Talk:French battleship Richelieu

Untitled
The pic of ship arriving in New York harbor has wrong title. It says "Ney York." Can someone fix it? There is no provision for change i can see 80.169.162.100 (talk) 14:52, 19 January 2011 (UTC) 19 Jan 2011

Free French flag
Why was this removed without discussion? It was used as a ensign and jack by the FF navy (see WikiProject Ships/Ensigns). The Richelieu fought with the allies and this is sufficiently important to the French for them to allow the use of the FF flag as a jack for ships whose namesakes fought as FF. It also indicates the vessel's allegiance. The FF flag is used elsewhere, so, before there are further deletions, let's get a consensus. I'll not revert for a few days, in case there are particular circumstances for the Richelieu. Folks at 137 16:49, 4 July 2007 (UTC)
 * Free France is defined by law as being what fought at the side of the Allies before 1943. The Richelieu was part in the "army of the Liberation", but not in Free France. It's a widespread problem across several articles, incidentally. Rama 19:10, 4 July 2007 (UTC)


 * Interesting - point taken. Is this point mentioned in the Free France article? Does the law affect which French ships can fly the FF flag? Despite the law, do we want to indicate which ships/military units fought with the allies after 1940? I've tried to open a debate in Wikipedia talk:WikiProject Military history/Maritime warfare task force. Folks at 137 05:53, 5 July 2007 (UTC)
 * The matter was brought to my attention by User:Jacques Ghémard on ; on his talk page, he points to a web page refering to a ministerial decree ("instruction ministérielle du 29 juillet 1953") defining what qualifies as "Free French". It is a bit complicated, which several cases and sub-cases, but broadly speaking, soldiers could join until the 1 August 1943.
 * We now have a number of articles related to, err, the "Goody French of the Second World War", which do not necessarily reflect this (I even goofed big time on the Casabianca (Q183), with Ghémard correcting me in the sharp tone that I deserved), and we now have a considerable task ahead on the matter. Unfortunately Ghémard himself is not too comfortable with writing English, so I don't expect him to rework the articles themselves.
 * As for the indication of the side of these units, I think that we might indeed want to have something since, as far as I know, all French units were flying the same flag but pointing guns in opposite directions.
 * Thanks for your interest and cheers ! Rama 08:36, 5 July 2007 (UTC)

It is difficult to understand nowadays how strong were the rivalry and perhaps even the hate, between Free French Forces, and North Africa & West Africa French Forces which joined the Allied side, after November 1942, even when everybody was, by then, fighting the Axis forces.

The Free French Forces were these which joined General De Gaulle from 1940 to November 1943, while the Vichy Forces were respecting the clauses of the 1940 armistices between France and Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. But...
 * 1.The first Free French operations were carried out against Vichy Forces, taking control of French Equatorial Africa territories, (Congo, Cameroon, Chad, Oubangui-Chari) by August 1940, and taking part to Operation Menace against Dakar.
 * At Dakar, among the Free French Forces, Captain Thierry d'Argenlieu, was hurt by MG shots, and Major De Boislambert was arrested, jailed, and court-martialed. The latter will evade two years after.
 * During the Battle of Gabon, on November 9, 1940, the sloop Savorgnan de Brazza (C. O. Captain D'Argenlieu), attacked and sank her sister-ship, Vichy French sloop Bougainville.
 * 2.By June and July 1941, the Free French Forces take part to the Syria-Lebanon Campaign, in which they were opposed to French troops under Vichy orders.
 * General Legentilhomme, formerly Commander-in-Chief French Military Forces in French Somaliland (Djibouti), who had not accepted the 1940 armistice, and had joined General de Gaulle by August 1940, created and headed the 1st Free French Division. For this, he was condemned, in his absence, for treason by the Government of Vichy to the death penalty.
 * Lieutenant-commander Detroyat, first Commanding Officer of the Free French Fusiliers Marins, was killed by Vichy French forces. His name was given to a Free French Navy corvette, Commandant Detroyat (1941-1947), and later to the sloop Commandant Detroyat (1974-2001).

. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Paul-Pierre Valli (talk • contribs) 22:21, 26 February 2011 (UTC)
 * 3.In the meantime, the Free French Forces fought against Italian Forces,
 * in Eritrea (Battle of Keren) by February-April 1941, with the 13th Demi-Brigade of the Foreign Legion
 * in Lybia where General Leclerc attacked, with the help of the British Long Range Desert Group, the Kufra Oasis, whose Italian garrison surrendered, on March 1, 1941.
 * 4.Later, under General Kœnig, they fought, against the Rommel's German Afrika Korps,
 * The 1st Free French Brigade took part to the battle of Bir Hakeim (May 26-June 11, 1942),
 * to the battle of El-Alamein (with the 13th Demi-Brigade of the Foreign Legion),
 * and to the pursuit of Afrika Korps, retreating through Libya towards Tunisia.
 * 5.The Free French Naval Forces lost several of their units,
 * from these coming from the French Navy which joined General de Gaulle,
 * as, on November 15,1940, the 1,500 tons submarine Narval, whose Commanding Officer's name, Lieutnant-Commander François Drogou, was given to the D'Estienne d'Orves class sloop Drogou,
 * and, on February 19, 1942, the submarine Surcouf, whose Commanding Officer's name, Commander Georges Blaison, was given to the Commandant Blaison,
 * or from those supplied by the Royal Navy,
 * as, the corvette Mimosa whose Commanding Officer's name, Lieutenant-Commander Roger Birot, was given to the sloop Commandant Birot.
 * 6.Several Navy officers and sailors, involved in the Resistance activities in France, were arrested and killed by the German forces (Gestapo, RHSA, SD, etc.)
 * as Lieutenant-Commander Honoré d’Estienne d’Orves, shot on August 29, 1941
 * and Leading Seaman Bernard Anquetil, shot on October 24, 1941.
 * Their names have been given to the sloops D’Estienne d’Orves  and Quartier-Maître Anquetil.

In July 1942, Fighting France was substituated to Free France, to show the unity of the Free French Forces, fighting over the seas, and the Resistance in the homeland, but this did not interfere with the feelings of the Free Frenchmen about Vichy.Paul-Pierre Valli (talk) 02:38, 28 February 2011 (UTC)

To sum up the debate, till November 1942, the Free Frenchmen, proud of their fights and of the sacrifice of their dead, had no consideration for those which had not fought the Axis Forces since three years. They were thinking that the fidelity to Marshal Pétain was a form of treason. On the other side, most of the soldiers and sailors of the Army of the Armistice thought that they had to be respectful of the Marshal Pétain's Government legality, and to obey his orders. Captain l'Herminier, who escaped from Toulon, on November 27, 1942, as he was in command of the submarine Casabianca, preferring to flee to Algiers, rather to scuttle his ship, wrote that the illness which led to replace him as Commanding Officer of submarine Sidi Ferruch, in early 1941, saved his life, otherwise he would have died with this submarine, lost off Casablanca, on November 8, 1942.

They were considering that the French Forces had the right to counterattack those which were attacking them, even if they had been formerly allies. For them, the heroism of their dead was not less admirable, because they had been killed, by British shells or torpedoes, on the battleships Bretagne  or Dunkerque, at Mers-el-Kebir, on the sloop Rigault de Genouilly torpedoed by the submarine HMS Pandora off Oran, in July 1940, on the destroyer L'Audacieux, or on the submarines Persée and Ajax sunk at Dakar, on the submarine Poncelet sunk by the sloop HMS  Milford, in the Gulf of Guinea, by November 1940, on the destroyer Chevalier Paul torpedoed off Lebanon, in 1941, or on the submarines Heros, Monge and Beveziers sunk off Diego-Suarez, by May 1942.

However, there never was any complicity with the German Forces, nor operation carried out with them. And some ones were able to find the right way when things became clearer : the most extraordinary story is the one of the submarine Marsouin which escaped from Algiers to flee to Toulon, on November 8, 1942, and escaped from Toulon, and steered to Algiers, on November 27!

The events of November 8 to 11, 1942, in North Africa, in a first time, worsened the minds confusion.

The hopeless gallantry of Admiral Gervais de Lafont's 2nd Light Squadron, against the American warships in Casablanca contrasted with the attitude of Admiral Esteva and Admiral Derrien in Bizerte, as if the Vichy Forces comportement had to be different in face of these, Allied or German forces, which were attacking. And in Tunisia, the French land forces waited nearly ten days before countering the General Nehring's German forces, at Medjez-el-Bab. Finally, the French forces in North Africa joined the Allies, but Admiral Godefroy, in Alexandria, and Admiral Robert, in Martinique, will wait till May-June 1943, to rally the Allies, with the Naval forces they had under their autority.

