Talk:Falsifiability/Archive 5

Statement of the obvious
We are told that the concept of falsifiability was "introduced" by Popper. It is a statement of the obvious. Everyone has always objected to a theory that cannot be disproved. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.146.216.125 (talk) 12:54, 27 May 2019 (UTC) In 1966, Popper noted that he wished he had known about Peirce's work earlier. -- 13:21, 27 May 2019‎ 86.146.216.125


 * 86.146.216.125 -- Popper didn't really invent the idea (though he explored it more systematically), but no, it's not entirely obvious. Many scientists would have said that the best theory is the one that most closely fits experimental observations in the most parsimonious way... AnonMoos (talk) 13:47, 27 May 2019 (UTC)


 * The usual logical notion of falsifiability which is the capacity to be falsified is as old as the notion of falsification, which was known in ancient Greek and Indian philosophies. However, the epistemological definition of the term falsifiability was given by Popper. This is well known. Charles Sanders Peirce coined the term "fallibilism" in the late nineteenth century and these are related concepts. However, these terms were coined in  completely different contexts. The article is about the epistemological notion  of falsibiability, as introduced by Popper, but we can certainly mention how it relates to Peirce's view, etc., as long as we have valid sources. Dominic Mayers (talk) 14:39, 27 May 2019 (UTC)
 * Perhaps the fact that falsification (and thus falsifiability) was known in the ancient times may appear beside the point, because it was not contested here that Popper redefined the term falsifiability, so that it is something different. The issue is whether it is new with respect to Pierce, etc. Indeed, simply because Popper defined or redefined the term falsifiability does not mean by itself that he introduced a new idea. Certainly, new knowledge is always related to previous knowledge and nothing is never totally new, but some contributions are considered more important, because at the time they changed the way of thinking. These contributions deserve separate articles in Wikipedia. How do we know that Popper's falsifiability is such a contribution? We know it because so many books and articles, secondary sources, acknowledge this contribution. For example, I have a book in front of me (and there are many others that do the same), which has a chapter written by W.V. Quine. The chapter is entitled "On Popper's negative methodology". This illustrates that many illustrious mathematicians and philosophers of science have attributed falsifiability  and its associated methodology to Popper, even though they obviously knew that it was not entirely new. Dominic Mayers (talk) 15:33, 27 May 2019 (UTC)

Re-write needed
Respectfully, a subject expert needs to reorganize the text to eliminate run-on sentences and grab bag paragraphs. Incrementally added text makes the article hard to understand.

The article sounds like a college term paper being padded for length. For example, the names of Karl Popper and other authorities are repeatedly inserted into the text unnecessarily. Please use footnotes to refer to authorities.

Also, some paragraphs now contain multiple ideas, which overcomplicate the text. Please break paragraphs into groups of ideas.

The issue is not accuracy. The goal is organization and clarity. Tdk408 (talk) 04:26, 28 December 2019 (UTC)

The awkward tag
The awkward tag out of context at the start of the article is confusing. Such a tag makes sense when used after a sentence such as explained in its usage: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template:Awkward. The first step if a reorganization is needed, is to propose changes in this discussion page, at the least point at specific sentences or paragraphs so that we have some context to discuss it. Dominic Mayers (talk) 03:05, 30 December 2019 (UTC)

I written my thoughts about why we need a plan to proceed Dominic Mayers (talk) 23:18, 2 January 2020 (UTC)

Clearer lead
The article currently starts:


 * A statement, hypothesis, or theory is falsifiable if its assertion contradicts data (more precisely, a basic statement) that is otherwise possible.

This wording is trying hard to be technically correct, but at the expense of being understandable by the ordinary reader, for several reasons:
 * "its assertion" seems to be used to mean "whether it is true"
 * it is unclear what it means for its assertion to contradict data
 * mentioning the technicality of "basic statement" is premature here; for one thing, "basic statement" isn't defined
 * "data" is unclear
 * "that is otherwise possible" is unclear.

It also doesn't give enough context.

Let me propose something simpler:


 * In philosophy, a claim is falsifiable if there could in principle exist an observation which shows it to be false. Many theories in the philosophy of science use falsifiability as a crucial criterion separating science and non-science; making this precise has occupied many philosophers.

It would also be nice to have a vivid, concrete example somewhere in the lead, e.g.:


 * The claim "all ducks are white" is falsifiable—and indeed false—because observing one black duck contradicts it. The claim "all ducks weigh less than a ton" is falsifiable but has never been falsified, and is indeed surely true. "All ducks are mortal" cannot be falsified in principle—even though it is doubtless true—because there is no way of knowing whether any of the currently living ducks will ever die.

I'm sure that the definition and the examples above can be improved... but my point is simply that the article needs to start with a general, understandable statement. Later on, of course, the article can go into necessary details, technicalities, and caveats. After all, the lead can't possibly summarize all the work on the topic! --Macrakis (talk) 18:11, 9 January 2020 (UTC)

Small Note
By the way, falsifiability is NOT a criteria that directly separates science from non science. If you want to write that, then you are biased with an agenda, which might be honorable, but still this bias would prevent you from presenting falsifiability for what it is. Falsifiability only applies to theories, not to scientific methods that accept or reject these theories. What can be said is that a method that would accept unfalsifiable theories can hardly be scientific, but this is a meta criterion that uses falsifiability. It's not falsifiability. There is a nuance and it is important.

Dominic Mayers (talk) 22:58, 9 January 2020 (UTC)


 * Agreed. "Naive falsifiability" is problematic in all sorts of ways, and using it as a blunt instrument to separate science from non-science doesn't really work in any sort of straightforward way, as a whole series of philosophers have pointed out over the past 60+ years.
 * My point was that the lead to the article needs to present the basic idea of falsifiability in a simple, comprehensible way. The basic idea is along the lines of: if your theory can't be contradicted by observation, it's not saying much. I really do prefer the term "observation" to "data", because "data" can mean many things -- not just observational data, but also any information at all. A book of random numbers is data in the latter sense. Maybe it suffices to rename it "observational data".
 * The current wording is difficult to understand, even for someone (like me) who has actually read Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend, et al. What does it mean for data to be "possible"? Why talk about the "assertion of a statement"?
 * The core idea of falsifiability is not that hard, and the introduction to the WP article should be understandable by an intelligent 10th grader (or 10th grade teacher!).
 * It also seems important to mention the role of falsifiability as a demarcation criterion in the lead. --Macrakis (talk) 23:26, 9 January 2020 (UTC)


 * My motivation for "data" was to refer to a common concept in practical science and data is such a concept. In particular, it includes the outcomes of complex processes and computations such as in magnetic resonance imaging, etc., but maybe you are right that it was too general. Observational data is better. We agree on this.   I am thinking more about the other points that you made.


