Talk:Enlargement of the eurozone/Archive 3

How to reflect the 4 exchange rate subcriteria in the convergence table ?
According to ECBs convergence criteria assessment clarification, their check for "exchange rate criterion compliance", means that they check:


 * 1) Has the country participated in ERM II “for at least the last two years before the examination”?
 * 2) Has the exchange rate been close to the central rate in ERM II [during the 2 year reference period], while also taking into account factors that may have led to an appreciation? Note: In this respect, the width of the fluctuation band within ERM II does not prejudice the examination of the exchange rate stability criterion. 
 * 3) When checking indicators such as exchange rate volatility against the euro, as well as short-term interest rate differentials vis-à-vis the euro area and their evolution, and also by considering the role played by foreign exchange interventions and international financial assistance programmes in stabilising the currency, can it then be assessed the country had absence of “severe tensions” [during the 2 year reference period]?

In addition to the 3 above checks, the Convergence Report's explanation chapter (along with the formulation of the Treaty+Protocol), explain that the 4th subcriteria also being explicitly checked for compliance, is:


 * 4. "The Member State shall not have devalued its currency’s bilateral central rate against the euro on its own initiative for the same period."

After carefully reading through all exchange rate assessment chapters of the convergence reports, it appear all 4 exchange rate subcriteria needs to be green in order to let the overall "exchange rate criterion" become green. If only one of the 4 exchange rate subriteria is red, the overall "exchange rate criterion" turns red. As discussed in our debate section above, the first subcriteria can turn green in cases where the member state "only had been ERM-members for 2 year prior euro adoption day". Some persons even believe ECB could approve a state in this first subcriteria, provided it "just entered the ERM2 on the same day it applied for euro adoption (meaning shortly before the publication of the convergence report)". When looking on precedent cases we can not conclude based on the observations, which interpretation will prevail, as we do not have any precedent "exchange rate criterion approval examples" where the "ERM2-membership was less than 2 years ahead of euro adoption day".

For the second subcriteria check, the word "close to" has never been quantified. This mean it is incorrect that our convergence table currently say this mean +/-15%. This is not true, as this is only the ERM2 fluctuation band presenting us to the maximum limits before they either intervene with market support or decides to devalue or revalue (by realigning the central rate). In example, in the worst case the word "close to" could mean values shall normally stay +/-6% within the central rate. We do not know. Moreover ECB seems to allow the currency fluctuations temporarily to exceed their "close to" range, provided it can be established the currency for the majority of the 2 year reference period fluctuated within the "close to" range. This is why I underlined the "normally" word in the line.

For the third subcriteria check, the measurement is even more complicated and impossible to figure out by simple observation, as it takes many additional subsub indicators into account. Finally the fourth subcriteria fortunately is precisely defined, and can easily be observed by a yes/no (meaning its crystal clear without being dependent on interpretation).

My proposal is that we update the convergence table's overall "Exchange rate" column to display these 4 subcolumns: The input value for all 4 subcriteria columns should be a simple yes/no (based on the ECB+EC convergence report conclusions). Personally I think its best to do it this way, in order to reflect that we actually deal with 4 different subcriteria, where the state needs individually to reach compliance with all 4 of them in order to pass this overall "exchange rate criterion" convergence check. For the first subcriteria, all "yes"-values should be green and "no"-values normally red, while I propose those "no"-values receiving exemption approval to be colored yellow followed by an explaining parenthesis or note. In all circumstances, I propose we attach an explaining linked note behind the cell title of the first subcriteria coloumn, in order to clarify the "length issue" (basically being a copy of the ERM-membership part of the criteria explanation already written by TDL in the euro convergence criteria article). What do you think about this new proposal? Danish Expert (talk) 08:58, 22 August 2014 (UTC)
 * 1) "ERM2 membership for minimum 2 years"
 * 2) "Fluctuations close to central rate"
 * 3) "Absence of severe tensions"
 * 4) "No devaluation through realignment of central rate"
 * I have to add, that both the EC+ECB reports unfortunately refrain to make conclusions in regards of the 2nd+3rd+4th subcriteria for all states who were not found to be ERM2-members (they only describe the data without concluding). For the ERM2-members they however conclude whether or not they found compliance on each of the remaining 3 subcriteria. In example ECB concluded in 2014 that Lithuania complied with all of these 4 subcriteria. Danish Expert (talk) 11:26, 22 August 2014 (UTC)
 * Grrr, my headache starts to grow! In the 2013 convergence report, ECB only explicitly concluded that Latvia complied with subcriteria 1+2+4 but to my big frustration stayed silent whether or not they had the opinion if there had also been "no severe tensions". For this third subcriteria they only presented the data (low "short-term interest rate differentials" along with low "exchange rate volatility" in the form of small fluctuations around the central rate, with both of these data sets listed by table 9b), then noted the state had benefit from a tension relieving "fiscal credit line" during the first half of the reference period, and finally remained silent whether or not this all together meant whether or not the 3rd subcriteria had been met. So here we have the ECB input value N/A for Latvia! Fortunately we however also have the EC convergence report, which assessed full compliance with all 4 subcriteria, and even did a special analysis to conclude "no severe tension" existed - not even in the period of receiving financial assistance. However, this particular finding that the ECB report was incomplete, mean that we in the future have to source all historic convergence tables both by the EC report plus the ECB report (as we can not be certain they always cover the same - or reach the same conclusions). Danish Expert (talk) 12:22, 22 August 2014 (UTC)


