Talk:Imperial Japanese Navy/Archive 1

Netherlands
I changed the use of Holland in "(especially Southeast Asian oil and raw materials) that were far away, and controlled by foreign countries (Britain, the United States and Holland)" in the paragraph of interwar years into "the Netherlands" as that is the only correct name of this nation or it's predecessors! check the Netherlands naming conventions for more information--Ameer&trade; 11:11, 28 January 2006 (UTC)

The "Characters for 'Imperial Japanese Navy' " image
Since this navy does not exist after 1947, isn't it better that one used the "Kyujitai" (see the characters near the top of the article) there instead, which is the form used before 1947? The characters in the image would not have been used at all at the time of the army's existence. -- KittySaturn 00:24, 28 January 2006 (UTC)


 * Corrected. Thanks for the comment. PHG 12:59, 28 January 2006 (UTC)

Slight reorder
May I suggest that the "Japanese Military" template be moved from "See Also" to the top of the page, as it is on the Imperial Japanese Army page. It includes ensign of the Japanese Navy, though smaller.

I didn't want to change it without asking for other's opinions, due to the article's featured status.--Lewk_of_Serthic 02:53, 29 January 2006 (UTC)


 * Hi Sir Lewk. It's kind of a clumsy, incomplete template box, and above all non-standard (there's somewhere a Wiki definition for template boxes as having to be strictly chronological and so on). Since it exists, it is a plus, but I suggest we should rather keep it at the bottom of the page. Regards. PHG 03:54, 29 January 2006 (UTC)

Admiral Yi
I added the fact that Admiral Yi was the deity of the navy. Is something wrong with that? Here is my site:


 * http://www.e-paranoids.com/y/yi/yi_sun_sin.html
 * Many other sites say the exact same thing, and I know that Wikipedia once had the same statement posted. -Wikimachine-


 * You are wrong. I have read that before battle of Tsushima, admiral Togo visited Yi's mousoleum and prayed for victory. That's all. Each of major IJN ships had a small altar  dedicated to Amaterasu. --Ypacaraí 00:52, August 24, 2005 (UTC)


 * I serched for the story of Adm.Yi and Adm.Togo, and found above episode (Adm.Togo prayed to Adm.Yi) is baseless. There are other legends on relation of those admirals but generally they are baseless. --Ypacaraí 04:27, August 24, 2005 (UTC)


 * Since the Yi Sunshin utterance of Admiral Togo does not have a basis, it desires to delete from the text. (There is no record in all the points of the time of an utterance, a place, an object, and a recording medium, and it inquires with creation from a novel. An utterance does not exist in the quotation sauce of the text, either.)Yasumi 06:48, 15 March 2006 (UTC)


 * Let's clear some stuffs out, my fellow Ypacarai.


 * "Each of major IJN ships had a small altar  dedicated to Amaterasu" does not prove my statement wrong.


 * You do not have any evidences to support your argument (but I do), and, therefore (this is to all other Wikipedians as well), until you have found evidence to disprove my claim, leave what I have edited alone. -Wikimachine-


 * See Talk:Yi Sun-sin --Ypacaraí 22:27, August 26, 2005 (UTC)


 * Hi Wikimachine. Any Wikipedian has the right to challenge what you write, and ask you to back-up your claims. Can you provide a few more independent proof (beyond Korean sites, which might be biased on such a subject)? Regards. PHG 22:15, 26 August 2005 (UTC)

Satsuma vs. Dreadnought error
This page incorrect in stating that the battleship Satsuma was the first 'all-big-gun' warship to be designed, laid down, and (it seems to suggest) launched in the world, and glaringly wrong in charging that she preceded the Dreadnought by a year. As is noted on Dreadnought's page, she was ordered in 1905, laid down on October 2, 1905, and launched on February 10, 1906. Meanwhile, the page for Satsuma shows that she was designed (and presumably ordered) in 1904, laid down in May, 1905, and launched on the 15th November, 1906 - and not completed until March 1910.

