Japanese focus was on the Philippines at that point (up until Okinawa, that is, which initiated the last phase of the war), the islands from the New Guinea campaign could be attacked with impunity more than ever- all of MacArthur's campaigns as SWPA commander should be seen as building on the other. He was waiting on Soviet entry into the war, which he had not only been among the most powerful and ardent advocates of (although he later denied it) but had in fact, been the first to propose. Contemporary Japanese government sources show that the Soviet entry was at least as much of a factor in their surrender as the A-bombs, most likely even more so. He considered Soviet entry a prerequisite for an invasion of Mainland Japan, and in the meantime the whole of his SWPA command combined attrition with constant mobility and attacks on hostile forces wherever and whenever the opportunity presented itself. Naturally, that happened to be the Philippines, and after that he turned to the Dutch East Indies for the reasons I mentioned.

I won't even engage the remark about Inchon except to say that it displays the pettiness of MacArthur's critics. MacArthur pushed that winning plan over the objections of the gutless Joint Chiefs, particularly those still stuck in their archaic Naval ways and conversely, Army zealots in the government who hated the Marines. It was no more "damn lucky" than any risky but successful offensive in history. It owes to a lot of people besides him, to be sure, but to his critics, his subordinates could do no wrong when he made mistakes, and they did all the work when he was successful. 06:07, 1 July 2007 (UTC)

The move to clear the Dutch East Indies in no way delayed the move north to defeat Japan. Once plans for Japan were approved, GHQ SWPA re-considered upcoming operations. It was determined that Oboe I, II and VI could be implemented without affecting the November target date for Olympic, and were carried out. Oboe IV and V could not, and were therefore cancelled. Hawkeye7 22:01, 1 July 2007 (UTC)


 * I hardly know where to begin.


 * "the problem was not that his staff should have been listened to, but that they should have been fired."? MacArthur sat for 8.5hr doing nothing, while Sutherland (supposedly so incompetent) tried to get permission to execute a plan MacArthur had previously approved, only to lie postwar & say it was suicide (then why had he approved it?), conveniently ignoring the fact the whole reason B-17s were in the Philippines was to attack Japan. (I'll leave aside how lunatic it was to think they could reach the Home Islands.) And conveniently ignoring the fact he had express orders to commence operations against Japan & foreknowledge of Japanese attack (which Kimmel & Short, who routinely get crucified for inaction, didn't get). I ask again, what did he want, an engraved invitation?


 * "This manuever allowed him to hold the line long enough for the Navy to prepare itself, for the South Pacific to be saved from being overrun". I'd say the Japanese did more to "save the South Pacific" than MacArthur, with their dispersal, poor planning, poor commerce defense, & mania for Manchuria. As far as USN "preparing", I'm less than sure the defense in the Philippines had anything to do with it, either, since domestic shipbuilding capacity meant major fleet units, like carriers, wouldn't begin to arrive for at least 9mo after Manila fell in any event.


 * "King's Formosa plan was originally conceived to invade Mainland China." The Formosa invasion plan was impossible. Invading China was unneccessary & stupid. Defending the Philippine operation on that basis is irrational.


 * "I'd say the Leyte invasion does not need any defending" You're blinded by Saint Douglas' halo, I guess. "the subsequent Philippines Campaign...did not stall anything that would not have been far bloodier from an American standpoint and it was a great tactical success when you look at the whole SWPA." Give me a break. The forces deployed could better have been used at Okinawa or Iwo Jima. "The Japanese shared MacArthur's "obsession" with the Philippines" I wouldn't give them too much credit, either. Japanese movements into the Philippines actually strengthened the defenses in Okinawa & Iwo Jima, which would have been weaker had Nimitz been able to move sooner.


 * "If he deserves blame for the Navy's subsequent losses at the Philippines, he also deserves credit for triggering that decisive battle" Decisive? Don't be ridiculous. Nimitz (& hence Halsey & Spruance) had complete command of the sea & air already. If Halsey had been less a halfwit, he'd have destroyed the Japanese forces at Leyte Gulf without hazarding Taffy 3 or the landings at all. And, I notice, you ignore the weather & casualty issues. I guess God is on MacArthur's side?


 * "which accounts for why they wasted so many fleets at Leyte Gulf, and also why the Philippines Campaign turned out to be more difficult than expected." Well, no. Japanese strategic mobility was at a premium, thanks to submarines. IJN was a virtual prisoner in harbor, thanks to lack of fuel; it would have been dead easy to bottle up IJN in Tawi Tawi & Haiphong, with no risk to carriers or 5mo delay.


