Talk:Electromagnetic theories of consciousness

How has this not been deleted yet?
Everything about the article smells of yet another crank theory invented by some "philosopher" who happens to dabble in physics. Short of nominating it for deletion, would someone care to rewrite the article, and condense it to one or two paragraphs? That's way more than it deserves. Dmitry Brant (talk) 20:12, 12 June 2009 (UTC)

Sue Pockett is a practicing neuroscientist who has experimental collaborations with Walter Freeman, the main pioneer of EEG. And McFadden is a well-known cognitive scientist. Your brief unsubstantiated comment "smells" like one of those utterances of a "skeptic", who attempts to impose a upon the public their extremely strong preformed opinions which are based on zero knowledge of the issues. Unfortunately you are the scourge of the Internet and of Wikipedia in particular. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 92.28.232.177 (talk) 20:33, 30 October 2016 (UTC)

Conscioussness is a hard problem and even with things like fMRI today there simply don't seem to be good testable theories with predictive and "explanatory" value- perhaps this just reflects the state of the art. The area of inquiry is certainly relevant as it could potentially tell us what we really are and if a physical or metaphysical description of self is real. Certainly if the self exists without the brain, ghosts and spirits could exist. The scientific method is what makes this non-frivolous. Remember, before the periodic chart and things like fMRI all you really had was philosophy. When we could put the ordered elements on one page and classical EM in 4 equations, suddenly things got a lot simpler. We may not have gotten their with consciousness yet. To paraphrase homer simpson, "who would have thought the brain would be so complicated."

Even if non-science, there are plenty of wiki pages on fiction and fantasy. If the belief is notable, it need not be deleted for being false.

Nerdseeksblonde (talk) 00:56, 15 June 2009 (UTC)

Redirect
"Electromagnetic theory of consciousness" really needs to redirect here. I'd do it myself, I just don't know how. 75.209.155.46 (talk) 20:40, 22 April 2008 (UTC)


 * Done. SamuelRiv (talk) 14:19, 20 May 2008 (UTC)

Comments
This topic has been vastly improved on your site in an honest iterative fashion. Its interesting that now there is a building momentum of consensus on the electromagnetic field as the binder of consciousness but it still lacks a look at the intricacies of wave interference in the conciousness "binding problem." Yet this is precisely why we and our much loved domestic cat and dog mammals get along so well and it all starts with similarity in brain structure that generates compatible electromagnetics. This is also why large concerts with many like minded people can be so ephiphanic and heartfelt with the harmonic amplification of so many similar wave signatures. It would be interesting to model group harmonics felt and acted upon at the individual level because quickly the researcher could see the need for a totally new mathematics.

Clearly, in individuals with altered local and small unit depolarizations whether due to epilepsy, psychedelic chemicals, or the brain damage associated with schizophrenia, or endogenous group clocking and timing mechanisms that drive bipolar illness with its waxing and waning windows of conciousness, the grouped interference wave field is also altered creating an attendant perceptual matrix enmeshing the operator that is often tragically dysfunctional.

This doesn't even get into the problems of neuronal assemblies firing outside their evolved operating ranges and how this attenuates certain frequencies of signal reception neurobiologically clipping the even field causing resorting in an attempt to adapt to new topologies. This is the constructed reality set in which the brain then posits its conciousness in. Simply put we are only percieving a viewing assembly of a set of interacting variables intermixed external to internal that have their own self-governing set of rules(natural physics). Its processed reality, a balogna reality if you will.

We are a biologic form of artificial intelligence that has limited self-assembly rights over time. This does not mean we cannot be spirtual and religious beings as this is all part of it and in the natural world boundries are optional. That is why quantum mechanics can be so counter-intuitive yet amenable to our projected maths. Its no wonder that mammals have such a hard time seeing the forest for the trees and absolutely no appreciation of geologic time or planck time or even any idea on how to intuitively conceptualize other dimensions.