 * Dominic Mayers (talk) 05:58, 10 January 2020 (UTC)

Not much can be said based on the naive definition, only confusion.
The problem is that we naively think that it is sufficient to have a definition that we know how to use to demarcate falsifiable theories from others.


 * All swans are white is falsifiable, because we can conceive the observation of a black swan (in fact they exist).
 * All swans weigh less than one ton is falsifiable, because we can conceive the observation of a swan that weigh two tons.
 * All swans are mortal is not falsifiable, because we cannot know if the swan is immortal. It's not an observation.

Simple definition: A statement is falsifiable if we can conceive an observation that contradicts it. That seems perfect and at the level of Wikipedia. This is wrong. The definition was not introduced to be used in this naive manner. This is a complete misconception. It was introduced to exhibit the logic of scientific discovery. In accordance with Popper, science is a complex process that use hypotheses (theories that are proposed) and refutations. The generation of hypotheses cannot be explained by logic, because induction is not logical. The only part that use logic is the refutations. The purpose of falsifiability is to show the purely logic content behind the refutations. The naive definition does not work for this purpose, because it does not has the key ingredient. The illusion that is created by the naive definition is misleading. Worst, this propaganda for the naive definition has contributed to many unfair criticisms toward falsifiability. So, if we give the naive the definition in the lead, we need to provide the proper context in the lead as well. I know, this definition is given in a few sources, but rarely out of context. Most sources avoid this naive definition.

What is missing? The link between the logical statements and the actual observations is missing. Given that the role of falsifiability is to exhibit the purely logical refutations that correspond to the actual refutations, this link is crucial. The whole discussion depends on it. This link requires the notion of basic statements, which are built using a background theory or a background knowledge. Popper discusses in details the issues of the empirical basis and what are the basic statements before he gives the definition.

Dominic Mayers (talk) 11:42, 16 January 2020 (UTC)

Unsourced debate about the subject of critical rationalism
This paragraph raises the question whether critical rationalism is about scientific theories only or about other things as well, but the only source provided is not convincing at all and I could not find any source that refer to Criticizability explicitly. In contrast to Positivism, which held that statements are meaningless if they cannot be verified or falsified, Popper claimed that falsifiability is merely a special case of the more general notion of critical rationalism, even though he admitted that empirical refutation is one of the most effective methods by which theories can be criticized. Criticizability, in contrast to falsifiability, and thus rationality, may be comprehensive (i.e., have no logical limits), though this claim is controversial, even among proponents of Popper's philosophy and critical rationalism.

In the reference provided, Popper does not say that "falsifiability is merely a special case of the more general notion of critical rationalism". First, it's not a special case, because critical rationalism is about the method whereas falsifiability is about the logical structure of the theory. Second, it's not clear that when Popper wrote "theories or guesses" that he meant that we should apply the methods of critical rationalism to other things than theories.

Dominic Mayers (talk) 20:01, 17 January 2020 (UTC)

What I did to improve the section Problem of induction
I removed the long paragraph that used "naive falsificationism" in a confusing way and then only listed a sequence of scientific theories, as if it was a proof of something. I placed the criticisms in their proper context. As a bonus, we have the explanation for the correct non dogmatic definition of falsifiability. The most important point though is that this is now very easy to source. I will be happy to add any citation needed. Dominic Mayers (talk) 23:20, 20 January 2020 (UTC)

Restructure and edit
So I've re-written a few slabs, reducing length, removing waffle and reinstating a structure in the lead that is reflected in the article.Banno (talk) 23:20, 18 January 2020 (UTC)


 * Thank you. This is a good cleaning and a better organization. There are many things that you removed that I did not have the courage to remove. I intend to reinsert some important and well sourced points that you removed, but it's ok that you removed them, because we need to think about where they fit. My guess is that they can be reinserted in the current structure, perhaps with an extra section for the definition, but maybe not. We will see. Dominic Mayers (talk) 03:31, 19 January 2020 (UTC)
 * Cheers. I'd encourage the reintroduction of some of that material. My aim was not to remove it but to restructure. Banno (talk) 23:22, 22 January 2020 (UTC)

Confusing section: Demarcation problem
We have to rethink this section. We could rewrite the second paragraph as a critic of naive falsificationism. We would swap the first and third paragraphs, because the third paragraph leads to naive falsificationism, because it is about rejection, whereas the first paragraph explains the usefulness of the criterion in a way that works in sophisticated falsificationism, where we only assess a theory with falsifications, but the final decision to reject is more complex and depends on failed falsifications (corroborations) as well. The section will then be a description of the demarcation problem to introduce the criterion, which should be provided somewhere. Any other idea? Dominic Mayers (talk) 18:21, 21 January 2020 (UTC)
 * I don't see how a reader would understand demarcation before naive falsification; and that this should be in the problem of induction. Go ahead with your edits, so I can see where you are going. Banno (talk) 00:01, 23 January 2020 (UTC)
 * I will go ahead, but before I would like to better understand what you are saying here. Can you expand a bit and be more specific about what aspect, if any, of my edits in the article or ideas in the above paragraph you are referring to? Dominic Mayers (talk) 03:50, 23 January 2020 (UTC)

Sokal and Bricmont
I'm questioning noteworthiness; but when investigating, I found that the quote provided is wrong. Specifically, the sentence " ... [but] the history of science teaches us that scientific theories come to be accepted above all because of their successes." was not found in the book. Nor could I locate support for "They further argue that falsifiability cannot distinguish between astrology and astronomy, as both make technical predictions that are sometimes incorrect." in the book. Hence, my edits. Banno (talk) 20:34, 24 January 2020 (UTC)

Does Wikipedia need this article?
Is Falsifiability a thing?

