Talk:Functionalism (philosophy of mind)/Archive 1

''These comments originally appeared on the talk page of "Functionalism (psychology)", an article that has been merged into "Functionalism (philosophy of mind)".

Title
This article has the word "psychology" in its title, where it should probably have "cognitive science" instead, because psychology is much broader and has non-cognitive approaches as well. Cognitive science, as the name suggests, is purely committed to the information processing view of the mind. 137.222.122.150 15:44, 11 May 2007 (UTC)

Article Update (March 2006)
I have updated this page so that it is consistent with what functionalism actually is in reference to psychology and cognitive science and the problems with it. --Neuropsychology 22:42, 18 March 2006 (UTC)

Definition
The Definition section is very misleading in starting out with irrelevant ideas (the innateness of mental capacities and characteristics), and ending with Block's correct definition. Innateness is no part of functionalism, since the latter is neutral on this issue. The term "functionalism" derives from the mathematical notion of function (from inputs to output), not the ordinary one (purpose).


 * Attempted to clear up confusion on this issue. I agree was a bit confusing. --Neuropsychology 15:18, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

Unsourced statements
Can someone flag some of these and I will try and find the sources. 137.222.122.148 10:03, 10 May 2007 (UTC)

Two senses of "Functionalism"
As some commentators here note, there are at least two senses of "functionalism" in psychology and cognitive science. In one sense, "functionalism" refers to a movement in psychology which is about 100 years old, dates back to James, and is critiqued, e.g., by Watson (see http://www.cas.buffalo.edu/classes/psy/segal/4212001/Functionalism.htm). Its contrast is Titchener's structuralism. I believe this is what Grinning Fool and several others here are referring to. In another sense, "functionalism" refers to a philosophical position which dates back to Chomsky and Putnam and Fodor is about 50 years old (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/). This is what most on this page seem to be referring to. At least that's my understanding. Somehow the distinction needs to be flagged in the article. And I agree that the functionalism in phil-mind and current functionalism in psychology articles overlap. Jyoshimi 04:55, 22 January 2007 (UTC)


 * Functionalism (psychology) could justly look to the APA Dictionary (2007) to find out what functionalism means to a psychologist and therefore what it ought to mean. Functionalism (psychology) can only refer to Dewey/James/Angell/Carr functional psychology. The links to this article include links from William James !!! Won't those readers be surprised !!! Why not call this Functionalism (cognitive science)? DCDuring 01:48, 1 October 2007 (UTC)

I fully agree DCDuring, this article specifically addresses cognitive science and should be renamed as such. This particular article should address the Dewey/James/Angell/Carr brand of functionalism. Does anyone know how to change the name of the article so that all the links to it remain operational? Neuropsychology 18:05, 2 December 2007 (UTC)

Merge
perhaps a merge between this article and Functionalism (philosophy of mind)? 71.250.15.252 00:58, 15 April 2006 (UTC)


 * I am not aware of a usage of the word "Functionalism" in psychology independant of that used in the philosopy of mind. This article seems to specfically discuss machine functionalism, which is covered in the philiosophy of mind article. Hence the proposed merge. Keithmahoney 19:25, 15 May 2006 (UTC)

I am an experimental cognitive scientist and this word is used to describe the current metatheory, that forms the backdrop to research in cognition and psychology. Although it shares a lot with philosophy of mind this article is more focused on the psychological/cognitive implications of functionalism - something that is not dealt with by the philosophy of mind (POM) article. I think it should either stay separate or a special section be added within the POM article specifically relating to fucntionalism's relevance to psych/cognition.--137.222.120.32 16:48, 25 May 2006 (UTC)


 * Agreed; functionalism was one of the first schools of thought in psychology, and very influential in its time. Though there seems to be little actual information on what functionalism is here (perhaps I'll fill it in a bit during the week), only criticisms and discussion over it, it is not directly related to the POM article.--Grinning Fool 07:56, 12 June 2006 (UTC)


 * See merge discussion at Talk:Functionalism (philosophy of mind) CharlesGillingham (talk) 07:43, 18 March 2009 (UTC)

"False conclusions"
I don't understand what is meant by "inductive functionalism is problematic because of the risk of false conclusions." This phrase needs a little bit of explaining. If it were exactly what it sounds like I don't think functionalism would be alone in that regard. Recury 17:15, 28 March 2007 (UTC)


 * Attempted to clear up confusion on this issue. You are right that it is not alone in this regard, but it is a serious problem for functionalism especially because the computation can't actually be "seen", at least not yet anyway. --Neuropsychology 15:18, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

Who is Kate?
The "Inverted Spectra" section introduces a character Kate and goes into a setup much like the Chinese Room thought experiment, which actually has nothing to do with the Inverted Spectra topic. I presume there were references to Kate earlier in the article which were deleted, which leads to this now-orphaned paragraph.