The best we can do, so far, is to reset the topology into a degree of freedom scheme and let the assignment algebra flow into studies of its nodes. As mammals we still do not have even the mathematical operators to sketch out the actual world we inhabit. That is why string theory is so incomplete. But machines with more advanced artificial intelligences may well be designed in the future that will be able to see a much more accurate version of our world than we.

It is valid for scientists to propose hypotheses about unknown phenomena such as consciousness. Many physical scientists are direct realists who do not understand that the scientific description of conscious experience is problematic. Those who have this viewpoint should see the articles on consciousness and philosophy of mind.

The article is mighty vague. Is that an accurate representation of the theory itself?67.118.119.253 06:00, 19 Jan 2005 (UTC)


 * Someone did a nice update on 24th Jan to answer this misgiving.Loxley 10:15, 20 Apr 2005 (UTC)


 * Nice rant, but science is about predictions and reality, and physics is more specifically about models. Otherwise it's just philosophy. This "theory" contains no model for how something like consciousness or even information processing is obtained from an EM field, nor does it explain how the EM field generated by the brain is different from that generated by the Sun or even a big lighting display. This is the Problem of Intelligence in cognitive science, except horrifically magnified to be completely useless. Oh, and as a basic argument, how is the binding problem solved with a vector quantity like an EM field when you still have four degrees of freedom? SamuelRiv (talk) 14:19, 20 May 2008 (UTC)

Binding Problem Problem
The idea that somehow this hypothesis could solve the binding problem is absurd. Whether or not consciousness is unified in the EM field or not would not change the information flow at all, just like the current theoretical "unification" in matter does not. The disjoint between pieces of information is a matter of information processing, which isn't magically solved by changing the computational medium and then invoking hocus pocus. - Augur
 * I think the article means "how the unity of conscious perception is brought about by the distributed activities of the central nervous system." and not the "how to destinguish one thing from another property wise" witch is the other definition of Binding Problem. I don't see anything in the article about how information is processed by consciousness just the theory that consciousness itself is a product of neuron's firing affecting the EM feild in the brain. Witch has other problems, I'll admit.Sanitycult (talk) 11:50, 27 June 2009 (UTC)

WikiProject class rating
This article was automatically assessed because at least one WikiProject had rated the article as start, and the rating on other projects was brought up to start class. BetacommandBot 03:57, 10 November 2007 (UTC)

So you've nailed the location but...
...That doesn't explain the nature of the consciousness any more than the previous beleif that consciousness took place in the brain did.

My theory advocates the E-M feild as the seat of the consciousness - in fact it depends upon it.

