Talk:Erwin Rommel/Archive 5

The Rommel myth, v. 2
I reworked the copy, reducing it by about half. I think it's in the shape that it can now be posted.

To the questions/comments above, the copy reflects what the sources say ("collaborated" etc); if something does not look right, I can double check, as I still have the books. Some of the sources are linked as PDFs or online web pages, such as Luvaas or Gibson. I'm also posting a few Google book previews, which I believe are searchable:
 * Monty and Rommel: Parallel Lives, by Caddick-Adams


 * Liddell Hart and the Weight of History, by Mearsheimer


 * Rommel: A Reappraisal (Ian F. Beckett. ed.)

To the editor's comment that "nothing of this is new", then why has this scholarship not been reflected in the article? This is what I'm attempting to do with this addition.

The Rommel myth

The objective assessment of Rommel has been hampered by the the post-war myth of a "noble" man and a "military genius who, but for bad fortune and the faults of others, might have changed the course of World War II". According to the historian Peter Caddick-Adams, Rommel's "image, carefully cultivated during his lifetime, was also carefully reworked after his death". Following a forced suicide, Rommel emerged as the "acceptable face of German militarism, the 'good' German who stood apart from the Nazi regime".

Origins
The origins of the myth can be first found in Rommel's drive for success as a young officer in World War I and then in his popular 1937 book Infantry Attacks, a "determined effort" in self-promotion. Rommel's military successes in 1940 and 1941 were then played up by the Nazi propaganda, even though his success was achieved in the least strategically important theatre of World War II. Rommel image was splashed across mass media throughout the Reich and reached as far as the U.S. and Britain. The ground was fertile for the myth to be reborn after the war, resulting in a "renaissance of Rommel's name and reputation".

The myth came about as "the necessary image manufactured to serve the German rearmament", as, after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, it became clear to the Americans and the British that a German army would have to be revived to help face off against the Soviet Union. Many former German officers were convinced, however, that no future German army would be possible without the rehabilitation of the Wehrmacht. To this end, in October 1950, a group of former senior officers produced the Himmerod memorandum for West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Intended as both a planning and a negotiating document, the document included a key demand for "measures to transform domestic and foreign public opinion" with regards to the German military.

Foundational works
In the atmosphere of the Cold War, Rommel's former enemies, especially the British, played a key role in the manufacture and propagation of the myth. The journalist and historian Basil Liddell Hart, an early proponent of the German rearmament, provided the first widely available source on Rommel in his 1948 book on Hitler's generals, updated in 1951. Portraying Rommel as an outsider to the Nazi regime, Liddel Hart concluded with comments on Rommel's "gifts and performance" that "qualified him for a place in the role of the 'Great Captains' of history".

The other foundational text was the 1950 "influential, laudatory" biography Rommel: The Desert Fox by Brigadier Desmond Young. Young collaborated with several individuals who had been close to Rommel, including Hans Speidel, with Liddel Hart also supporting the project. Young subscribed to the "generous view" that Rommel had not been a supporter of Nazism, subtly conveying that he served the regime, but was not part of it. Young's biography "assisted in developing a new version of the truth" – with Rommel now an active, in not a leading, plotter. Speidel contributed as well, starting, from the early 1950s, to "talk up the Rommel legend" and his own "anti-Nazi credentials", thus boosting his [Speidel's] suitability for a future command role in NATO.

1953 saw the publication of Rommel's writings of the war period as The Rommel Papers, edited by Liddell Hart, Romme's widow and son, and the former Wehrmacht officer Fritz Bayerlein. With an introduction by Liddel Hart, The Rommel Papers was one of the two "crucial texts" that lead to the "Anglophone rehabilitation" and a "Rommel renaissance", the other being Young's biography. Meanwhile, Liddel Hart had a personal interest in the work: by having coaxed Rommel's widow to include material favorable to himself, Liddel Hart could present Rommel as his "pupil". By "putting words in the mouths of German Generals and manipulating history" Liddel Hart was in a position to show that the dramatic German success in the 1940 could be "traced back to him".

Reevaluation
Young and Liddell Hart "set the stage for all post-war interpretations of Rommel", which consisted of three themes: Rommel's ambivalence towards Nazism; his military genius; and the chivalrous nature of the fighting in North Africa. Their works lent support to the image of the "clean" Wehrmacht and were generally not questioned, since they came from British authors, rather than German revisionists. The trend continued with the "effusive and often uncritical biographies", such as Rommel as Military Commander by the military historian Ronald Lewin and Knight's Cross: A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel by the high-ranking British officer David Fraser.

In contrast to the apologist accounts, the recent historiagraphy suggests that Rommel had not only "found favor with the Nazi regime, but [...] was delighted with the preferential treatment he was receiving", as evidenced by Rommel's letters to his wife. Rommel fully subscribed to the Nazi worldview, writing to his wife in October 1939 from the devastated Warsaw: "The inhabitants drew a breath of relief that we have arrived and rescued them." Contemporary military practitioners have been critical of Rommel as an operational level commander. While an accomplished tactician, Rommel was a "poor operational leader", according to a paper published by Naval War College, whose author concludes that Rommel's "personal relationship with Hitler put him in a position of authority he was not qualified to fulfill".

The picture that emerges is much more complex than the post-war myth. In a 2012 interview with Reuters, the German historian Sönke Neitzel noted: "On the one hand he didn't commit war crimes that we know of and ordered a retreat at El Alamein despite Hitler's order. But he took huge German casualties elsewhere and he was a servant of the regime. He was not exactly a shining liberal or Social Democrat. Mostly, he was interested in his career".

Conversion of units
Why are we converting 88mm to 3in when referencing the 88mm Flak gun? The gun is widely known, and was widely known even by Allied forces at the time, as the "88", and 88mm isn't 3 inches anyway!

