Talk:German Instrument of Surrender/Archive 1

Time Zones at Ceasefire
Removed "at 22:43 hours (CET)". This is the same factoid as appeared on End of World War II in Europe. What is the source? and does it explicitly say CET? Please see Talk:End of World War II in Europe for more details and please place an answer there. --Philip Baird Shearer 20:21, 8 May 2006 (UTC)

"2:41 hours" looks sort of strange. Shouldn't that be "1421 hours" ? John Sheu 17:34, 9 May 2006 (UTC)

It is in the first instrument of surrender as "Signed at Rheims at 0241 on the 7th day of May, 1945. France" --Philip Baird Shearer 23:26, 9 May 2006 (UTC)

WikiProject Military history/Assessment/Tag & Assess 2008
Article reassessed and graded as start class. --dashiellx (talk) 19:27, 5 May 2008 (UTC)

split
It is better to limit this article to surrender ceremony and text, and move the rest to a new artical Surrender of Germany. Also see Japanese Instrument of Surrender and Surrender of Japan. --Srinivasasha (talk) 18:57, 14 January 2009 (UTC)


 * I don't think that's necessary. The article is not very long after all, and the two things belong together anyway. --Maxl (talk) 11:43, 25 January 2009 (UTC)

I think the split makes sense. It is the format used for Japan, why not Germany?99.233.54.173 (talk) 23:25, 2 March 2009 (UTC)

Signature by Representative of Soviet High Command
Why is it in Latin not Cyrillic font? Milik (talk) 01:53, 7 May 2009 (UTC)

Inclusion in 'On this Day..." Section...
The German Instrument of Surrender took place on May 8th, not March 8th. It is currently listed as March 8th on the Wikipedia home page. Not sure how to correct this... —Preceding unsigned comment added by 206.108.253.203 (talk) 03:21, 8 March 2010 (UTC)

Acted individually
I removed this sentence "The United States and Britain acted on behalf of all Allied forces, whereas France, Germany and the USSR acted individually." Because it does not make sense. The surrender was between the German military and the Allied military who had two independent commands. The surrender was signed by a representative of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, the German High Command. No American signed the document, the Brit signed for his supreme commander (this rather neatly shows how combined the Western Allied command was). Both of whom were authorised to do so by their governments. Now it may be that the Soviet representative exceeded his powers and was not authorised to sign it, but the the Frenchman was only signing as a witness and as such his signature did not represent France's agreement to the terms, which was done through the signature representing the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force as it was for Canada and all other nations fighting under the command of Eisenhower.

If the sentence is meant to say that "Ivan Sousloparov was not authorised to sign on behalf of the Soviet High Command" then that is what it should say, because the wording at the moment is just plain confusing. -- PBS (talk) 00:42, 25 May 2010 (UTC)
 * This wording is a verbatim quote from the source (The American Journal of International Law) I used. We may speculate what concretely was meant by that, however, the source does not explain that. If this source contradicts to other sources let's think how to re-word that.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:58, 25 May 2010 (UTC)
 * I say remove it (as I did before), it is not clear and the reason why the Soviet's objected to the Rheims signing is explained much more succinctly in the next section. -- PBS (talk) 08:53, 25 May 2010 (UTC)
 * Agreed. After the article have been modified, this text became redundant.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:22, 25 May 2010 (UTC)

Timings and other problems
I moved this paragraph: "This ratification was a response to both Soviet and British concerns. As well as wishing to ensure that as much of Germany's military and industrial equipment as possible was available to be confiscated and taken to the USSR, and that German forces on the Eastern Front remained in place to await Soviet captivity rather than moving west to surrender to the western allies, the Soviets desired a signature in the presence of the Soviet Supreme Commander (Major General Susloparov, who had accepted the May 7 surrender for the Soviets, was only liaison officer at the Western Headquarters.) The British wanted the surrender to be signed by the highest military and civilian representatives of the German Reich, in order to avoid a repeat of the stab-in-the-back legend which had been cultivated by the Germans after World War I because the armistice had been signed only by a civilian politician and an unknown general. (Jodl, who signed in Rheims, was an officer without the power of command). It was agreed to have the May 7 act ratified with the signatures of the commanders in chief of the Wehrmacht, army, air force and navy, who were brought to Karlshorst, the seat of the Soviet Supreme Commander. The representatives of the Western Headquarters, the United Kingdom, France and the United States entered the dining room of the officers' mess in Karlshorst shortly before midnight. The German delegation, which had been flown in from Flensburg to Tempelhof in a U.S. airplane, entered the room shortly after midnight after Marshal Georgy Zhukov, the Soviet representative, had opened the ceremony. The ratification of the German Act of Unconditional Surrender was signed around 00.15 o'clock, after its regulations had already been in effect for over an hour (23:01 Central European Time)."

