Talk:Eastern Front (World War II)/Archive 10

kick in the door quote wrong date
I believe this quote was made prior to the invasion. The given date of october 1941 makes lttle sense, as the invasion was already reaching its zenith.Inteluck (talk) 18:13, 14 December 2011 (UTC)

Information about importance of the Eastern Front Part II
In the other discussion, Paul Sibert stated the following:

"Secondly, the statement "But most historians agreed that if it had fought alone, the USSR victory would be questionable at least." is not correct. For instance, such a reputable scholar as David Glantz believes that the victory was possible, although it would be more costly. The reason for that was simple: the USSR won the most decisive battles, the battles of Moscow and Stalingrad, virtually alone, because no considerable military of economic aid from the West had been provided by that moment. After Stalingrad, it was impossible for Germany to win (just to make separate peace with the USSR)."

I will start with the naval war:

Any consideration for the naval blockade Germany was suffering from the Western Allies? We have a detailed article about it and it's consequences: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockade_of_Germany_(1939%E2%80%931945)

It's certain that Germany would present itself a much more stronger enemy if the blockade didn't existed. Much more stronger industrially than the USSR, which despite all the Lend-lease, bombing and divertion of German resources in several areas, was still matched in aircraft and armored vehicle production by Germany in 1944.

And about the U-boat production, consequence of the blockade, the Germans built over 1,000 U-boats during the war because it. Each U-boat cost 5 million marks to build. A Panther tank cost 117 thousand marks. That means about 40,000 German tanks were not built so that the Germans could wage the war in the Atlantic. 40,000 Panthers, or resources from them directed in other areas could not have made a difference if the Germans were only in the East?

Air war:

Luftwaffe losses East/West:

'''4.06 times as many aircraft were lost in combat in the West than were lost in the East, a ratio reasonably close to Groehler's 3.41 for all "losses". The most chilling statistic for the JG 26 pilots appears in the sortie data. An airplane flying a combat mission in the West was 7.66 times more likely to be destroyed than one on a similar mission in the East. It is clear that the burden of sacrifice was borne by the Luftwaffe aircrew on the Western Front and over the Reich, not on the Eastern Front.'''

http://don-caldwell.we.bs/jg26/thtrlosses.htm

Allied Bombing:

'''The impact of bombing on German morale was significant according to Professor John Buckley. Around a third of the urban population under threat of bombing had no protection at all. Some of the major cities saw 55-60 percent of dwellings destroyed. Mass evacuations were a partial answer for six million civilians, but this had a severe impact on morale as German families were split up to live in difficult conditions. By 1944 absenteeism rates of 20-25 percent were not unusual and in post-war analysis 91 percent of civilians stated bombing was the most difficult hardship to endure and was the key factor in the collapse of their own morale. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that the bombing was not stiffening morale but seriously depressing it; fatalism, apathy, defeatism were apparent in bombed areas. The Luftwaffe was blamed for not warding off the attacks and confidence in the Nazi regime fell by 14 percent. Some 75 percent of Germans believed the war was lost in the spring of 1944, owing to the intensity of the bombing.

Buckley argues the German war economy did indeed expand significantly following Albert Speer’s appointment as Reichsminister of Armaments, "but it is spurious to argue that because production increased then bombing had no real impact". But the bombing offensive did do serious damage to German production levels. German tank and aircraft production, though reached new records in production levels in 1944, was in particular one-third lower than planned.[17] In fact, German aircraft production for 1945 was planned at 80,000, "which gives an idea of direction Erhard Milch and the German planners were pushing", "unhindered by Allied bombing German production would have risen far higher.'''

Note of mine: the author is very correct in the last line. Even more because the Germans dispersed many plants due to the bombing, which affected their capability with significance. This would not be the case with war only in the East. And any effort in strategical bombing from the Soviets would have drastical resources, since it would take large resources from other areas and their outdated bombers would suffer even more losses in the Germans hands. I belive it would be more easy for the Germans deploy an strategical bombing in the Soviet industry in this scenario than vice versa. The Luftwaffe would have the required time and resources to develop and produce aircraft such as the He 177 up to the task.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_bombing_during_World_War_II

More about bombing, from the RAF's Bomber Command:

'''By January 1943 some 1,000 Luftwaffe night fighters were committed to the defence of the Reich – mostly twin engined Me 110 and Ju 88. Most critically, by September 1943, 8,876 of the deadly, dual purpose 88 mm guns were also defending the homeland with a further 25,000 light flak guns – 20/37 mm. The 88mm gun was an effective AA weapon, it was a deadly destroyer of tanks and lethal against advancing infantry. These weapons would have done much to augment German anti-tank defences on the Russian front.

To man these weapons the flak regiments in Germany required some 90,000 fit personnel, and a further 1 million were deployed in clearing up and repairing the vast bomb-damage caused by the RAF attacks. To put this into perspective General Erwin Rommel's German forces defending Normandy in 1944 comprised 50,000 men, and their resistance caused the Western Allies grave problems.

This diversion to defensive purposes of German arms and manpower was an enormous contribution made by RAF Bomber Command to winning the war. By 1944 the bombing offensive was costing Germany 30% of all artillery production, 20% of heavy shells, 33% of the output of the optical industry for sights and aiming devices and 50% of the country's electro-technical output which had to be diverted to the anti-aircraft role'''.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAF_Bomber_Command

Lend-Lease aircraft:

'''Lend-lease aircraft amounted to 18% of all aircraft in the Soviet air forces, 20% of all bombers, and 16-23% of all fighters (numbers vary depending on calculation methods), and 29% of all naval aircraft. In some AF commands and fronts the proportion of Lend-Lease aircraft was even higher: of the 9.888 fighters delivered to the air defense (PVO) fighter units in 1941-45 6.953 (or over 70%!) were British or American. In the AF of the Karelian front lend-lease aircraft amounted to about two-thirds of all combat aircraft in 1942-43, practically all torpedo bombers of the naval air forces were A-20G Bostons in 1944-45etc.'''

http://lend-lease.airforce.ru/englis...deliveries.htm

A look about the early war help the Russians received from the British in 1941 is of worth: http://www.historynet.com/did-russia-really-go-it-alone-how-lend-lease-helped-the-soviets-defeat-the-germans.htm

The critical LL aviation fuel supply is another thing: http://www.oilru.com/or/47/1006/

A German perspective of the air war in both fronts: http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1974/may-jun/collins.html

What is my point with all this? prove that in WWII all was interconnected. And everything I'm providing must be analized in a cumulative matter, not individually. When Paul Sibert tried to argue about the capability of the Soviets to defeat the Germans alone, and by citing Glantz, an author with doubtful personal conclusions, which, among other things, don't explain how the Soviets would defeat all the Luftwaffe and thousands of Panther and Tiger tanks with abundance of fuel in such a scenario, he is only showing his lack of global view of a GLOBAL conflict. Not that this would be necessarily impossible, but certainly would not be something easily predictable, and even less by the superficial logic he used. In the same way, it would not be impossible for the Western Allies defeat Germany alone. If Germany had conquered the USSR, then the things would be really complicated, since it would have a "gold mine". But, as already mentioned, the non presence of the naval blockade of the Western Allies would be a gold mine from Germany as well. To have a favourable chance of at least sign a favourable peace in the East.

