Talk:German invasion of the Netherlands

Air forces
Using the plural seems to confuse some anglicization of German Luftstreitkräfte with the situation that there were truly several airforces present. The last is certainly not the case as the Dutch had merely an Army and a Navy air service; so not even a single airforce. Maybe we can agree on "air services"?--MWAK (talk) 18:40, 17 April 2009 (UTC)

They were two different air arms/services, so plural is needed. One was under Army control, the other under naval command. The term is meant to clarify the issue thats all. They were "air forces" not an Air Force. Dapi89 (talk) 15:05, 18 April 2009 (UTC)


 * So, we can agree on "air services"? Or perhaps "air power"? "Air forces" is so ambiguous (it can indicate air power in general, several real Airforces or several air services) that it will only confuse.--MWAK (talk) 18:34, 18 April 2009 (UTC)

Yeah, I'm not bothered. Just so long as it is not "aircraft". If you look hard enough or over analyse things, you can find ambigiuity in anything. Personally I find it tiresome and I think it would be best just to name the services under "Air Forces". But I'm not longer fussed. Dapi89 (talk) 12:08, 19 April 2009 (UTC)


 * I'll make an appropriate choice ;o).--MWAK (talk) 13:51, 19 April 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 01:22, 18 November 2009 (UTC) These kinds of discussions don't belong here. Yawning. I wish people were more bothered on the quality of major items and events than making this kind of fuzz about nothing.

Assault by tram
I remember reading years ago (in "The Race for the Rhine Bridges" by Alexander McKee) about German paratroops dropping into a football stadium, hijacking trams and driving to the bridges. Is this true? if so it's so extraordinary it probably deserves a mention. Cyclopaedic (talk) 17:19, 25 September 2009 (UTC)

It is partially true. One German airborne platoon landed near the Feyenoord Stadium in Rotterdam. From thereon they partially moved in chartered trams (street-cars) up to the quite nearby south bank of the Maas where airlanding troops of 11./IR.16 had seized the bridges already. Grebbegoos (talk) 12:38, 18 November 2009 (UTC)

The road to WP:GA
Alrigh now this is where everyone can post a list of things that must be added or fixed in order to get this article to GA class. Ill Start -- Coldplay   Expert  00:47, 2 November 2009 (UTC)
 * The section on the Dutch Ari Force needs more sources and there are about 4 citiation needed tags
 * More maps would help out the future GA nomination.
 * The background section need some rewriting
 * The section about the French army needs some more expansion
 * Someone proposed the "Aftermath", "Losses", and "Historiography" sections. That may be a good idea as well.


 * As regards the maps, many of them might be found here: http://www.waroverholland.nl/index.php?page=maps
 * or here: http://www.grebbeberg.nl/index.php?page=staf--en-overzichtskaarten&p=4


 * Obviously, these maps are copyrighted and may not be simply uploaded but they can serve as a good source of information and can often be quickly traced. And of course, making a map of useful quality is difficult work and very time-consuming, so you shouldn't feel obliged to commit yourself on this aspect!--MWAK (talk) 08:07, 2 November 2009 (UTC)
 * Ill try my luck with the maps, I do ask for a day to day position of the german advance in the netherlands however so that I can make a series of maps. MWAK do you think you can work on the Dutch Air force section?-- Coldplay   Expert  21:29, 2 November 2009 (UTC)


 * Well, it would be a bit hard to explain the details to someone who has no intimate knowledge of Dutch geography (something even most Dutch do not possess :o) but this map: http://www.waroverholland.nl/index.php?page=photo&pid=3862 indicates the days on which the main German attack axes had completed a certain advance. I'll try and find those references.--MWAK (talk) 06:54, 3 November 2009 (UTC)
 * thanks, that will help a lot.-- Coldplay   Expert  13:25, 3 November 2009 (UTC)

False references en bad info
Grebbegoos (talk) 12:32, 5 May 2010 (UTC) This article shouldn't be GA status. There is plenty of information falsly attached to references. Moreover much information is out-dated, which surprises not when a major portion of the sourcing comes from a 40 year old secondary source like De Jong. I shall address a few examples of the crooked info in the article:


 * Reference-wise for example (section 10 May) its states that ref 117 [being Amersfoort, pg 341] would state that 90 men were on board of the sea-planes. The reference mentions 120 though. It is historian A. Goossens who claims it to have been 90 men. A reference that was used in the old article, and rightly so, but has now been excluded for the crooked Wiki idea that references should be generally published on paper. New media dismissing itself! In a nutshell: either add A. Goossens as a reference or modify the number in the text to 120 men, for that is what the reference source states.


 * In the section 'German strategy and forces' it was wrongly mentioned that the German 1st Fallschirmjäger Division existed in May 1940. It did not. It was the 7th Fallschirmjäger Division that existed. That this 7.FD was the first off division of this kind is something else ...


 * Under the section 'Dutch army' it is stated that there were available 676 guns and howitsers. The following specification only adds up to 646 though. Indeed, wrong numbers were used, but particularly three used types were discriminated: Hw 12 l 12 (8 pcs), Hw 12 l 14 (52 pcs) and 15 cm l staal [48 pcs]. Moreover two pieces of special 10 l 30 were not mentioned. Official figures of available arty pcs were not 676 pcs but 689 pcs.


 * There were not just two dozen of M.36 and M.38 cars, but 12 x M.36 and 14 x M.38. Two of the M.38 were command cars, fitted with a fake main-gun but three live M.20 Lewis cavalry MG's. Very reliable source here is Drs J.A. Bom who has specialized in the armoured car dossier of the Dutch army history.


 * Mortars were not 80 mm but 81,2 mm, Brandt and Stokes standard. If one uses mm as an argument, one should be exact.


 * Should one compare Dutch army strength to German or Allied strength, one automatically bumps into the odd Dutch organisation. But if one compares only Dutch infantry regiments versus divisions of other nations, one makes unequal comparison. What about for example the 26 off artillery regiments? The only comparison that could give some idea of balances, is by equalizing the Dutch army into division equivalents of around 15,000 men. In that comparison the Dutch army could produce forces equalizing around 13 divisions.


 * Under the French strategy: the 9.DIM and 25.DIM were not mechanized divisions as the article wrongly states. Reference is given [ref 87] that Amersfoort states such on pg 240, but again a false reference. The chart on the Amersfoort page 240 states both divisions rightly as motorised infantry, which they were (and not even entirely). DIM stands for 'Division d'Infanterie Motorisé'. Mechanized refers to armoured and tracked equipment, which these divisions almost entirely lacked. Even more so, these divisions had no autonome motorisation, but were motorised by independant motorized battalions whereas one third of the strength was dependant on busses which had to be commandeered from the French public transport services.

Etc. Etc. It may be time to demand reassessement of this article as GA status Grebbegoos (talk) 12:32, 5 May 2010 (UTC)


 * Well, I still have to revise the whole :o). De Jong is indeed not ideal as a source: Please replace it with updated info from more recent sources! To adress your points:


 * 1) Is there no published secondary source that mentions the number of ninety? If not, the number should indeed be changed to 120. Or, alternatively, we replace it by something vague like "about a hundred". Perhaps just mentioning the strength in units would be a good solution.
 * 2) The division number will be revised.
 * Yes, the artillery numbers were preliminary — yet not overly misleading. Could you provide the correct numbers?
 * 1) "Two dozen" shouldn't be taken too exactly. But giving the exact numbers is preferable.
 * 2) Good point: the number of 81.2 mm is preferable.
 * 3) The number of thirteen division equivalents is a defendable estimate, but the point was not so much to compare absolute strength with that of other nations as to give an indication of the portion of the troops deployed in units of division strength.
 * 4) Well, the meaning of the acronym per se is Division d'Infanterie Mécanique, literally "Mechanised Infantry Division". There was a small number of armoured vehicles present — and of course it was hoped to increase this considerably in the near future, hence this designation despite the fact that indeed the unit was essentially a motorised infantry division. Obviously this last fact had better been mentioned. The armoured vehicles included, on paper, 66 Renault UEs, four Renault ZTs, sixteen H35s and sixteen Panhard 178s for a total of 102 per division.


 * As an aside, one shouldn't take the "Good Article" qualification too literally. It doesn't imply that you yourself would be satisfied with it — just that it conforms to some formal criteria.--MWAK (talk) 16:42, 5 May 2010 (UTC)

Dear MWAK


 * The secondary source is myself [www.zuidfront-holland1940.nl]. The landingparty on the Nieuwe Maas that was airlanded by means of 12 He-59 comprised two platoons of 11./IR.16, the company troop (6-7 men), two heavy MG troops (4 men each) and four engineers of 2./i.22. Estimates are between 85-90 men altogether. Historians have all copy-catted eachother and produced numbers in the range 120-150. All wrong, because they erroneously considered the entire 11./IR.16 to have landed, which was not the case. Only two platoons were specifically trained (as off April 1940) on this mission and that (plus the reinforcements and equipment) was all that the 12 He-59 could carry. But, since wiki finds itself caught in a policy to follow only what has been printed on paper, and since Amersfoort is followed, it should read 120 men. Better consistantly wrong, than inconsistantly right.

- 7-veld; 302 [310], 10-veld; 52 [54], 10,5 cm l 30; 2 [3], 12 lang staal ; 144 [157], 15 lang staal ; 48 [75] - hw 10,5 l 28; 20, hw 12 lang 12 Krupp; 8, hw 12 l 14 Bofors; 48 [52], hw 15 l 15 Vickers; 28, hw 15 l 17 Krupp; 36 [42]. - 8 cm staal; 108 [151].
 * Artillery numbers vary per study, but I can give the exact number by military files in arsenal and in the field army. The first number is the number in the field, the second [ ] the number available in total (including depots and arsenals):


 * Your perception of DIM is certified incorrect. DLM stands for Division Legere Mechanique and DIM for Division d'Infanterie Motorisé. And this means motorised infantry division and nothing else. Those divisions were not comprising tanks (organically) nor more than some APC's. Only the DIM with a addition 'avec VB' [voiture blindees] had some armour, but only in their GRDIm [motorized recce formation]. By the way, that still doesn't make them mechanized divisions, for those were the DLM's. Please follow me in this for I have plenty of French military sources to proof it when internet sources wouldn't yet convince you.

Grebbegoos (talk) 22:55, 5 May 2010 (UTC)


 * In that case, just saying "two platoons" would be best, I think. Thanks for the artillery strength numbers! I am aware the DIMs are most often called Motorisées but I distinctly remember having read this was not their real designation. Can't find the source though, so "motorised" it will be...--MWAK (talk) 07:17, 7 May 2010 (UTC)

Dear MWAK.

Regarding the French army, it is quite simple in fact. Their organisation saw into five sorts of divisions only: DLM, DLC, DCR, DIM and DI. Moreover, mechanised units like BCC and CACC. The most heavily mechanized division units were the DCR's, which were in fact genuine tankdivisions without a large infy component. The DLM's were mechanized divisions with a large tank component plus a large mechanized or motorised infy component. The lightest versions were the DLC's [Division Legere de Cavalerie], usually with light AFV's or traditional cavalry and infy. The DIM and DI were the two infantry components of which the DIM's were the motorised and the DI the traditional infantry units. The independant BCC's [Battallion de Char Combat] were often attached to other units or part thereof. In summary: the only mechanized division units were the DCR's and DLM's (and smaller units like BCC) in the French organisation. All other were traditional units or motorized units. Should you have read somewhere that DIM's were mechanized units, you probably found yourself an unreliable source.

By the way. 1.DLM was not an elite division, as the text states. It was the only 'active' [as in the typical French readiness and organisation ranking 'active', 'A-type' and 'B-type'] DLM and therefore the best of the three (later four) available. Grebbegoos (talk) 10:41, 7 May 2010 (UTC)


 * Well, the point was not so much whether DIMs were actually mechanised units — they basically were not — but whether they were nevertheless officially called that.


 * Being an active division, and mechanised, implies 1e DLM was an elite unit by the French standards of 1940 :o). Of course, though often being allotted superior personnel and matériel, it was not a military elite in the narrowest sense of a small, as such deliberately created and highly institutionalised organisation.--MWAK (talk) 05:20, 10 May 2010 (UTC)

Well, I guess we agreed by now that the DIM was nothing else but a motorised infantry division - named that way and intended that way - and that DLM's were the mechanized divisions. So that one is out of our way. Only the text should be modified accordingly.

Elite as a quality indication is often abused as in this instance. The Waffen SS is also often called elite all over the internet (and in printing), which is beloney too. Elite as a quality indicator should be saved for those specific units which were indeed extraordinary well trained and/or equipped and moreover few in number. 1.DLM belonged to the 10% of the French army which was forming the 'active' divisions and had nothing to do with an elite outfit. They were like the German 1.Welle divisions, and those aren't called elite units either.