It is apparent that the logic of falsification, posited as an answer to the problem of induction, is not presented at all clearly in thie article. Instead the push seems to be for an article describing falsification as the principle demarcation between science and non-science. That is, the article is now partisan.

Neither Stanford nor IEP have articles on falsifiability. The topic is subsumed into the articles on Popper and on Scientific Method.

What do folk think of moving the bulk of this material into a new article on Falsificationism, which would be an historical account of Popper, Lakatos, Feyerabend and the relevant controversies, with this article becoming a mere redirection? Banno (talk) 21:42, 16 January 2020 (UTC)


 * You raised two independent questions. Is the article biased regarding the problem of demarcation vs the problem of induction? Does falsifiability deserves an article in Wikipedia? These two questions are to a large degree unrelated. I will first answer the second question. The definition of falsifiability contains a lot of subtleties and it is considered the core of Popper's epistemology.  It is a part of critical rationalism. My answer is that we should look for a better integration between falsifiability and critical rationalism. These two articles should support each other and it's not the case now. We cannot decide if falsifiability should be a separate article before we worked on how these two subjects can support each other. Falsifiability should be a tool used in critical rationalism and critical rationalism should provide an extension of falsifiability, a larger context.


 * Regarding the bias, it's not like there is an agenda being pushed here, not at all. Every author, I am sure, is interested in covering all facets of falsifiability. There is no issue here. Yes, maybe a facet could be covered more. Great, let's do it. It's not an issue. By the way, the original motivation for falsifiability was the demarcation of science vs non science. But it is true that the problem of induction is very much related to this problem, because the previous solution (in the Vienna Circle, Berlin Circle, etc.) to the problem of demarcation was based on an attempt to describe science as some form of induction (we start from the truth of observation statements and we build from there to have more complex laws, etc.). This is the way falsifiability addresses the problem of induction. It does not make induction possible. It does not solve the problem that way. It solves it because the context at the time was that some form induction was considered essential to separate science from non science and this lead us no where. Falsifiability solves the problem, because now, Popper says, it is not necessary. What do you expect as a solution to the problem of induction? What exactly you feel is missing?


 * Dominic Mayers (talk) 01:21, 17 January 2020 (UTC)


 * I'm not making a philosophical point, and agee with much of what you say. I'm asking wha thte best arrangement for an encyclopaedia might be. Given that other encyclopedias do not include an entry such as this, it seems to me that we ought at least take pause and think about it being included here. Banno (talk) 01:50, 17 January 2020 (UTC)
 * Perfect ! I like that. I asked the same question to myself some time ago. There is an advantage in merging it in critical rationalism: it is naturally introduced by the larger article. It would naturally be integrated with critical rationalism. Yes, but it remains that it is important enough to be a separate article. It is natural to expand on falsifiability in its own article. By the way, some encyclopedia of science covers falsifiability. I think I have two on my bookshelf that covers falsifiability. One of them has an article by Alain Boyer. So, on that respect, we are perfectly fine. But, sincerely, I like very much that you asked the question. My proposal is that we work toward a better integration with critical rationalism. This is a challenge that must first be addressed. It will make it easier to see if we should merge them and how we would do that, if we should. Dominic Mayers (talk) 02:21, 17 January 2020 (UTC)
 * Excellent. I guess we proceed by working out what belongs here, and what belongs in critical rationalism. I think this is the place for a discussion of the logic of falsifiability, and a place to contrast it with verificationism. Overall, I agree that this article ought be a brief jump-off point to a wider understanding of the topic. Banno (talk) 09:54, 25 January 2020 (UTC)

OK, I'm going to take this point as moot, and instead sugest working on the article in such a way that it would not be a concern if it's title were so changed. Banno (talk) 02:31, 18 January 2020 (UTC)

Unverifiable and unclear paragraph
The paragraph that starts with "In place of naive falsificationism, ..." is not sourced. The first sentence suggests that the previously mentioned issues are the defining characteristics of naive falsificationism. Who is the well known philosopher that used "naive falsificatism" in this manner? Certainly not Lakatos who has popularized the concept and first carefully analyzed it. The remainder of the paragraph "Popper envisioned science as ... " is essentially weak propaganda for Popper methodological and sophisticated falsificationism, because even a dogmatic falsificationist (see Lakatos 1978, p. 13-14) can envision the series of falsifications described in the paragraph. The overall section is problematic. It contains only one citation and it seems incorrectly used. Dominic Mayers (talk) 18:52, 20 January 2020 (UTC)
 * Naive Falsification was introduced as a structural element, long ago. The intent, at least on my part, was that the article show issues with the verifictionism of the Viena Circle, mention how verificationism seems to rely on confirming the consequent and explain how Popper's use of Modus Tolens overcomes this. I'd intended to lead on to a discussion of the stats of falsification. but eventually moved on without finishing. Character drift more than removed its usefulness.
 * I suspect the term is from SSR, but am not in a position to verify. It is certainly used.
 * I now wonder if it might be better to keep this article relatively brief; a jump of point to the more detailed content that exists elsewhere on Wikipedia. Banno (talk) 23:56, 22 January 2020 (UTC)


 * To my knowledge naive falsificationism is not used in SSR. The term is often attributed to Lakatos, even if Lakatos attributes it to Khun. Perhaps Lakatos meant that Khun only considered naive falsificationism. What is clear is that Lakatos clearly defined the term and the term is strongly attached to Lakatos.  Dominic Mayers (talk) 21:01, 23 January 2020 (UTC)
 * You are correct, it is not in SSR but in Lakatos' repy to SSR. 15:43, 25 January 2020 (UTC)Banno (talk)

dogmatic falsificationist
Why aren't we using Lakatos' term naive falsification? After all, even a sophisticated falsificationist can be dogmatic.Banno (talk) 05:02, 27 January 2020 (UTC)


 * Important question. Thanks for asking. Lakatos defines both dogmatic falsificationism and naive falsificationism. They are different concepts. Both are important. Dogmatic falsificationism has nothing to do with the naive claim that if a theory is methodologically (i.e., not dogmatically) falsified, then it will be rejected from science. This naive claim is naive falsificationism. Dogmatic falsificationism is different. It is the dogmatic belief that we can have faithful (in my own terminology) observations of the reality, i.e., that if we write a basic statement that corresponds to an observation, then it's true. Lakatos and Popper explain that in reality, it requires some decisions taken by agreement among scientists. So, to sum up, we move out of dogmatic falsificationism to enter methodological falsificationism and we move out of naive methodological falsificationism (or simply naive falsificationism) to enter sophisticated falsificationism (or simply falsificationism). Dominic Mayers (talk) 07:22, 27 January 2020 (UTC)

Technical article or brief jump-off point?
In this, we have: Excellent. I guess we proceed by working out what belongs here, and what belongs in critical rationalism. I think this is the place for a discussion of the logic of falsifiability, and a place to contrast it with verificationism. Overall, I agree that this article ought be a brief jump-off point to a wider understanding of the topic. I do not see it that way. Yes, we should try to separate what belong in falsifiability from what belong in critical rationalism, but my understanding is that falsifiability, because it is a technical definition, is the opposite of a jump-off point.

