Talk:July Crisis/Archive 1

Extreme Bias
There are a series of errors and omissions and biased positioned expressed in this article that will lead most readers to assign war guilt to Austria-Hungary.

1. Serbia did not fully accept preamble points A, and B (it did however fully accept point C), nor did it fully accept enumerated demands 1-9 although it did accept the rendered nearly meaningles demand #10. Austria-Hungary thought point #8 had also been agreed to, but deceit was involved. Frankly, Serbia response was of little practical value.

2. No mention of the deceitfulness of Serbia's response was mentioned; two especially noteworthy items:  1)Serbia's false expression of "surprise" and 2) Serbia's deceitfulness regarding their inability to locate Milan Ciganovic.

3. The March declaration, which was the International Law basis of the demarche, was not mentioned.

4. Diplomatic exchanges settled on the term "demarche" to characterize the July Ultimatum, but the article sticks to the Entente propaganda term "Ultimatum" making it sound as if war was threatened, when in fact the only stated consequence was the withdrawal of Austria-Hungary's ambassasador. The continued popular use of the term "Ultimatum" of course requires that we cannot just substitute "demarche" for "ultimatum", but "ultimatum" implies an expressed threat of war and this must cleared up.

Added Dec 4, 2008. It seems inconceivable to omit the Hoyos mission to Berlin from an article on the July Ultimatum, so I’ve added a bland paragraph on it. Almost 100 years after these events, can we not achieve enough detachment from them to agree that Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia share heavy responsibility for the outbreak in 1914 of the general war in Europe? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Chateau-Gaillard (talk • contribs) 18:30, 4 December 2008 (UTC)

5. The following sentence is extremely troubling "When Austria-Hungary rejected Serbia's conditional acceptance of part of the ultimatum and declared war, it set into motion a series of events which led to World War I." The facts and causality stated and inferred are inaccurate. First, the chain of events leading to World War I was already in motion. This includes Russia's steps prepratory to war, Serbia's mobilization, Serbia's inadequate response to the ultimatum and of course Serbia's Military Intelligence sponsoring the Sarajevo outrage and other illegal activities against Austria-Hungary and of course the secret to this day discussions at the Franco-Russian summit that concluded on July 23. Second, Austria-Hungary really had no decision to make, it had already committed to break diplomatic relations if the demands were not totally agreed to and they clearly were not. Third, the implied direct link between rejection of the inadequate response and the declaration of war is false. The final order for Austria-Hungary to mobilize against Serbia and to declare war were not made until after Serbian forces were mobilized and the exagerrated reports of the border incident at Temes-Kubin.

6. The long series of assassination attempts and propaganda by Serbia against Austria-Hungary and the conclusions of Austria-Hungary's judicial inquiry were not mentioned. The article leaves the reader with no where to go except to believe that Austria-Hungary wanted a show-down with Serbia for no particular reason other than vengeance in the heat of passion over the assassination of Franz-Ferdinand.

7. The diplomatic requests early on by Austria-Hungary and Germany made directly to Serbia for an investigation by Serbia within its borders of the conspiracy to assassinate Franz-Ferdinand and Serbia's flat rejection and expression of unconcern were not mentioned. Nor were the rejections of (Austria-Hungary's and Germany's) requests to Russia to influence Serbia to investigate.

8. The demands in the preamble are not mentioned.

9. No mention was made that until Serbia received Russia's telegram of support and information of Russia's steps preparatory to war the Serbian Government was drafting a response of complete acceptance of the demands. "...ultimatum was widely considered to be unacceptable, and merely a preliminary measure to create a casus belli to enable Austria-Hungary to invade and punish Serbia" is highly misleading on a number of grounds. Serbia could have accepted but chose not to and if Serbia had accepted it, the implementation of all its points would have been sufficient and no war required. The demarche had a firm basis in fact and in law. Austria-Hungary did not see the rejection of the demarche as necessarily the last step before war. Punishing Serbia though acceptable was not really what Austria-Hungary was after as a state; the real object was simply to remove Serbia as a threat to its territory, property and people.

10. Grey's comments are unnecessary and he may be off the mark. There are a lot of formidable documents. Its better to let the demarche speak for itself or balance it with quotes from British, German or Austro-Hungarian diplomatic telegrams which state that war will not be the necessary result of rejection of the demands.

If someone can adquately address these issues the bias marker can be removed.

Werchovsky 20:54, 17 October 2007 (UTC)

Just as an example I will go into depth about the deceitfulness regarding the expression of surprise the the Serbian Government led by Pasic and quote some documents demonstrating Serbian knowledge of and secret investigation of the assassination. Deceit is a key element of the Serbian reply but instead the article mentions only "reservations". Was this a code word for deceit?

The following document is a report given by the Narodna Obrana to the Serbian caretaker government on or shortly after June 5, 1914. It appears as translated by Vladimir Dedijer in the “Road to Sarajevo” on page 388-389; information in " is added by me, information in "[]" was in the orginal document:                                                           I “On the 19th instant (June 1, 1914 [May 19 old Serbian calendar]) in the evening Miloš Milošević from Janja received two high school students, one of whom was called Triša.” (Triša was a nickname for Trifko Grabež one of the three assassins who was sent with the guns and bombs from Belgrade to Sarajevo.)  “I don’t know where the students were from, but they were Bosnians by birth. Miloš sent the students to Jakov Milović from Obrijezje. Jakov led the students to the teacher V. Čubrilović in Priboj, by Tuzla, and the teacher had to bring them to the trusted agent in Tuzla, whose name is M.J., and M.J. had to take them to Sarajevo.  (This is not quite true, they went on their own from Tuzla to Sarajevo leaving the weapons with M.J. and M.J. later handed off the weapons to the assassin coordinator.) Jakov told Boža (head of the Narodna Odbrana) all this after he escorted the student to Čubrilović. The students carried six hand grenades and four revolvers. The students’ purpose he did not know. The students were sent by the captain of the border guards in Šabac, Rade Popović, and Major Kosta Todorović, and as the students said, they met in Belgrade where they received hand grenades and pistols. The students crossed the border at the Island of Mladen Isaković, and they were brought by the Sergeant of the Border Guards, Grbić. Boža has informed all the agents that they should not receive anyone unless he produces the password given by Boža. II Fourteen days ago Captain Rade met Rade Malobabić [a man sentenced at the high-treason trial in Croatia] (the Chief of Serbian Military Intelligence confessed that he ordered Rade Malobabić to organize the assassination of Franz-Ferdinand) and the agent, Milan Vračarić, from Badovince, while they were traveling; they told Miloš that a box of hand grenades would come to him and that he was to give them to agents in Bosnia. Their duty is to hide the grenades and weapons and use them only when they receive orders to do so. Milan informed Boža of all this. Boža told him to receive the grenades and weapons, but not to carry them over to Bosnia, but only inform him when they came. The weapons have not yet been received. III Major Dimitrije Pavlović sent across before the war (Balkan Wars) six boxes of hand grenades to Bosnia. Fourteen of these grenades were found in the river Sava near Brcko. The rest are still over there among the agents. Four hand grenades are with Moja Bikicki in Mitrovica. The rest are in Croatia and they were distributed by Rade Malobabić. 74

