Talk:Ernest Bevin

Query
anyone want to incorporate the famous quote "we have got to have this thing over here whatever it costs... we have got to have [a] bloody Union Jack on top of it..." ,, , also quoted in the TUBE ALLOYS arricle Pickle 17:43, 22 March 2006 (UTC)

Ernest Bevin and Palestine
It's fairly widely-agreed (even by some of those who are no means enthusiastic supporters of Israel) that he messed up Britain's Palestine policy, partly by allowing free reign to some of his less endearing personality characteristics (which may have served him well in British trade-union politics, but which very conspicuously failed to accomplish anything whatsoever productive or constructive in the realm of mid-east diplomacy). To be brief, he caused many Jews to hate him passionately and intensely with some of his tactless remarks (such as accusing Jews of "jumping the queue"), and by pursuing certain highly controversial policies (such as returning attempted Jewish immigrants to Palestine to European refugee camps) far beyond the point of diminishing political returns -- but without thereby making the Arabs in the slightest degree more cooperative, or any more likely to agree to any compromise of any kind. It's hard to characterize this particular result as anything more than a personal failure on Bevin's part. Furthermore, he gratuitously (pointlessly and unnecessarily) offended and disgusted many politically-active people in America, at a time when the United States was beginning to take a more active role in middle eastern affairs... AnonMoos 00:46, 25 January 2007 (UTC)


 * Some scholars have suggested that his Palestine policy was a 'failure', notably Harris in his biography of Attlee, but not his seminal biographer Bullock. My (soon to be published) research, partly from material unavailable to either of these academics shows why Bevin foresaw the unhappy consequences of creating an apartheid style state of foreigners in Arab land (though he always believed that Palestine would have a special role in the future of the Jewish people). As John Campbell, author of a 1980's biography of Anuerin Bevan (Bevin's pro-Zionist cabinet rival) conceded


 * Admittedly it [Bevin’s Palestine policy] achieved no settlement and led only to ignominious withdrawal, leaving the protagonists to fight it out. Nevertheless from the perspective of the 1980s Bevin’s policy looks to have been based on a much shrewder appreciation of the realities on the ground than Bevan’s


 * To correctly predict the consequences of a course of action decades after ones own death is not failure, but the mark of a great statesman. To refer to it as such is an abuse of language.


 * When you say he 'gratuitously (pointlessly and unnecessarily) offended and disgusted many politically-active people in America' what you mean is he told American's truths about themselves they did not want to hear, such as when he commented on the American determination to open Palestine to Jewish immigration, whilst keeping the doors of the US firmly shut in the following terms
 * I hope I will not be misunderstood in America if I say that this was proposed with the purest motives. They do not want too many Jews in New York.
 * to which the British Ambassador in Washington remarked
 * Your criticism of New York has, of course, not only hit the nail on the head but driven it woundingly deep


 * The importance of periodically telling Americans things they don't want to hear is something the present British leadership would have done well to remember.


 * So your paragraph on Bevin and Palestine is, I submit, a highly subjective point of view, not a reasonable factual piece on Bevin's 'Attitudes' -User:Sirtoyou


 * First off, the mini-political-propaganda-tirade about "stealing Palestine" which you include in your version of the article is far more "subjective" than anything I have ever done in any of my edits to this article. Second, I'll thank you not to arbitrarily mutilate my past comments on this page (as I warned you on your user talk page).


 * Third, the very quotes which you included in your comment above only prove my point for me -- 99% of the time, the role of a diplomat is not to publicly agitate to make his personal political preferences become official government policy, nor to offend people by telling them alleged woundingly deep "truths" which they don't want to hear, but rather to follow the stated policies of his government in smoothing the way for a settlement or agreement which will be at least minimally tolerable to all parties in a dispute. In gratuitously offending many Americans, at a time when United States cooperation was becoming increasingly necessary to arrive at a political agreement for the future of Palestine, Bevin was hardly acting as a wise diplomat.  The same could be said for his remarks and policies which infuriated and inspired wide passionate loathing among Jews, without rendering Arabs any more amenable to a compromise agreement.  Bevin may have succeeded as a political agitator and long-term prophet, but his job wasn't to be a political agitator and long-term prophet, his job was to be a DIPLOMAT, and it's fairly widely agreed that he was an overall FAILURE in his job as diplomat with respect to the Palestine situation.


 * Again, the very quotes which you included above prove this very point: Admittedly it achieved no settlement and led only to ignominious withdrawal, leaving the protagonists to fight it out. At the time, Bevin's JOB, for which he was being paid a salary by His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, was exactly to arrive at such a settlement, and to avoid such fighting.  Therefore he was objectively a failure at the job he was hired to do (a difficult job, certainly, but the point is that he didn't do anything to make it any easier) -- and if he placed personal political agitating above implementing the official policies of the government of which he was a part, then he was accepting his salary from His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland under false pretences.


 * Fourth, your original research in primary sources is not really suitable for inclusion in Wikipedia articles according to Wikipedia policies -- see WP:OR. AnonMoos 14:01, 25 January 2007 (UTC)


 * P.S. I didn't add the header "attitudes", and I agree it may not be the most suitable sub-title (though Palestine is an area where it has been argued that his personal characteristics impacted his job performance).  Also, some might say that if Bevin hadn't done his little bit to pointlessly sour the overall atmosphere, then a settlement between Jews and Arabs could have been more likely -- and if an agreement had been arrived at, then many of the negative long-term consequences which Bevin predicted would possibly have been avoided.  In this case, Bevin's prophecies were largely self-fulfilling prophecies... AnonMoos 17:52, 25 January 2007 (UTC)


 * The article doesn't score very highly on the verifiability front as is. I don't see any references. It's not as if it's especially difficult to find them. Bullock's biography was reprinted recently for example. While it would be a Bad Thing to inject original research, there's no reason why the work which produced the original research should not be used to improve the article. Angus McLellan (Talk) 15:24, 25 January 2007 (UTC)

Well if you, Mr. Moos, read the whole of my dissertation (which you haven't asked for a copy of) you would know that I do suggest that Bevin's Palestine policy did indeed have the potential to undermine his wider policy in respect of, arguably, more important things. His relationship with Truman and Secretary of States' Byrnes and Marshall was strained by his position on Palestine, but they left him no alternative. Nevertheless this clearly wasn't fatal, as the Marshall plan did happen, the US did step into the breach in Greece when the UK could no longer continue, NATO was established and the influence of the Soviet Union was circumscribed.

What you fail to appreciate is that the Foreign Secretary is not simply a diplomat, but the author national of strategy (particularly when supported by the Prime Minister; which he was). Both Bevin and Attlee correctly foresaw where the creation of a Zionist citadel on Arab land would lead. Both Bevin and Attlee were further infuriated by Truman's repeated attempts to bounce them into accepting mass Jewish immigration into Palestine. There exists in the UK's national archive a telegram of the most perfect understated fury from Attlee (normally the very personification of diplomatic calm) to Truman, sent in response to one of Truman's particularly unhelpful interventions. The US position was intolerable, both because of its hypocrisy, and because of the US refusal to back their rhetoric (however wrong headed) with resources. To wit, if the US really wanted Palestine to accommodate the overwhelming majority of Jewish displaced persons then they really ought to have sent a sufficient military force to suppress the inevitable Arab uprising that would have followed; because Britain was bankrupt and could not do it alone, even if it had wanted to. This is a mark of their perceptiveness as statesmen. Therefore the policy was not a failure, but the least worst course of action available. Add to this the trivial consideration that it was right in principle.