Here because it does not have any sources to back it up. It makes several claims that carry POV connotations that need a source, eg the British position differing from the American one. Further it claims that the it was signed at 00:15 yet the source in the previous paragraph claims it was signed shortly before midnight.

There is a problem with the timing. It depends if the time given is zulu time (which was British Double Summer time --German summer time-- and the time the Western Armed forces were using) or times based on CET. The ceasefire came into effect at 00:01 local time which was 23:01 CET, so if as Earl F. Ziemke says it was signed shortly before midnight then it was signed before the hostilities formally ceased. So the paragraph my be wrong with its timings and this needs to be verified with a reliable source before being reinstated. -- PBS (talk) 10:58, 23 May 2010 (UTC)
 * AFAIK, at least part of the removed text is supported by reliable sources. Thus, Otto Preston Chaney in his "Zhukov" (University of Oklahoma Press, 1996, ISBN 0806128070, 9780806128078) writes that the Soviets were displeased that the surrender was signed in Rheims, not in Berlin and quotes Stalin's words that:
 * "We have reached an understanding with the Allies that the act of surrender signed in Rheims should be considered a preliminary protocol of surrender." (p. 328)
 * Then Chaney writes about the message Eisenhower received from Antonov saying that General Susloparov had not been an acceptable Soviet representative at the Rheims ceremony (ibid) and demanded more formal Act of Military Surrender to take place in Berlin.
 * Incidentally, that is in a direct contradiction with what the article states now
 * "The Rheims' instrument of surrender was ratified May 8, which was agreed at the time of the May 7 signing. "
 * The Chaney book explicitly states that the request for the Berlin ceremony was made after Rheims surrender was signed, so the statement (supported by a primary source) directly contradicts to the reliable secondary source (a university press book). Since interpretation of primary sources is explicitly prohibited by the policy I delete this sentence from the article.
 * Oscar Pinkus is even more categorical describing the circumstances of the Rheims surrender in his "The war aims and strategies of Adolf Hitler" (McFarland, 2005, ISBN 0786420545, 9780786420544):
 * "It should have followed a prior agreement of the three combatants on procedures and held at suitable place such Potsdam or Berlin, and attended by the war's major figures of equivalent rank and prestige. Instead the whole performance was arranged in slipshod fashion by the Americans alone. Present was an obscure Soviet general who did not rank any place in the hierarchy of Soviet military chiefs; moreover, Moscow had not given him authorisation to attend.... No wonder then that no sooner was the ink dry on the Rheims protocol when Moscow announced that as far as the USSR was concerned the war wasn't over."(p. 501-2)
 * This book was published by a leading U.S. publisher of scholarly, reference and academic books, so we have no ground to question a reliability of this source.
 * My conclusion is that not only the removed paragraph should be restored (although in a significantly modified form), but the whole article should be modified, because, as these and some other sources state, there were no accord among the Allies, and the idea that the Rheims surrender was followed by Berlin ratification contradicts to what the sources say. There were two surrender ceremonies, and only the second ceremony was recognised as official by the Soviets, whereas many Western sources tend to put an emphasis on Rheims. --Paul Siebert (talk) 16:37, 24 May 2010 (UTC)

I agree with what you have said. My problem is not with the Soviets wanting another ceremony. This is agreed in all sources. I am surprised that the document "UNDERTAKING GIVEN BY CERTAIN GERMAN EMISSARIES TO THE ALLIED HIGH COMMANDS" existed, I had not seen it mentioned before, but backs up the Soviet position rather than contradicting it. Without it legally one has to invoke paragraph four of the Rheims surrender to justify the second surrender.