The decisive proof of the authenticity of this documents, besides the details given in Note 74, is the fact that Prime Minister Pašić summarized in his own hand the first part of it.75”

Pašić’s notes as they appear on page 503 of “The Road to Sarajevo” are as follows: Line 1: 2 pupils h. (higher) c. (classes) of gimn (high school) Triša (Trifko Grabež) Mladenov (name of Drina Island) [The last word on the line is illegible] Line 2: 6 hand-grenades, 4 rev. (revolvers) From Narodna Odbrana, Janković Line 3: Boža Milanović and Tankosić’s Line 4: trusted agent [then comes an illegible word] and this returned, in Trnovo, in Priboj Line 5: In Tusla, in Sarajevo.

On page 390 of “The Road to Sarajevo” (Chapter 17) by Vladimir Dedijer

Several sources confirm that the civilian investigation took place. In 1914 the Austrian Army captured in Serbia a copy of an order of the Chief of Podrinje District, Kosta Jezdic, to the commander of the fifth company of the Border Guards on June 16, 1914 in which it was said:

I have learned that customs sentinels on the Bosnian border, through our men and men in Bosnia, are transporting from Serbia into Bosnia armaments, ammunition and other explosives. After an investigation I found out through Rajko Stepanovic, the sergeant of the Guard troops, that about ten days ago four revolvers and 400 bullets were transported from our territory to Bosnia; at the same time the mentioned Stepanovic and Milan Anicic brought a suitcase from Badovince in which there were weapons and hand grenades, in order to be transported to Bosnia and delivered there to Rade Malobabic ….On that occasion Sergeant Stepanovic showed Vracaric your written order about it. It is not necessary to explain to you what could happened and how bad the consequences could be if the Austro-Hungarian authorities learn about the transport of arms, and this could happen not only by the way the arms are transported but also at the time when it took place and particularly which persons were doing this. Informing you about this, I am advising you to stop your business immediately and to hamper any attempt to transport arms and ammunition from Serbia to Bosnia; if you don’t do this I shall make you responsible to the Minister in charge. You should inform me at once that you have taken notice of this act and in particular whether you have done the above-mention things and if so under whose orders and knowledge you did them, and also what was in the suitcase? At the same time you will send Sergeant Rajko Stepanovic for the necessary investigation in connection with this thing. The Chief of Distric, Kosta Jezdic 78

On Page 505 of “The Road to Sarajevo” by Vladimir Dedijer appears footnote 78 of Chapter 17.

78.	This document was copied by Major Kosta Todorovic in his diary, which was captured by the Austrian army in 1914…. A report written by Captain Jovan Prvanovic on June 27, 1914. to the commander of the Fifth Frontier Section: “I have heard lately that the police authorities, as well as customs authorities, on the basis of a higher order, are supervising and controlling the personnel of this company. The Chief of the Jadar District received two confidential orders from the Chief of Podrinje Region to keep an eye on men from this company and to report at once everything he learns. The same one has interrogated the chief of the customs station at Sipacka Ada. The Chief of the Azbukovica Distrcit ordered the village authorities, as well as the chief of Ljubovija customs, to inform him at once about the work of our men. All this has been done without knowledge of the undersigned, as the commander of his men, and this is all true because several county residents at the border informed him about it.

Werchovsky 21:23, 17 October 2007 (UTC)

and more....

“Il Dramma Di Seraievo” (in Italian) on pp 115-6 describes how in mid-June Prime Minister Pasic sent a telegram about the upcoming assassination. It should be noted that Jovan Jovanovic was a known ally of the military men sponsoring the assassins and not expected to carry out his instructions well.

"One evening, in a bivouac improvised in an Albanian stable, the conversation fell on the attack of Sarajevo. Colonel Lešanin asserted that the Serbian government was well aware of the conspiracy progressing toward Sarajevo.  In the first days of the second fortnight of June a telegram from Pašić to Minister Jovanović reached the Serbian Legation in Vienna advising Jovanović to make known that the Serbian Government suspected that there was a conspiracy against the life of the heir apparent archduke on occasion of his trip to Bosnia.  Such travel could result in disagreeable incidents involving some exalted personages and it would be useful to suggest to the Austro-Hungarian Government to suspend the travel of the hereditary archduke.

Minister Jovan Jovanović felt very embarassed; for two days he meditated the form that he could give to this most delicate matter, which might be regarded as an intimidation attempt to block the (archduke’s) trip. The telegram, moreover, was general and did not include particulars about the assassins. The personal relationship between Jovan Jovanović and Berchtold was bad. What reception would Berchtold have given to a step of this kind and how would he interpret it?

Jovan Jovanović determined to approach Finance Minister Bilinski, with whom he was on good terms and who had as one of his responsibilities the administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Jovan Jovanović did not have the elements necessary to allegate the existence of a conspiracy. Therefore he stressed in general terms the risks the Archduke heir apparent might run from the inflamed public opinion in Bosnia and Serbia. Some serious personal misdaventure might befall him. His journey might give rise to incidents and demonstrations that Serbia would depricate but that would have fatal reprecussions on Austro-Serbian relations. It would be advisable to communicate these not unjustified concerns of the Serbian Government to the Austrian Government before the journey was undertaken. He did not speak to Berchtold directly in order not to offend him, and because given the existing relationship with Berchtold, he feared he would be misinterpreted.

