Talk:Japanese battleship Nagato

image query
I am looking at the article and some of the pictures show a ship with two funnels while others show it with one. The Nagato class page has a single funnel. Are the images incorrect? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.100.208.147 (talk) 21:31, 30 July 2022 (UTC)
 * The forward funnel was eliminated when she was rebuilt in the 1930s.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 23:29, 30 July 2022 (UTC)

Are all Japanese battleships destroyed?
Nagato, the last surviving Japanese battleship … capsized and sank Do I understand this correctly – do no Japanese battleships from the period survive to this day? Somehow I think that's a shame. Shinobu (talk) 15:46, 9 June 2008 (UTC)


 * None of the Japanese battleships from WWII survive today. Admiral Togo's flagship at the Battle of Tsushima (1905?), the Mikasa, is preserved as a museum ship at Yokosuka, Japan, and is the only one of its type, pre-dreadnought battleship, surviving in the world today.Naaman Brown (talk) 14:55, 15 October 2008 (UTC)

1st picture
I'm not too impressed with the photograph above the info box - its got no caption (probably because the accompanying description has no information other than the ship's name), no where, when, etc and it has more than a hint of a double image. The line drawing might be better. But I am reluctant to change it without consensus. What do others think?

RASAM (talk) 20:05, 11 January 2011 (UTC)
 * Changed it out a few months back. Just noticed your note now. Gunbirddriver (talk) 04:13, 15 June 2011 (UTC)

Assets protected for important actions
The Japanese had a limited number of major assets, and were unable to produce more. They spent a fair amount of time at safe anchorages to protect them from unnecessary loss, the primary fear being submarine attack, which became a greater and greater threat as the war ground on. Despite their effective use of the aircraft carrier through the first six months of the war, the carrier being the main source of power projection was not understood by the higher command structure. Younger officers like Minoru Genda well understood the importance of airpower in naval engagements, and was to have said the battleship force was useful for little more than building piers with, but even Yamamoto held the belief that the war would be won by a decisive battle fought by their battleship forces (note the powerful battle force he was sailing in during the battle of Midway, though he was three hundred miles to the east of the actual fighting). This was true up until Midway, when the American carrier forces so devastated the Japanese without ever providing an opportunity for a surface action. After Midway it was clear that the carrier was the key element of power projection, and the Japanese changed their ideas about supporting their remaining carrier forces. Your thoughts about fuel concerns were certainly a factor as the war dragged on, but the assertion that the battleship was obsolete (though largely true) would have made the admiralty cringe. It was not an idea that they could readily accept, or overtly plan with that as the guiding principle. I believe the lead was better as it was. Gunbirddriver (talk) 04:13, 15 June 2011 (UTC)


 * Surface units at Midway were there either as AA escorts (Kongo class ships with Nagumo's carriers), shore bombardment (Kondo's group) or flagship and reserve (main body) to help any of the above if needed and engage in surface action only if there was no danger from the air (either if bad weather prevented air operations, or the US airpower was destroyed). There could be no other employment for them and Yamamoto, himself a former carrier commander knew that very well (as evidenced by his decision to withdraw once Nagumo's carriers were destroyed). The notion that they were kept out of harm's way because they were considered a decisive weapon of naval actions is an assumption often repeated (for instance here http://combinedfleet.com/officers/Isoroku_Yamamoto), but it is plain and simply wrong. It was understood by the top Japanese Naval commanders that the battleship was next to useless as a decisive naval weapon in the world of carriers due to it's shorter hitting range and slow speed - At Tsushima, greater hitting RANGE of Japanese battleships helped them to decisive victory - in 1937 the AIRCRAFT CARRIER, with more advanced and destructive aircraft had that kind of superior RANGE in relation to battleships. They could see the huge allied losses to Naval airpower in 1941 and 1942, all the while those IJN battleships that were committed to surface actions barely found anything to attack (damaged USS Edsall near Indonesia). They were committed to shore bombardment at Guadalcanal only after both carrier fleets exhausted themselves at Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz. Just look at the Japanese battle plan at Marianas - a LONG RANGE air strike at the US fleet. Battleships would be used only in a special case in which both US and Japanese airfleets depleted themselves or weather turned bad. Otherwise - stay behind.  If I were wrong, then the Japanese Marianas battle plan would have been a battleship rush with carrier aircover (that would end in even greater disaster due to Japanese aircraft and pilot inferiority by that time and battleship vulnerability to air attacks). Their use at Leyte Gulf came out of sheer desperation because there were no other means to even theoretically destroy the invasion fleet, and they actually used the long understood (by both sides) fact that carriers are potentially far superior to battleships to lure the US carriers north with their remaining carriers and it mostly worked.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.208.199.23 (talk) 11:15, 15 June 2011 (UTC)