Dominic Mayers (talk) 19:49, 28 January 2020 (UTC)

Demarcation
Overall the changes of the last few weeks have been positive. The Demarcation section is an exception. The first two paragraphs ramble on about verificationism as a theory of meaning, which is all but irrelevant here;Third paragraph is ambiguous; and no where does it tell me what Demarcation actualy is. Banno (talk) 21:18, 30 January 2020 (UTC)
 * No. On the contrary, the fact that a theory of meaning was a way to separate science from non science is the whole point. This is the way Popper and many others explain it. Dominic Mayers (talk) 23:22, 30 January 2020 (UTC)


 * I intend to complete the section about induction with Popper's solution as he presents it himself. Currently, this section presents Lakatos view only. Falsifiability could be defined here. So, the demarcation section will naturally refers to it. I think you keep doing the same mistake: you confuse the demarcation created by falsifiability with the demarcation in the demarcation problem. Falsifiability demarcates between empirically meaningful statements and the others, but the demarcation that was attempted before Popper was completely different and this created a problem. This is what the demarcation problem section should be about. It's ok that falsifiability is defined before, because falsifiability is also important in the problem of induction. Dominic Mayers (talk) 23:09, 30 January 2020 (UTC)


 * Suggests here what you have in mind. You might have your own view. Please share it before starting to edit, especially if it means a complete reorganization. Because, I might have to undo a lot of it and it's not time well spent for you and me. Dominic Mayers (talk) 22:30, 30 January 2020 (UTC)

We must consider the growth of knowledge
We must take into account that the problem of induction and the demarcation problem are facets of the main problem of epistemology: the growth of knowledge. This is Popper's view on epistemology and it's the relevant view. The positivists saw the inductive methodology as an explanation of the growth of knowledge and at the same time they demarcated what was considered scientific. The inductive methodology was an attempt to explain growth within the demarcated scientific theories. They provided a wrong solution to the correct problem. Falsifiability is Popper's solution to the same problem.

We cannot give a solution to the demarcation problem without explaining how the demarcated scientific theories grow. We cannot give a solution to the problem of induction without explaining how it is consistent with a growth of knowledge. It is also useful to explain how falsifiability compares to other attempts to a solution. This is the way the article considers the demarcation problem, for example.

Most if not all critics turn around the problem of the growth of knowledge. So, it will be totally inappropriate to present these critics without presenting falsifiability accordingly.

Dominic Mayers (talk) 01:44, 31 January 2020 (UTC)

citations for naive falsification
Naive Falsification is a term used by Lakatos in "Criticism and the methodology of scientific research programs": Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 69 (1968 - 1969), pp. 149-186 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Aristotelian Society


 * "For (Popper) the idea that on 'refutation' one can demand the rejection, the elimination of a theory, is 'naive' falsificationism" (p.150)

and then, explaining why the term is significant,
 * "In this paper I shall first show that in Popper's philosophy two different positions are conflated. Kuhn understands only Popper, the naive falsificationist (I shall call him Popper,),and his criticism of Popper1 is correct. I shall even strengthen it. But Kuhn does not understand a more sophisticated Popper-Popper2- whose rationality goes beyond naive falsificationism. I shall try to explain Popper2's position and strengthen it, mainly by stripping it of naive falsificationism. This improved Popperian position may escape Kuhn's strictures and provide a rational explanation of scientific revolution." (p. 151)

This paragraph has a pivotal place in the story of falsification, and ought either be included or summarised. Banno (talk) 06:26, 25 January 2020 (UTC)


 * The article already mentions the fact Lakatos presented naive falsificationism as a way to better explain Popper's falsificationism. However, the paragraph that you cite introduces a thesis that actually critics Popper. See in particular pages 159-167. The article should say something about this. It was at the source of a very serious dispute between Popper and Lakatos. I have excellent sources about this. However, it makes absolutely no sense to go into this without giving the definition of falsifiability, because Popper's angle cannot be understood without it. We covered a lot without using the definition, but here is a central point that cannot be covered without it. We could give Lakatos's angle only, but that would not be adequate and only contribute to the confusion. Dominic Mayers (talk) 17:43, 29 January 2020 (UTC)


 * Congratulations on having made the article much much clearer and better overall! --Macrakis (talk) 19:22, 29 January 2020 (UTC)


 * Thank you! Dominic Mayers (talk) 03:18, 31 January 2020 (UTC)


 * Errata: The article you cite is very similar to the first chapter of "The methodology of scientific research programmes" (1978), which contains the same first sentence that you cited. When I mentioned pages 159-167, I meant in this book, not on the paper that you cited. Dominic Mayers (talk) 03:17, 31 January 2020 (UTC)

Formalizing Modus tollens and link to fallacies are not useful
To understand falsification, it's not useful to formalize modud tollens as the formal rule

$$\frac{P \to Q, \neg Q}{\therefore \neg P}$$

Doing that, will only make the reader, which is lost in the technicalities, believe that he needs to understand this formalization. It might just scare him away even more. In fact, even mentioning the rule informally might not be needed, because it's very intuitive. The reader can get confused if we start to explain modus tollens as if this was what a key concept in falsifiability, when in reality what the reader needs to know about it is nothing else than the intuitive notion, which is a basic requirement for the understanding of anything in science,  mathematics and epistemology. I am not saying that knowing how to formalize a logic, prove equivalence between logical systems, etc. is a basic requirement. I am saying that this is not what falsifiability is about and let's not confuse the reader about this.