 * Some thoughts/questions:
 * So just to clarify, are you suggesting that the values in each column are simply copied from the conclusions reached by the EC/ECB? Otherwise I don't know how we'd measure "severe tensions" for example.  If we take this approach, then we would only be able to update these values every 2 years when a new convergence report is released.
 * Rather than a yes/no in the ERM membership column, what about if we list the length of membership, ie "0.5 years" or "2.5 years". It seems like it would be more helpful if we give readers information in the column rather than just yes/no, as it helps them see how close they are to satisfying the criteria.  (For example, we give a state's debt, and not just a yes/no whether it is over or under 60%).
 * Likewise I think it is helpful to give the % fluctuations versus the euro (which is what is listed in the convergence reports (ie pg 55) rather than just a yes/no. Perhaps we could do something like "Y (XX%)" or something. to give both.
 * For the other two a yes/no would be best I think. TDL (talk) 22:20, 22 August 2014 (UTC)
 * Yep - I suggest a copy from EC+ECB report conclusions, and whenever absent the data input should be N/A. At least this should be the rule for subcriteria 2+3 (due to their undefined interpretation element). I am not opposed to your suggested tweaks to the data format. In regards of subcriteria 2, the EC convergence report 2002 - appendix D3 actually quantified that "close to" means +/- 2.25% fluctuations from the central rate. The ECB however in one of their earliest reports noted "close to" would still be deemed met by states being "close to" in the majority of the reference period (while only exceeding the "close to" territory for short temporary periods). At this moment I have only checked all EC+ECB reports from 1995-2003 + 2013-2014. Today I will check the remaining ones in the middle, and return with answers if they help to clarify these subcriteria, more than already noted. Danish Expert (talk) 05:31, 23 August 2014 (UTC)
 * Important correction! Just found out subcriteria 2+3 is actually intertwined, meaning it should be understood as:
 * (2+3). Fluctuations within max. +-2.25% of central rate, or if it exceeds an absence of severe tensions.
 * This above realization can be extracted, when reading EC convergence report 2000 - appendix D2+D3+D4. In this regard, Ireland (1998) and Greece (2000) are also two precedent examples. Both states exceeded (in positive territory) their +2.25% limit for the entire reference period, but as this was only a breach of the upper limit, it was not considered to be "severe tension", and hence both Ireland+Greece passed the exchange rate criterion and were approved for euro adoption. This intertwined subcriteria could by the way, also be slightly reformulated (while still respecting the EC assessment approach) to:
 * (2+3 alternative formulation). Fluctuations above the -2.25% limit from central rate, or alternatively "no severe tensions".
 * The above reformulated line is derived from the fact, that the EC decided a breach above the +2.25% limit shall never be a "possible cause for non-fulfillment of the criterion". Compared to the first formulation, the alternative formulation clarify the matter in more detail, and therefore I prefer the alternative formulation. For the data input, we could note "lowest recorded fluctuation", and for those cases where this exceeds -2.25% we can add a parenthesis noting if we then either had "severe tensions" or "no severe tentions". Meaning that we refrain to use yellow color. If it fail to pass the first hurdle but succeeds in passing the second, I propose we color it green. Danish Expert (talk) 11:33, 23 August 2014 (UTC)
 * Damn this subject is complicated. Upon further inspection, we have both the intertwined (2+3) subcriteria and then also subcriteria (3) standing alone. In example this mean, that for states like Lithuania+Latvia with fluctuations well within the limit and thus complying with (2+3), they in addition still also needed to comply with (3) as a standalone criteria. Or in other words, compliance with (3) will automatically mean you also comply with (2+3). But if you comply with (2+3) you wont necessarily comply with (3). This latest observation btw also explains why the Council decisions from 1998+2000 (approving 11+Greece) only took note whether or not the approved states complied with (3). To conclude, we can now pick between implementing these two versions of the table:
 * Solution A: Subcriteria column (1), (2+3), (3) and (4).
 * Solution B: Subcriteria column (1)+(3)+(4), but then column (3) would still only answer yes/no if there was a "serious tension" without showing the lowest fluctuation. So the table would contain less data. Merging the lowest fluctuation data into (3) is not advisable, because it would mislead readers to think this alone was deciding whether or not "severe tensions" exist.
 * My first preference was "Solution A". After long and in depth additional consideration, I will however now instead only recommend "Solution B". Reason for this, is that it would be wrong of us to over-emphasize the meaning of "the lowest negative fluctuation". EC+ECB has past precedence cases with states breaching the -2.25% limit for a sustained period of 6 months (Italy in 1998), and still they conclude this is OK because upon closer inspection they found no existence of "severe tension". We also have precedence cases where it was below -6% for several months, and again it was OK because they found no existence of "severe tension". Taking the argument further, there could also be a case where the lowest deviation from the central rate has been registered to be 0% (i.e. for a state who benefit from a tension relieving bailout loan - like Latvia - or a "precautionary conditioned credit line" - like Romania - or a state like Island who since October 2008 is living in an artificial glass bubble with strict foreign capital control enforced by law), where they actually might discover a "severe tension" took place even if the recorded lowest fluctation in the past two years was found to be 0% or in positive territory. Any finding of "severe tension" would rule out possibility for compliance with the overall "exchange rate criterion". To sum up, the lowest fluctuation is not a subcriteria by-itself, but just an indicator for possible "severe tension" (that both could lead to false-positives and false-negatives). Hence, it is best we completely refrain too show this data in the table. Danish Expert (talk) 01:01, 24 August 2014 (UTC)
 * One thing that concerns me is that the table is already quite large and complicated, and this is only going to make it worse. WP:ACCESSIBILITY is becoming an issue.  Perhaps the thing to do is to keep the current table as is as a summary (like is used in the convergence reports), and create a separate "exchange rate convergence" table with more of these details.  TDL (talk) 23:15, 24 August 2014 (UTC)
 * On the other hand, its important we display all subcriteria, as a non-compliance for just one of them will mean the state wont comply with the overall "exchange rate criterion". To put it all into perspective, I just compiled a statistic of all previous "exchange rate criterion" compliance checks. First it is important to note, that if a state fail the first "ERM2-member criteria", it wont be assessed for compliance with the two other subcriteria due to the absence of a "locked central rate" (with data inputs N/A). This also applied for the 9 times an ERM2-member was ruled to have an "insufficient membership length". In all those 29 assessment cases, where the ERM2-membership had been deemed to have a sufficient length, the 2nd subcriteria (no tension) and 3rd subcriteria (no devaluation) was noted and concluded on - with compliance for the 3rd in all 29 cases - but only with compliance for the 2nd in 28 out of 29 cases. The precedent case where S1+S3 passed but S2 did not, was Latvia in 2010. This Latvian case was further more important, as it highlight my above stated concern we should not focus on "exchange rate fluctuations" as a criteria (because in fact it is not a criteria, but just an indicator, which can return both false positives and false negatives). During the 2yr review period: Latvia had been an ERM2 member for more than 2 years (1 subcriteria passed), did not introduce devaluation of its central rate (3rd subcriteria passed), and for the entire time had fluctuations close to its central rate within a narrow band of just +-1%. The last observation was however not sufficient to conclude there had been "no severe tension", because Latvian short-term rate differentials rose while foreign exchange reserve declined and due to significant balance of payments imbalance they also received a tension relieving "balance of payments" bailout loan by IMF+EU.
 * The noted Latvian incident is a good precedent case, teaching us why it is important we display all 3 subcriteria and not just 1 or 2 of them, and moreover a precedent case prooving my point, that we shall avoid to display the minimum currency fluctuation value in the table - as this by-it-self does not reveal anything as stand alone data (i.e. we have precedent cases with the -2.25% limit breached for 6 out of 24 months of the review period, with this being judged to be a case with "no severe tension"). So if you insist to show the minimum fluctuation value, we should as minimum also show for how many days the -2.25% limit was breached, and even if this additional data was added we would still have the so-called Latvian problem, that even a case with the minimum fluctuation at -0.9% (and 0 days of breaching the -2.25% limit) can lead to a situation with presence of "severe tension". All together this proofs my point, why we should not start to show all these supplementing data values, because basically not even 10 data columns would be a complete coverage of these additionally considered data. Only correct approach as I see it, is that we simplify this data only by displaying the final "EC conclusion" for "absence of severe tension", by the input value Yes/No.
 * For the purpose of simplifying the table, I will suggest we change the EDP column to become the overall title for the "budget defict" and "debt-to-GDP" criteria. This would also help to tell readers that the color of these two criteria is decided by whether or not an EDP is in place (which we can also add a note for). All of my proposed table changes has been added to the table heading below. Please check how it looks, and let me know what you think. Danish Expert (talk) 23:25, 25 August 2014 (UTC)
 * The reason I think a separate EDP column is important is because even if a state has a deficit<3.0% and debt<60% in the preceding year (which is what the column lists), that is not sufficient guarantee that the criteria has been met. For example, a projected deficit for the current year of >3.0% could be enough to prevent the EDP from being closed and to prevent euro adoption, but this wouldn't show up in your version of the table (unless I'm not understanding what you are proposing properly).
 * You make a good point with regards to the exchange rate fluctuations, though another thing to consider is that the columns you propose are only defined for ERM II members. Only 1 ERM II member was assessed in the most recent report, so these  two new columns will be almost completely empty (and likely will be completely empty for the next convergence report, barring a change in policy by some state.)  If we want to provide an estimate of convergence for non-ERM II members, I think that the fluctuations are somewhat illustrative in the absence of assessment by the EC/ECB, though you make the case well that they can't be used to definitively assess convergence.
 * What about if we try to merge the fluctuations/devaluations/tensions all into one column? We could list the fluctuations for all states, and for ERM II state if there has been a devaluation we add a "(D)" or if there has been tensions we add a "(T)".  Either a devaluation or tension would turn the column red.  For non-ERM II state we'd just base it on the fluctuations.  Just trying to think of creative space-saving ideas.  Although as I look at the table again, it is mainly wide because of the column headers and not the cell entries, so maybe this isn't as big a problem as I'm making it out to be.  TDL (talk) 05:36, 27 August 2014 (UTC)
 * I understand your EDP concern, and forgot to explain my idea in full. My proposal is to keep the yellow color "Criterion fulfilled by exemption" (decided by the official EDP decisions made by the Council within one month following the publication of the EC convergence report), in order to solve the problem and explain why values exceeding the limits were still approved. However, then you still have a valid point, that we in addition need to fix the issue of false positives (meaning a green value in the past fiscal year in theory also could be colored red at the EDP meeting due to a forecast figure). I propose we avoid this last concern, by simply changing the data input to be the "biggest deficit" and "highest debt ratio" in the 3yr period including "last fiscal year + next two forecast years" (based on the data in the latest available EC economic forecast report available at the assessment time). For the purpose not to cloud the table with data, I think its best we do not list all values for all years, but simply select and display only the "worst figure". If we do it this way, we have eliminated the risk of false positives, and have the yellow color to explain the false negatives (that a certain red limit excess was approved by exemption rules - turning it into yellow). My proposal is, that our convergence criteria table should mimic - as closely as possible - how the exact criteria assessment is done, and consequently only display the criteria deciding data. The debt+deficit criteria are two clearly defined and deciding subcriteria of the overall EDP criteria (solely deciding whether or not an EDP exist), which is why its appropriate also to list them as EDP subcriteria in the table. Readers not familiar with EDP, would accidentally believe it to be a separate extra stand alone criteria in case we keep having a separate EDP column, which is why I recommend we instead implement my proposed "integrated approach".
 * About the "width concern" of the table, I think there is no real concern, because as you mentioned, the width of input values is narrow, so it will still scale down nicely to small screens. I share you sentiment, that it is a pity we currently have so few states to show data values for in the two subcriteria columns "devaluation of central rate" and "severe tensions". For the 2014 table we only have Lithuania (while for Denmark we have sourced data for the first but needs to list a N/A for the second, because of the absence of EC assessment about this). Yet, I still think we should stick to my below designed 3 subcriteria proposal, for the purpose to mimic how the criteria exactly work when being assessed. We should avoid a display of "lowest fluctuation values", as they are not a singular deciding factor in the "severe tension" assessment (but only a supplementing indicator among many other indicators). So for the last two subcriteria I still think its best only to have input data saying Yes/No/NA. For the first "ERM2 membership length" subcriteria, I agree with you we can keep the dates and map them green if 2yr has been met. If you feel we did not manage to establish strong enough proof here at the talkpage, that the EC "measurement approach" always is to measure if this membership length criteria was complied with "ahead of euro adoption day" rather than "ahead of the assessment time", I am willing to accept (at least as a temporary compromise) that we use the yellow exemption color for those states who did not meet the "2yr membership length ahead of assessment time" but then were exempted by the Commission still to have complied.
 * As for your last proposal to show both Fluctuation + (D) + (T) data in the same merged column, I think it will do more harm than good. I prefer we keep my proposed design, as per the argument, that each criteria/subcriteria being able to cause a negative overall convergence criteria approval should be allowed existence of its own column and separate color. By adopting this approach, the table will closely reflect how the assessment process works, and be much easier for casual readers to grasp. Based on all these arguments, I think the below new proposed design is the best one to implement. Moreover I can assure you, this is also the final one. After reading through all EC convergence reports from 1996-2014, and using several working days to consider the best possible table design to display the "exchange rate criteria", this is the final design I will ever propose. It is well thought out, and I propose we now implement it for all convergence tables. If you are ready to give it a shot (for a start the table coding below can be copied 1:1 into Template:Euro convergence criteria top and the yellow legend into Template:Euro convergence criteria bottom, but I would appreciate if you help me implement the remaining part of the coding stuff), then I will assist you by adding all the additional historic input values (extracted from the EC convergence reports) for the period through 1998-2014. Danish Expert (talk) 06:45, 30 August 2014 (UTC)
 * I still feel like this is making the table so complicated that readers aren't going to be able to actually understand it. There is always a tradeoff between presenting every single last detail with all possible caveats, and a general overview with a summary of the important information that the average reader will actually understand.  Mixing debt/deficit fiscal years is just going to complicate things.  And I still feel that it is useful to show some sort of estimate for non-ERM states exchange rate convergence, even if it isn't an "definitive criteria".  Otherwise, readers have no idea how converged they are.  I'm going to start a thread at Template talk:Euro convergence criteria to see if anyone else has an opinion.  Feel free to comment there.  TDL (talk) 00:33, 1 September 2014 (UTC)

