Talk:Madhyamaka/Archive 2

Recent edits by Reifingam.
There is some sort of confusion here that I want to clear up before letting the recent edit through. As I understand it, 'existence' is not disputed by Nagarjuna - only inherent existence is disputed. If there were no existents, then all objects would have the same ontological significance as the horn of a hare, a hairy tortoiseshell, etc. and karma would not function. If we recollect that the project of Wisdom is to overturn Nirvana, we can identify that the specific quality of objects that is being invalidated is their efficaciousness as sources of happiness or suffering - a mistaken perception which leads to clinging/grasping (Upādāna/Taṇhā) (20040302 (talk) 16:24, 27 January 2012 (UTC)) Likewise, can you provide the specific verse of chapter15 of the MMK ? (20040302 (talk) 16:24, 27 January 2012 (UTC))


 * Candrakiriti, in the Prasannapāda, differentiates between the subtle object of negation, inherent existence, and the course object of negation, mere existence. Both are certainly refuted though in Madhyamaka. See Catuṣkoṭi and chapter 21 of the mmk. Of course Tsongkhapa's system focuses merely on the subtle object of negation, inherent existence. Is this what you are referring to? CO2Northeast (talk) 17:16, 27 January 2012 (UTC)


 * I understand what you are saying, I currently disagree. Can you please refer to the verse (and it's interpretation) of the Prasannapāda where Candrakirti refutes mere existence? Likewise, I cannot (yet) agree with an unsubstantiated (and unreferenced) argument that the Madhyamaka refute mere existence. Are you likewise denying that the Gelukpa's (followers of Tsongkhapa) are NOT Madhyamikas?  On what basis can you make that claim? On the other hand, if you accept that the followers of Tsongkhapa ARE Madhyamikas, then we must accept that there either (a) a difference of opinion on certain aspects of the Madhyamka or (b) that their writings are acceptable.  So, for instance - From Hopkins (Meditation on emptiness page 542-543) - "Thus, the sphere of valid establishment is the coarse conventions of the world; within that context what is validly established holds true, and even Buddhas and yogis need not contradict those truths just because their sphere is subtler." -Therefore, 'coarse' existence is not refuted. Of course, he is paraphrasing Candrakirti here (Madhyamakāvatāra  VI.82): "If the world does not harm you, based on the world itself refute these conventionalities. You and the world debate about these, and afterwards I will rely upon the stronger."  The root text of Nagarjuna, (Ch15 v10) line 2: "non-existence is a view of nihilism". By assuming that the Madhyamaka refute mere existence, one enters into an identification with Nihilism, which is a mistake, and one that Madhyamikas vigorously refute. Therefore, until adequately corrected, I re-iterate that conventional existence is not refuted. (20040302 (talk) 15:57, 29 January 2012 (UTC))
 * You are talking about the two truths. I am talking about the 4 extremes. There is no doubt what the four extremes are. Also by refuting existence, that does not mean Madhyamaka claims nonexistence.  — Preceding unsigned comment added by CO2Northeast (talk • contribs) 16:18, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

Mere existence (continuing from the section above)
A recent edit stated: "Nagarjuna reasons that dependently originated phenomena do not arise as existents in the first place, thereby removing claims that there are existents available to perish. (Ref:Tsondru, Mabja. Ornament of Reason. Snow Lion Publications. 2011, pages 56-58, 405-417.)

Nagarjuna only asserts that phenomena do not arise as inherent existents. Nagarjuna does not deny mere existence. This seems to be a sticking point. I am not disputing that this is what Mabja Jangchub Tsöndrü may say, but I certainly dispute that this is an accurate depiction of all Madhyamika views. It is quite clear that other Madhyamakas disagree with this assertion. Likewise, I do not know (and have not yet been given evidence) if Mabja Jangchub Tsöndrü reached this conclusion, and if so, how he did. What I know for sure is that there are plenty of Madhyamikas who dispute it - most notably Tsongkhapa and his followers. What I believe is completely undisputed is that Nagarjuna asserts: "Whatever is dependently co-arisen / That is explained to be emptiness." For the Lede, we should avoid using distinctions which are unshared position.

It occurs to me that this is a more subtle point - that what we agree is refuted is (the Svatantrika position of) an assertion of a conventional existence of intrinsic nature. However, mere, or conventional existence / aka nominal existence remains necessary for us to avoid conflating dependant origination with the imaginary (such as horns of hares, hairs on a tortoise shell etc.)