Now, the Royal Navy is hardly likely to order a ship that has yet to be designed (in fact, designs for 'all-big-gun' warships had been floating around for quite a while by this point), so we may presume that the design for Dreadnought existed prior to her 1905 order date - which it infact did; next, while Satsuma was laid down before Dreadnought, the difference between the two dates is less then 5 months, not a year; thirdly, as is shown elsewhere on this very website (and backed up in print) Dreadnought was launched 9 months before Satsuma; finally, while Dreadnought was commissioned into service in December, 1906, while Satsuma wasn't even completed until March of 1910.

Given this, exactly how did the author of this article come to the conclusion that Satsuma was "the first ship in the world to be designed and laid down as an "all-big-gun" battleship, one year before the British HMS Dreadnought"? This is misleading at best, and is otherwise downright false.

It is a shame that such an inaccurate piece of information could exist within a featured article. I would change the entry myself, but that seemed like the sort of thing that might start an argument, so I'm leaving it up to the author or other editors to work out what to do with this.

Rik


 * Thanks for the comments. So the Satsuma was ordered about one year before the Dreadnought (I don't have the exact months yet), and therefore also apparently designed about one year before (since, as you point out, designs normally precede orders), especially as the British Navy only moved in reaction to foreign interest in "All big gun battleships": "Aware of developments abroad, the commitee concluded quickly; design was rushed and the keel laid down in October 1905" Jane's Battleships p100), and laid-down 5 months before. So a more exact wording would be something like "Satsuma was "the first ship in the world to be designed and laid down as an "all-big-gun" battleship, about one year before the British HMS Dreadnought", although I agree the "concept" of all-big guns had been around since 1903 (Cuniberti concept). Regards PHG 21:25, 23 March 2006 (UTC)

Hat off
Whoever wrote this page, good work. I'm impressed. FWBOarticle


 * Same here. Very nice and detailed article. The image-work is fantastic. Aaрон Кинни  (t) 13:11, 1 August 2006 (UTC)

Mass obsolescence?
I recently read that, by the early 1940s, the Japanese fleet was experiencing "mass obsolescence", ie a significant proportion of its fleet was becoming out-dated at the same time (destroyers were a particular example). Given the strategy of qualitative advantage, this would have been serious. The article doesn't refer to this, so is it a valid point? Folks at 137 08:15, 27 September 2006 (UTC)


 * It would be an interesting fact. Would you have a few references? I suppose it was not the case for aircraft carriers, and for destroyers, I think they were actually at the forefront in the 30s (and were the quite efficient tactical workhorse of the Navy during the war, especially with torpedoes that were never surpassed) Regards PHG 09:02, 27 September 2006 (UTC)


 * I'll look for the quotes. I did a quick rummidge through : 70 of the Japanese destroyers in 1940 (approx) were 10+ years old (incl 20 Fubuki). Age isn't everything, but presumably they would not be up to date. According to Type 93 torpedo, "long-lance" was deployed in 1935: would the older destroyers be able to use it - did they? Folks at 137 10:30, 27 September 2006 (UTC)


 * The relevant text is in "The Second World War in the East" by H P Wilmott, pub 1999, pages 45-47. The author notes that "at the outbreak of the Pacific war the Imperial Navy was owner of 111 destroyers. Of this total thirty - the twelve Minekaze class members of the 1917, 1918, 1919 and 1920 programmes, three Momi class members of the 1918 and 1920 programmes, six Wakatake class members of the 1921 programme and nine members of the Kamikaze clas programme ..." He goes on to detail another 31 destroyers from programmes in the 1920s and 1931. Wilmott points out that the modern Yugumo and Akizuki classes would only have replaced ageing units and overall numbers would actually decline, particularly worrying given US naval expansion. For a navy that sought its edge from quality, this was serious. He also points out that he found no documentary evidence to support an official "go-now-or-never" policy but "the reality is noted". Not sure of the situation with capital ships. Folks at 137 08:31, 20 October 2006 (UTC)