Dear MWAK. You yourself have long since set a standard in your contributions regarding the fine print and details. That benchmark should also apply in these instances. Should you desire to hold on to DIM as mechanized and 1.DLM as elite, it should be presented with diligent and strong evidence from reputed sources. Otherwise I suggest to modify the text as by my suggestions. Grebbegoos (talk) 10:59, 10 May 2010 (UTC)


 * Thank you for the compliment :o)! The "mechanised" has already disappeared; I guess "elite" can be replaced by "well-trained" or something such.--MWAK (talk) 11:36, 10 May 2010 (UTC)

Indeed, it is meant as a compliment, for I too like to think that setting a higher standard of reliability on wiki is much desired and you are - in my opinion - one of few authors who also seems to have that very ambition.

The necleus of the French army comprised about 200,000 men in active units. They were like the 1.Welle divisions already peace time activated outfits, containing almost entirely professional cadre or reserve cadre of the latest levies, complete rosters, the most modern equipment and only the youngest levies of conscripts. How one should address that top layer of the French and German army is open for a certain room of negotiation, as long as we keep it within the confines of accuracy. Something like 'first class' unit would seem appropriate to me. That to me is the best description of the best trained, filled and equipped units of the belligerents. First class doesn't say anything about a specific standard, but refers to a general standard within those respective armies.

Grebbegoos (talk) 13:48, 10 May 2010 (UTC)


 * "First class" is an excellent solution!--MWAK (talk) 04:09, 11 May 2010 (UTC)

Falso info 10 May

 * One squadron, Kampfgeschwader 4. A Kampfgeschwader is the equivalent of a Wing, not of a squadron. It is built up from two, three or even four Gruppes (Groups), that are subdivided in Staffels (squadrons). In this instance a part of KG.4 took the Northsea route, whereas another part split off half way the Waddenzee, across the Ysselmeer and raided Schiphol.
 * Yes, Kampfgeschwader should be translated with "wing".


 * A dozen Dutch aircraft were destroyed on the ground. The Dutch planes that were able to take off shot down thirteen German aircraft. That is a mix of arguments that isn't traceable. The 13 shot down aircraft probably refer to the 3.JaVA at Waalhaven that alone downed that number. But the number of destroyed Dutch aircraft must include for example the Bergen raid. If that is the case, than there should be a considerably higher number of downed German aircraft. E.g. make this consistent and report the area's that are concerned. Now it is unclear and above all incorrect.
 * Indeed, the entire info in the article about the activities of the Dutch airforce is still poorly developed.


 * Total Ju-52 losses during the battle were much higher. Around 250 already on the first day (please refer to Speidel and Morzik on that account) alone. Furthermore the Hooton (crap) of 125 destroyed and 47 damaged is by far not representing 50% of the fleet strength. KGzbV1 and 2 - both entirely assigned to the Dutch theatre - alone represented 430 Ju-52. Another about 150 Ju-52 were assigned elsewhere (mainly the KGrzbV involved in Eben Emael and the Norway fleet). At 1 January 1941 - after many Ju-52 could be repaired - around 175 full losses remained from the Dutch theatre.
 * You mean Der Einsatz der Operativen Luftwaffe im Westfeldzug 1939/1940? But is the information from this work still up-to-date? And German Air Force Airlift Operations is from 1961. Anyway, the percentage needs correction.
 * I have the exact figures, but also the NIMH - Dutch Military History Institute - has released these figures long since.
 * But are you sure no more modern research exists? That could be the source of Hooton's numbers?
 * Even more so, recent extended research by the Studiegroep Luchtoorlog (in coop with NIMH) has shown even higher figures. By the way, Hooton is a terrible source.
 * Then we had best mention these new numbers! Have they been published and what is the citation?
 * Available at http://www.nimh.nl/nl/search/search.aspx?SearchText=vliegtuigverliezen


 * Valkenburg, unmetalled. The Dutch had no metalled airstrips whatsoever, so this remark is out of line. There were hardened or concrete strips on some air-bases, but basically only Schiphol had a full concrete infrastructure.
 * The English usage can be confusing; "metalled" no longer means a macadam strip or road per se, but any hardened surface.
 * I consider it a wrong use of the term 'metalled', and I consider it incorrect indication of the state of the airfields in that era. It is misleading.
 * If no concrete was planned to be used at Valkenburg, "metalled" is certainly incorrect and should be replaced by "hardened".
 * As far as I know there were no plans to harden Ypenburg and Valkenburg.
 * But something was planned to reinforce the soil?
 * No, at all sites it was a matter of lowering the ground-water level. Drying out in a way.


 * Fire by three batteries should be fire from three batteries.
 * Either is correct, I think, but the latter is certainly preferable.


 * Four planes of the first wave of transports were destroyed[Waalhaven]. What is your source, because this is complete crap. The first wave landed without a single loss. Theu carried two platoons of 9./IR.16, some pioneers with motorbikes and the KP Trupp of 9./IR.16. They arrived without losses. Please refer to the IR.16 and III./IR.16 battle reports.
 * O, dear, I'm afraid you yourself are the source: I misinterpreted earlier remarks by you about the event. But is it at least correct that four planes were lost? And, if so, when were they lost?
 * Where am I the source? My detailed study of the event mentions no losses whatsoever. Six planes in the first landing shift, three planes following shortly after. None of them lost. Please see: http://www.zuidfront-holland1940.nl/index.php?page=ijsselmonde-2
 * Well, much earlier in our discussions on this talk page you stated "The Ju landings on Waalhaven suffered only four losses". I wrongfully assumed these occurred during the first landings.
 * Indeed, but the first wave comprised also a batch that flew in the rest of 9./IR.16 as well as 12./IR.16.
 * So the four planes lost were not caused by fire from the defendants?
 * Does that matter?
 * Well, to make a contrast with the situation at Ypenburg...
 * It is unfair to make a comparison with Ypenburg. Over there the AAA was deployed in a most strategic way, able to cover the air space of the landing approach whereas the AAA positions itself (save the one at Voorburg) were not approachable to German formations. Moreover it is extremely hard to determine what caused which. At Ypenburg the joint fire of AFV's, dozens of Dutch MG's and light AA guns created a dead-run for the landing of the first wave of air-landing troops. But at Waalhaven the airborne landing had been rather pin-point and successful, so that when the first German Ju-52 landed the airfield defences incl light AA guns had virtually ceased to exist. A mere handful of MG's had survived.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by Grebbegoos (talk • contribs) 10:06, 14 June 2010 (UTC)


 * Tankettes is a French word and as such inappropriately used here. The Vickers Cardon-Lloyd carriers are usually referred to as 'carriers', 'MG carriers' or 'general carriers'. Moreover, the (two) carriers were not 'overwhelmed' but simply knocked out by the bomb-raid (1 off) and mechanical failure (1 off).
 * The last is certainly an improvement! However, "tankette" is English and the type in question is commonly called the Carden Loyd tankette — you see, it even has its own lemma! But it's true that later-on, when the tankette concept fell into disgrace, basically the same type was marketed and ultimately mass-produced as an Universal Carrier.
 * That is news to me. Peculiar is that pre-war Dutch papers already speak of 'Cardon Lloyd carriers'. Carrier is a much more accepted term and I would consider 'tankette' wrong wording.
 * Well, it simply is the official designation of this particular vehicle, I believe. It was bought in the early thirties; quite possibly the Dutch in the late thirties adopted the changed English usage.
 * I am not going to battle over this


 * The Moerdijk bridgehead was only 'fortified' on the south side. Not on the northside, so 'both ends' is inaccurate.
 * Good point.


 * The 'Handstreich' plan to raid bridges was not made by Hitler personally. Nice myth though. It was designed by Canaris and von Hippel. The basic plan came out of the meeting in Berlin at 27 Sept 1939 where the ObdH, ObdKM, ObdL and the Ob-Abwehr met with Hitler and his staff. Upon the assessment by the generals present that the Maas bridges were essential logistic essets, the plan arose to siege those by stealth commando raids, which had been done before elsewhere. Only in February 1940 the Dutch bridges were added. Besides next to the Brandenburger operated the Batallion zbV 100. Sonderverband Hocke (Maastricht) was comprised of men from both units.
 * It's a myth mentioned by many books, so it would be very desirable to have a source for it being one. Batallion zbV 100 should certainly be mentioned.
 * Like which source? I only know of reputed sources stating it was an idea coming out of the meeting with all general officiers on 27 Sept 1939. That Hitler sanctioned the general idea of stealth ops is another thing.
 * In do not deny the fact, but could you give an exact citation? This might prevent people from trying to "improve" it using popular history books.
 * Kurowski's latest product on this one 'Deutsche Kommandotrupps' [Brandenburger und Abwehr im weltweiten Einsatz, 2004, page 51] is quite reliable (for once).


 * At Gennep crossed only one armoured train whereas the following troop-train was not armoured.
 * Good point.


 * The 3rd Army Corps was not withdrawn from the Peel-Raam position where it never remained. It was removed from the rear positions around Den Bosch - Eindhoven.
 * But surely some troops were present in the line itself? Otherwise how could six battalions be "left behind"?
 * First of all those six batallions were no part of 3rd Corps anymore. Secondly if they were, they were not withdrawn. In both instances the sentence stating that 3rd Corps withdrew from the Peel-Raamline is inaccurate.
 * I see your point. But apart from those six battalions, had no other supporting units been deployed in the line itself? Such as artillery?
 * No, none whatsoever. The only bit of assistance was given by 2.RHM at Mill, but that was of the LD.


 * III.Corps did not join Brigade D, which did not even exist on 10 May 1940 (abandoned on 12 April 1940). It was joint by Brigade G that contained six battalions of infantry to replace the six battalions which had been detached from the 3rd Corps and left behind in the Peel-Raamline.
 * Good point


 * The Light Division was not a mobile reserve but became a mobile reserve. Furthermore it was not directly assigned to counter the Ysselmonde landings, but received those orders only when it had reached the Gorinchem regio, around 1630 hrs on the first day.
 * Could we agree on calling it a manoeuvre force? And you mean it had been planned to withdraw it to, or through, the Gorinchem area regardless?
 * LD was destined to become an army reserve in the The Hague - Leiden district. It was first ordered into the Gorinchem region in the morning of the 10th. Only at around 1600 hrs its commander received revised orders to march onto Waalhaven via the Noord.
 * But the first order had nothing to do with the air landings?
 * No, the first order was a result of the quick German appearance in the rear of the Peel-Raamline.


 * It was decided to postpone a crossing until the next day, when the artillery would be ready to support the attempt. No attempt was made to establish a bridgehead [131]. That is not accurate and it is not what the source says either. It was postponed due to the fact that the C-LD considered his division still dispersed - which it indeed was - and that it was more desireable to attack by morning dawn than by night, for which he considered his troops not trained well enough. With arty support it had nothing to do. It wasn't even used the next day.
 * Interesting.


 * 1.DLM was not the most northern French unit nor was it assigned to link up with the Vesting Holland perse. The most northern unit was 25.DIM, that was assigned to connect 1.DLM at Turnhout-Tilburg with the Roosendaal regio via the south and west shore of the Mark/Dintel.
 * Well, the larger strategic view should be taken here. I had not intended the text to suggest that 1DLM was the most northern unit and will try to remove any ambiguity on this point.
 * Which 'larger strategic view'? It was 25.DIM that had been assigned the task of covering the north-flank (assisted by three cavalry recce units), with on its right wing the light formations 6.RC and 4.DRP of 1.DLM. 1.DLM's tank formations had been assigned the Turnhout channel as their area of deployment.
 * The larger strategic goal of maintaining a link between the Antwerp area and Fortress Holland. That wouldn't necessarily imply that 1DLM was to take the more northern position in an initial linear defence. However, was I right in stating that the reconnaissance units of 1.DLM were to first to reach the Dutch border near Breda?
 * No, the recce task forces of Beauchesne and Lestoquoi were tasked with that forward deployment. 6.RC, point unit of 1.DLM, was assigned to deploy east of Tilburg in order to form a northeast forward protection, 4.RDP south of that on the Dutch/Belgian border area [Diessen area]. Behind them one tank regiment would develop, focussed on a deployment behind the Turnhout channel, largely on Belgian soil. The balance of the division was deployed in depth behind that.
 * I just discovered why I attributed the advance to 1 DLM: the Lestoquoi group was attached to it, despite 5e GRDI being a 25e DIM unit. This has to be explained much better in the text, preferably in combination with indicating an order of battle for the French troops.
 * Gr Lestoquoi and Beauchesne were detached divisional and corps recce parties, as you know. Like elsewhere in the French disposition, most recce units were used as screens in front of the entire French-Allied main defences from Tilburg to Metz. Lestoquoi was not 1.DLM, that is the issue and therefore the text should not suggest 1.DLM linking up with Fortress Holland. That was 25.DIM and some bits of the Beauchesne outfit.