New version of the convergence criteria table:

{{legend|yellow|Criterion fulfilled by exemption: ''If the budget deficit exceeds the 3% limit, but is "close" to this value (the European Commission has deemed 3.5% to be close by in the past), then the criteria can still potentially be fulfilled if either the deficits in the previous two years are significantly declining towards the 3% limit, or if the excessive deficit is the result of exceptional circumstances which are temporary in nature (i.e. one-off expenditures triggered by a significant economic downturn, or by the implementation of economic reforms that are expected to deliver a significant positive impact on the government's future fiscal budgets). In addition debt-to-GDP ratios exceeding 60% can also be exempted, if the ratio either have a declining trend as per the new "debt benchmark reduction" rule or alternatively solely has been caused by certain exceptional debt rising circumstances. As it is only the European Commission who can recommend the Council to rule "exemptions to exist" as part of their official EDP decisions, these yellow exemption colors can not be known/predicted for state's not being part of the European Union (whereas all colors consequently will be colored red for them, if they exceed the limits).''}}

Additional note of developments after the 2008 Financial Crisis
My far reaching look into the currency exchange rate topic, also resulted in a very interesting observation applying for all the EU members with a euro derogation (without opt-out) who had not become ERM2-members before the 2008 Financial Crisis arrived. For this entire group of states (except for the highly developed Swedish economy), they all experienced a significant currency exchange depreciation in the period from October 2008 up until today, in the face of their Central Bank building up a significantly increased foreign currency reserve. This observation is important for two reasons. First it helped their economies to overcome both the 2008 Financial Crisis and the entailed European Sovereign-debt crisis, because they through the depreciated exchange rates gained competitive advantages for their export sector (hence ensuring GDP growth could continue, even in the negative European economic climate). Second, it has now left them, not only with a monetary introduced competitive advantage, but also with a very high Foreign Currency reserve which they can use in the future to defend their central parity rate upon entry into ERM2.

This mean, their delay of ERM2-membership provided them with a double advantage, which will also help ensure that once they enter ERM2 they are almost guaranteed immediately to comply with the stability subcriteria - no matter what. If they had entered ERM2 prior of 2009, they should have applied ERM2 for a devaluation of their fixed central rate - and it is far from certain ERM2 would have allowed this in the context of their own economies facing challenges (and thus being hesitant freely to award competitive advantages to the Eastern Europe economies). To sum up, I think this observation is the real reason why all non-ERM2 members in Eastern Europe have opted to delay their ERM2-membership indefinitely. It has nothing to do with "euro membership costs" or "concern about the euros stability because of the European sovereign debt-crisis" (as some of their national politicians claim). It has everything to do, with national concerns that their own economy in the current climate is to weak to continue its "catching-up trend" towards the rest of the EU if they adopt the euro tomorrow. Or in other words, that the present insufficient level of "real economic convergence" for the state, would make an adoption of the euro in the near future a premature move.