Dualists rightly state that a scientist's assertion that pain is the firing of C-Fibre neurones in the brain does not in any way explain the sensation of pain; why or how it occurs, or even what it is. One can say, 'X impulse in the brain happens at Y speed' or 'A chemical signal in the brain is delivered in doses of B milligrams', but one can't say 'happiness is quick' or 'sadness is heavy'. The fact that we cannot express these emotions or sensations in terms of the 3rd or 4th dimension should be setting alarm bells off at this point, but I'll make them louder and more insistent by pointing out that the exact same problem occurs between time and space: for example it would be innapropriate to make the statement '5 minutes is 300 contimetres long'. It would be appropriate, however, to say 'the 300 cm strip of paper lasted 5 minutes in the rain'. For this conceptual/expressive dichotomy time was awarded the luxury of its own dimension, and for good reason; only spatial quantities can be expressed through space, this is why they are spatial qualities, so it follows if something cannot be expressed through space it is not a spatial quallity. This latter point applies to the consciousness, and it is why I assert that it must be considered to have a dimension of its own (let's say for arguement's sake, thatt it is the '5th' dimension'), something which dualists have tried to express by invoking the soul or the 'spiritual plane'. One might then go on to argue that, if that is the case, and all objects exist in all dimensions, why don't all objects have a consciousness. Simple; they do. However, it's not the same as ours. You see, we in our brains have a vast, complicated, but ultimately structured, network of thought, memory, vision and all the senses that other objects simply do not. I imagine that the 5th dimension requires a degree of structured complexity to come through as consciousness, just like particles must come together before atoms and objects can exist and just like the temperature has to be above absolute zero for time to be represented by change. Imagine the 5th dimension to be paparazzi and our chemical, 3rd dimension quantifiable sensations to be celebrities. The paparazzi require celebrities to be present in order to represent them in articles(imagine in this analogy that articles are the actual consciousness) - but the paparazzi still exist if celebrities are not present. This is the same as, for example, as empty space existing without there being objects around to properly represent it, or time existing without any noticeable changes occuring in the environment. Other forms of the consciousness, different and abstract from ours, may exist, but not in inanimate objects, or artificial intelligence as entailed by the location. Every 'event' as we perceive it happens slightly differently to every atom: if you imagine yourself punching a wall - every atom in that wall and in your fist receives a slightly different measure of force from the one next to it, so it could actually be rationalised in this way to be several events, several million changes in the energy states of the wall atoms and your knuckle atoms. I regard the entire consciousness to be just one event(otherwise how could one facet of the consciousness, say thought, interact with another, for example memory - if it was not one event their would be no reasonable structure or, more specifically chronological consitency, and anyway, why should the laws of physics adhere to our human conception of what an object is). So this begs the question, how can the consciousness occur inside the brain if the brain is made up of many millions of atoms? Certainly, every atom within the brain does not have the necessary structured complexity to fulfill the conditions of consciousness and the brain does not fulfill the condition of being one indevisable object for the conscious 'event' to occur - so what's up? The Electromagnetic Field. It's shape on a moment to moment basis is determined by brain activity, and so represents the brain's complexity, but it is also one indevisable object, in fact, luckily for my theory, besides sub atomic particles it is one of the only 4 things to be fully indevisable (Gravity, EM, Weak and Strong nuclear).Omg Pop (talk) 13:53, 27 July 2009 (UTC)
 * Thanks for the interest, but Wikipedia isn't a publisher of original research, and talk pages are not forums, they are for discussing improvements to articles. Fences  &amp;  Windows  02:40, 28 July 2009 (UTC)


 * You know, if this is true, there is every reason to believe that stars and planets are conscious as well. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 63.80.193.9 (talk) 22:48, 31 December 2009 (UTC)

Improvement of Article
In terms of improving the article, I might be able to add 20 or 30 lines of more detailed description to the first section of the article. Perhaps others would like to comment as to whether this seems a good idea. The third party reference issue is difficult as this is mainly McFadden's theory. The main third party work seems to be on brain synchrony. Persephone19 (talk) 19:18, 20 January 2010 (UTC)
 * As Susan Pockett says, the only ~way to make these ideas work is to assume that consciousness is not causal for behavior, and conceptions of consciousness that make it non-causal for behavior are of little interest to most third parties. Looie496 (talk) 16:43, 21 January 2010 (UTC)
 * My understanding was that a good part of mainstream opinion took the view that consciousness does not cause behaviour; for instance this is the most common interpretation of the Libet and similar experiments. But I agree that McFadden does not seem to see consciousness as causal. Persephone19 (talk) 18:17, 21 January 2010 (UTC)
 * Well, I basically can't take any of this stuff seriously, and mainly watch this article in the hope of keeping it from getting too bizarre -- but if you feel that you can improve the clarity of the article, I don't want to hinder you. Looie496 (talk) 19:48, 21 January 2010 (UTC)
 * I have attempted a first draft. I am not working on references until I feel there is some general agreement on what should go in. I have changed E. Roy John to a related theory, as I'm not sure he really means a field permeating the brain, as opposed to the collective em activity of large collections of neurons. His clunky style makes it ambiguous. For the cemi theory section, I have basically tried to summarise McFaddens's 2002 paper. I have brought in a short section on quantum brain dynamics, as these are also theories of the em field, and I would have thought them to be actually better known than McFadden/Pockett. I haven't come across much material actually trying to refute either McFadden or QBD, in contrast to what one gets with Penrose, so I have put in Chalmer's argument against quantum theories in the interests of neutrality, balance etc. Persephone19 (talk) 23:46, 30 January 2010 (UTC)
 * I have now added some new references. I can't claim much success on the third part references, as there is not much comment on these theories. I have added Fries et al on the relationship between consciousness and synchrony and Chalmers on objections to the general idea. Persephone19 (talk) 21:46, 5 February 2010 (UTC)
 * I have found another third party reference. Jeffrey Gray, who had a distinguished career as an academic psychiatrist, says in his 2004 book, 'Consciousness: Creeping up on the Hard Problem' that tests looking for the influence of electromagnetic fields on brain function have had universally negative results. Unfortunately, he doessn't give a direct reference to the papers concerned, so I've just put in the book as a reference. Persephone19 (talk) 20:30, 14 February 2010 (UTC)
 * Perhaps we could consider removing the boiler plate from this article. The text attempts to give an exposition of the ideas of the various scientists concerned, without putting in the views of the editors, in line with guidance, so there is hoped not to be any dispute over facts. Third party references remain a problem, because of the lack of wide discussion of the theories. Please suggest any references that come to mind. If you think anything is disputable please be specific rather than general so that the problem can be tackled. I will leave this until the beginning of March before doing anything more. Persephone19 (talk) 22:35, 21 February 2010 (UTC)
 * I agree with you that the tags don't serve any purpose, and I've removed them. Looie496 (talk) 22:50, 21 February 2010 (UTC)