Combined Fleet
Technically, "Combined Fleet" did not refer to the whole of Imperial Japanese Navy, but rather its main fighting force. Ordinarily, Combined Fleet was not a permanent organization, but a temporary one lasting only for the duration of wartime, with its constituent units going back to their peacetime assignments at the conclusion of hostilities. However, some time before World War 2, it did become a more or less permanent organization--although I can't remember the details. The source for this information is the book Kaigun by David Evans and Mark Peattie, Naval Institute Press. h27kim 10:39pm, December 19 2006 (PST)

What's up, doc?
I rewrote this:
 * "The Imperial Japanese Navy was faced, before and during World War II, with considerable challenges, probably more so than any other navy in the world. Japan, like Britain, was almost entirely dependent on foreign resources to supply its economy, so that the Imperial Japanese Navy had to secure and protect sources for raw material (especially Southeast Asian oil and raw materials) that were far away, and controlled by foreign countries (Britain, the United States and the Netherlands). To achieve this goal, she had to build large warships capable of a long range.


 * "To achieve Japan’s expansionist policies, the Imperial Japanese Navy also had to fight off the largest navies in the world (The 1922 Washington Naval Treaty allotted a 5/5/3 ratio for the navies of Britain, the United States and Japan). She was therefore numerically inferior and her industrial base for expansion was limited (in particular compared to the United States). Her battle tactics therefore tended to rely on technical superiority (fewer, but faster, more powerful ships), and aggressive tactics (daring and speedy attacks overwhelming the enemy, a recipe for success in her previous conflicts).

to this:
 * "The Imperial Japanese Navy was faced, before and during World War II, with considerable challenges, probably more so than any other navy in the world. Japan, like Britain, was almost entirely dependent on foreign resources to supply its economy. To achieve Japan’s expansionist policies, IJN had to secure and protect distant sources of raw material (especially Southeast Asian oil and raw materials), controlled by foreign countries (Britain, the United States and the Netherlands). To achieve this goal, she had to build large warships capable of long range.


 * "This was in conflict with Japan's doctrine of "decisive battle" (a doctrine did not require long range), in which IJN would allow the U.S. to sail across the Pacific, using submarines to weaken it, then force a battle against the U.S. in a "decisive battle area", near Japan, after inflicting such attrition. This is in keeping with the theory of Alfred T. Mahan, a doctrine to which every major navy subscribed before World War Two, in which wars would be decided by engagements between opposing surface fleets (as they had been for over 300 years). It was the basis for Japan's demand for a 70% ratio (10:10:7) at the Washington Naval Conference, which would give Japan superiority in the "decisive battle area", and the U.S.'s insistence on a 60% ratio, which meant parity. Japan, unlike other navies, clung to it even after it had been demonstrated to be obsolete.


 * "It was also in conflict with her past experience. Japan's numerical and industrial inferiority led her to seek technical superiority (fewer, but faster, more powerful ships), qualitative superiority (better training), and aggressive tactics (daring and speedy attacks overwhelming the enemy, a recipe for success in her previous conflicts). She failed to take account of the fact her opponents in the Pacific War did not face the political and geograpical constraints of her previous wars, nor did she allow for losses in ships and crews.

And rewrote to this:


 * "Gripped by faulty Mahanian doctrine and the lure of "decisive battle", Japan did not invest significantly on defensive organization: she needed to protect her long shipping lines against enemy submarines, which she never managed to do, particularly under-investing in the vital role of antisubmarine warfare (both escort ships and escort aircraft carriers), and in the specialized training and organization to support it. "

I also added these: Trekphiler 03:19, 12 February 2007 (UTC)

"great difficulty in developing new and more competitive designs during the war"
I read in a book on WW II Japanese aircraft that, almost like Germany, they did develop advanced airplanes but were not able to produce them in large quantities. (Germany charted out the whole coourse of Cold War aircraft.) They did have jet engines and high speed fighters. There seems to have been very little gasoline toward the end, so little that the US took the defensive armament off the B 29 (an aircraft that was in mass scale production with known weaknesses). 03:05, 29 January 2006 (UTC)


 * You have a point. Maybe we could add a line on these special weapon developments. PHG 06:15, 29 January 2006 (UTC)
 * I added a paragraph on jet-propulsion aircraft development, particularly the Nakajima Kikka. PHG 08:57, 29 January 2006 (UTC)

Actually, if memory serves, the B-29 didn't have to have a lot of firepower because it flew high enough that it was out of range of most japanese defensive aircraft. Raul654 09:37, 30 January 2006 (UTC)


 * No, actually B-29 was most heavily armed bomber of WWII. It even had remote controlled gun turrets.  The bomber did fly very high initially ~30,000ft where Japanese couldn't intercept, but this produced terrible accuracy, so they started to fly them lower. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 170.148.10.43 (talk) 20:25, 26 March 2007 (UTC).

