Talk:Ideal observer theory

Subjectivist
I just wanted to get someone's approval on this-- It is debatable that ideal observer theory is not subjectivist. Firth's article is titled "Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer Theory" after all. Now I happen to agree that it is subjectivist, but since Firth would probably disagree with this, should it be removed? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Pjwerner (talk • contribs) 02:16, 24 October 2008 (UTC)


 * This is related to the broader problem of vague and conflicting definitions of absolutism/realism/universalism/relativism/subjectivism/etc. In the schema we're currently using on meta-ethics articles, what Firth calls "absolutism" would be called "universalism", and this article's current text notes IOT as a universalist form of subjectivism. -Pfhorrest (talk) 22:06, 24 October 2008 (UTC)

Alright, cool. I saw the edit and I think it is an improvement. I appreciate it. Pjwerner (talk) 01:52, 25 October 2008 (UTC)



Firth's article "Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer" carefully explains what he takes the contrasts to be between relativism and absolutism, and between subjectivism and objectivism. Taking the latter contrast first (and writing from memory) according to Firth, an analysis of ethical statements is subjectivist if according to that analysis, all ethical statements would be false by definition if there were no experiencing subjects. This plainly corresponds as well as can be expected to the commonsense conundrum about sounds and trees falling in a forest. According to a subjectivist analysis of the word "sound" there could be no sound if there were no experiencing subject around to sense it. According to Firth, an analysis of ethical terms is objectivist just in case it is not subjectivist. (Now all this depends on the presence of the word "analysis" in Firth's explanation, and we are all supposed to know that this is by now a very suspect word. It is *more* suspect than the notion of a *theory* or of an *explanation*.  So the characterizations Firth presented in 1952 might easily be modified, so that we can think of subjectivist theories about ethical terms, or objectivist explanations of ethical terms.)  An ideal observer theory casts ethical statements in the subjunctive mood. Consider "If this animal had been a unicorn, it would have had a beard and a single horn in the middle of its forehead." This statement could be true even if there are no unicorns. Similarly for "X is good just in case it would be responded to in such and such an ethically significant way by any observer who was omniscient, omnipercipient, disinterested, dispassionate, consistent and otherwise normal". This kind of statement can be true even if there are no such observers. Firth, it was clear from his lectures, was working to show that ethical statements can be understood in terms of various scientifically discoverable features of observers. There are no ideal gases, but the early laws of thermodynamics entail that all ideal gases obey Boyle's Law. But of course it's a matter of physics that there can be no ideal gases. Similarly, perhaps, for ideal observers.

Now, for "absolute". An analysis of ethical statements is *relativist* according to the 1952 article, if it is incompatible with any analysis that does not contain some egocentric particular. (An egocentric particular is what Nelson Goodman called an indexical.) Firth remarks that Russell noted in *Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth* that all these words like "I", "me", "here", "now", etc. can be defined in terms of the single demonstrative "this". Of course the remark depends on the dubious word "defined". (W.V. Quine, according to Hilary Putnam, once remarked that he had encountered at least nine instances of definition, none of which had anything to do with the philosophical notion of analysis.) And an analysis according to Firth is absolutist just in case it is not relativist. Many moral philosophers would count themselves as absolutist according to this characterization. Firth often said in class "When I call something good, I don't think I'm talking about myself." This contrasts with R.B. Brandt's version of the ideal observer theory. For the qualified attitude method has us thinking "If I were fully informed... then I would have such and such an attitude toward X" -- Dave Kurtzman, drkurtz@atlantic.net

PS: In lectures, but not in the original article, Firth stated that he was still an objectivist naturalist about evaluative words like "good" and "bad" but had moved to intuitionism about words like "right" and "wrong". —Preceding unsigned comment added by 174.131.123.102 (talk) 20:56, 29 September 2009 (UTC)

Citation on subjectivist claim
As has been said, Firth considered ideal observer theory objectivist. The current citation for saying it is subjectivist is Richard Brant's definition of objectivism and subjectivism as a whole. However, Brant seems to have accepted Firth's claim that Firth's formulation of the theory is objectivist: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2103510

Given that Firth himself argues the theory is objectivist and plenty of citations would be available to that end (ex. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2103988 ), I think a claim that it is actually subjectivist would need to be supported at least by an academic source saying ideal observer theory in particular is subjectivist. Applying a third party definition for such a controversial conclusion seems too close to original research.

But even with a viable citation, I think any claim that the theory is subjectivist needs qualification. Warm Worm (talk) 12:01, 5 May 2011 (UTC)