On his return to the Embassy, Jovan Jovanović said to Colonel Lesanin that he was concerned by the fact that, after a few minutes of thoughtful silence, Bilinski showed no sign of attaching great importance to the total message and dismissed it limiting himself to remarking when saying goodbye and thanking him: “Let us hope nothing does happen.”"

THE SERBIAN PRIME MINISTER WAS NOT SURPRISED WHEN HE LEARNED FROM THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN DEMARCHE that Serbs were behind the assassination.

Werchovsky 21:45, 17 October 2007 (UTC)

I can't help but think this rewrite is a bit unbalanced in the other direction (if the term ultimatum is biased certainly the term "Sarajev outrage" could be dispensed with) and somewhat lacking in a few other ways. Since the article is about the demarche I think that seperating the terms of the ultimatum and the resply/compliance as it was in the prior version is desirable.

At any rate I'm going to correst some grammatical errors.

Loje 00:37, 21 October 2007 (UTC)

I can't find the grammatical errors you fixed, but there sure are some new ones. The assassination of Franz-Ferdinand does not include the killing of his wife and wounding of the 20 or so others, so the Sarajevo Outrage is a term you can ofen find including in the leading works on the subject such as Albertini. You have deleted a lot of verifiable and relevant information without comment. Let me hear your justifications for such deletions please.

Werchovsky 02:20, 24 October 2007 (UTC)

The grammatical errors comment was made before I started really looking at it. I know the term "Sarajevo outrage" was often used by contemporaries and researchers, but I'm sure you know that the assassination of the heir apparent was what made this one the cause of such reaction. You must also be aware that reference to the assassination of the archduke as an incident is rarely if ever meant to refer to the archduke and not the other victims. Perhaps near the end of the article after the parts on the ultimatum and Serbian response you could put a section on Serbian falsehoods (I have read most of the works you mentioned too after all), keeping in mind of course that the amount of space devoted should be somewhat in porportion. I naturally don't have any objections to your more recent modifications.

--Loje 03:24, 24 October 2007 (UTC)

"Archduke Franz-Ferdinand and the Sarajevo Outrage" is in fact the title of Chapter I of Volume II of "The Origins of the War of 1914". The total incident was indeed an outrage and provoked outrage in Sarajevo, Austria-Hungary, and arround the world. The reaction to "The Outrage" including the "Ultimatum" was not simply because the heir was killed, it was the totality of the circumstances including: 1. the scale of the operation and casualties; 2. the anti-Serb rioting; 3. the involvement of the Narodna Odbrana; 4. the involvement of the Serbian Military; 5. the correctly surmised monitoring role of the Serbian Civilian Government (see Potiorek quote in Albertini, Vol.II, Pg. 174); 6. the military intelligence style (Cyanide, compartmentalization, planning, training, safe houses, logistics, special map, funding); 7. the refusal to cooperate in the investigation and dissembling by Serbia; 8. the surrounding political and diplomatic circumstances.

Additional sections are a good suggestion and a way to include the appropriate historical detail. In the case of lies, the space devoted must be adequate to prove the lie was indeed a lie (lest someone come along and summarily delete it), which may bend your idea of proportion I fear, but let us try. When I opened my children's high school text books I was apalled to find that the Sarajevo Outrage was boiled down to "Princip", who happened to be a Serb, shooting the Heir." We should not perpetuate this popular misconception.

Werchovsky 04:10, 25 October 2007 (UTC)


 * Werchovsky, if you are so well informed and neutral on the subject as you claim, would you be so kind to show us the SERBIAN RESPONSE in the same detail as you did with all Austro-Hungarian documents trying to incriminate Serbia? As it stands the article is flatly pro-Austrian. As far I can see from what you yourself added - even the Austria-Hungary had no objections to the arms-trafficking point as well as to the 10th point, yet you claim that only the 10th was 100%accepted. There are no proofs here to the claimed Austro-Hungarian knowledge of the supposed control of the press by the Serbian state (for instance) yet the it is regarded as an outright fact. If you do not have any other information than those presented you should remove the "Serbian response" section (as it is written with far less ground than most of the rest of the article) and strongly point out that all the documents described in detail come from Austria-Hungary and reflect their POV! —Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.137.121.94 (talk) 20:41, 21 January 2008 (UTC)


 * Yes. Austria-Hungary did not object to the Serbian response to demand #8. Austria-Hungary had not yet captured the documents that showed that the Serbian civilian government had ordered the interdiction of the arms traffic several weeks before the assassination and so was not taking this action in response to the Austro-Hungarian demand, but rather in response to the plot to kill Franz-Ferdinand.  I think you are referring to the following passage when you state that the article expressed the view that Serbia could control the press as fact:  "The Serbian reply stated that the Serbian press was beyond the government's control. Austria-Hungary contradicted this claim."  The intent was to make no claim one way or the other, just to state each government's position.  If you think the "Serbian response" section is too brief I suggest you expand it, making good footnotes if you can.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by Werchovsky (talk • contribs) 21:21, 21 January 2008 (UTC)


 * By the way, I have never found a Serbian response to the Austro-Hungarian response to the Serbian response to the ultimatum. If there is one, can you point me at it?Werchovsky (talk) 23:46, 21 January 2008 (UTC)

If one has questions regarding the general worldwide response to the ultimatum, I recommend the following books;

'German Social Democracy during the war' by Edwyn Bevan in 1918. Available for free at archive.org. This book explains in detail the controversy in Germany over voting for war credits on August 4, 1914. But much more interestingly, it emphasizes and highlights the German and Austrian newspaper articles before the declaration of war against Russia. These articles show that the ultimatum by Austria to Serbia was considered 'Harsh' even by many in the German population and many in the Austrian population. However, once war was declared, the press was limited severely in what it could or could not say.

I also recommend books by Mr. James M. Beck(former Solicitor General of the United States) available for free at archive.org. I highly recommend his book 'Evidence in the Case' but also 'Humanity and the war' and 'The Reckoning' along with 'J'Accuse' and the 'The Vandal of Europe'.

He has five essential points regarding Germany's war guilt;

1.) Germany and Austria made war almost inevitable by a.) issuing an ultimatum that was grossly unreasonable and disproportionate to any grievance that Austria had and b.) in giving Serbia and Europe insufficient time to consider the rights and obligations of all interested nations.