I have no more time to continue looking further into this issue (backing it up with sources). If some of you can find sources for my above analysis, I think it would be interesting to let our article feature it as a short sub-chapter. For a start, I propose we anyway immediately add an observational table noting the "devaluations from May 2008 to May 2014" and the "change of the central banks foreign capital reserve from May 2008 to May 2014 (% of GDP)". Both data columns can be sourced by the EC convergence reports. Can you approve we add this proposed wikitable to the article? Danish Expert (talk) 19:12, 24 August 2014 (UTC)
 * After looking further into my above "first catch of the eye" analysis and proposal, I now object to it on several points. First of all, to tell the true story about impact of the 2008 Financial Crisis on exchange rates, it would be required also to display the pre-crisis development 2000-2008, where the floating exchange rates that subsequently followed a devaluation path had followed an appreciation path. Secondly, this topic is very complex, because the "exchange rate devaluations" is not the only available instrument to combat the adverse effects of the financial crisis - i.e. Latvia with a fixed exchange rate managed still successfully to adopt to the climate without devaluation by following a path with determined implementation of structural reforms and wage restraint. Thirdly the foreign capital reserves were "artificially strengthened" in Latvia+Hungary+Romania as they received EU funded "balance of payments" support loans, and it will consequently soon decline again upon the repayment of these loans. To those who wonder about the size of foreign capital reserves, they were recorded to the following values ultimo 2013: Bulgaria (35% of gdp), Czech Republic (27% of gdp), Croatia (29% of gdp), Latvia (20% of GDP), Lithuania (17.6% of gdp), Hungary (35% of gdp), Poland (20% of gdp), Romania (25% of gdp), Sweden (12% of gdp). No interesting info can be extracted solely from looking at seize of these foreign exchange reserves.
 * To conclude, the main interesting data observation (in the context of assessing if the state is ready to enter erm2), would be a summary of how its exchange rates developed pre and post crisis, and then list this in a table with multiple other "real economic convergence" data. Although being an interesting subject, this is a way to far complicated story and analysis - and we will likely discover that no common pattern exist for all the Eastern Europe states. They each have their own individual situation and circumstances. Or in other words, while a floating exchange rate was preferable in the post crisis for Romania, it was not preferable in Bulgaria/Latvia. Based on all these realizations, I now withdraw my above proposal to create a "2008 Financial Crisis impact table". Danish Expert (talk) 05:27, 3 September 2014 (UTC)
 * As a last followup only FYI (still think we should not include it in the article), I have compiled this table for historic exchange rate developments pre and post crisis. Positive percentage changes are equal to depreciation of the local currency, while negative percentage changes are equal to appreciation of the local currency. The general observation to extract from the table, is that among the states in Eastern Europe (going through a significant catching-up process), the 4 states without ERM2-membership or a fixed currency through a unilateral currency board all experienced severe currency devaluations during the aftermath of the 2008 Financial crisis. This is however, also the only thing we can extract, and therefor I do not recommend to add the table to the article. This will be my last followup reply in this sub-debate. Danish Expert (talk) 06:52, 3 September 2014 (UTC)
 * {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align:center"

!Exchange rates !FX Oct 2002 (currency/euro) !FX Apr 2008 (currency/euro) !FX 2 Sep 2014 (currency/euro) !2008/2002 (%-change) !2014/2008 (%-change)
 * style="text-align:left"|Bulgaria
 * 1.95583
 * 1.95583
 * 1.95583
 * 0.0
 * 0.0
 * style="text-align:left"|Czech Republic
 * 30.66
 * 25.0638
 * 27.784
 * -18.3
 * 10.9
 * style="text-align:left"|Latvia
 * 0.595
 * 0.702804
 * 0.702804
 * 18.1
 * 0.0
 * style="text-align:left"|Lithuania
 * 3.45280
 * 3.45280
 * 3.45280
 * 0.0
 * 0.0
 * style="text-align:left"|Hungary
 * 243.53
 * 253.752
 * 315.49
 * 4.2
 * 24.3
 * style="text-align:left"|Poland
 * 4.043
 * 3.44213
 * 4.2141
 * -14.9
 * 22.4
 * style="text-align:left"|Romania
 * 3.127
 * 3.64281
 * 4.4116
 * 16.5
 * 21.1
 * style="text-align:left"|Sweden
 * 9.105
 * 9.36989
 * 9.2018
 * 2.9
 * -1.8
 * }
 * After considering the above table a bit back and forth, I have now today copied it into the article, for the purpose to enlighten readers about the exchange rate impact that the 2008 Financial Crisis had on each of the remaining states with a euro derogation. While not being highly important, it is still of medium importance, and I think -after all- that the average reader will consider the info to be relevant and within the scope of the chapter. Danish Expert (talk) 13:49, 23 September 2014 (UTC)
 * style="text-align:left"|Sweden
 * 9.105
 * 9.36989
 * 9.2018
 * 2.9
 * -1.8
 * }
 * After considering the above table a bit back and forth, I have now today copied it into the article, for the purpose to enlighten readers about the exchange rate impact that the 2008 Financial Crisis had on each of the remaining states with a euro derogation. While not being highly important, it is still of medium importance, and I think -after all- that the average reader will consider the info to be relevant and within the scope of the chapter. Danish Expert (talk) 13:49, 23 September 2014 (UTC)

Swedish referendum + removal of secondary referendum source resulting in undue weigth of a non-official POV
Just updated the referendum paragraph again, to explain what the Swedish referendum was about in more clarifying details. When reading the simplified referendum question isolated without taking the politically communicated context into account, then it indeed appear as it was an "optout-or-adopt" referendum and not about "euro adoption timing". However, both the communicated political context of the referendum as well as how the Swedish politicians interpretated the meaning of the rejecting result of the referendum, lead to the unbiased conclusion it was only about "euro adoption timing". I could not find any sources of Swedish political parties complaining/protesting that the referendum subsequently did not result in a negotiated optout. Another important detail in this context, is that the Swedish referendum was only designed to produce a recommendation result and not a legally binding result, which also helps explain why its incorrect to portray at as a legal optout/optin referendum and simply just was about "euro adoption timing".

In regards of the removed line and secondary reference claiming "several states argue a reformed EMU will require new euro adoption referendums", this removal is something I insist on, because my search for more primary official sources backing up this story returned 0 results. On this ground, I concluded the article's display and use of a secondary source (referencing statements by an anonymous diplomatic source in 2011), was putting undue weight to a niche POV. The only official statement from a governing party of one of the non-Eurozone states, that I could find having supported the same viewpoint as the diplomatic source had stated in 2011, was the Czech ODS party in 2011. The referendum paragraph now carry the specific ODS-story in full detail. As the specific and official ODS viewpoint hereby is visible in the article, I see no point in keeping the unspecific unofficial line falsely implying that basically all other none-eurozone states have concerns that they might need to launch a new followup euro referendum due to the ongoing EMU-reforms. If you can dig up specific official primary references proofing this is a real story/concern and not a hoax planted by a politically spinning Czech diplomat, then fine lets add this story. Personally I could not find such references, which led me to remove both the line and the reference. Danish Expert (talk) 14:42, 26 August 2015 (UTC)
 * Concern 1: The Swedish government has made it clear that it is their official position that they will not adopt the euro unless it is first approved by the public in a referendum. The 2003 referendum asked "Do you think that Sweden should introduce the euro as a currency?"  This is by definition a referendum on euro adoption.  Trying to portray it as anything else is a misrepresentation and unsupported by sources.  If you think otherwise, please find ONE source which describes the 2003 referendum as a "euro adoption timing" referendum to support your claim.  Otherwise your personal interpretation does not belong in article space.
 * Concern 2: Whether this referendum was legally consistent with their accession treaty is a separate question entirely, but illegal things happen all the time so just because it might be illegal doesn't mean it can't (and didn't) happen. If you have a RS saying that the referendum was illegal under EU law than that would certainly be notable and should be mentioned.  But since neither you no I are judges of the European Court of Justice we do not have the authority to make such judgements on EU law, and wikipedia isn't the appropriate forum to publish such original findings.
 * Concern 3: Regardless, the argument about whether the Swedish euro referendum was a "euro timing" referendum or a "euro adoption" referendum is purely semantics with absolutely no significance.
 * Concern 4: See WP:PRIMARY. The usage of primary sources are discouraged.  Secondary sources are much preferred, so there is no need to find primary sources to support the secondary sources.
 * Concern 5: Also, I have again removed your erroneous claim that "All new EU members .. under the terms of their referendum approved accession treaties". As I explained in my first edit summary, this simply is not true.  There were no referenda on the accession treaties in Romania and Bulgaria.
 * Concern 6: And I've again removed the content on a supposed requirement of 2 years in ERM. As you are well aware, the rules do not actually require that, and regardless this is entirely irrelevant to the point being made.
 * As per the six above concerns, the article has now been restored to its previous consensus version. 01:29, 27 August 2015 (UTC) TDL (talk)


