Talk:Great Divergence/Archive 3

The Politics section
It seems more appropriate to consider the countries of western Europe as a whole, and add China, Japan and India (the three countries most often used as comparisons, although most are between China and Europe) for the politics section. According to Pomeranz, a unit like "China" and "India" is too varied to be compared to a single European country such as England (for example, there are large differences between hinterland Chinese provinces such as Gansu and rich provinces such as Jiangnan and Ming-era Sichuan. This argument also stands for India.Teeninvestor (talk) 22:44, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

Recommended reading
There is a highly recommendable, very critical and very detailed review of Pomeranz in: Ricardo Duchesne: On the Rise of the West: Researching Kenneth Pomeranz’s Great Divergence, Review of Radical Political Economics, Volume 36, No. 1, Winter 2004, 52-81. I wouldn't consider any treatment of the Great Divergence complete without sufficient notice of this analysis. Angus Maddison also has a highly digestible critique in his The World Economy: Historical Statistics, pp. 248-251. Gun Powder Ma (talk) 08:27, 15 July 2010 (UTC)


 * Thanks, I will see if it is available. However, I do have a copy of Pomeranz's Great Divergence.Teeninvestor (talk) 12:50, 15 July 2010 (UTC)


 * There is another rebuttal of Pomeranz' hypothesis in Brenner, Robert; Isett, Christopher: "England's Divergence from China's Yangzi Delta: Property Relations, Microeconomics, and Patterns of Development", The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 61, No. 2 (2002), pp. 609–662. They reinforce the standard view, most popularly expressed by David Landes, that Europe's productivity exceeded that of all other world regions by 1500, by concluding (p. 650):


 * "It has been our central argument, in contrast [with Pomeranz], that between roughly 1500 and 1750, the developmental paths of the two economies had already led them in radically divergent directions, with the result that by the second half of the eighteenth century, England had, by world-historical standards, become a developed economy and a relatively quite wealthy one, while the Yangzi delta had become ever poorer. We have naturally concluded that the American contribution, though obviously very great in itself, was not essential either to prevent the economy from coming up against Pomeranz's proto-industrial cul-de-sac, or to allow it to continue on its dynamic course."


 * I believe it is time that the article moves away from its overreliance on Pomeranz and his Chinese case, and adheres to the main view of the Great Divergence being a unique European phenomenon, a story in which the continued agrarian experience of Asian societies can serve at best as "baseline" for comparison, as User:Kanguole well put it, but not as protagonists of an alternative scenarios. In other words: the separate section on China shoule be removed for being out of WP:Scope. Gun Powder Ma (talk) 10:18, 20 July 2010 (UTC)


 * I'm sure Finnish lumberjacks will be surprised to learn that they are much wealthier than the Yangtze delta (according to Maddison's estimates and this hypothesis). Many facts, such as that Song iron production was not exceeded by Europe until 1700 and data on nutrition, puts this thesis into question and strongly supports Pomeranz's thesis. In any case, the section on China and other Asian societies is necessary, as part of the article's scope is to cover  why  the great divergence happened, not just the European growth. in order to do that, we must explore many different hypotheses, and to do so, the reader needs an understanding of what the pre-Great Divergence conditions were. Without any knowledge of the societies that are being compared, the reader will be bewildered. Pomeranz's view is a major, perhaps even the mainstream viewpoint on this issue, judging from the academic literature.Teeninvestor (talk) 15:26, 20 July 2010 (UTC)


 * Another dismissive analysis of Pomeranz which comes to the very opposite conclusion (that is confirming the standard view): Broadberry, Stephen; Gupta, Bishnupriya: The Early Modern Great Divergence: Wages, Prices and Economic Development in Europe and Asia, 1500–1800, Economic History Review, Vol. 59, No. 1 (2006), pp. 2–31 (2):


 * "Contrary to the claims of Pomeranz, Parthasarathi, and other ‘world historians’, the prosperous parts of Asia between 1500 and 1800 look similar to the stagnating southern, central, and eastern parts of Europe rather than the developing north-western parts. In the advanced parts of India and China, grain wages were comparable to those in north-western Europe, but silver wages, which conferred purchasing power over tradable goods and services, were substantially lower. The high silver wages of north-western Europe were not simply a monetary phenomenon, but reflected high productivity in the tradable sector. The ‘great divergence’ between Europe and Asia was already well underway before 1800."


 * With two thirds of the footnotes coming solely from Pomeranz as yet, it is hard to see how this article of Teeinvestor could avoid becoming another POV tag fest. However, assuming good faith, I am prepared to give the main author, provided a constructive attitude, sufficient time for balancing the article, that is straightening out the heavy pro-Pomeranz bias, and presenting what is the standard view, namely that Europe and Asia had embarked on a different economic trajectory long before the Industrial Revolution in fact. Gun Powder Ma (talk) 17:17, 20 July 2010 (UTC)

Request to Gun Powder Ma to add rival sources

 * Not just Pomeranz, but many other scholars as well (see statement above). Paul Bairoch was the one that provided per capita estimates. Judging from the literature Pomeranz is definitely NOT in a minority view. Indeed, the first book you will find on google books on the great divergence will most likely be that of Pomeranz. However, there's no way I can add Pomeranz's opponents' sources, because I don't have access to them (see below section where I asked people to add sources other than Pomeranz). If you are truly interested in working on this article, I would welcome it if you added an alternative view, preferably in the causes section (I think the relevant section is differences in wages and living standards).I've read the silver wages paper, but nowhere did they take into account the fact that silver was much more valuable (as in several hundred percent) in China; that more or less destroys its credibility as a source.Teeninvestor (talk) 18:20, 20 July 2010 (UTC)
 * I have found 2 other sources talking about this debate that support Pomeranz's view: 2. It seems to me the consensus is that the Great Divergence happened in the 18th/early 19th century.Teeninvestor (talk) 18:58, 20 July 2010 (UTC)

Pomeranz references
Pomeranz (pp64–65) is given as the source of statements that "Although there was a recovery during the Ming Dynasty in iron and other heavy industries, it declined again in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries." and "heavy industries declined after the founding of the Qing Dynasty". I can't find that on those pages. Page 63 refers to a revival of iron production under the Ming and also says "We still know very little about what happened to iron production in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, though the same study suggests (based on very slight evidence) that it declined." If that is what is referred to, it is hardly a sound basis for the confident statements made in the article. Kanguole 12:00, 19 July 2010 (UTC)


 * This is not sufficient. The only citation for the statement in the article is Pomeranz, evaluating Huang Qichen's work (which ranges from the 14th to the 17th centuries) as having "very slight evidence" on this point.  In that situation, we should not include the statement at all, not even with "scholars suggest" and "most likely" inserted.  Kanguole 15:49, 19 July 2010 (UTC)

POV tag on China section
Teeninvestor, you have twice removed the POV tag from this section (without mentioning it in the edit summary), although the tag enjoins you not to remove it while the dispute is ongoing, which it clearly is.

Itsmejudith has suggested a way forward. Instead of doing that, you continue with googling up bits of evidence for your position. That method is replete with tendencies toward bias, including the selection of works found, the selection of confirmatory evidence from those works (with anything that doesn't fit being discarded), and the interpretation you place on those fragments. And this is clear from the results: compare your account with, say, the chapter "Economic Developments 1644–1800" by Myers and Wang (two economic historians specializing in the region and period) in the Cambridge History (ISBN 978-0-521-24334-6). They even have a convenient summary section "Significant Economic Developments". One would hardly believe that they're discussing the same history as you. Then we have Wikipedia's neutral voice confidently stating that Qing policies "crippled China's industrial development and hampered the development of capitalism", though you must be aware that, even if some hold this view, there is no scholarly consensus for it. (You note above that Pomeranz dismisses it (p206).)

This section has a real POV problem, which needs to be addressed. Kanguole 00:18, 13 July 2010 (UTC)


 * Please see the four sources, including two academic papers, I have used to support the assertion that Qing Dynasty's policies did cripple China's industrial development (Myers and Wang was used to support the iternary of Qing policies, such as mining prohibition, so what they say is irrelevant here, as their focus was describing specific changes during the early Qing). Until you are able to refute these sources, there is no such thing as a "POV problem" except for your own POV. There is nothing POV about expressing a viewpoint that is held by a substantial number of sources concerned with this matter. if you want to add a counter-viewpoint,  backed by academic sources, you are free to do so (in fact, this counter point is represented in the section already; see last sentence).