Desconsideration of the Japanese side is another serious mistake, since the Japanese only attacked the Western colonies in the Pacific because the British and the Americans were involved in the war in Europe. They only entered in southern Indochina by this reason. It's quiet probable that the Japanese Empire would attack the Soviets if there were not tensions between the US and Germany. This would only complicate the Soviet situation even further. And there's also the Italians to be add in the equation.

There are many more factors I didn't mentioned. This article only shows that the war was decided in the East, like if everything happened there and regardless of the other fronts would happen in the same way. As it's name emplies, the conflict was global, and try put the Western Allies as secondary participants is totally against Wikipedia's policy of neutrality. Glantz is not neutral, he himself claims his goal is put light in the Soviet Union, and we should provide neutrality here.

To conclude my reasoning; people mostly considerate only the ground war as vital. Planes don't receive much consideration. But, a strong Luftwaffe in Stalingrad for example, could have avoided the massive casualities the Axis suffered there. Massive casualities in Kursk and Bagration could have been avoided as well, with maybe the Soviets suffering unsustainable losses. This puts the nail in the head of the casualities argument for this scenario, and even more if combined with other factors such as massive German armored divisions due to avaliability of oil to adequately train the crews and expand the arm. Casualities not occur for nothing, and the casualities in the East for both sides occured for several reasons, and such several reasons were in great part about the global conflict in which the Eastern Front was part of. My suggestion: put the importance of the Eastern Front in the same way of the book War, From Ancient Egypt to Iraq, from the DK publishing. This book let's very clear that the Soviets sustained most of the land warfare against the Axis, a fact, letting the individual contributions of the Allies separeted in order to the reader draw it's own conclusions. The book is an enclyclopedia of wars, and this only boost his credit for provide information like it in my view.

To confirm from two famous Russian and Western historians that this is an open subject: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4508901.stm

An article by Richard Overy, supporting his view of above and going in the same points as me: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/how_the_allies_won_01.shtml

Overy's words:

"Yet without Soviet resistance and reform, American rearmament and economic mobilisation, and western air power, the ability of the three major allies to wear down German and Japanese resistance would have been highly questionable."

Marcelo Jenisch (talk) 02:15, 15 January 2012 (UTC)

Result
How was this a Decisive victory for the allies when they suffered over double the amount of casualties than the Axis had 86.15.144.198 (talk) 21:08, 5 February 2012 (UTC)
 * The result is determined not based on casualties. The European Axis had been defeated fully and convincingly, its armed forces were totally destroyed or captured, the Axis countries surrendered unconditionally, the Third Reich was dissolved, its most prominent leaders were either killed or committed suicide, and the Nazi party was banned. All of that means decisive victory.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:48, 5 February 2012 (UTC)


 * I agree. Although the Russians usually suffered greater casualties, even in victories, they clearly had an overwhelming victory based on the way that the way that the Germans were completely destroyed.  Try looking at picture of German cities after the war; it's pretty obvious.


 * Anonyma Mädel (talk) 06:46, 12 February 2012 (UTC)

Should associated belligerents get such prominence?
Would it not be better to have Germany and the SOviet Union shown with much larger flags and other nations should somehow with smaller writing? Over ninety percent of those who fought and died were surely from these nations. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 60.248.234.210 (talk) 04:00, 18 January 2012 (UTC)

Why? The casualities of the Germans and Soviets were direct consequence of their allies, which you considerate "less important". It was a World War after all. Marcelo Jenisch (talk)
 * It was not the WWII, just one of its theatres (although the major one), and Germany and the USSR played overwhelmingly decisive roles there. It was a Soviet-German war, and other participants played just auxiliary role there. Therefore, this proposal seems quite reasonable.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:09, 3 February 2012 (UTC)