As to the point about no original research, this is a tricky one. Whilst you obviously can't have every whack ball peddling their own theories, there must come a point at which new perspectives are generally held to be accepted as correct, or wiki would still hold that the world is flat. The generally accepted scientific method on this is publication and peer review. As I state on http://www.richardhall.org.uk my dis has been accepted for publication by an academic journal, and therefore one may reasonably infer that its editors believe it to be a valid piece of scholarship. If you would like to verify this please feel free.Sirtoyou 18:18, 27 January 2007 (UTC)


 * The responsibility of the foreign minister is to implement the overall policies set by the cabinet (with many lesser uncontroversial details left to his own personal discretion, of course). If the prime minister was going behind the cabinet's back, and urging the foreign minister not to give high priority to the goals agreed to by the cabinet, then that's interesting information about the labyrinthine political manoeuvrings within the Labour Party during the second half of the 1940's, but I don't see how it serves to place Ernest Bevin in any positive light.  Furthermore, it's rather interesting that what you characterize as the best available course of action which was also "right in principle" was one which lead to the nakba ("Catastrophe").  If the best available course of action which was also "right in principle" led to a catastrophe and 70 years of strife, then I'd really like to see what the outcome of a so-called "bad" or "unprincipled" decision would have been!!


 * Bevin's overall actions may have had the ephemeral and transient result that certain Arab states continued to look more to Britain (rather than to the U.S. or Soviet Union) for a little while (until Suez 1956 put an abrupt end to most of that), but his actions conspicuously failed to accomplish any positive or constructive results whatsoever in Palestine, and to the extent that this article glosses over the fact, the article is dishonest by omission.


 * Truman had political pressures and constraints on his own actions, the same as the British government, and his main proposal was a one-off one-time immediate migration of 100,000 Jewish refugees from European displaced person camps to Palestine, without thereby creating future entitlements or pre-determining the outcome of future political negotiations on Palestine. That would have had several possible benefits -- it would have relieved the humanitarian situation in European displaced person camps, cleared the air of much of the ill-will dating back to British decisions of the 1930's (and only exacerbated by Bevin's tactless remarks and reckless policies), and gained much support in the United States.  And it could hardly have made the Arabs any more intransigent, dogmatically inflexible, and absolute in their refusal to seriously negotiate than they already were -- and it could have taught the Arabs a salutary lesson, namely that maintaining an immobile static rigidly-inflexible absolutist maximalist position and refusing to negotiate would not in fact always bring further British appeasement concessions (which was the main lesson that the Arabs had brought away from the 1930's).


 * However, most of the above comments of mine and yours are really just bantering; here are my actual main objections to your edits of the article: AnonMoos 17:23, 30 January 2007 (UTC)

Objections to Sirtoyou's edits
1) Sirtoyou's edits gloss over the obvious fact that Bevin was an objective failure in not achieving the UK government's publicly-stated goals of arriving at a political settlement in Palestine and avoiding major Arab-Jewish fighting there. (Whether or not these were also Bevin's personal goals doesn't change the aforementioned fact.)

2) Sirtoyou's edits ignore the conspicuous fact that by his gratuitously tactless remarks and obstinacy in sticking to unproductive high-negative-publicity policies (things which he no doubt saw as West-country bluntness and steely resolve, but which many others saw as at best surly boorish churlishness, and at worst as motivated by racist bigotry), Bevin offended and alienated many of those whose support and goodwill could have facilitated Palestine political negotiations. AnonMoos 17:23, 30 January 2007 (UTC)

Further general comment
Feel free to add any valid relevant information about Bevin's attitudes and motivations (which throws light on why he did what he did), but please do not remove well-founded information about his failure to achieve the publicly-stated diplomatic goals of the British government, and the widespread negative reactions of many at the time to certain of his statements and actions -- statements and actions which appear to have made it even more difficult to achieve the publicly-stated diplomatic goals of the British government. Of course, not everybody had a negative reaction, so if you have information on positive reactions, you could add that as well (without removing information on negative reactions). AnonMoos 09:36, 10 February 2007 (UTC)

Bevin's failure in Palestine
He failed to achieve just about all of the British government's publicly-stated policy goals in Palestine (it's hard to think of one he did manage to attain). Of course, a person would not ordinarily be called a "failure" for not accomplishing an impossible task -- but Bevin gratuitously chose to make his task (however difficult it may have been to start with) even more difficult than it needed to be, so the label sticks. AnonMoos 22:16, 14 March 2007 (UTC)
 * I don't think anyone would dispute that it was a failure. Do you think the phrasing "he opposed the plans of the Zionist movement to create a Jewish state" may imply that the Zionist movement was alone - as you probably know, at that time the creation of Israel was supported by many states/organizations (notably the US & USSR), for various reasons. ←Humus sapiens ну? 00:26, 15 March 2007 (UTC)


 * AnonMoos: Your statement ("One of Bevin's prominent failures was in the British Mandated Territory of Palestine, where he opposed the plans of the Zionist movement to create a Jewish state") implies that Britain's failure in Palestine rests solely or mostly on Bevin shoulders, when historians argue that the foundations of Britain's failure were laid decades earlier.  You yourself have stated that "a person would not ordinarily be called a "failure" for not accomplishing an impossible task," and you are right.  The article on Louis Mountbatten, 1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma, the last Viceroy of India, does not blame Mountbatten for the "failure" of British policies or even the unbelievably violent Partition of India. --(Ptah, the El Daoud 18:05, 14 May 2007 (UTC))


 * There was (and is) a fairly widespread perception that Bevin took on an (admittedly) tough job, and gratuitously and pointlessly made it even tougher by repeatedly making ill-chosen abrasive remarks and insisting on sticking with high-negative-publicity policies far past their point of diminishing political returns. Furthermore, Mountbatten's Viceroyalty had a lot of fiascos, but he more or less achieved the main goal he was originally sent out to do -- namely, give British India independence -- while it's hard to enumerate one single publicly-stated British government policy goal which Bevin managed to achieve in Palestine.  And in the Louis Mountbatten, 1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma article there ARE in fact statements about his "foreseeing vast disruption and loss of life and not wanting this to occur on the British watch, but thereby actually causing it to occur" and "a particularly harsh critic of Mountbatten in this regard...The horrific casualties of the partition of the Punjab" etc. AnonMoos 03:01, 15 May 2007 (UTC)


 * Furthermore, you attempt to equate opposition to Zionism with failure by merely stating "...he opposed the plans of the Zionist movement to create a Jewish state"--as opposed to "he opposed the plans of the Zionist movement to create a Jewish state, and supported the creation of an independent Palestine." The sentence that I proposed is a simple substitution: "Bevin opposed the plans of the Zionist movement to create a Jewish state in the British Mandated Territory of Palestine." It avoids both editorializing and pro-Zionist/pro-Palestinian politics; it also leaves plenty of room for the body of the sub-section to illustrate how this opposition was ultimately ineffective. --(Ptah, the El Daoud 18:05, 14 May 2007 (UTC))


