Talk:François Darlan

Comments in 2004
un français signale une erreur de nom!

le prénom de Darlan est françois ( et non jean-françois) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 83.157.160.198 (talk) 18:35, 30 March 2004 (UTC)

une autre erreur:

Ferdinand Bonnier de la Chapelle n'était pas un "anti-nazi royaliste", ce qui ne veut rien dire!

On ne sait pas qui était le commanditaire de l'assassinat de de Darlan, peut-être les gaullistes, peut-être des facho-monarchistes qui se sont sentis trahis par le rapprochement entre Darlan et les alliés!!! —Preceding unsigned comment added by 83.157.172.95 (talk) 21:45, 3 April 2004 (UTC)

Additions in 2007
Le francais qui a ecrit cela et qui reproche l expression anti-nazi fasciste devrait y reflechir a deux fois. Il n y a jamais existe de royaliste fachiste!! La droite legitimiste et orleaniste existent depuis le 19eme siecle et n a jamais ete fonciemenent fachiste. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 84.151.219.25 (talk) 23:34, 19 November 2007 (UTC)

(translation of above)
A frenchman would like to point out an error in a name!

Darlan's first name is francois, (and not jean-francois)

Another error:

Frendinand Bonnier de la Chapelle wasn't an "anti-nazi royalist", which doesn't mean anything in any case!

It isn't know who order the assassination of Darlan, maybe it was the Gaullists, or maybe the monarcho-faschists who felt betrayed by the rapprochement between Darland and the Allies!


 * (I don't have an opinion on this statement, I gues thought I'd translate it since this is English wikipedia)

"Despite being a real patriot, Giraud was committed to the Vichy regime." is very POV. What is a real patriot? In any case, collaborating with a foreign government isn't seen as being patriotic generally. I am removing the first part, and including that Giraud was commited to the Vichy regime. OneWorld22 21:51, 13 January 2007 (UTC)==>very poor understanding! There were patriots who always disapproved De Gaulle, there were also resistants who supported Petain's revolution nationale (Charles Maurras) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 84.151.219.25 (talk) 23:37, 19 November 2007 (UTC)

REPONSE sur BONNIER de la CHAPELLE
I - On sait que Darlan était un collaborateur d'Etat et qu'il avait signé en 1941 les Protocoles de Paris prévoyant l'utilisation par les Allemands de bases aériennes en Syrie,du port de Bizerte pour ravitailler Rommel et d'installations pour sous-marins à Dakar. -Ces accords ne furent jamais appliqués d'une part suite à l'opposition du général WEYGAND,alors Haut Commissaire en Afrique du Nord Française(AFN),d'autre part faute que les contreparties politiques allemandes  se concrétisent. - On sait aussi qu'étant rentré en guerre, il maintenait en décembre 1942 le Régime de Vichy avec toutes ses lois ainsi que le maintien des déportés de Vichy dans les camps du sud-algérien.

II - D'autre part, on sait que: 1°) Bonnier était un engagé du Corps Franc d'Afrique, fondé en fin novembre 1942 par des Français résistants qui ne voulaient pas combattre sous les ordres des officiers vichystes, qui venaient de tirer sur les alliés (et qui, forcés de reprendre la guerre aux cotés des alliés, prétendaient le faire "pour libérer le Maréchal") (sic). 2°) Bonnier a tiré à la courte paille, avec 3 compagnons d'armes qui étaient des résistants connus du 8 novembre 1942, pour désigner lequel d'entre eux tueraient Darlan, et que ces résistants l'ont même conduit en voiture au Palais d'Eté, pour qu'il exécute sa mission.

III - Par conséquent son acte était un acte de résistance, non seulement dans ses intentions, comme il l'a affirmé dans son premier interrogatoire, mais aussi dans les faits, puisque la mort de Darlan a permis la fusion entre Alger et Londres, fusion qui a entrainé le rétablissement de la démocratie en Afrique du nord.