 * On a side note, no one disputes that Qing Dynasty experienced some economic growth in the 18th century; so did say, Mughal India in the 17th century or the USSR in the 1920's, yet this does not conflict with the caste system or planned economy was not favorable to capitalism. The propositions that Qing's policies were interventionist and hampering to industrial development and that Qing had a boom in the 18th century do not conflict. As to the scholarly views, as I have stated previously, at least this view is very prevalent among Chinese-language sources and should be represented. Teeninvestor (talk) 16:14, 13 July 2010 (UTC)


 * There's a quite obvious issue of balance. According to the Cambridge History of China there's a dichotomy in opinion. To give one sentence about to one view, compared to an entire paragraph for the other is wholly inadequate. In fact, we only have that one sentence because I added it, although I noted at the time that it was inadequate. Nev1 (talk) 17:00, 13 July 2010 (UTC)


 * Perhaps adding Pomeranz's opinion will make it better? On a side note, Nev1, the statement you added doesn't really clarify the debate (see below for why)Teeninvestor (talk) 17:07, 13 July 2010 (UTC)


 * It's worth a go. Nev1 (talk) 17:08, 13 July 2010 (UTC)
 * This edit doesn't balance things. In fact the opposite. I'm getting tired of this attrition where sources are misrepresented and basic principles of fairly presenting sources are ignored. Teeninvestor, restore that quote I added as it is quite clearly relevant as it contrasts with the earlier claims of the paragraph. Nev1 (talk) 17:13, 13 July 2010 (UTC)
 * I didn't believe it was relevant, as the dispute between the two views were Qing's policies, not that there was economic boom from 1680 to 1780 (this is agreed to by everyone). The dispute is about policies, not the economic conditions (for example, free market economists do not deny that the era of Keynesian policies (1950-75) was relatively prosperous, they deny that the prosperity was the result of keynesianism). However, per Nev1, I will revert.Teeninvestor (talk) 17:20, 13 July 2010 (UTC)
 * So it is vital to mention prosperity under the Ming, and the damage caused by the wars in which the Qing took over, but the following recovery and century of prosperity and growth are irrelevant? That's a concise demonstration that it was premature for you to remove the POV tag.  Kanguole 20:30, 13 July 2010 (UTC)
 * I meant it was irrelevant in the sense of "balancing" the section between the two viewpoints as to the effect of Qing's policies. It would be somewhat relevant in describing the changes in the economy of China during the Great Divergence(but the main focus of that section is on policy).Teeninvestor (talk) 23:41, 13 July 2010 (UTC)


 * Your mixed assortment of sources is part of the problem. Leaving aside the problem of selection (which is major), you can't assemble a big-picture judgement of the Chinese economy or the factors in Chinese development from lots of sources each dealing with narrow topics that touch on this one, be they Sichuan, Yellow River flooding or the contrast between Chinese and Japanese dealings with foreigners.  For a big-picture assessment, you need a reliable secondary source that deals directly with that big picture.  Itsmejudith has described what's required.  Such sources exist in English, but you've not supplied one that says what you want.  You've been invited to find one in Chinese, but you have yet to do so.  Where is the Chinese Pomeranz?  Kanguole 20:57, 14 July 2010 (UTC)


 * The various sources were used to support the mining prohibition, of which (I believe), we're all clear and familiar with now. As for the stronger statement, the effect of Qing's policies on Chinese development, I have used good-quality sources to support this assertion as well. Although admittedly there is not a Pomeranz-style 400 page book expounding this view as its main focus, the sources I have used have dedicated several pages to this topic (effect of Qing policies) and repeatedly mention it; this thesis should not be taken lightly. The closest we have to an entire alternative theory is Xu's paper on the changes in China in late Ming, where Xu specifically focuses on the late Ming's economic and cultural development and attributes China's subsequent stagnation on the Qing. In fact, he specifically declares that: "The Great Divergence happened in the mid-17th century, rather than the 18th".Teeninvestor (talk) 21:11, 14 July 2010 (UTC)
 * You have only presented sources from one side. Nev1 (talk) 21:15, 14 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Right, that's why I added Pomeranz's objection. And previously you have told me to find sources from one side (to support my view), and now you object to this?Teeninvestor (talk) 21:17, 14 July 2010 (UTC)
 * It's worse than that, Nev1. We are not getting the position of one side in an academic debate.  We are not even told who the proponents are.  (I doubt that Xu Suming is being held up as a leading advocate of this "theory".)  We are getting the opinions of an enthusiastic Wikipedia editor, supported with an assortment of googled snippets touching on related points and being interpreted here. Kanguole 23:18, 14 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Uh, Kanguole, see the sources and my above post if you want to know who the "proponents" are (it's not just my opinion). The fact that all the sources used devote at least several pages to this problem (Qing's policies's effects on the Great Divergence), and a professor (Xu) has specifically authored a paper on it. Your repeated statements hinting or stating that this is only my personal "POV" is getting ridiculus. As I have said previously, it is beyond doubt that a substantial (if not the majority) of Chinese language sources accept this view.Teeninvestor (talk) 23:57, 14 July 2010 (UTC)
 * I will quote from Xu:

"而彭慕兰在《大分流：欧洲、中国及现代世界经济的发展》一书中则明确指出，认为“某些亚洲社会在满族或英国的入侵摧毁了‘资本主义萌芽’之前，一直在向一次工业突破发展”的观点是一种“非常反事实的断言”①. 一些中外学者将这两种观点综合起来，认为晚明100年中国江南经济的繁荣不过是西方白银输入的结果. 而彭慕兰关于英国的工业革命不过是偶然因素所导致的观点，至今也未见有人予以廓清. 本文试图证明，晚明中国江南的繁荣从根本上来说绝非西方白银输入的结果，“为什么江南不是英国”乃是以清代明的历史倒退所导致；而“为什么英国不是江南”亦绝非偶然因素所能解释，而是人权、科学、民主三大因素共同促成的必然结果.". In this quote, Xu specifically rejects the views of Pomeranz and states that the rise of the Qing against the Ming was the reason "Jiangnan was not England". I don't think you can't get clearer than this. Teeninvestor (talk) 00:00, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

Arbitrary break
Teeninvestor, I shall say this only once. I don't expect you to listen this time as you haven't previously, but I will not waste any more time on you. Please be aware that if you continue to ignore the concerns of others, I am prepared to take this further. WP:RFC/U if necessary, although I would rather we sort issues out here. The following quote comes from the first paragraph of Peterson's introduction to volume 9 of The Cambridge History of China:

""In the grand sweep of more than three thousand years of Chinese history, the period from roughly 1680 to 1780 has been celebrated as a prosperous age. From other perspectives, the period has been disparaged as a time when China's people were held down and held back by autocratic foreign rulers. Such dichotomies reveal that the possibilities remain open for both positive and negative assessments of the period of Chinese history from the founding of the Ch'ing dynasty to the end of the Ch'ien-lung emperor's life in 1799." (p1)"

So far you have cherry-picked your sources to support your view that the Qing Dynasty was a Bad ThingTM and that they prevented an industrial revolution in China. We have a source saying there's a dichotomy in opinion on the Qing Dynasty. So far you have only provided only piecemeal sources from one POV. They aren't even optimum sources, as Kanguole points out. At one point the article was using a school text book for heaven's sake. Nev1 (talk) 00:37, 15 July 2010 (UTC)


 * Piecemeal sources from one POV (the view supported is Qing policies hampered industrial development; whether there would have been industrial revolution without Qing is another question)? These include four sources, none of whose credibility has yet been in any way touched; would you care to name one area in which they are deficient? You claim they are not "optimum"; is any source in this article? I daresay the quality of the sources used to support this assertion is at least equal to all the other sources used in this article. And it is not as if the section included only one view; the last two sentences present an opposing view of Qing policies (and may I remind you they both come from  my sources), which takes up about as much space as the view that Qing policies did hamper industrial development (1 sentence each). I also described the recovery of the Qing economy in the 18th century. You claim that I have been unrepsonsive to others' concerns; this entire talk page can refute that view; why else would I bother to gather a plethora of sources (8 at last count) to support my assertions? Is any other section of the article even remotely as well supported as this supposedly "POV" section, which  accounts for a quarter of the citations in the article? Previously, you called on me to give sources to back up my assertions, which I did; now you denounce me for giving these sources and being supposedly one sided, when I was complying with your request in the first place! If you ask me to get sources to support a statement, you can hardly expect me to have gotten sources which contradict it. You can open an RFC/U against me if you wish; heck, you could even submit this dispute to the Arbitration Committee; but the fact is that I have tried my best to cooperate, and if this cooperation ceases, the responsibility is with you. Teeninvestor (talk) 01:11, 15 July 2010 (UTC)


 * How do your sources propose that China could have matched European levels of development without industrialization? (If not, there's no effect on the Great Divergence, is there?)