Dominic Mayers (talk) 05:45, 28 January 2020 (UTC)

I added this paragraph:

But I am not convinced it's useful. As I explained above, it might confuse the reader by letting him believe that falsifiability is about this kind of things, which belong to basic logic. There are two cases. First case: the reader is not good in basic logic (but still he naturally uses it). In this case, the reader may start to think that the issues in falsifiability are at this level, which is wrong. Second case: the reader knows about basic logic. In this case, the reader does not need this paragraph and may even find it annoying. Well, there is a third case: the reader cannot apply even intuitively basic logic. In this case, the reader needs more than a single paragraph.

Dominic Mayers (talk) 17:11, 29 January 2020 (UTC)

For the same reason, a link to a fallacy such as affirming the consequent is not useful, especially when it does not apply. I refer to this sentence in the article : This is not what falsifiability is about. The positivists with their inductive methodology understood very well the rules of logic. It is misleading for the reader to put an emphasis on fallacies. Moreover, in this particular case, the link points to a fallacy that does not even apply at all. There is no implication from "All swans are white" to "Here is a white swan", because "All swans are white" is equivalent to "There is no white swans or all of them are white". Therefore there is no antecedent to conclude from an affirmation of the consequent - there is no antecedent and no consequent in fact.

There might be a named fallacy that applies here, but it's not important, because it would be inappropriate to suggest that the great thinkers of the Vienna Circle were using fallacious logical reasoning. That's not what this article is about. We need to consider the fundamental philosophical issue that these philosophers had to face. Inductive reasoning was even considered as valid by Hume. Because he knew very well that it was not possible within the range of logic, he simply decided that it was valid in the psychological area. Even recently great thinkers have considered that we might need to reintroduce induction to explain the progress of science. Popper's thesis that it's not even a part of our day to day way to acquire knowledge is amazing.

Dominic Mayers (talk) 21:38, 30 January 2020 (UTC)


 * including links that explain the logical structure of a logical process is useful. Leave it in. Banno (talk) 22:10, 30 January 2020 (UTC)


 * At the least, find the correct fallacy that makes one go from one (or more) instance(s) to an universal law. I don't think it exists. Or if it exists, it's called the induction fallacy. I will agree with a few links, but we don't want to say too much, because it will be misleading. Dominic Mayers (talk) 22:24, 30 January 2020 (UTC)


 * CItation provided. Take it up with Grayling. Banno (talk) 03:11, 31 January 2020 (UTC)
 * "as if it were needed." It was indeed not needed for me to lookup your citation to know that it could not verify the added sentence "doing so would be to affirm the consequent". But, I did lookup, just to go with the rule and, as expected, it does not.  We see "affirming the consequent" (at page 457, not 397), but the implication  in the text is not from a universal law to an instance. So, you have not at all verified the content.


 * We have a problem here. The fallacy in the sentence, if we want to see it as a fallacy, is clearly an inductive fallacy. I provided a reference to go along with the principle of mentioning a fallacy. If this does not work, we have a serious problem. I made a very sincere compromise in accepting to point out a fallacy. Even if Popper mentioned a fallacy somewhere, it's obvious that it's not a central point. Dominic Mayers (talk) 03:46, 31 January 2020 (UTC)

Away from naive falsificationism
Here is a rough draft for this subsection:

Dominic Mayers (talk) 03:27, 2 February 2020 (UTC)

I will add references later. All of this can be very well sourced. Dominic Mayers (talk) 03:27, 2 February 2020 (UTC)

The technical tag at the top of this talk page
There is a difference between simplistic and simple. We need to make sure that the technical tag is not used because we have a too simplistic view. From a simplistic view, even an article that is as simple as it can be would appear too technical. From the discussions that we have above, I cannot rule out the possibility that there is an expectation for something too simplistic. Anyone that feels the tag is still needed, please explains what is your view of the subject: how the article could be made less technical, without becoming simplistic. Dominic Mayers (talk) 01:27, 8 February 2020 (UTC)

The third sentence The apparent contradiction seen in the case of a true but falsifiable statement disappears once we know the technical definition. might illustrate very well the situation. There is nothing technical in this sentence. The apparent contradiction in "true, but falsifiable" is obvious. Mentioning that a technical definition can take care of this is also not technical at all. The sentence is not technical. A reference to the existence of a technical definition might be incompatible with a "simple" view of the subject, but that is a different issue and, in that case, we need to rule out the possibility that this "simple" view is too simplistic. Dominic Mayers (talk) 01:44, 8 February 2020 (UTC)

Section Criticisms
The section Criticisms needs to be entirely revised. It's not well sourced and most of it is misleading. Kuhn himself explains in great details how much his view of Science is close to Popper's view. In particular, he says that his view about revolution in Science is the same as Popper - this can be sourced. He basically has two criticisms. The first is that Popper does not describe normal science, only the big revolutionary steps. Popper agreed with him and acknowledges that he has not thought about that (but adds that normal science is not interesting...) The second criticism is already mentioned in the article and it's the same as Lakatos's criticism.

What is written about Feyerabend seems correct, but it seems more a criticism of Lakatos's sophisticated falsificationism than a criticism of Popper's falsificationism. This has to be clarified using sources.

I am not sure about Socal and Bromont. It's not at the same level. Their criticism is directed on naive falsificationism or at best they repeat the old criticism of Lakatos and Kuhn. Here is how The Guardian quoted them : ""When a theory successfully withstands an attempt at falsification, a scientist will, quite naturally, consider the theory to be partially confirmed and will accord it a greater likelihood or a higher subjective probability… But Popper will have none of this: throughout his life he was a stubborn opponent of any idea of 'confirmation' of a theory, or even of its 'probability' … [yet] the history of science teaches us that scientific theories come to be accepted above all because of their successes.""

- Sokal and Bromont

Because they are themselves fashionable, it may be noteworthy, but it's not at all at the same level as Kuhn and Feyerabend.

