Talk:Ferdinand Foch

Plan XVII
Isn't saying that it completely failed an opinion? I could probably think of a few arguments on why it was at least partialy succesful.

And the other thing is that he didn't design said plan in the first place. Plan XVII was developed by Foch's pupil Grandmaison, who completely distorted Foch's position. So let's not libel the poor fellow any more than we need to, eh? -Turi

Actually, Joffre must take responsibility for Plan XVII, although the 'cult of the offensive' can be laid at Grandmaison's door and he did indeed distort Foch's position. Foch said 'Fire has become the decisive argument’ in 1903, so he clearly was not in the morale wins all camp. See Joseph Joffre, The Memoirs of Marshall Joffre, (translated by T Bentley Mott, London, 1932), Vol. 1, pp. 48-9 & Ferdinand Foch, The Principles of War, (trans. Hilaire Belloc, originally published 1903, London: Chapman, 1920), p. 337. In addition, Hew Strachan has recently suggested that Plan XVII was very successful in terms of mobilisation, Strachan, First World War, p. 206. It is also worth bearing in mind that the much vaunted WW1 German army suffered just as appalling casualties during 1914 as did the French. Only the BEF, with its well trained regular soldiers, was able to display the skill needed to engage in modern battle, although even the BEF suffered serious casualties. The standard account on the 'cult of the offensive' is in Douglas Porch, March to the Marne, pp. 213-231 but also see Stefan T. Possony & Etienne Mantoux, ‘Du Picq and Foch: The French School,’ in Edward Mead Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy, (Princeton: PUP, 1943), pp. 206-233, Michael Howard, ‘Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914,’ in Peter Paret ed., Makers of Modern Strategy, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), pp. 510 – 526, & for a modern French view; Michel Goya, La Chair et l’Acier – L’invention de la guerre moderne (1914-1918), (Paris: Tallandier, 2004), pp. 69-112. For a rather different view, see Paddy Griffith, Forward into Battle – Fighting Tactics from Waterloo to Vietnam, (Chichester; Anthony Bird, 1981), Chapter 4 & Azar Gat, Military Thought, pp. 382-440.

Everybody suffered heavy casualties, but Plan XVII was a monumental disaster - 500,000 dead iirc, and they took only tiny corner at the bottom of Alsace, to which they clung throughout the war. No wonder Joffre sacked so many generals afterwards. At least the germans took belgium and reached the Marne.

WWI position?
Generalissimo is italian and has no link back to Foch. Maxime Weygand article calls him Supreme Allied Commander, again an article apparently that has nothing to do with WWI and Foch. Perhaps somebody who knows more about this era and Foch should fix that matter. --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus Talk 10:54, 17 Feb 2005 (UTC)


 * I read a book by John Keegan on WWI which specifically uses the word "Generalissimo." I will source it if I can remember later. - Borg Sphere (talk) 17:31, 20 February 2008 (UTC)
 * Added the inline citation. Hope I helped. Borg Sphere (talk) 17:22, 25 February 2008 (UTC)

Generalissimo is more correct, although in Anglophone books he's sometimes called "Supreme Allied Commander" which is strictly anachronistic - it was actually the title of WW2 theatre commanders (Eisenhower, Maitland Wilson/Alexander, MacArthur, Mountbatten, Nimitz)

The Title given to him in his new command was "Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies". However, the English had a problem with this and always called him "General in Chief of the Allied Armies". The word Generalissimo, which was never really liked, came from the Italians, and was taken seriously. However, Foch created his own tile, and he had it approved by Clemenceau on April 15, 1918.

Ethnicity?
What is Foch's ethnic backround? Foch doesn't exactly sound French.

the ethnicity of Foch is quite french. in 1914, he wa at the head of the XX army corps (and not the XXX)


 * He's French by birth and never claimed to be anything but. Ethnically, however, he was the son of a Basque father and an Alsatian (the German-speaking people of Alsace) mother. His last name is Basque, derived from "fioch," the Basque word for fire. France has many Basques and Alsatians, they're French citizens just like everyone else.