 * Matter of personal view. The Romanians and Italians for example, were in Stalingrad for something: lack of German troops. In a situation such as this one, they were not just "auxiliary troops" (i.e without them, the things could have happaned much differently). Such "auxilary troops" that were protecting the flanks that were the decisive factor in the Soviet victory. Personally, I would not considerate them irrelevant. This should be let for the readers to drawn their own conclusions.
 * Ah, I will have to ask to Paul Siebert and many people here: what is the teamwork concept in your views? Historians love to argue that the Allies would be in trouble if the Soviet Union was defeated, but they rarely mention what could have happened to the Soviets if Britain had accepted peace in 1940. Alternatively, what the Italians, Japanese and other Axis countries did to allow Hitler wage war in the East like he did was equally vital for German conduct of the war. I think everyone understands what is a teamwork in personal life, so I don't understand why to do this in history. In the same way a friend would not like to be excluded from the credits in a teamwork, because he or she "was not important", do this with the other Allied and Axis nations in WWII is also not fair. The conflict was a GLOBAL one not for nothing. Marcelo Jenisch (talk)
 * (Again, please format your posts in accordance with our WP:TPYES guidelines. I cannot do that for you every time). Whereas it is correct that The WWII was a global conflict, EF was not: by and large it was the Soviet-German war, and the fact that other Allies or Japan had been heavily involved in other theatres does not change this fact. Again, thin is the Eastern Front talk page, not the WWII talk page, and you should have to understand that. The fact that more than 80% of European Axis troops had been involved in the EF during the Battle of El Alamein does not make the USSR a participant of this battle. Similarly, the fact that the UK fought in Africa or Italy does not make it a EF belligerent. The British or French flags are shown in the infobox only due to the fact that very small British or French units directly participated in the EF hostilities during some periods of time, and these contributions are simply incomparable with that of the USSR.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:38, 3 February 2012 (UTC)
 * You don't need to do nothing for me, and I don't want you to do.
 * And 80% of the Axis ARMIES were involved in the East. Armies are one thing, Air Force and Navy are so vital as armies.
 * And I'm in the Eastern Front subject Paul Siebert, you that are not in the WORLD War II scope. Your comparison of Africa that is not fair. Why? It was a WORLD WAR! You don't want to accept this, you don't want to accept that Britain, America and the Soviets were fighting the same enemy in Europe: European Axis, and were also under influence from the Japanese in the Pacific and in Asia. You talk too much about numbers, while I talk about possible consequences if the "irrelevant" factors you mentioned were not present. You still didn't answered me how the Soviets would "likely" defeat the Axis alone. In the other discussion, you just presented an irrealistic argument for this that because historically the Soviets inflicted more casualities in the Axis armies historically, they would repeat this. No consideration was given for the naval blockade, the U-boat construction, the bombing, the Lend-Lease and everything else, and in a cumulative manner!
 * About the flags, answer me: if there was not comparison of the German Allies, why they were at Stalingrad? Germany would wage war like it did in the East if Italy was not in the Mediterranean taking valuable resources from the Western Allies? Marcelo Jenisch (talk)
 * (I am not doing anything for you, I am doing what our guidelines require. Please, obey our guidelines, because otherwise you turn the talk page into a mess, unreadable by others. If you want a respect, please show respect to others).
 * The Navy was totally useless in land battles, so this argument is irrelevant. The distraction of Luftwaffe from the Eastern Front was highly instrumental, however, this story is a subject of quite different article. By the way, although a lion's share of land forces was located in the East, and this circumstances had dramatic effect on the course of the Western Front events, the USSR has not been listed among WF belligerents at all, and this is correct, because it made no direct contribution. Following your logic, we should list the USSR as a belligerent in all articles about African and West Europe WWII battles, because the outcome of all of them had been dramatically affected by the indirect role of the USSR. However, we do not do that,  and this is correct : only directly involved parties are listed in the infobox.
 * Therefore, the point made by the anonymous user is quite valid: if the direct contribution of one or two participants is overwhelmingly large as compared to the others, it would be highly desirable to emphasize this fact by changing the size of their flags.
 * In summary: what you propose is typical double standards, and, following your logic, we must add the Soviet flag to many non-EF related articles (which is obvious nonsence).--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:18, 3 February 2012 (UTC)
 * What is wrong with the current setup, where Germany and the Soviet Union are in bold and the other combatants (only those that actually participated on the Eastern Front) are not? Britain could perhaps be removed, as strategic bombing missions don't seem to be counted. And do the Partisans belong there? I would not have called Yugoslavia part of the Eastern Front. Tuva also seems to be missing. And did Croatia actually send troops, or were there just Croatian volunteers in German units? If that's the threshold (it isn't) we have to include Spain. 216.8.142.204 (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 21:59, 3 February 2012 (UTC).
 * The difference between bold and plain text is not easily visible, so larger flags would be better.
 * Britain was added due to the direct involvement of few British air units near Murmansk in 1941.
 * Re Yugoslavia, since Yassy-Kushunev operation lead to capture of Romania and subsequent liberation of Belgrade (in collaboration with Yugoslavian partisans), Yugoslavia does belong to the EF.
 * Re Tuva, I agree. We have the sources that confirm that this independent state did declare a war on Germany and directly participated in the EF hostilities, however, its flag is bein constantly removed by other users.
 * Re Croatia, it sent at least one regiment to Stalingrad, under the Croatian flag.
 * Re Spain, whereas the Spaniards did participate, Spain didn't. The Spanish voluntaries were ordinary Wehrmacht solders, who took a personal oath to Hitler, as all German soldiers did, and they were organized in ordinary Wehrmacht infantry division, which they acted under full control of German high command. Spain had no authority over that division, so it was Spanish only nominally.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:44, 5 February 2012 (UTC)


 * I think the difference between bold and plain is clear enough.
 * I have changed my opinion about Yugoslavia, at least as regards the Belgrade offensive and the general Partisan offensive that followed. I was thinking of the April War and the resistance.
 * Were the British units stationed in Murmansk? I knew of their involvement, but if air operations alone count then the United States should be included because it flew bombing missions over Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.
 * All I meant about Spain was that it should be included also if Croatian volunteers are being included, but I did not realise a Croatian (NDH) unit was present at Stalingrad. I though maybe there was one in the Crimea. As long as our criteria are consistently applied. 216.8.142.204 (talk) 17:01, 6 February 2012 (UTC)

As has been pointed out in this conversation, this was a world war and the Allies aided each other. It could be argued that the Bombing of Dresden was an attack on the Eastern Front, as it was carried out to to interdict German lines of communications to the Eastern Front, but that does not mean that the USAAF and the RAF should be included in the battle box of the Eastern Front article.

I agree with Paul Siebert. It would be sensible to include a short section for mention of unusual connections, for nations that contribute a few fighting men to a front, perhaps because they were a small nation or because their focus was on other fronts, but to include nations in the battle box who's contributions were very marginal distorts the information in the battle boxes, and does a disservice to readers. For example the RAF bombed the German battleship Tirpitz several times including in Operation Paravane where they attacked from Soviet airfields, but to include the RAF as operational in the Soviet Union because of that and other similar incidents would be misleading.

The battle box should be kept for inclusion of nationalities that made a significant contribution to the front and it can be debated whether the Italian contribution or the Spanish Blue Division should warrant those countries inclusion (personally I would include Italy but exclude Spain as they were volunteers), but including "Free France (from 1943), United Kingdom United Kingdom (air support in 1941) and  Tuvan People's Republic Tannu Tuva" is less than helpful. -- PBS (talk) 15:00, 19 March 2012 (UTC)

size of the red army and german army
It would be very nice if somebody provides a table of manpower for germans and soviets for years 1941 to 1945. In literature it is always mentioned that soviets are "much more numerous" then germans but one wonders exactly how much more? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 78.180.229.232 (talk) 16:59, 2 February 2012 (UTC)
 * Good point. Done.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:05, 3 February 2012 (UTC)
 * The table is completely wrong in June1941 the Germans Alone on the eastern front had 3.3 million then when you ad the Romanians the Hungarians, the Italians and the Finns you get well over 4.3 million. I will remove the table because it is so obviously wrong. Check out the Operation Barbarossa article it says 3.9 million invaded then we have to add the Finns and Romanians that entered one week later, so obviously 2.9 million is way wrong. Headssoulseleven (talk) 00:07, 6 March 2012 (UTC)