2.) That Germany had at all times the power to compel Austria to preserve a reasonable and conciliatory course, but at no time exerted that influence. On the contrary, she abetted and possible instigated, Austria in its unreasonable course.

3.) That England, France, Italy and Russia at all times worked for peace, and for this purpose not only overlooked the original misconduct of Austria but made every reasonable concession in the hope of preserving peace.

4.) That Austria having mobilized its army, Russia was reasonably justified in mobilizing its forces. Such act of mobilization was the right of any sovereign state, and as long as the Russian armies did not cross the border or take any agressive action no other nation had any just right to complain, each having the same right to make similar preparation.

5.) That Germany in abruptly declaring war for failure to demobilize when the other powers had offered to make any reasonable concession and peace parleys were still in progress, PRECIPITATED THE WAR.75.84.227.196 (talk) 07:09, 8 August 2008 (UTC)edwardlovette75.84.227.196 (talk) 07:09, 8 August 2008 (UTC)

falsely/accurately
For some reason every time the Serbian claims were shown it said in brackets (falsely) and when the Austrian claims were shown it said (accurately). It's a manner of opinion and quite stupid to have this repeated over and over. Personally I think Serbia held a lot of responsibility for what happened but why must we put 'falsely' every time we show the Serbia position and responses to Austria-Hungary? It's not even in sentences, just thrown in there. I deleted all the ones I could find. Lemniwinks (talk) 02:14, 14 April 2009 (UTC)

Please, before you start an other war, cite your sources, and add them, especially the relevant parts, if possible. Anything else than real facts, especially the heated private opinions must be omitted. Facts only, please, and in a well organised form! —Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.85.58.154 (talk) 02:01, 3 March 2010 (UTC)

Should these references be restored?
In 2007, when July Crisis was a section of Causes of World War I, I had included the following quotations and references. They are not in the article now, and I feel that they should be restored in the appropriate timeline.

- - - -

The French President Poincare and his Premier arrived in St. Petersburg on 20 July, conferred with the the Czar and his ministers, and left on 23 July 1914. A note on the bottom of page 345 in Michael Balfour's book, "The Kaiser and his Times," Houghton Mifflin, 1964, states: "By contrast President Poincare, when asked on 29 July if war could be avoided, is reported to have repled: 'It would be a great pity. We should never again find conditions better.'"

After returning from his cruise, the Kaiser reached Berlin on 28 July, read a copy of the Serbian reply, and wrote on it:

"Eine brillante Leistung fur eine Frist von bloss 48 Stunden! Das ist mehr, als man erwarten konnte! Ein grosser moralischer Erfolg fur Wien; aber damit fallt jeder Kriegsgrung fort, und (der Gesandte) Giesl hatte ruhig in Belgrad bleiben sollen. Daraufhin hatte ich niemals Mobilmachung befohlen!" [Emil Ludwig, "Wilhelm der Zweite," Ernst Rowohlt Verlag, Berlin, 1926, p 421].

"A brilliant solution—and in barely 48 hours! This is more than could have been expected. A great moral victory for Vienna; but with it every pretext for war falls to the ground, and [the Ambassador] Giesl had better have stayed quietly at Belgrade. On this document, I should never have given orders for mobilization." [Emil Ludwig, Wilhelm Hohenzollern: The Last of the Kaisers, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York (1927) p. 444 (translated by Ethel Colburn Mayne)]

When it became clear that the heretofore evasive British government would enter the war if Germany attacked France through neutral Belgium, the panic-stricken Kaiser attempted to redirect the main attack against Russia. When Helmuth von Moltke (the younger) told him that this was impossible, Wilhelm said: "Your uncle would have given me a different answer!" [Emil Ludwig, Wilhelm Hohenzollern: The Last of the Kaisers, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York (1927) p. 453 (translated by Ethel Colburn Mayne)] Italus (talk) 15:32, 9 March 2010 (UTC)

Reaction of General Lyautey
A timeline, posted in the message at

http://groups.google.com/group/soc.history.war.misc/msg/6858da5405cb91b5

on 15 September 2002, contains the following about General Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey, the Resident General in the French protectorate of Morocco:

Monday 27 July 1914.

''Morocco - Gen. Lyautey telephoned by Paris to evacuate Protectorate except coast & send all troops. Lyautey says 'A war among Europeans is a civil war. It is the most monumental folly the world has ever committed'.'' —Preceding unsigned comment added by Italus (talk • contribs) 15:07, 24 March 2010 (UTC)

Serbia's role in the assassination
According to the article:

<>

This should be supplement with the following note from the bottom of page 344 of Michael Balfour's book, The Kaiser and his Times, Houghton Mifflin, 1964.
 * "The chief instigator of the assassination was almost certainly the Serb director of Military Intelligence, in his private capacity as head of the secret society 'The Black Hand'. The Russian Miltary Attache at Belgrade equally certainly was in the secret. So was the Serb Prime Minister, Pasic who, although frightened of what war would mean for Serbia, was even more frightened of the 'Black Hand'. Pasic did send a warning to Vienna but by the time it had passed through several intermediaries, it became so muffled as to be disregarded."

Italus (talk) 17:38, 30 March 2010 (UTC)

This article in in trouble
This article is in trouble:
 * The first phrase is mangled and has been for a year or so: "The July Crisis caused a diplomatic crisis..."  The July crisis was a political,military and diplomatic crisis.  It did not lead to a diplomatic crisis, it led to war.
 * Fromkin and Fischer have become almost the only sources for this article and are being used for their opinions and spin which are extremely pro-Entente and anti-Austro-German. Let's take a look at the first two footnoted (to Fromkin) sentences:  "Ever since 1912, urged on by the increasingly powerful “War Party”, it had been the policy of Austria-Hungary to wage a war to destroy Serbia as a state[1]. The only thing that had been holding the Dual Monarchy back was a lack of German support and the fear of the Russian reaction to such a war[2]."


