Talk:Falklands War/Archive 3

Campaign Box
Thought a campaign box would be useful:

A class or B class?
Is this an A class or a B class. It says both at the top and I will remove the one that is wrong. Baseracer 15:43, 26 October 2006 (UTC)


 * Different projects can have different definitions of what falls in which class. Check the assertions of each wikiproject and change the classification if you see it fit. Mariano (t/c) 09:22, 27 October 2006 (UTC)

Casualties
Though officially 258 British died during the conflict, in the Spanish article they cite the Argentine army on a much bigger unofficial number, somehow supported by Germany:
 * "(1) Según cálculos hechos en la República Federal Alemana, las bajas británicas habrían sumado más de 700 muertos y 1.500 heridos. Teniendo en cuenta que, durante los 3 años de la guerra de Corea, Inglaterra perdió 537 hombres, la simple admisión de 255 muertos en 45 días de operaciones indica el más elevado promedio de bajas por día de combate sufrido por los ingleses desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial."
 * "(1) Acording the calculation mady by the Federal Republic of Germany, British casualties would have added over 700 dead and 1,500 wonded. Considering that during the 3 years of the War against Korea England lost 537 men, the lone admision of 255 dead in 45 days of operations give the highest rate of casualties per day of combat by English forces since the World War II".

Yet I haven't been able to find any other source for it. Anyone knows zee German language? Mariano (t/c) 10:10, 3 November 2006 (UTC)


 * I believe that the German study calculated that 700 Britons would have died in a high-intensity war like the Falklands War. Normally an attacker should have 2-3 more men than the defender. The Britons attacked a numerical superior foe in most of the land battles. If Pucarás had been dropping napalm at the British ground forces, if Argentine paratroops had been attacking the bridgehead at Port San Carlos, if the weather had been more windy at ARA 25 de Mayo's aborted attack, if the Argentine services had cooperated, if the Argentine bombs had exploded.... — then the British death toll would have been higher.
 * Argentina admit that UK lost 'only' 255 men in the war, but have taken the loser's privilege of presenting the fact, that it took North Korea a whole three YEARS to kill 537 Britons, while Argentina managed to kill 255 in only 45 DAYS. Necessary Evil 14:30, 3 November 2006 (UTC)


 * You know, napalm was used on occasion, by Pucarás. Toby Douglass 18:04, 23 December 2006 (UTC)


 * I'd suggest that you need to look at where those losses were, and appreciate that the actions were some 30 years apart. Many of the losses were at sea with survival rates in the cold waters of the winter south atlantic leading to survival times in terms of minutes.  In the land environment weapon effect was much greater than that available in Korea etc.  It's not a like with like comparison.ALR 15:10, 3 November 2006 (UTC)


 * I agree, at least 100 from General Belgrano died of Hypothermia, but the sailors of Royal Navy were issued with modern, orange immersion suits. Another aspect regarding cold weather is that several wounded (on land) were 'preserved' by the freezing temperatures, and survived against all odds.
 * Medical improvement in general since M*A*S*H 4077 does also makes the Korean War/Falklands War comparison stranger.Necessary Evil 18:11, 5 November 2006 (UTC)


 * With regard to the casualty rate at sea, I wouldn't suggest that a once only survival suit would provide much improved survivability in the South Atlantic. It depends on having adequate insulation underneath it and wearing it properly.  The suit itself is really only a waterproof covering and is pretty light.  It's really to manage the couple of minutes from first entry until one gets into a liferaft where the mass of bodies offers an increased ambient temperature.ALR 18:14, 6 November 2006 (UTC)

The comparison is, of course, dull. I was pointing to the death toll. Any reference to the German study? By the way, check the wounded/dead ratios of each one; clearly the British were better prepared to treat the wounded. Mariano (t/c) 09:47, 6 November 2006 (UTC)


 * I've made an enquiry to the discussion page at the German wikipedia. They should know it.Necessary Evil 16:32, 6 November 2006 (UTC)

Thanks a lot. Mariano (t/c) 10:27, 7 November 2006 (UTC)


 * At the Spanish wikipedia Argentine and non-Argentine users are debating the German calculation. The Argentine army's homepage doesn't give a direct reference to the German calculation. Cálculos hechos en Alemania - "calculations done in Germany" sounds like an toothpaste ad with "according to scientific research" with no direct reference. Germany sounds so conveniently neutral, so....
 * Regards Necessary Evil 10:47, 9 November 2006 (UTC)