 * Headssoulseleven, you seem to have very specific numbers. Do you have any sources for these numbers?  Rather than completely removing the table, is there a way you could improve it, instead? Cheers.  Sleddog116 (talk) 00:11, 6 March 2012 (UTC::
 * The numbers that are used in Barbarossa come from; World War II Chronicle, 2007. Legacy/ Publications International, Ltd. Page 146. Headssoulseleven (talk) 00:14, 6 March 2012 (UTC)
 * The figures for Germany are taken from David Glantz, a leading Eastern Front expert. Do not remove the table.--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:36, 6 March 2012 (UTC)
 * You are reading the table wrong, the GERMANS alone had over 4 million during 1941 with 3.3 in the east and the rest in the west, if one reads the table provided one can believe that the axis attacked with 2.9 million men and 700k were int he west, that is way wrong. Please recheck your book and see for your self, and then when you factor in the 500k Romanians, the 500k Hungarians, the 450K Finns and the 100K+ Italians you get a much larger number, also the book used in the Barbarossa page is from 2007 Headssoulseleven (talk) 01:12, 7 March 2012 (UTC)
 * For 1941, Glantz's figures are as follows: Axis total 3,767,000; 3,117,000 German; 900,000 (in the west). If you have alternative figures for the whole campaign (similar to those currently in the article), please, share with us.--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:24, 7 March 2012 (UTC)
 * I am now certain you are reading Glantz wrong, sorry to rain on your parade and your graph is very nice and all that but you are wrong. The Germans alone and only the Germans invaded with 3.3 million Germans in June 1941 then there were about 700-800k Germans in France, Germany, Norway etc in total, then we have the Finns who during the war had 450K, the Romanians who had 500k the Hungarians who had 500k and the Italians with 100K+. I gave a source a few lines up which gave 3.9 million Axis invading in 1941 from the Barbarossa article, World War II Chronicle, 2007. Legacy/ Publications International, Ltd. Page 146. So a more correct number is that for June 1941 the Axis invaded with 3.9 million or so with 700k Germans ADDITIONALLY stationed in the west.Headssoulseleven (talk) 02:08, 7 March 2012 (UTC)
 * You may be right or wrong, however, until you present some concrete reliable source in support for your claim, I have no reason to discuss. Create your own version of the table, add needed citations, and, if your source will be demonstrated to be more reliable (more accurate, more recent, etc) we will add this table into the article.
 * In addition, if you believe I read Grantz wrong, please, explain me what is my mistake concretely?--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:36, 7 March 2012 (UTC)
 * The information cited to Glantz is plainly an accurate reflection of what's in his article (which is online). That said, there may well be other figures in reliable sources, and if that's the case we should include those as well. I note that Glantz's figures are for 'June 1941', and so may not include the follow-on forces which were latter committed to the theatre, and probably also doesn't include replacements for casualties. Nick-D (talk) 03:46, 7 March 2012 (UTC)

Spain as a belligerent, again
I started the discussion on the issue years ago, then abandoned the idea after lengthy debate. However, I recently and accidentally encountered two new sources: http://www.lalkar.org/issues/contents/nov2010/soviet.html http://yqyq.net/26746-Korennoiy_perelom_v_VOV_1942_1943gg.html They, like the book The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, mentioned a Spanish division fought among the Axis forces in the Eastern Front. Besides, I still consider William Shirer's book to be a valid source. Vulturedroid (talk) 09:25, 16 May 2012 (UTC)

A few more words. William Sherir's book says this: "So successful were he and Keitel with all the satellites that the German High Command calculated it would have 52 ‘Allied’divisions available for the summer's task--27 Romanian, 13 Hungarian, 9 Italian, 2 Slovak and one Spanish."

The only reason some people diagreed with this source is that the book is old. But, my arguments are:
 * A. It is the German High Command's calculation, not the author's calculation.
 * B. William Sherir was a renowned writer who was stationed in Germany both during and after the war. He had direct access to captured German archives.
 * C. For historical events, an "old" book written by someone who experienced it himself, is more valueable than so-called "new" books whose authors probably weren't even born during the said event.

Vulturedroid (talk) 09:52, 16 May 2012 (UTC)


 * What makes those websites reliable sources? In regards to The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, it's considered to be outdated and unreliable by modern historians - see the introduction to Richard E. Evans' The Coming of the Third Reich for a discussion of its inadequacies. Your point C. is the exact opposite of conventional thinking: modern historians are able to draw on a much wider range of documentation than those writing at the time, and build on the works of other historians. Shirer was a journalist, and not a historian by the way. Nick-D (talk) 10:25, 16 May 2012 (UTC)


 * What makes them not reliable?

For Sherir's book, it does not matter if it is outdated or not. It's not the book author's opinion, but the German High Command's(the author had direct access to captured German archives).

Would you deny that on Sept.1st Germany invaded Poland, because this was written on an "old" book?

For Point C, no document is more reliable than the German High Command's archives. You are opponite to conventional thinking. If I wrote a book on Punic Wars, would my book be more reliable than those who fought the war themselves, because I am modern and thus have wider range of documentation? What kind of conventional thinking is this? Vulturedroid (talk) 10:52, 16 May 2012 (UTC)
 * Punic Wars may be a bad example, as ancient sources were sometimes inaccurate. But, for events happened just decades ago, when modern communication and recording had been well established, the archival information provided by a DIRECT PARTICIPANT is more reliable than those new books whose authors did not participate the said events at all.Vulturedroid (talk) 10:56, 16 May 2012 (UTC)


 * is it worth pointing out that a the German High Command calcualting they would have a Spanish division available is not the same as actually having one when the time came. Are there no books written about Spanish involvement in the war that cover their contribution? GraemeLeggett (talk) 11:18, 16 May 2012 (UTC)


 * Blue Division INDEED participated in the Eastern Front, it's history, not fiction. Vulturedroid (talk) 11:24, 16 May 2012 (UTC)
 * As I understand it, the Blue Division was a German Army unit made up of volunteers from Spain (who'd been given the OK to enlist by Franco). As such, it wasn't under Spanish command and so there doesn't seem to be a good reason to include Spain in the infobox. Nick-D (talk) 11:32, 16 May 2012 (UTC)
 * The Croatian unit in the Eastern Front also was made of volunteers, given a German formation title as the 369th German infantry regiment, wore German uniforms, sworn oath to Hitler and Germany, placed under German command. Why is Croatia considered a belligerent? The Croatian legion wasn't even mentioned in the German High Command's calculation of Allies, yet it showed up. Vulturedroid (talk) 11:44, 16 May 2012 (UTC)
 * I don't think it should be there either. This article has one of the most ridiculously bloated infoboxes I've seen. Nick-D (talk) 11:47, 16 May 2012 (UTC)