IV - Les accusations de complot monarchiste ou gaulliste ont été inventées par les dirigeants vichystes d'Alger, pour réduire le geste de Bonnier à un crime de basse politique, et pour en rendre de Gaulle responsable. En effet, la disparition de Darlan a profité avant tout à Giraud, et non au Comte de Paris, ni à de Gaulle. Giraud, en effet, aprés avoir refusé de gracier Bonnier, l'a fait exécuter à la hâte. Giraud a ensuite fait ouvrir une enquête, alors qu'il venait de faire tuer le principal témoin. Il a même fait arrêter les chefs de la résistance, quin'avaient rien à voir dans l'affaire, à l'instigation de son adjoint, le général Bergeret, ministre de Pétain.

V - Bonnier a été réhabilité le 21 décembre 1945, par un arrêt de la Chambre des Révisions de la Cour d'Appel d'Alger, en considération de l'accomplissement de son acte, dans l'intérêt de la libération de la France. Philomax82.124.140.8 02:00, 5 Apr 2005 (UTC) (de French Wiki.)

The page at Destruction of the French Fleet at Mers-el-Kebir says that several ships were damaged or destroyed


 * "...with over 2,000 French sailors killed."

This page says that there were "around 1,300 French naval dead". Is there a definitive number? DefiMolinari 02:33, 18 Feb 2005 (UTC)Definitive number:1297

Some online sources write "more than 1,000" and others "around 1,300", anyway 2,000 seems wrong to me. Ericd 13:11, 18 Feb 2005 (UTC)

Comments in 2006
Can somebody please copyedit this page. It looks like an extremely literal translation from French. There are far too many appositions and unwieldy long sentences. Rednaxela 15:25, 21 May 2006 (UTC)

Relations with fascism
Was he a fascist? He had a big connection with Vichy France, so naturally I would assume he was a loyal fascist, and much like Petain, a traitor to the French. Aaрон Кинни (t) 19:59, 3 August 2006 (UTC)

Firstly, my apologies for fouling up my logon, as it may cause some confusion. I am Ranya and Ranya is me, now Caryn96 (hey, I lost my password and my logon....it happens).

I do not see how asserting that Admiral Darlan "had a big connection with Vichy France" advances the discussion on presenting the life and service of Admiral Darlan. Whatever we, as Americans, might like to think to the contrary, the legitimate government of the Third Republic asked for, and agreed to, and Armistice. For a serving officer, such a situation is fraught with choices, none of which are simple or easy. Was it de Gaulle who was acting illegally, when he refused to acknowledge that he was no longer a member of the French Government? By its very nature, an Armistice is an instrument of coersion, as no nation asks for an Armistice if it feels its prospects for recovery are good.

These are hard questions, and simplistic replies couched in vague language do not serve the discussion. What constitutes a "big connection"? How is it helpful to dismiss a man like Darlan, much less Petain, as "a loyal fascist", or to call him a "traitor to the French", merely by "naturally assuming"? Darlan was long a "hard" in the Cabinets of both Daladier and Reynaud. Darlan had ordered the Fleet to African waters in accordance with Reynaud's declared intention to fight on from Africa, and it is hardly surprising that Darlan would feel the ultimatum delivered by HM's Government was shocking and unreasonable---Oran and Dakar are a long way from Metropolitan France, and thus rather difficult for the Germans to "seize". Looking out from France, Darlan may not have seen how the assurance that France would never allow her Navy to be captured intact might compare with her pledged word not to make a separate peace---there were, after all, mitigating circumstances in regard of that event---the French believed they had asked for, and received, a realease by HM's Government from the obligation not to make a separate peace, and that **before** the hair-splitting over "Armistice" vs "Separate Peace".