 * Please don't put words into my mouth!!!! I was not actually the one who first united those two clauses into a sentence, and the sentence doesn't necessarily imply any logical connection between the two clauses (I have no objection to breaking it up into two separate sentences).  Bevin was not a failure because of any political position that he took, but rather because he conspicuously failed to achieve any single one of the British government's publicly-stated policy goals for Palestine (and even seemed to go out of his way to take actions which made it even more difficult than it already otherwise might have been to achieve the British government's publicly-stated policy goals for Palestine).  I object to your substitute because it obscures or whitewashes over the fact that Bevin conspicuously failed to achieve any single one of the British government's publicly-stated policy goals for Palestine. AnonMoos 03:01, 15 May 2007 (UTC)


 * Fair enough. What do you think of my new proposal? --(Ptah, the El Daoud 03:56, 17 May 2007 (UTC))

The issue in a nutshell
If as a result of his tactless boorish remarks ("queue-jumping" etc.) Bevin had managed to get the Arabs to agree to a compromise plan, then he would be remembered today as a brilliant manoeuvering diplomatic strategist. However, since instead the result was that he caused many Jews to intensely hate him, and offended many Americans, without thereby making the Arabs at all more likely to assent to any proposal which included any element of Jewish sovereignty whatsoever, therefore he is now largely remembered as an overall failure who took an already-screwed up Middle East situation, and gratuitously screwed it up even further through his inability to restrain some of his less endearing personality characteristics. AnonMoos 04:07, 3 July 2007 (UTC)


 * This is editorializing. Even if Bevin had acted like the proper English gentleman who led his party, he would have been hated by Zionists of all backgrounds (be they judged by nationality, race and/or religion) because of his fundamental political stance on the issue.  The Foreign Office (let alone the ruling Labour Party) was split on the issue, and there is every reason to believe that a Zionist Labour representative would have riled as many feathers by positively infuriating the (already furious) Palestinians (as well as the neighboring Arab states).  Did Bevin fail at his mission? Yes.  Is there any reason to believe that a polite Zionist or a two-stater with genuine sympathy for both sides of the mother of all arguments would have succeeded where Bevin failed? No.  Consequently, while we should recognize that Bevin failed at his mission, and we should recognize that he was dangerously divisive, we should not pretend that his failure is the sole defining element of his career.  Historians who specialize in Labour politics or even British politics in the first half of the last century will argue that Bevin played a vital role in the establishment of the Labour party as a vibrant political force.  --(Ptah, the El Daoud 05:04, 3 July 2007 (UTC))


 * Another person might not have succeeded, but another person might not have gratuitously pointlessly and unnecessarily inflamed the situation by his undiplomatic behavior, either. You can call it "editorializing", but it has a lot to do with why his name is execrated in circles where the internal history of the British Labour Party is not of much interest. AnonMoos 06:09, 3 July 2007 (UTC)

Where do you think that his name is 'execrated'? Certainly not in Britain, where he is considered by both historians and more general commentators as a statesman and one of the greatest Foreign Secretaries that the country has ever had. There is a celebrated three volume biography by Alan Bullock, considered to be one of the best pieces of modern historical writing. If you read that, you will find that Bevin was an outstanding trade union leader, the 'Docker's Q.C.' (after a high profile court case in which he argued the claims of the dock workers for a living wage) and the founder of the Transport and General Workers Union. He was a far sighted man, who grasped the importance of Keynsian economics before many economists, and gave evidence to the Macmillan Committee on Finance and Industry. Bevin, more than anyone else, organised the British economy for total war, and can be regarded as one of the architects of victory. As Foreign Secretary, Bevin was responsible for helping to bring about Marshall Aid, for helping to set up Nato, for helping to defuse the problems of postwar Europe. For that alone, he deserves to be remembered. Yes, he was blunt. Yes, he did not suffer fools gladly. Yes, he told people things that they did not want to hear. So why has this article been hijacked, to some extent, by American zionists with an axe to grind?--Train guard (talk) 14:54, 28 November 2007 (UTC)


 * He may have been a very fine political trade-union organizer within the British Labor party, but he was was an overwhelming objective failure as a diplomat in middle-eastern affairs (considering that he ignominiously failed to achieve any single one of the British government's publicly-stated goals in that region), and he was widely "execrated" at the time by a very large number of Jews (in Palestine and elsewhere), and by many Americans who had an interest in the region at the time -- and he continues to be execrated by those who did not find his brutal tactlessness or surly boorish churlishness to be endearing, and who remember (or have been told by those who remember) how his failures negatively impacted on them or their families. AnonMoos (talk) 21:24, 28 November 2007 (UTC)

But this is an encyclopeadia article about Ernest Bevin....and a very poor one at that. You simply cannot concentrate upon one issue to the exclusion of anything else. Look, the majority of British historians (and people who are aware of him) couldn't really give a toss about what Americans thought of him at the time, or what some Zionists think of him, except in passing. This is not an article about Bevin and Palestine. Please stop treating it as if it was.--Train guard (talk) 11:15, 29 November 2007 (UTC)


 * sofixit. As for AnonMoos, the comment above is difficult to square with WP:NPOV and can be ignored. Anyway, here's some of the great heap of published material *about* Bevin. Anyone who cared to do the necessary research could write a quality article on Bevin which didn't give undue weight to any part of his career or any single viewpoint. Have fun, Angus McLellan (Talk) 12:45, 29 November 2007 (UTC)


 * Whatever -- my comments directly above could not be incorporated into the article in that particular form (and I was not proposing that they be incorporated into the article in that particular form), but nevertheless they are a basically factual explanation of why it is that Bevin's memory is far from being universally venerated (and it's an objective fact that his memory IS far from being universally venerated). We can discuss his trade union and internal labor party successes in the sections devoted to those aspects of his career, and can discuss his middle-eastern diplomacy failures in the section devoted to that particular aspect of his career, without any necessary conflict between the two. AnonMoos (talk) 00:20, 30 November 2007 (UTC)

And his foreign policy successes? If I, and others, expand these sections, will you and your friends leave well enough alone? (I also propose to add material from Bullock to the section dealing with Palestine.)--Train guard (talk) 11:36, 30 November 2007 (UTC)

Minor point/correction
I edited the paragraph 'Bevin was undeniably a plain-spoken man, some of whose remarks struck many as insensitive, but his biographer Alan Bullock rejects suggestions that he was motivated by personal anti-Semitism. The historian Howard Sachar cites a source which suggests otherwise. Sachar quotes a remark by Richard Grossman, a Labour Party MP and a member of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry into the Problems of European Jewry and Palestine, who met Bevin on 4 August 1947. Sachar claims that Grossman described Bevin's outlook as:

"corresponding roughly with the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a notorious anti-Semitic canard of the 1920s[6]. The main points of Bevin's discourse were ... that the Jews had successfully organised a worldwide conspiracy against Britain and against him personally."[7]' last night to include a comment that the references to [Richard] Grossman should be replaced by references to [Richard] Crossman. This edit was deleted without the suggested changes being made. There was no Labout MP Richard Grossman in 1947. I have checked lists of members of parliament published in Whitakers Almanac for for 1946 (the first year after the 1945 general election) and for 1950 (the last publication before the 1950 general election). In addition I have checked against the possibility that someone of this name entered parliament at a by-election after 1946 and left before 1950 on the page "List of United Kingdom by-elections (1931–1950)". The fact that additional material in footnote 7 ascribes very similar sentiments to Richard Crossman, and that Richard Crossman fits the description given exactly, suggests that Grossman is just a mis-typing of Crossman. I don't know whether such a mis-typing arose in Howard Sachar's work or in the writing of this Wikipedia page. However it arose, I do think that it could usefully be corrected, and therefore I am disappointed that this was not done when the error had been highlighted. Martin Lunnon —Preceding unsigned comment added by 91.125.99.127 (talk) 20:48, 23 February 2010 (UTC)
 * You're probably right in that this is just a typographical error. The Wikipedia way is to just make the correction on the main page yourself (you could mark this one as a 'minor' edit by ticking the box at the bottom).  Politely noting the reasons for your change on this page (as you have done) is also a good idea.  In Wikipedia every user is an editor and you don't have to ask permission before diving in.Blakkandekka (talk) 10:28, 24 February 2010 (UTC)

Palmach??
Who put the text in this article about the Palmach? It was NOT an American Zionist organisation, as the text implied, but a military unit of the Haganah.Scott Adler 23:13, 3 July 2007 (UTC)

Request details of the Mandate Collapse: Who gave the orders?
1. Has it been established who in the British government allowed al-Kaukji's army into Palestine in February, 1948? 2. Who was responsible for the transfer of the Arab Legion to "Transjordanian" control, with its British personnel infrastructure in place? Was the Imperial General Staff still in control during the Battle of Latrun? 3. Who ordered the RAF to intervene in unmarked aircraft in the later stages of the war? 4. Who was responsibile for isolatint UN representatives and preventing them from doing their jobs? 5. Who ordered "Operation Chaos" -- the British government's policy of shutting down the mandate by ripping out phones, burning files, and doing whatever it could to prevent an orderly transfer of power to any successor state?

Was Bevin responsible for any of this? And does Bevin share any blame for the Indian partition disaster?

When I have time, I'll add some text regarding the amusing behavior of UK diplomats at the UN following the withdrawal. It demonstrated remarkably childish stubbornness. Scott Adler 00:39, 3 July 2007 (UTC)

"His policies inspired resentment and violence from both Arabs and Jews"
Don't want to monotonously harp on a single theme, but the recent edit of an anonymous IP, boiling down all references to Bevin's quasi-inflammatory remarks (and their effects) to the clause "his policies inspired resentment and violence from both Arabs and Jews", is completely inadequate. Arabs were of course disappointed that Britain didn't side with the Arabs against the Jews outright -- but many Arabs were in fact moderately or guardedly satisfied with the general trend of British Palestine policy under Bevin, while many Jews had feelings of resentment and even rage.

In 1946-47, Jewish leaders didn't necessarily insist that the problems of Jewish displaced persons in Europe were worse than other problems of displaced persons (whatever the word "worse" would even mean in such a context), but they did insist that the problem of Jewish displaced persons had certain very special and unique features, and that the Jewish displaced persons had some needs (beyond food, clothing, and shelter) that had to be dealt with almost immediately (and which couldn't wait for the slow negotiation of the Ultimate Grand Diplomatic Settlement of All European Problems and/or the Ultimate Grand Diplomatic Settlement of All Middle-Eastern Problems). If staying "in the queue" meant that the special problems of the Jewish situation would not be recognized, and that urgent needs of Jewish refugees would not be dealt with, then Jewish leaders were not willing to wait in the queue, and they were not in the slightest degree ashamed or embarrassed about not being willing to wait in the queue -- and many Jews became grimly determined to make Britain pay as high a price as possible for Bevin's attempts to make them wait in the queue (something which did not lay a foundation of goodwill for the success of British middle-eastern policies). AnonMoos (talk) 08:45, 8 July 2008 (UTC)

Bevin, Palestine and Israel - British policy objectives
AnonMoos, please provide reliable sources if you want to keep the sentence: Bevin failed to secure the stated British objectives in this area of foreign policy. When somebody's bluff is called, it means that, when challenged, they fail to carry out a threat. In this case, Bevin threatened, then did, hand the problem of Palestine to the UN to solve. -- ZScarpia (talk) 00:14, 17 March 2010 (UTC)


 * The stated British policy objectives were a peaceful settlement of the situation, above all avoiding involuntary population transfers and anything that could be considered a religious war. It's hard to think of one single publicly-stated significant British policy objective which Bevin did manage to achieve in Palestine itself; the most that can be said is that he managed to salvage some of Britain's influence and alliances with Arabs elsewhere from the unmitigated Palestine fiasco (until Suez 1956 later blew much of that away, of course). It says something similar further down in the article: "the very opposite of what Bevin seems to have wanted" etc.  Furthermore, I only inserted the "call bluff" wording as a desperation maneuver to insert some kind of finite verb in a sentence which is somewhat incomprehensible without one.  Feel free to reword it -- as long as what results is not an incomprehensible sentence lacking punctuation, and not having any finite verb present until four clauses and over 25 words in... AnonMoos (talk) 05:47, 17 March 2010 (UTC)
 * I'll change the latter sentence, but you've managed to transform its meaning to the complete opposite of what it should mean: the source actually says that Bevin "called the bluff" of the other parties. The rules say that sources should be provided when statements are likely to be challenged, meaning that, if they are challenged, which they are likely to be if they are not clearly true or non-controversial, they can be justified. If you want to keep the text about Bevin failing to secure the stated British objectives, then please provide a source stating that or, failing that, a sources listing the stated British objectives.     -- ZScarpia (talk) 11:30, 17 March 2010 (UTC)
 * On second thoughts, maybe there was some mutual bluff calling going on. My dictionary's definition of calling someone's bluff is: to expose or challenge someone's show of strength, confidence, etc.. It would be correct to say that the Jewish representatives, at least, were "challenging" Bevin's "show of strength" (the Arab representatives didn't care whether Bevin carried out his threat or not).  -- ZScarpia (talk) 12:54, 17 March 2010 (UTC)

Avi Shlaim - The Debate about 1948
In The Debate About 1948 chapter of The Israel/Palestine Question (edited by Ilan Pappé), Avi Shlaim writes about the differences between the new and old history accounts of the events of 1948, including the role of Ernest Bevin and British policy:

"Zionist historiography, reflecting the suspicions of Zionist leaders at that time, is laden with charges of hostile plots that are alleged to have been hatched against the Yishuv during the twilight of British rule in Palestine. The central charge is that Britain armed and secretly encouraged her Arab allies, and especially her client, King Abdullah of Jordan, to invade Palestine upon expiry of the British Mandate and do battle with the Jewish state as soon as it came into the world. For Ernest Bevin, the foreign secretary in the Labour government headed by Clement Attlee, is reserved the role of chief villain in this alleged conspiracy."