 * "The move to clear the Dutch East Indies in no way delayed the move north to defeat Japan." Oh, really? Where did the forces & supplies to do the job come from? Armies 'R Us? I'd say, given limited manpower & logistics resources, turning south was an unquestionable delay. Of course, I'm not Saint Douglas.


 * As for the Coast Guardsmen, maybe you're right. I hear how MacArthur gets the intel wrong, misjudges the Chinese entry, & still gets all the credit for success at Inchon, & I get a bit nauseous. My bad... Trekphiler 04:00, 2 July 2007 (UTC)


 * The forces used in Borneo came mainly from Australia. The 7th and 9th Divisions moved from their bases on the Atherton Tableland and staged on Morotai in April and May 1945. Air cover came from the RAAF 1st Tactical Air Force and the USAAF 13th Air Force. None of these units were scheduled to participate in Olympic. Since most of the personnel of the 6th, 7th and 9th Divisions had been in the Army since 1939 or 1940, The Australian government intended to send them home, and form a composite division from the remainder. This division might have participated in Coronet. The VII Amphibious Force was scheduled to participate, but was available shortly after the amphibious phase.


 * The Japanese forces in the East Indies were not short of fuel. Indeed, they were sitting atop major oil fields. Until Allied airpower moved into the Philippines and Borneo, supply lines from there to Japan remained open, not withstanding the effort of submarines, and troops from as far away as West Papua were making their way back to Japan. Hawkeye7 10:50, 2 July 2007 (UTC)


 * "The Japanese forces in the East Indies were not short of fuel." Really? I wish you'd tell Willmott & Blair, et.al., because they disagree with you. "Indeed, they were sitting atop major oil fields." The operative word being "sitting". They couldn't get the raw oil back to Japan to refine it due to lack of tankers, thanks to submarine attacks, & what could be pumped directly into bunkers was extremely hazardous, because of its volatility. Take a look at the runup to the attack on Saipan: IJN awaiting an American attack, "hopefully not to far from their bases" because their ships are immobilized.
 * You've evidently missed my point on "where from". Those Oz forces could as well, better, have been used invading Europe, while Marines took Oki & Iwo, rather than clearing out IJA forces as easily bottled up by submarines (or submarine-layed minefields...), at no hazard to the troops & no delay to the defeat of Japan. Clearing the DEI did nothing to further that cause. (Also, where was the shipping coming from? PTO was perennially short, so any troop movements, let alone from Oz, tied up ships that could better have been used for assaults. 07:04, 8 September 2007 (UTC))
 * "troops from as far away as West Papua were making their way back to Japan." When? Before or after SWPA ceased to be an active command? Until then, there was too much risk of fratricide to put full sub strength into the Luzon Strait. And I'll bet the numbers getting thru were pretty small, too, even without it. Trekphiler 17:02, 26 August 2007 (UTC) (BTW, I notice you have no answere for the rest... 07:04, 8 September 2007 (UTC))


 * I have all the answers; the issue is only whether it is relevant to the article and therefore can be discussed here. It would have been politically impossible to use Australian troops in the war in Europe. More American forces could have been sent though, including the marines. Note that the whole of the 3rd Marine Division was not employed on Iwo Jima, nor was the whole of the 2nd used on Okinawa. The theatre reserve, the 81st Infantry Division, was not call on in either case. There was yet another division available in Hawaii, which would have been used before units in SWPA were called upon. The conventional argument against Borneo is the same as that usually advanced about Okinawa; that while it was very valuable indeed, it could have been taken with less loss if the fact that the war was about to end had been known at the planning stage. Your point on shipping is well taken, although the shipping made available would not have been used for assaults, but for the far more useful task of rolling up bases across the Pacific for the assault on Japan. The shipping was made available by the end of the war in Europe. And SWPA did not cease to be an active command until 29 August 1945. Hawkeye7 10:23, 9 September 2007 (UTC)

Carol Petillo and the bonuses
I'm surprised the controversy section does not mention the discovery by historian Carol Petillo, ca. 1975, that MacArthur and Sutherland received very substantial bonuses from the Philippine government at about the time that MacArthur made the decision to move the Philippine president and vice-president from Manila to Corregidor. Some historians see this as a straightforward quid quo pro; others point out that a bonus was already allowed for in MacArthur's contract and that the award had the tacit approval of the Roosevelt Administration. Either way, it's an interesting controversy, and one discussed by quite a number of more recent histories. It ought to be included.