I am genuinely curious here - if Mabja Jangchub Tsöndrü actually does interpret Nagarjuna as denying mere existence how does he distinguish between objects that are real (eg. the four noble truths - the denial of which would make him a non-buddhist) and those which are purely imaginary (such as the aforementioned hare-horn or, in a more contemporary setting, hobbits)? (20040302 (talk) 16:20, 29 January 2012 (UTC))
 * Since existence is one of the 4 extremes, of course Madhayamaka refutes existence. Nagarjuna devotes an entire chapter to this, no matter what translation you use. But you seem to think refuting existence means claiming nonexistence, when thats not the case at all.  CO2Northeast (talk) 16:22, 29 January 2012 (UTC)
 * What? Where does Tsongkhapa deny the 4 extremes? What are you talking about? CO2Northeast (talk) 16:49, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

I do not claim that Tsongkapa denies using the Catuskoti.

The four extremes are to do with inherent existence, not mere existence. Tsongkhapa states (Lam-Rim-Chen-Mo, Snow Lion, Vol 3. p156) Question: "If these things cannot withstand rational analysis, then how is it possible for something to exist where reason has refuted it?" Reply: "You are mistakenly conflating the inability to withstand rational analysis with invalidation by reason. Many who have made this error claim that production and such exist even though rational analysis of reality refutes them. This is reckless chatter, so we do not agree. To ask whether something can withstand rational analysis is to ask whether it is found by a line of reasoning that analyses reality. Candrakirti's commentary on The Four Hundred Stanzas (13.11) says: ...because our analysis is intent upon seeking intrinsic nature. So this (Catuskoti) is seeking to discover whether forms and so forth have an intrinsic nature that is produced, ceases, and so forth. [...] It is not that this line of reasoning searches for mere production and cessation. [...] The fact that this line of reasoning does not find them does not entail that it refutes them. Rather, reason refutes something that - if it did exist - would have to be established by reason, but which reason does not establish. Conventional consciousnesses establish the production and cessation of forms etc. though such forms and such exist, reasoning consciousness does not establish them. [...] For example, a visual consciousness does not find sounds, but this does not refute them. If production and so forth existed essentially - i.e.. were established in final reality, then reason would have to find them because it accurately analyses whether forms and such have essentially existing production and cessation. Since such analysis does not find production and so forth, it refutes production, cessation and so forth that exist essentially.

Candrakirti's says the following: (all taken from the aforementioned commentary on Aryadeva's 400 verses) Incorrect position: Aryadeva means that compounded phenomena lack production because this analysis (Catuskoti) refutes all forms of production. Reply: In that case, the production of compounded phenomena would not be like a magician's illusion. Rather we would make it understood using examples such as the son of a barren woman (horn of a hare, etc). Wary of the absurd implication that dependent-arisings would not exist, we avoid such comparisons. Instead we compare the production of things to a magician's illusion and so forth, examples that do not contradict dependent-arising. Objection: If eyes and such do not exist, then how can the sensory faculties of organs such as the eye be considered things that result from karma? Reply: Would we refute that it is the nature of these to result from Karma? Objection: Since you are demonstrating (via Catuskoti) the refutation of eyes and such, how could you not refute that? Reply:Because our analysis is intent upon seeking intrinsic nature. We refute here that things exist essentially; we do not refute that eyes and such are products and are dependently arisen results of karma. Therefore, they exist. Hence, when eyes and such are explained only as results of karma, they do exist.

So, we can see from both Candrakirti and Tsonkhapa that the Madhyamikas do not refute existence. Likewise, they do not assert that the Catuskoti refute existence - and indeed explicitly state that the Catuskoti are to be used to search for intrinsic nature. Moreover, Candrakirti asserts existence - as long as we are talking about existence arising from dependent-arising. (20040302 (talk) 17:06, 29 January 2012 (UTC))
 * Tsongkhapa claims that inherent existence=existence, and also claims that when sentient beings look at an object they see only inherent existence, not mere existence. CO2Northeast (talk) 17:10, 29 January 2012 (UTC)


 * I would like you to substantiate your claim regarding what you say Tsongkhapa states. How do you respond to the substantial material (from both Tsongkhapa and Candrakirti) I have provided which supports that Madhyamakas do not deny conventional existence, but they deny inherent existence / essential existence, and likewise that the Catuskoti cannot refute conventional existence, but is used in order to refute essential existence. On the last citation, Candrakirti explicitly states "Therefore, they exist". (20040302 (talk) 17:16, 29 January 2012 (UTC))
 * Did you add the various "Catuskoti" you have in parantheses to the original quote?CO2Northeast (talk) 17:19, 29 January 2012 (UTC)


 * Indeed, I did - but I can substantiate that this is exactly what they are talking about. There is no doubt whatsoever that the analysis both Tsongkhapa and Candrakirti are talking about is the Catuskoti. If you wish, I can provide evidence right now - meanwhile, I am waiting for specific references for your assertions -especially the notion that Tsongkhapa equates existence to essential existence. Maybe you are referring to where he mentions that in some Sutras the word 'inherent' or 'essential' is missing from the original texts, because it is 'obvious by context' - and where he goes on  to say, 'but we should be more careful and should distinguish the two' ? (20040302 (talk))