I do not agree that a "big connection to Vichy" is a sufficient basis for letting the article remain as written. The word "traitor" is a strong word, one permitting of no mitigation. The circumstances of Admiral Darlan's actions do not admit of so stark a judgement in history. Caryn96 (talk) 03:10, 29 February 2008 (UTC)


 * You assume that the Vichy government was fascist. It was not. It was the government of unoccupied France, and no more. That it had authoritarian tendencies was no surprise; so do most governments in wartime.Royalcourtier (talk) 18:39, 23 December 2015 (UTC)

Comments in 2007
This article is poisoned with personal prejudice not supported by the historical records of France, Britain, or the United States, by many of the sources cited, or by other works scholarly or popular. In pursuit of its personal agenda, it permits glaring errors of fact---an example being the idea that it was General Mark Clark and the Resistance that forced Admiral Darlan to order a Cease Fire to end the fighting during Operation Torch. Certain works in the citation do, indeed, contain the inflammatory opinions expressed in this article, but they would not pass through even a cursory examination of the Historical Record or the less-biased sources.

There are so many mis-statements of events, personal opinion passed off as fact, and frankly defamatory comments in this article that I believe the article makes a negative contribution to the goals of Wikipedia.

Admiral François Darlan was a complex man, to be sure, and certainly as much an opportunist as most politicians of any country were then, or are now. But a page on his life is not the place to re-fight the egregious Battle *for* France among the French. It is possible to state what Darlan did without stating personal opinion as fact. It is possible to draw inferences as to *why* he did them from the many sources cited, without attributing to him, or to other Frenchmen, motives that are laden with personal resentment.

This vendetta weakens the work even when it veers towards fact---a "Flag" Officer is a term employed, in France as well as the United Kingdom and the United States (and most other nations as well) for *Naval* Officers; Army Officers of similar rank, such as Henri Gerard, are "General Officers", thus the use of "General" in their official titles.

Many French officers served the French State (L'État Français) after June 22nd 1940 out of a sense of loyalty to France, not because they were collaborators or Nazi sympathizers. To indulge in name-calling is certainly a personal perogative, and one every French citizen has a right to; but to do so in this forum only weakens it's hoped-for reputation.

This article must go, or be filed as an opinion piece. Ranya 19:26, 3 April 2007 (UTC) I totally agree with this last point. The person who writes the article seems to understand the France under the second world war in terms of good (resistance) and bad (vichy). Doing so is very prejudicial and you may have trouble understanding many events, e.g. why one of the first thing Germans did when they enter the Zone Libre was to arrest General Weygand... —Preceding unsigned comment added by 84.151.219.25 (talk) 23:45, 19 November 2007 (UTC)

Assassination
I know of several books and documentaries which state that Darlan was actually shot five times, not twice, and later died in hospital. Several of these also quote an associate of La Chapelle, who claims that the assassination was his idea, and that a group of them, all members of Henri d'Astier's resistance group, drew straws on who would do the deed, with La Chapelle obviously drawing the short straw. Unfortunately I don't really know Wiki rules on editting, since it seems that online sources are needed, and I have no idea if any of this information is even online. So if anyone could either make the changes for me, or tell me what to do, I'd appreciate it.

The only sources I can remember off the top of my head are the Allies in War documentary and book, since I only finished reading it yesterday, but I will try to find the other books. I doubt I can find the documentaries. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 220.101.178.99 (talk) 17:17, 5 January 2008 (UTC)

assassination 2
"There are serious doubts on the fact that de La Chapelle acted alone, it seems that a SOE involvement was likely, as British historian David Raynolds writes in his book: "In Command of History" noting that Sir Stewart Menzies, the chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) who rarely left London during the war, was in Algiers in those days."

OK to me that statement is biased and uses weasel words. "it seems that" if you can quote an author ( who has no proof ) it adds up to nothing more than gossip and original research. British involvement is "not proved" because : 1. the fact that a senior agent was present ( if true ) proves nothing he could have been there for the negotiations, 2. wartime dirty operations were mostly carried out by SOE, not MI6 and 3. he was useful to the Allies alive, but possibly a threat to De Gaulle. if anything he could have been murdered by de Gaulle who was angry at his power and controlled the resistance. 91.128.113.19 (talk) 19:24, 10 September 2009 (UTC)