128.165.87.144 20:37, 11 July 2007 (UTC)


 * Sutherland's page does mention it though. Hawkeye7 10:48, 12 July 2007 (UTC)

Medal of Honor Location
Douglas MacArthur's Medal of Honor is on permanent display at the MacArthur Gallery in Howard Payne University's Douglas MacArthur Academy of Freedom. As I write this, the medal sits in a glass case two floors above me, along with a collection of MacArthur's effects, including swords from the Philippines and Japan, a collection of his pipes, and other personal belongings. Also, the article states that one of Macarthur's Purple Hearts is on display in the previously mentioned location. This is not true.

Tristan Summers

Tour Guide

Douglas MacArthur Academy of Freedom


 * The main article has been updated accordingly Hawkeye7 21:08, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

Count Tereuchi?
"In fact those responsible were under orders from Count Tereuchi" - wtf is this referring to? Google isn't being helpful. --moof 03:46, 20 July 2007 (UTC)
 * It should be Hisaichi Terauchi. I have corrected the spelling, but left the query stand as this fact should be referenced. Terauchi was in Singapore at the time, so it seems unlikely. Hawkeye7 05:19, 20 July 2007 (UTC)

The attack on Clark AF on December 8th
This whole episode has been blown way out of proportion and should be deleted from this brief encyclopedia article.

To summarize, FEAF has 35 B-17s and 100 P-40s, in the Phillipeans on December 8th, 1941. The FEAF lost approximately 17 B-17s and 40 P-40s in the attack. Clark AFB had inadequate AAA and was not properly bombproofed. Not matter what Brenton or MacArthur did or didn't do there were too few planes (with no replacements from the USA) to have done anything against significant against the hundreds of Japanese bombers and fighters. And of course, the Japanese had replacements and the FEAF did not. Note, the remaining US fighters were quickly disposed of during the remainder of Dec/Jan 1941.

To argue that 35 unescorted B-17s, on their first combat mission, could have inflicted significant damage on Japanese Shipping in Formosa is absurd. It is 500 miles from Clark AFB to Tapai and Formosa was covered with Fog through much of the day. In fact the reason the Japanese did not attack at dawn was due to fog covering the airfields. Finally, the target would have the harbor NOT the airfields. The USA had never done Photo Recon of Formosa before Dec 8th, and had no idea where the airfields were.

Finally, FEAF was warned of a Japanese air attack and had their planes airborne at dawn. However, they had to come down refuel. The attack on Clark AFB achieved surprise because the radar operators did not warn Clark AFB of the incoming Japanese planes.


 * "To argue that 35 unescorted B-17s, on their first combat mission, could have inflicted significant damage on Japanese Shipping in Formosa is absurd." Is that a fact? The plan was to attack Japan with those 35 B-17s.


 * 'NO the plan was NOT to attack Japan. LOok at a Map and caluculate the distance from Japan to Manila.'


 * And even a force of B-17s were capable of hitting ships at anchor. IJN did rather well against armored ships at anchor at Pearl Harbor; even a handful of bombs against unarmored merchantmen could have done significant harm. And, recall, any delay or disruption was detrimental to to Japanese execution.


 * 'The Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor with 300 planes, including torpedo planes. Not the same 35 B-17s on their first mission, bombing through fog at a target from 20,000 ft.'


 * "It is 500 miles from Clark AFB to Taipai". So? The B-17 was perfectly capable of carrying a significant load that far... IIRC, her design bombload was 2000pd for 3500mi; surely 2000pd for 500mi wasn't out of the question.


 * The point is the mission would have been unescorted and with a maximum bombload of 4,000 lbs. In 1943 300 B-17s would attack the German port of Hamburg and not sink a single ship. 


 * "The USA had never done Photo Recon of Formosa before Dec 8th, and had no idea where the airfields were." So MacArthur claims. Blair & Caidin disagree, but suggest there was PBY coverage of Formosa in the days or weeks prior, so Brereton (& MacArthur) presumably had some notion.


 * Blair never did a biography of MacArthur or the Phillipean Campaign and was a Naval Historian. Cadin never published a book on the Phillipean campaign. He was a popular historian of doubtful accuracy. Not only MacArthur, but Brenton and the official US Army Historian states there was no Photo Recon of Formosa prior to December 8th. 


 * "However, they had to come down refuel. The attack on Clark AFB achieved surprise because the radar operators did not warn Clark AFB of the incoming Japanese planes." You miss the point. The attack on Clark should never have found FEAF planes, because they should have been attacking Formosa while the IJAAF planes were on the ground, under that fog, & unable to defend the harbor (or, 1 might suggest, their own bases)...