 * Foch was born in Tarbes to Napoléon Foch and Sophie Dupré. Napoléon Foch was from a family whose roots were in the village of Valentine in neighbouring Comminges (Haute-Garonne, former Gascony) : Foch is a Gascon surname meaning "Foix" which is another town in the Pyrenees. Sophie Dupré was born in Argelès (Hautes-Pyrénées) near the Spanish border.

http://gw4.geneanet.org/index.php3?b=pdelaubier&lang=fr&m=N&v=Foch —Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.250.67.96 (talk) 22:50, 3 November 2008 (UTC)


 * Now, the article claims that Foch is a Breton (neither Basque nor Gascon) name. What's right? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 92.230.56.89 (talk) 17:02, 8 September 2009 (UTC)

Work
This article needs major improvement. Foch was a very significant figure in the French Army during the First World War and the paragraph concerning that conflict only deals with his role in 1918. J Gez M 17:02, 1st March 2006

You are, of course, welcome to make additions to the article to make it better. john k 19:08, 1 March 2006 (UTC)

Changes
Tried to improve things a bit as part of the collaboration of the week. I am happy to report that it is now much more substantial than the French Wiki article. Andreas 16:21, 11 March 2006 (UTC)

Slow promotion?
I think that unless it can be sourced, the half-sentence about his brother being a Jesuit and that holding back Foch's career, should go. I could not find anything on that on Google, but a WW I buff would come in handy now. Andreas


 * That was from Carver's book, I can add the reference later if you like. The sentence relates to the separation of religious and political or military power in France, officers were strongly discouraged from having links to religious groups. I don't understand the issue well enough to explain it concisely, so as it stands that sentence is a bit isolated. I wouldn't object to its removal just now, but the issue would be important enough to be discussed in a more in-depth article. Leith p 07:54, 29 March 2006 (UTC)


 * Hi there - in that case I would suggest to add the citation and maybe a footnote. Otherwise it comes a bit out of the blue. Andreas 07:46, 31 March 2006 (UTC)


 * This observation is actually pretty standard in biographies of Foch (see Johnston, Puaux, Cornwall, and of course, Liddell Hart) or generally in histories of the French Army under the Third Republic (de Gaulle, incidentally, faced similar discrimination owing to a right wing Catholic background). It relates to Republican fears of the counterrevolutionary forces entrenched in the army and clergy&mdash; leftovers of Boulangism that supposedly acted in concert to challenge the legitimacy of Republican governments and threatened to carry the country into civil war during the Dreyfus affair&mdash;or really, any reactionary "man on horseback" who might entertain funny ideas about the value or sustainability of parliamentary values and institutions. (look no further than Petain) In the case of Foch, moreover, Catholicism is often cited as a defining element of his character:


 * At times, his eyes seemed to say: 'Young men, you do not know what a father suffers when mourning has entered his home to bide there forever. My only son is taken, and one of my daughters is widowed. I shall find in my home, which I left in the joyousness of a midsummer Sunday, little orphans who have never even known their fathers. I approach the twilight of my life with the consciousness of a good servant who will rest in the peace of his Lord. Faith in eternal life, in a good and merciful God, has sustained me in the hardest hours. Prayer has illuminated my soul. Our France has been torn and murdered. There are thousands and thousands of old fathers who, like me, have lost all they loved best, all the hope of their race. I am one with them at heart. I know what they suffer. But we have no right, now, to think about ourselves. ... We, here, are humble sons of the soil of France, who defend our liberties. Each one does his best. I know that we shall have the victory. It will be complete, and our dead will be avenged. But it is necessary to work, to fight on, to meet, with all the resources of the French spirit, the shocks of the barbarian masses. Spirit will conquer matter. Without a high ideal, without a spiritual conception of life, it is not possible to rise above feebleness and discouragement. Great sacrifices will be demanded of you, young men, they will be demanded of you to the end. Accept them as I have accepted mine. ... Afterward we may weep in our silent homes over which float the standards of victory." It is thus I would help you to think of him: mighty in spirit, strong in faith, supreme in strategy, immensely broad in understanding–a very great man; but too great a man to be a "superman"; and, withal, a tender, heartbroken old father to whom the laying down of arms means not the leisure to wear laurels, but the right to sit again by his hearth, now desolate, and think back on happy days and forward to a reassembled group in the house not made with hands.


 * Albrecht 05:05, 7 September 2007 (UTC)

It is true Catholic officers were discriminated against during the time of Foch's career - and you have to remember the political context. France became a Republic largely by accident in the 1870s (monarchists had majority, but they couldn't decide which Bourbon claiminant to restore to throne). As noted above General Boulanger tried to overthrow the state in 1880s, then at turn of century you had the Dreyfus Affair, in which the Army/conservatives were seen to be out of synch with Republican/civil ideals. Similar issues in education, where there were big disputes between secular and Catholic control of schools.

