Talk:Ford v Quebec (AG)

POV
It is not neutral as these are not the words of the Supreme Court, nor that or the two Quebec courts. There is indeed a passage on "reasonable limitations in a free and democratic society" in the judgement. It reads as follows:

"Commercial expression, like political expression, is one of the forms of expression that is deserving of constitutional protection because it serves individual and societal values in a free and democratic society."

That in itself has nothing to do with the reasons why section 58 and 69 of the Charter of the French Language were invalidated. It only says that, in the opinion of the judges, commercial expression is one form of expression deserving constitutional protection.

Nowhere does any of the judgements claim that "the sections regarding commercial signs were contrary to the freedom of expression protected by section 3 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms and under section 2b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and that those limitations were not reasonable in a free and democratic society." This is a fabrication by someone who did not carefully read the full text. Not only is this sentence unclear (what limitations?), it is also too long and misleading.

Here is what the Supreme Court had to do:

"This appeal is to determine (1) whether ss. 58 and 69 infringe the freedom of expression guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and s. 3 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12; and (2) whether ss. 58 and 69 infringe the guarantee against discrimination based on language in s. 10 of the Quebec Charter."

Here is what the judges said on this very subject:

(c) Freedom of Expression

The "freedom of expression" guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter and s. 3 of the Quebec Charter includes the freedom to express oneself in the language of one's choice. Language is so intimately related to the form and content of expression that there cannot be true freedom of expression by means of language if one is prohibited from using the language of one's choice. Language is not merely a means or medium of expression; it colours the content and meaning of expression. It is a means by which a people may express its cultural identity. It is also the means by which one expresses one's personal identity and sense of individuality. The recognition that "freedom of expression" includes the freedom to express oneself in the language of one's choice does not undermine or run counter to the express or specific guarantees of language rights in s. 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and ss. 16 to 23 of the Canadian Charter.

The expression contemplated by ss. 58 and 69 of the Charter of the French Language -- conveniently characterized as "commercial expression" -- is expression within the meaning of both s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter and s. 3 of the Quebec Charter. Commercial expression, like political expression, is one of the forms of expression that is deserving of constitutional protection because it serves individual and societal values in a free and democratic society. Indeed, over and above its intrinsic value as expression, commercial expression, which protects listeners as well as speakers, plays a significant role in enabling individuals to make informed economic choices, an important aspect of individual self-fulfillment and personal autonomy. This leads to the conclusion that s. 58 infringes the freedom of expression guaranteed by s. 3 of the Quebec Charter and s. 69 infringes the guaranteed freedom of expression under both s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter and s. 3 of the Quebec Charter.

(d) Reasonable Limits

The material adduced in this Court did not justify the limit imposed on freedom of expression by ss. 58 and 69 of the Charter of the French Language. The material established the importance of the legislative purpose reflected in the Charter of the French Language -- the enhancement of the status of the French language in Quebec -- and that it was a response to a pressing and substantial concern -- the survival of the French language. The threat to the French language demonstrated to the government that it should, in particular, take steps to assure that the "visage linguistique" of Quebec would reflect the predominance of the French language. While the material indicated a rational connection between protecting the French language and assuring that the reality of Quebec society is communicated through the "visage linguistique", it did not demonstrate that the requirement of the use of French only in ss. 58 and 69 is either necessary for the achievement of the legislative purpose or proportionate to it. Whereas requiring the predominant display of the French language, even its marked predominance, would be proportional to the goal of promoting and maintaining a French "visage linguistique" in Quebec and therefore justified under s. 9.1 of the Quebec Charter and s. 1 of the Canadian Charter, requiring the exclusive use of French has not been so justified. French could be required in addition to any other language or it could be required to have greater visibility than that accorded to other languages. Accordingly, the limit imposed on freedom of expression by s. 58 of the Charter of the French Language is not justified under s. 9.1 of the Quebec Charter, and the limit imposed on freedom of expression by s. 69 of the Charter of the French Language is not justified under either s. 1 of the Canadian Charter or s. 9.1 of the Quebec Charter. Section 9.1 is a justificatory provision corresponding to s. 1 of the Canadian Charter subject, in its application, to a similar test of rational connection and proportionality.

(e) Discrimination Based on Language

Under section 10 of the Quebec Charter, a "distinction, exclusion or preference" based on one of the grounds listed in s. 10 is discriminatory when it "has the effect of nullifying or impairing" the right to full and equal recognition and exercise of a human right or freedom. Although s. 58 of the Charter of the French Language applies to everyone, the requirement of the exclusive use of French, regardless of their language of use, has the effect of impinging deferentially on different classes of persons according to their language of use. Francophones are permitted to express themselves in their language of use while anglophones and other non-francophones are prohibited from doing so. Because of its differential effect or impact on persons according to their language of use, s. 58 creates a distinction based on language within the meaning of s. 10. The human right or freedom in issue here is the freedom to express oneself in the language of one's choice. The distinction based on language of use created by s. 58 has the effect of nullifying the right to full and equal recognition and exercise of this freedom. Section 58 is therefore of no force or effect as infringing s. 10 of the Quebec Charter. The same conclusion applies to s. 69 of the Charter of the French Language.

Summary
Obviously, we can't write the whole thing in the article, however, we can maybe try to summarize it in clear and easy to understand terms. I will try to do that here. Feel free to correct any mistake you see:

Sections 58 and 69 were invalidated because the judges were of the opinion that 1) commercial expression is indeed protected by both Charters of Rights and Freedoms, 2) the limitation imposed to freedom of expression were not justified as "it did not demonstrate that the requirement of the use of French only in ss. 58 and 69 is either necessary for the achievement of the legislative purpose or proportionate to it." and 3) the sections created a discrimination based on language, which section 10 of the Quebec charter does not allow.

-- Mathieugp 22:03, 19 Dec 2004 (UTC)


 * I've tried to add links to relevant concepts and changed the words "not reasonable" to "not justified", if it's not clear enough I can work on the opening paragraph again. The words I used are common Canadian legal jargon, maybe they can seem to lack neutrality to the lay person but this is unintentional... You're right I haven't read the complete decision, but I've taken two courses in constitutional law, so I just assumed those were the arguments (often) used based on how the article was written when I first read it. --132.204.219.5 19:13, 20 Dec 2004 (UTC)