 * On second thought, I've removed the paragraph you objected to, and collapsed the discussion on referendum in the new states to a few sentences with a bunch of sources: . We really don't need to go in details here as it's all covered in the respective sections/articles.  Does that address your concerns?  TDL (talk) 03:57, 27 August 2015 (UTC)
 * For sure I am ready to accept a compromise on this topic. My main concern about the previous "referendum paragraph", was that is misled casual readers to believe that legal optin/optout euro referendums have been arranged or officially considered to be held by the governments of the remaining non-eurozone states. This is not the case. My concern about the previous formulation and use of a single unofficial secondary source (based on what an anonymous Czech diplomat stated in 2011), which subsequently could not be backed up by other secondary/primary official sources during the subsequent four years now having elapsed, is fully justified. My complain was not about semantics, but to clarify the referendum-situation in in the remaning non-eurozone states (scope and possibility). I will now briefly reply to your six above concerns, so that I initially here fully can explain my position and viewpoint in this debate.
 * Ad.1+2: In the Scandinavian states we have the option as per our constitutional law, that our parliaments have the option either to launch an "indicative non-binding referendum" or a "legally binding referendum". The Swedish parliament chose to launch an "indicative legally-non-binding referendum" for their euro adoption timing referendum, which meant the rejecting result did not legally bind the Swedish government to transform their legal "euro adoption obligation as per their accession treaty" into a legal optout. I can post thousands of sources to you if you want, to proof this fact. My formulated lines to the article, never claimed the Swedish referendum was illegal under EU law. On the contrary, I claim (a long with all other legal experts in the field), that it was not illegal due to only being an "indicative non-legally-binding referendum" which did not impose the Swedish parliament to transform their euro adoption obligation into an optout.
 * Ad.3+4:It is certainly not a semantic irrelevant observation, that 0 non-Eurozone states have arranged or planned legally binding optin/optout euro referendums to be held. Official governmental referendum considerations have so far only been about "euro adoption timing" (including in Sweden) and not whether or not their state should "never" join the euro through enforcing a permant legal optout solution. At least up until today, the governments of the remaining eurosceptic non-eurozone states, did not dare to test if such legally binding optin/optout referendums would be legally possible to conduct. If I remember correct, both Vaclav Klaus and Orban some years ago floated the proposal for their parliament to prepare a permanent euro optout solution to be enforced in their country, but the ruling governments in their respective states disregarded such ideas as illegal and concluded that simply refraining to join ERM worked just fine as a defacto optout. In my point of view, if we shall feature referendum proposal info in the article, it should be limited only to reflect historical facts about previous held euro referendums and the official agreed position of the ruling governments in non-eurozone states about the prospects of holding future euro-adoption referendums (i.e. it is not interesting to report in the country summary if Ponta has floated a referendum position as he only represents one 1 out of 4 coalition government parties, but it would be highly relevant to summarize and report what the Romanian government ultimately decides in this regard) . The referendum info should not mislead casual readers falsely to believe, that it is possible to conduct legal euro optin/optout referendums for their non-eurozone country (just because an anonymous diplomat floated the idea in 2011 this might be the case if the EMU is reformed into something radically different compared to the moment when his non-Eurozone state joined the EU and made its euro adoption commitment). Such optin/optout referendums can only legally be held by UK/Denmark. This is an undisputed fact. Claiming otherwise, will definitely require we can find and add official sources (secondary/primary) which support such claim.
 * Ad.5: Sorry, my bad. I only checked that the first 14 new EU members had referendum approved accession treaties, and forgot to check if the same was true for the last two (Bulgaria+Romania). I accept your correction on that ground.
 * Ad.6: About the "requirement of 2 years in ERM", this note was made in conjunction to the above "exchange rate regime" graph. As you perfectly know, and accepted in our previous debate, the official rule require "minimum two years of unproblematic ERM-membership prior of the convergence assessment time", although calm exchange rate developments prior of ERM-membership might be taken into consideration (still to be approved if ERM-membership upon assessment time was slightly less than two years), although all previous around 30 ERM-membership criteria compliance rulings in this field has established the precedence that such shortened ERM-membership approvals upon the assessment time only will be granted, if the state has been an ERM-member for minimum two years before it officially adopts the euro. I opposed your removal of the info that unproblematic ERM-membership for minimum two years is needed as one of the convergence criteria. But accept the later clarification you implemented (the formulation you copied from the convergence criteria article that we previously agreed on).
 * To sum up: Ad.5+6 has been solved into what you have changed it into now. As for Ad.1+2+3+4, I do not agree with your arguments posted here about the need for removal, and hope my elaborated reply posted above also can help we report this "referendum info" better in the future. As I am about to leave Wikipedia for a 4 month long vacation, I am out of time to develop this "referendum paragraph" further - for now, and on that ground can accept we leave the article temporarily as per your recent implemented changes. I might however be interested to expand the referendum information again (to reflect my points made above as per Ad.1+2+3+4), when I return again more actively in December 2015. As always, your response to my reply here, will in any case be listened to and taken carefully into consideration. Best regards, Danish Expert (talk) 12:35, 28 August 2015 (UTC)

7kb of text. No sources. You are once again posting your personal opinions and presenting them as facts without any sources to back up these opinions. Such unsourced options are not publishable on wikipedia. If you want to include this content in article space, you must support it with sources, not opinions.

In reply to your specific points:

I'm aware of the concept of a non-bonding referendum. In fact, the Swedish European Union membership referendum, 1994 was also non-binding, hence the original terms of accession (including obligation to adopt the euro) were also never approved by a legally binding referendum. You are drawing an arbitrary line at the legal basis of the referendum. If Sweden didn't even have a binding referendum on joining the EU, why on earth would they have one on adopting the euro? Even the UK planned to hold a non-binding referendum if they ever decided to join the euro.

I never suggested you were claiming the referendum is illegal. What I said was that your argument boils down to "it had to be about timing because otherwise it would have been illegal." Hence my response above. If you know of thousands of sources to support this opinion that the referendum was not about euro adoption, but only about timing, then it should be simple for you to share ONE with me. I'd be happy to include this content as far as it can be supported by sources.