 * Three people had the greatest say in Austro-Hungarian policy, The Emperor, the Hungarian PM, and the Heir. All three were in general opposed to war with Serbia.  Absent their ascent there could be no AH policy of war against Serbia.  So, from 1912 to June 1914 there were many things that held Austria-Hungary back from war with Serbia despite the propaganda war and assassination attempts emanating from Serbia and despite the exceptionally good opportunities to invade Serbia while Serbia was busy fighting wars on other fronts.  First, there was the issue of what to do with any acquired lands.  So far, AH was unable to assign Bosnia-Herzegovina to Austria or Hungary for internal political reasons.  Acquiring Serbian lands would only make this problem worse.  Part of this concern was the demographic swamping of the monarchy with slavs and orthodox christians.  Taking over Serbia did not look good from a cost/benefit point of view with little industry or resources and a restive populace.  Another problem was Italy, who could be expected to demand compensations such as the Italian speaking parts of Austria-Hungary.  Another concern was the cost and possible unintended consequences of war.  Austria-Hungary was quite cost conscious when it came to mobilization and war.  It is worth noting that several times after Serbia mobilized for war against Austria-Hungary, Austria-Hungary held back from mobilizing itself because of the cost and disruption that mobilization entailed.  It is just not a supportable thesis that Germany and Russia were the only things holding Austria-Hungary back from attacking Serbia; Austria-Hungary had many other concerns.  There were other ways of preventing Serbia from undermining Austria-Hungary. Reorganization of the Dual Monarchy into a Triple Monarchy or a Federal system of Cantons similar to Switzerland were alternative ideas to war with Serbia which were politically debated.  These of course were not policy either.  AH's real policy was to try to muddle-through.


 * Most of the sentences in the article have similar problems. For example  "Rumours at the time that Russia was involved in the assassination have proven to be, as the historian David Fromkin noted, “baseless” [5]."  The rumors of course were not that Russians had done the bombing and shooting, but rather had approved, supported, or funded the attacks of June 28.  There was of course a proper basis for these rumors.  The Russian Military Attache's office was in close and constant contact with Serbian Military Intelligence Chief Apis.  Apis admitted that he had used money from the Russian Military Attache's office for the assassination and that the receipts were in the Russian's hands.  Artamonov admitted to giving money to Apis but said he didn't know it was used for the assassination.  Artamonov said he was on vacation at the time of the assassination but had left his assistant in charge.  His assistant admitted the involved of his office in the assassination plot and then fell silent.  Members of Serbian Military Intelligence and the Black Hand stated that Artamonov had promised that if the plot Russia would give Serbia her protection.  These are most of the bases for the rumors. They are more basis than most rumors have. Werchovsky (talk) 00:01, 1 April 2010 (UTC)


 * Hello,
 * I changed "caused a diplomatic crisis" to "was a diplomatic crisis" in the opening sentence, and I was wondering if the introduction is now acceptable.
 * As for the rest, it's more or less in the form of a diary: "On July 7, Count X told Count Y that..." "On July 8, the German Emperor wrote to the Austrian Emperor..." etc.
 * I fully agree that this article is in trouble, realizing that rewriting the whole stuff would be a terrible lot of work, but I'm asking myself if there is any better solution. --Alfons2 (talk) 16:29, 10 June 2010 (UTC)

Proposal for Connective tissue between Sarajevo Criminal Investigation and the July Crisis
In the first week or so there was an interplay between diplomacy and the criminal investigation. I propose a new section as follows:

Franz-Ferdinand’s motorcade was bombed on June 28, 1914 at 10:10AM near the Čumuria bridge in Sarajevo. (Albertini 35). 20 people were wounded but Franz-Ferdinand was unhurt (Dedijer Chapter XIV, footnote 21). The bomb thrower, Nedeljko Čabrinović, swallowed potassium cyanide to kill himself as he had been instructed by Serbian Major Voja Tankosić,(Magrini 94-5) but the cyanide only sickened him. The police promptly arrested Čabrinović and brought him to the police first aid post (Albertini 40). Investigating Judge Leo Pfeffer was at the police station and immediately assigned to investigate. (Albertini 41). Before the investigation got far, news arrived that Princip had shot Franz-Ferdinand and Sophie. (Albertini 41) Princip also swallowed cyanide and was brought to the first aid post. (Albertini 41) Within 45 minutes of the shooting Princip began telling his story to Pfeffer.(Dedijer 321)

Princip and Čabrinović were part of a larger conspiracy. By the next day, 29 June, based on the interrogations of the assassins, Governor Potiorek was able to telegraph to Vienna that Princip and Čabrinović had conspired in Belgrade with the comitaji Milan Ciganović and others to obtain bombs, revolvers and money to kill Franz Ferdinand.(Albertini 43) A police dragnet quickly caught most of the conspirators.(Albertini 43)  At trial, they numbered twenty-five although nine were acquitted.(Owings 527-530)

As Albertini wrote in “Origins of the War of 1914”: “What Serbia ought to have done to prove her innocence and render it more difficult for Austria to hold her responsible for the crime was to open a judicial inquiry into the possible complicity of Serbian subjects and take the necessary measures in that event.”(Albertini 273)  By 30 June, Austro-Hungarian and German diplomats began making that request to Serbia with German Undersecretary of State Zimmermann making the request to the Serbian and Russian Ambassadors and with the Austrian Ambassador to Serbia making the request to Secretary General to the Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs Slavko Gruić. Germany and Austria-Hungary were rebuffed. (Albertini 273) On July 5,based on further interrogations of the assassins, Governor Potiorek was able to telegraph Vienna that Serbian Major Voja Tankosić had given the assassins instructions.(Albertini 44)   The next day Austrian Ambassador Czernin approached Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov with the idea that the instigators of the plot against Franz Ferdinand needed to be investigated within Serbia, but he too was rebuffed (Albertini 189-190).