 * And I think the following passage shows which tye of ship the Japanese trully considered decisive: Just look what types of capital ships they planned to build after 1939. Not a single battleship! And they even converted Shinano to a carrier and Ise class to XCVs.

"In order to maintain parity with United States naval air arm, the Fourth Naval Replenishment Program of FY 1939 authorized the construction of a new fleet carrier named TAIHO. The Third Vinson Plan (i.e. Fleet Expansion Bill) passed in 1940 authorized already three new carriers and in response the Fifth Replenishment Program was hastily drawn up in Japan." http://www.combinedfleet.com/kojinshavolume6.pdf — Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.208.199.23 (talk) 11:28, 15 June 2011 (UTC)
 * I understand what you are saying, but the statement you wrote confers a modern knowledge of carrier warfare to the Japanese High Command from the outset of the war. After Midway it was apparent to the High Command that the carrier was the primary means by which power is projected, and their doctrine changed to match that, but even so not in time for the new doctrine to be implemented at the next major naval engagement, the Battle of the Eastern Solomons.  We need to be careful to avoid filling the the text with our own opinions.  As we are unlikely to agree at this point, we should revert to the earlier wording, and we can each then go about providing supporting references, changing the wording once a clear, supportable statement can be made.  I will revert it for now. Gunbirddriver (talk) 01:01, 16 June 2011 (UTC)


 * Well, everything ever stated is somebody's opinion. The problematic sentence tries to interpret what the Japanese naval staff thought at the time. Unless it's a direct quote from a prominent staff member it is a speculation (and even then he might lie and insert postwar wisdom). But this is supposed to be an encyclopedia and it needs to say what makes the most sense. Forget my interpretations of battleship employment in battles since it indeed might be biased, but the ship orders are not and 1939 is 3 years before Midway. Cancellation of Design A-150 battleship quoting: "With war on the horizon in early 1941, all design work was diverted from battleships" clearly shows that the Japanese understood that the Battleship is no longer a decisive weapon. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.208.199.23 (talk) 06:28, 16 June 2011 (UTC)
 * You are wrong about this, and the references you point to show that is the case. I do not have time right now to go through all this with you, but I will do so.  It is possible that some part of your statement would be worth including, but my guess would be that it would be better placed in the body of the work.  The other point that should be starting to arise is the practice of changing the text when the issue is not clearly supported by the evidence.  You should refrain from changing the text from what is already present when the change has been subjected to a valid challenge.  At this point you should be looking for the references that support your opinion, and only changing the text when you can provide in line citations that support this new wording.  It might also be a good idea to present them here in the discussion so all can review them prior to changing the body of the text.   Gunbirddriver (talk) 03:46, 18 June 2011 (UTC)

The following are a number of different sources that essentially speak of the gradual realization by naval commanders that the war would be a carrier dominated war. This was true for the commands of both the United States and Japan, but the point was brought home harshly to the USN at Pearl Harbor, and to Japan six months later at Midway.

from

"... however, it was not until December 1941 when the Prince of Wales and the Repulse were sunk by Japanese aircraft in the South China Sea and the American battlefleet was severely damaged at Pearl Harbor that the importance of the battleship was seriously questioned." p. 3

"In June of 1942, after the loss of four fleet carriers in the Battle of Midway, the Japanese decided to convert warship #110 to an aircraft carrier to be named Shinano. " p. 78

"The Fifth Fleet Replenishment Program: Five more capital ships were projected by this program - three battleships and two battlecruisers." p. 84