The previous discussion of this (in 2009) is available [http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Eastern_Front_(World_War_II)&oldid=327223170#Spannish_Blue_division.2C_again. here]. I and provided references to reliable sources which describe Spain as not being a participant. Nick-D (talk) 11:50, 16 May 2012 (UTC)


 * I am 100% okay to remove Croatia. What is the problem to add Spain, since German High Command, the high command of the dominating Axis power in the East, said a Spanish division participated in their summer offensive?Vulturedroid (talk) 11:53, 16 May 2012 (UTC)
 * May I say there is obvious bias in the editing? Spain was mentioned by German High Command, yet it was determined not to add it. Croatia was not mentioned, and even youself agreed that it should not be there, yet it stayed all the way.Vulturedroid (talk) 11:56, 16 May 2012 (UTC)
 * What 'bias'? - accusations of bad faith are really unhelpful. In regards to your earlier point, reliable sources say that Spain didn't actually participate in this war, and the German high command was obviously referring to a division of Spanish volunteers serving under their command, and not a Spanish military unit (assuming that Shirer wasn't mistaken - his book is over 50 years old and is totally outdated). By the way, what page of Shirer are you referring to here? Nick-D (talk) 12:06, 16 May 2012 (UTC)
 * Bias means double standards on Croatia and Spain. It's not up to you to decide what's reliable and what's not, the German High Command directed the war, it was the most reliable source regarding the war.
 * You are misinterpreting the context. The German High Command said clearly, ALLIED formation, not volunteer formation. There were volunteer units from Croatia, France, Belgium etc. on the Eastern Front, none of them was mentioned in the same calculation of "Allies". Page 911.Vulturedroid (talk) 12:18, 16 May 2012 (UTC)
 * BTW, speak of "bad faith", I'm sorry, but aren't you the same person who accused me to be personnally targeting Saul in previous debate? He and I agreed to further discuss the matter, and he was by then the only one opposed the inclusion of Spain, so I mentioned his name in the discussion. Then you assumed very "good" faith on me. Indeed. Vulturedroid (talk) 12:32, 16 May 2012 (UTC)

Validity of William Shirer's book

 * This sector aims to show the latest information.
 * So far, the most deciding source to say Spain was a belligerent is William Shirer's book, in which he wrote the German High Command listed an "Allied" Spanish division. The book was rejected by some, citing it's old and outdated. The equally renowned author Richard E. Evans' book, The Coming of the Third Reich was then cited as a proof to say Willaim Shirer's book had inadequacies, thus not reliable.
 * I wrote an email on 1938 hours (E8) to Mr.Richard E. Evans himself, asking for his opinion on whether William Shirer's claims in the book can be regarded as truthful. Here's his reply, received on 2302 hours(E8):
 * "Shirer was a scrupulous journalist and did not invent or manipulate quotes."
 * Thus, it is safe to say, William Shirer's writting on German High Command's calculation can be taken as reliable. The German High Command indeed calculated the Spanish division as "Allied" unit, not a volunteer division belonging to Germany. Vulturedroid (talk) 15:36, 16 May 2012 (UTC)


 * It's Shirer, as your source says. Not Sherir. 216.8.149.38 (talk) 18:33, 22 August 2012 (UTC)

Error in map pertaining to Soviet Winter offensive 1941-1942.
The "Barbarossa" map in this article correctly shows that the Germans had, by Dec 5 1941, gained ground near Leningrad that, in combination with Finnish advances, isolated the city apart from a water/ice route across lake Ladoga. But the map associated with the section "Soviet Winter Offensive" shows in green a similar stretch of land as having been gained by the Germans over the interval Dec 5 1941 to 7 May 1942. This is incorrect. The region shown in green was already in German hands by Dec 5, 1941. One source (many are available) is David Glantz's book The Siege of Leningrad 1941-1944, 900 days of terror, isbn 0-7603-0941-8, 2001, map on page 24.

From the map on page 45 of the same book, it may be seen that in fact part of the area shown in green, though not all of it and thus not enough to lift the siege of Leningrad, had been regained by the Soviets from Dec 11 to Dec 31, 1941.

The map in question is unsatisfactory and should be removed or, better, replaced. --Historygamer (talk) 04:31, 9 September 2012 (UTC)

Forces
First the graph shows German not axis forces, secondly the source is from 1969 so It can no way know the Soviet forces, thirdly it is about the Manchurian campaign. Shookdown55 (talk) 22:43, 29 September 2012 (UTC)

The Soviet Union being critical to Allied victory
Hello,

In a discussion with Paul Siebert in the past, he insisted with me that the Allies were dependend of the USSR to defeat Germany.

While the Soviets were largely responsible for Germany's defeat, this does NOT meant the Anglo-Americans didn't have a realistic chance to beat Germany alone. I will provide evidence contrary to this:

With hindsight it is hard to avoid the conclusion that after the defeat of France Germany would have done better to adopt a defensive posture, consolidating its position in Western Europe, attacking British ''positions in the Mediterranean and forcing the British and the Americans to bomb their way onto the Continent. Given that the Red Army ultimately proved to be the nemesis of the Wehrmacht, this is hard to deny. But what is too often ignored in such counterfactual arguments is the grow-ing awareness in Berlin that, even after the occupation of Western Europe, Germany did not have the upper hand in a long war against Britain and America. The chronic shortage of oil, the debility of the European coal mines and the fragility of the food chain, made it seem unlikely that Germany would in fact be able to 'consolidate' its conquests of 1940 without falling into excessive dependence on the Soviet Union. Even if this were possible, the combined manufacturing capacity of Britain and America vastly exceeded the industrial capacity currently under German control and this, in turn, spelled disaster in a protracted air war. The German army, on the other hand, had proved its ability to achieve decisive victory against what were thought to be the strongest armies in Europe. When we bear this range of factors in mind it is easier to appreciate why a defensive strategy seemed like a second-best in the autumn of 1940. After the defeat of France, the dream of a gigantic land empire seemed within reach, and, given the industrial strength looming on the other side of the Atlantic, there was no time to waste.''

The Wages of Destruction, Adam Tooze, page 420.