Rather as I said above my problems are two fold: The first is the British and the Americans holding different positions over this issue, and more importantly the timing issue which is contradicted by Ziemke book, so both these need citations. -- PBS (talk) 23:56, 24 May 2010 (UTC)


 * Paul this text:


 * Since the Rheims ceremony was arranged by the Western Allies, and the Soviet command was not notified about the ceremony, immediately after the surrender had been signed the Soviet command announced that the Soviet representative in Rheims, General Susloparov, had no authority to sign this document.


 * seems to be contradicted by Ziemke who wrote:


 * SHAEF had sent drafts of the Act of Military Surrender to Washington, London, and Moscow on 6 May and received reactions from Churchill and Winant before the signing but not from Washington or Moscow.6  Moscow's response reached Reims on the morning of 7 May, six hours after the Germans had signed. It practically accused Eisenhower of making a truce with the Germans that would allow them to continue the war against the Soviet Union; and it insisted-too late by then-that there be only one signing and that in Berlin. SHAEF had proposed signing first at Reims and later at Berlin to save time and lives.


 * IE the Soviets had been informed of the signing and the text of it before the signing but that their objections did not arrive until after the signing ceremony. -- PBS (talk) 00:23, 25 May 2010 (UTC)
 * Re: "I am surprised that the document "UNDERTAKING GIVEN BY CERTAIN GERMAN EMISSARIES TO THE ALLIED HIGH COMMANDS" existed." Unfortunately, I've found nothing on that account so far, so I have nothing to say.
 * Re: "this text ... seems to be contradicted by Ziemke..." I agree that it is not completely correct to say that "the Soviet command was not notified about the ceremony". In actuality, it was a not timely notification (a kind of pre-Internet era Einstein paradox :-)). One way or the another, the Western High Command signed an armistice without approval form the Soviets, although the Big Three came to consensus (achieved, off the top of my head, in Tehran) that no separate agreement would be signed between one of the Allies and Germany. Frankly, I don't want to blame the Americans in bad faith, although their explanation (to stop a bloodshed as soon as possible) sounded odd, taking into account that the hostilities in the West almost ceased by that time. One way or the another, I agree that the wording is not correct, so I propose to change it to:
 * "Since the Rheims ceremony was arranged by the Western Allies, without approval from the Soviet Command, immediately after the surrender had been signed the latter announced that the Soviet representative in Rheims, General Susloparov, had no authority to sign this document. "
 * Please, let me know if you agree (or provide your own wording).
 * Regards, --Paul Siebert (talk) 01:00, 25 May 2010 (UTC)


 * The West did not need Soviet approval so substitute "approval" with "agreement", and "immediately" with "shortly".


 * The problem faced by Eisenhower was that if he did not agree to accept the German surrender then he would either play into Donetz hands and would have had to accept the surrender of the German forces retreating away from the Soviet Fronts, or he would have been forced to close the fronts to Germans trying to surrender to the Western Allies. Although he had threatened to close the Western front to the Germans if they did not agree to a general surrender, whether that would have been practical (to do it if the Germans had said that they were but the surrender was not being taken by the Allies) is debatable as it would have been a war crime, and subordinate generals might not have been willing to do carry out a no quarter order. So it was necessary to get the Germans to agree to a general capitulation ASAP, mainly because the Western Allies did not want any more German POWs, and they did not want to do what the Soviets were accusing them of doing "making a truce with the Germans that would allow them to continue the war against the Soviet Union". Also it is unlikely that the Soviets would have appreciated help from the Western Allies advancing further east (into the Soviet designated areas of influence) so it seems to me that Eisenhower made the best of a politically (and legally) difficult situation by taking the general capitulation of the Germans ASAP. -- PBS (talk) 08:48, 25 May 2010 (UTC)
 * Since the Allies agreed that separate agreement with Germany was impossible the surrender had to be approved by all "the Big Three's" members. If you think that the word "agreement" reflects this fact better, I have no objections. With regard to "shortly", if "no sooner was the ink dry on the Rheims protocol" means "shortly", I also have no objections.
 * Re Eisenhover. He faced two other problems: (i) although a greater part of Wehrmacht was in the East, the Germans preferred to sign the instrument of surrender with the Western Allies; (ii) it was tempting for Eisenhower to play the role of the man who ended this war. It is hard to decide which considerations (political, military or just human ambitions) played the dominant role (probably, none of them).
 * Re: "Also it is unlikely that the Soviets would have appreciated help from the Western Allies advancing further east". The reason could be more prosaic. Eisenhower and Marshall also raised concern about "unfortunate incidents" involving the "advancing forces." --Paul Siebert (talk) 15:16, 25 May 2010 (UTC)