 * Your sources are not comparable in quality (or scope) to the Cambridge History or Pomeranz's book. Itsmejudith has described what is required, but you continue to multiply googled fragments, and to synthesize their significance in the overall argument.  Quantity is not the same thing as quality.  Nor is replying the same as being responsive.   Kanguole 07:55, 15 July 2010 (UTC)


 * In fact, that is what they (and Pomeranz) say. In the 18th century, China's level of development was equal if not superior to that of Europe; before that it was much superior. For example, iron production in China during the 11th century was not matched by Europe as a whole til probably the 18th century. The view that China's development was at least equal to Europe's in the 18th century (previous centuries are not addressed) is supported even by Pomeranz and other scholars who have many varying theories. And it is not as if Cambridge history of China is stating what you want, Kanguole; in fact, it happens to give us a list of Qing's policies, which are reproduced in this article (it also notes the existence of negative and positive views on Qing, confirming the importance of both views and remaining neutral). Pomeranz's book presents another view, but it is not the only one. WP:SOURCE states that "Articles should be based on reliable, third-party (independent), published sources with a reputation for fact-checking and accuracy; I think the sources I use fit that description. You accuse me of synthesis; Go check all the sources I have used. Do they not state what they support, e.g., Qing's policies hampered overall industrial development?Teeninvestor (talk) 12:57, 15 July 2010 (UTC)


 * You know, shouting in bold font does not make your arguments any more convincing.


 * Your sources say that Chinese development could have matched the European during the Great Divergence (our subject here) without industrialization? I rather doubt it.  (The achievements of the the Song are irrelevant here.)


 * And yes, your basing of large-scale conclusions on sources that do not deal with the large-scale topic inevitably involves synthesis. Kanguole 14:44, 15 July 2010 (UTC)


 * I'm highlighting key passages  to call your attention to them . As I said, please read the sources or bring your own before you speak; they support the assertion that Qing policies hampered industrial development. I will state here again: WP:SOURCE states that "Articles should be based on reliable, third-party (independent), published sources with a reputation for fact-checking and accuracy; I think the sources I use fit that description. and as to your accusations of synthesis, the definition of synthesis: "Do not combine material from multiple sources to reach or imply a conclusion not explicitly stated by any of the sources. If one reliable source says A, and another reliable source says B, do not join A and B together to imply a conclusion C that is not mentioned by either of the sources". This has not happened here; all my sources  explicitly state what they're used to support, so theres no way they can be synthesis. Synthesis isn't whatever doesn't fit with your worldview, Kanguole.Teeninvestor (talk) 21:58, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

Have to say all sources I've consulted seem to support Teeninvestors position that the Quing held back China's growth. True, by some measures China became wealthier during 1680 - 1780, but thats inspite of the Quing - the reason being a developement they werent responsible for - increased demand for Chinease goods. Because Chinas manufacturing was in that period still far superior to RoW, she enjoyed a large trade surplus, receiving substantial ammounts of silver in return which accounts for the increase in wealth. In addition to the Toynbee sources I've just added I've checked The Triumph of the West (1985) by Oxford's JM Robert  (a book all about the great divergence) , Inside China (1980) by Malcolm MacDondald and The Atlas of Past Times (2002) by John Hayward. The only positive achievements mentioned is that the Quing were good at territorial exspansion at least up to the 19th, and they were good for novelists and the dramatic arts, otherwise they are described as repressive, backwards looking and corrupt. FeydHuxtable (talk) 16:43, 19 July 2010 (UTC)
 * I think you're talking about the 19th century, after the European economies had already diverged. How do these books suggest that the Qing were a factor in the Great Divergence?  Kanguole 17:08, 19 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Admitedly most did focus their criticism on post 1800, but the Toynbee source mentions that right from start the Quing were relatively backward looking compared to the Ming, and confirms some of the points in the article such as the restrictions on trade. Anyway glad to see you found a compromise most seemned happy with :-) FeydHuxtable (talk) 20:15, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

Comparable technologies
"Another explanation for the disparity in mining is geographic distance; although China and Europe had comparable mining technology (China had developed a steam turbine as early as the seventeenth cenutry), the distances between the economically developed regions and coal deposits were vastly different."

The above says China and Europe had comparable mining technology but then only mentions that of China. This needs to be redressed. If they really are comparable, how about something along the lines of "... by the 17th century both had developed xyz". As it stands now, it's not balanced. Nev1 (talk) 23:59, 21 July 2010 (UTC) The quote is meant to reinforce Hobson's point that China had developed mining technology similar to that of Europe. How's it not balanced? Is not common sense that Europe had developed the steam engine?Teeninvestor (talk) 00:56, 22 July 2010 (UTC)


 * Implicit comparison isn't enough, it should be explicit. And while it might be common knowledge (not sense) that Europe developed the steam engine, it is by no means common knowledge that it was used in mines. I would expect that when most people think of steam engines they think of the railways rather than engines being used to pump mines or even power machinery on a large scale. Nev1 (talk) 00:58, 22 July 2010 (UTC)
 * That part is true. However, I do believe that Hobson's point about mining technology is valid and worthy of inclusion.Teeninvestor (talk) 01:03, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

Qing theory (again)
In this edit, Teeninvestor is again spreading the "Qing theory" through the article. This is the theory that policies of the Qing Dynasty somehow contributed to the Great Divergence, not by causing industrialization in Britain, but by preventing it in China. It is currently assembled in the article from an assortment of references to parts of publications of varying quality, mostly dealing with other topics. We do not have a quality reference for the theory itself—it should be removed. Kanguole 07:46, 27 July 2010 (UTC)
 * sigh; What is this, Kanguole?

Don't tell me this is not a quality source expositing the Qing theory; I think an academic paper published on the topic of the Great Divergence is enough. Indeed, Xu's source is a direct response to Pomeranz, along with nearly fifty other essays by other Chinese academics. And besides, the edit is on the direction of policies, not on the effect. I don't think you will find one historian that would agree the Qing was more laissez faire than the Ming. To argue that is absurd. Even Myers and Wang, which you use your support your position, rejected that argument (in fact, they specifically said Qing understood the "advantages" of monopoly power and repeatedly stated that the center was intervening into the market economy). And please don't go through the labor conscription argument again, see Zhang Juzheng. There is  overwhelming consensus on the direction of policies during the Qing. Tell me, Kanguole, when did the Ming monopolize foreign trade, ban mining, restrict commercial agriculture and regulate the number of merchants in marketplaces? There is overwhelming consensus that Qing's policies are intereventionist. What is disputed is whether they are harmful or not.Teeninvestor (talk) 13:01, 27 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Xu, Suming (2005), 1 The Great Divergence from a humanist perspective: Why was Jiangnan not England?, Tianjin Social Science, http://economy.guoxue.com/article.php/7656 1


 * I'm not claiming the Qing were more laissez faire than the Ming. I am disagreeing with your claim that there is scholarly consensus that the Qing took China in the opposite direction.  (Do you see the difference?)  We've been over Myers and Wang: they mention some interventions, but they also mention reductions in the burden of the state and summarize Qing actions as "contradictory"; they do not support your claim, so it cannot be said to have consensus.


 * I see mentions of this theory continue to spread, without any improvement in the referencing. What would you say is the best authority that you've come across (in any language) on the Qing theory of the Great Divergence?  Kanguole 14:45, 27 July 2010 (UTC)


 * I would say Xu's exposition is the most complete one on this theory (there are others, but not WP:RS); as it is an academic paper written in response to Pomeranz, it definitely fits WP:RS (and its topic is the Qing theory). The essence of Xu's argument is that Qing's suppression of science and restrictions on industry and commerce made China's economy stagnant. As to Myers and Wang, although they did not explicitly say "Qing was more interventionist than the Ming", but they mentioned an entire list of interventions, and repeatedly stated that the government intervened into the economy. I don't think there is a single scholar that would question that Ming's tax burden was lower than Qing; the reduction on the tax burden is in reference to the war era. This contrasts with the treatment of the Ming in Cambridge history of China, which describes them as laissez faire. And this is not counting the other sources which describe the Qing as more interventionist. Teeninvestor (talk) 14:52, 27 July 2010 (UTC)


 * OK, if Xu Sumin's article is the best account, perhaps you'd be kind enough to tell us about the author's expertise, rate the periodical in which it was published, and provide your translation of the abstract?