American Victory Program:

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-WD-Strategic1/USA-WD-Strategic1-3.html

I hope that the things stay clear to Mr Sibert now, which was spreading fallacies about the Anglo-American capabilities in a manner that resembles me of the Germans with the USSR and the Japanese with the US. As we can see, only the US Army could have fielded 215 divisions. This does not includes the USMC, dones not include the British Empire and does not include other Allied nations. They would really not stand a chance without the Soviet Union? — Preceding unsigned comment added by Marcelo Jenisch (talk • contribs) 00:30, 2 October 2012 (UTC)

Are you proposing a change to the article? If not, this has no relevance here. AndyTheGrump (talk) 00:39, 2 October 2012 (UTC)


 * Are you suggesting any changes to the article? The US Army later abandoned the 215-division 'victory program', and had considerable difficulty manning about 100 divisions. The British also had to start disbanding Army combat units from mid-1944 due to manpower shortages. Nick-D (talk) 00:41, 2 October 2012 (UTC)

A mate in other forum posted the following about this:

''There were three things that appear to limit the size of the US Army. 1) Transport over seas. This seems to have been one of the biggest but given time would go away. 2) Equipment shortages. Mobilization of troops was slowed to conform to delivery of equipment. This also would go away over time and faster if the aid to the Soviets was kept for internal use. 3) Support requirements were greater than expected. This would have meant that the 200 division force was likely not reachable but something well in excess of 100 would ultimately be.'' Marcelo Jenisch (talk)


 * This is not a forum. This is a talk page for discussing changes to article content. Are you proposing any such changes? AndyTheGrump (talk) 01:17, 2 October 2012 (UTC)
 * Just one comment. The alleged shortage of oil was not as important and MJ believes. Germany had well developed synthetic fuel industry, which used coke (which was in excess in Germany). See, e.g. Raymond G. Stokes. The Oil Industry in Nazi Germany, 1936-1945. The Business History Review, Vol. 59, No. 2 (Summer, 1985), pp. 254-277. Natural oil was needed mostly for production of diesel fuel (for submarines, etc), not for land warfare. Only in 1944 did Allied bombing started to effect significantly on the synthetic fuel production.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:26, 2 October 2012 (UTC)

It's not my view, it's from my source, which is very creditable in breaking myths of the German war machine.

Something more from Wages of the Destruction, page 410:

''The territories that Germany had conquered in 1940, though they pro-vided substantial booty and a crucial source of labour did not bearcomparison with the abundance provided to Britain by America. The aerial arms race was the distinctive Anglo-American contribution to thewar and it played directly to America's dominance in manufacturing.But though the disparity in aircraft deliveries was extreme it was notuntypical. A similarly vast gulf was also evident in relation to energysupplies, the most basic driver of modern urban and industrial society.Whereas the Anglo-American alliance was energy rich, Germany and itsWestern European Grossraum were starved of food, coal and oil.The disparity with respect to oil was most serious. Between 1940 and1943 the mobility of Germany's army, navy and air force, not to mentionits domestic economy, depended on annual imports of 1.5 million tonsof oil, mainly from Romania. In addition, German synthetic fuel fac-tories, at huge expense, produced a flow of petrol that rose from 4 milliontons in 1940 to a maximum of 6.5 million tons in 1943. Seizing thefuel stocks of France as booty in no way resolved this fundamentaldependency. In fact, the victories of 1940 had the reverse effect. Theyadded a number of heavy oil consumers to Germany's own fuel deficit.From its annual fuel flow of at most 8 million tons, Germany now hadto supply not only its own needs, but those of the rest of Western Europeas well. Before the war, the French economy had consumed at least5.4 million tons per annum, at a per capita rate 60 per cent higher thanGermany's. The effect of the German occupation was to throw Franceback into an era before motorization. From the summer of 1940 Francewas reduced to a mere 8 per cent of its pre-war supply of petrol. In aneconomy adjusted to a high level of oil consumption the effects weredramatic. To give just one example, thousands of litres of milk went towaste in the French countryside every day, because no petrol was avail-able to ensure regular collections. Of more immediate concern to themilitary planners in Berlin were the Italian armed forces, which dependedentirely on fuel diverted from Germany and Romania. By February1941, the Italian navy was threatening to halt its operations in theMediterranean altogether unless Germany supplied at least 250,000tons of fuel. And the problems were by no means confined to the Reich's satellites. Germany itself coped only by dint of extreme economy.In late May 1941, General Adolf von Schell, the man responsible for themotor vehicle industry, seriously suggested that in light of the chronicshortage of oil it would be advisable to carry out a partial 'demotoriz-ation' of the Wehrmacht. It is commonly remarked that the Luftwaffe suffered later in the war because of the inadequate training of its pilots,due in large part to the shortage of air fuel. But in 1941 the petrol shortage was already so severe that the Wehrmacht was licensing itssoldiers to drive heavy trucks with less than 15 kilometres of on-roadexperience, a measure which was blamed for the appalling attrition of motor vehicles during the Russian campaign. Shortages made them-selves felt across the German economy. So tight were fuel rations thatin November 1941 Opel was forced to shut down production at itsBrandenburg plant, Germany's largest truck factory, because it lackedthe petrol necessary to check the fuel pumps of vehicles coming off theassembly line. A special allocation of 104 cubic metres of fuel had to bearranged by the Wehrmacht's economic office so as to ensure that therewere no further interruptions.'' Marcelo Jenisch (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 01:09, 3 October 2012 (UTC)


 * This isn't a forum for general discussion. If you don't have any specific comments relating to this article, please take it elsewhere. Nick-D (talk) 01:16, 3 October 2012 (UTC)

This is about the article. Paul Sibert claimed that the Western Allies would be hopeless without the Soviet Union, and therefore the Soviet Union was the only country that made Allied victory in WWII realistic. I'm just proving here that while the Soviets were the main force behind the German defeat, the Western Allies were far from be the weaker nations at mercy from the Soviet Union like he claimed. The posture from him towards the Western Allies was from an underestimation quiet similar as the Nazis had with the USSR, and Japan had with the US. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Marcelo Jenisch (talk • contribs) 01:24, 3 October 2012 (UTC)

Thanks for the censorship
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Western_Front_%28World_War_II%29

Forth topic.