"The last two ships projected in the 1942 program, Warships No. 798 and 799, were to have been battleships of a new design armed with 510mm/45 caliber guns. This was consistent with the Japanese policy of individual superiority, since the Japanese expected the United States would learn the actual armament of the Yamato-class ships when they became operational." p. 85

---

from :

"During the 1930's more senior naval officers began advocating a larger role for carriers. They envisaged carrier aircraft forming the first line of the fleet's defense and dominating its offensive operations, with battleships and auxiliary warships operating in support of the carriers.  Over the course of the six years of World War II, their vision became reality as aircraft carriers supplanted battleships, becoming the new capital ship of the world's fleet." p. 67

"Unlike the Imperial Japanese Navy, the United States Navy made major efforts to increase the numbers of its pilots and establish training programs that would meet the requirements of a major war well before the conflict came." p. 94

---

from :

"Thus, the Japanese believed that bringing greater fire power to bear at decisive ranges they would be able to defeat more numerous opponents. The seeds of this dogma had already been planted during the Navy's formative years, as the Japanese naturally adopted the policies of their mentors, the Royal Navy, which advocated an aggressive attitude toward naval engagements.  But Tsushima cemented the notion that that big guns were the final arbiter of any naval encounter, a belief further reinforced by the clash of heavily armed battle lines at Jutland." p. 404

If you wish to discuss it further you are welcome to comment on my talk page. Gunbirddriver (talk) 00:25, 19 June 2011 (UTC)


 * It strikes me that you (89.110.243.56) are operating under the assumption that Japanese carrier task force groups operated much as the USN operated their carrier task force groups, and that the carrier was placed in a defensive center position, with the surrounding ships adding their guns to the defensive firepower of the group. This is a common misconception, and is addressed in Shattered Sword by Pashall and Tully, who did a great deal of work looking at Japanese carrier doctrine and operational procedures in their work on the battle of Midway.  They state:
 * "It should be noted, too, that contrary to some Midway accounts that describe the Japanese escorts as being in a ring around the carriers, this is not strictly correct. At this point in the war, the concept of a tight ring formation optimized for antiaircraft screening, (i.e. the active defense, via combined gun power, of a capital ship), was unknown to the Japanese.  While the U.S. and the Royal Navy were already using such defensive alignments, ring formations did not appear in Japanese doctrine until mid-1943.  During the course of 4 June, those destroyers that were not assigned as plane guards were pushed out to the extreme perimeter of the formation to act as air-raid warning pickets.  Thus, while the formation might have appeared as a ring from the air, the escorts on the perimeter were there for different purposes than an American ring formation and were much farther out from the high-value assets."    (Shattered Sword  p. 138)
 * Parshall and Tully based their comments on the Japanese Mobile Force Tactics, p. 15 issued by the Yokosuka Kokutai in August 1943.   It matches with the photos we see of the Japanese carriers at Midway, performing violent evasive maneuvers, seemingly alone in the ocean.
 * As to the more central question of the Japanese understanding of the usefulness of battleships as weapons at the start of the conflict, it is directly addressed by the same two authors in their review of the impact that the battle of Midway had on Japanese naval doctrine, as follows:
 * The battle plan for the carrier fleet was changed drastically as well. Much like the agonizing reappraisal that the U.S. Navy had undergone in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, the Imperial Navy now grappled with the doctrinal consequences of its own calamity.  Combined Fleet for the first time now explicitly recognized that the aircraft carrier was "the center, the main objective, of the Decisive Air Battle; surface forces will cooperate with them."  The battle squadrons of the navy were subordinated to the purposes of the carriers - a radical shift in attitude.  Given its earlier triumphs, of course, it is ironic that the Imperial Navy had taken six months longer than its opponents to come to this conclusion.  But from now on, battleships and other screening units were to be directly incorporated into the carrier fleet, and would steam with them to the anticipated battle.  (Shattered Sword  p. 392)
 * This was supported by their review of the Senshi Sōsho, the official Japanese war history documents, whose many volumes were published between 1966 and 1970, all in Japanese. Only recently have these volumes begun to be translated into English.
 * Now, as to the actual use that the Japanese Navy made of the Nagato, and whether or not the Naval command considered her obsolete at the outset of hostilities, those are two different questions. To answer them we should know how the IJN used its naval assets, and in particular what they did with the Nagato.   There were great operational differences between the US Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy.  Much to the surprise of the Japanese, who thought the vast distances of the Pacific Ocean would act as a defensive barrier, the US Navy kept its fleet at sea and on station for extended periods of time.  It was able to do this through the use of forward bases that it built through the course of the war (Majuro, Kwajalein, Enewetak, Ulithi) and squadrons of resupply ships that we constantly convoying back and forth from the forward base and the fleet.  The Japanese had no such capabilities, and as such their fleet would remain in port, conduct training runs and than sortie in force when an operation was scheduled or a threat appeared.  As to the Nagato specifically, we had best refer to the Tabular Record of Movement (TROM) for the ship in question.  I have reviewed it, and clearly the Japanese did not intend to keep the ship cooped up in port, as it was the flagship of the Pearl Harbor attack force, and was also present in the main body at the Battle of Midway.  The next two years the Japanese waited for the opportunity of a decisive battle to present itself, and the ship was stationed either at the naval base at Truk or the base at Lingga, until the fleet sortied again for the disastrous Battle of the Philippine Sea and then again four months later at the desperate Battle of Leyte Gulf, which spelled an end to the Japanese Navy as an effective fighting force. Gunbirddriver (talk) 06:16, 20 June 2011 (UTC)


