Talk:Houla massacre

Using ANNA News as a Source
The right choice was made above on FAZ, to include at least one media reference to the other set of alleged witnesses. But it's been alleged his sources are exactly the same as those cited in the Syrian government's report, which seem to be the same two shown on SANA TV, filmed by Abkhazian ANNA news crew, working with SANA. Okay, if so, most would say "ERP, obvious shills, ignore." But all the pro-Assad news team does is let the alleged witnesses talk, like all journalists do, just getting them by other channels. They were more on-site than Channel 4, just not spending time behind rebel lines (they would totally get killed) If a reputable Western journalist repeats a garbled version of the same witnesses, that's worth including and refuting. But ANNA's pro-Russian-Assad cameras, recording minutes of uninterrupted narrative must be making them less reliable? They are the most useful witnesses who give detail that actually matches the video record pretty well, and deserve being cited - briefly - in the gov.-Hermann section. --AdamakaCausticLogic (talk) 14:41, 2 January 2015 (UTC)

Problem is, even if it's agreed to let these two core witnesses have their say ... youtube videos in Arabic with Russian titles? No. Trusting subtitles? Musin's summary in Russian? Transcription? Translation? Best available? Reliable? Archived? It gets a little fuzzy. Perhaps the best place is ACLOS transcriptions, collected here. But that's self-promotional. Not expecting any thoughts, nor opposition to just adding this now that there's no "buzz", but I will wait and consider how to do it best. Accepting thoughts. Will check back. --AdamakaCausticLogic (talk) 14:41, 2 January 2015 (UTC)

Deleting offensive blasphemous references in section
Religious and Racist offenses can´t be tolerated in wikipedia. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 186.93.110.128 (talk) 23:20, 13 October 2013 (UTC)

Houla Towns and Rebel Control
I just now edited "in two opposition-controlled villages in the Houla Region" to read "in the town of Taldou, in the Houla region." I see in the discussion archive the Shuimarieyeh reference was removed long ago, but this linguistic trace remains. Shumariyeh is not a part of Houla, but Taldou is. It may be part of the Houla massacre happened up in Aqrab, but by the usual, accepted info, it was all in Taldou. What might be more controversial is that I modified the "opposition-controlled" part, skipped "mixed-control" to just no control mention. While the tri-village Houla area at large is generally agreed to have been rebel-held by then, the exception was the center and south of Taldou, the southern end of Houla, the "connecting road" to Homs and surrounding Alawite villages. Guess where the shells all fell, and where the massacres happened? The center and south of Taldou, against people of disputed loyalty there whose security was provided by the last 5 army posts in Houla, until the violence of May 25 (citations as needed, it's not very controversial). The "opposition-controlled" part makes it sound like only anti-rebel people would attack an all-rebel town, or all-rebel towns in that area. But we needn't be leading the other way and explicitly highlight how the shelling and massacre was against the last government-secured part of Houla, which the government basically lost as a result. Simply Taldou, to start with, is probably best. Any disagreement on that? --AdamakaCausticLogic (talk) 09:02, 28 December 2014 (UTC)
 * The same point is made for almost the entire "background" section. Cited for the "unable to enter" part was uninformed activists talking to Al Jazeera: "...government forces tried to break into the town, the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said." "A team of UN observers visited the Homs area to assess the situation on Saturday. Some activists complained, however, that they just visited the village of Taldou, at the edge of Houla, rather than entering the town." All alleged shelling and massacres were in Taldou, mainly its southern half, down Saad street and Main street, along which there were four security posts. There was never any reason to visit the other towns of "the town." Seriously. "Houla is under the control of the Free Syrian Army, which means government troops cannot enter the town. Instead, they are launching shells from a distance in a bid to defeat the rebels." See the map in the UN's June report - it's a map only of Taldou, and it shows all relevant locales, which the monitors visited or passed. Mass grave, north of center. One of the contested posts is 120 meters north of one massacre site. Another is exactly across the street from another massacre site. In fact, the UN's CoI wound up blaming the government by pointing out that rebel attacks they took out the northern two posts that day failed to eliminate government control in the immediate kill zones further south, so rebels could not have done it and Shabiha types must have (see below, ). This background section really needs some work. All it says is a few things that are totally wrong and paint an almost backwards picture. --AdamakaCausticLogic (talk) 09:55, 28 December 2014 (UTC)
 * New edits up now in background, I think, improve the article's intelligence so the reader is less confused on the village-town-region issue. It's important to understand where in Houla this happened. --AdamakaCausticLogic (talk) 14:15, 2 January 2015 (UTC)