As we can see, equal to mine, just the opposite, and it was not closed there. Marcelo Jenisch (talk) ''
 * Please read WP:NOTFORUM. You were repeatedly asked whether you were proposing any changes to article content, which is the sole purpose of this page. It is not a forum for general discussions on the topic of the article. You provided none. As for 'censorship', don't be ridiculous - this is an online encyclopaedia, and it is no part of our remit to provide a platform for random opinionating. If you wish to do that, there are plenty of websites and forums that allow this - and nobody is stopping you. AndyTheGrump (talk) 12:53, 3 October 2012 (UTC)

"direct ideological antipode"
The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact article says that they did recognize some of their similarities. Their practical interpretations of their ideologies were similar. David R. Ingham (talk) 06:05, 18 December 2012 (UTC)

Autumn and Winter 1943–44?
I'm a little confused by the organisation of this article. Looking at the Operation Bagration, the action was during the Summer-Autumn Campaign of 1944 though the preparations began during the Spring of 1944, i.e. at the closing of the Soviet Winter-Spring Campaign. However, this is entirely absent in the Article sections! Instead there is only the Autumn and Winter 1943–44, entirely missing from Soviet periodisation, and one that doesn't make sense because from my sources it seems the weather would not permit planning for Bagration to begin until late Spring.

A similar omission appears in the Summer 1943: Kursk section which says "When the Germans began the operation (i.e. Citadel), it was after months of delays waiting for new tanks and equipment, by which time the Soviets had reinforced the Kursk salient with more anti-tank firepower than had ever been assembled in one place before or since that day." This "months of delay" were in fact the Spring months during which Soviet forces were prepared at the Kursk salient. In effect it sounds like nothing else of significance happened on the Eastern Front between final shots of Stalingrad in early Spring 1943, and Autumn 1943 except Kursk preparations by the Germans only. However, the Rzhev Battles were also concluding, and I count six strategic operations according to the Strategic operations of the Red Army in World War II AFTER the German failure of Operation Citadel. The entire section, while mentioning the Allies' landing in Sicily on 10 July fails to mention any of these major Soviet operations, or the German attempts to counter them.

At a guess the Germans also probably planned their operations subject to the seasonal influences, and in the video of Glantz I added as reference he says that on closer examination due to the rains the Barbarossa could not have started any earlier in the East, Balkans or no Balkans. It seems to me then that Soviet season-based periodisation can serve generally to organise operations for both sides where this article is concerned.

I'd like to see a little greater reflection of the events here to tie in with the editing of Operation Bagration I'd like to do in the near future. Crock81 (talk) 05:17, 31 December 2012 (UTC)

kick in the door quote wrong date
i believe this quote was made prior to the invasion. The given date of october 1941 makes lttle sense, as the invasion was already reaching its zenith.Inteluck (talk) 18:13, 14 December 2011 (UTC)


 * I just happened to notice this, and looking at the reference it didn't seem particularly 'military history'. Further investigation shows this source cites Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (New York: Avon, 1970), p. 258; and William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New York: Simon & Schuster, i960), p. 856. Interestingly both these works are available online! Albert Speer and William L. Shirer. Supposedly, according to Shirer who doesn't offer a source, the quote was directed to Jodl. There is no mention of the quote in the Speer book on the page cited, or any other page I could find, as Jodl isn't mentioned at all during 1941. I scanned the relevant part of the book, but found nothing. Perhaps I missed it. Powell in note 48 where he cites Shirer gives p.1118, but Shirer's work isn't that long, and the last chapter appropriately deals with the fall of Berlin.
 * Alan Axelrod, in his The Real History of World War II: A New Look at the Past, p.111 prominently has the quote in the sidebar, stating, without attribution, the quote was from shortly before the invasion, so October 1940. Carl L. Steinhouse in Barred: The Shameful Refusal of FDR's State Department to Save Tens of Thousands of Europe's Jews from Extermination, Author House, 2007, p.114 has Hitler talking to Keitel with Jodl present during the planning of Barbarossa on 23 December 1940. His attribution is from (note 183) Goodwin. No Ordinary Time: 254. Goodwin however offers no attribution, with the quote again directed at Jodl. The other officer that seems to have been present was von Runstedt. Only one online source directs this to Speer.
 * The earliest sources for the quote, earlier even then Speer's 1970 English translation of memoirs, are J. Killen. A History of Luftwaffe. Berkley Publ. Corp., New York, 1969, and A. Clark, Barbarossa, Signet Books, The New American Library Inc., New York, 1966. Neither offer attributions! This includes the 2012 edition advertised as "Carefully researched and beautifully written, this book is a classic of military history." (Hachette, UK) where it is quoted on p.1661 as told to [von] Runstedt, replicating the W. Morrow, 1965 ed. p.43, but it is unreferenced.
 * An even older source is arrived at via John France's Perilous Glory: The Rise of Western Military Power, Yale University Press, 2011 who cites Quoted by S.J. Lee, The European Dictatorships 1918-1945(London: Methuen, 1987), p.78, which leads to - Quoted in A. Bullock: Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (London 1952), Ch. 12. p.94. This was Bullock's first book as a modern history fellow at New College, Oxford, and Mark Frankland (The Guardian) has argued that the book on Adolf Hitler "remains both a standard work and an absorbing piece of modern historical writing. The book on which his reputation as a historian rests, it played to his strengths as a biographer who had the knack of penetrating the minds of others." This was reprinted in 58, 61, 62, and 71 in UK alone. So where did Bullock get the quote? It seems he wrote based on the transcripts of the Nuremberg Trials. Therefore there is no explanation as to why the 1962 edition does not cite anything on page 652. The confusing thing is that William Leonard Langer & Sarell Everett Gleason paraphrase this in their 1953 The undeclared war, 1940-1941, p.533 (available for reading online from several US universities), but likewise don't cite anyone. The strange thing about this is that unlike Bullock who was just a BBC reporter and an academic with perhaps access to the transcripts of the Nuremberg transcripts released to the public, Gleason from 1942 to 1946 was the Intelligence Chief for the Office of Strategic Services, and probably had access to the original interrogation files as the Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council. The book was published again while he was a member of the Historical Division of the Department of State, from 1962 to 1970. The reason this is important is because as reported in The Saturday Review, September 26, 1953, p. 14, "For the purposes of the Nuremberg trials the prosecuting staff inspected 100,000 documents and reduced them (unfortunately, without the advice of historians) to the 2,000 that the eight volumes of the printed record contain. The United States Department of State and the British Foreign Office have 400 tons of documents from the captured archives of the German Foreign Ministry and the Reich Chancellory. At its present rate publication will not be completed for fifty years." The quote was likely to have come from the 2,000 records contained in the 8 volumes. Chester Wilmot quotes it also in The struggle for Europe Collins, 1952, p.72...again, without a citation.


 * So was it ever actually said? James Giblin, in Life Death of Adolf Hitler CI on p.157 without further citation is sure the words were said between 23 June and 3 July in East Prussian field headquarters. Adrian Weale in his unpagenated The SS: A New History claims the words were spoken at a conference in April 1941. Colin Bingham, in Men and Affairs: A Modern Miscellany p.338 declared for "1940".
 * Many books simply quote it as a given truth. Others invariably cite earlier works (above), Bullock most often in the UK works, and Clark in the US works.