One last avenue of diplomacy and investigation lay open. The lone adult amongst the armed asssassins was Mehmed Mehmedbašić. Mehmedbašić was arrested by the Montenegrin police for his role in the June 28 attack. In custody, Mehmedbašić confessed to a wider conspiracy including a terrorist planning meeting against Austria-Hungary in Tolouse France. Learning of the arrest but not of the confession, Austria-Hungary asked Montenegro to honor their mutual extradition treaty and hand over the assassin. After Montenegro shared Mehmedbašić’s confession with the French Ambassador, the problem of extradition was solved by permitting Mehmedbašić to “escape” to Serbia. (Documents Diplomatiques Francais III Serie 1911-14,3, X Doc. 537. This document notes that the diplomatic cable was forwarded to the Secret Service of the National Security Department to investigate the matter of the January 1914 irredentist planning meeting in France but the Secret Service did not report back.)Werchovsky (talk) 05:09, 18 August 2010 (UTC)Werchovsky (talk) 19:00, 18 August 2010 (UTC)

Germany sure writes on the margin allot
So what did the French write on their "margins"? What did the Russians write on their "margins"? What did the Serbians write on their "margins"? Seems to me, someone is deriving all of Germany's motives by what someone doodled on their "margins". A vast majority of diplomacy Germany has undertaken apparently is being done by doodling on the "margins", not formal communication.
 * Well, while agree with the direction of your comments, that is to say that the bombast that William II included in his marginal notes does not give a lot of insight into Germany's true foreign policy and that the motives of Poincare, Isvolski, Sazonov, etc. are treated far more kindly, one of William II's means of communicating with his ministers was through these marginal notes...some political leaders do this and others do not. I say, if the entente will finally publish and include here the minutes of the Franco-Russian summit of 1914, then let them keep all of William II's marginal notes in the article, if not, let's dispense with them for balance.Werchovsky (talk) 05:43, 3 September 2010 (UTC)

I'm halfway through this article, 20 minutes later, and I still haven't run across the 10 demands that Austria-Hungary made of Serbia. Is it even in here?98.165.15.98 (talk) 01:28, 3 September 2010 (UTC)


 * No. Someone deleted it and also the link to the honest set of demands and put in its place a link to a very bad summary of the demands. The link that was added has the effect of making it seem that Serbia had accepted almost all of the demands because the details that were omitted were mostly those that Serbia decided to ignore or otherwise reject or finesse.Werchovsky (talk) 05:43, 3 September 2010 (UTC)

Source cited by Fischer
I have replaced some of the references to Fischer with references to the source which he cites (Kautsky, Karl - Outbreak of the World War - German Documents, New York: Oxford University Press, 1924). This is because I feel that it is best to cite the 'fountain-head', which reprints the original documents.

Alekksandr (talk) 21:40, 4 September 2010 (UTC)

Article does not comply with Manual of Style with regard to punctuation and references.
Hello.

Throughout the article references often appear before the full stop giving:


 * word word word [1].

It should be:


 * word word word.[1]

This is in line with http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:MoS#Punctuation_and_footnotes

I've changed quite a few but there are hundreds of these errors. A good method is to use your browser search function when in editing mode to search for " >. " (without the quote marks) and changing where necessary.

I hope that those with an interest in seeing this article reach its full potential will consider taking a section to work on and bringing it into line with the Manual of Style. --bodnotbod (talk) 16:53, 27 October 2010 (UTC)


 * If you turn on the regular expression script under preferences this will do it automatically: Find: /[\.;,:\?]? *((]*>[^<]+]*>)|(]* / *>)) *([\.,;:\?])/g
 * Replace: $4$1 Shadowjams (talk) 16:22, 15 November 2010 (UTC)

French mobilization? What French mobilization?
The article has sections titled but does not mention any French mobilization. Here's what a French Government website has to say about The causes of the Great War
 * 10 Russian mobilization
 * 11 German mobilization
 * While, as far as French public opinion was concerned, pacifist demonstrations were certainly more numerous than nationalist demonstrations, and although the population - mainly rural - was hardly conscious of what was happening, the French government was also subject to blackmail by the High Commander, General Joffre, who threw his resignation into the equation, considering that it was no longer possible to wait to take the necessary measures. This is how, on the afternoon of Saturday August 1st, at practically the same time, France and Germany both ordered general mobilisation.

Surely, such a marginal detail like the peace-keeping French mobilization does not fit into an article that needs every one of its 137,529 bytes to illustrate the German warmongering. -- Matthead Discuß   05:26, 13 January 2011 (UTC)
 * As you sarcasm implies, most of the article takes an extremely anti-German point of view leaning far too heavily on the closet Nazi Fritz Fischer. I could use some help editing this article into a more factual account.Werchovsky (talk) 21:41, 15 January 2011 (UTC)
 * Indeed, this is a bit of a dog's breakfast to tackle. Some time ago I took a stab at it, but it is truly a major task requiring informed editors many hours to sort out the article. One editor essentially dumped an essay into the causes of World War I article, that was then moved here. At the time I considered whether it was worth keeping, but I think that the level of detail is a shame to waste. I became somewhat demoralized of doing it all myself back then, but would also welcome a concerted effort to improve the article. Peregrine981 (talk) 18:16, 17 January 2011 (UTC)
 * How can Fritz Fischer be a bad historian ("closet Nazi")? In the wiki article on Fischer, The Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical Writing is cited whereby Fischer is characterized as "perhaps the most important German historian of the 20th century". But I agree about the need to further tidy up the article! Dog's breakfast describes well the work involved. (I started with the Refs' style.) -The Gnome (talk) 21:18, 4 April 2011 (UTC)

this article is shockingly biased and needs to be completely rewritten.128.112.25.156 (talk) 04:32, 14 August 2013 (UTC)jf

false argument in the article, even though the whole article disproves the same argument.
the whole article points to the maximum effort of the Austria to make a war against Serbia, with Serbia accepting 9 out of 10 demands of the very harsh ultimatum which was designed to be rejected. Even though German, Russian, British, Hungarian leaders found that almost complete acceptance of the ultimatum was enough from Serbia, Austria still invaded Serbia. So it is obvious that Serbia did try to avoid the war, while Austria really made all effort for war to happen. Still someone found it reasonable to add this to the article:

"In effect, it could be argued that the two central powers (Serbia and Austro-Hungary) made concerted efforts not to avoid a war that turned global killing 17 million people and injuring another 20 million: this includes the deaths of 7 million civilians" — Preceding unsigned comment added by Veliborivezic (talk • contribs) 21:35, 18 November 2013 (UTC)
 * Listing Serbia among the "central powers" in this context is confusing, even if not capitalized, because of the (capitalized) Central Powers which would mean "(Germany and Austro-Hungary)", but I don't think that's the point 90.212.125.132 was trying to make in these changes last February. Half of that paragraph sounds vague yet editorialized: "to ignore [...] would be naive to say the least", "In effect, it could be argued". This should be attributed and sourced (to say the least) or removed. ---Sluzzelin talk  23:28, 18 November 2013 (UTC)