GBev1987 (talk) 10:35, 14 March 2016 (UTC)

deutsches-afrikakorps.de
I tagged this passage with "unreliable source" as it appears to be cited to a fan page or other page affiliated with Africa Corps:


 * Maintaining momentum was critical. He was willing to trade the tenuous logistical support of such moves for the advantage in creating havoc and confusion in the enemy. A former Afrika Korps soldier recalled: "When the kampfgruppe leader would say 'Jawohl Herr Feldmarschall. According to my estimates the proposed drive behind the lines to encircle the enemy would require a drive of 150 km. Our fuel supply is barely enough for 50 km.' Rommel would reply in his Schwaebisch dialect, 'Fahren Sie, fahren Sie, dann brauchen Sie keinen Treibstoff' (Drive, drive, then you do not need fuel), which was understood to mean 'Get there quickly, take the enemy by surprise, then use the fuel available from the enemy's supply.'"

I suggest removing this passage altogether, as quoting a anonymous supposed participant of the events. Any objections? K.e.coffman (talk) 05:33, 25 March 2016 (UTC)


 * I will remove this passage. K.e.coffman (talk) 01:19, 5 April 2016 (UTC)

Wehrmachtbericht references
Is this section (Erwin_Rommel) needed in the article? It is citing from the OKW propaganda report, the Wehrmachtbericht. This appears to be either WP:OR or extensive quoting from a WP:Primary source. In either case, the section is citing verbatim (including in German) a piece of Nazi propaganda that has no informative value; all such reports were approved by the Reich Propaganda Ministry and were meant solely to instill optimism in the German population.

In the past, I've seen these removed from articles such as in Bach-Zelewski. Please let me know of any feedback. K.e.coffman (talk) 06:01, 8 April 2016 (UTC)

Leadership
This section could stand to be trimmed. Now that I relocated the material from Personality, it appears that certain ideas are discussed twice, for example:


 * The respect afforded Rommel by his soldiers was the result of their observation of him. Said staff officer Friedrich von Mellenthin: "The Afrika Korps followed Rommel wherever he led, however hard he drove them. ... the men knew that Rommel was the last man to spare Rommel." Hard on his officers, he demanded they take proper care of their men and materiel. Once he saw things were properly attended to he could be easy and comfortable, but if unhappy with the way an officer was applying himself he could be very severe, being quick to fire officers who did not maintain standards or dithered over his commands. Mellenthin said: "While very popular with young soldiers and N.C.O.s, with whom he cracked many a joke, he could be most outspoken and offensive to commanders of troops if he did not approve of their measures."

And


 * He could be difficult on his subordinate commanders and superiors. He expected a great deal of himself and much the same for them. He had little patience for junior officers who did not do their jobs properly. He was not open to objections to his plans, and he did not tolerate incompetence.

Another example:


 * Friedrich von Mellenthin, who was a key aide on Rommel's staff during the Africa campaign, wrote that Rommel was willing to take chances and preferred to be at the forefront of the battle. But at times in North Africa his absence from a position of communication made command of the battles of the Afrika Korps difficult. According to Mellenthin, Rommel's counterattack during Operation Crusader is one such instance.

And


 * Rommel placed a high value on a commander being physically present at the point of contact, to be able to make tactical decisions quickly.

Are there any comments or suggestions? K.e.coffman (talk) 00:32, 9 April 2016 (UTC)


 * I will go ahead and trim. K.e.coffman (talk) 01:08, 17 April 2016 (UTC)

20 July plot
I reworked the section using contemporary sources. Pls see discussion that I started on another page Talk:20_July_plot. Improvements welcome. K.e.coffman (talk) 02:07, 18 April 2016 (UTC)

Early life and WWI sections
I believe that these section could stand to be trimmed somewhat, per WP:NOTEVERYTHING. Here are my suggested copyedits. The sections with number 2 in the section name are the trimmed versions; the originals have the titles as currently in the article.

Early life and career
Rommel was born on 15 November 1891 in Southern Germany at Heidenheim, 45 km from Ulm, in the Kingdom of Württemberg, then part of the German Empire. He was the second of four children of Erwin Rommel Senior (1860–1913), a teacher and school administrator, and his wife Helene von Lutz, who headed the local government council. As a young man Rommel's father had been a lieutenant in the artillery. Rommel had one older sister and three younger brothers, one of whom died in infancy.

At the age of 14, Rommel and a friend built a full-scale glider and were able to fly it short distances. He later purchased a motorcycle, and upon getting home immediately set about taking it apart and putting it back together. Rommel considered becoming an aeronautical engineer, but at age 18 he acceded to his father's wishes and joined the local 124th Württemberg Infantry Regiment as a Fähnrich (ensign), in 1910, studying at the Officer Cadet School in Danzig. He graduated in November 1911 and was commissioned as a lieutenant in January 1912 and was assigned to the 124th Infantry in Weingarten. He was posted to Ulm in March 1914 to command the No.4 Battery, 46th Field Artillery Regiment, XIII (Royal Württemberg) Corps. Until the start of the First World War he trained new recruits and gave refresher courses to reserve officers, and then returned to the 124th when war was declared. While at Cadet School, Rommel met his future wife, 17-year-old Lucia (Lucie) Maria Mollin (1894–1971). They married in November 1916 in Danzig.

World War I
During World War I, Rommel fought in France as well as in the Romanian and Italian Campaigns. He gained success leading small groups of men, using tactics such as infiltrating through enemy lines under cover of darkness, moving forward rapidly to a flanking position to arrive at their rear, and attacking defenders using the element of surprise. Arriving at the front near Verdun on 22 August 1914, Rommel initially commanded a platoon in 2nd Battalion, 124th Regiment. They were assigned to reconnaissance and courier tasks. His first combat experience was on 22 August 1914, when – catching the French garrison unprepared at the village of Bleid – he and three men engaged the enemy without waiting for the rest of their platoon to arrive. Rommel was often ill while on active duty, particularly with stomach troubles and exhaustion, a problem that manifested itself from the beginning of his career. He was appointed Battalion Adjutant in September. The armies continued to skirmish in open engagements throughout September, as the static trench warfare typical of the First World War was still in the future. On 24 September Rommel was shot in the leg when he engaged several French soldiers armed only with his bayonet (he had run out of ammunition). For this action, he was awarded the Iron Cross, Second Class.