So staunch Catholics were seen as politically unreliable (not quite as bad as Britain in the late seventeenth century, in which they were prevented from holding public office until 1829). Preferment was often given to people like Joffre and Sarrail who were arch-Republicans (indeed the growth of the Salonika Front owed a lot to the latter's political connections and need to find a big job for him).

But it's rubbish to claim that similar prejudice hampered de Gaulle (b. 1890) in the inter-war period. De Gaulle was a protege of Pétain, who ran the French Army of the 1920s. It's true he was a captain for 14 years (till the late 1920s) but Lacouture points out that this was "a perfectly usual period". He was also very arrogant - when being examined on an exercise in the mid-1920s, he rubbed up the examining officer the wrong way and was lucky not to fail the course outright - he had to call in a favour from Pétain to get a "good" grade (rather than "excellent" which he would have needed for a General Staff posting) and wound up with a posting to supply & logistics in Occupied Germany. In the mid-1930s he was already a bit of a right-wing political intriguer, and was passed over for promotion to full colonel, having to pull strings (Daladier, Minister of War) to get his name added to the promotion list the following year. He was still a brigadier and divisional commander, and being considered for jobs at the War Ministry, before he was fifty, which is pretty reasonable going. De Gaulle was Catholic but, for what it's worth, was a Republican and his family had been pro-Dreyfus. Any decent de Gaulle biography will cover all this, eg. Lacouture.

Rating
I am assuming that this article has been expanded since the Military History rating. There is good basic information here. ludahai 魯大海 23:38, 3 June 2007 (UTC)

Possible Neutrality Issues
The article seems to give Foch large amounts of credit out of context. For example it credits Foch with the defense during the Spring Offensive when Petain deserves as much or more credit. The section about WWI seems to only focus on the good and magnifies that while ignoring the bad and the major downfalls of Foch as a commander. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Tempestswordsman (talk • contribs) 01:40, 7 September 2007 (UTC)

It also fails to note that due to Foch's insistence that there will be no cease-fire and that hostilities will not cease during the commencement of the peace talks (even though the Germans offered one), there were even more casualties taken on both sides. Apparently full scale offensives were still being launched by the Allies, even as the negotiations were progressing, offensives which Foch, as Supreme Allied Commander, had authorised. There is a documentary on the History Channel, entitled "Last Day of World War I: 11th Month, 11th Day, 11th Hour: Armistice Day, 1918", which covers this. Coruvian (talk) 05:14, 1 January 2008 (UTC)

A Franco-US offensive was being planned towards Metz, along with further BEF pushes through Belgium, at the time of the Armistice. Pétain's role was (after the mutiny) the refitting and regrouping of the French Army (and some successful minor offensives) in late 1917. In Spring 1918 Pétain was felt - by the politicians and by the British generals - to lack fire in his belly, and to be too keen to retreat on Paris when the Germans defeated British Fifth Army - that was why Foch was appointed Generalissimo. To be fair to Pétain, the disaster on the Aisne (Blucher, May 1918) was because Humbert had ignored his instructions to defend in depth.

Terms of the Allies' (French, British and American) Versailles (German) Treaty 1919 and the role of Maréchal Ferdinand Foch
It is generally conceded that the problems facing those drawing up the Versailles (or German) Treaty at the Palace of Versailles were complex as a result of political and economical developments in Europe as from the date of that which at the time was the precedent (the Congress of Vienna 1814-1815). It seems evident that there was no easy answer and that the view of Foch, here in this article apparently unconditionally supported, that it was too concessionary neither was nor is now the general view (cf. Michael Howard, The First World War, OUP, 2002, at p.111, 'the terms, so far as land operations were concerned, were dictated largely by the French. The British themselves, anxious to end hostilities, would have made them milder. ... The German delegates protested that the results would be anarchy and famine from which only the Bolshevists would profit, but Foch as leader of the Allied delegation was implacable. The Germans had no alternative but to sign what with some reason they expected to be their own death warrants. ... ' ).