"No sooner was the ink dry..." is a common figurative expression, and given the time frame of 2 to 3 days, a gap of 4 hours is not immediate. Immediate has connotations of the candles used for the sealing wax flickering as a muddy dispatch rider throws open the door with a dispatch in hand as the talcum-powder is blown off the surrender document. -- PBS (talk) 22:52, 25 May 2010 (UTC)
 * Understood.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:17, 26 May 2010 (UTC)

Churchill stated that Berlin ratified Rheims
Churchill's speech on the surrender. In it Churchill states that Berlin will (he was speaking on the 8th May 1945) ratify the Rheims surrender. -- PBS (talk) 23:03, 26 May 2010 (UTC)
 * Yes, that is a conventional Western point of view. However, Stalin's point was that Rheims was just a preliminary protocol. One way or the another, both of them are primary sources, so let's stick with what scholarly sources say.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:17, 27 May 2010 (UTC)


 * You will have to explain to me how that is not the Soviet view, because it seems to me to be a Western diplomatic move to accommodate the Soviets position. If it was a preliminary protocol and not an initial signing then why was the same text used in Berlin and not the EAC text?


 * BTW Churchill's radio comments can also be seen as an expert cometary on the primary sources. -- PBS (talk) 01:01, 27 May 2010 (UTC)
 * By saying that you step into a realm of quantum politics, when a commentator of such a calibre by very fact of his commentary significantly affects the event he comments on. Remember, by that time Churchill was an acting politician, and all Western politicians wanted two obvious things: to extricate themselves from a difficult situation they created by signing a surrender separately from the Soviets, and, simultaneously, to capitalize on the fact that the German surrender was signed in the west and the US played a leading role in that. in other words, I don't think Churchill's words were just a neutral expert's comment.--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:28, 27 May 2010 (UTC)
 * Yes of course but that is equally true of Stalin's comments and the Berlin signing. The point is that such a political event was bound to involve politics and it does not mean that any one view is correct. Churchill's point of view is at least as valid as Stalin's or any version based on that POV and it is a considerably weaker position than that common from Western historians after the start of the Cold War that Berlin was just window dressing. -- PBS (talk) 02:13, 27 May 2010 (UTC)
 * That is definitely true of Stalin's comments. However, please, keep in mind that I do not propose to use Stalin's words as a source. With regard to Berlin and "just window dressing", you are absolutely right that the point of view on the Berlin surrender was formed as a result of Cold War. However, the Cold war ended, and I see no reason to support its myths any more.--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:49, 27 May 2010 (UTC)

Lead
When wording for the body of the text has been agreed, it will be necessary to update the lead to reflect the wording in the body of the text. -- PBS (talk) 09:10, 25 May 2010 (UTC)
 * I already did that. Please, let me know if the changes reflect the new article's text.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:24, 25 May 2010 (UTC)

"It was signed by representatives of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) and the Allied Expeditionary Force on May 7 (French and Soviet representatives signed as witnesses), and by the head of OKW and the British, American and Soviet High Command on May 8, 1945. "

Is still not quite right it the soviet did not sign as a witness, and the change in wording from "Allied Expeditionary Force" to " American and Soviet High Command" implies that somehow the AEF was not the same as the American High Command. In point of fact although different people signed, exactly the same parties to the agreement signed both, the only difference was that in the first instance one of the signaturees (is there such a word) was not authorised to sign on behalf of the Soviet Hight Command and the number of witnesses was greater for the second one. -- PBS (talk) 02:46, 26 May 2010 (UTC)
 * There was one more difference: Jodl was an officer without a right of command. Anyway, since the situation with these two surrenders is quite confusing, I simply do not know how to summarise it in few words (the lede should be short). If you have any idea, please, propose your own wording.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:55, 27 May 2010 (UTC)
 * How was the position of Walter Bedell Smith (who was an American and not British as I mistakenly wrote above) any different? They were both staffs offices and not operational officers. -- PBS (talk) 01:09, 27 May 2010 (UTC)
 * Yes, he was an American. Again, please, propose your wording.--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:54, 27 May 2010 (UTC)