 * As stated the P-40s could not have attacked Formosa because they did not have the range to escort the B-17s. They would have been destroyed on the ground in any case. 


 * As for what a handful of B-17s could, or couldn't, do? Recall the idea was for them to co-ordinate with Hart's submarines. Had they been able to, it would have made the job of counterattacking Japanese landing forces easier. Or they could have repeated their attacks on Formosan bases/harbors; recall, the Japanese found shooting down B-17s remarkably difficult. And, again, any delay or disruption only hurt the Japanese timetable. The same applies to the 70-odd P-40s (& about 35 P-36s) in the islands: every plane Japan had to use to down them was 1 not available elsewhere. Recall, too, what happened at Wake: the slight resistance caused Japan to call in carriers. The same at the Philippines could have offered juicy targets to Asiatic Fleet subs (even with the terrible Mk14 torpedoes); damage, however minor, even sinking, might have kept (say) Shokaku or Zuikaku out of Coral Sea, which would had incalculable effects on the war: would Operation MI even have gone forward? Would Pye have been emboldened to relieve Wake? Would there have been an early carrier battle at Wake? No telling. Any of these could, should have been a product of the survival of the B-17s & P-40s lost at Clark to MacArthur's incompetence.


 * Blah, blah. 17 B-17 were left after the attack and accomplished nothing. B-17s at Midway and later at Guadacanal accomplished nothing. In Europe hundreds of B-17s were neeeded to hit the largest of targets. The thought that 35 B-17s with 4,000 lbs. could have made a difference is absurd.

Trekphiler 18:36, 26 July 2007 (UTC)


 * "As stated the P-40s could not have attacked Formosa because they did not have the range to escort the B-17s. They would have been destroyed on the ground in any case. " Ridiculous. They should have been dispersed, able to intercept the Japanese when they attacked. And I never said the P-40s should, or would, go along. Learn to read.
 * "Not only MacArthur, but Brenton and the official US Army Historian states there was no Photo Recon of Formosa prior to December 8th." I notice you don't mention PBYs, which presumably a "naval historian" would know about...
 * "NO the plan was NOT to attack Japan. LOok at a Map and caluculate the distance from Japan to Manila." Learn to read. Manchester records the original plan, lunatic as it was, was bomb Japan. (BTW, I think the original plan is insane. I do know how to read a chart. I don't need you telling me.)
 * "The Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor with 300 planes, including torpedo planes. Not the same 35 B-17s on their first mission, bombing through fog at a target from 20,000 ft." Agreed. Not the same targets, either. And they didn't have to do much to screw the Japanese timetable. Nor, AFAIK, were the harbors socked in.
 * "The point is the mission would have been unescorted and with a maximum bombload of 4,000 lbs. In 1943 300 B-17s would attack the German port of Hamburg and not sink a single ship." Rather different operating conditions: heavy AA & fighter defense, which wouldn't've obtained over Taipei. And how many ships were there at Hamburg? How many at Taipei? If Taipei was remotely like the NEPTUNE  ports, it couldn't have been hard to hit something valuable.
 * "The point is the mission would have been unescorted". Doubtless MacArthur & Brereton understood that (I certainly did, without any help from you), & favored it anyhow. Unescorted missions were in keeping with AAF doctrine at the time, which doubtless MacArthur & Brereton understood, too (I certainly did, without any help from you on that, either), so it's a moot point. And recall Japanese fighters found B-17s rather tough targets (as Sakai records in Zero. {Or is he "a popular historian of doubtful accuracy", too? His cowriter was Caidin.})
 * "Blah, blah. 17 B-17 were left after the attack and accomplished nothing. B-17s at Midway and later at Guadacanal accomplished nothing. In Europe hundreds of B-17s were neeeded to hit the largest of targets. The thought that 35 B-17s with 4,000 lbs. could have made a difference is absurd." Yeah, when you have no arguments, just ridicule it. Try answering those, if you can. I'd guess not.
 * "hundreds of B-17s were neeeded to hit the largest of targets."? It wasn't a matter of need, it was a matter of desired effect, & factories were rather harder to knock out than ships. No sinkings at Guadalcanal or Midway? Warships at sea, under power, are extremely different from merchantmen at anchor.
 * "17 B-17 were left after the attack and accomplished nothing." Which only proves my point: MacArthur is incompetent.
 * "The thought that 35 B-17s with 4,000 lbs. could have made a difference is absurd." It's not, y'know. The point isn't stopping the invasion, it's screwing up the Japanese timetable. With that in mind, any damage was of value. The Japanese were on such a thin margin, they couldn't afford to take any losses. Trekphiler 05:50, 19 August 2007 (UTC) PS. If you want to reply, why don't you have the courtesy to cut & paste quotes, rather than break up my post? Or are you so convinced you're right, courtesy comes right after ridicule? If you're so sure you're right, why don't you have the courage to sign your posts?