Darlan could have served his country better then de Gaulle
Avancer que Darlan aurait pu mieux servir son pays que De Gaulle relève de la spéculation intellectuelle pure!Evitons de confondre l'Histoire et l'uchronie!Au vrai,la supériorité du général de Gaulle sur Darlan et Giraud c'est,outre qu'il n'a jamais transigé avec Vichy,qu'il a le soutien de toute la Résistance,y compris la résistance communiste,qui a reconnu son autorité, suite à la création du Conseil National de Résistance(C.N.R)en mai 1943 par Jean MOULIN,son représentant personnel en France occupée.Voilà ce qui fonde sa légitimité politique.Le fait qu'il dispose à partir de 1943 des forces armées d'Afrique du Nord renforce sa position aux yeux des Alliés. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.207.66.43 (talk) 22:30, 25 August 2009 (UTC)

Had Darlan chosen to lead the French fleet to anywhere and kept his word to Churchill he would have had the 4th most powerful navy at the time and could have drawn on the French gold reserves in the USA. Thus unlike de Gaulle who only had words and some troops from Dunkirk (most of whom went back to France and were jailed by the Germans) he would have been hailed the leader of the free french and had a very valuable asset at would have helped fight the nazis.

reference - "Memoirs of the Second World War" Abridged version (1959) page 328 W. S. Churchill

From a personal point of view Darlan represented many of the reasons France fell so easily and collaborated for so long with the nazis.

I find no issue with the current entry on Darlan. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.173.62.76 (talk) 23:36, 18 March 2008 (UTC) Matt Milne

ex London

Los Angeles

USA —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.215.136.43 (talk) 21:17, 19 March 2008 (UTC)


 * France did not fall "so easily". It fell quickly and surprisingly, but it fought hard, inflected casualties on the Germans, and British troops did not fare better than their French counterparts. Not to speak of the USA who did not fight at all, and who suffered similar collapse of their front when meeting a comparable configuration in 1994. Rama (talk) 12:48, 20 March 2008 (UTC)

Interesting to compare and contrast "so easily" with "quickly and surprisingly". Perhaps you can enlighten me as to the difference?

Also could you please help me understand who the Americans were fighting in 1994 when their front collapsed? Matt Milne

ex London

Los Angeles

USA —Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.173.62.76 (talk) 03:25, 28 March 2008 (UTC)
 * "So easily" does not apply to a battle in which both camps suffer heavy casualties. "So easily" would better apply to the USA in Lebanon, or in Somalia. But not to Iraq or Viet-Nam.
 * In 1944, Germany was on the brink of military collapse. The USA were fighting in France alongside the British and French armies, and large amounts of German forces were occupied in the East. They benefited from absolute air superiority which meant that the German offensive could not continue nor keep its position when weather permitted sorties by aircraft. Rama (talk) 08:24, 13 August 2008 (UTC)

History, Memoir, and Citing One's Sources
A quick note about sources: there is no bar to citing actual published sources in a wikipedia article---in fact, the best ones have many sources, not all of which agree. Citations are especially important for viewpoints which are poorly supported by the historical record, or which are exceptionally congenial to conspiracy theories.

Almost without exception, politicians and military officers write memoir, not history; while an argument may be made that even historians often fail to write history, the historian at least must face peer review and provide sources, even if those sources have been "interpreted" in an unorthodox manner. Winston Churchill was a great man, perhaps the greatest man of the 20th Century, certainly one of the greatest Britons of any century. He was a brilliant and interesting writer, but he was first and foremost a politician, and his works on the Great War and the Second World War are colored by his role in both conflicts, and the natural tendency of great men to wish they could recast or pass over their own all-too-human mistakes.

Using Churchill's works as a source for perspective on Admiral Darlan's life is certainly appropriate. Drawing an inference from them which is insupportable in respect of the writings themselves, much less wholly without substantiation in any extent historical documentation, is another thing entirely.

I know of no promise given to the Prime Minister of Great Britain by the Admiral Darlan as the Minister of Marine in the last governments of the Third Republic, other than the assurance that, in the event the Germans attempted to take over the French Fleet by force or coercion, the fleet would be scuttled. Admiral Darlan's assurance was kept in November of 1942, when the Fleet at Toulon was scuttled upon the German activation of Anton.