"The key to British policy during this period is summed up by Pappé in two words: Greater Transjordan. Bevin felt that if Palestine had to be partitioned, the Arab area could not be left to stand on its own but should be united with Transjordan. A Greater Transjordan would compensate Britain for the loss of bases in Palestine. Hostility to Hajj Amin al-Husayni, who had cast his lot with the Nazis during World War II, and hostility to a Palestinian state, which in British eyes was always equated with a Mufti state, were important and constant features of British policy after the war. By February 1948, Bevin and his Foreign Office advisers were pragmatically reconciled to the inevitable emergence of the Jewish state. What they were not reconciled to was the emergence of a Palestinian state."

"The policy of Greater Transjordan implied discreet support for a bid by Abdullah ... to enlarge his kingdom by taking over the West Bank. At a secret meeting in London on 7 February 1948, Bevin gave Tawfiq Abul Huda, Jordan’s prime minister, the green light to send the Arab Legion into Palestine immediately following the departure of the British forces. But Bevin also warned Jordan not to invade the area allocated by the UN to the Jews. An attack on Jewish state territory, he said, would compel Britain to withdraw her subsidy and officers from the Arab Legion. Far from being driven by blind anti-Semitic prejudice to unleash the Arab Legion against the Jews, Bevin in fact urged restraint on the Arabs in general and on Jordan in particular."

"If Bevin was guilty of conspiring to unleash the Arab Legion, his target was not the Jews but the Palestinians. The prospect of a Palestinian state was pretty remote in any case because the Palestinians themselves had done so little to build it. But by supporting Abdullah’s bid to capture the Arab part of Palestine adjacent to his kingdom, Bevin indirectly helped to ensure that the Palestinian state envisaged in the UN partition plan would be stillborn. In short, if there is a case to be made against Bevin, it is not that he tried to abort the birth of the Jewish state but that he endorsed the understanding between King Abdullah and the Jewish Agency to partition Palestine between themselves and leave the Palestinians out in the cold."

"The Zionist charge that Bevin deliberately instigated hostilities in Palestine and gave encouragement and arms to the Arabs to crush the infant Jewish state thus represents almost the exact opposite of the historical truth as it emerges from the British, Arab, and Israeli documents. The charge is without substance and may be safely discarded as the first in the series of myths that have come to surround the founding of the State of Israel."

   ←   ZScarpia  00:34, 23 April 2010 (UTC)


 * Not sure why there's such emphasis on 1948, when Bevin actually did most of his damage before 1948. What happened in 1948 was pretty much paying the piper for his multitudinous pre-1948 failures... AnonMoos (talk) 00:57, 23 April 2010 (UTC)


 * P.S. In any case, a rather large number of Palestinian Arabs in early 1948 thought that Palestine would naturally be annexed by whichever Arab state managed to play the leading role in throwing the Jews into the sea during the upcoming battles, and many of them were not too upset by the idea, viewing it as another step on the way to the goal of pan-Arab unification.  The main individuals who were strongly attached to the idea of a separate Palestinian Arab state were a relatively small group of personally ambitious "notables" (of whom Nazi collaborator Haj Amin al-Husseini was the most prominent figure), who had shown a lot more talent for self-seeking political intrigues than for any of the hard work involved in constructively building a nation. As far as I can tell, most of the material in your quote refers to Bevin simply choosing not to put the weight of British support behind the Husseini faction -- and considering the history of the preceding dozen years (from Husseini being one of the leading figures behind the 1936 revolt against the British in Palestine, to his more recent meeting with Adolf Hitler) I don't really see any compelling reason why Bevin should have chosen to go out on a limb in supporting Husseini at that point.  If the British had simply refrained from appointing Husseini as Mufti of Jerusalem in 1921, then history might have turned out a lot better for all sides... AnonMoos (talk) 11:21, 24 April 2010 (UTC)

Portsmouth Treaty
Mohommed Fadhel Jamali wrote in Arab Struggle, Experiences of Mohammed Fadhel Jamali, published in 1974, that at a meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Saleh Jabr, Nuri Sa’id and Jamali a week after the signing ceremony for the Portsmouth Treaty:

"Mr Bevin opened the discussion saying, “We have decided to leave Palestine. What you want us to do now?” Nuri Sa'id answered, 'we want you to hasten in terminating the Mandate and to do it immediately if possible.”  Mr Creech-Jones answered that the military authorities agreed that there should not be a long period between terminating the Mandate and the complete withdrawal of the British army, for ending the civil administration would have a direct effect on the plans for the military withdrawal.  Mr Bevin added, 'It seems that this is the only point on which you are in agreement with the Zionists, for they also want us to terminate the Mandate quickly and withdraw. We will do our best to terminate the Mandate and withdraw in the shortest possible time.'  Nuri as-Sa’id suggested that the military should be asked to review their program and quicken their withdrawal.  I intervened and asked, 'Is it true that the process of withdrawal will be delayed on account of the season for exporting oranges from Palestine?'   Mr Creech-Jones answered, 'The press has written a good deal on this subject, but it is not correct. Exporting oranges has absolutely nothing to do with the plan for withdrawal.' Nuri as-Sa’id raised the problem of control of petroleum. He did not want it to pass to the Zionist so that they could fight the Arabs. Mr Creech-Jones said, 'Control of petroleum is under consideration. I told the representatives of the oil companies to inform their American counterparts to be frank with President Truman about the difficulties which the oil companies face as a result of American policy in Palestine. I was told by them that this week the American oil companies in the Arab world approached both President Truman and General Marshall, Secretary of State, and informed them a bout the critical situation of the oil companies in the Arab world and the unreadiness of the Arabs to take any new steps in expanding their oil projects so long as the situation in Palestine end the Arab world remains as it is. I proposed to the representatives of the Ministry of Fuel that they under take a similar move to make the Americans understand.'"

"Then we dealt with the military aspects and we stated that Iraq alone, mobilizing the Palestinians for self-defence, would undertake to save Palestine. It was agreed that Iraq would buy for the Iraqi police force 50,000 tommy-guns. We intended to hand them over to the Palestine army volunteers for self-defence. Great British was ready to provide the Iraqi army with arms and ammunition as set forth in a list prepared by the Iraqi General Staff. The British undertook to withdraw from Palestine gradually, so that Arab forces could enter every area evacuated by the British in order that the whole of Palestine should be in Arab bands after the British withdrawal. The meeting ended and we were all optimistic about the future of Palestine. While still in London Saleh Jabr thought of purchasing some German torpedo boats that were for sale in Belgium. They were small, swift boats which he thought would protect the shores of Palestine and prevent any support coming to the Zionists from outside. The Treaty of Portsmouth, which was neither seen nor read by 99% of those who attacked it, was intended to be a pattern of cooperation between Britain and the Arab states It was hoped that other Arab states like Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Egypt would join a defence agreement with the West so that the West could guarantee that Communism and Soviet influence would not penetrate the Middle East. However, it seems that this policy became known to the Zionists who considered Bevin as a bitter opponent. They cooperated with the Communists in Iraq and exploited the sentiments of some Iraqi nationalists to organize al-wathbeh, a sanguinary uprising against the Treaty. Iraqi public opinion was mobilized not only against the Portsmouth Treaty but against any defensive cooperation whatever its nature with the West."