 * Thank you for taking back your claim that Myers and Wang explicitly called the Qing "interventionist". Myers and Wang say they are referring to the late Ming, not the war period, and they say the Qing taxes were lower, so that's more than a single scholar.  Your account of the Ming volume seems to be similarly selective, and I don't think they make a comparison with the Qing there, do they?  Kanguole 15:46, 27 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Myers and Wang compare the Qing with the Ming, and their account does not support your statement "policies shifted in the opposite direction in China". Since the statement thus lacks scholarly consensus, I am removing it from the lead. Kanguole 08:51, 28 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Neither does, I don't think. Do you really need my translation, Kanguole? I was under the impression you knew Chinese. The periodical, Tianjin Social Science, is one of the major social science publications of Chinese academia, and is rated as "heavy-point" by the Chinese government, signifying its major status. Indeed, many of the responses to Pomeranz's theory was published in that periodical. Here is the website. 1. As to Xu Suming, he is a professor whose main focus is on philosophy and social science during the late Ming-Qing transition. He is a major academic and the department head of social science at Wuhan and Hubei universities. He also seems to hold a position in Nanjing University's social science department.Teeninvestor (talk) 15:53, 27 July 2010 (UTC)
 * I'd certainly be interested in a translation. I am concerned that you are reluctant to do so, and have several times been uncooperative in this situation. Nev1 (talk) 16:13, 27 July 2010 (UTC)
 * I would certainly do a translation if necessary, but my previous beliefs was that Kanguole was knowledgable of Chinese. If that belief is wrong I will provide the necessary translation- Nev1, I've already provided a partial translation of Xu's thesis above.Teeninvestor (talk) 16:15, 27 July 2010 (UTC)
 * I am aware you provided a translation above Teeninvestor, but only after being asked multiple times. This isn't the only time you've beaten around the bush providing sources or translations. It is certainly not conducive to people wanting to work with you. Nev1 (talk) 17:22, 27 July 2010 (UTC)
 * That's completely false, Nev1. I provided after you asked one time. Your repeated statements that somehow I have been "uncooperative" are completely false. Look at the previous conversation; when did I not give you a reference or translation right after you asked for it? please stop making these false statements. Statements like these are false 1 and not the way for editors to cooperate or behave.Teeninvestor (talk) 17:42, 27 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Kid, you can lecture me on what is and is not constructive behaviour when you learn to respond promptly and reasonably to people's requests. I have asked you several times for translations, so it's obvious I can't read Chinese. Providing a quote in Chinese without a translation was either careless, obtuse, or deliberately uncooperative. Nev1 (talk) 17:54, 27 July 2010 (UTC)
 * The quote was provided at 18:30 and the translation at 18:36. That's pretty fast.Teeninvestor (talk) 17:58, 27 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Not my point, but getting back to what Kanguole said, can we have a translation of the abstract please? Nev1 (talk) 18:03, 27 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Original text:

衡量社会发展水平的根本尺度是人的自由程度，经济、政治、道德的尺度都只有从属于人的自由的尺度才有意义. “为什么江南不是英国”，乃是由于晚明江南人民所具有的自由权利几乎被清王朝完全剥夺；“为什么英国不是江南”，亦绝非彭慕兰所说的偶然因素所能解释，而是人权、科学、民主三大因素共同促成的必然结果. 无论是彭慕兰的偶然因素决定论还是弗兰克所运用的史学方法，都只是见物不见人的所谓纯化了的经济学方法. 也许，只有一种富有深度的、以现实的人和人的实践为出发点的、综合一切社会因素的“人学史观”，能够帮助我们走出外因论和偶然论的误区，把史学研究建立在更为深广的历史视野的基础上. Translation (rough; some Chinese is hard to translate): "The proper way to measure the development of a society is through the degree of freedom a human has. Politics, economics, and ethics have value only when they are within the reach of human freedom. 'Why Jiangnan wasn't England', is because the rights and freedoms of late Ming citizens were almost all completely stripped away by the Qing. 'Why England isn't Jiangnan', cannot be explained by Pomeranz's random factors, and is because of the three factors of human liberties, science, and democracy. Both the random factors thesis that Pomeranz proposes or the historical method Frank proposes, are purely economic methods that does not taken into account the human factor. Only a 'humanist view of history' based on reality and human nature, can help us reject the wrong thesis of random chance and external causes, and let historical research be built on a more broad base." Teeninvestor (talk) 20:46, 27 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Hardly an economic historian, is he? Although there is some overlap (the focus on Qing suppression), this is quite different from the theory you've been putting into the article: he has no interest in economics, while you haven't mentioned the European scientific revolution. Kanguole 09:40, 28 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Actually, he devotes an entire section of his paper to the economic changes in late Ming and how they died out during Qing, as well as the English scientific revolution (which he asserts could only develop out of an increasingly classical liberal influence). His theory is that the late Ming economic boom was not driven by inflow of silver, and notes many momentous changes such as the emergence of large private enterprises, foreign commerce, a great increase in urban population, etc. Indeed there are whole pages devoted to this. Then he examines the relative decline under Qing (indeed Xu directly refutes Pomeranz's point about coal and land by noting that there were coal mines near the Yangtze and extra land in Manchuria, but the Qing government did not allow them to be used.)Teeninvestor (talk) 14:20, 28 July 2010 (UTC)
 * He is clearly outside of his field, a social historian complaining that the economists won't listen to him. (And why would they?)  Kanguole 11:26, 29 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Strange you would say that, since the economists are publishing on the same journal as him. He also refers to a great number of the economic arguments on the topic by the way; if you read the paper, he is by no means uninformed on the arguments used. His main thesis is that the economists ignored changes in institutions(specifically, science and industry cant develop under a regime that would execute a man for thinking the brain is the center of thought and ban mines and foreign trade). And I'm not sure Pomeranz is an "economist"; maybe an economic historian; these 2 professions can be different you know.Teeninvestor (talk) 14:04, 29 July 2010 (UTC)

I am not even sure this is relevant to the topic. Who says that if Qing had been more expansionist, the Great Divergence would not have taken place? I would say chances are that there would have been even more of a race for the colonies, and perhaps more unity among the European powers because of the external threat, so that an even greater leap in a shorter time might have occurred. This is just speculation of course, but it is speculation inherent in the claim that Qing laissez faire somehow contributed to the European leap forward. The whole what ifs would seem more appropriately placed to me in the Qing Dynasty article. --dab (𒁳) 16:55, 27 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Uh, please check the sources and talk page. You don't seem to be understanding the dispute here. The dispute is whether or not include a theory, very popular in China, that the destruction and interventionist policies imposed by the Manchus after their conquest was responsible for China falling behind the west after the prosperous Song and Ming.Teeninvestor (talk) 17:26, 27 July 2010 (UTC)

A fragment for possible reuse
I am rewritting world-system theory, and I found the following fragment, although unreferenced, possibly of use to this article. Feel free to use it (or not). I find it useful as an extenion of a nice argument from here, criticizing the term "rise of the West" as inappropriate, because )according to this argument) it wasn't the West that has risen - it was the East that fell. --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus 19:14, 29 July 2010 (UTC)

Europe only prospered when Asian economy was in its contracting phase of long-term economic cycle and Europe had access to virtually free silver and gold from the Americas. There was no European miracle, Europe simply had geographical advantage in the discovery of Americas. This contracting phase is now coming to an end and the center is moving back to Asia. In a joint critique, Wallerstein, Arrighi, and Samin attacked the empirical data of this argument.


 * This was originally presented as the view of Andre Gunder Frank. Kanguole 19:29, 29 July 2010 (UTC)

What the article needs- suggestions
So far, I think the article's new structure and info is a lot better than before, thanks to the additions from Pomeranz. But there are some things I believe the article needs now. I think with these two problems out of the way, we will have effectively complete coverage of the topic. I will try to get sources on this data, but note I will be working less on this article as I am starting a new project, Chinese Economic Reform. I will also have less time to contribute to wiki as I have to study for SAT, driver ed, etc soon.Teeninvestor (talk) 14:29, 19 July 2010 (UTC)
 * a reliance on sources other than Pomeranz; almost 80 percent of citations are from Pomeranz. Perhaps another academic source.
 * Data on the effect of the Great Divergence. There is no per capita income data that shows how effective the Great Divergence was in increasing incomes.


 * I think the Conditions/Causes/Effects division makes sense, though there is some overlap between the first two. The Ideologies section is probably superfluous, especially as there are so many mentions of mercantilism and laissez faire throughout the article.  Coverage of Pomeranz's rivals would be welcome.  It is curious that there is so much reliance on Murray Rothbard, who hardly represents the mainstream of economic thought.  Kanguole 16:05, 19 July 2010 (UTC)
 * I agree that the ideologies section is superflous. As to use of Rothbard, whatever one thinks of his economic philosophy (a radical extension of classical liberalism), his work on economic history is relatively undisputed. I think few economists would dispute the effects of mercantilism on the European economy (Even Ultra-left Keynesian Krugman was angry at being called a mercantilist). What is needed now is per capita income statistics and a rival source to Pomeranz. Oh ya, and I think the templates should be removed as now we have reached an agreement on the treatment of the "Qing theory" (merging it to a cause section). Revert me and post on this talk page if you think that is wrong.Teeninvestor (talk) 18:59, 19 July 2010 (UTC)
 * It's getting better, with most of the problems now confined to the state intervention section, including the case for an "interventionist" Qing, and of course the "Qing theory".


 * Every government intervenes in the economy to some extent; if you focus only on Qing interventions you can paint a picture of increased intervention, but it won't be inaccurate. Yes, the Qing licensed rich merchants and placed some restrictions on them, but they also lightened the burden of the state on everyone by running a more efficient administration, cutting the tax burden (including the land tax that had forced so many families to give up their farms and become tenants in the late Ming), abolishing the corvée labour system and avoiding regulating markets (except for salt). Yes, they banned overseas trade in the late 17th century, but so did the Ming in part of the 15th and 16th, and there was more overseas trade in the 18th century than the Ming had.  They encouraged people to migrate to the periphery, and the Ming encouraged people to move back to the north.  And so on.