Admiral Darlan was not the Premier of France, nor its President, at the time of the Battle Of France in May and June 1940, nor at the time the Armistice was effected in July 1940. Admiral Darlan was therefore in no position to make "promises" to the PM of HM's government regarding the conduct of the government of the Third Republic. The records of cabinet meetings between May and July of that terrible year make clear that Admiral Darlan, as Navy Minister, was prepared to fight outside of Metropolitan France. Only at the end, when Reynaud was wavering and the softs were positioning Pétain to form a new government, did Darlan begin hedging.

Nothing was "wrong" with France that had not been "wrong" twenty-five years before. Nor was Great Britain any more committed to the war than was France, until Winston Churchill became PM in May, even as the German armored columns were slashing into France. The act which solidified Churchill's stance, which gained his government the irreplaceable support of the USA, also turned many Frenchmen against Great Britain; the act against French Fleet units which ultimately led to Mers-el-Kebir. That event is signal in any understanding of Admiral Darlan, and to brush over it with a few words about "promises" while tossing about "Nazi", "Collaborator", and "Fascist" in the hope of silencing actual discussion does no good for any viewpoint on Admiral Darlan.

Worse, bringing other wars and combat actions into the discussion diverts attention from a critical review of Admiral Darlan's life, career, and actions. American, French, and British interventions in situations where no compelling national interest is clearly at stake is in no way comparable to the struggle between France and Germany in the first half of the twentieth century. Let us remain focused on the facts and actions of Admiral Darlan's life. Caryn96 (talk) 05:20, 29 October 2008 (UTC)

When did he become a minister ?
article says when Paris fell, Darlan stayed loyal to the premier Petain and was rewarded by keeping post as minister. List of posts held shows Darlan becoming minister on June 16 ie day the Reynaud ministry fell and some time after Paris fell, but above post talks about Darlan as Navy Minister in the Reynaud government. Something doesn't quite tie up there (and 'stayed loyal' might seem a bit POV n'est ce pas ?). (Martin Gilbert's Churchill biography has Darlan making promises as an officer & a gentleman, not as a minister & a politician, with half the problem being that when he became a minister it was felt to make his assurances less reliable).Rjccumbria (talk) 00:06, 8 June 2010 (UTC)
 * As far as I can gather, César Campinchi was Minister of Marine in the Daladier and Reynaud governments. john k (talk) 22:25, 10 June 2010 (UTC)

Vichy Pro Nazi?
Is it correct to call the Vichy government pro-Nazi? Was it any more pro-Nazi than the government of occupied Denmark, for instance?Royalcourtier (talk) 18:37, 23 December 2015 (UTC)
 * The phrase actually used is 'pro-German', not 'pro-Nazi' (there is a difference). Doubtless "Vichy" contained (or at least was served by) many inherently decent people who had thought in 1940 that their duty was to France, not to the cause for which France had gone to war, but that doesn't justify getting too revisionist about the regime. Prominent members of Vichy, such as Laval were fascistic and pro-German and willingly collaborationist so yes, Vichy was more pro-Nazi, more pro-German, than the Danish government.Rjccumbria (talk) 01:00, 25 December 2015 (UTC)

No tears over death
There is a contradiction between writing that "It was said that "no tears were shed" by the British over his death", and the suggestion that Churchill was aggrieved by his death. Churchill's views are not likely to have been unique to him.Royalcourtier (talk) 18:46, 23 December 2015 (UTC)
 * I would have thought that there is a significant difference between 'being aggrieved by' somebody's death and 'grieving over' it, or at least enough of one for there to be no contradiction; the circumstances of his death may be objected to without implying that the fact that he is dead is to be regretted. Rjccumbria (talk) 00:30, 25 December 2015 (UTC)