 * Is this a real quote? Was it actually uttered by Hitler, or invented for effect by Bullock and plagiarised ever since? I'd like to know the answer Crock81 (talk) 13:19, 31 December 2012 (UTC)

Adolf Hitler Killed in Action
Im Pretty sure That he supposedly committed suicide. I dont think that it should be the same as Killed in Action. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 79.193.90.153 (talk) 07:02, 13 January 2013 (UTC)

Yugoslavia
Considering the Yugoslav front and the Eastern front were not merged until September 1944, should Yugoslavia receive the prominence it does in the infobox? Or should it receive dates in parentheses or a footnote indicating that the Eastern front was only extended south into the Balkans in the summer/fall of 1944? As is, I think it is misleading. Srnec (talk) 19:26, 26 January 2013 (UTC)

bulgarian participation
while bulgaria was not involved in land warfare with the soviet union, its navy took part in skirmishes with the black sea fleet. shouldn't it be added to the list of axis belligerents, albeit with a note that it had an exclusively naval role? Capt Jim (talk) 20:11, 9 May 2013 (UTC)

Poland listed as an ally of Russia?
That seems quite inaccurate given that Poland was invaded and occupied by Russia. Russia did not consider Poland it's ally in the Great Patriotic War and neither did the Poles in Exiles consider themselves allies with Russia. Statalyzer (talk) 04:26, 1 April 2013 (UTC)


 * Well, Poland had two 'governments' (I suppose we should be careful of our terminology here) one based in London, the other in Moscow. Each claimed the loyalty of armed forces. The Polish LWP forces were raised, equipped and led by the Red Army but were flagged Polish. They were most certainly considered allied forces by the USSR. They were separate from the polish forces in the west, supported by the USA and UK. Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 16:12, 1 April 2013 (UTC)


 * Well, the one in Moscow was not the legitimate sovereign authority. The Soviets knew who that was (London) as the Soviets made a point of cutting off relations when the Katyn massacre was uncovered and blamed on the Soviets. They labeled the Polish government in exile as "Hitlerites." VєсrumЬа ►TALK 23:23, 1 April 2013 (UTC)


 * As I wrote, we should be careful in our usage of words. Who are we to say which (if either) of the competing governments was 'legitimate' ? The fact of the matter is, there were two bodies claiming to be the legitimate government of Poland, each commanding armed forces in combat against the Germans. Regardless of our opinions on the legitimacy of these governments (and there are obvious problems with both of them) there WERE Polish armed forces, and they were allied with the Red Army. Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 16:17, 4 April 2013 (UTC)


 * Given that the Soviets formally broke off relations with the legitimate Polish authorities in exile over Katyn, I think it's certainly simple enough to understand whom the Soviets considered the legitimate Polish authorities. Apologies for repeating myself. Polish units don't mean Poland. VєсrumЬа ►TALK 17:40, 4 April 2013 (UTC)


 * You're making judgments about the legitimacy of governments, which is a rather massive project as well as original research. E.g., which government of France, Yugoslavia or Norway was 'legitimate'? How about Czechoslovakia, which broke up both during WW2 and again during the end of the communist era, i.e., as soon as it had the chance? Was any of its governments ever 'legitimate' ? This is not a problem a few editors on this article can solve. DMorpheus2 (talk) 17:50, 4 April 2013 (UTC)


 * Been away. We're only talking about one specific country, don't confuse the issue with cases which don't apply. In the case of Poland it was quite clear whom the Soviets considered the legitimate authorities until they labeled the Poles "Hitlerites" and installed puppet authorities. In no way can war-time Poland be considered an ally of the Soviet Union. Poland was a victim of both Nazis and Soviets. The USSR being reductio ad Socium is the oversimplification here. The USSR needs to be shown as an ally of Germany until Barbarrosa. VєсrumЬа ►TALK 01:11, 4 October 2013 (UTC)


 * Statalyzer has a good point. Soviet Union was co-belligerent of the Nazi Germany in 1939-40 by waging wars against Finland, Baltic states, Poland, and Romania. All those talks of Russians about the non-aggression pact with the Nazi Germany is a bunch of baloney. There people who compare invasion of Poland by Soviets as the invasion of Iceland by British. Which of course is two completely different type of actions (especially considering the Katyn massacre) that also became clear after the war. It should be considered that without the Soviet Union, Germany was not able to wage such an effective war against the whole Europe. Soviet Union was an effective ally of Germany supplying them with important natural resources. And because of that number of countries such as Finland and Romania turned against Soviet Union in 1941. Note that it was not until 1941 that Finland allied with Germany against Soviet Union, while the article states otherwise. I don't favor to consider co-belligerent with the Nazi Germany as automatically something evil. Aleksandr Grigoryev (talk) 17:44, 13 October 2013 (UTC)


 * Katyn massacre completely defeats any claim of the Soviet invasion of Poland as peaceful. Also noticeable is the fact that internationally the Soviet Union was never really perceived as a political union of its constituent republics, but rather as one nation of Russia. Aleksandr Grigoryev (talk) 17:50, 13 October 2013 (UTC)

Actually, the question of which wartime Polish government was legitimate is not so difficult as mentioned above. We can start with the proposition that the pre-1939 government was clearly the legitimate government of the territory of Poland. The President of that government transferred power on 17 Sep. 1939 to Władysław Raczkiewicz, who became President of the government-in-exile based first in Paris and then London. The London government was therefore constitutionally legitimate, at least until 1945.

The larger question of whether Poland should be listed as an ally of the USSR does not depend, however, on either the London government or the Moscow "Provisional Government of National Unity." The government-in-exile was in diplomatic relations with USSR and a co-belligerent between the start of Operation Barbossa in 1941 and the discovery of the Katyn massacre in 1943. So for a length of time, the Poles and Soviets were allies and a listing is appropriate. A note could be used to make the temporal limits of this situation clear. Perhaps something like: "The USSR broke off relations with the Polish government-in-exile after the April, 1943 discovery of the Katyn massacre. The Soviet-sponsored State National Council was formed at the end of 1943 and eventually became the government of the People's Republic of Poland." Does that cover the bases? --Eggishorn (talk) (contrib) 03:26, 24 October 2013 (UTC)
 * Did forces loyal to government-in-exile actually participate in any combat at Eastern Front before breaking off the relations with Soviets though?--Staberinde (talk) 15:26, 24 October 2013 (UTC)