 * Japanese battleships were not held back because they were obsolescent or because they used too much fuel. They were held back because the strategic aim was to use them for a decisive surface battle. Binksternet (talk) 07:30, 22 June 2011 (UTC)


 * I see no reason to take your word for it, additionally you are wrong. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 89.110.243.56 (talk) 21:42, 30 June 2011 (UTC)
 * You do not have to take any one person's opinion, even the opinion of an editor with a great deal of experience such as Binksternet, but you are expected to provide citations that support your opinion. For example, here is a citation that supports Binksternet's assertion:
 * From: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/ijn.htm
 * Japan developed the concept of “Kantai Kessen” (decisive fleet battle). Kantai Kessen assumed that any war with the United States would be primarily a naval war. Therefore, Japan wanted the fight to be near the Japanese home islands. Japanese naval planning had called for the destruction of American naval strength in a climactic gun duel between battleships - a belief firmly embraced by the other major navies of the day. As technological advances increased the operating range of submarines and aircraft, the operational theater for the interception-attrition operations and the decisive battle had moved eastward, further from Japanese home waters.Throughout the 1920s the Japanese expected the decisive battle to occur near the Ryukyu Islands. By 1940 the Japanese were planning for the decisive battle to be fought in the Marshall Islands. Japan’s traditional defensive strategy was to keep the Combined Fleet in home waters, waiting to attack the US Pacific Fleet as it sailed into the Western Pacific to liberate the Philippines. The Pacific Fleet had to be destroyed in a decisive fleet engagement to force the Americans to negotiate for peace with Japan.


 * The Japanese strategy of waiting to commit their forces in a decisive battle is broadly known. Wikipedia even has an article on it here: Kantai Kessen.


 * The rule of thumb is support the writing you do with supporting references, such as books, articles or other reliable sources. This is especially true if you are asserting something contrary to what has already been placed into wikipedia, and even more so if someone is challenging the validity of the claim.Gunbirddriver (talk) 23:18, 1 July 2011 (UTC)


 * I already stated that I already came across that silly assumption on several places and myself provided one reference but IT IS WRONG - when you look at the manner the Japanese actually used their fleet in war - theory is one thing, practice is something else.


 * So the best thing is to erase the speculative content and write about it if you wish on a page about the Japanese naval staff or strategy in WW2 for instance because that is where it belongs.