 * We still lack a good source focussed on this theory. I'm starting to think that the laissez faire Ming/interventionist Qing twist on the theory is your own (given your enthusiasm for Rothbard and the way laissez faire/intervention/mercantilism has spread through the article).  I just don't think everything (or anything) is that simple.  Sure, mercantilism was harmful and liberalism helped, but no-one (except Rothbard?) seems to be suggesting that any amount of government inactivity was going to modernize a pre-industrial economy without a lot of other factors, most of which are poorly understood. Kanguole 13:06, 20 July 2010 (UTC)


 * Really, Kanguole? If this is my own theory, how come there are four Chinese sources exactly affirming this? As I have stated previously, there are  four academic sources, including one academic paper written by a university professor addressing this topic. Just because they happen to be in Chinese, a language which you can understand, doesn't mean they're useless. In terms of academic, the  Consensus is that the Qing were much more interventionist than the Ming; this is stated  explicitly by the Cambrige history of China, who calls Ming a "Government that by modern and premodern standards taxed very lightly and left its wealth in the hands of the people" and the Qing "interventionist". As for the mercantilism/classical liberalism question, I would grant that mercantilism was probably  more harmful than the Qing interventions (not including the earlier massacres, ban on trade, etc). The question is not whether Qing intervened at all, but what the interventions were; I doubt anybody, from ultra-left keynesian to anarcho-capitalist, would think banning mining/foreign trade is a good thing. True, the government cannot by itself cause a industrial revolution, but it sure can prevent one if it wanted (what would have happened if England banned coal?), so its policies are an important factor.  Even Pomeranz recognized this and mentions Qing's policies regarding coal as a factor hampering their use.In fact, Pomeranz devotes an entire chapter to government interventions in his book to analyze the effect of this factor; this can show how important it is.Teeninvestor (talk) 14:27, 20 July 2010 (UTC)


 * I didn't say the theory that the Qing had held China back, I said the emphasis on interventionism vs laissez faire.


 * On which page does the Cambridge History use the word "interventionist"? And I thought we'd established that mining was not banned, and that foreign trade was banned only in the late 17th century (but flourished in the 18th).  Clearly the dispute is unresolved.  Kanguole 15:21, 20 July 2010 (UTC)


 * The article states that that mining and foreign trade was restricted, not banned (as in no new mines). Isn't interventionism versus laissez faire the whole crux of this dispute; (that's the whole thing the Qing is blamed for, banning mines from being opened with enough capital, restricting foreign trade, etc. As to the interventionist claim, I think that is the academic consensus; the theory that Qing had held China back specifically blames the interventions such as banning mines.Teeninvestor (talk) 18:35, 20 July 2010 (UTC)


 * On which page does the Cambridge History call the Qing "interventionist"? Kanguole 22:57, 20 July 2010 (UTC)


 * It says clearly on page 592 that: "Contradictory as the Ch’ing state’s means were to achieve its purposes, the early emperors and their officials, motivated by Confucian ideology and fearful of the same developments that had toppled the Ming, intervened in the market economy." On page 591, it says: "Even so, the center continually tried to intervene in the market economy to win the allegiance of the people, prevent local power holders from becoming too wealthy and influential, and ensure social order." I think that's pretty clear statement that they were interventionist. Teeninvestor (talk) 17:09, 21 July 2010 (UTC)

I didn't think they'd say "interventionist": it's a bit too simplistic and one-sided for the overall picture they present.

So they say the Qing intervened, as most governments do. But again your quotes are selective. (Do you have access to the full book, or are you working from the Google Books limited preview?) Between those two quotes, they set out the interventions they are referring to: (1) reduced the burden of the state on the people, (2) centralized control of taxation, and (3) "selectively discouraged certain wealthy people from using the market". The first two are not, I think, the kind of interventions you're accusing them of. On the first, Myers and Wang say "Instead of merely extracting taxes for enriching the political center, Qing rulers declared that 'wealth should be amassed in the hands of the people'. To that end, the inhibited political center enhanced people's incentives to participate in the market. One such incentive was for the state to avoid regulating prices and instead encouraging market forces to operate freely." They go on (p595) to describe how the Qing reduced tax burdens in comparison with the Ming, and lightened the Ming labour conscription system, finally abolishing it in the early 18th century. If one were to select these quotes instead of yours, the Qing would sound like beacons of liberalism. But one must consider the whole complex picture that they present. And when you do that, there's no case for presenting the Qing as a new era of intervention.

Indeed Pomeranz does devote a whole chapter to markets and governments, but it is striking that that chapter makes no mention at all of these things that you claim are so significant, except for a brief remark that the late C17 trade ban had no lasting effect on the growth of trade. In an earlier chapter he mentions the policy of giving Jiangnan coal mining licences to the poor instead of the rich, but ends by saying it's unlikely this made any difference in the long run, though it can hardly have helped. These few scattered mentions of one side of the story do not rate selection in an encyclopedia article on the Great Divergence. Kanguole 15:23, 22 July 2010 (UTC) I see Pomeranz does mention the salt monopoly and the Canton trade, in order to contrast with the extensive European monopolies. Kanguole 10:38, 23 July 2010 (UTC)


 * Right, Kanguole: Right before that quote about enhancing the political center, the book talks extensively and repeatedly about how Qing intervened. In addition, they also talked about, right after your quotes about how "liberal" the Qing is, how they understood "the correctness of monopoly prileveges". And Kanguole, When you talk about Qing's "reduction on the burden of the people", you're being contradicted by all th academic evidence. The labor conscripton system was already abolished during the single whip reform by Zhang Juzheng and even earlier under Later Han(though that was restored); this is mentioned in the cambridge history of China. It was restored and used extensively and then briefly abolished by the Qing after the wars were over; hardly a "reduction". As to taxes, Ming land taxes were increased dramatically during the fall of the Ming Dynasty and then later reduced by the Qing after peace was restored; again, as with the labor conscription system, the authors' talk about the reduction in tax burden is in comparison with the situation at the end of the Ming, not with the Ming in general; remember by the end of the Ming only 30% of the population was even registered and pyaing taxes.

As to Pomeranz's apparent neglect of these factors, it appears that many sources disagree with him; indeed Xu's source is a direct response to Pomeranz.Teeninvestor (talk) 17:08, 23 July 2010 (UTC)


 * They are indeed comparing with the late Ming, but not the war period, and they do refer to the "Ming labor conscription system". But my aim was not to claim the Qing were particularly enlightened, just that Myers and Wang give a nuanced account.  Kanguole 15:02, 24 July 2010 (UTC)
 * It's very clear that the Ming abolished the labor conscription system in Zhang Juzheng's single whip reform. This is attested by every scholar on the topic, from pro-Qing to anti-Qing. If Myers and wang did indeed state that, they're simply wrong; read the article on Zhang Juzheng and Single whip reform for details. Some scholars think that under the Later Han, another laissez faire dynasty, labor conscription was also abolished, but they're not sure. From any point of view, abolition of labor conscription was there way before the Qing.Teeninvestor (talk) 02:33, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