I am as an amateur open to contradiction, but it seems that, at the same time, the British, for their part, did their best to maintain their practical control of the open or high sea and the US (while supporting the long-term German attempt to create 'freedom at sea', to be confirmed of course mainly by custom rather than by legislation) effectively suggested the creation of a new form of 'democratic' government within Germany itself.

Unfortunately, and as the subsequent history of Europe demonstrated, peace could not in any event be assured for any length of time. Was this something for which Ferdinand Foch himself had any ready solution? I find it rather difficult to see how it can be demonstrated that this was the case (that which at the same time would seem to demonstrate that it is only military matters as determined by the military themselves that decide peace or war in this world, a complex issue). Peter Judge 14 August 2010 —Preceding unsigned comment added by 92.17.45.50 (talk) 16:52, 14 August 2010 (UTC)


 * The terms on land frontiers were not dictated by the French: they failed in their attempt to detach the Rhineland from Germany, which was what Foch in effect wanted. Had that happened, then the economic heart of German industry, the Ruhr, would have been at the mercy of the French and the ability to wage war by Germany would have been seriously curtailed. "Peace could not in any event be assured for any length of time". This is essentially meaningless: has peace ever been assured? I could quote historians (such as Correlli Barnett) who give the opposite view to Sir Michael and claim that the Treaty left Germany in a better strategic position than in 1914 and that had Foch succeeded then war would have been less likely.--Britannicus (talk) 17:02, 14 August 2010 (UTC)


 * Thank you for your very prompt reply. Unfortunately I have not read the work of the author to which you refer. Please remember in any event the motto of Hitler later in the 20th Cent. 'only one can win', referring to the victory of the Germans in the East. It is clear that it was the division of Europe into three separate sections which created an unstable situation which the Versailles Treaty could not have resolved by the occupation of part of Germany, probably leading to the access to power of Bolshevism within what remained unoccupied, the main problem having been the failure to restore the original February 1917 form of government within Russia in the Civil War, in which war the Germans themselves were involved effectively in support of the Allies. There was no answer to these problems until the end of the 'Cold War'. We now of course have entirely different problems which arguably also however arise at least in part from the First World War and its consequences, the 2001 '9/11' attack on New York having taken place on the anniversary of the issue by the British Empire of matters relating to its occupation of Palestine under the terms of the League of Nations, and this not having been a coincidence, as confirmed by a broadcast statement at the time by Bin Laden, even if never discussed by ouselves. Peter Judge 14 August 2010  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 92.17.45.50 (talk) 17:19, 14 August 2010 (UTC)
 * It is not clear the "the division of Europe into three separate sections which created an unstable situation which the Versailles Treaty could not have resolved". The problem facing the Allies in 1919 was how to deal with a defeated Germany. The French were afraid of a revived Germany, not of Bolshevism (they were proved correct as we now know). "There was no answer to these problems...": There certainly was an answer, and Foch and other Frenchmen provided it when they demanded the dismemberment of Germany, which would have made the Second World War impossible.--Britannicus (talk) 17:47, 14 August 2010 (UTC)


 * Sir, thank you again for so prompt a response. Neither you nor I nor anybody else can possibly even guess what might have been the consequences if the atheist Bolshevist regime (under the motto 'Workers of the World Unite' as first coined in the Communist Manifesto at the time of the Paris Commune in 1871) had moved further west into Germany and Austria after the First World War (something which was evidently possible at the time of the Versailles Treaty, 1919). I cannot contradict what you say yourself, neither can you or anyone else contradict this as an open question; so please let us hold to our own opinion, right or wrong, while recognizing this: that the achievement of any lasting peace was always a problem, as was recognzed at the time of the conclusion of the First World War in war memorials in both the East (St Petersburgh, on the 'Field of Mars', commemorating those killed in the Bolshevik revolution) and West (Scottish National War Memorial) as also by the Allied 'Peace Parade' in London on 19 July 1919 (this being incidentally the anniversary of the declaration of war by Napoleon III of France on Prussia in 1870, leading to a Prussian victory and to the creation of a Second German Empire). Is it not therefore the case that you and the author you quote do not know the definitive answers any more than I do myself, while each is entitled to their own opinion? Peter Judge 14 August 2010 —Preceding unsigned comment added by 92.17.73.121 (talk) 18:57, 14 August 2010 (UTC)
 * The Communist Manifesto appeared in 1848, not 1871. Yes we are all entitled to our own opinion but it is not opinion which should be inserted into the article. That Foch predicted the Second World War to the year is a fact. The article passes no judgement on whether his solution of the German problem would have been effective.--Britannicus (talk) 19:14, 14 August 2010 (UTC)
 * Well I am indeed sorry that I was stupid and misunderstood this article (it is however perhaps at least slightly ambiguous?). Peter Judge 14 August 2010

Foch's scorn for aircraft - true or myth ?
In the wake of present events, I've heard a quotation supposedly attributed to Foch: "The aeroplane is all very good for sport. For the army, it is useless."