 * The pontoon bridge alongside the railway bridge at Gennep was not clogged with traffic, but had been blocked by a tractor with arty piece which had detsroyed an element of the pontoon-bridge, causing it to be out of action for most of the day.
 * Splendid detail. At least it caused a traffic jam :o).


 * It is not mentioned that German assaults on the Mill position - by regiment strength - were repelled. That should be stated though, for that costly operation was the reason for the regiment commander to consider postponing a divisional attack to the next day.
 * Yes, I agree.


 * Limburg surrendered at 0930 hrs a.m.. That is not 'at the end of the day'.
 * Good point.

Grebbegoos (talk) 08:53, 28 May 2010 (UTC)

Re-replied Grebbegoos (talk) 22:39, 8 June 2010 (UTC) Re-re-replied Grebbegoos (talk) 00:55, 12 June 2010 (UTC) Re-re-re-replied Grebbegoos (talk) 23:02, 12 June 2010 (UTC)

Let's get on with the 11th, MWAK! ;) —Preceding unsigned comment added by Grebbegoos (talk • contribs) 23:04, 12 June 2010 (UTC)

False info 11 May
MWAK, we continue with 11 May.


 * Winkelman saw no priority whatsoever in a French build-up in Brabant. As a matter of fact he dropped all subjects below the Maas, with exception of the province Zeeland. In that respect the TBB [Territoriaal Bevelhebber Brabant] had already pre-war been instructed that as off the very moment that III.Corps and Light Division would have been successfully withdrawn into the Fortress, he should submit to the French command and follow their directives. The French build up was entirely the French prerogative, as was already clear from the Gamelin-Winkelman telecon on the 10th of May 1940.
 * Well, certainly he realised that he himself could do little to facilitate a solid French front in the area. Nevertheless — again in the larger strategic view — such a French presence was an necessary condition for a prolonged Dutch resistance. So, though it was not a major Dutch operational priority, it was obviously still a fundamental concern. I agree that the difference between the two situations should be made more explicit.
 * Let's agree on the latter.


 * The LD was not permitted to break off and reinforce the Dutch troops on the Island of Dordrecht. It was ordered to cross the Merwede to the Island, kick out the German airborne troops, cross the Kil, recapture the bridge at Barendrecht and from thereon move into the south of Rotterdam. Those were the orders to the C-LD. Should you doubt this, please relate to this URLwhere the marching orders are quoted.
 * That would be an excellent addition.
 * Then we agree on that too.


 * The 'second battalion' did not try to expand its bridgehead, but had been under orders from the start to submit itself to the command of the garrison commander of Dordrecht. The following passage in the text is unidentifiable: ' Although the crossings were successful, the first lacked artillery support and the advance was executed only hesitantly; the troops were ambushed and dispersed, with many men being taken prisoner. If that is related to 3.GB ('the first battalion') the information is inadequate as to lack of arty support (which they had) and the number of POW's lost (which were no more than about a dozen). If it refers to the second battalion, which seemes to be more appropriate, the text should be modified because it is confusing, particularly the first lacked artillery' which seems to refer to the first battalion.
 * Yes, the text is confusing and should be improved. I was unaware artillery support had been given.
 * 3.GB had one battery of 23.RA at its disposal. The Ravelli battalion a full battalion of 23.RA that indeed assisted at Amstelwijk (b.t.w. against a ghost enemy ...).


 * It was not 12.GRDI that attempted to assault the Moerdijk pocket but 5.GRDI in cooperation with elms of 6.RC. 12.GRDI was still at Zeeland - Woensdrecht peninsula at the time. Moreover, 5.GRDI brought in at least two platoons Panhard, whereas the elms of 6.RC present had its Panhard on recce missions towards Lage Zwaluwe and Geertruidenberg. It were the Panhards of lt Martin of 5.GRDI that supported the attack.
 * Indeed, I had the two confused.
 * No probs.


 * In Rotterdam and The Hague there were not simply paratroopers but airlanding forces particularly. So paratroopers should be editted from the content. In Rotterdam there were no more than around 50 paratroopers active in the frontline, and north of Rotterdam no more than around 700 paratroopers landed. I wonder where the figure of 1,600 came from. The pockets at Valkenburg, Ockenburg, the dune region and Overschie held around that figure in total, but referring to such as 'The Hague' is quite non-specific.
 * Well, it is non-specific because we want to indicate the general area "near The Hague". The number came from De Jong Deel 3, I believe — I had better give the exact citation. "Paratroopers" is indeed inexact in both occasions.
 * I permit to disagree. The Residence operation was an independant operation from the tactical operation in the south. They should be seperately addressed, like your most popular source [May 1940 - the battle for the Netherlands] does. By the way, are you aware that the Amersfoort / Kamphuis 1990/2005 book has been published in English just a months ago? Slightly editted, partially also incorporating some of the findings of yours truly. Brill International Publishing (Leiden) has launched it for the British and American market ... ;)
 * No, I wasn't aware of that and thank you for bringing it to my attention! Seeing that it costs an astounding $128 :<o, I'm unlikely to acquire an personal copy. Should any improvements have bearing upon this article, don't hesitate to mention them :o). But it's good to see that at last extensive printed information is available to the general international public. I'm not sure I get your point regarding this particular issue. Is your objection that Overschie is near Rotterdam and therefore indicating the residence operation with a purely geographical description is inaccurate?
 * I got a review copy, so I didn't have to pay the astonishing price, but otherwise I wouldn't have bothered to buy it either. It is the same old crap as before. I am assessing the book once again, this time for the English speaking world (on www.waroverholland.com), but continue to be amazed what an overload of factual errors are contained in this book, that the editors dare to call the new standard and based on 'the newest scolarly research'. They have vitually missed out on all scolarly publications for the last decade or so! So many factual errors in such a simple piece of work. Anyway ... back to the actual matter. My intention is that the Residence and Rotterdam areas are strictly seperated and that airbornes and air-landing troops are addressed seperately too (or defined in the terms under one combined definition). —Preceding unsigned comment added by Grebbegoos (talk • contribs) 22:34, 23 June 2010 (UTC)


 * The French did not expect the Dutch to hold the defences in Brabant, but the French local commanders did. Gamelin knew since April 1940 about Winkelman's revised strategy but chose not to inform his local commanders Bilotte and Georges. Please refer to Tobias van Gent ('falende gewapende neutraliteit').
 * Good point.


 * It is inaccurate to state that the withdrawal to the Zuid-Willemsvaart went along with abandoning all heavier weapons incl. MG's. Only the obsolete 8-staal guns were indeed left behind, but 90% of the MG's and light guns were taken along.
 * Correct. In my defence, I might add I didn't write this particular passage :o). I presumed it was referring to the heavy machine-guns in the pillboxes.
 * It is one of the impurities taken from 'May 1940 - the battle for the Netherlands'. It were a mere handful of weapons that were left behind. The far majority was taken along.


 * ' Winkelman therefore requested the British government to sent an Army Corps to reinforce allied positions in the area and bomb Waalhaven airfield' - is an inaccurate and untrue account, and also not what Amersfoort says in the reference source. Winkelman was totally oblivious of what was happening in the south. His request to the British was done in anticipation of a possible collapse of the Brabant front, but not as a consequence ['therefore'] of the events, of which Winkelman knew little to none!
 * His ignorance should indeed be made explicit.


 * The Dutch counterattack at the Grebbeberg (out posts) wasn't cancelled due to friendly fire on the approaches of the executing battalion, but it was cancelled due to the non-arrival of a necessary engineering-bridge. Since the night before the bridge across the narrow Grift had been blown up, the crossing of the small battalion with its heavier weapons could not be done without a bridge. When upon sun-rise the bridge had still not arrived the mission was abandoned.
 * The way Amersfoort describes it, the time loss due to the friendly fire was decisive. He doesn't even mention the bridge. Couldn't it be that the general disorganisation also hampered the attempt to bring the bridge forward? The absence of which then became a convenient excuse to abandon the attack?
 * Amersfoort has a reputed dis-trust of battle reports and a strong reputation of constructing his own truths. The reports of the battalion, easily found on www.grebbeberg.nl, speak for themselves. It was the fact that the Grift could not be crossed that the mission was called off. That the BC did little to expedite things shoud be said too.
 * Well, it is the prerogative of the historian to assess his sources...But is there a secondary source available for the bridge event?
 * I realize that we fundamentally disagree on that matter. As far as I am concerned a historian has only limited freedom to assess sources. If a number of battle-reports and after battle evaluations agree on the fact that the lacking engineering material (combined with a weak battalion-command) caused the mission to be cancelled, it is not the historian's freedom to make up his own story. Fact is that the major van Apeldoorn considered his mission not executable due to missing pontoon boats for his forward scouts to cross the Grift, the strong enemy opposition (which was beloney, because the Hoornwerk was still occupied by Dutch troops) and he considered arranging the engineering material too much of an effort to be done before sun rise. The whole own fire issue had ended before midnight. Amersfoort can interpreted what he desires, but will you copy him if he tomorrow publishes a work in which he states that we won the battle of the Grebbeberg, just for the sake of him having the freedom to assess things his way? Reputed sources should be used. Amersfoort is not one of those.
 * Well, I think it can't hurt to mention the bridge.

Thanks to this terribly unreliable format/system (that so often breaks down during editting ...) I keep it at one day at the time. Grebbegoos (talk) 09:37, 19 May 2010 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 17:01, 21 June 2010 (UTC) I reflected on your replies MWAK.


 * I think we are now more or less in agreement over these points and will implement the changes, after which I'll address the issues of 12 May.--MWAK (talk) 06:15, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

Agreed! Grebbegoos (talk) 09:17, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

False info 12 May

 * It is more accurate to state that during the 11th of May 9.PD saw little action. No action is inaccurate because point formations of the reinforced recce battalion did see action against Dutch and French units. Limited action, nonetheless some. Furthermore, not 9.PD 'decided' to link up with the airborne troops, but it was instructed to do so under the applicable operation and marching orders. That seems an overkill in nuance, but the virtues of the 'Auftragstaktik' demand such a nuance to be precise. Therefore 'decided' should be replaced by 'was under orders to link up'. Moreover, it was not 'the Dutch front to be resolved' but the fact that a decisive breach in the Peel-Raamline was reached that triggered the take-off of 9.PD.
 * The last is certainly an important point. Of course 9.PD was under orders to link up with the airborne forces, but was it explicitly obliged to act the very moment a breach had materialised? French battle reports indeed indicate they encountered units of 9.PD but I've always wondered whether they in fact bumped into the armoured car platoons of the Infantry Divisions. Where exactly did the encounters take place?
 * 1) The 9th PD was under instructions to take off at the very moment of breaching the Peel-Raam position. It was then to overtake the 254.ID and 256.ID that had been assigned to achieve the aforementioned breach. 2) The German infantry had no armoured car [wheeled AFV's] platoons. Besides the motorized infantry divisions (of which only SS-VT was assigned to 18.Armee) only the tank divisions had armoured cars (in their AA's). A few regular infantry divisions had some of the old light armoured vehicles in one or two platoons in their AA's, such as de Kfz.13/14, but that was it. The Aufklarungsregiment 9 - that had about 50 wheeled AFV's - had been divided in three columns, which had been reinforced with a few Pz.II tanks, a few companies of motorized infantry of SR.10 and SR.11 and some mechanized FLAK and Arty. These three (later two of them merged) had to point the way for the division. One formation took the Langstraat (northern) route, the other the southern route which led them to the south of Breda. It were those German armoured elms that fought some skirmishes with the French. Only on 13 May some medium tanks met up with French troops of 25.DIM and 6.RC at Breda (Ginneken and Princenhage). That was the only clash between the 9.PD main tank-force and the French in Holland.Grebbegoos (talk) 23:28, 5 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Very interesting.


 * It was not the French right flank that was threathened by the 6.Armee, but their left flank. Calling flanks goes from the twelve o'clock of a belligerent.
 * Well, I meant the right flank of 7th Army :o). I'll remove the ambiguity.
 * Right, so we agree that it was the French left flank?
 * Yes, in the larger strategic sense. Obviously the situation of 7th Army is what concerns us here.
 * Right, so you mean that the right flank of the 7th Army was threatened from the German advance through the Belgian Kempen area? If that is the intention we shake hands.


