Talk:Indian Ocean raid

Merge
It has been suggested that Japanese Raids into Indian Ocean be merged into this article or section.

The articles deal with the same subject and events- Vikrant Phadkay

I agree the articles should be merged. Rakeshsharma 00:50, 16 December 2006 (UTC)

Results section
The results makes a number of claims/analysis which express an opinion. These should all have a citations from an attributable source, none more so than "and its occupation would have made the British position in India untenable". --Philip Baird Shearer 18:35, 15 March 2007 (UTC)

RAF attack on the Japanese carrier force
An episode that is missing here is an air attack on the Japanese carrier fleet by 9 British Bristol Blenheim bombers on April 9. No hits were scored, but what happened to the Blennheims is not entirely clear to me. The Tabular record of movement of the Japanese battleship Hiei from www.combinedfleet.com (probably constructed from mostly Japanese and American sources) states that five were lost to the combat air patrol of Zeroes:

''9 April 1942: At 0600, the Striking Force launches 91 "Val" dive-bombers and 41 "Zeke" fighters, led by Cdr Fuchida, to attack the British naval base at Trincomalee, Ceylon. They find the harbor empty, but wreck the base's facilities and shoot down nine planes. The HARUNA launches a "Dave" floatplane that spots an enemy carrier 65 miles south of the base. At 0900, the Striking Force launches 90 aircraft that sink the old light carrier HMS HERMES and the Australian destroyer HMAS VAMPIRE. Nagumo's aircraft also find and sink the corvette HMS HOLLYHOCK, depot ship HMS ATHELSTANE and the oiler BRITISH SERGEANT. '''During the day, nine of the Royal Air Force’s No. 11 Squadron’s Bristol "Blenheim" bombers attack Nagumo's Force. They score no hits and lose five of their number to the Striking Force's Combat Air Patrol "Zekes". BatDiv 3 and the Striking Force depart the Indian Ocean through the Straits of Malacca for Singapore.'

However a rather old book on the Pacific war I've read (that contained some myths and errors, but possibly used British sources) stated that the Japanese were so surprised that no Blennheims were lost.

Veljko Stevanovich 22. 7. 2007. 19:45 UTC+1

The official UK war history - War at Sea 1939-1945, by Roskill - says on page 28 of Vol II (available online at http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-RN-II/UK-RN-II-1.html): "Nine R.A.F. Blenheims of No. 11 Squadron - all we had to strike back with - took off to find the enemy; but they got no hits, and five of their number were lost." Scartboy (talk) 18:59, 28 May 2011 (UTC)

Japanese air loses
The entry as it is currently written says that the English claimed to have shot down 18 Japanese air craft but the Japanese only "admitted" to losing five. There could certainly have been confusion about both sides' losses back in 1942, and both sides could have claimed more kills than they scored while not admitting all of their own, but that was almost 70 years ago and there is no need now for propaganda claims one way or the other. Are the English records available to document the English losses? Are the Japanese records available to document the Japanese loses? Books have been published in recent years that use the day-by-day records of both sides to document these things in detail. Maybe one of you who has the information can provide that information. (71.22.47.232 (talk) 04:08, 27 December 2010 (UTC))

Roskill in the official UK history of WWII (War at Sea 1939-1945 Vol II) says of the Japanese air attack on Colombo:

"Forty-two fighters took off to meet the enemy, and in the fierce air fighting which followed seven attackers were destroyed for the loss of nineteen of our own aircraft."

Commenting on the outcome of the whole operation, he says:

"At the time we believed that the defending fighters had inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese carrier planes, especially over Colombo; but it is now plain that the claims were greatly exaggerated. According to Japanese records the whole operation only cost them seventeen aircraft."

Source: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-RN-II/UK-RN-II-1.html, Pages 26-28

I don't have more precise citations for the losses, so I haven't changed the article text. Scartboy (talk) 19:13, 28 May 2011 (UTC)

Losses section
How about adding the amount of wounded/dead to the casualties and losses section, instead of just talking about planes and boats? GrimmC (talk) 17:38, 7 December 2011 (UTC)

Moved from article
However, the expected Japanese invasion of Ceylon never took place; the First Carrier Striking Force was recalled to Japan, due to events far away in the Pacific. The Doolittle Raid of 18 April 1942 was the first air raid by the U.S. on the Japanese home islands during World War II. The totally unexpected raid on Tokyo, the capital and home of the Emperor, caused little damage, but had strong effects in the Japanese High Command. U.S. bombers had flown near the Imperial Palace, insulting their Emperor; more important was their realization that the home islands were now vulnerable to U.S. air attack. The Imperial Japanese Navy had responsibility for securing the ‘Pacific Frontier’, thus would have to fix the problem. Their Commander in Chief—Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto—now took charge of a complex operation, which would involve the taking of Midway Island, with the luring of U.S. Navy aircraft carriers into a fatal battle. Instead, in June 1942, the U.S. Navy would turn the tables and all four aircraft carriers of the First Striking Force would be sunk at the Battle of Midway, thus depriving the IJN of the ability to conduct long range strategic attacks.

This is really dubious stuff:


 * The British may have guessed that an invasion was coming, but this text implies that they were right - which is something I've never heard. Ceylon would have taken a lot of troops to secure, and the IJA was at this point fiercely opposed to any more dispersion of its forces from what they considered to be the main theatre in China. Ceylon was also very far from the main Japanese bases of supply, and they were very short of shipping, etc etc. So far as I know, no Ceylon invasion was contemplated - not even in the airy, map-table sense that invasions of Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia were planned.