By late May, all the Axis forces in Tunisia have surrendered. But there was so few brotherhood of arms between the Free French Forces and the French Africa Forces, that, for the march past of Victory in Tunis, on May 23, 1943, the Free French Forces were with the British 8th Army, and the French Africa Army 19th Corps was with the American troops.

By then, in 1943, the problem was no longer between Free France and Vichy, but between these who, since 1940, followed General de Gaulle, and those who had followed Marshal Pétain, and the question was : who will command whom ? In Algiers, the struggle was hard, between General de Gaulle and General Giraud, and on various subjects. One of the main problems was to know which admirals will have the most important commands.

After the scuttling of Toulon, the French warships represented roughly 284,000 tons afloat:
 * 137,000 tons were based in Northern and Wetern Africa, acting under orders of the Algiers authorities,
 * 66,000 tons were laid up in Alexandria,
 * 34,00 tons at Fort de France (West Indies)
 * 16,000 tons were laid up in Indo-China,
 * and 31,000 tons based in Great Britain.

The Free French Forces were the weakest, but it was inconceivable for them to be under orders of Admirals who had too much complied to Vichy orders, as Admiral Michelier, who had been Commander-in-Chief French Naval Forces at Casablanca, on November 8 to 11, 1942. So, in early 1943, there were two Chefs d'Etat-major de la Marine (C.E.E.M.), Admiral Collinet, formerly Commanding Officer of the battleship Strasbourg, when she escaped from Mers-el-Kebir, for the French Naval Forces in Africa, and Admiral Auboyneau for the French Naval Forces in Great Britain, who escaped from Alexandria, by August 1940, to join General de Gaulle.

It was necessary to re-group and merge all the ships into one force, except for the few ships which were compelled to remain in Indo-China. In the event this was not achieved until the end of the summer of 1943 owing to political and psychological difficulties resulting of the dispute between De Gaulle and Giraud (cf.Henri Le Masson, The French Navy Volume 1, published by Macdonald & co, in Paris, 1969, p.51-53). In "De Gaulle et Giraud L'affrontement 1942-1944", by Michèle Cointet, published by Editions Perrin, Paris, 2005, ISBN 2-262-02023-X, in p. 308-322, and p.363-365, it can be found indications about the Gaullist operations carried out, during the 1943 year, to recruit, even in the U.S. harbours, sailors of merchant ships, and in North Africa, sailors of warships, or soldiers of the land army units which were under General Giraud authority. Gaullists were using the aura of Free French Forces, promising also a better pay, and taking avantage of the noxious climate on merchant ships or warships between the Vichyst minded officers and Gaullist sailors, as on battleship Richelieu, where Captain Deramond, Commanding Officer from February 1941 to April 1943, was reproached to have publicly called Churchill bastard and Roosevelt villain, and to have kept on board Marshal Pétain's portraits.

On August 4, 1943, Admiral Lemonnier, formerly Commanding Officer of the cruiser Georges Leygues at Dakar, became the unique Chef d'Etat-major of the French Navy. As in the mean time the French Comitee of the National Liberation has been created, there was no reason to keep a dictinct organisation for the former Free French Forces: this is the meaning of the "instruction ministérielle du 29 juillet 1953".

Concerning the Free French bow ensign, with the Cross of Lorraine, neither the Free Frenchmen would have accepted it was set up on warships as Richelieu, nor most of the officers of Richelieu would have even wanted to raise it. Nowadays, the Free French naval enseign may be hoisted, as bow flag, only on the last remaining ships of the Free French Naval Forces, the goelettes Etoile  and La Belle Poule, school ships of the École navale, and on ships which bear the name of warships of the Free French Naval Forces, as the nuclear attack submarine Rubis, or the stealth frigates Surcouf, Courbet, Aconit, because the submarine-minelayer Rubis, the large submarine Surcouf, the corvette Aconit and the old dreadnought Courbet were part of the Free French Navy Forces.Paul-Pierre Valli (talk) 02:17, 1 March 2011 (UTC)

Present at Japanese surrender?
Are we sure about this? This link does not have Richelieu on it, and this link says this:

"Drydocked at Durban that summer, Richelieu did not complete that stint of repairs in time to participate in the final act of the war in the Pacific. She arrived at Trincomalee on 18 August 1945 - three days after Japan announced their acceptance of the unconditional surrender terms of the Potsdam Declaration. The war with Japan was over."