Bold quotations
The article contains some long quotations that are in bold font which makes it difficult to read, do you have any objections to change it to normal font? Χρυσάνθη Λυκούση (talk) 01:48, 26 March 2014 (UTC)

Why should we care about Alfred Fabre-Luce's opinion?
Alfred Fabre-Luce's is a writer and a journalist and not a very prominent one. He certainly isn't a trained historian. His opinion about the meeting in St Petersburg has no place in this article. It might possibly be wattanteed to mention him if there was an article about that meeting alone. Give me a reason to keep it or I will remove it. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Sensemaker (talk • contribs) 09:06, 23 September 2014 (UTC)

German demands of France
Several sources on the causes of the War mention the following:

France was hesitating whether to join Russia. The Germans sent them a demand; that France guarantee it's neutrality by evacuating a ten mile strip of territory all along the Franco-German border, and handing over the fortresses of Toul, Belfort, Epinal and Verdun to German occupation for the duration of the War. Some historians see this as a deliberately unacceptable demand to a France still smarting from the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, designed to draw France into the war that Germany had long desired. Others see it as a rather naive attempt to secure Germany's Western Front from surprise attack while she was busy in the east. In any case, the article could use a little more research on this point. 213.123.199.119 (talk) 23:16, 5 May 2015 (UTC)

Serbian response to the ultimatum
In the section 'Serbian response to the ultimatum' it says "... Happily, there seems to be no reason why we should be anything more than [sic] spectators". I can't see any reason for the sic? Am I missing something, or has the quote been inadvertently corrected? Aarghdvaark (talk) 02:41, 28 July 2011 (UTC)


 * Well spotted! I'll fix it now. Regular user not bothered to log in 86.44.205.88 (talk) 08:48, 28 July 2011 (UTC)


 * Have amended again. Brock and Brock's edition of Asquith's letters to VS shows clearly he wrote "than spectators" not "then spectators."  Also, Asquith wasn't a Sir. KJP1 (talk) 12:02, 11 September 2016 (UTC)

Section "Serbia drifts"
The title is misleading and unclear. Where does the Serbia drift to?

The concluding sentence in this section are not supported by the facts and I have erased it. For the reference, it stated: "With a recently retired king, a bitter conflict between the caretaker civilian government and the Serbian military, the loss of the Russian Ambassador's steadying hand, and a lame-duck French Ambassador, *Serbia lost all sense of direction*."

Later in the text it can be seen that Serbia accepted all suggestions of Russian Empire and attempted to avoid the war, while Austria and Germany were pushing with all their might to the war. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.178.250.229 (talk) 08:03, 23 July 2012 (UTC)

Move Page
What are the feelings about moving this page to "July Crisis" and importing a large portion of text from Causes of World War I which is getting to be far too long and detailed? Does anyone object? I notice that a large number of pages link directly to July Ultimatum, many more than to July Crisis. However, it seems a bit redundant to have separate articles on the Ultimatum AND the Crisis. Importing the text from Causes doesn't make sense in an article titled "July Ultimatum." Peregrine981 (talk) 20:05, 10 June 2009 (UTC)

Split Request
Nice work with this thorough article, but I think it's way too long, especially with the sizable chunk of prose in the middle. Much of the details could be moved to separate articles about specific topics, while this article should be much more short and concise. --Tungsten (talk) 09:42, 7 August 2009 (UTC)

Way too detailed/long
As you Serbs and other Balkan people are waving around your e-peens with regard to this article's neutrality, it has become way to friggin long for a casually interested person to read. (a) divide into sections, (b) provide a summary, and (c) make it way more f'ing simple. 71.231.102.197 (talk) 04:16, 14 September 2009 (UTC)


 * I agree. It's a mishmash. Reading through part of it and the discussion its seems more like an article on the determination of some to show "deceitfulness" on the part of Serbia as opposed to the actual diplomatic events and their consequences. I don't know how anybody is expected to read this unless they have an unhealthy fixation on the topic and nothing else. No proper sections and the sections that exist look more like a thesis than an encyclopedia article.208.131.184.223 (talk) 23:41, 4 October 2009 (UTC)


 * I, to, concure. It's nice to have a dissertation, for what is understandably a very complicated topic, but as Mark Twain said: "I would have written a shorter letter, but I did not have the time." Please, someone who has the time and knowledge, spend some time shortening this. As far as I can tell, rewriting it may be in order, maybe taking segments out of the current article as it stands, but having something this long and unorganized is completely unacceptable. An example is that, while the "July Ultimatium" redirects to here, the actual contents of the ultimatium aren't listed until the section "external links."V ALENTINE S MITH | T ALK  22:36, 21 October 2009 (UTC)


 * This article is too long. It is also too detailed in parts.  While there is a lot of content, its lacks proper analysis.  This article need a complete overhaul.Keith Johnston (talk) 20:09, 10 March 2017 (UTC)



And yet missing detail
Missing one thing - what were the terms of the ultimatum? I'm not seeing that - certainly not in a digestible manner. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Jhutzler (talk • contribs) 21:06, 28 February 2011 (UTC)


 * There is a connection between this article and Causes of World War I as noted above by Peregrine981 who in June 2009 moved a lot of content from Causes of World War I into this article. This article is also too large. There has been a split request - though that wouldn't solve the problem of reducing the amount of material into something readable - it would simply move it from one place to another. The detail needs to be reduced into a manageable summary of the important information. Precise timings are not important for this summary - such timings are best for books which can explore such detail at length.  SilkTork  *YES! 21:52, 15 January 2011 (UTC)


 * A very important part of the July Crisis was the effort by Russia and France to convince Britain and other Powers and their populaces that the war was Austria-Hungary's and Germany's fault. Russia and France came upon (apparently the origin is Poincare) and then stuck with a false timeline of events to support the thesis of Central Power warguilt. Fuzzing up the timeline is a very bad way to shorten the article...it will lead to endless arguments that can only be resolved by reintroducing the precise sequence of events.Werchovsky (talk) 18:05, 17 January 2011 (UTC)


 * Yes, do. It will not change the fact that Germany blew up a minor crisis in the Balklans to launch its long desired war. 213.123.199.119 (talk) 23:21, 5 May 2015 (UTC)


 * Absolutely correct. I added link to the ultimatum's text, translated in English, and relevant separate paragraph with synopsis - as if article isn't too long already! But since there are no blatant redundancies in the text and it is adequately constructed (it follows a reasonable, chronological order), we should try for smaller sections.-The Gnome (talk) 21:09, 4 April 2011 (UTC)

Count Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf
Count Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf is constantly referred to by first name("Conrad") on this page.