 * Did Gamelin order the 2.BLM? No way. Gamelin didn't interfere in tactical details. It was either Bilotte or Giraud who did. Gamelin ordered the 7th Army to draw-in its left flank back onto Belgian soil only on the 12th. It was Giraud c/w Georges who decided to develop moderately on Dutch soil.
 * Indeed, Gamelin did not directly instruct 2e BLM.


 * The German armoured division would not be engaged by its stronger French counterpart. Previously 25.DIM was adressed and so it seems that the supposingly stronger French counterpart refers to 25.DIM. But it probably (should) refer to 1.DLM, which is not addressed.
 * Indeed it refers to 1DLM — which was the counterpart of 9.PD by being a large mechanised unit also. I'll make that more explicit.
 * Even more so, 1.DLM was considerably stronger!
 * Very true :o).


 * Their was no attack of the extreme right formations of the 9.PD (recce squadron reinforced with a SR.11 battalion) at Loon op Zand. It ran into the battle-staff of the Dutch Peel-Division, but after that met no opposition whatsoever. It connected to the first Germans at Zevenbergschen Hoek shortly after noon and marched on to Moerdijk around 1600 hrs Dutch time. DIM being a Division d'Infanterie Motorisé (and not Mecanisé or Mecanique) was already addressed but still not changed.
 * "Advance" might be the better term.


 * Forty km to the west? The distance Loon op Zand - Zevenbergsche Hoek is less than 30 km, virtually straight road.
 * Well, the Moerdijk itself is a bit further :o). I assumed Schmidt was surprised east of Loon-op-Zand. Was I wrong?
 * Yes, that is wrong. Schmidt had not been allowed by the French to take the main road to Tilburg, so they took a northern detour, leading them into Loon op Zand, where the road goes straight south into Tilburg, where Schmidt intended to re-occupy his previous staff quarter. The Germans on their behalf avoided the French forces still massing the main road between Breda and Tilburg and took the northern route westwards. That is why these two columns met head on.
 * Well, Amersfoort states that Schmidt in his haste missed the turn to Tilburg. I assumed that he then drove towards Udenhout, trying to reach Tilburg via the Vught-Tilburg road and as a result bumped into the German vanguard.
 * Schmidt's driver missed the turn to Dongen [between Oosterhout and Loon op Zand] which would have led them to a short-cut to Tilburg. That is why they drove on to Loon op Zand. But they met head up with the taskforce of Major Lüttwitz.


 * The 'Dort' bridge? Wouldn't you call that the Dordrecht bridges?
 * "Dort" is the English name of Dordrecht. The plural is indeed more accurate.
 * That is news to me. I have never heard of 'Dort' being the English name for Dordrecht.
 * Some secondary Dutch ports have special English names, other examples are Flushing and Brill. Occasioned by old trade contacts, no doubt.


 * The Germans did not drive back 'the battalion' during the Dordrecht street fighting. In fact the Germans didn't gain an inch, but in the evening the battalion was withdrawn by the Commander of the Independant Staff of the LD. Only then the Germans gradually progressed further into town. During the day the battle around the southeastern edge of the city was a giant stand-off. The entire description is poor and hardly understandable. Which are 'the other units' and what attack did they develop? The facts were (are) that (from left to right) parts of I./FJR.1, III./FJR.1 and II./FJR.2 sealed off the city of Dordrecht from the bridge-area to the south, in an arc shaped half-encirclement. In the southeastern corner the task-force De Boer - comprising mainly infantry of IR.72 reinforced by a platoon of PAK and a battery of 7,5 cm howitsers - was under instructions to penetrate Dordrecht and close the entire southeastern and eastern arc around the city. After that all forces would develop an concentric assault on the remaining 'Kessel'. The classic German 'Kesselslacht'.
 * Ah, with the other units Dutch troops were meant. That should have been made explicit.


 * The sentence Spotting a weak point, one of the SS battalion commanders, Obersturmbannführer Hilmar Wäckerle, suddenly attacked with a hastily assembled force of about company strength using infiltration tactics broke through the Stop Line, quickly advancing a mile to the west until being halted by a fall-back line along the Rhenen railroad doesn't make sense. Should be editted.
 * Will be done.


 * The stopline was not largely abandoned, but only in the sector on either side of the main road crossing the stopl-line. The general German advance caused the main line to be abandoned for over two miles to the north because the troops there feared an attack from behind is inaccurate in the given context. That should refer to the previously addressed front-line event of the afternoon-evening assault by the SS. Given the current position in the text it suggests that the German night assault by the SS caused a two click breach, which it did not.
 * Those ambiguities must be removed.


 * Three RN MTB's were sent to the Yssel Lake. Also another Guard battalion was prepared to be sent to Hook of Holland.
 * I believe the text mentions the first fact? The last point is very interesting. Could we mention the exact number of the Guards battalion?
 * These Guard battalions were quite weak. Both battalions had a strength of no more than 500 men and were poorly equipped. Rumours of them bringing APC's and other heavy stuff are false. They didn't even have heavy MG's or light arty. The best they could bring were some light mortars, but basically rifles, Brenguns and Lewis MG's.
 * Yes, their fighting value would have been limited. Was this 2nd Battalion Welsh Guards?
 * It were battalions of the 20th Guards Brigade, of which the 2nd Irish [reinforced with a company of the 2nd Welsh] were actually sent in and the balance of the 2nd Welsh embarked on the 14th but wasn't sent after all when things turned bad.


 * Near Breda the XXVI Armeekorps had to overcome the resistance of several French divisions; nonsense. That was the fear, not the fact. It only faced parts of 25.DIM and of the GRDI's along the Mark, most of it even only on the 13th. The text should be editted and set in a form of suggestion rather than facts.
 * Correct.


 * The whole passage about Von Bock demanding a new Army Corps is totally pulled out of context. This German strategic-operational discussion took place in March/April 1940. As a consequence the SS division (VT) was reinforced as well as the arty component of 9.PD. Furthermore a (motorised) AK staff was included into the 18.Armee which was XXXIX.AK. That staff was tasked to become active whenever the penetration of Fortress Holland would be achieved, whereas at that very point in time XXVI.AK would be split-off of the Dutch campaign, reinforced with one or two reserve divisions (208 and 225.ID) and XXXIX would take 9.PD and a part of SS-VT together with an infantry division into Fortress Holland. All part of the pre-battle plan and not an issue that Von Bock addressed on the 12th of May only, as the text suggests. The only thing is that Von Bock had freedom to alter the composition of both Army Corpses.
 * This indeed has to be re-editted.


 * Rudolf Schmidt was Generalleutnant, not General.
 * Good point.

Grebbegoos (talk) 18:53, 21 May 2010 (UTC) Grebbegoos (talk) 22:50, 8 July 2010 (UTC)

We're in agreement, I think; I'll change the text and then we can tackle 13 May!--MWAK (talk) 11:06, 9 July 2010 (UTC)

Excellent!Grebbegoos (talk) 12:03, 10 July 2010 (UTC)

Falso info 13 May

 * The Ministers left the Hook at 1920 hrs, not at 1720 hrs. If the TOD is mentioned it should be right.
 * Correct.


 * 9.PD had eight tank-companies, not six as the text suggests. Both tank-battalions were formed with a Staff-Company (comprising 8 tanks), two light companies (organically 22 tanks each) and a medium heavy company (organically 19 tanks). Companies were number 1 thru 4 in I./PzRgt.33 and 5 thru 8 in II./PzRgt.33.
 * Well, they had eight companies with tanks but six tank companies. The staff company, though having a tank allotment, was not a tank company.
 * Well, funny that the Germans maintained 8 numbered companies then! 1st u/i 4 of 1st Tank Battalion PzRgt33 and 5 u/i 8 of 2nd Tank Battalion PzRgt33. That should be maintained. The staff companies were both used independantly (like the most well known assault at Barendrecht) or combined with another tank company. Would you maintain the same odd method if it were for the infantry regiment companies, stating that these had only 12 infantry companies for the other three (or four) were support companies?
 * Why, I think I would :o). They would be Infantry companies of course, companies belonging to the Infantry Arm — but they would not be infantry companies, companies composed of infantry. Furthermore, applying your line of reasoning we would have to call any company within an armoured unit a tank company, even if it did not possess any tanks at all. The least we can say is that this would be rather misleading.
 * No, it is misleading to leave out 10% of the AFV component for the sake of stubborness. It is quite simple. If it were plain staff companies (Stab Kompanies) they would not have been numbered. Numbered companies were fighting units with armed AFV's. The Armoured Pioneer companies in the PD's, also containing AFV's, were not counted as fighting units, notwithstanding that they also possessed some armed AFV's.
 * Then it would perhaps be best to mention the staff companies separately, with an indication of their tank strength. Both crossed into the Island of Dordrecht?
 * The first company joint the mission into Dubbeldam, later the centre of Dordrecht. The other one first stayed south of Moerdijk and rejoint the division on the 14th at Rotterdam.


 * The effort to flood the Island of Dordrecht were unsuccssful due to the failure to set the inlet sluices open. Attempt by arty and by 3.GB failed.
 * It should certainly be mentioned that the attempt itself to open them failed.
 * Then it should read 'attempts', because there were a number of independant actions undertaken, on several days.


 *  However, two of the four battalions available were decimated in a failed effort to recapture the suburbs of Dordrecht. According to the ref 184? This is untrue info and not an accurate recital. There was no decimation whatsoever. Please explain to which event this refers.
 * This has to be re-edited.


 * On their tops? On top of the German armour.
 * Indeed not on top of the Dutch infantry :o). We had better remove the ambiguity.


 * The Dutch battalions were not waivering before the 'orange cloth' event but after. The Stuka attack that followed the tank intervention was only called in when the first tanks were shot off of the causeway. Only then the waivering of the battalions occured.
 * Are you absolutely sure there was no prior German bombardment also?
 * 100% sure. It were the tanks being shelled by a 7-veld gun calling in air strikes by means of flares. That was when the tanks bashed into the point formations of the LD massing along the Zeedijk.


 * a catastrophe was prevented by 47mm and 75 mm batteries destroying with direct armor piercing fire two Panzer IIs, after which the remainder of the German tanks fell back. What is the source for two Pz.II being shot? There are no sources specifying the German losses. This is wild speculation. The recital given (ref 185] does not specify 2 Pz.II being shot up.
 * I seem to recall I had that from Brongers. Could be mistaken though.
 * This is exactly the action that caused the tankers to call in the Stuka's


 * The text doesn't mention that the LD left wing opposing the tanks lost about two full companies of POW's. That in comparison to the text stating that a successful withdrawal was completed by the LD is quite untrue. The losses were heavy and the withdrawal absolute chaos. Moreover, not the LD withdrew to the Alblasserwaard, but only about two battalions did. The balance stayed in Dordrecht (whereas two battalions had remained along the Noord all along) and fought until night fall.
 * Good improvements.


 * Again, the tank losses in Dordrecht are not supported by adequante sources whereas the recitals [186 and 187] do not specify these losses. And rightly so, because they are unknown. The tank losses were in any case higher than specified in the text. Also at least two Pz.III and one Pz.IV were put out of action. Moreover the Germans were not beaten back in the Dordrecht city but withdrew on order. In fact they had managed to decisively breach the Dutch inner-city defences. Infantry was following up just beyond that line. Only when the tanks withdrew the Dutch managed to reclose the gap.
 * Well, I used the information given by you on 11 May 2009: Afterwards one of the medium tank companies of 1.Abtl raided the inner city of Dordrecht, where the lost quite some tanks. The first two Pz.II sent in - as recce party - were destroyed in no time by AT guns. Afterwards another bunch of tanks were either crippled or destroyed. As the number of two destroyed is given by Amersfoort, I only mentioned these. If you based yourself directly on primary sources you are right that such details have to be omitted. Maybe we can describe it as "at least two tanks". In an another earlier discussion between us you stated that the German tank losses on the Island of Dordrecht amounted to twelve. If about ten of these were suffered in Dordrecht and three more were disabled, total losses for the tank company would have equalled about half of its strength. That they had breached the defences is stated in the text but having to return, on order or otherwise, to avoid further losses, is fairly described by "beaten back", I would say. But we could rephrase it in less "strong" language!
 * As you can see my quote you used doesn't specify the total losses. Certain are the losses of 2 off Pz.II, 2 off Pz.III and 1 off Pz.IV in the city. These were mentioned in battle reports of PzRgt33. The Quartermaster of 9.PD gives higher losses but these cannot be matched to events nor to any supporting evidence of battles in Dordrecht. These losses were for the entire Island of Dordrecht. Btw: 'Beaten back' [in Dutch 'teruggeslagen'] clearly indicates rebuffing, repelling or rejecting and does not accurately describe the facts, which were that the tanks were called off by the Germans themselves.
 * Then "at least two PzKpfw IIs" and "ordered to retreat" would be acceptable?
 * Yes


 * The description of the Barendrecht event is inaccurate two. The assault force comprised four Pz.II of a Stabszug and was led by the attached Pz.III of Lt Grix. Two Pz.II were positioned on either side of the Barendrecht bridge northern land-head to give supressing fire. Only two Pz.II with the spearing Pz.III went across the bridge and were hammered into destruction.
 * Well, I went by your statement of 11 May 2009: The Staff platoon of 1.Abtl raided the Barendrecht bridge, with three Pz.II and one Pz.III. All four were destroyed by a single AT gun. This is confirmed by your list of total 9. PD losses. Could it be that you have now been influenced by the traditional account that three tanks had been destroyed? Or should the list be corrected?
 * No, I have simply made an error in an earlier assessement, apparently. Five tanks involved, three destroyed.