Does anyone have a reliable source that says Richelieu was there? — Ed 17  (Talk /  Contribs)  00:33, 8 April 2009 (UTC)
 * The Japanese instrument of surrender was signed on the 2nd of September 1945. There are a number of sites that mention her presence at Tokyo Bay then   ; though I would not qualify hem of "reliable", the concordance is a strong clue, and not incompatible with what you provide. I'll try to check if I can find harder evidence when I have some time. Rama (talk) 11:46, 8 April 2009 (UTC)
 * Alright. Shall we leave the text hidden for now and go with the navy site? Also, just throwing this out there&mdash;could those sites you gave have just copied or paraphrased that from us? I don't know, but I'm attempting to throw thoughts out there. — Ed 17  (Talk /  Contribs)  13:28, 8 April 2009 (UTC)


 * Interesting question, complicated by the number of mirrors. This source from USN Historical Center does not list Richelieu there.  Kablammo (talk) 14:01, 8 April 2009 (UTC)
 * I am not very confident of US sources. The ones we have are not even capable of spelling Leclerc's name properly. Furthermore, there was a clear US policy at the time to shun and dismiss anything French.


 * I am not saying that I am certain of anything, but I would regard US record like this one with some critical distance. Rama (talk) 15:42, 8 April 2009 (UTC)


 * I see the French wiki article does not make the claim (but does have the vessel at Singapore for the surrender there). Perhaps a question there would elicit an answer.  Kablammo (talk) 16:00, 8 April 2009 (UTC)
 * I have invited comment from WP:MILHIST on this. — Ed 17  (Talk /  Contribs)  16:12, 8 April 2009 (UTC)


 * An article in the Times, 11 September 1945, has her arriving at Singapore the previous day for the surrender ceremony, which certainly bears this point out. No mention of anything definite between May and September, though according to this she was definitely in the region in August. It's interesting to note that the photographs of Leclerc and his staff show them being brought to Missouri by a US destroyer, from the shore, which implies there wasn't a significant French presence there. Shimgray | talk | 16:46, 8 April 2009 (UTC)


 * In fact, the Times seems to definitely support "was at Singapore, not Tokyo" - "A naval force, which has been at sea for the past month covering landing operations, arrived at Singapore today ... includes the Nelson, the Richelieu..." (report Sept. 10th, emphasis mine). If the force was at sea off Malaya for a month, it certainly wouldn't have been able to be in Tokyo the previous week. Shimgray | talk | 16:50, 8 April 2009 (UTC)

According to our List of Allied ships at the Japanese surrender article, your battleship was noticeably absent. Didn't check the CINCPAC link at the bottom though. TomStar81 (Talk) 16:15, 8 April 2009 (UTC)
 * One problem, Tom: I'm pretty sure that was copied from the navy link given above. :/ — Ed 17  (Talk /  Contribs)  16:17, 8 April 2009 (UTC)