Ad hoc text
We need to add a point that despite the elaborate plans drawn up by the European Advisory Commission, it was not their document that was implemented but one drafted by a SHAEF staff officer based on the surrender in Italy, I think Ziemke covers it. -- PBS (talk) 02:51, 26 May 2010 (UTC)
 * I already added that using the Pinkus' book as a source. Do you think Ziemke's description is more adequate? In addition, Rheims and Berlin instruments differ in only two details: the first sentence (about English language) was removed from the Berlin text and the clause #6 was added. Since the Berlin's instrument is supposed to be a document from the blue folder (EAC approved text), the folder Smith forgot during preparation of the Rheims instrument, then it is hard to explain almost verbatim coincidence between these two documents. The only reasonable explanation is that the Rheims instrument was prepared using the EAC document as the starting point, so the clause #6 was deliberately removed and the preamble ("Only this text in English is authoritative") was added. However, all of that are just my speculations. --Paul Siebert (talk) 00:15, 27 May 2010 (UTC)

I don't think "In addition, it wad been found that the document signed in Rheims was different from the draft prepared earlier, which had been approved by the Big Three." in the Berlin section is adequate, because as the Berlin wording is almost identical to the Rheims document, it follows that was not considered a show stopper by the Soviets. The point needs to be placed in a paragraph of its own in the background section, pointing out that it is adequate as an immediate military surrender, but as it was not based on the EAC document it missed out the civilian surrender and other finer points of diplomacy as discussed in preceding paragraphs. -- PBS (talk) 00:56, 27 May 2010 (UTC)
 * The text proposed by me is based on this (p.501-3). According to this, Mcfarland is the academic and scholarly publisher, so the source seems to meet RS criteria.--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:01, 27 May 2010 (UTC)


 * What proposed text? The work presents one point of view, but it is a point of view and not the only interpretation of the events. For example the speculation of why Eisenhower did not attend Berlin would be more credible if he had signed the Rheims document but he had avoided doing that as well. As with any secondary source it empathises points in the primary sources to support the view of events held by that historian. Ziemke 257,258 gives different reason why the EAC was not used. It also includes the fact that "The chief author of the surrender document signed at Reims was a British colonel, John Counsell, an actor and theatrical manager in civilian life, who had cheerfully "cribbed" much of it from the terms for the German surrender in Italy (2 May) published in Stars and Stripes." (Ziemke cites: John Counsell, Counsell's Opinion (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1963), 148-50.)

-- PBS (talk) 02:06, 27 May 2010 (UTC)
 * I agree that if other points of view exist, they also should be presented. What concrete changes do you propose?--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:40, 27 May 2010 (UTC)
 * Re: "Ziemke gives different reason why the EAC was not used." Pinkus gives no reasons. He just writes that the document signed in Rheims was prepared without Soviet participation (what caused quit understandable Soviet concern), and, btw that does not contradict to what Ziemke writes.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:07, 27 May 2010 (UTC)

"Karl Dönitz had agreed to surrender to the allies earlier in 1945."?
This article says:
 * Karl Dönitz had agreed to surrender to the allies earlier in 1945.

I had not known about that. Can a reference be cited and some specifics provided? Michael Hardy (talk) 23:41, 22 December 2013 (UTC)


 * The sentence was added on 17 September 2012 it is a semi-true but garbled version of events. See End of World War II in Europe for a more accurate time line. In the same article see End of World War II in Europe Where it explains that as German naval forces in Germany had surrendered to Monty on Lüneburg Heath on 4th of June, Dönitz's command on the 5th to the U-boats to return to port was ordering them to surrender, hence the indication that he was intending to surrender.


 * I am going to revert the edit and remove the stuff that was added. -- PBS (talk) 00:05, 24 December 2013 (UTC)

Remove

 * Like many institutions in Nazi Germany the control of the Army was split between the OKW and the German Army High Command (OKH). By 1945 the OKW commanded all German forces in every theatre apart from those on the Eastern Front which were under OKH control and which, before his suicide, had reported directly to Hitler. So it was not clear if Schörner was under the command of OKW on May 8 or if Dönitz, or von Krosigk, needed to order Schörner to surrender. In the end it was resolved by force of arms.

