Talk:Egyptian Armoured Corps

The reason why there are no citations or sources.
The reason why I didn't put sources in the references is that because I brought these information from an Egyptian source called "Marefa.org" it's similar to Wikipedia and has a lot of things about Egypt that's not existing in the English Wikipedia we use and sadly, it's totally in Arabic so not anyone can use it. So I got these information, translated it and copied it here, many of the things I edited were from the Marefa.org site though. Please I have been working on these things for hours so don't delete it, I think you know where do I get my information now. Thank you. Yehija (talk) 13:05, 23 February 2020 (UTC)
 * I did a Google search on the subject and found no evidence from any reliable source that the Armored Corps even exist as a branch of the Egyptian Army. Has anyone else found any information on them outside of this Wikipedia article (or Marefa.org, as mentioned above)? Noahfgodard (talk) 00:27, 10 April 2020 (UTC)

Rote training, false reporting, lack of initiative
I have had to remove a couple of instances where you have written things like 'the only reason the Egyptian Army lost to the IDF was that they had older, less capable tanks.' This is not supported by WP:RELIABLE sources, such as Kenneth Pollack's books. The Country Study, for example, writes: "Officers below brigade level rarely made tactical decisions and required the approval of higher-ranking authorities before they modified any operations."
 * This is from Egyptian Armed Forces: "Scholars such as Kenneth Pollack, deAtkine, and Robert Springborg have identified a number of reasons why Arab (and Egyptian) armies performed so poorly against Israel from 1948 to 1991 and afterwards. In battle against Israel from 1948–91, junior officers consistently demonstrated an unwillingness to manoeuvre, ‘innovate, improvise, take initiative, or act independently’. Ground forces units suffered from constant manipulation of information and an inattention to intelligence gathering and objective analysis. Units from the two divisions dispatched to Saudi Arabia in 1990–91, accompanied by U.S. personnel during the 1991 Gulf War, consistently reported fierce battles even though they actually encountered little or no resistance. This occurred whether or not they were accompanied by U.S. military personnel or journalists. Later researchers such as Springborg have confirmed that the tendencies identified in the 1980s and 1990s persist in the Armed Forces in the twenty-first century."
 * I have repeated references from later, 2019, articles saying the same thing. This book is an excellent, updated summary of the problem and the argument. Buckshot06 (talk) 02:13, 2 June 2020 (UTC)
 * Also 2020: William D. Hartung, Seth Binder, U.S. Security Assistance to Egypt: Examining the Return on Investment, POMED/CIP, May 2020. "The immense human toll of the Egyptian military’s approach to counterterrorism in the Sinai has alienated local communities and radicalized significant numbers of individuals who have subsequently been recruited by one of the nearly 12 terrorist groups operating there."