Contradict
The 1st paragraph in the intro says it lasted untill 1947, but the second one states that it was "officially dissolved" in 1945. 68.39.174.238 (talk) 03:42, 18 January 2008 (UTC)


 * Thanks for catching the discrepancy. As far as I know, it was officially dissolved following the renunciation of the use of force by Japan in 1947. Regards. PHG (talk) 20:06, 24 January 2008 (UTC)

Japanese navy redirect
Should Japanese Navy really redirect here? Wouldn't it be better as a disambiguation page pointing towards both the IJN and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force? I know when I typed in japanese navy I was looking for the current japanese naval force. Passingtramp (talk) 01:37, 19 March 2008 (UTC)


 * Ignore that. Turns out it was just Japanese navy, not Japanese Navy, which was redirecting. Passingtramp (talk) 01:40, 19 March 2008 (UTC)

Image Caption
It says "the ensign of the Imperial Japanese Navy." I was just wondering if maybe it should say insignia? Ensign beedrill (talk) 18:51, 28 August 2008 (UTC)

WW II Battleships
In the general section of Battleships in WWII, the text states that the battleships Yamashiro and Fuso were crippled by destroyer attacks before Oldendorf fired on them. I have no independent reference to cite, but the Wikipedia portion of the Wikipedia article discussing said battle says that Fuso was blown in half and sunk by the destroyer attacks, not crippled. This seems to imply that Oldendorf didn't fire at Fuso at all.71.33.215.81 (talk) 19:21, 28 March 2009 (UTC)Dave Frishman, dfrishman@aol.com

IJN vs the IJA
I can't see anything about the hostility between the Navy and the Army, if you watch Tora! Tora! Tora! then you learn why they don't like each other, the Navy thought the Army were warmongers who didn't know anything about war and its consequences, and the Army didn't like the Navy's motives (which is why they tried to get Yamamoto assasinated)m w (talk) 21:39, 17 August 2009 (UTC)Phthinosuchusisanancestor I can't see anything about the hostility between the Army and Navy, if you watch Tor

Disambiguations
There are too much disambiguations in the begin this article. I think we should reduce them.--AM (talk) 14:34, 9 December 2009 (UTC)

Image - Anachronism?
There is a problem with one of the images: The landing of the Japanese marines from the Unyo at Ganghwa Island, Korea, in the 1875 Ganghwa Island incident. The Japanese troops here land under the Kyokujitsu-ki (Morning Sun) flag (the one with sun rays). At the time of Ganghwa incident that was still an Army flag. There is another woodblock print showing this incident: The landing of the forces of the Unyo at Ganghwa Island. Here the troops land under historically correct naval battalion flag while the ship sports - also historically correct - Hinomaru. Does anybody knows where did this picture (The landing of Japanese marines...) actually come from? The source quoted is somehow vague - "Saigo Takamori and Okubo Toshimichi"??? The article is great btw!

Wirza (talk) 06:57, 15 January 2010 (UTC)

Japanese "Phantom Ships"
The translation of the written Japanese language (letters=characters) have resulted in what the authors of the book entitled Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1869-1945 described as the rise of "Phantom" ships (Reference: Preface Page of said book). That is to say, the publication of Japanese warships that didn't really exist (due to mis-spelling). Have corrected some of the names on certain Japanese warships with referenced sources. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.105.32.38 (talk) 18:24, 9 February 2011 (UTC)

Possible bias?
Is it just me, or does the World War II section seem slightly biased? --Inhuman14 19:33, 7 October 2007 (UTC)