2082
In 1984, the secret plans for Operation Overlord were released. 40 years seems like a fair time span to me. But the Falklands War's archives will be released after 100 years. All that secrecy will nurture a lot of myths and conspiracy theories. Why?: Necessary Evil 11:30, 9 November 2006 (UTC)
 * To cover up 700 dead Britons?
 * I doubt it, UK can't get 700 families to disappear.
 * To cover up UK's nuclear threat?
 * In a desperate situation, a nuclear power could be using it. Soviet Union wouldn't go to war for Argentina.
 * To cover up clandestine operations from Chile?
 * Very likely.
 * To cover up that HMS Invincible was hit?
 * Why was the Royal Navy so frank about the other ship losses?
 * But according to Naval Airman B. Marsden "died on H.M.S. Invincible and was buried at sea". He wasn't a Sea Harrier pilot or involved in a helicopter crash, so if a member of HMS Invincible dies, the ship could have been attacked!
 * To cover up that French arms have NO-GO enemies? (selfdestruct codes)
 * Possibly.


 * Well - I can clear one of those up for you. According to "Falklands Air War" (Highly highly recommended) Airman Brian Marsden was killed on the deck of Invincible on 15 June 1982, when in heavy seas an "aircraft tug" broke free and crushed him against the carriers' Island. My money would be on ops from Chile / spys inside Argentina. Megapixie 12:40, 9 November 2006 (UTC)


 * So he didn't even died during the war, no wonder the date of death wasn't published at SAMA82. Necessary Evil 17:13, 9 November 2006 (UTC)


 * as the secret exists, something must be out there. The Chilean Connection was described in detail by Sir Lawrence Freedman but there were another versions of the facts originated in Argentina such: the ship attacked by the Daggers on May 1st just in the beginning of the UK operations was in fact HMS Sheffield and badly damaged. Differences with the real number of SeaHars damaged/shot down on the same day and after. the fact the british sustained these first loses in what they first thought was just a picnic take them to refuse to accept Peru 's President peace plan (when Argentina already do it) deliberating sinking Belgrano out of the war zone to force argentinians to fight showing thatcher desesperate 's decision of go to a war at all costs to clean her internal problems . Also the real role of the US thought all the conflict (deliberately less appraised in favor of the uk strength) maintaining a real air bridge from the US to  ascension delivering all kinds of suplies  from Sidewinders, Shrikes to fuel and ammunition and last but not least some hints of war crimes carried out by british troops against argentine prisoners (with no firm evidence)  Jor70 12:59, 9 November 2006 (UTC)


 * Hi Jor70. Do you know if the Argentine government has imposed a 100-years secrecy on its 1982-war archive? Regards Necessary Evil 15:33, 9 November 2006 (UTC)


 * Of course not, there is a Democracy down there! :) There was a Libro Blanco "white book" released soon after the war that was used on the war trials and military head chiefs (Galtieri, Anaya, .. ) were condened to prision by the armed forces supreme council when democracy was restored under the Alfonsin administration in 1984  Jor70 16:02, 9 November 2006 (UTC)


 * Argentina in fact is having trouble facing up to their loss in the conflict. Fabricated stories of Argentinian military successes created by the Junta's propaganda/publicity machine during the war maintain their currency because the mass of people, understandably, emotionally reject what happened; they do not *want* to believe it, and so they choose to believe stories of victory and success. Toby Douglass 18:27, 23 December 2006 (UTC)

Very well. Is there any explanations of the following in Libro Blanco:
 * Why wasn't the air bridge in April used on a few bulldozers to lengthen the Port Stanley runway, instead of 12,000 soldiers. If FAA had deployed high performance jets on the islands, Mirages could have created air superiority, and Skyhawks would have had more than 5 minutes to find their targets AND they could reach the British Task Force East of the islands.
 * Why didn't the junta wait to 1983, when HMS Hermes and the Vulcan bombers were scrapped and HMS Invincible was sold to Australia. ARA would have acquired more exocet missiles and type 209 submarines.
 * Why did ARA redrew ARA 25 de Mayo to port after ARA General Belgrano's loss? The aircraft carrier had plenty of ASW aircraft and ASW helicopters plus six destroyers to protect it from British submarines. Was it because of a nuclear threat to Southern Argentina?
 * Why didn't 80 percent of the Argentine bombs explode? The Argentine air force must have known the performance envelope of the bombs.
 * Why didn't Argentine paratroopers attack the Port San Carlos bridgehead, when most of the British infantry was fighting at Port Stanley?
 * Did the authorities found any trace of SAS in Argentina?
 * Regards Necessary Evil 17:13, 9 November 2006 (UTC)