"Such optin/optout referendums can only legally be held by UK/Denmark. This is an undisputed fact." - Prove it with sources. Otherwise it's just you playing lawyer on the internet. TDL (talk) 02:50, 31 August 2015 (UTC)
 * Here you have two sources proving my point about the real scope of the Swedish referendum question being about "euro adoption timing":
 * "Although the referendum in Sweden was not binding, the government decided to respect the results and delay the adoption of the common currency to an unspecified time."
 * After the negative outcome of the referendum the Swedish voters were surveyed about how they now felt about the euro after the referendum (Page 34): "When asked whether they thought that Sweden would end up adopting the Euro in replacement of the Swedish Krona, respondents clearly indicate that this is going to happen one day or another. This fate is expressed by 87% of the total voting population in Sweden (Only a small minority, representing 3%, believes that the Euro will replace the Swedish Krona in less than three years time. 30% indicate that the Euro will be adopted in three to six years, while 36%, the relative majority, believe this will happen in seven to ten years time. Finally, 18% of the voting population believe that it will take more than ten years. The remaining 5% of respondents did not know or refused to answer.). Those convinced that the Euro will never replace the Krona, represent a mere 8% of the population."
 * To say it short, while the official referendum question was "Do you think that Sweden should introduce the euro as a currency?", it was implied and understood by voters to mean: "Do you think that Sweden should introduce the euro as a currency (now)?" - with the yes campaign officially having clarified to voters that a yes vote would mean euro adoption as soon as possible equal to 1 January 2006.
 * I think we both agree Sweden's accession treaty is still legally binding. This mean Sweden is still legally bound to adopt the euro at some point of time, if their parliament does not take initiative and succeed to negotiate a legal optout solution for Sweden (to be approved by all EU member states, Parliament and Commission). My sole point is, that none of the remaining non-Eurozone states without a legal optout can claim their euro adoption pledge made in their accession treaty is no longer legally binding (because of the EMU being slightly reformed). Such states would breach the commitments made in their accession treaty if launching legally binding optin/optout referendums, meaning that if any of such states launch "euro adoption referendums" the scope will be limited to be about "euro adoption timing", with their referendum question either reflecting this explicit or implicit. Danish Expert (talk) 13:19, 3 September 2015 (UTC)
 * No, those sources say nothing of the sort. You are trying very hard to find hidden "implied" messages, but this search is OR.  You need sources which actually say this was the issue, not sources which you see hidden messages in.  That Swedes expect they will eventually adopt the euro is fine, but it's an entirely different question.  If the polls showed that they expected to never adopt the euro would you claim it was an opt-in/opt-out referendum?  Of course not.
 * I agree that as per it's accession treaty, Sweden is legally obliged to adopt the euro. But you are once again playing European Court of Justice judge, making rulings on the interpretation of primary law.  If you think a euro in/out referendum is illegal, provide a source which says that, not your personal opinion.  I haven't seen any legal provisions which prohibit putting the issue to a referendum.  For instance a state could decide to hold a legally binding in/out referendum seeking a public mandate to negotiate an opt-out with the EU.  That wouldn't negate their treaty obligations (without the consent of the EU) but it would be an in/out referendum, and I can't see how or why it would be illegal.  States could (and have) hold a referendum on withdrawing from the EU (and hence it's euro adoption obligation) if it so pleased.  Not illegal, but doesn't change treaty obligations without the consent of other contracting states.
 * A referendum on "euro adoption timing" as you call it would ask "do you want to adopt the euro in 2016 or 2018". It would not ask "Do you want to adopt the euro or not".  TDL (talk) 00:00, 4 September 2015 (UTC)
 * Explaining what a referendum was about based on its simplified "referendum question" alone, can never be recommended. During referendum campaigns, the consequences of yes/no will be communicated to voters, and the government of democratic states often in fact publish information material about the content of the referendum to help explain the full details behind the referendum question (i.e. ahead of the Danish referendum the government had published a national euro changeover report to explain all consequences of a yes, while it was explained the consequences of a no would mean our "protocol exemption for euro adoption" would not be abrogated). My two sources posted above, support my initial understanding and claim that the Swedish euro referendum was not a legally binding optin/optout referendum but in effect just a "euro adoption timing" referendum, as its rejecting result was never expected by other journalists or even Swedish voters to result in a legal permanent euro optout solution being enforced through its government seeking a UK/Denmark style Protocol exemption for euro adoption. You have posted nothing here to convince me the opposite was the case.
 * The point here for the so-called "derogation states", is that they can not just hold a referendum on changing their treaty obligations without the approving consent of all other contracting states. Once you are part of the EU club, the EU acquis per definition always overrule our national law/legislation or the outcome of a "national referendum" (if its in contradiction with the EU acquis). If any of the "derogation states" want to hold a legally binding optin/optout euro adoption referendum with a rejecting result being certain to cause implementation of a UK/DK style "protocol exemption for euro adoption", such state would need first ahead of the referendum to negotiate such "protocol exemption" with the 27 other EU members. If such "protocol exemption" has not been negotiated prior of the referendum, this referendum would be limited in scope only to be a "non-binding referendum". If a binding referendum is held with a scope and question on something not being legally possible, it will as far as I know always result in being deemed an illegal referendum. All states are of course always allowed to organize a legally binding optin/optout EU referendum without the prior consent of other EU member states, if they want entirely to exit the club (and hereby also exit their euro adoption obligation). As a matter of fact, you can find recent sources pointing out Greece would need first to exit EU entirely in order to exit the euro, unless all 27 other EU member states would consent to such exit by granting Greece a special "protocol exemption". Once you are a EU club member, you are bound by the rules of this club. A single state can not just unilaterally pick and choose its optins and optouts according to its personal preference. Any such changes need prior ratified consent granted by all the other EU club members.
 * Just to sum-up, I sense we are not so deeply divided in our understanding of the this topic. My long replies here at the talkpage was not meant to offend you or others, or contain lines to be adopted 1:1 by the article. I explained myself in full to avoid being misunderstood, and also think our debate help clarify what we at some point of time shortly can mention in the article in regards of the legal framework concerning "euro adoption", "preparational requirements" and "referendum possibilities/considerations". As mentioned earlier, I do not have time to help compile such paragraph now (envisaged to be limited in length to roughly 5 lines) as I am now on a self-imposed Wikipedia vacation for the next 4 months. I might return and give it a try in December 2015. If some of you have time to do it straight away based on what has been posted here at this talkpage (further supported by the search and add of supplementing sources), please go ahead. Danish Expert (talk) 06:51, 6 September 2015 (UTC)
 * No, those sources obviously say nothing of the sort. They say that the public expects they will eventually adopt the euro.  If the Danish people were polled and found that they expected to eventually adopt the euro, would you be claiming that they didn't have an opt-out?  Of course not.  These are two entirely different questions.  I have no idea why you can't understand that.
 * And now you are trying to change the debate. No one has ever suggested that a referendum would "changing their treaty obligations".  Of course changing the treaty obligations would require the consent of other states.  What you don't seem to understand (or refuse to accept) is that there are NO treaty obligations to meet the criteria (in spite of your unsupported claims otherwise).  No treaty amendments are required for a state to unilaterally stand up and say "We will never satisfy the criteria and thus never adopt the euro".  You have provided absolutely no sources which say otherwise, nor any sources which say referenda are illegal, as you continue to claim.  Rather than posting more of your personal interpretation of international law and why you think this dubious claim is true, please provide one reliable source which actually says this.  TDL (talk) 19:56, 6 September 2015 (UTC)

Just a short question. You are both talking about the obligation to adopt the euro under the accession treaty of 1994. But where exactly in the accession treaty is this obligation mentioned (I cannot find any mentioning)? Does the accession treaty really explicitly state that Sweden is obliged to adopt the euro? Is it not rather so that it is article 140 TFEU that "obliges" Sweden to adopt the euro when it fulfills the convergence criteria? If this is the case, I just note that it is a difference compared to the states that joined in 2004, 2007 and 2013, where the accession treaties really explicitly point out that the acceeding states shall join the euro when they fulfill the convergence criteria. Legally it doesn't really matter, but we shouldn't formulate us in a way that people believe that it is the accession treaty itself that obliges Sweden to adopt the euro at some point.