In fact, the style for the Problems sections using a series of interrelated thought experiments seems quite un-wikipedia-esque. Is there a way to revise this? ddickison 18:25, 16 April 2007 (UTC)


 * Attempted to clear up confusion on this issue. Taken out Kate and unravelled the thought experiments. --Neuropsychology 15:18, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

Searle's Room
I don't see how Searle's Room applies here - it's an argument against algorithmic ai - wheras functionalism rests not upon traditional algorithmic computation. Furthermore, the analogy is flawed - e.g. if you were to ask one of my brain cells if it were aware of what I'm typing at this moment, it would be pretty hard pressed to provide you with a sensible response.


 * Functionalism, as it relates to cognitive science, states that mental states are defined by their causal relations to inputs, outputs and one another (see Block ref in article). In other words, mental activity is computational in its nature. Functionalism is often aligned with Turing or digital computation (1 and 0s); however, this does not necessarily need to be the case as functionalism allows for other flavours of computation, like quantum.


 * Therefore, I take issue with the above comment, specifically, "functionalism rests not upon traditional algorithmic computation", because functionalism can refer to traditional, digital, Turing computation. It can also refer to quantum computation or other forms of computation known or unknown. In other words, functionalism is blind to the 'flavour' of computation.


 * That cleared up, the reason Searle's Chinese Room is important here is because if functionalism is to explain all mental processes it encounters problems in explaining how meaning and intentionality (which are crucial to consciousness according to Searle) can be derived from pure digital computation. In other words, the very theoretical underpinning of cognitive science as it currently operates (functionalism) may not, according to Searle, be able to satisfactorily account for consciousness.


 * The above comment author's second point about the flawed analogy is perceptive. I have always found it interesting that Searle, himself a proponent of non-eliminative materialism (the idea that higher order processes cannot be reduced; his example is 'wetness' which cannot be reduced to a single water molecule), does not consider this in the Chinese Room. That is, intentionality and meaning are unlikely to be a product of simple, deterministic computation of a single neuron or whatever as Searle presents; however, it could very well be the product of much larger networks or emergent vector states, which other authors (e.g. Bechtel, 1995; Churchland & Churchland, 1990) have suggested. Moreover, when such complex networks interact with the environment, semanticity and intentionality may well be afforded as Van Gulick (1993) has advocated. In these respects, I find Searle’s argument myopic and not really a serious threat to functionalism.


 * Here are the refs I have used so you can go away and check them yourself if you wish:


 * Bechtel, W. (1995). Consciousness: perspectives from symbolic and connectionist AI. Neuropsychologia, 33, 1075-1086
 * Turing, A.M. (1950). Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind, 49, 433-460.
 * Churchland, P. M & Churchland, P. S. (1990). “Could a Machine Think”.  Scientific American, 262, 1, 32- 37
 * Van Gulick, R. (1993). “Understanding the phenomenal mind: Are we all just armadillos?” In M. Davies and G. Humphreys, (Eds.), Consciousness: ::Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Blackwell.


 * I will update this section in the article to make readers aware of the criticisms. Thanks for the comment, hope this has helped and also next time please remember to sign your name after. Neuropsychology 10:50, 20 July 2007 (UTC)

James and Functionalism
Doesn't Functionalism in Psychology start with William James? I know it is in a different sense that functionalism in cognitive science but is an historical antecedent. I think this should be included in this article. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Voloshinov (talk • contribs) 15:43, 17 September 2007 (UTC)


 * You are absolutely correct. This point has been brought up before and needs to be acted on. DCDuring 01:42, 1 October 2007 (UTC)

Assessment comment
Substituted at 06:04, 24 July 2016 (UTC)