Talk:Falklands War/Military Analysis

Suggestions: Topics
1. Mention of removal of CIWS on Type 42 and Type 22 design, installation post war in response to anti-ship missiles. 2. Effectiveness of SSN in suppressing Argentine navy. 3. Point out really lessons relearned.

Suggestions: Books
Lawrence Freedman - Official history of the Falklands War Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward - 100 Days

Additional suggestions
My starting point is the words of SACLANT to Woodward, that there were: "no new lessons to be learned from your little war" (quoted by Woodward in his foreword to "The Falklands conflict twenty years on"). I agree that some old lessons were re-learned: the importance of logistics, the value of anti-flash gear, the need for a fleet to have AEW cover.

On the specific matter of CIWS, I would like to see the sources. Hughes (p.286), relying on Schulte, gives a defender effectiveness in defeating a well-aimed ASCM as 0.68, but Schulte's data cannot distinguish between soft-kill (e.g. chaff) and hard-kill (e.g. CIWS), because soft-kill was employed in every case.

Sources: Hughes ISBN 1-55750-392-3. "The Falklands conflict twenty years on - lessons for the future" (Badsey, Havers, Grove - Sandhurst Conference Series). It's not a source for the war itself, but the point about V/STOL carriers not having AEW, as the previous generation of carriers did with the Gannet, was made as far back as 1965 ("Maritime Strategy", Vice-Adm Sir Peter Gretton, Cassell, London, 1965, p.130). Gretton seems remarkably prescient in the light of the Falklands War. He would have been surprised by the effectiveness of the Sea Harrier, but he made his remarks before the invention of the ski-jump. I have been promised a copy of "The Falklands Campaign: The lessons" (Command Paper), but it hasn't arrived yet - it was discussed in Parliament so there may be something useful in Hansard. Philip Trueman (talk) 09:03, 18 January 2013 (UTC)

An attempt to suggest a solution
Would it make sense to have a "Military analysis" section, focused purely on military analysis by military analysts, and a separate section to cover the longer-term politico-military responses in the light of the war? That could cover, on the British side, the reversal of the Nott defence cuts (e.g. the planned sale/scrapping/withdrawal of Hermes/Invincible/Fearless/Intrepid/Endurance), the introduction of CIWS in some ships, and the revived enthusiasm for the 4.5" gun in the later Type 22s and the Type 23s in the light of the (re-learned) lesson of the value of naval gunfire support. On the Argentine side there'd be mention of the reduced defence expenditure imposed by a democratic civilian government facing economic challenges and the difficulties imposed by the American veto of certain arms purchases e.g. from Israel.  Not sure if I would count the ending of conscription, though I know some people would.

My aim is not suppress all mention of CIWS, but rather not to put under the heading of "Military analysis" anything that isn't such. I'm sticking by my contention that the war showed nothing about the vulnerability of ships to air attack, especially when those ships give up their advantage of manoeuvre in order to defend a beachhead, but that isn't to deny that CIWS was later installed. (I suspect the real reason involved a certain amount of the Politician's Syllogism: "We must be seen to do something. This is something.  Therefore we must do this.") Philip Trueman (talk) 14:12, 21 January 2013 (UTC)


 * It does still need to be a minimal coverage, just want to check you're aware that Military Analysis was moved to Aftermath of the Falklands War some time again. This was done to slim the article down, when it got too large. Wee Curry Monster talk 20:51, 21 January 2013 (UTC)