Bytheway, I'm a bit sceptical about the claim that member states of the EU are obliged to join the euro. This is a statement you sometimes hear in media. But is it really true? It is very clear from the treaties that a member state is only obliged to join the euro when it fulfills the convergence criteria (article 140 TFEU). But there is no obligation for the member states to fulfill the convergence criteria (in particularly not by joining the exchange rate mechanism). So, this means that the member states are actually not obliged to join the euro, which is also the reason why Sweden (and other countries) can stay out of the euro as long as they want without any legal consequences. The only difference between Denmark and Sweden, is that Denmark has a protocol which states that the procedure where the Commission/ECB evaluates the Danish fulfillment of the convergence criteria can only be initiated by the Danish government. That's the only difference. All member states whose currency is not the euro are free to decide when they want to aspire for euro adoption. Under the treaties there is no possibility for the Commission or any other European institution to force a member state to fulfill all the convergence criteria (read: joining ERM). In other words, it is optional for a member state to adopt the euro. --Glentamara (talk) 09:25, 4 September 2015 (UTC)
 * You post some interesting questions about Sweden's legal euro adoption commitment. You are correct to point out its technically the EU treaty and not the "accession treaty" binding Sweden to adopt the euro. However, as far as I know, their legal situation (in possession of a temporary derogation) should be similar to those who joined the union in the current millennium and had their euro adoption commitment emphasized in their accession treaty. Someone once told me (I have no written source for this), that the reason why the euro adoption commitment was explicitly mentioned in the accession treaty, was because the Commission wanted to put pressure (or avoid) future member states to organize euro adoption referendums (or attempting to negotiate legal optouts) by making it an explicit part of the package of joining the European Union. So to speak, those states having their euro adoption commitment explicitly mentioned in their accession treaty, already approved a "euro adoption once their ready" as part of their EU accession package, meaning a subsequent request for euro optout would be considered a breach of their accession treaty in the eyes of the Commission. It would be great if we can find some academic sources pointing out what the legal impact of all this mean. I have no time available to dive further into this topic now, so I will limit my reply only to share my knowledge at this point of time:
 * While the Commission (as you mentioned) has no possibility to sanction derogation states for failing to comply with all convergence criteria for euro adoption, the community law still requires euro derogation states to prepare for a future criteria compliance, meaning that if absolutely no preparation takes place for decades it could ultimately result in a case being launched against the member state in concern for an "accession treaty" breach.
 * However, at the moment the preparation requirements were only issued towards the member states through a "Commission Recommendation". In Community law, a Recommendation is a legal instrument that encourages those to whom it is addressed to act in a particular way without being binding on them. A recommendation enables the Commission (or the Council) to establish non-binding rules for the Member States. To be more specific it is this COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of 10 January 2008 outlining, that the preparation steps should include establishing a "national euro adoption steering committee" and formulation of a "national euro changeover plan".
 * Again, I think the article would benefit from going more into details on the legal matters concerning "euro adoption", "preparational requirements" and "referendum possibilities/considerations", but I just do not have time to help compile it right now. If some of you have time to help do it now, I would really appreciate. :-) Danish Expert (talk) 11:33, 4 September 2015 (UTC)
 * As you said yourself, recommendations are not legally binding. I still wonder which article in TFEU you mean obliges the member states to (actively) strive to fulfill the convergence criteria? As I understand it, the treaties were written in a time where participation in the euro was seen as something that all member states (except Denmark and the UK) would obviously strive for. Therefore no legal obligations to strive for fulfilling the convergence criteria were included. Today the situation is different, but the treaty formulations from the Maastricht treaty are still pretty the same. --Glentamara (talk) 12:24, 4 September 2015 (UTC)
 * We have no explicit treaty article legally binding the "non-Eurozone states without euro optout" to strive for fulfilling the convergence criteria. However, the heading for Chapter 5 in TFEU is "transitional provisions", which imply these so-called "derogation states" are expected only to be covered by this chapter 5 through a temporary era, while they transition into complying with all convergence criteria and hereby become full euro members. In regards of Sweden, no phrase in their accession treaty explicitly bind them to be a "derogation state", but they are defacto a "derogation state" as they have not asked for and negotiated an optout euro exemption protocol to the treaty similar to those negotiated by UK+Denmark (see Protocol 15+16 that feature a legal euro optout which were negotiated and ratified by all other EU member states) . While those 13 states having accessed EU in 2004+2007+2013, have this explicit phrase included in their accession treaty: "shall participate in the Economic and Monetary Union from the date of accession as a Member State with a derogation within the meaning of Article 139 of the TFEU.". Hereby their accession treaty literally prohibit them from asking to receive a "protocol exemption" (legal permanent euro optout applying until the state by own will abrogate it). This is the difference.
 * While I agree with you, there are no legal binding provisions in the treaty setting up rules for how "derogation states" are supposed to prepare/strive for convergence criteria compliance, I think the preparation for such thing to happen is expected by the treaty to take place on an ongoing basis using the amount of time deemed appropriate and needed by each specific derogation state in concern. And as I replied above, we have the non-legally binding "COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of 10 January 2008" applying for "derogation states", outlining a recommendation for how such preparation is supposed to take place through establishing a "national euro adoption steering committee" and formulation of a "national euro changeover plan". As long as "derogation states" does not enter ERM-2 they have a defacto optout applying at least for as long as they can find reasons/excuses for not being ready to join ERM-2. My sole point here is, that at least those "derogation states" who had their "derogation status" explicit confirmed in their accession treaty, can not organize a legally binding optin/optout euro referendum. This said, they might decide to launch a "euro adoption timing referendum" (and yes, I still count the non-legally binding Swedish 2003 euro referendum as such) or a "referendum to change their constitution and legislation establishing a euro compatible national bank statute to prepare for a future euro adoption" or simply an "ERM2-entry referendum". Danish Expert (talk) 20:54, 5 September 2015 (UTC)
 * Actually I don't think what you're writing is correct. First, the protocol on Denmark says two things: (1) That "(...) Denmark shall have an exemption. The effect of the exemption shall be that all Articles and provisions of the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB referring to a derogation shall be applicable to Denmark." In other words, Denmark has a derogation just like Sweden and the other non-euro member states. Neither more nor less. (2) "the procedure referred to in Article 140 shall only be initiated at the request of Denmark." So, the only difference between Sweden and Denmark is that Sweden is regularly evaluated in the evaluations of the fulfillment of the convergence criteria, while Denmark is not (UK on the other hand has a much more extensive opt-out). Of course this causes several indirect consequences, e.g. Denmark is allowed to remain outside the eurozone even if it fulfills all the convergence criteria, since the Commission/ECB cannot evaluate Denmark's fulfillment of the criteria without a request of the Danish government. I repeat: The only difference between the derogations of Denmark and Sweden is the procedure through which the derogation is abrogated.
 * Second, you are actually wrong regarding your claim that the accession treaties prohibit post-2000 member states from applying for "opt-outs". There are no limitations at all what treaty amendments a member state can propose, see article 48 TEU. Just as any other treaty, the accession treaties can be amended or even repealed (the proposed European Constitution is a concrete example of this). There is nothing that prevents a member state from requesting opt-outs, and actually several countries have had discussions on this (Sweden, Poland, Czech Republic among others).
 * Third, I agree with you that the intention of the treaties is that all member states shall adopt the euro. However, just because the intention of the treaties is that the non-euro member states are only temporarily outside the eurozone, does not mean that there are legal obligations forcing the member states to adopt the euro. I repeat what I said before: There are no legal obligations that force a member state to fulfill the convergence criteria. Hence, it is completely optional for a member state to adopt the euro (even though this is not the intention of the treaty texts of course). The reason why Denmark has a special protocols is mainly to clarify its position for political reasons. The only real effect of Denmark's protocol, compared to the legal situation for Sweden, is that Denmark's fulfillment of the convergence criteria is not regularly evaluated by the Commission/ECB. --Glentamara (talk) 07:59, 6 September 2015 (UTC)
 * If CJEU ever files a case against a member state for "accession treaty" breach, it would not only interpret the literal words of the treaty but also take into account the "intention of the treaty texts". This is why you can not just disregard "intention of the treaty texts" from the equation. I still claim the "derogation states" hereby are bound someday to adopt the euro (at the moment they comply with all convergence criteria), unless the other 27 EU member states accept granting them a special "Protocol exemption optout" (something which need ratification by all member states including Sweden itself to take legal effect). So Sweden as well as other "derogation states", can not just hold a binding referendum on changing their treaty obligations without the prior approving consent of all other contracting states. Once you are part of the EU club, the EU acquis per definition always overrule our national law/legislation or even the outcome of a "national referendum" (if its in contradiction with the EU acquis). If any of the "derogation states" want to hold a legally binding optin/optout euro adoption referendum with a rejecting result being certain to cause implementation of a UK/DK style "protocol exemption for euro adoption", such state would need first ahead of the referendum to negotiate such "protocol exemption" with the 27 other EU members. If such "protocol exemption" has not been negotiated prior of the referendum, this referendum would be limited in scope only to be a "non-binding referendum". If a binding referendum is held with a scope and question on something not being legally possible, it will as far as I know always result in being deemed an illegal referendum. All states are of course always allowed to organize a legally binding optin/optout EU referendum without the prior consent of other EU member states, if they want entirely to exit the club (and hereby also exit their euro adoption obligation).
 * To sum up, I agree with you there are no binding explicit requirements for a "derogation state" to strive towards criteria compliance, but still maintain CJEU could rule existence of a treaty breach against a "derogation state" if it (lets say for 50 years) have done nothing to prepare/strive towards reaching a future criteria compliance and at the same time failed also to negotiate a permanent protocol exemption (optout). I also still maintain, that for Sweden or other "derogation states" to hold a legally binding euro optout referendum, they would need prior of such referendum to negotiate a "protocol exemption" to be approved by each of the 27 other EU member states. If such approval is not granted in advance, the referendum would need to be limited into only being of the non-binding type, because a subsequent "protocol exemption" grant can not be guaranteed. Danish Expert (talk) 09:36, 6 September 2015 (UTC)
 * I agree with most of what you write (regarding the legal effect of the EU acquis etc). However, I don't share your views on referenda. We seem to agree that a member state is obliged to adopt the euro if the Commission/ECB finds that it fulfills the convergence criteria (that's the essence of article 140), while the member states are not legally obliged to actively strive to fulfill the convergence criteria. Hence it is optional for a member state to adopt the euro.
 * I don't believe what you say about referenda. A member state can of course have a legally binding referendum on the euro adoption. Legally binding means that the government has to follow the result. If the people of a member state would vote no to the euro, the government would simply fail to fulfill all the convergence criteria. There is nothing that prevents a government from both fulfilling its treaty obligations and at the same time keep a country outside the eurozone, in accordance with the no result in a legally binding referendum. That is exactly what Sweden and other countries are doing. That the Swedish referendum was non-binding was a result of Swedish legislation (we have never had a legally binding referendum, but they can be arranged if the constitution is changed), and not a result of European legislation. --Glentamara (talk) 10:27, 6 September 2015 (UTC)