"McFadden's view of freewill is deterministic." No it is not. Read the fucking book. --87.93.86.84 (talk) 22:37, 26 March 2011 (UTC)

First sentences
The first two sentences of this article depart in a subtle but important way from the title. This could be avoided by revising them into a separate paragraph as follows--any comments? "Electromagnetic theories of consciousness propose that consciousness is an electromagnetic phenomenon. Within this broad scope, several different groups of proposals have been made:  For example, electromagnetic field theories (or "EM field theories") of consciousness propose that consciousness results when a brain produces an electromagnetic field with features that meet a criterion; Susan Pockett and Johnjoe McFadden have proposed EM field theories." This change would, of course, lead to further changes in the remainder; but first things first.EMIConscious (talk) 16:20, 14 May 2011 (UTC)
 * Seems reasonable to me, with the caveat that Wikipedia rules do not require using the title in the first sentence when the title is a phrase -- it comes off a bit awkward as written. How about something like the following:  "Several theorists have proposed that consciousness can best be understood as an electromagnetic phenomenon.  Their theories differ in the roles they attribute to electromagnetism.  For example, electromagnetic field theories (or "EM field theories") of consciousness propose that consciousness results when a brain produces an electromagnetic field with features that meet certain criteria; Susan Pockett and Johnjoe McFadden have proposed EM field theories."  In any case I think you should feel free to work directly on the article, as long as your edits are understandable and accurately reflect published sources. Looie496 (talk) 16:50, 14 May 2011 (UTC)

I think that the use of the word theory in "Eletromagnectic theory of consciusness" is innapropriate. Conjecture or maybe hypothesis would be far more appropriate, since there's no consensus that electromagnetism explains neuron activity which eventually could lead to an explanation for free will. If there's no consensus around an explanation, there's no theory, really. Frgomes (talk) 04:27, 23 December 2013 (UTC)