Although OKH was operationally independent of OKW, OKH was subject to the orders of OKW, and the surrender document applied to all German forces.

Roadrunner (talk) 15:59, 9 May 2008 (UTC)


 * I corrected "OKH" to "OKW" in the last sentence. --Orangerider (talk) 18:18, 11 June 2008 (UTC)
 * von Krosigk certainly not. Also, it may be that Keitel had been appointed CiC Army then (Dönitz, supposing that he was Reichspräsident at all*, certainly had the authority to do so). Anyway, Schörner, though Hitler had appointed him his successor as CiC Army in his testament, at least effectively only commanded the army group he had commanded before.--2.236.198.248 (talk) 21:35, 22 January 2014 (UTC) *Theoretically, the Weimar Constitution provisions about the President were only suspended for Hitler's lifetime, so one could argue that elections should have been held, or the President of the Supreme Court should have stepped in as Acting President.

Germany vs Nazi Germany
Any such term as "Nazi Germany" should be removed from the article and be replaced by plain Germany. There was no other Germany than the Third Reich then, nor were there attempts to overcome the Nazis from within, that could have been worth mentioning. Hence the nazis acted on behalf and most likely with the agreement of Germany or the vast majority of the German people. They were an integral part of it or sometimes rather the integrating part of the society, independant of the question whether we today like it or not. It was Germany all through the war and it was all of Germany surrendering to the allied forces. Don't you agree? Regards, --194.246.46.15 (talk) 08:06, 8 May 2009 (UTC) I agree. Using term "Nazi Germany" might give an impression that "not nazi" Germany exist at that time mutually. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.222.121.72 (talk) 00:52, 8 February 2010 (UTC)


 * Unfortunately for the non-Nazi Germans the alternative to playing-along with their government was being shot or sent to a death camp. In a regime like that one had little choice but to do as one was told, whether one agreed with the politics or not. The same old story with every extreme and nasty regime before and since; "Do As We Say or We Will Kill You" - and that's usually incorporated into the legal system. So it becomes an offence not to do as one's told.


 * One can usually see what's coming by examining the targets for the new laws that are introduced by such regimes - first the 'undesirables' such as the poor, the sick, the disabled, and the unemployed are deprived of rights and access to legal redress, so that the government can do what it likes to them. Later specific groups such, as in Nazi Germany's case, the Jews. To paraphrase Bonhoffer, "if you let them get away with going after THEM, pretty soon they'll be coming after YOU".


 * ... a very nasty business.


 * The whole Nazi and Soviet regime eras, and a number of those similar ones since, highlights the extreme importance of keeping one's own government under control. That is true democracy. Without the restraining hand of the public, governments like to think they can do what they like. Once they start talking of "war" they should be gotten rid-of, quickly. Notice how they always say "We" are at war with so-and-so - well THEY aren't going to be doing any of the fighting. THEY will be in some nice, safe, concrete-lined bomb shelter, while the Public goes out and dies. Countries don't go to war - Governments do. That should be borne in mind when criticising Germany in the 1939-45 period.


 * Until there is an international way of quickly and legally removing governments who start doing extremist things, such as starting aggressive wars, persecuting their own citizens, etc, there is little hope for the future. The majority of the politicians themselves of course, don't want these restraints put on them, which tells you a lot about the sort of people that, for the most part, they are.


 * It might be worth bearing in mind that if Hitler and Tojo's governments had been removed from power in 1939-40 then saner minds in those countries would almost certainly have prevailed and there would have been no Second World War. The war was a direct result of letting power fall into the hands of a bunch of crooks. But then again, war usually is. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.4.57.101 (talk) 09:44, 8 May 2012 (UTC)