Regarding this edit, it is well known that some Qing emperors persecuted authors they believed were challenging their rule, but what science did they suppress? Also, "suppression of free thought" appears to be overstating the case, given the flourishing Chinese literature of the period. Kanguole 14:50, 25 July 2010 (UTC)
 * It is well known that many texts, such as the Tian Gong Kan Wu were burned. While Chinese literature did flourish somewhat, Wenzhiyu destroyed many, many texts for simply making minor references to Qing rule; The number of Wenzhiyu recorded in the history books is 70 to 80, with over 100 deaths in many cases (Ming history case, etc).Teeninvestor (talk) 16:59, 25 July 2010 (UTC)
 * That literary inquisitions took place under the Qing is not being disputed. The issue is to what extent they suppressed scientific endeavour and "free thought". Nev1 (talk) 17:19, 25 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Are you going to argue that Wenzhiyu did not suppress "free thought"? For heaven's sake, people were being killed by the hundreds because they compiled a history of the Ming that referred to Manchus as "tribes". As to the scientific part, it is well known that many Ming-era science texts were also suppressed and are now only available outside China. For example, the "Tian Gong Kai Wu", which was a summary of scientific inventions during the Ming period.Teeninvestor (talk) 17:29, 25 July 2010 (UTC)
 * In my own opinion literary inquisitions hindered freedom of speech, but that's subtly different to freedom of thought. Is that explicitly what the source says, or your own spin on it? The target of literary inquisitions were mostly historical texts and poetry, anyone who was considered to have explicitly or implicitly criticised the Qing. That scientific texts were caught up in this would seem incidental. Nev1 (talk) 17:37, 25 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Xu mentioned specifically an example of suppressing new scientific theories in which Kangxi executed a man because he believed the brain was the center of thought, rather than the heart as believed by the majority of the doctors and scholars. You think science thrives in that climate? The text used specifically is "freedom of thought".Teeninvestor (talk) 17:46, 25 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Nice quote, but how does it relate to the Great Divergence? Remember that it was a socio-economic phenomenon. Nev1 (talk) 17:49, 25 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Cited as an example of the suppression of new science. I assure you that England would not have had the industrial revolution if Newton had been executed because he believed in gravity.Teeninvestor (talk) 17:50, 25 July 2010 (UTC)
 * That's a remarkable insight into the Industrial Revolution, but contrary to popular belief Newton's theory of gravitation had little to do with the development of steam engines, or canals, or the factory system. Unless you're trying to say it would have put off other scientists, but really your point isn't clear. Now can we have an example of the suppression of scientific endeavour related to the Great Divergence please. Nev1 (talk) 17:53, 25 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Are you trying to argue that this wouldn't put off other scientists? This is only one of many of Xu's examples (along with the earlier example of Tian Gong Kan Wu being suppressed); his argument was that scientific endeauver can't thrive in such an environment. Ruthless suppression of all non-orthodox thought that deviates a little from the state line encourages free thought and inquiry a lot, right? That's exactly why the Cultural revolution and Great Purge were hotbeds of scientific advances, right?
 * So can we have a quote from Pomeranz so we actually know what his view is or must you continue to filibuster? Nev1 (talk) 18:16, 25 July 2010 (UTC
 * I don't think Pomeranz addressed this (why'd you even mention him)? This is mainly an argument of Xu and the other sources.Teeninvestor (talk) 18:21, 25 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Xu then, or whatever source you're using (it wasn't clear as you didn't bother adding a source when you made the edit). Nev1 (talk) 18:25, 25 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Why would I add Xu? He's already a source. Here is the quote(s)

"无数历史事实证明，纵然只是为了经济和科学技术的发展，也得有人的思想言论自由，而建立在扼杀思想言论自由基础上的经济繁荣和国力强盛是不可能持久的，更不用说有无思想言论自由乃是一个是否把人当人看的问题了. 然而，在明朝的统治下，是言论自由的多少问题；而在清朝的统治下，则是言论自由的有无问题. " Effectively, he is arguing that the Qing's suppression of freedom of speech and thought hampered scientific advances.Teeninvestor (talk) 18:30, 25 July 2010 (UTC)
 * I don't want to know what he is effectively saying, I want to know what he is saying. Could you please provide a translation. Nev1 (talk) 18:32, 25 July 2010 (UTC)
 * "As many historical incidences have proved, freedom of speech and thought is essential for economic and technological advances. A national prosperity built on suppression of freedom of thought and speech cannot last; and this is not addressing the issue of whether having these freedoms are essential rights of man. While under Ming's rule the question of freedom of speech was how much of these freedoms citizens should have, under the Qing, the very existence of freedom of speech were in question."Teeninvestor (talk) 18:36, 25 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Is that it? No details, no examples, just an allusion that the Qing didn't allow freedom of speech? Nev1 (talk) 18:40, 25 July 2010 (UTC)
 * obviously not. He then lists many many examples, such as the brain example, Ming history case, etc. Do you think I pulled the examples I used above out of nowhere?Teeninvestor (talk) 18:42, 25 July 2010 (UTC)
 * No, but getting a straight answer from you is like pulling teeth. Nev1 (talk) 18:43, 25 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Who ordered the burning of the Tian Gong Kan Wu? Kanguole 11:57, 2 August 2010 (UTC)

Update
The reliance on Pomeranz is not as bad as I thought. Out of 87 citations, 35 are from non-Pomeranz sources. Considering Pomeranz's importance on the topic, this is not necessarily unwarranted.Teeninvestor (talk) 14:38, 20 July 2010 (UTC)
 * 4 more citations have been added from Hobson.Teeninvestor (talk) 17:38, 21 July 2010 (UTC)

Structure
On second thoughts, the division between causes and effects requires interpretive judgements in order to decide where to place a particular item, with various authors disagreeing. This is related to the dispute over when the divergence happened. The article is also curiously terse on what actually happened in Europe.

I think a chronological organization would avoid the need for judgement in placing items, though there would still be the question of relevance. Kanguole 09:27, 28 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Can you please clarify? I think it is universally agreed that the biggest era of the divergence is in the 19th century. Even Maddison et al simply believes that Europe grew at a faster rate and was ahead by 1500 (however, Maddison did not have access to the current research on agricultural productivity in China, but let's ignore that; he also estimated per capita income doubled during Mao, a gross exaggeration that would thrown his premodern estimates off by a lot (I am inclined to think the opposite happened)), but the era of the greatest divergence was in the 1800's. My biggest concern is the lack of data currently in the 1800's to show how Europe lept ahead; I have added Bairoch's estimates; hopefully this will help.Teeninvestor (talk) 14:56, 28 July 2010 (UTC)

Vandalism

 * This article has come under attack from the IP vandal 81.229.148.118, a sock puppet of banned User:Tosses who abused sockpockets to push his extreme and eccentric POV on China and Jewish people-related articles. He may be using other IP's as well. Please revert all of his edits without hesitation (especially his vandalism towards the information about China), though constructive edits from other IP's are welcome. Teeninvestor (talk) 18:13, 7 August 2010 (UTC)

Liang reference on Ming iron
This reference was apparently published in the early 1960s, focusses mainly on the early 14th century, and the cited statement seems to be from an article in the People's Daily from November 1958. The 1989 study of Huang Qichen (cited by Pomeranz) is likely to be vastly more reliable. In general, much more care is required in using articles from the China Economic History website. Kanguole 11:34, 9 August 2010 (UTC)
 * That website is used for mostly the papers on it, lol. Are you sure this reference is published in the early 1960's? Teeninvestor (talk) 12:42, 9 August 2010 (UTC)


 * Nevermind the reference to west Germany confirms it for me. Teeninvestor (talk) 12:29, 9 August 2010 (UTC)


 * The many tongzhis and the lack of any references later than 1960 should have been clues, but see the intro to the first chapter. I see you've since re-inserted it.  Don't you think a claim on iron production based on a Great Leap Forward-era article in the People's Daily is a bit problematic?  Kanguole 12:36, 11 August 2010 (UTC)

Vandalism

 * This vandal above has repeateldy removed material due to his extreme POV views aiming at distorting the article. If you continue this behaviour, your IP will be blocked from wikipedia. If you wish to actually have any information on the article's top, please read the scholarly sources on the article- it's available online.Teeninvestor (talk) 18:13, 7 August 2010 (UTC)
 * .Are you getting trouble with your extreme anti-Western bias? Gun Powder Ma (talk) 22:38, 9 August 2010 (UTC)
 * GPM, why are you defending a vandal who was blocked from wikipedia? Do you hope to share his fate? Calling me anti-western is completely absurd, considering I advocate the western ideology of Classical liberalism and live there!Teeninvestor (talk) 22:44, 9 August 2010 (UTC)

I've request semiprotection for this page, I see it is now active. This should give us some breathing space from vandalism. --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus 17:23, 11 August 2010 (UTC)