On his return in January 1915, Rommel was assigned to command 9th Company, 124th Regiment, stationed in the trenches near Argonne. On 29 January, he and his platoon crawled through 100 yd of barbed wire to engage the French, who were positioned in blockhouses and earthworks. His company was running low on ammunition and were ordered to retreat. Rommel ordered an attack on one of the blockhouses to keep the enemy from opening fire on the withdrawing men. For his work that day, he was awarded the Iron Cross, First Class.

He continued to soldier in the trenches of France for another nine months, and received a minor shrapnel wound to the leg on 29 June 1915. He was promoted to Oberleutnant (first lieutenant) and transferred to the newly created Königliche Wurttemberg Gebirgsbataillon (Royal Wurttemberg Mountain Battalion) of the Alpenkorps in September. He was commander of 2nd Company, which trained in mountain warfare in Austria until December, when they were posted on a 6 mile stretch of front in the Vosges mountains of Alsace. They remained there, seeing action in reconnaissance work and raids on enemy positions until October 1916, when they were moved to the Southern Carpathians to fight the Romanians, who had joined the conflict in August. In August 1917, his unit was involved in the battle for Mount Cosna, a heavily fortified objective on the border between Hungary and Romania. They succeeded after nearly two weeks of difficult uphill fighting and were withdrawn to reserve on 25 August. The unit spent six weeks recuperating in Carinthia, and Rommel received leave to return to Danzig to see his wife and recover from a gunshot wound to the arm that he had received in the fight at Mount Cosna.

The Mountain Battalion was next assigned to fight on the Isonzo front, a mountainous area which had been the scene of near-constant fighting since the entry of Italy into the war on the Allied side on 23 May 1915. The offensive known as the Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo, or the Battle of Caporetto, began on 24 October 1917 with a four-hour artillery barrage. Rommel's Abteilung, consisting of three rifle companies and a machine gun unit, was part of an attempt to take enemy positions on three mountains: Kolovrat, Matajur, and Stol. Beginning at dawn on 25 October, Rommel took advantage of the terrain to outflank the Italians and gain control of the ridge on Kolovrat, taking 1,500 prisoners in the first three hours. Noticing that there was no field of fire on a supply road leading down to the village of Luico (now Livek), Rommel and 150 of his men proceeded down and captured the town, 2 miles behind enemy lines. Believing the presence of Rommels' group to be proof that their lines had collapsed, a column of Italian light infantry, 2,000 strong, surrendered after a brief firefight. Before dawn on the 26th, Rommel led his Abteilung, now reinforced with two additional machine gun companies, toward Matajur. They took the village of Jevszek without a fight, capturing another 1,600 men. In spite of orders not to attack, they assaulted Matajur from an unexpected direction from behind the Italian lines, arriving at the summit shortly before noon on 27 October. In two and a half days, he and his small contingent of men had captured 81 guns and 9,000 men (including 150 officers), at the loss of six dead and 30 wounded. Acting as advance guard in the capture of Longarone on 9 November, he again decided to attack with a much smaller force. Reinforcements continued to arrive, and fighting continued through the night. Convinced that they were surrounded by an entire German division, the 1st Italian Infantry Division – 10,000 men – surrendered to Rommel at dawn. For this and his work at Matajur, he (and his battalion commander, Major ) received the order of Pour le Mérite. After a week on leave in January 1918, Rommel was promoted to Hauptmann (captain) and assigned to a staff position with XLIV Army Corps, where he served for the remainder of the war.

Early life and career 2
Rommel was born on 15 November 1891 in Southern Germany at Heidenheim, 45 km from Ulm, in the Kingdom of Württemberg, then part of the German Empire. He was the second of four children of Erwin Rommel Senior (1860–1913), a teacher and school administrator, and his wife Helene von Lutz, who headed the local government council. As a young man Rommel's father had been a lieutenant in the artillery. Rommel had one older sister and three younger brothers, one of whom died in infancy.

At age 18 Rommel joined the local 124th Württemberg Infantry Regiment as a Fähnrich (ensign), in 1910, studying at the Officer Cadet School in Danzig. He graduated in November 1911 and was commissioned as a lieutenant in January 1912 and was assigned to the 124th Infantry in Weingarten. He was posted to Ulm in March 1914 to the 46th Field Artillery Regiment, XIII (Royal Württemberg) Corps, as a battery commander. He returned to the 124th when war was declared. While at Cadet School, Rommel met his future wife, 17-year-old Lucia (Lucie) Maria Mollin (1894–1971). They married in November 1916 in Danzig.

World War I 2
During World War I, Rommel fought in France as well as in the Romanian and Italian Campaigns. He successfully employed the tactics of infiltrating through enemy lines under cover of darkness or moving forward rapidly to a flanking position to arrive at their rear, to achieve the element of surprise. His first combat experience was on 22 August 1914 as a platoon commander near Verdun, when – catching the French garrison unprepared – he and three men engaged them without waiting for the rest of the platoon to arrive. The armies continued to skirmish in open engagements throughout September, as the static trench warfare typical of the First World War was still in the future. For his actions in September 1914 and January 1915, Rommel was awarded the Iron Cross, Second Class.

Rommel was promoted to Oberleutnant (first lieutenant) and transferred to the newly created Royal Wurttemberg Mountain Battalion of the Alpenkorps in September 1915, as a company commander. In August 1917, his unit was involved in the battle for Mount Cosna, a heavily fortified objective on the border between Hungary and Romania, which they took after two weeks of difficult uphill fighting.