UN on the Rebel Offensive
As noted up front the UN's CoI concludes likely government guilt based partly on "its understanding of access to the crime sites" and "the security layout in the area including the position of the government's water authority checkpoint." But did anyone notice the part in the UN reports where they say rebels didn't just attack but probably overran two security posts on that same day? This when there were only five to begin with? Did they exaggerate the fight, minimize it, or get it just right? The quotes:

“...the protestors appear to have been fired upon or shelled by Government forces. Either in retaliation, or in a pre-meditated attack, anti-Government armed groups, including the FSA present in Taldou, fired upon the security forces checkpoints, probably overrunning one or two of them. Several people were killed in these clashes or as a result of the shelling...”(June report, p.7)

The two overrun posts: the CoI "determined that the clocktower checkpoint was overrun at some point in the day." (June report, p.10) Rebels boasted of their "liberation" of "Freedom Circle" that happened this day. (citations needed...) This was the main post in the center of town, the overrunning of which would give rebels free access to the homes down Saad street where most killings occurred. In fact, "Opposition activists managed to reach the site of the Abdulrazzak killings in broad daylight - while the clashes and shelling were reportedly ongoing. This fact indicates that routes to the Abdulrazzak crime scene were not closed to them.”(June, p. 9)

The other post was military intelligence HQ down Main Street. The map at the end of that report has its spot labeled "Military Intelligence Post (likely overrun by anti-gov't forces)."(June p.21) Videos show the building bullet-marked and burnt, with two APCs out front burnt, flanking apparent rebel graffiti on the wall as of May 26 (UNSMIS video catches the edge of it). It seems very likely to be overrun. The CoI even acknowledge that by putting the frontline of the rebel offensive further south: the mobile security post at the Qaws (arches) "demarcated the new front line between the opposition and Government forces" and "the front line between the opposition and Government forces was north of the checkpoint,"”but not as far north as MIHQ. (August report, p.66) North of where? The June report's map labels the arches with "Qaws (mobile - maybe further south)." The nearest massacre site was just 120 meters south of the arches. They may have just driven off to survive, for all we know. Mobile front lines are problematic that way. --AdamakaCausticLogic (talk) 10:38, 28 December 2014 (UTC)

So the UN's investigators claim a rebel conquest of 40% of security posts the very day of the massacre - likely pre-planned (there is other evidence for that). It took a lot of detective work outside "credible" channels to establish that the video record - again that's primary source evidence that actually doesn't lie in and of itself, usually - shows all five posts coming under sustained attack, with the "Water Company" never overrun, but the Qaws and the National Hospital apparently falling to the rebel offensive. Despite the CoI conclusions, the video record and correlated evidence supports an 80% conquest of posts, with all massacre sites left open to rebels that evening. (source: http://ciwclibya.org/reports/thebattleforthehoulamassacre.html July, 2014). I'm the author of that. I don't expect to have that cited in the main article, but seems worth mentioning in context. --AdamakaCausticLogic (talk) 10:38, 28 December 2014 (UTC)

Suffice to say, the CoI's consistent conclusion of only two posts overrun by rebels is the softened option that leaves it open to still seem to have to blame the Army and Shabiha after all. Note also the "credible" type of alleged witnesses consistently fail to mention the rebel offensive of the day even the CoI had to acknowledge. They call it all Army shelling, but it took out the army's own posts. So maybe the page should reflect a bit more ambiguity about the shelling allegations? At least vis-a-vis what the UN's investigators found? I mean come on: "U.N. observers could confirm "the use of small arms, machine gun[s], artillery and tanks" by someone, at different points, in violence that included rebels taking over 40-80% of the town's security posts is proof of government guilt? --AdamakaCausticLogic (talk) 10:30, 28 December 2014 (UTC)

Other recent edits explained

 * "The report originally could not come to a solid conclusion due to restrictions of movement on the ground by the Syrian government." This is sort of implied in the report, in the quote I replaced that with (and nowhere else - I searched back and forth for all relevant terms). But it's a weak implication IMO and does not deserve being amplified into a real reason, as if their gaining access would suddenly resolve the confusion, and only the regime was preventing that. In fact, a lot of evidence pointed both ways. And the CoI had access to their own on-site UNSMIS monitor's report, which they apparently ignored. Claiming no one but the two gov. report witnesses supported the gov. version seems to gloss over the "locals" with "another story" (different from other locals) which Gen. Mood had no problem talking with, and reported to UN HQ in NY (as mentioned here already, deserving mention on the front page?). The CoI did not come to a solid conclusion at first ... for reasons worth considering, not just giving easy excuses to ignore. --AdamakaCausticLogic (talk) 14:11, 2 January 2015 (UTC)