 * The text implies that the Doolittle raid caused a hasty recall of Japanese forces; in fact, when word of the Doolittle raid reached it, the main Japanese force was between the Philippines and Taiwan, headed for home base. They actually made a high-speed dash to try and cut off the American raiders but never made contact.


 * As for the Midway stuff, it's mostly true but also basically irrelevant. It's not true or even meaningful that "all four aircraft carriers of the First Striking Force" were sunk, as there was no force designated "First Striking Force," and Kido Butai was an informal tactical designation that did not apply to any particular group of ships over time. Nor is it clearly true that IJN lost the ability to conduct long-range strategic attacks -- what then were the Solomons battles?

TiC (talk) 21:45, 21 August 2012 (UTC)

The usual procedure for removing material is to discuss it first, and/or edit the article with a in the sections of the article that you believe are incorrect. You can also add footnotes to explain (for example your Kido Butai contentions) that alternate sources dispute the current wording. The IJN did plan an invasion of Ceylon: "The Combined Fleet intended also to destroy the British Eastern Fleet and capture Ceylon (today, Sri Lanka) and thereby extend Japanese power over the central Indian Ocean. This in turn would protect the western flank of the East Indies and thereby allow the Combined Fleet to deal with the U.S.Pacific Fleet. The Combined Fleet presented this plan to the Naval General Staff, which brought it to the attention of the army. The army supported eliminating the British fleet from the Indian Ocean and cooperating with the Germans in the Middle East but protested that the capture of Ceylon would be premature.Army leaders were concerned that if they agreed that troops were available, the navy might divert their scarce resources for Pacific operations. Because of the army’s objections and the lack of response from Germany, IGHQ decided to limit..."  and the British were fairly certain that an invasion would take place, and you can read a summary of the operation and British fears here:, pages 20-31.Damwiki1 (talk) 01:09, 22 August 2012 (UTC)


 * Context implies (I think?) that you intend that quote to refute what I wrote, but it's a detailed confirmation of what I just said. The IJN apparently did come up with what I called "airy, map-table" ideas about conquering Ceylon, but they were nowhere near even having a real plan, let alone the logistical train and the IJA troops to make it happen, and the notion was quickly scotched. (For some reason you cut the quote off right at "IGHQ decided to limit operations in the Indian Ocean to massive raids by the 1st Air Fleet"?)
 * Same with the Hyperwar link you reccommended; yes, it does discuss British fears of invasion (which of course belong in the article, which is why I left that stuff in it), but it goes on to say "But the Japanese actually had no further designs for conquest in the Indian Ocean. Nagumo's carriers returned to Japan after the raid on Trincomalee, to prepare for operations in the central Pacific..."
 * So am I just misunderstanding your point or what gives? TiC (talk) 02:39, 22 August 2012 (UTC)
 * You wrote "So far as I know, no Ceylon invasion was contemplated..." and I presented a reference to show that you are wrong on that point. I am not disagreeing with the rest of your contentions, but I thought you might want to read a summary of the operation from the British PoV, which would also provide you with some sources if you wanted to add additional references to the article. Damwiki1 (talk) 03:38, 22 August 2012 (UTC)

Damwiki1, I believe you've mischaracterized your own source. The Japanese Navy wanted to invade Ceylon, the Japanese Army refused to provide the necessary divisions, and that was that. Your own source says so; Willmott says so; and every other historian of the war against Japan that I'm familiar with has said so. The Doolittle raid had nothing to do with the failure to invade Ceylon and I support TiC's decision to remove the paragraphs.

And while we're discussion recent edits: I, too, have never heard Kido Butai described as the Fast Carrier Strike Force. I've only heard that term applied to the American carrier force of 1944 onwards. --Yaush (talk) 13:47, 22 August 2012 (UTC)

Japanese unopposed in the Indian Ocean?
The article states in the beginning that:

"The Japanese under Chūichi Nagumo compelled the Allied (largely Royal Navy) forces to retreat to East Africa, leaving the Japanese unopposed in the Indian Ocean."

Later on it refers to the Japanese "mastery of the Indian Ocean," etc.

What does that even mean? After the Indian Ocean Raids, the IJN carried out exactly zero major operations in the Indian Ocean. The British Eastern Fleet, meanwhile, carried out Operation Ironclad in May 1942, one month after the Indian Ocean Raids. The Indian Ocean was open to British shipping, not so to Japanese shipping.

These bizarre and nonsensical statements about Japanese mastery of the Indian Ocean run contrary to known facts and are unsupported by any facts, arguments, or scholarship. They should be stricken from the article. 216.214.188.112 (talk) 20:14, 2 September 2015 (UTC)

I quite agree.The IJN was able to gain temporary superiority, in early April 1942, by using almost their entire fast carrier force but the Royal Navy was always ready to engage smaller raiding forces.Damwiki1 (talk) 07:54, 3 September 2015 (UTC)

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Categorization of Hermes
I don't think that the RN much bothered with characterizing their carriers as fleet, escort or whatever until they started design work on the Colossus and Majestic classes which they official designated as light fleet carriers. So I'm gonna remove light, escort or fleet from the article entirely.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 22:57, 9 January 2019 (UTC)

Hermes and other small carriers such as Ryujo were "...Small and lightly built in an attempt to exploit a loophole in the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922..." (Wiki article on Ryujo and in that sense they were always considered light carriers since they were built to a very restricted tonnage. I think the article should call these two ships light carriers to reflect these facts.Damwiki1 (talk) 22:02, 11 January 2019 (UTC)
 * Good thinking on that; never crossed my mind to look there. I'll see the IP editor responds; if not, I'll change both of them to light carriers.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 03:27, 12 January 2019 (UTC)