I agree with this editor and I will remove all instances of bias in the WWII section as well as sections deficient for other reasons. I will go through them sentence by sentence.   "In order to combat the numerically superior American navy, the IJN devoted large amounts of resources to creating a force superior in quality,[86] the objective being of "making up for quantity by means of quality"" First of all, the acronym IJN should not be used. What does this sentence mean? And what does it imply? Does it mean that the IJN actually created a force superior in quality? Or does it signify its intent? The sentence is vague, and could mean either. I will change this so that the IJN's aspirations are clearly shown as mere aspirations, not a state it actually achieved.  "while Allied navies were devastated during the conquest of South East Asia." This sentence is hugely misleading. Allied 'navies' first of all were not in South East Asia for the most part. The Royal Navy was needed in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, and the US Navy was recovering from Pearl Harbor. Second, they suffered some losses but not to such an extent that one could use the charged word "devastated" without qualification.  "In April 1942, the Indian Ocean raid drove the Royal Navy from Asia.[96]" This is simply wrong. The Royal Navy's Eastern Fleet relocated to the Maldives. This information can be found on wikipedia itself. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Fleet  "During 1943 the Allies were able to reorganize their forces and American industrial strength began to turn the tide of the war." The same "source" that got #3 wrong got this terribly wrong as well. IJN lost all of its major battles in 1942, lost 4 of its 6 carriers and several large gunships. As the source appears extremely unreliable, I will remove all claims supported by Evans & Peattie.  The constant referral to American industrial power seems gratuitous at best, and at worst tends to imply that the US navy would not have prevailed except for its industrial power. I don't see the point of this referral other than to affirm the bias this article very clearly shows.  I will wait one week for replies and discussion. If no one objects in a substantial manner, I will remove all sentences tending to bias. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Pensiveneko (talk • contribs) 23:15, 2 May 2015 (UTC)


 * ♠You're going to need more than your opinion to counter Peattie & Evans. They're right. RN was driven off the continent (Singapore) to the Maldives. American production was essential to victory (tho, yes, superior American crew training methods, enabling easy replacement of losses, was very important & deserves a mention)
 * ♠Use of "navies" may be inapt, but the fleets in place were shattered by IJN attacks, & that's not in question.
 * ♠You seem to think Japanese losses were entirely one-sided & the Allied victories came at no cost. How & when, exactly, did this happen? It took time to replace losses & build the superiority to defeat Japan--& that had to wait until 1943, since (for example) the Essexes would not start appearing in numbers until about November (which is why Nimitz's counterattack had to wait). (I'll leave off how bad the Mark XIV was; it wasn't as big a deal as commonly thought.) If you don't know that, you ought to think twice about "removing bias".  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  17:58, 4 May 2015 (UTC)

Responding to your three points in order: To say that RN was driven off the continent and there off "Asia" is pendantism of the worst sort and serves no purpose other than to inflate IJN's accomplishments beyond what was historical. RN still had influence over the Indian Ocean, whether it was stationed on an island or on Singapore. At this point, the decision we are facing seems to be over the purpose of this article: does it exist to inform, or does it exist to celebrate the Imperial Japanese Navy whether through facts or through fiction? Use of "navies" is more than inapt, it is misleading. It suggests that the IJN was able to defeat the US and British navies, when in fact it faced the smallest portions that could be spared in the early months of the Pacific War. I am pointing out the error in asserting that the US navy had to wait until 1943 to achieve rough parity in the Pacific. In fact the IJN was effectively destroyed in 1942, and this did not happen through magic or accidents. Japanese losses were not entirely one-sided, but that's not what the article as it stands imply. It implies rather that the IJN dominated the Pacific in 1942, and the USN only fought back in 1943 when the US industry allowed it to outnumber the IJN. That is patently and grossly false.  In any case I am not interested in engaging in a debate. That is not the purpose of the talk pages. My main goal is rather to suggest that the article be written without biases. This can be done by: 1. Removing outright falsehoods; 2. Rewording sections in a more neutral manner; 3. Removing claims to superiority that can neither be proven nor disproved. Any debate henceforth should focus on how best to accomplish these goals, not whether the US navy destroyed the IJN in 1942 or 1943.