"The result was that the Portsmouth Treaty was abandoned, and the Iraqi Cabinet which signed it had to resign after the sanguinary events in Baghdad. Mr Bevin's whole defence system against Communism in the Middle East fell to pieces. Mr Bevin himself lost his political battle inside the British Cabinet. He was overcome by the supporters of Zionism who were quite strong in the Labour Cabinet and in the British Parliament. The sanguinary disturbances in Baghdad, the resignation of Saleh Jabr's Cabinet, and the abandonment of the Portsmouth Treaty, all led to the defeat of Mr Bevin's policy, which was intended to gain Arab friend ship and to guarantee security in the Middle East. After the rejection of the Portsmouth Treaty by the succeeding Iraqi Cabinet, Iraq did not get the arms which were intended to save Palestine. This reversal was capped, when the British army was leaving Palestine, by a British General who handed over guns and tanks to the Zionists so that they could fight the Arabs. This was done, as the General is reported to have said, 'to defend the honour of Britain' which had been tarnished by Mr Bevin. There is no doubt that thoughtful Arabs today regret the losses and sacrifices in Baghdad caused by the signing of the Portsmouth Treaty, especially since world strategy has been fundamentally changed by modern arms, so that military bases, treaties and alliances do not carry the same significance that they carried when the Portsmouth Treaty was signed. Regret for the sanguinary events in Baghdad connected with the Portsmouth Treaty is increased when one realizes that they were probably the immediate cause of the Arab defeat in Palestine. It can be clearly seen then, that the Arabs did not utilize the strategic position of their lands in order to win the Palestine case."

From The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948 by Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim (Cambridge Middle East Studies):

p. 131 (December 1947) - "Nuri al-Sa'id, who was sent to Cairo at the behest of the British to exercise a moderating influence on Jabr, backed him instead and criticized the other Arab states for doing so little to help the Palestinians. ... The other Arab states, more cautious in their public approach and unwilling to commit themselves to radical economic sanctions or to military action, found themselves outflanked by Iraq. ... Instead, they agreed merely to increase financial aid and small arms supplies to the Palestinian Arabs and to the rapidly forming Arab volunteer forces."

p. 132 - "Despite the Iraqi government’s rhetoric and despite their reiteration of Iraq’s right to act unilaterally in defense of the Palestinians, neither on the economic nor the military fronts did Iraq take any initiative that might have had irreversible consequences. Nor was the government of Salih Jabr at all eager for a confrontation with Great Britain at a time when he was trying to negotiate a revised Anglo-Iraqi Treaty which he believed would be to Iraq’s advantage – and would enhance his own political standing. Consequently, whilst the public, symbolic face of the Iraqi state corresponded to the most pan-Arab interpretation of its obligations, other important aspects of that state were making themselves felt with greater weight. Nuri and Jabr had linked Zionism with communism to prevent their domestic critics from using the Palestine question and its anti-imperialist overtones to mobilize opposition to their regime. This had been accompanied by a repressive campaign designed to disrupt the organization of the ICP and to throw into confusion their many fellowtravellers. In this respect, they sought to insulate the Iraqi state as hierarchy and structured inequality from the radicalizing effect of campaigns in support of Palestine. This identification was easier to make once the Soviet Union had come out in support of the partition of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state. ... At the same time that Jabr was advocating the intervention of all the Arab armies, if the partition plan were implemented, he was privately telling British officials that he was in favor of cooperating with 'Abdullah in the take-over of Palestine."

p. 133 - "The Transjordanian and the Iraqi governments were as one in their refusal to allow al-Husayni to play any part in the deliberations of the Arab League and, partly as a result, the League failed to decide on a future Arab government of Palestine when it met in Cairo in December 1947."

p. 133 - "Nuri al-Sa'id had by this stage become convinced that the British were unwilling to countenance the take-over of the whole of Palestine by the armed forces of Iraq and Transjordan, as he had once hoped. Furthermore, he saw little chance that the Arab states, individually or collectively, could deflect the United States from its chosen course of supporting the partition of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state. He seemed therefore to accept that partition would take place and put his energies into trying to persuade the British to withdraw sooner than planned in order to deprive the Zionist forces of the advantages they enjoyed in the developing civil war. He also tried to convince the British of the need to send increased military supplies to Iraq, within the context of the renegotiated Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Nuri’s efforts were unsuccessful, but it was the question of the treaty, embodying the British connection with the Iraqi state, which was the major preoccupation of Salih Jabr’s government, overshadowing the question of Palestine."

p. 133 - "However, there was a convergence of British and Iraqi thinking on Palestine. In December 1947, Jabr and Nuri visited Amman on their way back from London and told King 'Abdullah that Great Britain not only favored partition, but was also in favor of Transjordan taking over the Arab areas of Palestine. They also pledged Iraqi support for such a move."

p. 134 - "It was at this point, however, that the Iraqi government’s attempt to renegotiate Iraq’s relations with Great Britain came to a violent and abrupt end in the events known as al-Wathba [the leap] which brought down Jabr’s government. In January 1948 most Iraqis learnt, to their surprise, that their government had been secretly negotiating a new Anglo- Iraqi treaty, the terms of which became known publicly only with its signature at Portsmouth in January 1948. Great Britain was to withdraw all its forces from Iraq and hand over the RAF’s two air bases to Iraqi control. However, a joint defense board of British and Iraqi officials would oversee Iraq’s military planning, Great Britain would remain Iraq’s principal military supplier and would be allowed to take over the air bases again in time of war. Furthermore, this treaty would last until 1973, fifteen years beyond the expiry date of the treaty it superseded. The reaction in Iraq was one of outrage, mixed with political opportunism since most of the government were in Great Britain for the signing ceremony. Protest marches and demonstrations erupted on the streets of Baghdad and soon spread to the other cities of Iraq. Although initially organized against the Portsmouth Treaty, the processions and demonstrations were used to protest against many features of the Iraqi political establishment. ... The regent, who had initially supported the Portsmouth Treaty, took fright and now declared that he would refuse to endorse it."

Personally, I get the impression that Mohommed Fadhel Jamali's account was a bit self-serving. Jamali's account is a primary source which, as far as its claim about the intention of the British to withdraw at such a speed as to enable Arabs to control the whole of Palestine is concerned, contradicts itself and is contradicted by reliable secondary sources.(preceeding sentence inserted -   ←   ZScarpia  17:40, 30 April 2010 (UTC))     ←   ZScarpia  03:01, 28 April 2010 (UTC)


 * Could you summarize a little, or indicate what you think the main point of the above long quotes is for the "Ernest Bevin" article? It's widely-known that the British probably wouldn't have withdrawn from Palestine if they hadn't thought that the Arabs would probably win, but I'm not sure that the diplomatic machinations described above had any great impact on historical events. AnonMoos (talk) 13:39, 30 April 2010 (UTC)


 * Currently, the article quotes the following extract from Jamali's account, a primary source, to imply a number of things, including that Britain intended that Palestinian Arabs (apparently) should take over the whole of Palestine on British withdrawal:


 * "It was agreed that Iraq would buy for the Iraqi police force 50,000 tommy-guns. We intended to hand them over to the Palestine army volunteers for self-defence. Great British was ready to provide the Iraqi army with arms and ammunition as set forth in a list prepared by the Iraqi General Staff. The British undertook to withdraw from Palestine gradually, so that Arab forces could enter every area evacuated by the British in order that the whole of Palestine should be in Arab bands after the British withdrawal. The meeting ended and we were all optimistic about the future of Palestine."