Because you are an a Zealot, with such negative feelings about the General, I'd swear you are a Truman Apologist.. You are so biased that you discredit yourself. It's all Blah blah blah, 'MacArthur is worse than Hitler and Stalin' and 'I am the Supreme expert here' You act like you were there. It's great that you are such a great military strategist. Shut up! Freaking self-proclaimed experts. This is worse than the Assanine comments people leave on YT. Wiki should remove the whole article and just have a pict and his date of birth and death.!!!
 * Zealot? From somebody without the courage to sign a post & willing to simply blank a reply he can't answer? Small minds. Trekphiler 21:59, 14 September 2007 (UTC)

coup plot
Was Douglas MacArthur involved in the Business Plot to overthrow FDR in the 1930s? WooyiTalk to me? 02:14, 29 July 2007 (UTC)

Removed false fact about "interplanetary speech"
I removed the following false information:

In a speech given in October 1955, MacArthur told the cadets of West Point: ''The next war will be an interplanetary war. The nations of the earth must some day make a common front against attack by people from other planets.The good news about terrorism'' by Paul Robinson spectator.co.uk

Read the actual circumstances here: http://www.snopes.com/quotes/macarthur.asp --Acefox 01:44, 19 August 2007 (UTC)

MacArthur's time in Sydney during WWII)
Does anyone have or know about the generals time in Sydney during WWII. I know that in Australia we can look up the National Archives of Australia to find out certain things related to Australia. I guess there would be an American equivalant or can someone point me in the right direction. I have news paper articles stating that he visited a certain bunker called the Bankstown Bunker during his time in Sydney. I do have references stating that he did visit, I can email scans of news paper articles, I have a feeling that they may be wrong though. Could someone have a look at that article as well. Cheers_Ad@m.J.W.C. 23:31, 14 September 2007 (UTC)
 * MacArthur visited Sydney only once, on 7-8 June 1943. Hawkeye7 03:02, 15 September 2007 (UTC)
 * Thanks for that, I have atleast three news paper report saying that he visited this base atleast once, so it could have been over these two days. Cheers_Ad@m.J.W.C. 03:54, 15 September 2007 (UTC)
 * There are a lot of myths and legends about MacArthur and Sydney. For years after the war a lot of people believed that a underground bunker had been built under the Sydney CBD as MacArthur's HQ (one version stated that the disused tunnels at St. James railway station, Sydney were converted for this purpose). The reality is that MacArthur ran the war from office buildings in Melbourne and Brisbane until he moved his HQ to New Guinea in 1944. Nick Dowling 12:01, 16 September 2007 (UTC)

Table
The Dates of Rank table is messed up: the vertical line goes through the text in the second column. I've tried to fix it but failed: can anyone who knows about table formatting take a look at it? Richard75 16:45, 20 October 2007 (UTC)
 * Looks like a browser-specific CSS problem. It works fine for me using Firefox 2.0.0.8. Internet Explorer 7.0.5730.11 messes it up. I'll bring this up at WP:VPT.  -- Boracay Bill 01:52, 21 October 2007 (UTC)
 * Thanks for doing that, somebody has fixed it. Richard75 17:38, 25 October 2007 (UTC)

Dugout Doug

 * Dugout Doug MacArthur lies ashakin' on the Rock
 * Safe from all the bombers and from any sudden shock
 * Dugout Doug is eating of the best food on Bataan
 * And his troops go starving on


 * We're the battling bastards of Bataan:
 * No mama, no papa, no Uncle Sam,
 * No aunts, no uncles, no nephews, no nieces,
 * No rifles, no planes, or artillery pieces,
 * And nobody gives a damn.

Doggerel verses by MacArthur's troops on Bataan

This website paints a thoroughly different picture of the "war hero" MacArthur. 88.217.71.187 (talk) 01:38, 12 December 2007 (UTC)

You're being paranoid
Somebody fact-tagged it. Maybe it wasn't clinical paranoia, but he sure had a complex; every time he didn't get exactly what he thought he deserved, he claimed it was about him personally, no other reason accepted, & even Manchester noticed it. I'd call that paranoia. Trekphiler (talk) 19:24, 19 December 2007 (UTC)