The Mountain Battalion was next assigned to the Isonzo front, in a mountainous area in Italy. The offensive, known as the Battle of Caporetto, began on 24 October 1917. Rommel's battalion, consisting of three rifle companies and a machine gun unit, was part of an attempt to take enemy positions on three mountains: Kolovrat, Matajur, and Stol. In two and a half days, from October 25 to 27, Rommel and his 150 men captured 81 guns and 9,000 men (including 150 officers), at the loss of six dead and 30 wounded. Rommel achieved this remarkable success by taking advantage of the terrain to outflank the Italian forces, attacking from unexpected directions or behind enemy lines, and taking the initiative to attack when he had orders to the contrary. In one instance, the Italian forces, taken by surprise and believing that their lines had collapsed, surrendered after a brief firefight. Acting as advance guard in the capture of Longarone on 9 November, Rommel again decided to attack with a much smaller force. Convinced that they were surrounded by an entire German division, the 1st Italian Infantry Division – 10,000 men – surrendered to Rommel. For this and his actions at Matajur, he received the order of Pour le Mérite. In January 1918, Rommel was promoted to Hauptmann (captain) and assigned to a staff position with XLIV Army Corps, where he served for the remainder of the war.

The original versions combined are about 8 300 characters; the suggested versions are about 4 500. Please let me know of any feedback. K.e.coffman (talk) 06:11, 10 March 2016 (UTC)

Discussion
That was a very poor series of edits. The edits advanced a viewpoint, a viewpont that is clearly biased. It does not take long reading in the sources you cite to see that they are not written in an objective voice, but that they push a particular political view. You comment on sources you have not read, taking the word of someone advancing an argument to place these sources in doubt as to their value. The general lack of knowledge you display on this subject matter and others elsewhere is remarkable. The fact that a source you use may meet criteria as a secondary source does not mean you have found an unbiased viewpoint. The pursuit of historical truth based on the best available evidence should be our dominant concern. That means when we read material and consider introducing it we have to consider what the bias is of the author and guard against allowing the author's bias to enter into the voice of wikipedia. From your comments it would appear you have not read Infantry Attacks or The Rommel Papers, or even any of Liddell Harts works. This places you in a position where you are completely dependent on the opinion of whomever you happen to be reading. If you have not read broadly on a subject you are less able to discern fact from opinion. I asked you to look for sources that presented an alternative view. Did you make any effort to do so? When an author's political view matches your own you are less able to perceive bias in the writing. From what you have offered above any authors that did not match your view you have dismissed, showing that the source you are citing, who is advaincing a particular view, has informed us that the sources that are counter to the author's view are not of any value (Eg: "Searle... refers to "effusive and often uncritical biographies"). Apparently we are to conclue that Searle's opinion is unbiased, but Fraser's is not, and we have Searle himself to tell us so. I find that problematic. As to your editing in general, you have consistently introduced material that is critical of Germans, and removed content that might be viewed as supportive of Germans. The practice demonstrates a marked bias in your editing, which in my view is distorting wikipedia. Gunbirddriver (talk) 08:10, 10 March 2016 (UTC)


 * I agree and I also think the new page regarding the Rommel Myth needs major changes. I can list several thing:
 * First, the Rommel Myth probably sounds a bit too negative in English and can cause misunderstanding. Actually it's a direct translation of the German "Mythos Rommel". But Mythos Rommel as being used by German authors refers to something mostly neutral, like "the Enigma of Rommel" or "The Rommel Mystery" or even "the Mythology of Rommel", for example here Peter Lieb (one of the authors listed as if he's one who's trying to debunk "the Rommel myth") states that he "is and remains Mythos".

The Rommel Myth theory has also come to the stage when it faces revisionism of itself. For example, basically Maurice Remy (who's also listed as if he belonged to the myth camp, and even more curiously, a French when actually he's a German )argues (with much success) that Rommel was both a Nazi and a hero who fought Hitler: »War er [ Rommel ] ein überzeugter Nationalsozialist, den man verachten muss, oder ein Held des Widerstandes gegen Hitler?«, stellt sich bei genauer Kenntnisnahme der Geschichte so gar nicht. Die Antwort ist nämlich ebenso einfach wie überraschend: Rommel war beides. But even though "his heart did belong to Hitler, it's all the more remarkable that he always found the strength needed to fight against him whenever his conscience required so ... Unwilling and probably without ever realizing it, he was part of a murderous system... but no individual sin..
 * This revisionism vs revisionism trench was the reason Der Spiegel had to change its general tone towards Rommel, beginning with (one of the two authors was also the author of the "New Research taints image of Rommel"

cited by this wiki page). Here, the message is same with the two previously mentioned authors': the man was complicated, vainglorious, seduced by Hitler, yet [the Mythos of] his heroic battles remain nonetheless, like Hitler had predicted.
 * The Rommel Myth page also makes it as if modern officers become increasingly doubtful of Rommel's abilities. The reality is that the thing has remained the same since WW2. He has his haters and his lovers. And many of his admirers are quite high on the military ladder themselves. For every Zabecki who doubts him you will get a Schwarzkopf for balance treatment. "Schwarzkopf imbibed Rommel's strategic lessons, and he had no intention of being drawn into a direct assault on Iraqi positions..." “A war in the desert,” Schwarzkopf had observed, “is a war of mobility and lethality".  Rommel was a genius at battles of movement, Schwartzkopf noted, and from the start he saw this conflict in those terms. Fast-moving troops and tanks, decisive encounters . It seems in the U.S they still teach Rommel as standard for desert warfare . And it should be noted that Saddam and Gaddafi were admirers of Rommel too. Deamonpen--Deamonpen (talk) 16:25, 20 April 2016 (UTC)


 * What specifically is problematic with the suggested copyedit/condensing for the above sections?