 * I have quoted Avi Shlaim as a reliable secondary source to show that, among other things, the British accepted partition, they wanted Transjordan to occupy the part of Palestine proposed for an Arab state (above all they wanted to avoid an independent state under the control of the ex-Mufti) and that they had a treaty obligation to sell arms to the Iraqis. I have quoted a larger section of Jamali's account to highlight its unreliability.
 * Do you have reliable sources to support your statement that, "It's widely-known that the British probably wouldn't have withdrawn from Palestine if they hadn't thought that the Arabs would probably win?"
 *    ←   ZScarpia  18:10, 30 April 2010 (UTC)


 * I think most analysts and observers of the mid-east scene around 62 years ago today were of the opinion that the Arabs would probably win, and I doubt that the British were different. I'm paraphrasing what I read maybe ten years ago, so I don't have references immediately at hand... AnonMoos (talk) 22:21, 30 April 2010 (UTC)


 * P.S. Most of this seems to boil down to the government of the king of Iraq naturally feeling inclined to support his fellow Hashemite dynast in Transjordan, and Bevin feeling disinclined to throw the weight of British support behind Haj Amin al-Husseini (rather naturally, considering that Husseini had led an anti-British revolt in 1936, and gotten in bed with Adolf Hitler in since then).  Some of the remainder makes semi-colorful reading, but I doubt whether it had a great impact on history, or if it calls for any major revisions to the "Ernest Bevin" article. AnonMoos (talk) 20:28, 1 May 2010 (UTC)

Sorry for rather belated reply, but here's a source:

"At the end of December 1947, the [British] Chiefs of Staff had been quite convinced that 'in the long run the Jews would not be able to cope with the Arabs and would be thrown out of Palestine unless they came to terms with them. The Arabs would succeed by guerilla activities.'[Bevin-CIGS interview, December 22, 1947, E12325, FO 371/61583] Cunningham had also initially been of the opinion that the Arabs would prevail... -- Michael J. Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers 1945-48 (1982 ISBN 0691053715), p.311."

The London military men and politicians eventually came to a different understanding in 1948, but all the deliberations which led to the British decision to withdraw happened in 1947, when most of them still thought that the Arabs would win... AnonMoos (talk) 02:30, 16 March 2011 (UTC)

Allegation of anti-Semitism - OR
The text currently suggests that Bevin's opposition to Jewish actions in Palestine was "motivated by personal anti-Semitism" This is based on a quotation from Crossman ("(Bernie) had become convinced that the Jews were organising a world conspiracy against poor old Britain and, in particular, against poor old Ernie"), but IMO it is taken out of context. In context, it reads like this:

"Ernest Bevin felt himself unbearably provoked when the Jews wantonly rejected his solution of their problem. The provocation grew when he discovered that the Russians were exploiting the issue against him and, and even worse, the Americans were ganging up with the Russians. Driven by a frightening mixture of anger and violent self-pity, he became convinced that the Jews were organising a world conspiracy against poor old Britain and, in particular, against poor old Ernie. Of course, there were plenty of sound reasons why any British Foreign Secretary at this time would have been angry with Mr. Truman..."

Thus, Crossman is describing Bevin's emotional reaction to a specific, unusually strained moment in the crisis, in which the two other Great Powers, who were each other's main Cold War rivals, seemed to be be uniting against him. Crossman is not describing Bevin's preliminary opinion about the Jews in general, or some kind of principled, ingrained anti-Semitism that he had always held. It cannot be claimed that his conviction (that the Jews were organising a conspiracy), which is cited here as evidence of anti-Semitism, had "motivated" his position in the Palestinian conflict, because this conviction arose only in a certain critical moment in that conflict, when his overall position had already long been a fact. The tense is not past perfect ("had become"), as in the quote in the text, but past simple ("became").

The significance of this quotation is first exaggerated by Sachar, who compares it to the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion", when he does not even have a direct quotation from Bevin but only a very approximate description of Bevin's alleged feelings by Crossman. Still, judging from the available excerpts, even Sachar does not state directly that Bevin was personally anti-Semitic, and he does not venture to claim that a pre-conceived anti-Semitic bias had motivated Bevin's overall position on the Palestinian conflict from the start. These steps are taken by the Wikipedia editor here - and they constitute Original Research.--91.148.159.4 (talk) 23:01, 1 June 2010 (UTC)


 * Well written. I agree.      ←   ZScarpia  15:39, 27 August 2010 (UTC)
 * yes i agree too. Rjensen (talk) 22:14, 25 September 2015 (UTC)

Quotation from Bullock

 * I'm Sorry, but it's not up to you to determine whether or not what Bullock wrote is "rubbish" - it's a direct quote from a published book about Bevin, published by an academic press, and written by a well respected historian. If you disagree with the statement, you are free (and encouraged!) to find sources that contradict it and use them to incorporate a different point of view into the article.  But the fact that you personally disagree with the statement is not a valid reason for removing it.  I suggest you find a reliable source to back up your position on this point.  Fyddlestix (talk) 15:26, 6 February 2015 (UTC)
 * Again, I have no problem with adding something to the article that questions Bullock's assertion, but you need a source. Even then, Bullocks statement would probably remain. Please consult WP:NPOV.  The article should reflect what reliable sources say, so if you feel the need to take issue with what's there (regardless of your opinion of him, Bullock is a reliable source), then you need to cite some sources of your own.Fyddlestix (talk) 15:48, 6 February 2015 (UTC)
 * Agree with Fyddlestix. Alan Bullock is a well known historian and his attributed opinion is definitely citable.  It matters not at all whether editors agree with it. Zerotalk 22:36, 6 February 2015 (UTC)
 * Scholars cite Bullock as the most important scholarly biography of Bevin--it is cited (says google scholar) in over 1000 scholarly books and articles. It was he who pushed the Americans into the Cold War & the Marshall Plan. Morboso's POV is what rubbish looks like & he does not have support from any RS. Rjensen (talk) 23:28, 6 February 2015 (UTC)
 * Resor says Bullock's book is "the definitive biography and a model political biography; demonstrated the place of Bevin in British history." online Rjensen (talk) 23:36, 6 February 2015 (UTC)

The quote is rather grandiose, but I don't see a problem with it in terms of Britain not being a great power. In 1945, the UK was still more powerful than everyone other than the U.S.A. and Soviet Union, and its second-tier status did not fully become clear until 1956... AnonMoos (talk) 02:18, 7 February 2015 (UTC)


 * The UK's third-tier status was completely apparent when it was forced to give away India in 1947, pull out of Palestine after American pressure, and was completely overruled throughout the Korean War. If Alan Bullock really made that statement then he was obviously too stupid to be considered a real historian. (Morboso (talk) 15:15, 7 February 2015 (UTC))


 * I don't know how we can explain this to you any more clearly than we already have, but trying anyway: We get that you dislike Bullock and don't like the quote. That's fine! But it's not, in itself, a valid reason for removing the quote from the article - you might dislike it, but it seems that there are lots of people out there who do, since I can't find any evidence that it's been discredited, and it has been part of the article for years without anyone else having an issue with it.