 * Evil, the Libro blanco should not be confused with the 2000's one, you can find it as "Informe Rattenbach" and the spanish version  is here Was done by the military in late 1982 and I think a little too soon.  There are not direct answers to yours questions in the report. I can resume you that the april 2 "invasion" (a long dream of Anaya not Galtieri since it was naval ops chief) was launched due the Georgias incident, a war was never imagined by the arg mil who were still negotiating april 23 when the brits retake georgias and they realized how the real situation was (in fact all 2nd april invasion troops had returned to the mainland  )  In that moment, last week april, the decision was to fill the islands with a great number of troops, again not for combat but for dissuasion and you need to remember that there was another caotic situation with Chile which Argentina was virtual in a cold war condition since 1978. Chilean armed forces positioned their troops along the southern border forcing ARA maintain the marines brigade in Tierra del Fuego and argentine army southern regiments in Patagoina. About the so comment deployment of combat Jets to Stanley, I personally think they could not operated from there with the brit naval gunfire. pucaras, machis and T-34s had a hard time there and the mirage or a-4 wouldnt made any differences once in the air against the seaharrs if they were still armed just with shafrirs or aim9b againsts the aim9l. for the other questions, I personally think, that the arg armed forces where focusing in those years against an internal enemy not to a foreign war which the last one was 150 years before. Not only the bombs didnt explode ( replaced in late may with some given by the israelis ) but also san luis torpedoes didnt work and the  lack of jointness was a vital part that helped the brits too. Jor70 12:08, 10 November 2006 (UTC)


 * That answered many questions, since it was last-minute decisions, and not long-time planning. But I still don't understand why ARA 25 de Mayo was redrawn with all her ASW capacity. Since Argentina and Chile share 5.150 km of borderline, a sea war isn't the first thing coming to my mind. The narrow Strait of Magellan is unfit for aircraft carriers, and as far as I know, ARA had fast patrol boats stationed there. ARA 25 de Mayo wasn't that necessary in an eventual Argentine-Chilean war. Some of ARA's destroyers and corvettes were armed with Exocet MM38 missiles (the type hitting HMS Glamorgan) and a helicopter could guide these missiles from a high altitude (like a very high radar mast) toward the British task force. Do you have any idea why ARA redrew from the fighting (except COAN, ARA San Luis and units trapped on the Falklands Islands)? Regards Necessary Evil 14:18, 10 November 2006 (UTC)


 * ARA 25 de Mayo was an obsolete World War II era carrier, and was probably unseaworthy. In any case, she was being stalked by several RN nuclear subs, who would have finsihed her off if she came too close to the taskforce. Astrotrain 14:43, 10 November 2006 (UTC)


 * She was part of Task Group 79.1 and WAS seaworthy. She was World War II-vintage, like ARA General Belgrano, but was modernised for jet operations. According to a Salamander book called Modern Naval Warfare from late eighties, the Argentine Task Groups 79.2 (three corvettes) and 79.3 (General Belgrano with escort) were shadowed by RN submarines, but not Task Group 79.1 (25 de Mayo with escort). Royal Navy failed to find ARA Veinticinco de Mayo May 2nd, when her 8 Skyhawks should have carried out a raid on the British Task Force. A sudden loss of wind, made it impossible for the 24 knots of the carrier, to create enough headwinds for the heavily fuel- and bombloaded Skyhawks to take off.


 * Not quite accurate. Winds dropped; the planes could have taken off with a reduced bombload if the carrier had turned into the wind, but that would have meant sailing directly towards the British; this was something that was not welcome, since the fleets were only about 150 miles apart and British Task Force thoroughly outclassed the Argentinian force.  As such, the Argentinians backed off, sailed away, opening the range, with the mission postponed till the next day; but then in the end didn't happen. Toby Douglass 18:27, 23 December 2006 (UTC)


 * Do you believe that the sinking of Belgrano was an eye-opener for the Argentine Navy Command (gee, they really have submarines down here and - gee, ships could be sunk outside MEZ), Astrotrain? Necessary Evil 15:30, 10 November 2006 (UTC)


 * I think it was an eye-opener, but not in the sense you're questioning. The navy knew they were at war and knew it was deadly dangerous.  However, none of the crew had been in combat before and the first time a ship is sunk really does ram the message home - and in that sense, I think it was an eye-opener. Toby Douglass 18:27, 23 December 2006 (UTC)


 * Well fom what I have read she was being stalked by HMS Splendid (although Splendid did not find her). I think that if she was detected then she would have been attacked, and would have been sunk. The 25 de May was of course the main target, as the only Argentine aircraft carrier. However even if she had launched her aircraft- would they have been effective in any attack on the Task Force? The Sea Harriers/Sea Wolf systems would have slaughtered them. And once she lost her aircraft- the carrier would be useless.