Copy paste from other text ? --Cmskog (talk) 11:37, 28 July 2011 (UTC)

His first name was "Franz." "Conrad von Hötzendorf" (or "Conrad," for short), was his last name. john k (talk) 19:34, 1 October 2011 (UTC)

CE
Did a cheeky little drive by edit, redn references to Schlieffen Plan commensurate with contemporary thinking (Zuber, Holmes et al.) and cleaned up references. Does anyone know what book Clark 2013 refers to? Regards Keith-264 (talk) 10:26, 24 June 2017 (UTC)


 * "The Sleepwalkers" I should think.Paulturtle (talk) 04:43, 9 July 2017 (UTC)

Reference problem
Reference 103 says "Clark (2013), p. 466", but there is no work by a Clark listed with that date. DuncanHill (talk) 18:37, 6 November 2017 (UTC)

Article Displays Heavy Bias
Most of the citations in this article come from two sources: Fischer (1967) and Fromkin (2004). The historiography of the First World War is enormous, but approx. 110 of the 200 citations in the article come from these two sources. Though Fritz Fischer was an intellectual giant when his book was published, surely the article would benefit from more recent historiography? I am open to being incorrect on this point, but would love to see some justification for the heavy use of these two works. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Asburns52 (talk • contribs) 12:59, 18 October 2017 (UTC)
 * I have a better suggestion than us arguing whether the article displays bias. How about you adding citations from other, still reliable, sources, Asburns52, until you're satisfied the Fischer/Fromkin-quota is low enough to no longer represent bias according to your own standards? Best regards, CapnZapp (talk) 17:49, 7 November 2017 (UTC)

Relationship with Causes of World War I article
I have started a discussion about structural edits at Talk:Causes of World War I. Your input is welcome. - Tulchan (talk) 14:07, 10 May 2018 (UTC)

Bethmann Hollweg
According to the article when Russia partially mobilises Bethmann Hollweg becomes alarmed and urges Austria to avoid war (section 10), but then when Russia fully mobilises the article says he is pleased as this gives justification for war (section 12). If this information is accurate then I think the change of view needs to be explained. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2A02:C7D:86B:4A00:A4D5:23B5:DE79:2A8 (talk) 18:22, 24 May 2018 (UTC)
 * This article is a bit schizophrenic as it doesn't reconcile the various theories of responsibility. Fritz Fischer, who is referenced for the core of the article, holds that Germany instigated the war deliberately; current historians tend to be apply the blame more broadly. I suggesting checking the references of the two conflicting statements to see who wrote them. - Tulchan (talk) 20:10, 24 May 2018 (UTC)

From what I've read most modern historians still say the war was instigated by Germany. But in either case though looking up who wrote it wouldn't help unfortunatly as I don't own many books on this topic so I would not be able to check the detail. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2A02:C7D:86B:4A00:F977:9B30:CC45:A9A6 (talk) 10:51, 4 September 2018 (UTC)

Etymology
Does anyone know the earliest use of this phrase to refer to the chain of events and who coined it? I got curious reading Causes_of_World_War_I since it actually runs from late June to late August so Summer Crisis would seem more apt. ScratchMarshall (talk) 18:50, 20 June 2018 (UTC)
 * Scholars were using the term in 1930 and probably before then: eg Proceedings of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association https://books.google.com/books?id=GGQvAAAAIAAJ 1930 "A NEGLECTED CHAPTER OF THE JULY CRISIS, 1914 One of the few unchallenged propositions of the July Crisis of 1914 is the German Kaiser's opinion that the Austrian action against Serbia must not be delayed...."  Rjensen (talk) 12:17, 4 September 2018 (UTC)

Incorrect Map
The initial map which purports to show alliances in early 1914 is incorrect and misleading.

Serbia has no formal alliance with Russia - 'Slavic allies' is an odd term. The Triple Entente is not a military alliance but merely an understanding and therefore Great Britain is not tied by military alliance to either France or Russia

I suggest removing the map until a better one can be found. Keith Johnston (talk) 14:16, 24 February 2019 (UTC)
 * Nope. Any college professor teaching 200 level classes would call that map spot-on. Sorry, backed by RS. 50.111.27.90 (talk) 21:49, 23 July 2019 (UTC)

I agree with Keith Johnson, there were secret "understandings" with the French & Russians but that did not constitute an alliance. Moreover the whole cabinet and the House of Commons had not been advised of any "military conversations" or "understandings" and Lloyd George said had he known of the arrangement he would have resigned. Moreover Asquith received legal advice that Britain's 1839 guarantee to Belgium was a collective guarantee with the Concert of Europe, not a singular one.Gaptech (talk) 03:54, 5 August 2019 (UTC)


 * Thanks, its very important to get this right.

Clive Ponting noted: "Russia had no treaty of alliance with Serbia and was under no obligation to support it diplomatically, let alone go to its defence".Ponting, Clive (2002).

In Thirteen Days: The Road to the First World War. Chatto & Windus. ISBN 978-0-7011-7293-0.

The Entente, unlike the Triple Alliance and the Franco-Russian Alliance, was not an alliance of mutual defence and so Britain was free to make its own foreign policy decisions in 1914. As British Foreign Office Official Eyre Crowe minuted, "The fundamental fact of course is that the Entente is not an alliance. For purposes of ultimate emergencies it may be found to have no substance at all. For the Entente is nothing more than a frame of mind, a view of general policy which is shared by the governments of two countries, but which may be, or become, so vague as to lose all content".

In Hamilton, K.A. (1977). "Great Britain and France, 1911–1914". In Hinsley, F.H. (ed.). British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey. Cambridge University Press. p. 324. ISBN 978-0-521-21347-9.

The map is in error and had to go.

Keith Johnston (talk) 08:27, 16 August 2019 (UTC)