 * One individual wikipedia editor doesn't get to decide what historians are right and which ones are wrong, or remove the opinions of those he doesn't like from articles. If you want the quote challenged/removed, then you need to cough up some reliable sources that present a different view. Then we can talk about either reworking the article to acknowledge that some people - ie, other historians - have issues with Bullocks view.


 * Also, you might want to read up on wikipedia's policies about edit warring Fyddlestix (talk) 15:41, 7 February 2015 (UTC)


 * I do not see any policy reasons for removing the quote. TFD (talk) 19:25, 7 February 2015 (UTC)


 * because it's vandalism to remove it. Please read the quote more carefully because it explains why he was the last of a line. Rjensen (talk) 23:03, 7 February 2015 (UTC)
 * The point that Bullock makes is that Bevin played his cards very well, even though it was a much weaker hand. I think other historians agree, Rjensen (talk) 01:46, 9 February 2015 (UTC)

The article already discusses how Britain in the late 1940s and early 1950s expected to continue as a World Power for the foreseeable future, with a huge army and air force, colonies in Africa, client states in the Middle East and military bases in both areas. It was only from the late 1950s/early 1960s that Britain's economic travails really began to be seen as symptomatic of a deeper malaise (the "British disease") rather than merely temporary. Hence (as well as Suez) the reappraisal which began under Macmillan.Paulturtle (talk) 22:51, 20 February 2015 (UTC)

Added some material on the above, as one of the key things to understand about the 1945-55 era is the degree to which Britain was still trying to be the third superpower and going along with, whilst remaining slightly aloof from, US pressure for West European integration. As for the comments above about the Truman Administration "treating Britain with contempt" over Korea, the USA regarded the Pacific as her own sphere even to the point (during WW2) of pulling off Australia as an ally and putting on the pressure for Indian independence (Richard Thorne Allies of a Kind still remains a classic work on this). The US was glad to receive a division or so of Commonwealth troops but did not take kindly to being told what to do in Korea. British hopes for reciprocal US support in Palestine, Iran and Egypt were largely in vain.Paulturtle (talk) 16:26, 8 March 2015 (UTC)

Lend Lease and the Atlantic Charter in 1941 marked the end of the UK being a world power as it surrendered its independence and its empire to the United States. Bullock was a very stupid man and as he was a Labour peer his POV is too obviously biased. The reappraisal of the UK's role in world affairs began under Attlee with the independence of India, Burma, Sri Lanka, Israel, Ireland etc and the evacuation from Greece and Iran. (DelmarAndrews (talk) 17:53, 15 June 2015 (UTC))
 * The quotation that DelmarAndrews repeatedly tries to erase is the considered view of the leading specialist in the field. DelmarAndrews simply misreads the statement: it does not claim that Britain was a great power, it claims that Bevin was a great Foreign Minister who did more with the material at hand than anyone else could achieve. The statement by DelmarAndrews that "Bullock was a very stupid man" is weird--and shows he has not read the book or the reviews. Indeed, DelmarAndrews can't even read the quote accurately. Rjensen (talk) 18:35, 15 June 2015 (UTC)
 * DelmarAndrews is very likely HarveyCarter, I have opened a SPI accordingly. Winner 42 Talk to me!  18:47, 15 June 2015 (UTC)
 * Following whatever the Americans did is hardly being a great foreign secretary. Since the UK was no longer independent in foreign affairs after World War II it didn't really matter what Bevin did. The reduction in the UK's influence and power happened before Bevin became Foreign Secretary. Bullock was a Labour peer so his POV is obviously biased and should not be at the beginning of the article. (DelmarAndrews (talk) 18:56, 15 June 2015 (UTC))
 * All wrong-you really have to do some reading. Historians agree that Bevin was leading the US (as in Greece/ Truman Doctrine/ Marshall Plan/ NATO). Rjensen (talk) 19:00, 15 June 2015 (UTC)
 * The UK had destroyed itself by starting WW2 and followed Washington's line on everything, hence the withdrawal from India and Greece and the closer integration with Europe. (DelmarAndrews (talk) 19:03, 15 June 2015 (UTC))

Picture: Bust of Bevin
Perhaps it's me but IMO the picture showing his bust looks nothing like him at all. Wouldn't be the slightest surprised if it's a mistake. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.31.250.123 (talk) 09:56, 25 September 2015 (UTC)

Jordan
The claim the Israel and Transjordan had reached an agreement not to attack each other is, as far as I can tell, a pet fringe theory promoted by Avi Shlaim, and debunked by multiple other historians (not to mention being clearly false - see Battles of Latrun (1948)). In any case, the statement in the article was not sourced, and I replaced it with a sourced one. It is questionable if any of this even belongs in a biography of Bevin, unless sources are provided to show that he personally participated in the alleged collusion. Bad Dryer (talk) 15:58, 19 October 2015 (UTC)

Bevin in the news (late June 2016)
Isaac Herzog, leader of the Israeli ZU alliance (i.e. old Israel Labor party) compared Jeremy Corbyn to Bevin, saying: "Corbyn represents a consistent stance of hatred toward Israel, like the infamous Ernest Bevin, and like Bevin, who failed, Corbyn will fail, as well." --- AnonMoos (talk) 23:15, 2 July 2016 (UTC)

Quotation is wrong
Eden was just as influential as Bevin during his second term as Foreign Secretary during 1951 to 1955. (2A00:23C4:6392:3C00:CC0E:E611:D9F8:8ABC (talk) 14:06, 1 April 2017 (UTC))
 * The quotation you removed was cited to a reliable source and therefore I have reverted your edit. If you want to add further content providing an alternative viewpoint that is great as long as you can also provide a citation. This is the best way to ensure that wikipedia provides a neutral point of view rather than just removing content you disagree with.&mdash; Rod talk 14:39, 1 April 2017 (UTC)
 * Bullock is not a reliable source - he was a lifelong Labour supporter. (2A00:23C4:6392:3C00:CC0E:E611:D9F8:8ABC (talk) 14:46, 1 April 2017 (UTC))
 * IP user, you need to discuss this matter and stop continually removing the text you find problematic. This is considered edit warring and not permitted; more than 3 reverts in 24 hours can result in your being blocked.  Please see your user talk page for more information. 331dot (talk) 15:08, 1 April 2017 (UTC)
 * Saw this at AN/I. This apparently is longstanding text so I agree that the IP editor needs to justify his removal under BRD. However, on the merits, I think that a summary of the Bullock quote would be preferable to the current block text. I think block text is pretty uncommon for leads. Coretheapple (talk) 15:28, 1 April 2017 (UTC)
 * @2A00: We don't rely merely on Alan Bullock's personal standing as an expert on history – although that is beyond dispute – but on the editorial oversight and publication process of Heinemann, who published the book that is quoted. For that reason your objection on the grounds of Bullock's personal politics carries no weight. I know of no source that places Eden's influence as a Foreign Secretary on the same level as Bevin's, but would be interested in hearing about any that you may have found. Your personal opinion on the matter is worthless, the same as every other editor's. The only opinion we are willing to countenance for article text is that found in a reliable source.
 * aesthetically, I agree that block quotes in a lead are far better avoided, and I commend you on refactoring it into a shorter in-line quote. Well done. --RexxS (talk) 21:57, 1 April 2017 (UTC)

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