 * The addressing of the Irish Guard battalion suggests as if they were around the corner. They were in Hook of Holland, well away of the events.
 * The fact that the battalion was positioned in Hook of Holland is mentioned. We could indicate the distance.
 * You should, cause the text suggests as if they could intervene any time.


 * Both the Dutch company-size formations that assaulted the Willemsbrug areas contained Marines.
 * But they weren't completely made up of them, right?
 * The text states now Two Dutch companies, one of them of Dutch marines, stormed the bridgehead ; that suggests as if one company of marines was involved, the other made up out of regular infantry (or so). That is incorrect. One company was entirely made up out of marines, the other partially with additional navy troops and a few engineers. Both were led by marines officers.
 * Perhaps we should simply speak of "two companies of Dutch marines"?
 * "Two companies mainly composed of marines" would seem suitable to me.


 * The events around the Willemsbrug lasted for many hours. After all the Dutch found themselves cornered between the fiercly defending Germans in the Insurance building and the evenly fiercly firing south side of the river. After hours of intensive close quarter fire, the Dutch companies withdrew.
 * The time aspect can be mentioned.


 * The Kornwerderzand defences did not contain 55 mm AT guns. It were both (outside defences) navy guns of 3,7 cm and (embedded) the HIH 'kanon van 5 lang 50 no.1' which had a calibre of 4,7 cm.
 * My mistake.


 * South towards the Grebbeberg, during the evening and night the Dutch had assembled about a dozen[196] battalions for a counterattack to retake the main line. This is pure fantasy by the author of this article! There were five battalions available for the counter-attack and a sixed one to reinforce the main line on the hill (Grebbeberg) itself. Again the given reference [196, Amersfoort pg 308] doesn't support the text. The source [196] states that in total thirteen (13) battalions were incorporated in either the existing defence-lines or the counter-attack. I myself have never been able to come to more than 10 battalions and half the 4th regiment hussars. But Van den Doel and Amersfoort have big thumbs ... ;)
 * Well, first of all the text certainly isn't meant to suggest twelve battalion actually participated in the counterattack! However, of the thirteen battalions mentioned by Amersfoort as "available", clearly a dozen were reserves as two battalions of 8IR had been largely destroyed. In fact such reserves were indeed present: apart from the five battalions of brigade B, they included: II-19 RI; III-11 RI; I-46 RI; II-11 RI; I-20 RI; 11e Grensbataljon; and elements of 3e and 4e Regiment Huzaren. It all adds up doesn't it?
 * No, it does not. Many of those battalions were either incomplete (11.GB only two companies for example, the five battalions of the counterattack only made up less than four battalions strength) or heavily battered, like the 8.RI battalions, II-11.RI, III-11.RI (only three companies) and II-19.RI (only three companies) battalions. 3.RH was not around (but one squadron), of 4.RH only two squadrons. My objection to such quantitative comparison is that it is unreliable. It suggests much more than there was. Besides the current text does indicate that 12 btl were involved in the counter attack. Can you read South towards the Grebbeberg, during the evening and night the Dutch had assembled about a dozen[196] battalions for a counterattack to retake the main line any other way???
 * Well, it is followed by However, not all of these units would be concentrated into a single effort. Some battalions had been fed immediately into the battle at the Stop Line, and others were kept in reserve, mainly behind the fall-back line near the Rhenen railroad. Four were to be used, under command of Brigade B, for the flanking attack from the north. However, I think we can rephrase the first sentence to remove any misleading suggestion from the outset. As regards the numbers, I wouldn't say the impression given is all that inaccurate. For twelve reserve battalions you expect 48 companies or squadrons of which 43 were present. Not a very great discrepancy. And was not some of the difference compensated by smaller units? Nevertheless we could add that not all battalions were at full strength.
 * Not 43, something like 37 to 38 at the most. The five battalions of the counter attack (Brigade B plus one of IV.Corps) already missed out on four companies. The II and III-11.RI, II-19.RI missed one company (save the losses suffered) allocated elsewhere. The 8.RI battalions had lost much more. The thing is that these kinds of summaries are misleading. Moreover, it was not like there were 12 battalions to counter strike. Only five were assigned counter strike tasks. The majority were either replacement or rear defence forces.
 * The last should certainly be made clear by the rephrasing. A sentence like "Furthermore, most battalions were a quarter below strength" would then remove the drawback of an in itself too simplistic numerical comparison?
 * Partially. Furthermore it should be mentioned what the German strength was. That is not mentioned. That involved three SS battalions (save their losses, comprising around 300 men WIA and KIA) and SS support troops (like four supporting companies including the 15th Kradschutzen), three unbattered battalions of IR.322 and two untouched battalions of IR.374 (west of Wageningen). The strengths of these battalions of both belligerents was almost equal.
 * The German strength and the force parity should be indicated also.


 * 207.ID was not committed to fight for the first time! Its 368.IR had developed an assault on the Ede-de Klomp region on the 12th, and had been rejected with severe losses (incl. a battalion commander).
 * True.


 * The Germans planned to shift two regiments of 3rd Army Corps to this part of the line.[203]. What the hell is that? 3.AK was Armeegruppe A and faced the Luxemburg area. Please get rid of this straight out nonsense and scrap Lou de Jong as a source for troop movements! Totally unreliable as is certified by this citation.
 * This has to be re-edited.


 * It were basically two Armee Corpses [II and IV] and Brigade B that were withdrawn. III.LK largerly stayed in position.
 * You mean during the evening of the 13th? Surely on the 14th III LK was withdrawn to the west also?
 * III.LK connected to the south of the Eastfront, which was a minor move
 * Agreed, but still a move?


 * 227.ID only found out at the 14th that the Grebbeline had been deserted by the Dutch.
 * Certainly, but the text refers to the gap in the defences, not to be confused with the general withdrawal.

Grebbegoos (talk) 10:34, 22 May 2010 (UTC)

Falso info 14 May

 * Winkelman already gave orders to occupy a position north of Amsterdam on the 12th, not only on the 14th. The 'Amsterdam position' was not the same as the North front. It was an improvised position behind the Noordzeekanaal (Northsea-canal).
 * Excellent improvement.


 * Adolf Hitler was safe in his bunker near the French front, so its quite unlikely that he himself intended to cross the Meuze. It was the Leibstandarte. Please address the unit as SS Leibstanderte or SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, in short SSLAH.
 * Well, the italics should have made that clear anyway :o). But for the sake of precision it should be as you say.


 * Meanwhile two squadrons of Heinkels arrived? Two formations that should say. A squadron is an equivalent to a German Staffel, which means around 12 air-planes. This were around 90-100, divided over two groups.
 * Good point.


 * The flares were shot from the Noordereiland only upon the arrival overhead of the southern (smallest) formation. At that very point the eastern formation had started its bomb run already. Before the southern formation was waived off the eastern formation had already started the raid. The text seems to suggest otherwise.
 * Not necessarily, I would say, but we can remove the ambiguity.

Grebbegoos (talk) 23:42, 22 May 2010 (UTC)
 * The amount of 158 x 250 kg and 1.150 x 50 kg bombs was the total number of loaded bombs in the entire Geschwader. The number is retreived from the Quartiermeister of KG.54 and only sums up the Geschwader load, not the number of bombs dropped. Should the theory be right that indeed only around 60 bombs dropped their pay-load, the number of bombers dropped must have been around 2/3 of the 1.305 bombs. Moreover, it is almost certain that also bombers of the Ju-88 type raided tactical positions along the Meuze river at around the same time. This is also what Oberst Lackner reports in his account. Remarkably enough this is never copied in Dutch sources, perhaps due to the high 'copy-paste' content the description of the Rotterdam raid contains in Dutch historical work.
 * Very good point. We can subtly indicate this, I trust. However, for the Ju-88 attacks a secondary source is needed.
 * The commander of KG.54 - Oberst Lackner - clearly states in his October 1952 report on the affair: An Bomben auf Rotterdam wurden insgesamt rd. 60 Tonnen abgeworfen (50 kg und 250 kg) and Ein oder 2 Stuka-Gruppe - Genaueres weiss ich hierüber nicht - erhielten ausserdem den Befehl, gleichzeitig besondere Punktziele in der Stadt, wie Nachrichtenzentralen, Kraftversorgung und Ähnliches anzugreifen. Why would you need a secondary source on that? Dutch military reports clearly indicate the raid to last at least 20-30 minutes. Besides even photographs show evidence, like the Bijenkorf building being unharmed and untouched during the first footage of the firestorm, whereas on later pictures in the afternoon the building was clearly destroyed by bombs. Karel Mallan erroneously concluded in his book 'Als de dag van gisteren' [pg. 222 - remark at picture 224 of the Bijenkorf - compare photo 249] that the Germans used timer-fuses. An unlogical suggestion. The German push across the bridges was scheduled 30 minutes after the raid had started [e.g. 20 minutes after it had ceased] and timer-fused bombs would therefore particularly have jeopardized the German push through the city.
 * Again, it is not that I doubt the truth of the matter. But when such new elements are introduced, they have to be mentioned by some book. Isn't that report referred to by any author?
 * :) You stick with the old rap, MWAK. I am not going to bother about the odd moral that secondary sources prevail over primary sources. I am not gonna be bothered about this. Suit yourself (and wiki).

Shall we get on MWAK? The last two chapters shouldn't be too much trouble to 'settle' ... ;) Grebbegoos (talk) 10:20, 27 August 2010 (UTC)


 * Yes. I tend to get distracted...I'll change the 14 May chapter and then address the 15 May issues.--MWAK (talk) 11:48, 27 August 2010 (UTC)

False info 'the surrender'

 * It is inaccurate that all units were informed at 1650 hrs of the armastice (not the surrender). First of all Winkelman forgot to inform the Navy Staff. Secondly he only informed his direct subordinates at 1650 hrs. It took hours to inform lower units and most commanders only received the news of the armastice when the 1900 hrs radio statement was announced.
 * This could indeed be made more clear.


 * Chief executive of the homeland? He was acting head of state.
 * Well, he was the highest executive power, so we can call him so. "Chief executive" has perhaps too many business connotations :o).
 * Indeed, Chief executive is not a governmental e.g. administrative title. (acting) Head of State was.


 * It is often seen in history books, but the Dutch did not surrender on the 14th. Winkelman only announced an armastice, which still had to be accepted by the Germans. Only on the 15th the armastice transferred into a capitulation.
 * I haven't read the actual phrasing Winkelman used. Did he explicitly ask the Germans to start armistice negotiations? Obviously, he could not unilaterally cause an armistice agreement to go into effect. Of course, a conditional surrender would oblige the Germans to observe a cease-fire until they had decided to accept it or not, but that's a different matter. An unconditional surrender must lead to an immediate and lasting end of hostilities, but apparently both parties at least tacitly understood the surrender to be conditional, otherwise there would have been no need for capitulation negotiations.
 * Well, we shouldn't make it all too complicated I presume. Technically there was an armastice (a surrender in Rotterdam) as off 1900 hrs, but it was pre-announced to the German ambassador that it was an armastice to army-surrender. So a conditional surrender till the unconditional surrender was agreed on the 15th. As we know some details of the German demands were altered during this brief meeting in Rijsoord, which proofs the status of the conditional surrender thusfar.
 * Perhaps pointing out that the surrender implied a cease-fire will be enough?
 * Yes, why not, that clarifies the matter.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by Grebbegoos (talk • contribs) 22:17, 30 August 2010 (UTC)


 * It should be specifically mentioned in this chapter that the province Zeeland was excluded from the armastice and capitulation.
 * It would create some redundancy with the next chapter but it is indeed best to mention it immediately to avoid any confusion for the reader.
 * It may seem redundant but it is not. Since we agree that the surrender at 1650 hrs (e.g. 1900 hrs) was a conditional one, it is fair to say at this very point that Zeeland was excluded. After all fighting did not cease in the province whereas it should have ended in the rest of the country as a result of the conditional surrender / armastice. By the way, fighting did not cease in the west of the province of North Brabant either, although it was just marginal (the Essen area).