Second GAN?
I want to gather the main contributors' opinion on whether this article is ready for a second GAN or not, and if not, what needs to be done. In my view, the article's two major problems, overreliance on Pomeranz and lack of information in the effects section, has been solved. We now have info on per capita income growth and productivity due to the great divergence in the effect section, and the percentage of pomeranz citations has gone down from nearly 70% to less than half. The article is a lot better than the first GAN under the students now, I believe.Teeninvestor (talk) 19:28, 31 July 2010 (UTC)
 * Looks better. Some thoughts: 1) "Conditions in pre-Great Divergence cores" section is missing information on the Middle East (Janet Abu-Lughod's book comes to mind). 2) Discussion of Japan is interesting, but was it a core? I thought it wasn't really involved in trade till recently... 3) About "Timing". My readings, influenced by the world-system literature (Wallerstein, Lughod) suggest that it was the "long 16th century" that was the time of GD, not the 18th (by which time the modern world-system was well established). I am of course receptive to arguments about other time periods, but is it really ok to suggest - as the current section does - that 18th is the more popular variant, and previous terms are less popular? On that note, the sentence in "Terminology and definition" (Pomeranz argues that the period of most rapid divergence was during the 19th century) - as in "why P.'s view/date is the only one mentioned there"? 4) Regarding File:Maddison GDP per capita 1500-1950.svg I'd like to see a line for "Europe, aggregated" --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus 20:32, 31 July 2010 (UTC)
 * The source does not include aggregate data for Europe, though it does include a West European average. But what would that illustrate?  The current selection shows substantial variation within Europe, which is part of the story.  Kanguole 23:59, 31 July 2010 (UTC)
 * If we are using "Europe" as the unit of analysis, we need to have numbers for it. Speaking of Europe and then using data only for individual European countries seems like a fallacy to me. --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus 23:20, 1 August 2010 (UTC)
 * Then the flaw lies in using "Europe" as the unit of analysis, doesn't it? But few of these authors seem to treat Europe as a whole.  Kanguole 23:46, 1 August 2010 (UTC)
 * Is it really a flaw, and is it really rare? The very term European miracle and the surrounding discussion suggests otherwise. World-system perspective, for example, does suggest that we should not look at nation-states, but at wider concepts (regions, or world-systems). In the context of GD I do agree that we should compare Europe (well, perhaps Western Europe, or some selection of countries) to other regions, not individual countries (unless we want to make a point about them). For me, GD existed not when one of the European countries became more powerful than China, but earlier, when a bunch of them did. --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus 14:14, 3 August 2010 (UTC)
 * Piotrus, its pretty clear from data on agricultural productivity done by historians such as Allen, Needham and Pomeranz that Chinese incomes per capita exceeded all of Europe and even Britain until the 19th century. European agriculture (75% of all premodern economies) was quite backwards til the adoption of Chinese agriculutral technology such as iron plows and heavy hoeing in the 18th century. This can be seen from Allen's study, in which European productivity lags far behind China until a rapid catchup in the 18th century.Teeninvestor (talk) 02:10, 1 August 2010 (UTC)
 * Frankly, agricultural production is not very convincing to me. Many places outside Europe were more efficient in something for quite some time; depending on the definition of something, they never lost their edge in it. That doesn't change the fact that around 16th century, Europe started disrupting and taking over various trade flows worldwide, something rest of the world (China included) never cared to do.Europe was more efficient at certain things, in particular, in projecting its force, or the will to power. When a region decided to try to take over the world, and was able to do so - Great Divergence started. Now, mind you, this is my reading of the world-system theory; nonetheless, I think this is a point to be mentioned somewhere in the article (and of course, don't cite me - cite Wallerstein and his colleagues). --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus 23:20, 1 August 2010 (UTC)
 * Well, Piotrus, I'm sure the world systems theory is mentioned somewhere in the article, but I will note to you that agriculture made up 80% of all premodern economies; so if Europe was backwards in that respect to China, its GDP per capita would definitely be lower (it would be like being inferior in aeronautics, steel, computers, petroleum, textiles and all industries today). Without advanced agriculture, there is no base or market for proto-industrialization, let alone industrailization. Regarding world-systems theory, I think you overexaggrate the effect of international trade pre-19th century, which while substantial probably never made up more than 5% of GDP even in countries like Holland or Britain. And even in terms of international trade, I believe China's volume of international trade was probably not inferior to Europe til the 19th century; keep in mind that North American silver was flowing there repeatedly. And even if that was the case, if European agricultural productivity was much lower the wealth of the people would still be less.Teeninvestor (talk) 20:08, 3 August 2010 (UTC)
 * I'm not sure the article's stable enough, and there still seems to be some uncertainty. I think these two edits require more justification that is provided in the edit summaries. Nev1 (talk) 22:43, 31 July 2010 (UTC)
 * That section had Toynbee (1976, posthumous) saying a fall in the 18th century, Allen (2009) saying a marginal fall and Pomeranz (2000) a modest rise and not stagnant. Result: Pomeranz is trimmed (even though this is part of his argument), Allen's view is made stronger and Toynbee set beside him.  I would say Pomeranz's view should be kept, but attributed to him.  Toynbee was a generalist, and quite a while ago; he's the one who should be removed.  Since Allen says of his figures "I find no significant evidence of falling productivity in the next to centuries" (typo in original), and speaks of "static labour productivity", the qualification should be restored.  I have reverted and deleted the Toynbee claim.  Kanguole 00:49, 1 August 2010 (UTC)
 * I think the article is still incomplete. It has rather little on the GD itself, being more about theories of what caused it, and those are mostly Pomeranz's.  He has many rivals, and the standard view is also far from dead.  Kanguole 00:57, 1 August 2010 (UTC)
 * Well, I think we have good info on the per capita incomes divergence from Bairoch. And as to the traditional view, I think that is noted in all the sections about the theories of the great divergence, which Pomeranz argues against. The latest research by Allen et al gives strong support to Pomeranz's thesis, and this is not counting Needham's earlier research regarding this. So in a way we have covered the standard view more or less.And to be honest I think any reader searching up GD would want to know what caused it rather than what happened (that's covered under industrial revolution).Teeninvestor (talk) 02:10, 1 August 2010 (UTC)
 * Allen supports Pomeranz's comparison on English and Jiangnan income and productivity in the late 18th century, but not Pomeranz's thesis: "If the findings of this paper generalize to China and Europe as a whole, the 'great divergence' in income did, indeed, occur in the nineteenth century, but its roots extend back centuries. Europe, in this scenario, was behind China in 1600 but was on a trajectory that was accelerating rapidly. China's trajectory was not advancing. The paths may have crossed around 1800 when incomes and agricultural productivity were similar, but the European rocket had taken off two centuries before, and the sources of Europe's advance after 1800 must be sought in that earlier ascent." Kanguole 23:25, 1 August 2010 (UTC)
 * Maybe change that? I thought Pomeranz's thesis was simply that Europe and China were comparable in the early 19th century. This thesis stands even if Europe's income was growing since 1600 (since it was starting from a very low base, the middle ages). Example, China's GDP has grown massively since the Maoist despotism, but this doesn't mean that China and the US are experiencing a "great divergence" which has its roots since late 70's!Teeninvestor (talk) 14:09, 2 August 2010 (UTC)
 * I thought we were comparing the traditional view of the Great Divergence with Pomeranz's view. Kanguole 14:49, 2 August 2010 (UTC)
 * I was replying to your reference about Allen disagreeing with Pomeranz. My view is that they are comparable. The standard view is that European productivity exceeded China by 1500, a view that has been exploded in recent research.Teeninvestor (talk) 19:55, 2 August 2010 (UTC)

See. The article as it stands still largely misses the subject. Gun Powder Ma (talk) 20:18, 14 August 2010 (UTC)

Pomeranz on coal
Please quote the passage in which Pomeranz specifically says government regulations during 18th century were a factor in the declining use of coal. Kanguole 17:00, 9 August 2010 (UTC)


 * See the talk page archives. It's absurd that you're even trying to contest this.Teeninvestor (talk) 22:20, 9 August 2010 (UTC)

Since you refuse to answer, I will have to guess that you mean
 * "Some coal mines did operate in various parts of south China and within marketing range of Beijing in the north—they were mostly small and poorly positioned to take advantage of China's richest and most fuel-hungry market. They were also hampered, at least intermittently, by inconsistent government policies. By far the largest deposits, which theoretically might have justified major investments in production and transportation improvements, were those in the northwest." (p63)

or perhaps
 * "In the eighteenth century, when the government decided to encourage coal in this area with the explicit goal of alleviating the Yangzi Delta's fuel shortage, it also chose to give the mining licenses to poor and unemployed people, who mostly dug small, shallow mines. Although it seems unlikely that even better capitalized mines would have achieved the major breakthroughs needed to transform China's energy, transport, and metals sectors, having such small operators in charge at one of the few sites in China where coal was within relatively easy reach of both large markets and concentrations of skilled artisans could hardly have improved the odds." (p64)

Neither of these specifically say "the use of coal declined, due to reasons such as tranpsortation costs, government regulations during the Qing and other factors." Kanguole 23:38, 9 August 2010 (UTC)
 * Uh, Kanguole, what is Pomeranz's whole argument again? Mines were far in England, close in China. And he mentions explicitly above that gov regulations were a factor; why else would he mention it repeatedly? This is not counting the Qing mining ban on which there was overwhelming academic consensus.Teeninvestor (talk) 23:49, 9 August 2010 (UTC)
 * Right, he mentions it, but does not state causality. Indeed in the second quote he shies away from such a claim.  The previous version of the text laid out Pomeranz's argument, including a mention of this point mirroring his.  This addition goes beyond what he is willing to say.  Kanguole 13:02, 10 August 2010 (UTC)
 * The previous version of the text said Chinese iron and other industries shifted to using charcoal because of transportation costs, gov regulations in the 18th century, etc. All I did is reword that.Teeninvestor (talk) 13:41, 10 August 2010 (UTC)
 * I missed that you had deleted the existing mention, so let's put that back instead of calling it a reason. By the way, it's not certain that the hampering in the first quote is limited to the 18th century—the paragraph starts by talking about the 18th, but then broadens out, and the citation for this sentence is a study on the 14th-17th centuries.  Similarly, he speaks of "a shift away from fossil fuels as a result of the post-Mongol relocation", which would have been earlier.  Actually, on re-reading, he doesn't produce any direct evidence for a reduction in coal use: he's just conjecturing it on the basis of the distance to the major deposits.  Kanguole 15:04, 10 August 2010 (UTC)
 * Nevermind. I doubt there was a decline in coal use, but it is certian that coal production was not expanded, that's for sure. Some estimates think that the Ming dynasty saw a threefold increase in iron output over the Song, followed by a drastic decline under the Qing. Perhaps this warrants mentioning?Teeninvestor (talk) 15:07, 10 August 2010 (UTC)
 * There are problems with the source (see above), but iron production figures for the Ming (and Song) just aren't very relevant here. Kanguole 14:04, 14 August 2010 (UTC)

Rewrite because the approach is wrong
I appreciate the continuous efforts at improving the article, particularly of Kanguole, but I have to say that the basic problem of the article which was outlined here has not been remedied, but in fact worsened. Then we agreed that the focus must necessarily lie on the exceptional Western industrial development, its move away from the traditional constraints of agricultural modes of production, and not on the rest of the world which continued to follow traditional modes of production. These could serve as a baseline, but no more than that.