Dominic Mayers (talk) 03:00, 5 February 2020 (UTC)

Testing on mobile... There is a bug. I was testing a response to the last contribution, not here.Dominic Mayers (talk) 15:53, 9 March 2020 (UTC)

Second test. I see clearly that I am in the section "The lead is inadequate" and I try to respond. I am on my mobile phone. Dominic Mayers (talk) 16:02, 9 March 2020 (UTC)

The lead is inadequate
This lead was written before important additions to the article. These additions make clear that the basic concept of falsifiability depends on a separation between the formal/logical and creative/subjective aspects of science. Falsifiability exists in the formal/logical side only. The creative/subjective aspect is only used to guess new theories and define the empirical basis, which is decided by conventions, not by logical rules. This separation is central in almost all sections, including the section about controversies. It's weird that the lead says nothing about it and its first sentence even contradicts this central idea. The informal definition mixes both aspects and thus totally fails to convey the main point. We have to work on this. It's ok to be informal in a brief summary if it conveys the central idea, but that's not what we have in the current lead. Dominic Mayers (talk) 14:59, 5 March 2020 (UTC)
 * Hi. This sounds very important but I'm not sure I understand the distinction. Would you help me? BillyGoatsGruff2020 (talk) 07:48, 9 March 2020 (UTC)
 * The distinction is a very well verified part of the article. Have you tried to read the sources? If you need help to get the sources, I can send you electronic version (when it's possible), at the least some sections. I am not fanatic at all about always referring to the sources all the times in the discussion page. On the contrary, I believe it's necessary that editors exchange their respective understanding in a very natural manner, without having to mention the sources all the times.  However, you need to have some understanding of the sources.
 * The distinction is central in Popper's thinking. You can see it in The Logic of Scientific Discovery,  Realism and the Aim of Science, etc. Thornton wrote : "Popper has always drawn a clear distinction between the logic of falsifiability and its applied methodology. The logic of his theory is utterly simple: if a single ferrous metal is unaffected by a magnetic field it cannot be the case that all ferrous metals are affected by magnetic fields. Logically speaking, a scientific law is conclusively falsifiable although it is not conclusively verifiable. Methodologically, however, the situation is much more complex: no observation is free from the possibility of error—consequently we may question whether our experimental result was what it appeared to be" and I am not saying that Thornton covered the whole subject with this sentence about experimental errors.  The informal aspect of science shows up even more in the way we propose theories. This is perhaps where the distinction is  most important. Dominic Mayers (talk) 19:47, 9 March 2020 (UTC)

Attempt to improve the lead
I reverted this attempt to improve the lead. The first sentence in this attempt was:

Falsifiability is simply not an assertion. Right there, we already have a problem. But, let's assume the goal was to use "falsifiability" to refer, in a very broad manner, to what is asserted by its associated philosophy. The philosophy asserts that a statement must be falsifiable before it can become accepted as a scientific theory. So, this attempt would make sense, if "inherently disprovable" was the definition of falsifiable. Otherwise, it's not even the correct philosophy. I never seen "inherently disprovable" as the definition of falsifiability.

We should not have to discuss the content of the lead in terms of its direct verifiability in the literature. What is important is that it summarizes the key points of the article. We don't say in the article that falsifiable means inherently disprovable. I understand the intuition though: if it is falsifiable, there must be some way to prove it false. Yes, but unless we explain correctly the way of proving the statement false, we miss the key point. The article explains it. The way is through the notion of empirical basis. The empirical basis is one of the most important key point in the notion of falsifiability.

Dominic Mayers (talk) 18:09, 14 March 2020 (UTC)

But this attempt was actually useful. It made me realize that a simple key point to add in the lead is that the difference between the informal and technical definitions is only the definition of the empirical basis, i.e., the basic statements that can be used to show a statement false. Based on this I made this edit. Dominic Mayers (talk) 18:50, 14 March 2020 (UTC)

Non verified and, I believe, non verifiable statement
It just occurred to me that the following statement in the article is not verifiable.

These observation or basic statements constitute the empirical "basis".

For Popper, a basic statement does not have to be an actual observation. This contradicts what is written just before in the article:

the written form of the observation matches with an actual observation.

Popper so much insisted that a falsifier does not have to be actually possible that I consider this a very serious unverifiability issue. It's not entirely surprising, because I and others were aware that we have not given the actual definition of falsifiability in the article. We just pointed to it quickly in the lead. Personally, even though I know that my personal view does not really matter, I would like to say that I find interesting that we could go a long way, following Lakatos, without actually defining falsifiability. Well, it's not entirely true. The definition is implicit in the decisions (mentioned by Lakatos) that must be taken by the scientists. We only need to relax the decision that is mentioned above. The observation needs only to refer to existing technologies. It can combine different parts that are possible separately, but not possible together. I remember that Popper discusses that somewhere. For example, identifying a raven refers to existing technologies and observing the color red also, but observing a red raven is impossible (at the least, it is what we believe) and yet it is a valid falsifier. In contrast, "all men are mortal" is not falsifiable because no technology can allow us to conclude that a man is immortal. Dominic Mayers (talk) 01:36, 7 April 2020 (UTC)

The picture on the left illustrates another example, but in this case it is the initial condition in an eventual falsifier, observing an angel, that cannot be supported by conventionally accepted technologies. We have already given an example (the red raven) that illustrates that a falsifier does not have to be possible. In a footnote, we have another example: "this duck weigh two tons" is impossible and yet a valid falsifier for "all ducks weigh less than one ton." The point is that we have many examples that illustrates that the empirical basis used to falsify the theory can contain impossible falsifiers, but these falsifiers, including the impossible ones, must be describable in terms of conventionally accepted technologies. I mention this because what is an empirical basis is the central notion in the definition of falsifiability. Once we have the empirical basis, falsifiability can easily be defined in a rigorous manner. Dominic Mayers (talk) 10:24, 7 April 2020 (UTC)

Planned modifications to correct for a missing definition
List of issues associated with a missing definition (the proposed solutions will follow):


 * Issue 1. We do not actually give the full solution in the section "Critical Rationalism as a solution to the problem of induction".
 * Issue 2. The sentence that I emphasized in this excerpt  is incorrect in the following sense that statements such "this swan is white" can as well be expressed in terms of universal quantification. Popper gives the following example: "For example, the statement ‘Napoleon was born in Corsica’ can be expressed in the form, (x) (x = N → φx), in words: it is true for all values of x that, if x is identical with Napoleon, then x was born in Corsica."