 * (ad the comment by 85.222.) I agree to the conclusion but only to part of the rationale (as the lawyers say).
 * There does exist such a legal thing as the state of Germany. This state led war against its opponents in the Second World War (commonly called the Allies), which lead to its being "in the state of war" with them even into the 1950s, when this was officially lifted. Also it was clear that, whether by its Constitution or by a revolution (it is more fitting to say the latter), Germany undoubtly was Nazi-ruled in 1939, and there did not exist another Germany. (This is more, btw., than can be said about China. It makes sense to say "Red China", if one bears in mind the at least theoretical Taiwanian claims.)
 * I do not agree to this part: nor were there attempts to overcome the Nazis from within, that could have been worth mentioning. Hence the nazis acted on behalf and most likely with the agreement of Germany or the vast majority of the German people. First, the vast majority of Germany was anti-war in 1939, which is a well-established fact, and also according to all popular tales heard today with the beginning of 1941 when Hitler started to invade Russia, and certainly after the Battle of Stalingrad. Though - which is easily to retrace - the war certainly did receive some popularity when Poland and France were quickly defeated. (You have to keep in mind that the four year nightmare on the Western Front 1914-18 was still in the German heads. In Tadellöser & Wolff, Walter Kempowski neatly describes how the radio speaker laconically announces "Verdun fallen". The fictitionalized version of Kempowski's father reacts with "one day, one would have to buy one of these Hitler pictures after all". The book finishes with: "In reality, it is us who have won the war - that is, the Church, and the forces on the good side".)
 * As for attempts to overcome the Nazis within, there were plenty, only they had the misfortune of being unsuccessful. Though it is true: those who lead them, and those of like mind, were themselves sure that Germany, as such, was at war against the allies. The Allied officially said they were not liberating but defeating, and a staunch anti-Nazi, Bishop the Bl. Clemens von Galen, said that he was a staunch anti-Nazi, but as a patriotic German had to consider the occupants enemies.


 * (ad the comment by 80.4.) It is not so easy to say that it was like "do as we say or we will kill you". Though the Nazis obviously had vividly deformed and unjust laws which would be atrocities in most comparisons, still what we do remember as Nazi atrocities - the Holocaust, the war crimes like the order to shoot political commissars immediately, the murder against the handicapped, and so on - were most of the time even against contemporary law.
 * Now German military law said then, as it says now, that orders to commit crimes are not orders and that the subordinate who acts upon them becomes guilty of the crime (though naturally he may get a lighter sentence). - Unfortunately, it seems, this point is insisted upon far too little in the comments on the Nuremberg trials, although I believe it was mentioned then. -
 * It was rather like: "do as we say or someone else will do it and get promoted - oh and ah yes, you may face a prison sentence, or a or even, at least if you are too loud about it, you might face concentration camp or death". Plus the point which even anti-Nazis themselves described about 1933 (as, if I remember correctly, Fest mentions in his Hitler biography), that they felt themselves defeated by history, and consequently, being unsure of themselves, asked whether Nazism, which then appeared victorious, was not true after all for this very reason.
 * - To another thing: Forgive me, but I don't think that "getting rid of a goverment" is so easy a thing. --2.236.198.248 (talk) 22:07, 22 January 2014 (UTC)

Legal Precedents
Were there any legal precedents considered when drafting the documents ? Such as previous instruments of surrender. Obviously there was no likelihood of legal challenges but the committee drafting might have had an eye on the consequences for future legal disputes if the niceties were not observed. 31.68.196.128 (talk) 23:51, 15 March 2015 (UTC)

There seems to be a mistake in the text
I came here from the front page where it says (to my great surprise) that today (8 May) the surrender was signed in Berlin. The body of the article precisates that to "somewhen before midnight". Now either all our schoolbooks and lexica in Germany are wrong, or this is incorrect. On 8th May of Central European Time, no surrender happened. The Reims surrender happened in the very early hours of 7th May. The Berlin surrender happened at precisely 0:16 CET on May the ninth. What actually happened on May the 8th was the ceasefire the capitulation naturally brought with itself (May 8th 23:01 CET) and, apparently, the date on the Berlin document says "May the 8th" (not surprising at a document signed shortly after - but not before - midnight.)--2001:A60:1572:6701:E5BB:9D76:829E:13DD (talk) 18:12, 8 May 2015 (UTC)
 * You are right that although the Act of surrender is dated May 8th; that the physical signing didn't happen til after midnight CET; hence, strictly on May 9th. When the German delegation realised that the text of article 2 had been tightened up to require surrendering forces to lay down their arms; they stalled signing until they realised there was no alternative.  But of course, by then, the date of surrender - and hence the date of signing that surrender - was fixed. TomHennell (talk) 17:56, 9 May 2015 (UTC)