 * Specific to alternate sources for the "Rommel myth" section, I have posted above: "When I searched for "Rommel legend" or "Rommel myth", the above sources are what I found. I have not found sources that state that the "Rommel myth" is the invention of contemporary historians that are trying to take Rommel down a notch. ... Regarding WP:Biased, this content is built on multiple WP:RS sources (books, articles, studies, etc). This is what the sources said. If you have contemporary sources that state the opposite, I would be glad to review them." The was no response. I believe the onus is on those who disagree with the sources to present alternate WP:RS. K.e.coffman (talk) 16:47, 10 March 2016 (UTC)


 * Could you specify what was problematic with my suggested copyedit?K.e.coffman (talk) 05:08, 20 March 2016 (UTC)


 * I provided you with an extensive answer earlier with this response on March 7, to which you had no substantive answer. Instead you pushed through with your favored theory, without considering the prejudice of the authors involved. There is no discussion to be had if you ignore what is said and just continue forward with what you want to do. Obvious problems have already been pointed out, and many more exist. For example, to criticize Rommel on his operational abilities because he was unable to get his forces supplied is looking at the wrong person.  When asked how his forces in the desert would be supplied, he would quip “That is the problem of the quarter master.” Some interpret this to mean he was not concerned with supplies, which is a completely false notion. Rommel achieved more than what was expected with less, and expected the same from his junior officers. He also believed the supply issue could be remedied if someone with energy and drive put their mind to it,  which proved to be the case in December 1942 and January 1943 when another panzer division and a heavy tank battalion were brought across to Africa following the landings of Operation Torch. In saying “That is the problem of the quarter master” Rommel is placing the responsibility where the responsibility lies.
 * There is much more that could be said, but it is all time consuming and appears to make little difference. The myth advanced here is rather cartoonish in its simplicity. Much of the theory is based on ascribing motives for actions when another person’s motives are usually not known. Thus it requires assumptions, which is dangerous ground for historians. One could easily show there was a great deal of animosity towards the Germans following the war, that people were incensed when German soldiers or officers were portrayed in a favorable light. As to movies, many movies were made where the German military mind was portrayed as being detail oriented in planning, and that they were thrown off when their forces made first contact with an enterprising and inventive American or British officer. In such cases German soldiers in these movies were depicted as being killed by the score, with little thought and no regret to it. The Desert Rats (1953), To Hell and Back (1955), The Guns of Navarone (1961), The Battle of the Bulge (1965), Kelly’s Heroes (1970), the Combat! Series (1962 – 1967), the Rat Patrol series (1966-1968), all of these portrayed the German soldier as being stiff, unimaginative, hapless, and soon dead. This is all a silliness, and has no place in an article on an important figure in military history.
 * The basic fact is that Rommel was held in high regard by the British common soldier well before anyone started thinking about the Cold War and the need to see the Soviets as the bad guys, and thus the Germans must not really be all that bad. Furthermore, Rommel is still spoken of in military circles as an aggressive and capable commanding officer. Books are still written about him with the intention of being instructive. Charles Messenger’s book comes to mind. Rommel's "Infantry Attacks" is still used in military schools as a primer on small unit infantry tactics, which was Rommel's intention with the book. He was an excellent instructor, liked working with the young, and hoped to pass on valuable lessons to younger officers in training. He did not write it as a mere effort at self promotion. If that were the case, we would not be interested in reading it today, would we?
 * As time allows I will attempt to address some of the problems in the addition you made, but I would stress that it is not up to me to do all the work. You should look to see what evidence is available to suggest the “Myth” theory as advanced is not balanced, and that on the whole is not reflective of reality. I am more interested in working on articles, and not writing responses. You should be well versed in a subject to make the changes you have. It would appear that is not the case, and you are now giving us your drafts for changing the article further. I do not believe that is a good idea. Getting it right is our first priority. Gunbirddriver (talk) 02:32, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

Sorry, I did not make myself clear. I was pinging you on the suggested condensing of Early Life/World War I section; this part here: "What specifically is problematic with the suggested copyedit/condensing for the above sections?" The article is very long, so here I'm attempting to make it more readable.

On the discussion of the Rommel myth subsection, I responded on March 10 as follows, which I'm reproducing here:
 * Specific to alternate sources for the "Rommel myth" section, I have posted above: "When I searched for "Rommel legend" or "Rommel myth", the above sources are what I found. I have not found sources that state that the "Rommel myth" is the invention of contemporary historians that are trying to take Rommel down a notch. ... Regarding WP:Biased, this content is built on multiple WP:RS sources (books, articles, studies, etc). This is what the sources said. If you have contemporary sources that state the opposite, I would be glad to review them." The was no response. I believe the onus is on those who disagree with the sources to present alternate WP:RS. K.e.coffman (talk) 16:47, 10 March 2016 (UTC)


 * K.e.coffman (talk) 03:37, 21 March 2016 (UTC)


 * Here's an interesting abstract: ‘Our Friend Rommel’: The Wehrmacht as ‘Worthy Enemy’ in Postwar British Popular Culture*. I do not have access to Oxford Journals; if someone does it may be interesting to have a look, as the article specifically discusses Young's biography and attitudes of the British military commanders. K.e.coffman (talk) 02:07, 27 March 2016 (UTC)


 * I was able to get access to the article; it's an interesting read. K.e.coffman (talk) 06:08, 8 April 2016 (UTC)


 * The previous comments that raised a concern to the trimming of these two sections did not offer specifics. Are there any specific concerns about reducing Early life and World War I sections? The trim would improve readability, IMO. K.e.coffman (talk) 02:36, 15 April 2016 (UTC)

Since it appears that there are no objections, I will go ahead and trim these two sections. K.e.coffman (talk) 01:16, 17 April 2016 (UTC)

Lewin 1968
I don't believe that Ronald Lewin is an appropriate source for this article. Please also see: Rommel_myth.

I got this book from the library out of curiosity, and it's indeed quite effusive. Opening on a random page, I got this: "But Rommel is one of the Great Captains whose ideas and actions are all of a piece throughout". There are 3 pages of bibliography, minimal footnotes and no endnotes.