- Karl Popper To complement this, let me add that Popper attributes no importance to whether we identify a singular entity with an expression such "this swan" or by use a proper name such as "Napoleon". In both cases, he says, we refer to a singular object. Popper wrote an entire section and more to emphasize that purely logical statements, which he calls strict statements, are not able to express in themselves the notion of singular objects. We need the separate notion of an individual constant, such as expressed by the symbol N for Napoleon. The same issue shows up in this sentence Given the previous context, this sentence confuses (strict) existential statements with statements of (singular) observation. No one, not even the positivists of the Vienna Circle, have considered the possibility of passing from an existential statement to a universal statement. What was considered is how to pass from a collection of observation statements to a universal statement. Solutions:
 * Issue 3. For completeness, I mention that the following sentence  is incorrect and the reference given does not verify it.  The fallacy affirming the consequent given in the reference is: p &#10230; q & q; therefore p. In our case, we observe a fallacious move from q="here is a white swan" to p="all swans are white". Unfortunately, this cannot be directly explained by "affirming the consequent", because we don't have the required p &#10230; q.  We must consider the intermediary statement p'="all swans are white and here is a swan". Only then we have the required p' &#10230; q. Indeed, the fallacious move from q to p', i.e., affirming the consequent, logically supports the fallacious move from q to p, because p' &#10230; p. But, even if a fallacious move from q to p' logically supports a fallacious move from q to p, when we observe a fallacious move from q to p, we cannot affirm that there was a fallacious move from q to p'; funnily, this would be similar to affirm the consequent.
 * Issue 4. I recall without further details the issue mentioned in .  The following statement in the article is not verifiable.
 * Issue 5. The first two paragraphs in section Falsifiability discuss more the solution, falsifiability, than the problem. They refer to falsifiability, which is not yet well defined, because the empirical basis is not.
 * Issue 6. Similarly, the paragraph "Demarcation_and_growth_of_knowledge" in the same section would fit better after we have defined falsifiability.
 * Issue 7. The section Falsifiability does not properly present Popper's view on the demarcation problem, which unfolded when he realized that some theories where not falsifiable in contrast with Einstein's theory of general relativity.
 * Issue 8. Of course, the main issue is that the notion of empirical basis and the definition of falsifiability are missing.


 * Solution 1. The title will be changed to "The problem of induction."


 * Solution 2. The entire paragraph is not really needed for the remainder of the section. It can be seen as a failed attempt to introduce the empirical basis, which would be easier to introduce later after the explanation that decisions must be taken by agreement between scientists in a falsification process. We will reuse parts of this paragraph when we explain the empirical basis later.


 * Solution 3. Not yet clear. A statement that is verified by the reference is  However, even though this modified statement is now verifiable I think it is misleading to suggest that those who believe in the induction principle are making such a fallacy. Yes, there is a reference that mentions this fallacy in the same context, but it's not the common view. Never seen this elsewhere. It is problematic. It  suggests that the fallacious logic is as follows: we go from "here is a white swan" to "all swans are white  (and here is a swan)" and then to "all swans are white". It could have been some other wrong principle such as an induction principle, which does not require an unnatural intermediary statement.


 * Solution 4. This sentence and the two subsequent sentences (i.e. the remainder of the paragraph) can be taken out. We can reuse part of these sentences later when we define the empirical basis.


 * Solution 5, 6 and 7. We rewrite the section Falsifiability using the paragraph that refers to the Vienna circle, but also add the independent perspective that Popper had when he considered Marxism, introspective psychology, etc.


 * Solution 8. After the section Falsifiability, we refer to Popper and many other references to give the definition of falsifiability. It will not be so difficult to explain the empirical basis, because the need for decisions by agreements between scientists is discussed in previous sections. The discussions that we removed from section Falsifiability can naturally follow the definition.

Dominic Mayers (talk) 20:55, 8 April 2020 (UTC)

The empirical basis and falsifiability
I have implemented solutions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. I think that there is now a good context to do step 8, which is the definition of falsifiability and of the empirical basis. I propose to call the new section "The empirical basis and falsifiability" or "Falsifiability and the empirical basis". Dominic Mayers (talk) 16:08, 11 April 2020 (UTC)

Texts that might be reusable
First, here are texts that were taken out and that might be reusable in the section:

This exerpt was taken out from the section "The problem of demarcation":

This one also under the subtitle "Demarcation and growth of knowledge":

I also taken out this:

Draft of the section
In Popper's view of science, statements of observation can be constructed within a logical structure independently of any factual observations. The set of all purely logical observations that can be created within the logical structure constitute the empirical "basis". Popper calls them the basic statements. Popper insists that a basic statement does not have to be possible in practice. It is sufficient that the values or properties that appear in the observations are associated with technologies. Popper gives the example of an apple that moves from the ground up to a branch and then starts to dance from one branch to another. It is a valid potential falsifier for Newton's theory, because we can measure the position of the apple at different times. In contrast, "all men are mortal" is a classical example of an unfalsifiable statement, because no technology can decide that a man is immortal. Yet another example of an unfalsifiable statement is "all angels have large wings". It is not falsifiable, because though we know how to observe the absence of large wings, no technology (independent of the presence of wings) exists to identify these angels.

In more than twelve pages of The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Popper discusses informally which statements among those that can be constructed in the logical structure are basic statements. The logical structure has universal classes. For example, the concept of swans define a universal class. It corresponds to a set of properties that every swan must have. It is not restricted to the swans that exist or will exist. Once we know the universal classes, informally, a basic statement is simply a statement that concerns only a finite number of specific instances in these classes. In particular, an existential statement is not a basic statement, because it is not specific about the instance. For example, the statement "there exists a black swan" is not a basic statement. On the other hand, "this swan here is black" is a basic statement. Popper says that it is a singular existential statement. So, basic statements are singular existential statements. Thornton says that the basic statements are statements that correspond to particular "observation-reports". He then gives Popper's definition of falsifiability: ""A theory is scientific if and only if it divides the class of basic statements into the following two non-empty sub-classes: (a) the class of all those basic statements with which it is inconsistent, or which it prohibits—this is the class of its potential falsifiers (i.e., those statements which, if true, falsify the whole theory), and (b) the class of those basic statements with which it is consistent, or which it permits (i.e., those statements which, if true, corroborate it, or bear it out).""