French fleet moves on armistice request, and disposition immediately post-armistice.
According to : Shortly after the armistice was requested, French warships sailed from ports threatened by the advancing Germans The Richelieu sailed from Brest to Dakar, and the Jean Bart from St. Nazaire to Casablanca. Consequently, when on 29 June the British Chiefs of Staff reported the disposition of the French fleet, on their reckoning, there were four light cruisers and three destroyers on the Mediterranean coast of metropolitan France, and one destroyer in a port in the occupied zone (because it was still under construction, but almost completed). The rest of the French fleet was in British or French African ports. Rjccumbria (talk) 22:16, 20 March 2017 (UTC)


 * Those ships may have moved, but it was not on the orders of Darlan. From Churchill's account, which I cited:


 * "For the rest, Darlan had been present at most of the conferences which I have described, and as the end of the French resistance approached he had repeatedly assured me that whatever happened the French Fleet should never fall into German hands. Now at Bordeaux came the fateful moment in the career of this ambitious, self-seeking, and capable Admiral. His authority over the Fleet was for all practical purposes absolute. He had only to order the ships to British, American, or French colonial harbours— some had already started —to be obeyed. In the morning of June 17, after the fall of M. Reynaud’s Cabinet, he declared to General Georges that he was resolved to give the order. The next day Georges met him in the afternoon and asked him what had happened. Darlan replied that he had changed his mind . When asked why, he answered simply: “I am now Minister of Marine.” This did not mean that he had changed his mind in order to become Minister of Marine, but that being Minister of Marine he had a different point of view."


 * Note that "some had already started" - these were probably the Richelieu ,Jean Bart, etc. It is not clear on whose orders they had started, but it was not Darlan.


 * Churchill also quotes a long letter from Darlan to himself in 1942, in which Darlan tries to justify himself:


 * "On June 12, 1940, at Briare, at the headquarters of General Weygand, you took me aside and said to me: “Darlan, I hope you will never surrender the Fleet.” I answered you: “There is no question of doing so; it would be contrary to our naval traditions and honour.” The First Lord of the Admiralty, Alexander, and the First Sea Lord, Pound, received the same reply on June 17, 1940, at Bordeaux, as did Lord Lloyd. If I did not consent to authorise the French Fleet to proceed to British ports, it was because I knew that such a decision would bring about the total occupation of Metropolitan France as well as North Africa. I admit having been overcome by a great bitterness and a great resentment against England as the result of the painful events which touched me as a sailor; furthermore it seemed to me that you did not believe my word. ... This policy was by the force of events opposed to yours. What else could I do? At that time you were not able to help us, and any gesture towards you would have led to the most disastrous consequences for my country."


 * In other words Darlan himself later admitted that he did not give this order. Green Wyvern (talk) 07:08, 22 March 2017 (UTC)
 * Churchill, of course, was not particularly proud of Operation Catapult, and might reasonably be expected to make best efforts to ensure that history would judge him kindly. The order your quote shows "Darlan himself later admitted" not giving was "to authorise the French fleet to proceed to British ports", which is not the same thing as moving the fleet out of Atlantic ports, which was done, and on Darlan's watch. Another interpretation of his conversations with Georges is that (whilst the fleet should still be put somewhere safe) there was a need for plausible deniability once he became a government minister: orders which could be formally/honourably given by a naval commander could not be formally/honourably given by a member of a government suing for peace. A War Cabinet on 22 June was told by Dudley Pound that, in his view, Darlan was taking 'all possible steps' to safeguard Britain's interests. Pound also reported at that meeting both the Richelieu and the Jean Bart as on their way to Dakar and Casablanca respectively.
 * The most detailed account that I can find in what's on my bookshelves is in Shirer 'The Collapse of the Third Republic'. The day before Reynaud resigned, Darlan was telling Herriot that he would sail away with the fleet if 'those bastards' made an armistice.  When Petain formed his government, Darlan became Minister of the Marine: following which, according to Shirer, "during the night of June 17-18 the Admiralty sent out orders to the Brittany naval bases that no warship must fall intact into enemy hands" Richelieu sailed June 18, Jean Bart June 19.  Equally, Darlan ordered (June 21) all French warships in British ports to leave immediately and head for French North Africa.  The British, of course, stopped them doing so, as a British admiral explained "We have to win the war, not only for us but for you, and all these trivialities and sob stuff about friendship and feelings must be swept aside" Rjccumbria (talk) 21:07, 22 March 2017 (UTC)