I would like to replace Lewin with alternate sources or trim content cited to him where possible. Please let me know if there are any objections. K.e.coffman (talk) 03:45, 23 April 2016 (UTC)
 * Just tread lightly as unless a source can be shown to be extremely out-of-date or not WP:RS or extreme in POV or written by someone such as, David Irving; we must be careful in what we cut out and calls we make; it cannot be because we WP:IJUSTDONTLIKEIT or because newer sources state something opposite. Just because an account is "uncritical" is not enough to totally discount it; its like Shirer - is his work now dated to be degree, yes, can one totally discount it, no. Comparison and contrast is a better way to go. Remember too that just because a source is more recent or a new author or historian has written a "critical" account, does not automatically mean it should carry much more weight. Take Evans and Kershaw, for example; there are newer works as to Nazi Germany and Hitler, but not better. As another editor recently said, a new author or historian who has written a "critical" account can be "self-serving" by the new area or point-of-view they present. BTW-I am not defending Lewin, just giving something to think about herein on these articles. As in the end, I must say that Lewin's work is probably dated to say the least. Kierzek (talk) 15:39, 23 April 2016 (UTC)

Agreed in principal. Shirer is also dated, but one can at least see where he is citing to, and make an informed opinion. In Lewin's case, the book looks mostly "polemical" (i.e. his opinions) as I leafed through it, as there were no endnotes and very minimal footnotes. It's just not on par with books that are available today. Take these statements:

This is given as a statement of fact.
 * According to Lewin, Rommel was the possessor of a great deal of moral courage.

Why is this opinion important or relevant?
 * German historian Hans-Adolf Jacobson commented: "Rommel was one of the few generals who had the strength to refuse to carry out one of Hitler's orders."

There were many other reasons why High Command looked at Rommel this way, such as (mostly) his special relationship with Hitler, his impetuosity and ambition, his lack of acknowledgement of contributions by other units, etc.
 * He was not a part of the Prussian aristocracy that dominated the German high command, and as such was looked upon somewhat suspiciously by the Wehrmacht's traditional power structure.

See above.
 * Rommel received both praise and criticism for his tactics during the French campaign. [...] Others, however, were more reserved, some out of envy, others over concerns about risks Rommel was willing to accept, and others in the German High Command out of their limited appreciation and acceptance of maneuver warfare.

This is constructed in such a way as to buttress (?) Rommel's anti-Nazi credentials. I came across this incident in another source, where it was presented as Rommel resenting the SS, rather than for any ideological reasons.
 * Here he first met Hitler, who inspected his troops on 30 September 1934. On this occasion the SS major in charge of Hitler's bodyguard tried to place a row of his men in front of Rommel's men, ostensibly to protect the Führer. Insulted, Rommel refused to turn out his battalion. The S.S. were ordered to stand down.

K.e.coffman (talk) 02:32, 24 April 2016 (UTC)


 * What do recent sources say about this book? It would be good to know if its no longer cited, or experts in the field have criticised it. More generally, it does seem rather dated. Nick-D (talk) 02:49, 24 April 2016 (UTC)


 * Here's from Ronald Lewin article:
 * Lewin's biography Rommel as Military Commander (1968) has been described by the historian Alaric Searle as "uncritical and effusive", part of the tradition that cemented the Rommel legend, a view that the Field Marshal was an apolitical, brilliant commander and a victim of the Third Reich due to his (now disputed) participation in the 20 July plot against Adolf Hitler. The historian Patrick Major states that the work focused on the military career of Rommel, depoliticising it and presenting him strictly as a soldier. In another work on the North African campaign, the 1977 The Life and Death of the Africa Korps, Lewin wrote that it was "possible and necessary to assert that (...) the purity of the desert purified the desert war", contributing to the myth of the clean Wehrmacht.


 * Disclaimer: this is my addition. :-) K.e.coffman (talk) 02:58, 24 April 2016 (UTC)
 * From what you have written he seems to toss around opinions quite easily; it sounds like he is not as criticized for the "military career" aspect, but do cross-check sources; and certainly if the same point can be made by another better regarded work, that is okay; just want to make sure there is balance and objectivity in presentation. Kierzek (talk) 04:05, 24 April 2016 (UTC)


 * Agreed; I will trim the areas that I highlighted above and/or replace with more academic sources. K.e.coffman (talk) 05:12, 26 April 2016 (UTC)

"Orders to kill Jewish soldiers, civilians and captured commandos were ignored"
Rommel personally executed a POW in France, and his units there also conducted executions. This sentence is really, really wrong.--MyMoloboaccount (talk) 13:00, 17 April 2016 (UTC)

Atrocities committed by Rommel's 7th Panzer Division in France Hitler's African Victims: The German Army Massacres of Black French Soldiers By Raffael Scheck page 24,26 mentions executions of black French soldiers(approximately 109 victims).--MyMoloboaccount (talk) 13:12, 17 April 2016 (UTC)


 * Article, or more correctly, review : Scheck seems to have toned down his position somewhat: "Although there is no evidence incriminating Rommel himself, his unit did fight in areas where German massacres of black French prisoners of war were extremely common in June 1940." So, neither concrete evidences of even his soldiers commiting crimes either. Scholar jumping to quick to conclusions as far as I can see --Deamonpen (talk) 17:15, 20 April 2016 (UTC)

That seems to be original research on your part, he only says that Rommel didn't took part directly in massacres of black French soldiers, not that his soldiers didn't took part in them. As to Rommel directly involved, he executed a soldier(of unknown background) on 17th May, and event which he himself wrote about openly. Please do note that involvement of Rommel's troops in mass murder of French PoWs is sourced by several works which you have removed, not only Scheck. --MyMoloboaccount (talk) 13:14, 23 April 2016 (UTC)
 * I am not involved in this as I don't have the sources to check. With that said, it needs better attribution and RS citing; apparently the claim is not fully agreed upon (like many other claims with his man). Also, remember the WP:Lead is a summary of the body, so the details need to be in the body of the article, not the lead. I am not commenting on the truth of the matter asserted, only the need for better attribution and proper presentation in the article. Kierzek (talk) 14:44, 23 April 2016 (UTC)
 * Sure thing, I will add more sources in the main article about executions Rommel's troops carried out, there are several locations out of which one is under question by one author, but not the others. As to Rommel and execution of French colonel, this is actually without any doubt, Rommel himself wrote about it.But yes, I can bring more sources if needed.--MyMoloboaccount (talk) 15:15, 23 April 2016 (UTC)


 * Thanks, MyMoloboaccount. Give it a go; it can always be tweaked or cleaned up by copy edit if need be. Kierzek (talk) 15:20, 23 April 2016 (UTC)


 * Scheck could have written that "although there is no evidence of Rommel being involved, there is evidence that his troops being involved...". Instead what he did know was that they operated in areas plagued by massacres.