Grebbegoos (talk) 23:54, 22 May 2010 (UTC)

Shall we get the last one (Zeeland) done too, MWAK? Grebbegoos (talk) 10:56, 1 September 2010 (UTC)


 * Yes. Finally found some time...--MWAK (talk) 18:37, 4 September 2010 (UTC)

False info 'fighting in Zeeland'

 * On the 10th three GRDI's arrived in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen and moved into Walcheren the same day. They had to form a forward defence for an infantry regiment to arrive at Vlissingen on the 11th.
 * Very true of course. I planned to treat this within a better account of all French troop movements, but there's no reason not to mention it here straightaway.


 * The Dutch only considered the Zanddijkline defensible. Not the Bathline.
 * Yes, but in a different meaning of "defensible" than is used in the text. The Bath Line as such offered good defensive possibilities but they intended to merely wage a delaying battle here. The French didn't see those possibilities.
 * Hmm. The thing is that the Bathline was never an intensional defence-line. It was a 'opnamestelling' (don't know the English word for that). It was intended to form a security defence in case of a sudden invasion from the south and/or a 'opnamestelling' for Brabant forces. It was hardly suitable for prolonged defence and not treated as such, also given the small occupation.
 * These aspects should indeed be made more clear. Opnamestelling or Aufnahmestellung in German have no equivalent in English. Like Auffangstellung they are typically translated with "delaying position" or "collecting line".


 * However, the French were not convinced of their value and positioned their troops at more conspicuous obstacles. Poorly put. General Durand - the French General who had taken general command of the combined forces in Walcheren - considered the Zanddijkline indefensible and moreover anticipated an amphibious German attack from the north across the Easterscheld. He therefore moved his regiment along the north shores of Walcheren west of the Zanddikeline and at the same time refused to position any unit east of the canal, that intersected the island just west of the Zanddijkline. 'The French' did not concur Durands actions, reason why he was sacked a few days later.
 * It is indeed better to ascribe the actions to the man responsible, Durand himself, and also mention his positioning a regiment on the northern shore.


 * There was absolutely no carpet bombing of Walcheren whatsoever! This is a myth. There were Ju-88 and some He-111 involved in air-raids, but those were pointed at military targets and therefore of a tactical nature. Vlissingen harbour was raided for its essential logistic value. Middelburg was mainly targetted by German artillery battalions positioned just east of the Sloe. Only an occasional bomb fell on Middelburg. French arty positions - as well as one Dutch arty battery - near Middelburg were targets to some bombers, but this does not by far qualify as carpet bombing.
 * So, the fire that consumed a large part of the inner city was started by that artillery bombardment? And at most a few bomb loads hit Middelburg? That's indeed not the impression given by many books.
 * Indeed. It were at least two, possibly three, German arty battalions that shelled the city. This caused most of the devastation. Air-raids by the Luftwaffe on the city itself were not on (some hit the outskirts though), pin-point punishments of Dutch-Franco positions were. A few of those Ju-88 attacks were pointed at Dutch and French arty near Middelburg and particularly the French positions near the west side of the dam. I know of a book mentioning even 90 bombers raiding Middelburg! It is purely a well preserved myth, much copied since.

Grebbegoos (talk) 00:14, 23 May 2010 (UTC)
 * The gallant delaying action of Brigadier Deslaurens was obviously executed by a bit more than the General himself. Peculiar to put it this way.
 * Obviously so. The sources are perhaps a bit too romantic on this point. Would "led by Deslaurens in person" do?
 * Certainly. Deslaurens was a memorable person and a galant exception amongst the French Generals. He should be credited for his courage and determination. But he was accompanied by quite some of his staff troops and some stranglers.

I guess that we are at a point where we shake hands for the achieved consensus on virtually all points. Although it took some persuasive discussion here and there I think that with these last modifications the page is of quite acceptable quality, particularly compared to much else on this medium, which I still find hard to accept from time to time due to its easy-to-manipulate concept. Nonetheless, thanks for your cooperation in this process. Grebbegoos (talk) 23:14, 6 September 2010 (UTC)


 * And my thanks to you! Your knowledge on the subject, which far surpasses mine, has been an invaluable contribution to the article. I'll implement the last changes. It's true that there is an inherent weakness in the Wikipedia concept — but you have shown it can be turned into a strength!--MWAK (talk) 05:43, 7 September 2010 (UTC)

Authors / citations
MWAK, I am sure you agree that your citation-references should be expanded with the actual authors. H.W. van den Doel, C + J. Schulten and P.M.J. de Koster wrote most of the chapters, Amersfoort and Kamphuis were mostly editors. Grebbegoos (talk) 22:51, 18 July 2010 (UTC)


 * Well, the problem is the book itself doesn't provide us with a preferred citation format. It also isn't mentioned with a full list of authors in bibliographies. On the other hand providing their names is very desirable. A tricky question.--MWAK (talk) 13:07, 23 July 2010 (UTC)


 * I don't know what you are getting at. Point is that your citations say 'Amersfoort' for all those taken from 'May 1940 ...'. Amersfoort only wrote two chapters. Most of the citations come from Van den Doel chapters. He should be the cited author, not Amersfoort. Grebbegoos (talk) 21:48, 1 August 2010 (UTC)


 * I see. Those citations do not so much serve to indicate the author per se, nor the chapter, but purely refer to the book (and page) as such, of which the full title is mentioned more below. As Amerfoort is the first mentioned author, the short references to the book all become "Amersfoort" as they all refer to the same book.--MWAK (talk) 17:45, 4 August 2010 (UTC)


 * Well, the thing is that for example H.W. van den Doel wrote the best part of the book. Amersfoort and particularly Kamphuis were mere editors. The authors of the chapters are specifically mentioned in the book, chapter by chapter. I find it unrealistic to apply citations that refer to an editor who may not have anything to do with the wording. I can address Amersfoort as it comes to the work as a whole, but when I cite from the book I refer to the author of a chapter. That is how it should work. Isn't it silly to cite an author's name whereas he didn't write the referred article or chapter? I find it quite imperfect to leave it at Amersfoort. Citations should be precise. One can always add Amersfoort as a second name, but the first name referred to should be the author. Grebbegoos (talk) 22:20, 4 August 2010 (UTC)


 * Yes, but the thing to keep in mind is that these footnotes are not full citations. They are simply a quick way of indicating the page number of the book cited, the real citation of which is given under "references". However, even in the real citation the co-authors are not mentioned for the reason I gave above: they are not part of a list of authors given by the book title page. Of course, it would in principle be possible to expand each note with a book chapter title plus specific author — but this would involve a lot of work! :o)--MWAK (talk) 10:50, 5 August 2010 (UTC)


 * Sometimes you give the impression that you are just plainly stubborn. I give up. You rule. Grebbegoos (talk) 01:08, 6 August 2010 (UTC)


 * Not stubborn. Just lazy ;o).--MWAK (talk) 17:59, 6 August 2010 (UTC)


 * If you tell me how to get to the citation listing, I'll add the authors. Grebbegoos (talk) 10:54, 15 August 2010 (UTC)


 * Well, each citation from Amersfoort should then begin with the author who wrote the chapter followed by an indication of the Chapter number. So. e.g. a citation from page 39 Chapter 2, written by H.W. van den Doel, should read as "Van den Doel, H.W. Chapter 2 in: Amersfoort (2005), p. 39". And so forth for every single citation from the book. The citations can be found in the normal editing window but are dispersed throughout the text. So you have to identify and find each separate citation by reading through the text, then manually change it. A very time-consuming business, given that it would have to be done almost two hundred times! If you are not determined to finish the job, it's better not the start the process at all because it would be useless half-done...--MWAK (talk) 14:44, 15 August 2010 (UTC)


 * I'll do it when I have some time on my hand. Grebbegoos (talk) 10:19, 27 August 2010 (UTC)

Wilhelmina bridge - Saint Servatius bridge
Today I changed the caption of the picture showing German soldiers crossing the damaged Sint Servaasbrug in Maastricht. The caption read (as it did before I changed it last time):

“Despite the destruction of the Wilhelminabrug, German troops passed this vital traffic hub relatively quickly. Photo taken 10 May 1940 in Maastricht”

'Hey', I thought when I read this in 2010: 'That is not the Wilhelminabrug (Wilhemina bridge) but the Sint Servaasbrug (Saint Servatius bridge)! Let's change it'. So I did.

However, User:Diannaa immediately undid my revision with the following comment:

“Undid revision 422484163 by Vunzmstr (talk)This pic shows the Servaasbrug, but that is not the bridge that was destroyed”

I have to say I was a bit pissed off. If you look at the picture it is very clear that you see German troops trying to pass a (partly) demolished Saint Servatius bridge. The steel part of the bridge that was (and is) used to let large ships pass is clearly destroyed and is hanging down into the water. You can see the German soldiers descending and ascending to some kind of pontoon bridge using ladders. Therefore, your statement that the Saint Servatius bridge was not destroyed is, on the basis of the picture, incorrect. Should you have meant that the Saint Servatius bridge was not 'destroyed' but only 'damaged' in contrast to the Wilhelmina bridge that was 'destroyed' then that also would be incorrect. According to Dutch wikipedia, only the steel part of the Wilhelmina bridge was destroyed, which means that both the Saint Servatiusbridge and the Wilhelmina bridge were damaged/destroyed in exactly the same way however you want to call it.

Now, my own knowledge of how the Germans passed Maastricht is limited. However, the picture and the caption as they currently read make no sense. First of all, what do you mean with 'this vital traffic hub'? Do you mean the Wilhelmina bridge? Then why show a picture of the Saint Servatiusbridge? Do you mean Maastricht? Then the caption is grammatically incorrect, and the caption still makes no sense. Was it only the destruction of the Wilhelminabridge that was relevant? Then why did German soldiers build a pontoon bridge within the Saint Servatius bridge? And again why show a picture of the Saint Servatius bridge at all? I am not saying that my original edit was perfect, but the caption clearly needs improvement, which is why you should not have just undone my edits without using my input to come to a better text.

I changed it now as follows:

'Despite the destruction of the Wilhelminabrug and the Sint Servaasbrug (pictured) German troops passed Maastricht, a vital traffic hub, relatively quickly. Photo taken 10 May 1940 in Maastricht'

Thank you for not undoing this revision on the basis of misconceptions (but feel free to improve it) and for making editing Wikipedia such a pain in the ass. --Vunzmstr (talk) 16:00, 23 September 2011 (UTC)


 * I'm afraid I'm ultimately to blame for all this. Originally I mistook the St Servaas bridge for the Wilhelmina bridge :oS. My excuses!--MWAK (talk) 06:17, 24 September 2011 (UTC)


 * No need to excuse, everybody makes mistakes and that's not my issue. My issue is someone reverting my edits of a picture showing a destroyed Saint Servatius bridge on the basis that the Saint Servatius bridge was not destroyed. --Vunzmstr (talk) 13:37, 24 September 2011 (UTC)

overly military
In the introduction it is said that

"The Dutch tried on several occasions to act as an intermediary to reach a negotiated peace settlement between the Entente and Germany."

However, no details are given about the settlement proposal and the reaction of the opposing sides. One can only guess that it was Britain who refused settlement.