 * Take a look at this line from Battleships of World War II:
 * On July 8, [Richelieu] sailed for refit at Durban where she arrived on July 19. On completion, she sailed for Trincomalee on 10 August, arriving on 18 August 1945, after the Japanese surrender. She covered Operation 'Zipper', the reoccupation of Malaya, in September...
 * No mention of the ship having been in Tokyo Bay on 2 Sept. Parsecboy (talk) 16:50, 8 April 2009 (UTC)
 * Good source; still not determinative of her whereabouts on 2 Sept., but makes it less likely. Ceylon on 18 August (arrival, when was departure?), Malaya in September (including Singapore by 10 September for surrender on 12 September), but interspersed with a detour to Tokyo Bay on 2 September?  That's a lot of steaming for no practical purpose.
 * Perhaps whoever first propagated the story (if that's what it is), read something of the ship's presence at the Japanese surrender and associated that with 2 September at Japan rather than the later ceremony at Singapore. And if the story is erroneous, it may be an object lesson on how misinformation can spread from Wikipedia, even if it did not originate here.  Kablammo (talk) 17:19, 8 April 2009 (UTC)
 * This appears to have been present since 2004; see this revision. Sorry Rama. :/ — Ed 17  (Talk /  Contribs)  17:29, 8 April 2009 (UTC)
 * No problem, the aim is to tell the truth, not to please people :)
 * It seems to be pretty well established that Richelieu was part of a squadron with HMS Nelson at the time. I think that the confusion arises from the fact that captain Merveilleux du Vignaux, commanding Richelieu, was indeed in Tokyo with Leclerc ( this one is a pretty reliable site). Somehow this was deformed into the battleship being there too, I read it and included it into the article without double-checking.
 * Well done User:the_ed17 (and the others too) ! Rama (talk) 17:38, 8 April 2009 (UTC)
 * Hey, we all make mistakes! :-) A pat on the back goes out to everyone. — Ed 17  (Talk /  Contribs)  02:17, 9 April 2009 (UTC)
 * Just to confirm the above, she's not listed in the United States Navy's list of Allied ships present at the surrender. Nick-D (talk) 23:40, 9 April 2009 (UTC)

(outdent)I have the definitive French-language book on Richelieu by Sarnet and le Vaillant, which I will check tomorrow then reference accordingly in the article. --Simon Harley (talk | library | book reviews) 13:48, 9 April 2009 (UTC) took part to a large

In "Les derniers cuirassés", by Rear Admiral Lepotier, published in 1967, by Les Editions France-Empire, Paris, p. 241-242, it can be read that "Richelieu", which had left Trincomale on September 5, 1945, with the large destroyer "Triomphant", was struck by a mine, on September 9, at 07:44, in the Strait of Malacca. She moored in Singapore, on Septembre 11, at 11:30. On late afternoon, General Leclec came on board to dinner. On September 12, Admiral Mountbatten received the surrender of General Itagaki, at the City Hall of Singapore. With General Leclerc, the Commanding Officer of "Richelieu", Captain Merveilleux du Vignaux, and a sailor of the battleship represented the French Forces, in the Allied Armies delegation. After this ceremony, the landing corps of "Richelieu", strong of 250 sailors, took part to a large march past. At noon, Admiral Walker, Commander-in-Chief East Indies Fleet ordered orally to Commanding Officer,"Richelieu", to return to Tricomale, as soon as possible. At 16:30, the battleship get under way, with the"HMS Relentless", and arrived "Trinco" on September 16.

On September 2, "Richelieu" was not at the surrender of Japan, in Tokyo Bay, where General Leclerc represented France.Paul-Pierre Valli (talk) 00:46, 26 February 2011 (UTC)

Smallest possible target?
As I understand it, hitting a thinner target (from left to right) at long range is substantially easier than hitting a shallow target (front to back). A battleship facing the enemy would then present an easier target than one oriented perpendicular to same. Why does this article claim the opposite as an advantage of the design? Is there a source to verify this? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Archer884 (talk • contribs) 20:19, 13 April 2009 (UTC)

Actually, I'm just gonna give this a little while and then reword this part so that it doesn't mention the "small target" bit if no one brings up any evidence. J.M. Archer (talk) 20:43, 17 April 2009 (UTC)


 * Think width. Shooting at a thin target that is moving toward you would be a lot harder than a wide target on a parallel course&mdash;you can just "walk" the shells to the target in the latter. — Ed 17  (Talk /  Contribs)  01:55, 18 April 2009 (UTC)


 * Your comparison doesn't hold up. How much harder is it to hit a much wider target moving toward you than a much thinner target moving on a parallel course? ...because that's what you're dealing with when it comes to range and elevation. Hence my desire to see some kind of source material or to remove the offending statement. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Archer884 (talk • contribs) 14:31, 28 April 2009 (UTC)
 * But you are not trying to hit a line in the water, either. Shells that would fall further than the line in the water will hit the flank of a ship that you see from her profile. On the other hand, shells falling few metres to the right or the left will result in a near miss less likely to cause significant disruption. It's really aiming at a 35m x [height] target, as opposed to a 247.90m x [height] one. It's not only that the orientation of the target changed. Rama (talk) 16:28, 28 April 2009 (UTC)