A short while with google reveals the line - or some variation thereof - to be attributed to Foch, but with no citation, and no mention of date or context.

So, urban myth ? Or quotation taken out of context - originally referring to some specific unreliable aircraft, perhaps ?

86.25.120.204 (talk) 17:01, 20 March 2011 (UTC)


 * Barbara Tuchman ("The Guns of August", 1962) traces it to a book called "Les Officiers" by Victor Monteil (1958). Presumably the trail runs cold there, as she provides no primary cite...Paulturtle (talk) 12:17, 23 August 2014 (UTC)

Marshal Ferdinand Foch Introduction
I have edited the introduction and reduced it by 60 words. Following is the text. If approved and asked, I'll alter the introduction.

[Marshal Ferdinand Foch (French pronunciation: [fɔʃ]), GCB, OM, DSO (2 October 1851 – 20 March 1929) - a First World War hero - was a French soldier and military theorist.

A native of Tarbes, France, Foch enlisted in the infantry during the Franco-Prussian War and later graduated from the École d'application de l'artillerie et du génie as artillery officer.

For his scholarship of military history and strategic skills, he was appointed instructor at Staff College. At the outbreak of WWI he successfully blocked the German counterattack short of Nancy and later won laurels for defending Paris while commanding the French Ninth Army. The subsequent failure offensives—including the operations at Ypres and the Somme—led to Foch's removal from major commands. Recalled as Chief of the General Staff in 1917, Foch was ultimately appointed "Generalissimo of the Allied Armies" in the spring of 1918. He played a decisive role in halting a renewed German advance on Paris in the Second Battle of the Marne, after which he was promoted Marshal of France.

Accepting the German request for an armistice in November 1918, Foch advocated peace terms that would make Germany unable to pose a threat to France ever again. His words after the Treaty of Versailles, "This is not a peace. It is an armistice for twenty years" would prove prophetic; the Second World War started twenty years and sixty-five days later. In 1919 he was made a Field Marshal in the British Empire, and in 1923 a Marshal of Poland, adding to a long list of military decorations.] --StarryEyed (talk) 08:31, 13 October 2012 (UTC)

External links modified
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Quotations
Considering the fact that he has his own page on Wikiquote, should the Quotations section be removed?142.156.1.225 (talk) 14:24, 18 January 2018 (UTC)

Military thought
The section on "Military thought" is as follows as of 20190319:

"Foch was later acclaimed as "the most original military thinker of his generation".[7] He became known for his critical analyses of the Franco-Prussian and Napoleonic campaigns and of their relevance to military operations in the new twentieth Century. His re-examination of France's defeat in 1870 was among the first of its kind. At the College, Foch was a professor of military history, strategy and general tactics while becoming the French theorist on offensive strategies.

During his time as an instructor Foch created renewed interest in French military history, inspired confidence in a new class of French officers, and brought about "the intellectual and moral regeneration of the French Army".[8] His thinking on military doctrine was shaped by the Clausewitzian philosophy, then uncommon in France, that "the will to conquer is the first condition of victory." Collections of his lectures, which reintroduced the concept of the offensive to French military theory, were published in the volumes "Des Principes de la Guerre" ("On the Principles of War") in 1903, and "De la Conduite de la Guerre" ("On the Conduct of War") in 1904. While Foch advised "qualification and discernment" in military strategy and cautioned that "recklessness in attack could lead to prohibitive losses and ultimate failure,"[9] his concepts, distorted and misunderstood by contemporaries, became associated with the extreme offensive doctrines (l'offensive à outrance) of his successors. The cult of the offensive came to dominate military circles, and Foch's reputation was damaged when his books were cited in the development of the disastrous offensive that brought France close to ruin in August 1914.