Related?
"While at least one researcher claims otherwise, Jeffrey Gray states in his book Consciousness: Creeping up on the Hard Problem, that tests looking for the influence of electromagnetic fields on brain function have been universally negative in their result." I am by no mean an expert, but I gathered several examples of electromagnetic fields influencing brain activity - I'm not sure of how pertinent my findings are though. http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21128274.300-empathy-enhanced-by-magnetic-stimulation-of-the-brain.html http://articles.cnn.com/1998-03-20/health/9803_20_magnets.depression_1_ect-depression-treatment-ends?_s=PM:HEALTH http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21128321.500-quantum-life-the-weirdness-inside-us.html http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21128284.400-powerful-magnets-hamper-our-abilityntangle-to-lie.html http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Savant_syndrome - "Savant-like skills may be latent in everyone and have been stimulated in people by directing low-frequency magnetic pulses into the brain's left hemisphere, which is thought to deactivate this dominant region (in at least 90% of right-handed people) and allow the less dominant right hemisphere to take over, allowing for processing of savant-like tasks." — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.227.66.211 (talk) 22:38, 14 October 2011 (UTC)
 * There is absolutely no doubt that magnetic fields can affect brain function if they are strong enough, and Jeffrey Gray, as an electrophysiologist, knew that perfectly well. But those fields are many orders of magnitude stronger than the fields generated by neural activity inside the brain.  It is those intrinsically generated fields that Gray is referring to. Looie496 (talk) 00:30, 15 October 2011 (UTC)


 * This important paper seems to show EM fields are probably not just an epiphenomena Frohlich & McCormick’s (2010) paper seems to demonstrate that neocortical neuronal networks may not only be defined by their anatomical interconnectivity and the status of the synaptic activity that binds them together, but also by the spatially and temporally complex Electro Magnetic Fields in which they are embedded.
 * Koch Lab where Anastassiou et. al. 2011 seems to show Ephaptic 'field based' coupling between neurons “…Endogenous brain activity can causally affect neural function through field effects under physiological conditions…” and that the resulting synchronization “…may have a substantial effect on neural information processing and plasticity…”.
 * An earlier paper Weiss & Faber 2010 who review this field and reference a growing body of research that shows larger more powerful EM field effects when the dipoles produced by a group of individual neurons are similarly oriented in space, neuronal population activity that is synchronous or coherent in phase.
 * 80.176.155.103 (talk) 23:56, 14 October 2013 (UTC)

Very related, someone more knowledgeable than me should give it a look: http://www.kurzweilai.net/unexplained-communication-between-brain-hemispheres-without-corpus-callosum — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.227.66.211 (talk) 22:01, 21 October 2011 (UTC)
 * There are lots of pathways between the hemispheres other than the corpus callosum, and lots of subcortical areas that project to both hemispheres. All that the results show is that the brain's default mode is established by those other pathways rather than by callosal communication. Looie496 (talk) 22:33, 21 October 2011 (UTC)

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AI Paper
Does anyone have a source for the row hammer AI paper? Googling brings up nothing, 84.113.219.112 (talk) 18:20, 5 May 2017 (UTC)

Recall seeing it somewhere but it got taken down. I did actually get somewhere with the idea, tried a few experiments on my old laptops to see if overclocking or otherwise messing around with the memory timings did anything strange. Incidentally at least with Apple modules with the temperature sensor its worth mentioning that the lag time between chip warming up and sensor bit changing can be several tens of seconds, alas most newer DDR4+ modules are not alterable without physically replacing the chip though ASLR can be used to its advantage if the underlying algorithm is cryptographically weak.

A possible enhancement that would be worth attempting is to add a sensor on each RAM stacked chip, this is feasible but very cumbersome. Linear sensors aren't particularly thick and may be more stable if they are based on semiconductor diodes rather than resistance devices such as thermistors as there is substantial inconsistency with the latter. Think this might be why older laptops often had instability issues.

Interestingly in every case where I did an adjustment the laptop overall stability increased until it "hit the wall" often refusing to POST or in one case corrupting the BIOS completely with either a flashing cursor of doom (tm), beeps or 3 flashing lights at 1 second intervals. Lost a 750GB HDD during my experiments on an early single core netbook but might have been coincidence. Incidentally many older (eg Core, Core 2 Duo, Atom N) machines are known to be fussy about memory and even refuse to boot at all if specific combinations of speed and manufacturer are chosen: I had to try 4 different 4GB sticks before finding that a Crucial 2013 12800s one did the job. This is believed to be a sign that the manufacturers did not correctly implement voltage stepping so memory undervolts when running on the battery exacerbating any inherent instability already present.