Talk:Idlib demilitarization (2018–2019)

Section on rebels
This large section was just removed by with edit summary "this sections services no purpose". It is quite badly written and some of it is poorly sourced, but it seems potentially useful with editing. Possibly it duplicates the infobox, but it gives more Idlib-specific information than what is there, so I have restored it, to enable consensus. BobFromBrockley (talk) 16:17, 21 September 2018 (UTC)

Ansar al-Din Front
This paragraph was deleted from the HTS-affiliated sub-section of the above-mentioned problematic section, with the edit summary "part of HTS": Ansar al-Din Front: A group that merged with HTS, but later split like Hurras al-Din. It is essentially an alliance of many pro-Qaeda small groups, some of whom are foreign. It still has members in HTS, and was considered a founding member of the coalition. I believe it was the subject of some back and forth last couple of days as well. I don't know anything about it, but it's own WP page says this: 1 February 2018: Harakat Fajr ash-Sham al-Islamiya defected from Tahrir al-Sham and resumed working as an independent group under the name Ansar al-Din Front - Harakat Fajr ash-Sham al-Islamiya. What's the correct story? If it's part of HTS it still belongs in the HTS-linked section doesn't it? And if our WP article is correct it should have its own entry back for sure? BobFromBrockley (talk) 16:51, 21 September 2018 (UTC)

A majority of Ansar is part of HTS, Ansar al Din was composed of 4 groups however 2 of them merged and later left the alliance and totally merged with al-Nusra prior to the foundation of HTS, while the other 2 remained, 1 group left HTS just reviving its old name and using its old symbols but in reality there are dozens of small units in Ansar still in HTS which are without any doubt the vast majority, this information is easily available online. Takinginterest01 (talk) 02:40, 24 September 2018 (UTC)


 * OK, so maybe we need to cite the sources that say that, on this and the specific WP pages? BobFromBrockley (talk) 11:03, 24 September 2018 (UTC)

Position of Alwiya al-Furqan?
Right now Alwiya al-Furqan is listed under "HTS and allies". The source given has nothing to do with the topic and only briefly mentions Alwiya al-Furqan. Although an independent Islamist group, it was closer to the FSA than the jihadis; we need a better source to list it as an HTS ally. Bulbajer (talk) 04:50, 4 October 2018 (UTC)
 * I agree. This source says they are aligned to the FSA: https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2018/06/american-threats-promise-to-abort-southern-syrias-negotiations/ Will move. BobFromBrockley (talk) 10:05, 4 October 2018 (UTC)


 * There's no evidence that Alwiya al-Furqan is involved in Idlib (or is even still alive) at all. Until we have one it should be removed altogether. Editor abcdef (talk) 22:13, 4 October 2018 (UTC)


 * You're right. I misread the Reuters piece, which clearly says "in Quneitra", so it should be deleted, unless a RS later reports they are in Idlib. BobFromBrockley (talk) 09:53, 5 October 2018 (UTC)

Be more specific on ideology of groups
Mostly the ideology is https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salafism and jidhadism. What kind of non-islamistic movements do exist in Idlib?
 * Pretty much all of the major remaining rebel groups in Idlib espouse some form of islamist ideology. Where they differ is primarily in wether or not their islamist tendencies are mixed with Syrian nationalism, or with a pan-islamist sentiment (and by this point most groups lean toward the latter). None of the major remaining rebel groups in Idlib espouse secularism, at least to my knowledge. Not to mention that ever since the newest government offensive, the only rebel group left in Idlib that still controls territory directly is HTS, which espouses a fundamentalist islamist ideology. Goodposts (talk) 22:26, 25 August 2019 (UTC)

Deal listed as current
The demilitarization deal is listed as still existing to the present day. Can we really state this to be the case? While the zone is cited every once in a while by either party, usually while accusing the other of some violation, the "demilitarized" zone is a warzone at this moment. The vast majority of the deal's provisions were never enforced and the "DMZ" is currently the subject of an all-out offensive, which includes the capture of a large amount of territory and is currently sitting at several thousand casualties. There are no serious efforts still being made to enforce the DMZ. It does not exist anymore and the offensives being conducted on the zone's territory are very well documented. Unless something changes, I believe it can only be viewed as a historic deal, and not as a present day satus quo. I propose that the article be edited so that the demilitarization deal is listed as having ended either at the beginning of HTS' offensive against the NFL and the other rebel groups on 1 January 2019, or at the very latest - at the start of the govt's northwestern Syria offensive in late April. If the powers that be see fit to re-establish the zone or fulfil some of the deal's conditions, we can edit that in at a later date. After all, there were "de-escalation" deals reached some time ago, that included areas like Daraa, which were also never officially repudiated, but became entirely obsolete as those regions were recaptured by govt forces.