Foch was seen as a master of the Napoleonic school of military thought, but he was the only one of the Military College Commandants (Maillard, Langlois, Bonnal) still serving. Their doctrines had been challenged, not only by the German school, but also since about 1911 by a new French school inspired by General Loiseau de Grandmaison, which criticised them as lacking in vigour and offensive spirit, and contributing to needless dispersion of force. The French Army fought under the new doctrines, but they failed in the first battles of August 1914, and it remained to be seen whether the Napoleonic doctrine would hold its own, would give way to doctrines evolved during the war, or would incorporate the new moral and technical elements into a new outward form within which the spirit of Napoleon remained unaltered. The war gave an ambiguous answer to these questions, which remains a source of controversy among experts.[10]"

This is an excellent section to have and is in fairly good shape. But it needs someone with knowledge to elaborate more on the distinction between the Napoleonic school as rearticulated by Foch and the second French school of Grandmaison, and with regard to the quickly passed over reference to the German school, which is offered as contrast without any definition.

I suggest a promising avenue would be to lay out Foch's recognition of the importance of will [seems obvious] to win as a first condition in the context of others, including "fire" and the relative capacity of the offense and defense, as against Grandmaison's and others' arguable overemphasis on will and morale and on a particular subset of offensive tactics. As well as their distinctions on the operational and strategic levels vis a vis plan XVII, which is better addressed elsewhere but the strategic level needs to be represented here with regard to the two French perspectives. I think the distinction between the schools is probably clear enough, but here it demonstrably is not. And it needs to be done in such a way to make it clear that Foch still was an advocate of the offensive in theory and practice. He just was less dogmatic and more pragmatic about conditions. Thanks to anyone who can tackle this. Random noter (talk) 20:39, 19 March 2019 (UTC)

In The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, T. E. Lawrence commented on Foch's philosophy as follows: "I had made a comfortable beginning of doctrine, but was left still to find an alternative end and means of war. Ours seemed unlike the ritual of which Foch was priest; and I recalled him, to see a difference in land between him and us. In his modern war--absolute war he called it--two nations professing incompatible philosophies put them to the test of force. Philosophically, it was idiotic, for while opinions were arguable, convictons needed shooting to be cured; and the struggle could end only when the supporters of the one immaterial principle had no more means of resistance against the supporters of the other. It sounded like a twentieth-century restatement of the wars of religion, whose logical end was utter destruction of one creed, and whose protagonists believed that God's judgement would prevail. This might do for France and Germany, but would not represent the British attitude." Lawrence, T.E.. Seven Pillars of Wisdom [Illustrated with Working TOC] (p. 110). Kindle Edition. KenOfSimi (talk) 00:00, 2 September 2019 (UTC)

Name
Hi, I added in sources his official records (birth and death certificates). I will add later his services records and promotions in the Legion of Honour. What surprised me is that nowhere is his name Ferdinand Jean-Marie Foch. His birth certificate is at the name of Ferdinand, but also his death certificate, his service records, his promotions. Every single official source never uses Jean Marie.

So I removed it. This is a pure invention that was kept for whatever reason.

His records (culture.gouv.fr) — Preceding unsigned comment added by CocoricoPolynesien (talk • contribs) 20:00, 24 July 2019 (UTC)

Poland
Did he ever visit Poland? Did he speak Polish? He was made a marshal of Poland and this is why I am asking. 2A00:23C7:5882:8201:1B:E11:8CC4:81D6 (talk) 15:48, 19 December 2022 (UTC)

Introduction clarification
This part of the introduction is a confusing run-on sentence.

I would edit it but I don't know anything about the man, and I wouldn't feel comfortable without resources corresponding to the information. Also, other than being names Allied Commanders, the other information doesn't belong in the introduction IMO.

An aggressive commander ['''says who? in what way?], at the First Marne, Flanders and Artois campaigns [they're battles, the Western Front could be considered a campaign] of 1914–1916, Foch became the Allied Commander-in-Chief [this reads as Foch became the allied commander as a result of being aggressive at the mentioned battles, then says he became commander in the face of the German offensive years later; it's unclear'''] in late March 1918 in the face of the all-out German spring offensive, which pushed the Allies back using fresh soldiers and new tactics that trenches could not withstand. MrWrightEsq. (talk) 07:38, 15 February 2024 (UTC)


 * Being named allied commander* MrWrightEsq. (talk) 00:36, 17 February 2024 (UTC)