 * Of course maybe the Argentine navy, after Belgrano, released they could not possible compete against a nuclear submarine fleet, and decided to withdraw to save their capital asssets. The British were only really interested in the carrier tho, Splendid did not attack the Hercules when she was spotted off the Argentine coast later in the war. Astrotrain 15:49, 10 November 2006 (UTC)


 * Well, the Argentine High Command didn't seem to have any problem in sacrificing scores of Skyhawks, but the Task Force's lack of AEW might have caught the British with their pants down. I still believe that 25 de Mayo could have mustered a better anti-submarine screen than Belgrano. Belgrano was escorted by two Pacific War veterans, while 25 de Mayo was escorted by two modern type 42 destroyers. Of course Royal Navy knew all about the type 42's blind angles, but ARA also had three modern French build frigates/corvettes (which failed to detect that HMS Spartan was shadowing them) and 25 de Mayo had 6 S-2 Tracker ASW aircraft and 5 H-3 Sea King ASW helicopters deployed. Combined, they stood a better chance than Belgrano.


 * I just think that it's strange: Admiral Anaya (the navy member of the junta) was most excited about bringing the Malvinas home and Operation Rosario was almost a navy-only operation. It's like he suddenly realised that ships can be lost in a war, and withdrew the navy from the war, abandoning 12,000 teenage soldiers to their fate on the islands.Necessary Evil 17:53, 10 November 2006 (UTC)


 * althought are facts like the us satellites and radio codes given by the chileans that could justify their action I sadly agree. While the air force sacrifice their pilots in an matter that they supposdly did not need to participate according to ARA (at least initially) and the Army give what  had available   at the time, the navy, main mind of the recuperation, did not risked their ships after the belgrano sinking. If you go to a war you need to accept the consequences, more if the majority of crew of those ships were not conscripts .  Thanks God I can assure you that today ARA is very different. Jor70 20:45, 10 November 2006 (UTC)


 * You say "if you go to war, you must accept the consequences". But this war was so artifical; the Argentian claim to the Falklands has been deliberately exploited and magnified by the State over the decades prior to the war.  In childrens geography textbooks, the Islands were draw much larger than their real size, to make it seem that they were a major loss to the country!  And then the Junta, to keep themselves in power, capitalised on what the people had been decieved into believing, started the war, paid for it with the money taken by tax from the people, conscripted the sons of the people to fight, and then got them killed.  "If you go to war, you must accept the consequences" - this isn't about that.  This is actually about lacking freedom and liberty in your own country, and the consequences that follow from *that*. Toby Douglass 18:27, 23 December 2006 (UTC)


 * Prob because losing a ship (especially the sole aircraft carrier) would be a larger psycological blow than the deaths of some soldiers or a few jets. Astrotrain 21:11, 10 November 2006 (UTC)


 * I can't stop thinking of old fashion Honour and Glory. General Manuel Belgrano was one of the founders of Argentina, and it must have been some kind of disgrace for the Argentine junta, to lose a ship with his name. May 25th is the Argentine Independence Day and would have represented the same shame, if it was lost too. At the beginning of World War Two, the German pocket battleship Deutschland was renamed Lützov, because Hitler feared that the loss of a ship with the name Deutschland (Germany) would have a significant negative psychological and propaganda effect. Regards Necessary Evil 21:39, 10 November 2006 (UTC)


 * The Brits also kept the Queen Elizabeth 2 well away from the combat area- and didn't even send the Royal Yacht Britannia as a hospital ship- for similar reasons. Astrotrain 23:23, 10 November 2006 (UTC)

Britannia was never sent down south as it would required its own tanker due to needing fuel oil unlike the rest of the fleet


 * Stupid comment, but Argentina's Independence Day is July 9. May 25 is a very important day, however, thus the same concept about shame would apply. Sebastian Kessel Talk 23:42, 10 November 2006 (UTC)


 * Thanks for the enlightenment, Sebastian. UK newer cared much about their ANZAC allies - Gallipoli 1915 and anchoring SS Canberra in the hornet's nest in the San Carlos Waters, May 23rd 1982. Necessary Evil 01:49, 11 November 2006 (UTC)