"legal obligation to adopt the euro" is just used as shorthand (at least by me) for what I wrote here: "Sweden is obliged under its 1994 Treaty of Accession to join the eurozone once it meets the necessary conditions set out in the Treaty of Maastricht". I completely agree with everything else that you wrote, ie that there is no obligation to actively try to satisfy the criteria, only an obligation to adopt the euro if they ever satisfy the criteria. It is up to Council to decide when to abrogate the derogation, not Sweden. And if Sweden's derogation was abrogated and they failed to convert the krona to the euro, they would be in breach of their treaty obligations.

Article 1 of the accession treaty said "the Kingdom of Sweden hereby become ... Parties to the Treaties on which the Union is founded". That binds them to all the terms and conditions of the EU treaties. I agree that euro adoption is not specifically mentioned in the accession treaty, but I'd still argue that it is the accession treaty which makes all the provisions of the EU treaties binding on them so the wording isn't incorrect. Note that Sweden joined the EU before the euro even existed, so at that point all EU states had a derogation. There was no need for a clause in their accession treaty to specify whether they had a derogation or not.

Of course, none of this prohibits referendums on euro adoption, as DE continues to claim. DE you seem to be being confused by what the outcome of a no binding referendum on euro adoption would mean. It would not mean that the state needs to negotiate a DK/UK style opt-out in the treaties. It's just means that the state would choose not meet the criteria for adopting the euro. This is precisely what happened in the last Swedish referendum. Sweden has very clearly said it will never adopt the euro, unless it is approved in a referendum. Any other state could take the same stance, and nothing in the treaties prohibits it. None of your "analysis" above is either supported by the terms of the treaty or analysis by reliable source. It's just your personal interpretation of international law. Once again, please support your opinions with sources. TDL (talk) 19:34, 6 September 2015 (UTC)
 * I completely agree with everything you write. Of course, it is the accession treaty that makes the EU treaties applicable on Sweden. What I meant was just that your previous formulations gave the impression that it was the accession treaty itself that made Sweden obliged to adopt the euro. It is rather so that the accession treaty makes the TFEU treaty applicable on Sweden, and since the TFEU treaty obliges the member states to adopt the euro (when they fulfill the convergence criteria), Sweden is obliged to join. Legally it doesn't really matter, I was just questioning your formulation.
 * I completely share your views on the meaning of the obligation to join. There is no obligation to fulfill the convergence criteria. But if the Council, based on the evaluationd of the Commission and ECB, founds that the criteria are fulfilled, then a member state is obliged to adopt the euro.
 * I completely agree with your views on the referenda too. There is nothing in the EU treaties that prevents a non-euro member state from holding a referendum. --Glentamara (talk) 19:44, 6 September 2015 (UTC)
 * Yeah I agree it was sloppily written. I've reworded the article to make this clearer.  Let me know what you think.  TDL (talk) 20:10, 6 September 2015 (UTC)
 * Great! --Glentamara (talk) 21:01, 6 September 2015 (UTC)

Eurostat links
The Eurostat links appear to point into limbo.

For HICP, the new link appears to be at "http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=teicp000&language=en"

For interest, it seems to be at "http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=teimf050&plugin=1"

Or are these the wrong tables? Ambi Valent (talk) 08:26, 17 January 2016 (UTC)

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Content changes by Danlaycock under the misleading edit summary "clearer structure"
I oppose the following removal of content and the re-insertion of removed content by User:Danlaycock under a misleading edit summary "clearer structure"

https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Enlargement_of_the_eurozone&diff=800973104&oldid=800429437
 * removal of Euro-accession Instrument
 * removal of NL-dependencies
 * re-insertion of Liechtenstein

It seems s/he just started their edit from the 2017-08-31 version of the article

78.55.127.125 (talk) 13:47, 18 September 2017 (UTC)
 * Yes, I reverted to the last version prior to edits that were made which I did not think were improvements. What was misleading?  You made changes to the structure that made it more convoluted, and I reverted to the clearer structure.  On the other changes you made:


 * The Euro-accession Instrument doesn't yet exist. One mention in a speech really does not make it notable.
 * Listing non-EU member states before EU member states doesn't seem sensible to me. They are two steps removed from joining the eurozone.  The natural order is the degree removal from joining the eurozone.
 * Titles like "Inside the eurozone" do not make sense to me. Enlargement inside the eurozone?  "Historical eurozone enlargements" is much clearer.
 * I've remove Liechtenstein and restored your content on the NL-dependencies. TDL (talk) 04:00, 21 September 2017 (UTC)

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