Any way, the English version of Scheck's book has updated his opinions on the matter. "the operations against Airaines and nearby villages came from the 2nd and 46th ... (Rommel's 7th Panzer Division had already advanced much farther)." Looking at the way Scheck works, I think it highly probable that he had the initital conclusions about Rommel and his division just because of evidences that they had operated there.

By "other locations" did you mean Le Quesnoy? It is very near Airaines and Scheck writes that the 7th Division had advanced much farther. Also, as for Rommel executing the French officer for refusing to obey three times, while it was certainly true, but listing that along with "he and his units executed prisoners...", and writing that "Rommel was personally implicated".. make it sound like it was a crime while no author of note, even the revisionist ones like Beckett, Reuth...etc treats it to be so. --Deamonpen (talk) 05:30, 26 April 2016 (UTC)


 * Please provide sources denying these executions took place. Wikipedia isn't based on personal views, and thus far you have only presented your own theories.--MyMoloboaccount (talk) 21:21, 26 April 2016 (UTC)


 * Scheck saying that they had already advanced much farther from Airaines to commit atrocities there and nearby is his words, not mine. The only personal opinion I provided was that I see problems with the way he jumped to conclusions as an author. If you like to present authors' "likelys" and "possiblys" as well proven theories, then here Butler suggests that the Quesnoy massacre was either a scheme the Nazi Hanke organized behind Rommel's back or "equally likely", (in his words) it was all a propaganda scheme made up by the Allies to demonize the enemy, while according to Butler, given Rommel's views on races, and the 7th's general conduct, "it's almost impossible to conceive" Rommel had anything to do with it.

And if you would like it, Dennis Showalter says that no massacre happened

--Deamonpen (talk) 00:16, 27 April 2016 (UTC)

Rommel myth
How is the section for size now? It appears to be similar in size to "Battle of Gazala and capture of Tobruk", so I think it's appropriate, since the "Rommel myth" is critical in understanding the portrayal of Rommel to the present day. K.e.coffman (talk) 03:46, 27 April 2016 (UTC)
 * Its better, I removed the tag. Kierzek (talk) 11:11, 27 April 2016 (UTC)

Rommel on Montgomery, Patton
This did not really belong in the "Popular perceptions" section; moving it here for storage:
 * Rommel reciprocated their respect. He at one time said Montgomery "never made a serious strategic mistake" and credited Patton with "the most astounding achievement in mobile warfare".

K.e.coffman (talk) 02:43, 28 April 2016 (UTC)

Suggestion re citations
It's great that new content is being added to the article, but I'd like to suggest that it follows the predominant citation style, which is mostly using shortened footnotes. Please see: Template:Harvard_citation_documentation

This makes it much easier to edit text, without the long web url getting in the way of understanding where the article text ends and where the reference begins. K.e.coffman (talk) 04:24, 28 April 2016 (UTC)

In Nazi and Allied propaganda
I added a new section on Rommel's role in propaganda, both Nazi and Allied. This was an important part of his career, which has previously not been covered. Improvements welcome. K.e.coffman (talk) 05:23, 26 April 2016 (UTC)
 * I am concerned that showing that he wasn't as the myth portrayed is overwhelming a statement of who he was/what he did. For example, its unclear that the lede has to note that a German general during WWII supported Hitler and Nazi-ism.  It goes "without saying."  Also every General on both sides I presume had issues under there command that came close to War Crimes.  I'm not sure those listed in the lede are notable enough to be included there.
 * I'm getting used to the re-writes, so I'm not feeling bold to make changes yet - but figured I should put the thoughts out there. --John (User:Jwy/talk) 23:47, 1 May 2016 (UTC)

Manoeuvre warfare
Concerning this section:
 * Taking his opponent by surprise and creating uncertainty in the mind of the adversarial commander were key elements in Rommel's thinking on offensive warfare. Rommel understood the impact of striking quickly, and his offensive campaigns are noted for his ability to arrive in force where his opponents did not expect him. Rommel would take advantage of sand storms and the dark of night to conceal the movement of his forces. In France and later in Africa, Rommel made use of the Luftwaffe as a forward, mobile artillery to support the advance and help overcome difficult obstacles. He viewed the essential aspect of successful use of armour was the ability to concentrate all available strength at one point and then hit that point with everything at hand to force a breakthrough.


 * His surprise attacks often led larger enemy formations to surrender, as they were overwhelmed by the pace of the action and became unsure of themselves. Rommel's experiences in the First World War of successes gained by rapid forward movement, flanking opponents and attacking their rear areas, and catching the defenders by surprise were amplified with the mobility afforded to armoured formations. According to Liddel Hart, a major aspect of his success was his grasp of the psychological shock such attacks had upon the morale and fighting spirit of the enemy forces.

This section does not appear to add much to the article, as some of it belongs in Leadership, or was standard Wehrmacht practice of Bewegungskrieg (war of movement) such as "...Luftwaffe as a forward, mobile artillery to support the advance and help overcome difficult obstacles. ... the ability to concentrate all available strength at one point and then hit that point with everything at hand to force a breakthrough."

Rommel, according to sources, was a skilled practitioner, but he does not appear to have added much to the Maneuver warfare theory to sustain a section. I plan rework it, potentially reallocating material to other section, such as Leadership or specific battles, unless it's already discussed there.