 * Source material. :D


 * http://www.navweaps.com/index_inro/INRO_BB-Gunnery_p1.htm


 * "Long and consistent observation revealed that large errors in range were more common than large errors in deflection, and much more difficult to detect." In other words, left and right is easier than up and down. A ship pointed toward you is effectively a bigger target; the problem, then, becomes one of simply knowing how fast it's moving. (Shipboard targeting systems were designed to help compensate for this, of course, as having two battle lines or vessels traveling exactly parallel to one another, with no change in range, would've been very rare.) Unfortunately, the source doesn't directly address the issue of firing at a ship moving toward or away from the shooter--in fact, it (this section of the article focuses on evidence from American gunnery drills) points out that such drills were not carried out for fear of hitting the vessels towing the target, since, again, "consistent observation revealed..." You get the idea. They were afraid of hitting their own ships under those circumstances.


 * I'm pretty certain that the difficulty in getting the range of a target (as compared to its deflection) was one of the reasons ships of this period continued to fight as part of a battle line--if facing the enemy head-on served to increase survivability, it would've been a far more common tactic. I'll keep looking for more explicit source material, but this seems pretty supportive of the general concept. J.M. Archer (talk) 17:55, 28 April 2009 (UTC) Ha. I signed my [censored] post this time.
 * Well yes, right and left might be easier, but consider both at the same time? When two ships are parallel, left to right is easy to compensate for becuase you can 'walk' (i.e. change elevation by a small amount) the shells up or back to the target. When bow/stern on, it requires massive changes in elevation. What I'm saying is that massively modifying the direction of the guns to compensate for the movement of the other ship (with smaller changes in elevation) is easier than massively modifying the elevation to compensate for the movement of the other ship (with smaller changes in direction). Did that make sense? — Ed 17  (Talk /  Contribs)  20:47, 28 April 2009 (UTC)


 * In a word, no. The difficulty will be in finding the range of the target, not in moving the guns; they're not cranked by hand or anything. I'd like a source explicitly stating difficulty in tracking a target closing at 20-30 knots. This seems to have been something that ships did with decent proficiency.


 * I'll also point out that simply because a ship is facing directly toward or away from the enemy does not mean that the range is changing. Especially in this regard, the way the article states this "smallest possible target" point is quite erroneous. J.M. Archer (talk) 17:41, 29 April 2009 (UTC)

(outdent) I'm struggling to see what the fuss is about here. This is the section of the article which provoked all this I assume:

On the other hand, the entirety of the main artillery was able to fire forwards, as the ship closed in to her enemy, in an angle where she made the smallest possible target.

This makes it sound like the issue of "danger space" was a factor in her design. Nothing I've seen in English or French has ever specifically suggested this.

Go buy a book called Naval Firepower by Professor Norman Friedman and actually read up on naval gunnery Archer884. You're making some pretty bold assertions here which don't hold up. --Simon Harley (talk | library | book reviews) 08:07, 30 April 2009 (UTC)


 * How so? Is it really so bold to ask that someone provide a source to verify the article's claim? J.M. Archer (talk) 14:52, 30 April 2009 (UTC)


 * Update: I'm currently reading the book you mentioned. As yet, I've found nothing to suggest that my (not unsourced) assertions are particularly outlandish, but I must confess that, in the period leading up to Jutland, figuring out the closing speed of a target seems to have been a particularly onerous ordeal. I'm not sure to what extent these difficulties apply to Richelieu, being a much more modern ship, but I'm certainly willing to concede that moving swiftly toward or away from a target might significantly increase the difficulty the enemy has in scoring a hit.