However, as it stands, the article extensively deals with non-industrializing countries and goes to great length trying to show that the Great Divergence took place as late as can be, developed as weakly as can be and was as coincidental as can be. In this vein, the reductionistic Coals and Colonies approach by Pomeranz, a minority view and critically discussed by other economists at length itself, still permeates much of the text.

So, how should the final article structure look like? We have to ask ourselves what is important and what not; what caused the Divergence, what changed and what remained the same? What was revolutionary and what remained traditional? In this context, I strongly advocated to conjure up the image of a scissor: The Great Divergence, that was a historical scissor where one blade (rest of the world) remained static, while the other (Europe) opened up. Therefore, the compelling question which should guide the article is not why the first blade remained in the position it has always been, but why and how the second one suddenly moved.

To put it bluntly: This article is by necessity through and through euro-centric because it describes an event of western history. These events began in Europe and America, were primarily caused by intra-Western processes and developments (many of which aren't even mentioned yet) and practically remained confined to Europe and America in the given time span. That has yet to be fully reflected by scope and contents of the article. Regards. Gun Powder Ma (talk) 20:16, 14 August 2010 (UTC)


 * I agree. The answer is to add all that material from a range of sources.  Pomeranz cannot be ignored, but he should be one voice among many, and he should not always be given the last word.  That will also involve cutting material currently in the article that is not directly related to the subject.  Kanguole 00:09, 15 August 2010 (UTC)


 * Glad we agree. Pomeranz is a valid minority opinion, but not more than that. For the baseline comparison is very useful: David S. Landes: "Why Europe and the West? Why Not China?", Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 20, Number 2, Spring 2006, Pages 3–22, but note that DL has a dislike for quantitative economic history (in this respect he is the direct opposite of Maddison). Gun Powder Ma (talk) 17:48, 15 August 2010 (UTC)


 * Thank you Gun Powder Ma for making the article more neutral! —Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.226.72.209 (talk) 18:44, 17 August 2010 (UTC)

Universities
This is a list of the first universities in the world:
 * 1) University of Bologna, Italy – teaching from 11th Century recognised as University 1088
 * 2) University of Paris, France – recognised as University 1150
 * 3) University of Oxford, England – teaching known from 1096 (potentially 825) recognised as University 1167
 * 4) University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Italy – recognised as University 1175
 * 5) Bosnian Church University, Moštre near Visoko, Bosnia (today Bosnia and Herzegovina) – recognised as University 1175

There are a lot more but these are the first. All in Europe. something to add? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.226.72.209 (talk) 21:53, 9 September 2010 (UTC)


 * Is this really relevant given the period this article covers? Nev1 (talk) 23:13, 9 September 2010 (UTC)

I'm not sure it would be accurate to include universities here. Different cultures had different educational systems. The problem lies in the definition of a university. Univiersities have become the de facto standard today as the Western culture influences the rest of the world. Studying where the first universities were feels misrepresentative of the overall picture as it discounts foreign schools just because they did not call themselves a 'university'. 94.193.61.168 (talk) 11:48, 5 January 2011 (UTC)

Where is philosophy?
My thesis is that the divergence has nothing to do with coal or economics... but philosophy and culture. The thinkers of Europe shaped the societies to become liberal and capitalistic and it did evolve the political systems and thus the culture. Shape the culture and intelligence will follow. Example: Our culture endorse innovation which have given us the computer which has created new subcultures among the youth, which will eventually put these new cultural behaviours on the whole society which will then evolve and create more innovation which will create new culture.

But first comes culture. Shouldn't there be something about philosophy? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosphy#Ancient_philosophy_.28c._600_BC.E2.80.93c._AD_500.29 —Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.226.72.209 (talk) 18:54, 17 August 2010 (UTC)


 * I agree. Much, if not most of the rise of the West had nothing to do with the alleged readier availabilty of raw materials in Europe or unfortunate policy decisions of other political entities which allegedly put them at a disadvantage. To assume this is a thoroughly positivist mindset which just looks at things quantifiable or visible (and gets it wrong even there often enough).


 * Rather, it was the different mindset which made the difference, the Western rationalism. In advocating this view, we have a prime thinker in Max Weber, and Ricardo Duchesne has recently reaffirmed his conclusions here. And, of course, Karl Marx, not the one of Lenin and Stalin, but the 19th century economist, one of the very greatest of all times, who was a contemporary of the events and devoted much thought to this question. As I said, many of the most important topics the article has not even touched on. Gun Powder Ma (talk) 09:52, 18 August 2010 (UTC)


 * Credits to Gun powder Ma! You must be one of the most brilliant people on this planet! —Preceding unsigned comment added by 194.103.205.27 (talk) 13:30, 19 August 2010 (UTC)


 * This article is definitely missing an explanation on the non-material differencies in not only philosophy but also politics/government and scientific tradition. Numbers divorced from their context can be very misleading. For instance, just to illustrate my point, the Incan capital at the time of the Spanish conquest of their kingdom was reputed to be far larger than any city in Europe with an enormous and disciplined workforce. However, the Incas also lacked writing and basic science among other things. If it was a matter of mathematics and sheer numbers regarding urbanization and possibly also agricultural output of products X and Y, then the Incas would have been in a superior position to Europe and we would be justifiably dumbfounded to this day as to why Europe and not the Incas led the world into modernity. Yet, I don't think that anybody would seriously dispute the fact that the non-material differences between the Incas and the Europeans were far more important than the material ones, namely the enormous legacy that Europe had amassed in politics, law, philosophy and science which made possible certain dynamics in Europe that were simply unthinkable in the Incan world. Certain such differences existed between Europe and China, between Europe and the Islamic caliphate, between China and Japan, between India and China, etc, and they all played out in different ways and contributed into shaping the different paths many of these countries and regions have taken since, some more significant and some less. Not including these non-material differences is tantamount to avoiding the subject that this article is supposed to be dealing with... Abvgd (talk) 22:20, 6 January 2011 (UTC)


 * Actually, the Incas didn't have any very large city. The civilization of the "city bigger than any in Europe" is actually the Aztecs. The Aztec capital, Tenochtitlan, is estimated to have had 100,000 inhabitants, about the size of the largest European cities of the time, and larger than any Spanish city at the time (Madrid had around 50,000-60,000 inhabitants). However, that was because the Aztec empire channeled a great proportion of the resources of Mesoamerica and concentrated them on this single city. Europe didn't have consumer cities, but instead had a network of cities that contributed to the development of the European economy. Urbanization is a very important indicator of economic development since it indicates the proportion of the labor force that needs to be employed on agriculture. While the largest cities in the world weren't in Europe during the early modern period, Istanbul and Beijing were the two largest, that was because these cities represented an artificial concentration of surplus agricultural production due to political factors, not because China and the Ottomans were more urbanized. For example, take Europe and China in 1650, Europe and China had 100 million inhabitants, but China's largest city was nearly twice the size of Europe's largest city (Beijing had 700,000 inhabitants, while Paris had 450,000 inhabitants), that wasn't because China was more urbanized than Europe, but because Europe had a less primal urban system. Overall, Europe had 10 cities over 100,000 inhabitants while China probably had only 4,5 cities over 100,000 inhabitants. China was consequently less urbanized. --RafaelG (talk) 22:49, 5 March 2011 (UTC)


 * My mistake, I meant the Aztecs but for some reason ended up writing the Incas instead... BTW, I fully agree with your analysis. This was what I had in mind when I wrote that numbers can be misleading when taken out of their context, but your comment was much more to the point. Pre-feudal societies usually had emperors who on a whim could redirect large portions of the population or economy into large-scale projects, no matter the costs or consequences. In feudal Europe with the division of power between monarchs, the church and the nobility, this was no longer possible or even desirable. Feudal Europe's economy was much closer to the rules of market economy, while China's economy had more in common with what is today associated with a Soviet-style planned economy. Planned economies are good at channeling resources into specific geographic or economic sectors (thus potentially creating the illusion of development or urbanization) but they are also lousy at managing resources as history repeatedly has shown. Abvgd (talk) 07:19, 17 April 2011 (UTC)