- Thornton, Stephen

As in the case of actual falsifiers, decisions must be taken by scientists to accept a logical structure and its associated empirical basis, but these are usually part of a background knowledge that scientists have in common and, often, no discussion is even necessary. However, this agreement, if we can speak of agreement when there is not even a discussion, exists only in principles. When an actual falsifier is proposed, the technology used is then considered in details and, as we discussed before,  an actual agreement is needed. This may require that we use a deeper empirical basis, hidden within the current empirical basis, to make sure that the properties or values used in the falsifier were obtained correctly ( gives some examples).

Dominic Mayers (talk) 19:35, 12 April 2020 (UTC)

Reusing texts that was taken out
Now, it's all done. I implemented 1 to 8. It remains to reinsert some of what was taken out. The only texts that I feel need to be considered for reinsertion are these ones:

This one also under the subtitle "Demarcation and growth of knowledge":

The subject is already covered in subsection falsifiability, but it so important that it needs to be reconsidered in the light of the definition. This issue together with the problem of the empirical basis, are at the source of almost all controversies. In both cases, the issue is that Popper, one might feel, hides a lot under the part that, he says, cannot be made rigorous. Therefore, it's very natural to question whether its true that only logical deductions and falsifications can be made rigorous in the scientific process. Is Popper correct when he says that the induction problem is solved, because the growth of science, except for the part where we do logical deductions and falsifications, is not a rational activity, but only an organic activity, a natural process of evolution? Is he correct that no induction is responsible for progress of science in the same way that human physiology was not created by our mental process? One might think that I am mistaken and that Popper only meant that it is a psychological process that does not concern epistemology. But, if this was the situation, he would have agreed with Hume, because that was Hume position. It must be said, though, that what Popper said is not that it is not a psychological activity, but only that it was not a logical activity at the psychological level. As soon as we accept activity that cannot be rationally described in terms of some logic at the psychological level, i.e., an activity that could be described as a viewpoint on what he prefers to call an organic activity, his argument to reject (what was called at the time) psychologism does not apply. Dominic Mayers (talk) 02:02, 14 April 2020 (UTC)

I changed my mind. It's an interesting subject, but I think the article does not have to go into this. At this stage, it's more important to consider how falsifiability works in the context of probabilistic laws and how it relates to the principle of parsimony. Dominic Mayers (talk) 15:04, 14 April 2020 (UTC)

Problem with The demarcation problem section
Basically, until a recent modification by user:Biogeographist, the section presented clearly Popper's position in contrast with a previous understanding. After the modification, it only appears as a difference of view point between Popper and a few other philosophers, which is totally not interesting. There is something wrong that, after this modification, we are not saying anymore that Popper really made a clear contribution. The key point is that to be able to claim that Popper made a clear contribution there should be no need that all others were wrong and that Popper corrected all of them. It sufficient that the knowledge was clearly not there in the discussions among others. For example, what the article does is  useless for our purpose. What it does is that it extracts from many divergent views, none of them being close to Popper's view, a minimal consensus that can be seen as consistent with Popper's view. But, this minimal consensus is not elaborated at all. It's very vague and it's not the view of any philosopher at the time. In contrast, Popper's view is very elaborated and detailed and it's not an imaginary constructed view. I need to think about that, but it's wrong that we cannot find a way to say clearly that Popper answered an important open question at the time and cleared out a lot of misunderstandings. Well, whether it was a solution and the other views were misunderstandings is not something Wikipedia can express, but we can contrast Popper's view with these other views.Dominic Mayers (talk) 04:32, 19 April 2020 (UTC)

I think the solution is to take separately the main views that were considered significant at the time, not a minimal consensus. What's is the point of a minimal consensus in science or in philosophy of science? What a strange idea? In contrast, if only one of the main views, already provided the solution that Popper provided, then Popper did not made an important contribution. Otherwise, he did and we can see it by comparing it with these views. Dominic Mayers (talk) 04:52, 19 April 2020 (UTC)


 * wrote: the section presented clearly Popper's position in contrast with a previous understanding. After the modification, it only appears as a difference of view point between Popper and a few other philosophers, which is totally not interesting. And: In contrast, if only one of the main views, already provided the solution that Popper provided, then Popper did not make an important contribution. But it is just your opinion that the details of controversies among particular philosophers are totally not interesting! The past is what it is, whether you find it interesting or not. In fact, scholars have found such controversies among particular philosophers to be interesting enough to write whole monographs about them. (The book series Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook comes to mind as addressing debates among Vienna Circle philosophers, among other issues.) And the idea that Popper did not make an important contribution if this aspect of his thinking was shared by others also strikes me as just your opinion. Looking at the issue in terms of later influence, Popper's contribution has to be considered important regardless of whether other philosophers shared this aspect of his thinking. Don't forget that the Vienna Circle is not the only context that should be considered (that is, the whole field of philosophy of science was not centered in Vienna!) but also, as mentioned above, what Niiniluoto and Laudan called the nineteeth-century methodological tradition, including Whewell in England and Peirce in America, and the other thinkers that Lakatos mentioned in "Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes". Biogeographist (talk) 11:23, 19 April 2020 (UTC)
 * , you mention references that refer to disagreement between philosophers. Of course, this happens. For example, it could happen simply to show that there were different views within a group. This can be interesting, but it's not at all the point that is being made in the section.  So, it remains that, even though the general context that you present is interesting, a particular disagreement between Popper and two or three other philosophers is not interesting in itself.  This particular point within the section as it is now is most likely not verifiable (in the sense that it would be cherry picking). It is  not a point that deserves to be mentioned in itself. It has to appear within a context that uses it to make another point, which other point would then be verifiable.  On the other hand, I agree that finding out a minimal consensus among a large group of philosophers is useful. I was wrong when I wrote that it is a strange idea. In any case, the section does not make use of that minimal consensus. Dominic Mayers (talk) 12:42, 19 April 2020 (UTC)

The view that should be made in the section, which is certainly verifiable, is simply that the demarcation problem was central in the Vienna circle and that the solutions provided all tried to use observations to verify statements. This is consistent with another view, which is likely to be also true, which is that none of the solutions obtained consensus. Dominic Mayers (talk) 15:51, 19 April 2020 (UTC)