 * However, I must also point out that the same book, in the section discussing the Russo-Japanese war, points out the obvious: that which makes it difficult for the enemy to hit you (the high "range rate," as professor Friedman calls it) also makes it difficult for you to hit the enemy. The two difficulties being equal, I would still say that the larger target is in the weaker predicament. For information on whether the bow or broadside of a ship presents the larger target at long range (and I know of no examples of closing quickly at close range following WWI), please see the source I cited above. J.M. Archer (talk) 15:56, 30 April 2009 (UTC)


 * In the same book (page 143) you will find "ships always attempted to be end-on, in order to present a smaller target." This is evidently taken from the British Confidential Book 3001 (42) Progress in Naval Gunnery, 1942.  One reason why having a target end on was recognised by the British in that the target would not be able to bring all its guns to bear, a problem Richelieu wouldn't have had.  As to the "two difficulties being equal", the United States Navy introduced a stable vertical for trunnion-tilt (i.e. end-on fire) in the 1930s.  Whether Richelieu had such a system I don't know (British fire-control is my interest), but I happen to know an expert on French fire-control and will ask him. --Simon Harley (talk | library | book reviews) 20:24, 30 April 2009 (UTC)


 * I haven't gotten that far in the book. :) But I'm confused by what you cite here. Perhaps you could provide some context? I understand that Dreadnought was designed to have forward fire equivalent to her broadside fire for a reason such as that (ships attempting to be end-on), but that was in a much earlier era, when gunfights were expected to take place at shorter ranges (where trajectories were largely flat and catastrophic damage from plunging fire less of a concern). They even considered ramming a viable tactic at the time. Does that still apply in an era when engagements often began at 25,000 yards? (I did note the date of the book -- 1942 and much later than Dreadnought -- but as I've no idea what the book is referring to I can't say as to how it meant this information to be applied.)


 * Also, I'm not really worried about Richelieu's ability to fire while sailing toward the enemy. Additional difficulties in aiming forward notwithstanding, she does have twice the forward firepower of the average ship -- none of which will make any difference in how easy she is to hit.


 * I've sent an inquiry to a knowledgeable party in hopes they'll be able to provide us with some additional sources. I'm going to try to look up this confidential thingy, too, but considering my luck so far I wouldn't hold out much hope.


 * Also, I think your mind may have gotten a little ahead of your fingers at one point. "One reason why having a target end on was recognised by the British in" ? Recognized as what? This seems to imply that the end-on target is at a disadvantage (not one experienced by this particular ship, certainly), rather than implying that engaging end-on is to be preferred for some reason not related to turret placement. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Archer884 (talk • contribs) 23:44, 30 April 2009 (UTC)

Found a source! This actually supports the article's current assertion that Richelieu would definitely present a smaller target end-on (though whether she'd be safer at that angle is still a question her deck armor would probably have to answer).

Found here: http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_16-50_mk7.htm

One of the nice guys at NavWeaps.com pointed out this table (titled "Accuracy During WWII"), taken from a study by the Naval War College that pitted the American Iowa Class against Bismarck at varying ranges and angles of attack:

At 10,000 yards, the ratio of broadside to end-on hits is 1.47:1.

At 20,000 yards, the ratio worsens to 2.56:1.

At 30,000 yards, the ratio improves slightly to 1.92:1.

Now, being a nub, I have no idea if this is considered a valid source, and, if it is, I don't know how to add a source to the article. Maybe one of you fellows can help?

Anyway, it seems you guys were all right. Apparently, once guns do have the right range, shot fall patterns for each individual broadside tend to be relatively shallow and wide -- it's the overall patterns for several successive broadsides that seem long and thin, as the diagrams in that earlier source reveal. J.M. Archer (talk) 04:57, 2 May 2009 (UTC) :D
 * I'm about to go to bed, but I can say that NavWeaps passes WP:RS. — Ed 17  (Talk /  Contribs)  05:07, 2 May 2009 (UTC)


 * The most difficult aspect of gunnery has always been in estimating range accurately, but that was mostly solved in naval gunnery by the advent of radar, which provided accurate range information, such that at the Battle of the North Cape Duke of York was able to sink the Scharnhorst without ever seeing her. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.55.7 (talk) 10:25, 11 March 2018 (UTC)

Laid down dates
I'm new here, so didn't want to edit directly. This site looks like it has more exact dates for when the ship was laid down, commissioned, etc. Please make the updates if this is acceptable. http://ww2db.com/ship_spec.php?ship_id=107 24.6.176.195 (talk) 05:37, 21 January 2011 (UTC)Keri Morgret

In "Le Cuirassé Richelieu 1935-1968" by Robert Dumas, published by Marine éditions, 2001, in Nantes, ISBN 2-909675-75-0, p. 8, it can be found some precise data, but there is some difficulty to translate them in English, as the French Navy does not officially use some British terms, as "commissionned", but "armé". It can be read:

Building dates
 * Program : 1935
 * Buiding shipyard : Arsenal de Brest
 * Laid down : 22-10-1935
 * Launched : 17-01-1939
 * Armed for trials : 15-10-1939
 * Armed definitively : 01-04-1940
 * Presentation for reception : 14-04-1940
 * End of armament : 15-06-1940
 * In service : november 1943 — Preceding unsigned comment added by Paul-Pierre Valli (talk • contribs) 10:23, 26 February 2011 (UTC)

Robert Dumas gives an interesting precision, in a margin note : Richelieu's admittance in active service was never officially prononced. The ship is declared available, October 10, 1943, the day the refit in New York Navy Yard is declared completed. Following the "French Navy Monthly Activity Reports", admittance on service list is reported, by November 1943, but without precise day. In "Les Derniers Cuirassés", by Rear Admiral Lepotier, published by Editions France-Empire, in Paris, 1969, it can be found, p. 43-46, some interesting details, on the way the gunnery and speed trials were carried out in 1940, interruption of speed trials on April 14, 1940, following detection of a submarine, gunnery shots trials reported to have been carried out "without major damage", by June. Arriving to Dakar, by late June, the loading of the main artillery guns lasts one quarter of hour to hoist one shell and powder charge from magazine to gun.Paul-Pierre Valli (talk) 11:31, 26 February 2011 (UTC)

Owning last edit
I did the 1 March 2011 edit. Wiki logs me out without warning if I spend more than a few minutes working on an edit without previewing or something.

Mostly I fixed non-anglophone usages ("battery" for "artillery", "in" for "on"). Some formatting clean-up, removed many excess links, rephrasing to clarify opening section. There was an error: the original light AA was described as 13.7mm in one place, instead of 13.2mm. Also spelling errors, and run-on sentences.

Rich Rostrom (Talk) 20:50, 1 March 2011 (UTC)

Richelieu's speed
User:JRPG explained his edit (16:09, 10 January 2013‎ ) about Richelieu 's speed, with «Remove 'Her speed was surpassed only by the fastest U.S. Navy battleships.' Faster than contemporary US and British ships yes, but Bismarck and Littorio seem at least similar speeds». May I not completely agree ? In the Siegfried Breyer's book, «Battleships and battle cruisers 1905–1970» (1973, London, Macdonald and Jane's, ISBN 0-356-04191-3) cited in the article bibliography, we can read the Richelieu 's speed was 30 knots (p.436), as Littorio(p.386), and Bismarck was credited with 29 knots (p.300). But in the same pages, the speed reached during trial runs of 32.0 knots is indicated for Richelieu (32.13 knots for Jean-Bart), 31.42 knots for Vittorio Veneto (and 31.29 for Littorio), 30.1 knots for Bismarck (and 30.8 knots for Tirpitz).Paul-Pierre Valli (talk) 13:17, 15 January 2013 (UTC)

Long sentences.
This is a great article with a huge amount of well referenced material. I think, though, that some of the writing, while creative, is overly complex. I've simplified the second paragraph in the introductory section and I would appreciate opinions on whether the new version is easier to understand. Thank you. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Seanmcdill (talk • contribs) 14:35, 13 August 2014 (UTC)

External links modified
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ammunition for bombardment
hi, I may have read over the point where the article says this. the ship is detached to Eastern Fleet "because only armor piercing ammunition is available" after being "specially made in the US based on plans sent from dakar" but then seemingly the next mission is shore bombardment. Where did the ammunition suddenly come from? thanks for clarifying.84.215.194.53 (talk) 84.215.194.53 (talk) 12:16, 30 June 2021 (UTC)


 * That's a good question - they just used APC shells at Sabang without regard for their general low usefulness for that purpose (though they did destroy or damage several targets). I've clarified in the text. Parsecboy (talk) 20:39, 30 June 2021 (UTC)

A Commons file used on this page or its Wikidata item has been nominated for deletion
The following Wikimedia Commons file used on this page or its Wikidata item has been nominated for deletion: Participate in the deletion discussion at the nomination page. —Community Tech bot (talk) 05:23, 17 March 2022 (UTC)
 * French battleship Richelieu colorized.jpg