 * Oh and by the way that was anything but the Japanese naval strategy in WW2 (and that is what we are discussing here). They knew that they were in disadvantage in numbers (later formalised in the naval treaties with 5:5:3 ratio in capital ships), so the important part of the plan was wearing down the US fleet sailing for Philippines per Plan Orange with submarines, night torpedo attacks and most significantly naval air attacks. BUT THOSE ARE ALL OLD PRE-WAR PLANS, and as Clausewitz said - no plan survives the first contact with the enemy. Besides the manner in which Yamamoto used the first mobile fleet clearly shows that he grasped the importance of aircraft carrier even before the war. He kept the slow bbs (Nagato included) in port because they would contribute little to a carrier battlegroup's realised firepower while slowing the group and depleting the fuel stocks. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 89.110.243.56 (talk) 08:46, 2 July 2011 (UTC)

Diving hiatus?
What is with the last sentences? It says it is one of the most popular diving sites, and then that "diving resumed after a hiatus...". Perhaps some mention of what hiatus, when it started, and why would help make this statement more relevant?.45Colt 19:57, 16 March 2014 (UTC)
 * The link has all the relevant info, but I've deleted all mention of the hiatus as it doesn't seem very important.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 21:41, 16 March 2014 (UTC)

Spelling
This article used to be in British English ("armour", "defence") but now seems to be in USEnglish. Why was it changed? --MarchOrDie (talk) 11:00, 5 December 2018 (UTC)


 * I will agree that an article started by British or American editors should remain in British or American style as originated and not be changed without consensus. Considering British influence on Japanese naval design, here I would support keeping a British tone. -- Naaman Brown (talk) 03:47, 8 December 2018 (UTC)
 * The changes have been piecemeal over quite a period but there was a bit of an orgy of ENGVAR-ignoring editing by the mercifully-shortlived editor 96.41.230.158 on 30 August 2012, dealing with date format and the spelling of armo[u]r. I hate this sort of thing – in either direction – and would support a move back to BrE but not without consensus here.
 * I have not carried out a massive forensic investigation but the history is patchy – AmE date format was used when the article was first established on 11/09/2004 but on 26/10 2004 the word "armour" was first used, spelt thus; on 14/12/2004 "defence' was first used, spelt thus ... and so on. So it depends how you go with the whole ENGVAR thing really, and there is something compelling to me about 's point on the Japanese navy (that is, if you say "Japanese warships" to me I'd often think of Tyneside!) So, as these things often are it's a bit of a mess and open to interpretation. One of my motivations in wanting to push it back to BrE is just on principle, to resist the creeping undermining of ENGVAR which is just sh*t when it is done from either side of the Atlantic. But no-one will die if it does not change, and as I have tried to explain elsewhere over the word "tyre", it is unlikely that anyone will fail to understand the word "armor" which does look quite similar to one that we know in BrE! So we could change it or leave it and either way it will not, really and honestly, affect the price of fish. Best wishes to all DBaK (talk) 11:29, 8 December 2018 (UTC)
 * PS to be fair, I suppose an additional argument that could be made for the status quo could concern the possibility that this is more about US history than that of the UK; that is, that although there were certainly other Allied forces involved in the Pacific theatre, it sounds like (and yes I am no expert) the US were the leaders here. This gives both a historical angle on the appropriateness of AmE or BrE here, as well as the practical angle that it has been worked on, I imagine, by far more AmE editors over the years. This still doesn't mean that I think that stealth changes in defiance of Engvar are in any way right, or that the IP's changes were anything less than idiotic and perhaps dishonest ... just that it's maybe a case for letting sleeping dogs lie. And that, I think, is me done on this topic unless something really crucial comes up! Cheers DBaK (talk) 10:29, 9 December 2018 (UTC)

Operation Crossroads
The battleships expended as nuclear targets in Operation Crossroads (Arkansas, New York, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Nagato) were the only surviving combat battleships of their classes. Arkansas' sister (Wyoming) had been repurposed as a gunnery experimental ship. New York's sister (Texas) had been retired as a war ememorial. The sisters of Nevada and Pennsylvania (Oklahoma and Arizona) were the permanent battleship loses in the Pearl Harbor attack. Nagato's sister (Mutsu) had accidentally exploded in harbor. As the orphan survivors of their classes, they were expendable. But the battleship fleet at Operation crossroads was the third largest battleship fleet in the world at that time, which I found interesting. --Naaman Brown (talk) 03:47, 8 December 2018 (UTC)

Bombed out
I added this photo to Commons recently. Someone just told me that it's the Nagato. . Can anyone confirm that, and if it is, should the pic be used in the article? -- GravityIsForSuckers (talk) 19:54, 27 August 2023 (UTC)