Perhaps we could add a note to the end date of the DMZ, stating that it has never officially been cancelled, but is listed as over due to the fact that none of the parties are abiding by it. I'm interested to hear what you think.

Tagging

Best regards, Goodposts (talk) 15:55, 24 August 2019 (UTC)


 * The deal exists in name, it is referenced by both sides as a justification for the continuation of their fighting, both sides accuse the other of violating the DMZ and wronging the other, and both call on each other to respect the DMZ and halt all military action, it is also referenced by the international community that support a cease-fire in Syria, and it is likely that after the current offensive in Idlib is over it will continued to be referenced and upheld.Takinginterest01 (talk) 18:13, 24 August 2019 (UTC)
 * You are correct, both sides allude to it as a justification for their actions. At the same time, if you try to draw the DMZ using the agreement, you'll find it falls almost entirely within government-controlled areas in the southern part of Idlib, rather than entirely within rebel-held areas, as was the original intention. Fact of the matter is that a lot of the areas that were supposed to be "demilitarized" were subjected to vicious fighting and have since been recaptured by the SAA, rendering their designation as a "demilitarized zone" quite obsolete. This is why I fear listing this as a current and ongoing thing would be very misleading to the casual reader, who would assume that the zone is at least partially in effect. By this point the only part of the deal that is in place are the Turkish observation posts (and due to the ongoing situation at Murak that might also potentially change). I agree that there is likely to be a similar deal after the offensive ends, but the borders of another DMZ would have to be redrawn entirely. Plus, following the offensive, Jaysh al-Izza, the NFL and the rest of the groups deemed 'moderate' by the deal lost all of their previously controlled territories, leaving HTS and it's allies as the only rebel faction still controlling territory in Idlib. That would make this format of deal impossible, as the original intention was to have a zone occupied by the groups deemed 'less radical'. Essentially, the deal would have to be completely reworked. So, I'm thinking - what would be a good way to present all of this complex information to the reader in a short, clear, unambiguous and concise way, without sacrificing accuracy? Goodposts (talk) 18:28, 24 August 2019 (UTC)
 * I don't think the deal would be reworked per se, it would be altered, possibly if not likely to reflect Assad's gains in recent months as well as the role the Turkish and Russian militaries would play in it and about to what extent the rebels will be allowed to keep their heavy weapons in the area. I understand and agree it could be confusing to a casual reader, the Syrian civil war itself is a very complex and difficult topic to cover with a lot of bias, conflicting reports, and shifting allegiances and stances, any new cease-fire that comes from the recent offensive would be built on the current agreement, and the current agreement is referenced by individuals such as Vladimir Putin and Erdogan, but I think if we look towards the Korean conflict where the war never actually ended despite the DMZ it is a bit easier to understand, seeing how despite the UN-backed DMZ and presences of American troops in the DMZ cross-border shelling and armed clashes were a common occurrence and there was no official end to the war, which is very similar to the Syrian situation in Idlib and surrounding rebel held areas outside of Afrin and the OES zones. Takinginterest01 (talk) 19:10, 24 August 2019 (UTC)
 * True, though the Korean DMZ did keep it's borders, while the Idlib one did not. Perhaps we could actually flip my proposal around - instead of ending it with a note, leaving it as "present" with a note clarifying that most of it's clauses have not been fulfiled long past the deadline, that a considerable chunck of the DMZ has been recaptured by government forces, and that airstrikes and armed confrontations are still going on on a daily basis. Goodposts (talk) 20:10, 24 August 2019 (UTC)
 * I would either put an end date (30 April 2019 - start of the Syrian gov. offensive) or leave "present" but with a note that even though its considered to be still in effect its de-facto not implemented and dead. EkoGraf (talk) 16:01, 25 August 2019 (UTC)
 * My thoughts exactly. Goodposts (talk) 16:54, 26 August 2019 (UTC)


 * I support this RopeTricks (talk) 20:57, 29 August 2019 (UTC)