Generally, Allied popular history is almost exclusively focused on military action, displaying the Nazi German War Machine. All diplomatic efforts and positions remain hidden. It is known that Hitler had no interest of war on the Western front and tried numerous times to end war after re-incorporation of territories that were annexed by Poland after WWI. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 187.153.19.174 (talk) 07:16, 4 October 2011 (UTC)


 * No, the main problem was that both sides were not all that interested in using the Dutch as intermediaries :o). Is there any proof that Hitler seriously intended to give up any part of Poland after September 1939? Poland was of course recreated on territories in 1914 being part of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia, so the term "annexation" seems somewhat imprecise to describe this process.--MWAK (talk) 12:36, 4 October 2011 (UTC)

A lot of information is provided by Pat Buchanan

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Churchill,_Hitler_and_the_Unnecessary_War

Rudolf Hess proposed a 7 point peace plan. There is controversy if Hess had authorization by Hitler. Nonetheless, Britain did not follow up on it. If Hitler was opposed to it, Britain could have tried to influence public opinion in Germany with Hess. The points proposed by Hess were very reasonable and even could be taken as base for negotiation as a first draft. The problem for Britain and the rest of the Allied powers was that they held large territories of occupied land, colonialism was still at its peak. Any public debate about self determination would have sparked a world wide uprising, particularly in Britain colonies. Furthermore, Churchill had no personal interest in a negotiated peace. He would have had to concede to its political opponents, and as we know in democracies nothing ever gets reversed. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 187.153.19.174 (talk) 18:55, 4 October 2011 (UTC)

Another source is Schultze-Rhonhof

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerd_Schultze-Rhonhof

After invasion of Poland, Germany cut down on arms production. This clearly proves that any extended war was not planned and a negotiated peace was intended. Furthermore, Schultze-Rhonhof analyses military spending and arms production in the period up to the outbreak of war in 1939. Germany was only prepared for a restricted war. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 187.153.19.174 (talk) 20:57, 4 October 2011 (UTC)

Britain still does no declassify its files relating foreign policy issues around and after the outbreak of war. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 187.153.19.174 (talk) 21:19, 4 October 2011 (UTC)


 * Well, it's certainly true that Germany was not well-prepared for a protracted war and that at first Hitler would gladly have made peace with the Western Powers. But there are no indications he would in October 1939 have settled for just e.g Posen, the Corridor and Danzig while allowing the re-establishment of a fully sovereign Polish state. Indeed, negotiating with the Soviet-Union he had just given up Lithuania in exchange for a full annexation of Poland. In late 1939 there was a shift from pure arms manufacture to ammunition production but that was intended to allow longer war campaigns; nobody at that point planned for peace. Churchill only became relevant in June 1940. He was immediately after the Fall of France prepared to make remarkable concessions — Poland, Norway, Denmark, The Low Countries, France, Malta and Gibraltar if only the UK could keep the mass of its colonies — but Hitler had just entered a phase of full megalomania and had become very eager for a full victory. That prevented the magnanimity needed on his part to allow a peace agreement to happen.--MWAK (talk) 07:27, 5 October 2011 (UTC)

This ends up in a long discussion that is not directly related to the Netherlands. Regarding the Netherlands, German-Dutch relations used to be good before WWII. Dutch were sympathetic to Germany during WWI and had a lot of problems with colonial Britain, in particular the Boers war. There were many volunteers in the SS, as well many French and Belgians. National Socialism was largely a response to Communism, that was very strong in continental Europe. To a large extend NS is simply expressively contradicting Marxist dogmatism of that time, while conservatism kept silence or in its British and US version had little local experience with Soviet style communism.

Regarding Poland, there was no normalization in German-Polish relationships, the borders were never recognized by any government during the Weimar period, it was a postponed conflict. Germany would have ceded the Poznan territory but not Danzig, West Prussia and Pomerelia without plebiscite in accordance with the Wilson plan. There were 2.4 million Germans under Polish borders who lost their citizenship due to Versailles. Poland expelled most of them and as well killed many. What is now White Russia was also not Polish, Poland's eastern border was not recognized by the SU. Poland canceled a military pact with Germany in 1935 and attempted to convince France for attacking Germany in order to annex even more German territory, what finally happened. Months before September 1939 there was already Polish mobilization. Poland's military government actually wanted war and escalated the conflict with British guarantee. Hitler postponed the attack on Poland three times, trying to negotiate. A lot of information can be found at Schultze-Rhonhof. British files are still classified and they even extended classification.187.153.19.174 (talk) 20:49, 5 October 2011 (UTC)


 * Well, Polish policies were not impeccable. No nation's policies are, if inspired by a radical nationalism. The Polish government preferred war over making any concessions, assuming (not implausibly) that beginning to give in to Hitler could only end in the destruction of Poland. While it's true that some people joined the Nazis for fear of Stalinism, I feel that national-socialism was generally more of an alternative to communism, allowing you to be a socialist — very beneficial to the vast majority of people given the unequal wealth distribution at the time — without having to embrace universal moral principles — such as treating other nations with the same equity as you expected the capitalists of your own nation to show to you ;o). The Dutch were very pro-German in 1914 but much less so in 1918 after having witnessed the depths of self-deception the German people had sunk into. In 1940 the attitude was largely pro-British.--MWAK (talk) 07:02, 6 October 2011 (UTC)

Well, actually there was never any radical nationalism in Germany and they were behind in that development compared to the other major powers. NS was of course totalitarian but it shared this was Marxism. Nationalism at that time was meant to overcome the lack of internal coherence, Germany broke with the old monarchy/class system, there were ethnic and religious fractions, socialist ideas etc. and in order to overcome the totally fractionated and dysfunctional Weimar Republic, which was a result of the Versailles treaty, a common denominator was needed. Same as nowadays "democracy" or "globalism" are phrases in order to line up public opinion.

Thinking at that time was based on the 19th century (18xx), were colonialism emerged. That kind of ideology had not changed after WWI, the victorious powers became even worse in respect to it. Self determination was not established as a principle.

The Baltic states, white Russia, Ukraine and Finland were claimed by Russia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Prussia, Pomerelia, Silesia, Pomerania by Poland, the Rhine area by France. Checks dominated German Sudetenland, Slovaks and other minorities. Italy and Belgium had annexed small parts of Germany and Austria. Britain had conquered half of the world, as well as Ireland, US were dominating the pacific. Jews wanted Palestine.

Hitlers claims were moderate and backed up by self determination and intention for plebiscite, ie. Danzig, West Prussia and Pomerelia. Parts that went to Denmark after plebiscite were not re-incorporayed by Hitler. Actually it was British and Polish imperialism that sparked WWII. The guarantee Britain gave to Poland was not to avoid war but to initiate it. Russia attacked Rumania a German ally, who was given a prior guarantee from Germany. So Russia knew well that attack on Rumania would mean war with Germany.189.149.68.42 (talk) 22:39, 7 October 2011 (UTC)


 * It all depends on how you define "radical" of course :o). Like Denmark, wouldn't Poland have ended up a German protectorate? And would Hitler then have left all those Jews alone? Article 4 of the secret annex of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact basically implicated an occupation of Bessarabia by the Soviet-Union.--MWAK (talk) 05:45, 8 October 2011 (UTC)

Regarding nationalism, I meant the extend of nationalism as it was common among the German population, including those sympathetic to NS.

Germany always wanted to re-establish Poland. Poland was a German ally in WWI and they helped Poland to become independent. Parts of Poland were incorporated into Prussia as a result of the Congress of Vienna. Russia and Prussia wanted to establish a Poland in its ethnic boundaries then but British and French opposition related to balance of power prevented it. after WWI, the British guarantee prevented German-Polish negotiations about the border questions.

NS politics towards Jews was removing them from Germany. After WWI British expelled and dispossessed 2 million Germans from former colonies, French expelled Germans from the Alsace based on race laws, Italy expelled Germans based on territory claims dating to the Roman empire, Poland expelled and killed many of the 2.4 million Germans who were incorporated into Poland (as well they expelled more Jews than Germany did during the 1930s). Jews attended the Versailles conference as a victorious party. Therefore, expelling the Jews was a reaction on Allies measures. Zionism cooperated with NS because the wanted recognition as a people and a territory ceded from the major powers.

Regarding the attack on Rumania, Russia took more than Bessarabia and Hitler would have ceded Bessarabia as stipulated in the pact. Before the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, Britain and France offered the same to SU but Poland objected to a British-French-SU pact because it would have reduced the territory Poland wished to annex from Germany and Lithuania in a war. Ribbentrop and Molotov arranged the pact within a short period of time and the final version presented by Russia did not reflect the previous talks. The division into zones of interest was normal at that time and did not mean annexation of territory. Germany did not invade Lithuania although it was their zone according to the pact. Invasion of Poland was necessary to destroy the army. There were also harsh measures that were taken against Poles who were accused for abuse of Germans during the previous two decades. British-German peace negotiations attempts are still classified.189.149.126.91 (talk) 18:33, 12 October 2011 (UTC)


 * " ... The guarantee Britain gave to Poland was not to avoid war but to initiate it. " - Britain was required by its alliance with France to also guarantee Poland's independence as the French had done. France had a history of close and friendly relations with Poland, Britain OTOH hadn't. War was the last thing Britain wanted, the British Empire had had over 700,000 casualties in WW I, all lost fighting for other people's countries.


 * "Churchill only became relevant in June 1940. He was immediately after the Fall of France prepared to make remarkable concessions — Poland, Norway, Denmark, The Low Countries, France, Malta and Gibraltar if only the UK could keep the mass of its colonies — but Hitler had just entered a phase of full megalomania and had become very eager for a full victory. That prevented the magnanimity needed on his part to allow a peace agreement to happen" - Churchill had no reason to do any of this, nor would he or anyone other than perhaps a cabinet headed by Lord Halifax, have been stupid enough to give away Gibraltar, the key to the Mediterranean, and the Suez Canal. Nazi Germany had no significant surface navy or merchant fleet and thus had no way of invading or conquering any but the smallest and nearest part of the British Empire, i.e., The Channel Islands, and if the UK itself had succumbed to invasion then the war against Germany would have been continued from Canada. There was no need at any time therefore for Churchill to make any concessions.


 * BTW, Churchill didn't "make remarkable concessions — Poland, Norway, Denmark, The Low Countries, France ..", Hitler made the choices for him. All these countries had their own defence forces responsible for defending these countries, over which Britain had no control whatsoever.


 * One more thing, neither the Netherlands nor Belgium had any military alliance with Britain or France and both countries refused them permission to move defensive forces in to these countries until the Nazis invaded them, King Leopold then surrendering Belgium without bothering to consult Britain or France and thereby leaving a considerable gap in the Allied line which the BEF was then forced to hurriedly fill.


 * ... and The Netherlands weren't 'liberated by the Canadians', it was liberated by elements of the 1st Canadian Army, which was composed of a mixture of Canadian and UK units under the control of the 21st Army Group.

Why is 'Zeeland' called 'Zealand' in this article?
Yes, New Zealand gets its name from the Dutch province of Zeeland, but why not just use the correct Dutch name of Zeeland? Is the New Zealand connection the rationale for this? If you're going to use Zealand, you might as well go further and say 'Sealand'! Or why not call 'Zandvoort' 'Sandford'! Note that if one does a wikipedia search for 'Zealand' one is directed to an article about the Danish island of Sjælland. In that case the transliteration might make sense because of the difficulty of typing the æ ligature for English speaking users.1812ahill (talk) 21:33, 7 December 2012 (UTC)
 * The reason for the spelling might be lost in the mists of time :) I have no objection to correcting it to Zeeland -- Dianna (talk) 00:18, 8 December 2012 (UTC)
 * Then, based on your authority/ stature :) wrt. this article, I'll make the change.1812ahill (talk) 00:59, 8 December 2012 (UTC)
 * Made the change simply using the Notepad 'Replace...' feature and copy-repasting the entire text. Hope it worked OK.1812ahill (talk) 01:16, 8 December 2012 (UTC)


 * "Zealand" is the correct English exonym of Zeeland.--MWAK (talk) 07:31, 8 December 2012 (UTC)


 * Then we still have the Sjaelland/Zealand problem. Feel free to undo me btw.1812ahill (talk) 10:37, 8 December 2012 (UTC)


 * Well, the "Sjaeland problem" can be solved by correctly linking. The historical cause of the "Zealand" spelling of "Zeeland" was simply that in the 17th century "ea" was commonly pronounced as present "ay", as can still be seen from words as "bear". If no one objects, I'll make the change to Zealand.--MWAK (talk) 19:55, 10 December 2012 (UTC)
 * I certainly don't object, MWAK. I just want the article to be correct. -- Dianna (talk) 03:16, 11 December 2012 (UTC)
 * OK, I'll change it :o).--MWAK (talk) 08:46, 14 December 2012 (UTC)
 * Sorry to open this up again, but I notice the Battle of Belgium article uses Zeeland (only twice), and the Battle of France does too (once), but Zeeland nonetheless. Sorry to pick nits on this issue, but perhaps in the interests of consistency... - it's my Dutchophilia ;)I guess one can argue either way on this one. I would say 'North Holland' rather than 'Noord Holland' in this article because of the compass direction 'North', but would say for instance 'Belarus' rather than 'White Russia' in an article on that topic. I dunno, Zealand just looks odd to me, but I'll defer.1812ahill (talk) 04:40, 18 December 2012 (UTC)


 * Well, Battle of France once used "Zealand" and might again :o).--MWAK (talk) 08:17, 19 December 2012 (UTC)