Please let me know of any feedback. K.e.coffman (talk) 22:32, 30 April 2016 (UTC)


 * Will go ahead; improvements welcome. K.e.coffman (talk) 06:04, 2 May 2016 (UTC)


 * A problem with this material is that it presents Rommel in a void: the tactics described above were standard for blitzkrieg-type warfare, and were not developed by or for Rommel. He was certainly good at using them during 1940-42, but was hardly alone in doing so (on the flip side, he was also far from alone from over-extending his forces and supply lines during such campaigns and was far from the only tank general who struggled with positional warfare). Nick-D (talk) 11:07, 2 May 2016 (UTC)


 * If you are removing sourced content then do not do so. Content should be removed if it is false, but if it is true it should remain, sourced or not. If you believe more sourcing would better support the statement then find and add the sourcing. Removing sourced content however is not correct, whether or not you believe it adds much to the article.
 * Also at the rate you are editing articles and re-writing articles other editors do not have the time to address your "concerns". Wikipedia is a collaborative project. Simply writing "improvements welcome" does little to foster the input of other editors. I see very little back and forth in any of the changes you attempt. You should consider why that might be and attempt to correct the problem. Gunbirddriver (talk) 02:58, 4 May 2016 (UTC)


 * This page is watched by over 300 editors and 40 of them visited to view the recent changes. If there were concerns, I hope that they would have been expressed. It is my understanding that there's no rule against removing or resourcing material, see for example this edit of the article. Separately, Nick-D commented above on the content in question. In any case, in an effort to foster collaboration, I will aim to allow for more time to elapse before making major changes going forward. I hope this will work for you. K.e.coffman (talk) 03:26, 4 May 2016 (UTC)

I did (mildly) express some concern about the article as a whole (https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Erwin_Rommel&curid=19371003&diff=718539645&oldid=718536554), hoping for some dialog - but not having time to dig through all the changes with more specific issues. I plan to circle back for that.

I would expect the removal of sourced material would include at least an edit summary explaining why it is being removed. Is the source no longer considered reliable? Is it just an editorial flow change?

A slower pace would likely help. I appreciate the enthusiasm! --John (User:Jwy/talk) 04:48, 4 May 2016 (UTC)


 * Ah, I see you posted above, under the "Propaganda" section. It was in part in response to your concern that I moved the statement on the 1940 events from the lead into the body of the article, with this edit.


 * I believe that the statement "Rommel supported the Nazi seizure of power and Adolf Hitler, although his attitude towards Nazi ideology ..." is appropriately placed in the lead, as the lead is the summary of key points in the article, where this is discussed. Rommel's support for the regime and his relationship with and admiration for Hitler (at least while Germany was winning) had a major impact on his career, as the sources show. Hope this helps! K.e.coffman (talk) 05:16, 4 May 2016 (UTC)

Contradiction
These two sentences appear to be contradictory:


 * Hitler and his various intelligence services largely agreed with this assessment. Rommel, believing that Normandy was indeed a likely landing ground, argued that it did not matter to the Allies where they landed, just that the landing was successful.


 * Although Hitler himself expected a Normandy invasion for a while, Rommel and most Army commanders in France believed there would be two invasions, with the main invasion coming at the Pas-de-Calais. By D-Day on 6 June 1944 nearly all the German staff officers, including Hitler's staff, believed that Pas-de-Calais was going to be the main invasion site, and continued to believe so even after the landings in Normandy had occurred.

The latter para states that Rommel believed that the Pas-de-Calais would be the most likely invasion point. Peter Lieb states that "Most German commanders, including Rommel, expected the invasion to land at Pas-de-Calais.

K.e.coffman (talk) 02:55, 11 April 2016 (UTC)


 * I'll remove the statement sourced to Rommel as not being third-party. It also contradicts other sources that I've seen. K.e.coffman (talk) 01:48, 15 April 2016 (UTC)


 * The first paragraph does not contradict the second. "believed there would be two invasions" does not contradict 'Normandy was indeed a likely landing ground". If the other sources you've seen support your position, how do they explain Rommel's efforts to move 21st Panzer, Panzer Lehr, 12th SS Panzer, and an anti-aircraft division up to Normandy just before the invasion? If your sources cannot explain it then you should revert your edit. Gunbirddriver (talk) 02:48, 4 May 2016 (UTC)


 * This was sourced to The Rommel Papers. I would not consider this to be a neutral, third-party source on the subject of evaluation of Rommel’s performance in Normandy. I've not seen this content in Messenger and Leib. I thus don't believe that this content should be restored. I also question the concept of "the belief in two invasions" but need to look into sources to understand this better. K.e.coffman (talk) 17:28, 4 May 2016 (UTC)

Quote
I removed this quote, as it presents Rommel's opinion, and appears to blame others for the failures in Africa. Douglas Porch calls Rommel a "whiner" as one of his defining characteristics:


 * "The African campaign and the new aspects of warfare which it brought were never understood by men like General Haider. They stuck to their established methods and precedents, even though these often showed themselves to be outdated and hence false. The consequence was that Goering and Himmler thought they knew better how to make war, and often caused great harm by their dilettantism, while the senior military commands, with their professional staffs, were increasingly overruled. My staff and I gave no regard whatever to all this unnecessary academic nonsense, which had long been overtaken by technical development. Consequently, many officers of the academic type, steeped in their ancient theories, failed to understand us and so took us for adventurers, amateurs and the like. Not that I would have let this worry me unduly, had it not been for the disastrous effect which it had on the course of the war in Africa."

K.e.coffman (talk) 01:26, 21 May 2016 (UTC)

Claims that Allies were fabricating Nazi war crimes
I have removed claims that Allies were fabricating Nazi war crimes. Such extraordinary fringe claim would require extraordinary evidence and needless to say go against all mainstream history.--MyMoloboaccount (talk) 22:26, 27 May 2016 (UTC)