 * If Darlan did give orders that "no warship must fall intact into enemy hands" then one wonders why the French ships at Oran refused all reasonable offers to keep then out of German hands. Offers which included letting the ships sail with French crews to French colonial ports in the West Indies to be put into storage there, if they didn't want to join the fight against Hitler. The British were forced to sink them to keep them out of German hands, only because the French commanders were not willing to take any action themselves to do so - on Darlan's orders as Vichy Minister of Marine.


 * Darlan chose freely to support the Vichy government. There was nothing stopping him leaving France as General de Gaulle did - and taking the whole French fleet with him - in which case Darlan, not De Gaulle would have become the leader of the Free French.


 * I have no time or energy for a Wikipedia battle about this, and no real interest in Darlan, so I'll let this slide. The fact is that Darlan was a Nazi collaborator and a traitor to France. If you choose to think the best of him, good luck. I'm sure sooner or later someone else will correct this Wikipedia page. Green Wyvern (talk) 13:47, 23 March 2017 (UTC)
 * A somewhat less than gracious concession, or non-concession. In no particular order:
 * Darlan's refusal to order the ships to British ports was not a volte-face by the French resulting from the Petainist pseudo-coup. Reynaud had sought agreement from the British to seek an armistice. When told that they would only agree if the French fleet was sailed to British ports, Reynaud took that as a 'no'. Darlan's instructions - to keep the fleet in French hands, and to sink it if any attempt were made by the Axis to seize it - were consistent with Reynaud's views and with promises made to the British.
 * Consequently, Darlan handing over the fleet to the British (against the wishes of Reynaud) would not have been equivalent to de Gaulle's flight to Britain supposedly as the sole free member of Reynaud's administration.
 * Churchill's suggestion that Catapult was justified by Darlan's failure to keep past promises is -to be polite - disingenuous. At the date of Catapult it is difficult to point to any such failure. Darlan's instructions to the French units at Mers-el-Kebir, are well documented, and there is no need to 'wonder' why the French ships 'refused all reasonable offers' ('reasonable' is debatable from the French point of view, since not only did none of them match Darlan's instructions, but they all involved immediate breach of the armistice conditions.)
 * The problem, which lay in the future, but was clear to the French, the UK, and the US, was twofold. Firstly, the armistice called for the fleet to be demilitarised under Axis control (clearly inconsistent with the promises made to the UK). Secondly, in any peace negotiations, the French had few bargaining chips, but their fleet was one of them. Therefore it seemed likely/inevitable that at some point in the future Darlan would break promises to somebody. The problem, however, would disappear if the British made peace, or were defeated. Unfortunately for the French, the British were not minded to oblige, and pursued (with US encouragement) the alternative solution : "Copenhagen"-ing the French fleet. The justification for that lay in uncertainty over Darlan's future actions, not failure to keep past promises.
 * Whatever WP contributors may think of the subject of articles, their contribution to articles should stick to facts, rather than tendentious re-imaginings of them. I am sorry that your repeated inability to distinguish between 'in British hands' and 'out of Axis hands' has become steadily more entrenched, and instead you prefer to ascribe to a fellow-editor a political bias he does not hold. I have no particular inclination to think well of Darlan, beyond noting that he, like many others in June 1940, had to rapidly come to a decision whose full implications they were in no position to understand. His understanding of what the 'France' was to which he should be loyal led him to jump the wrong way, but (as Weygand told Reynaud at one point) these things are simpler in a monarchy. Rjccumbria (talk) 19:30, 23 March 2017 (UTC)

Darlan deal
note that "resistance" here means Vichy military fighting back when Allied forces landed in Algeria, and the there is mention of unconnected  anti-Vichy combatants, presumably Algerian. That group should be named and if possible the wording should be changed here to "defensive fire" or any other wording but "resistance". Elinruby (talk) 19:24, 5 May 2023 (UTC)