300,000 Dutchmen
"It would be five years before the country was liberated, during which time over 300,000 Dutchmen died." This needs clarification. Does this include only people who died because of the occupation or all people who died during the occupation, i.e. people who died of natural causes? Surtsicna (talk) 17:13, 6 August 2013 (UTC)


 * Good point. I'll be a bit more precise.--MWAK (talk) 19:51, 6 August 2013 (UTC)
 * Thanks for reacting so quickly! Surtsicna (talk) 20:44, 6 August 2013 (UTC)
 * MWAK, you did not edit the number, so I will. The number of casualties from the war, including genocide victims, was 210.000. CBS 1948 figure and still considered accurate Grebbegoos (talk) 14:01, 3 November 2013 (UTC)


 * Thank you! I'd quite forgotten...--MWAK (talk) 16:44, 3 November 2013 (UTC)

Entente should be Allies
The article repeatedly refers to the Allied Powers (or Allies) by the term "Entente" or "Entente Cordial." The Entente Cordial was the term for an unofficial understanding between France and Great Britain in 1904 in which Britain made it clear that they would not remain neutral in the event of a major war between France and Germany. It became substantively obsolete with the outbreak of the First World War. -Ad Orientem (talk) 00:46, 14 May 2015 (UTC)


 * Well, in contemporary sources "Entente" was the normal name of the Anglo-French coalition during the entire First World War and the concept was revived at the outbreak of the Second World War. Of course, in June 1940 it was quickly abandoned :o). It is useful here as a distinction between the initial Anglo-French coalition of which the Dutch and Belgians were not part and the later "Allies" that did not include Vichy France but encompassed the majority of independent nations. I agree though, that the redirecting is somewhat confusing.--MWAK (talk) 08:07, 14 May 2015 (UTC)

Non-neutral tone
Hello everyone, this article is well-written and documented, so first of all, kudos to all of you for your outstanding work. However, I find the tone in some paragraphs too critical, and clearly subjective. For exemple, see the sentence : "It simply could not stage a major offensive, let alone execute manoeuvre warfare.[64]". The ironical formulation in here doesn't abide to Wikipedia's standards of neutrality. Although some would argue here about the "storytelling approach", this kind of writings are more appropriate for Quora than Wikipedia. Bias editoring and insinuations shouldn't corrupt the factual richness of this article. Hence, I think someone should correct some sentences for a more neutral tone by keeping the substance and only reseting the p.o.v. Greetings. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.12.42.143 (talk) 16:26, 30 July 2016 (UTC)


 * Well, the statements reflect the sources. These sources in turn are not partisan but reflect the consensus among military historians. Nobody claims e.g. that the Dutch army could in May 1940 have staged a major offensive. Making this, rather relevant, fact clear to the reader is not a matter of irony but veracity. Of course, if you order the information into a coherent whole and expose it in a rational way, the result makes for a good narrative. See it as a benefit :o). This matter-of-fact approach is also the opposite of "bias" and "insinuation". We would be biased if we suggested that the Dutch army was not poorly equipped and trained. And we don't insinuate that it had a limited fighting capacity, we plainly state it so.--MWAK (talk) 17:24, 1 August 2016 (UTC)


 * I think both of you have a point but you might consider avoiding adjectives and adverbs, when describing what the RS write. "It simply could not stage a major offensive, let alone execute manoeuvre warfare.[64]" How about: The Dutch army could not conduct an offensive or manoeuvre warfare (possibly "a battle of manoeuvre"). The words in italics seem to me to be redundant and offensives are big things so major and minor are pointless except for comparison and let alone execute is hyperbole. If that is what the RS wrote it teeters on plagiarism too unless rendered as a quotation. Regards Keith-264 (talk) 10:34, 28 September 2016 (UTC)


 * Adjectives and adverbs are part of normal language; we can't do without them. I admit the sentence is a bit rhetorical, but at least it gives a clear picture of the situation. I we would say: "It could not stage an offensive, nor carry out manoeuvre warfare", the reader might wonder "What? Not the tiniest offensive? And how do offensives and a war of movement compare in difficulty?". We can rephrase it but at the cost of longer sentences and a weaker style.--MWAK (talk) 16:12, 28 September 2016 (UTC)
 * On the contrary, we can resist the temptation to sink to the level of journalists and write in sentences. We should trust the gentle reader to let us know if they are in doubt about meaning; inferring what a hypothetical reader might think is projection and leads to pleonasm. My draft was shorter.... An offensive is a big thing, there aren't any tiny ones, they are attacks or raids. An offensive cannot exist without movement. Keith-264 (talk) 17:26, 28 September 2016 (UTC)


 * We inevitably project. So let's do a good job at it! But you're right about there being no tiny offensives.--MWAK (talk) 17:46, 28 September 2016 (UTC)


 * Eythenkew! Keith-264 (talk) 18:30, 28 September 2016 (UTC)

CE
Added a prelude header and changes several header levels, feel free to rv if desired.Keith-264 (talk) 10:26, 28 September 2016 (UTC)


 * I have two objections against the "Prelude" header. First of all, a prelude is a series of developments gradually leading to some major event. The word thus poorly describes a description of the various strategies. Secondly, it creates an unnatural break between the information about the Dutch forces and the Dutch strategy.


 * I also think the Oster Affair should not be made a part of the German strategy and forces, for the simple reason it wasn't :o). Nor did the affair influence them. On the other hand, this is a prelude of sorts!--MWAK (talk) 16:36, 28 September 2016 (UTC)


 * It doesn't need a 2nd level header. RegardsKeith-264 (talk) 17:33, 28 September 2016 (UTC)


 * Do you have a Background in mind now you've moved the prelude? Keith-264 (talk) 17:35, 28 September 2016 (UTC)


 * Alternatively, we could remove the strategies header and make the Oster affair third level.--MWAK (talk) 17:44, 28 September 2016 (UTC)


 * Since I'm only driving by I'll defer to your preference. Regards Keith-264 (talk) 18:29, 28 September 2016 (UTC)

"Zealand"
Especially to User:MWAK: why would we anglicise "Zeeland" to "Zealand" when the article and entire rest of the wiki clearly use "Zeeland"? I don't understand this unique treatment. Bataaf van Oranje (Prinsgezinde) (talk) 11:03, 31 January 2017 (UTC)


 * Zealand is the English exonym for Zeeland. This is the English branch of Wikipedia. So we use Zealand. As Dutchmen we should of course be proud that the English have special exonyms for our topography. The reaction: "Those Brits can't spell" should be overcome. Most pages mentioning Zeeland are of course written by Dutchmen who are ignorant of English exonyms. A sad thing...--MWAK (talk) 16:13, 31 January 2017 (UTC)
 * Have you experienced the minefield of Belgian place-names? British military historians use traditional terms which are often French. Wiki editors like me copy them, ignorant of post-1945 spelling revisions (Ieper?), which can cause unrest when Belgians read the articles. ;o)Keith-264 (talk) 22:51, 31 January 2017 (UTC)

Albanian crisis
Let me explain why this caption makes no sense. Spoiler alert: this photo was taken in May 1940. You know, when the Germans invaded the Netherlands and when it actually made sense for armed Dutch soldiers to close a bridge barrier as a line of defense. Back me up, source material.

But let's say that this photo was taken around April 1939 (when Italy invaded Albania). Why put undue weight on this event alone? It makes no sense and confuses whoever happens to chance upon this caption. The article mentions Albania only once, in a paragraph that isn't at all aligned with the picture.

I figure that whoever wrote it intended it to illustrate why everyone was on edge around that time. Still doesn't make sense to single out this event and not the Munich crisis or the Anschluss. ''Why was the Albanian crisis so important to the Dutch? What the heck is their connection to it when it's more than 1000 miles away? Also, the invasion has never been referred to as the Albanian crisis''. This is what Google comes up with for Albanian crisis. There isn't even a single mention of the word "crisis" in the article about the 1939 invasion (apart from a navbox).

Anyway, you get the point. Jay D. Easy (talk) 20:39, 24 October 2018 (UTC)


 * I'm afraid that the photo was taken in April 1939. Of course the Germans didn't take it originally. They then took it in the sense that during the war they confiscated much Dutch material and that's how a copy ended up in the Bundesarchiv. And ended up with an incorrect German caption, doubtlessly written by someone applying the same line of reasoning you did. The issue turned up earlier in the talk page. So, the natural mistake to assume it's from May 1940 is a very good reason to make explicit it's in fact not.


 * The main text refers to a number of international crises (you should have searched for the plural) when the Dutch increased their alert status. The Italian invasion of Albania was one of them: the Dutch feared this could trigger a general European war. Indeed the events in Albania are far less known than those other crises but we can only use that particular picture for the mundane reason we have no other material illustrating a Dutch reaction to such events...--MWAK (talk) 22:05, 24 October 2018 (UTC)

Ju 52 losses ?
German Ju 52 losses in the entire battle amounted to about 250, representing 50% of the fleet's strength. - who says that ? Ju 52 losses in the "entire Netherlands campaign" (?) amounted to about 250 ? Are there meant 250 total losses ? Hardly credible. Wouldn't that mean, around, at least, 2.000 fatalities connected with Ju 52 transports ? --129.187.244.19 (talk) 08:45, 24 November 2020 (UTC)


 * No, because many planes were wrecked or destroyed when landing on the airfields, when these were retaken by the Dutch army, or by crash landings in the polder landscape.--MWAK (talk) 12:53, 24 November 2020 (UTC)
 * I now see how the sentence could be very deceptive, as it suggests that the Wehrmacht Ju 52 materièl strength in May 1940 would be about five hundred, while it was in fact above fifteen hundred. I'll rewrite.--MWAK (talk) 13:53, 24 November 2020 (UTC)

Requested move 29 May 2021

 * The following is a closed discussion of a requested move. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on the talk page. Editors desiring to contest the closing decision should consider a move review after discussing it on the closer's talk page. No further edits should be made to this section. 

– By far the WP:COMMONNAME, see NGRAMS or Google Scholar results Although there have been other invasions of the Netherlands' predecessor states, none of them is called "invasion of the Netherlands", so I believe this one is the WP:PT. Otherwise, it could be moved to Invasion of the Netherlands (1940) or German invasion of the Netherlands (which is still more common than "battle" according to both NGRAMS and Google Scholar.) — (t &#183; c)  buidhe  15:24, 29 May 2021 (UTC)
 * Battle of the Netherlands → Invasion of the Netherlands
 * Invasion of the Netherlands → Invasion of the Netherlands (disambiguation)
 * Note: Invasion of the Netherlands titles a page with significant content and so is ineligible as a target "new" title in a move request unless it is also proposed to be renamed. This request has been altered to reflect that fact.  P.I. Ellsworth   ed.  put'r there 11:52, 30 May 2021 (UTC)


 * Oppose. In the NGRAM, the proposed title is as common post-1945 as pre-1940, leading to me to suspect that the 1940 campaign may not be the primary topic. The NGRAM for "German invasion of the Netherlands" is different: the phrase was basically not used before the late 1930s. I would support that as a title, but best to leave the dab page alone. A GScholar search reveals lots of ambiguity: in the top 20 hits are Prussian, French, English, Japanese and hypothetical WWI invasions of the Netherlands or its East Indies. Srnec (talk) 18:43, 29 May 2021 (UTC)
 * I agree. 1672 probably a better claim. —Brigade Piron (talk) 08:16, 2 June 2021 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.
 * Oppose. "Invasion of the Netherlands" is much too vague. "German invasion of the Netherlands" has the advantage of referring to a unique event, but lacks a certain neutrality, presenting the Dutch as the mere passive subjects of German activity. "Battle of France" is very common, and in analogy "Battle of the Netherlands" should be an acceptable title.--MWAK (talk) 08:13, 30 May 2021 (UTC)
 * Support German invasion of the Netherlands, per Srnec. This also tallies with the apparent thrust of the discussion at Battle of Belgium and with the existing German invasion of Luxembourg. —Brigade Piron (talk) 08:16, 2 June 2021 (UTC)

1 Week
The infobox reads that it took 1 week, but the article suggests it was complete on 27 May? GlobalReference221 (talk) 12:36, 10 October 2023 (UTC)


 * Well, the fighting with Dutch forces was over after eight days, but only on 27 May the total Dutch European territory had been occupied.--MWAK (talk) 07:20, 11 October 2023 (UTC)
 * Well its called German invasion of the Netherlands but the invasion German invasion of the Netherlands was complete on 27 May, isn't this misleading, or am i missing something? GlobalReference221 (talk) 18:35, 13 October 2023 (UTC)


 * This is one of the unhappy consequences of changing the title from the original Battle of the Netherlands...--MWAK (talk) 06:41, 14 October 2023 (UTC)