 * Direct relation of the Catuskoti to this text is found in the same text, on page 156 of the translation. (It is called tetralemma by the translators) A refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma– things exist, things do not exist, and so forth- is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena.  (20040302 (talk) 17:28, 29 January 2012 (UTC))
 * If you admittedley add your wrong views to the quote, how does that help? I think that was pretty deceitful there, but I did not fall for it. Thank you for also quoting the proper tetralemma for me. "things exist, things do not exist." CO2Northeast (talk) 17:35, 29 January 2012 (UTC)
 * No they are not talking about the Catuskoti. They are talking about the subtle object of negation, like I said on my first comment on this page. CO2Northeast (talk) 17:36, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

Is that it? — Preceding unsigned comment added by CO2Northeast (talk • contribs) 18:03, 29 January 2012 (UTC)


 * There is no deceit. The title of the section in the original text is A refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma– things exist, things do not exist, and so forth- is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena. The entire chapter "Rational Analysis" of the translation is concerned with the catuskoti. There is no mistake here. Tsongkhapa and Candrakirti do not talk about subtle objects of negation in this context. They are talking about the fact that the tetralemma is not a refutation of conventional phenomena. (20040302 (talk) 18:05, 29 January 2012 (UTC))

You are trying to drag me into a Tibetan debate. Its very clear the two main extremes are, based on your quote "things exist, things do not exist."CO2Northeast (talk) 18:09, 29 January 2012 (UTC)
 * Actually it says the refutation of the tetralemmea is NOT a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena. Please read more carefully. CO2Northeast (talk) 18:13, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

I have the book is front of me now. The whole tetralemma chapter is chapter 15. You are quoting chapter 12. You stated that chapter 12, the one which you are quoting from, deals with the tetralemma, but it doesn't. You left off part of your quote, again in a deceitful manner. Here is the whole quote "A refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma– things exist, things do not exist, and so forth- is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena (Chapter 15).   Chapter 15 is not the "Rational Analysis" chapter, which is chapter 12.  I am seeking admin action. CO2Northeast (talk) 18:23, 29 January 2012 (UTC)


 * I am really gratified that you are reading the book. I am glad that you are citing the whole quote. Likewise, you are right that chapter 15 discusses the issue in detail. As do chapters 12 through 14. And as you point out, the refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena. Therefore, they exist conventionally. Things exist. (20040302 (talk) 18:44, 29 January 2012 (UTC))

Bullshit. You said "There is no deceit. The title of the section in the original text is A refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma– things exist, things do not exist, and so forth- is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena. The entire chapter "Rational Analysis" of the translation is concerned with the catuskoti. There is no mistake here."  NONE OF THIS IS TRUE. CO2Northeast (talk) 18:58, 29 January 2012 (UTC)


 * I would ask you to remain civil. It occurs to me that you may find the later sentence easier to interpret: (Page 185) c "You cannot eradicate conventional phenomena by refuting them through investigating whether they are produced in one of the four alternative ways.  And at the top of P186 "we assert mere production [...] we do not assert real production." On the same page "these opponents go wrong by not distinguishing 'no intrinsic production' from 'no production'. and on page 188: "Thinking that they are not produced intrinsically, I said that all phenomena are not produced". The business of the qualification of 'ultimately' (which I referred to earlier) is then addressed. There really is no doubt. The rational analysis that is being talked about is indeed the tetralemma of Madhyamaka, although the case may be made more generally. Clearly we have some basic disagreement. Maybe a third opinion would help? (20040302 (talk) 19:02, 29 January 2012 (UTC))

Its not a disagreement. What is the real subtitle of chapter 12? Simple question. You said it was one thing, but it isn't. CO2Northeast (talk) 19:03, 29 January 2012 (UTC)
 * Also you modified the quotes extensively up above. That is another new issue I am bringing up now. CO2Northeast (talk) 19:04, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

The rational analysis of chapter 12 is not the tetralemma in anyway, shape or form. You saying otherwise is simply deceit or illiteracy. The tetralemma is exclusively in chapter 15, and only a smart part of chapter 15 at that. CO2Northeast (talk) 19:19, 29 January 2012 (UTC)
 * Tetralemma starts on page 189, which is the second part of chapter 15. CO2Northeast (talk) 19:22, 29 January 2012 (UTC)


 * I will continue with this tomorrow. Right now, I have other commitments. However, I find it hard to understand how you do not appear to agree that the tetralemma is an important means of rational analysis for the Madhyamikas. I am surprised, and will think further upon it. Meanwhile, if you have the time, I would appreciate you finding the sources to back the claims you have made above. I apologise if you feel that I have misrepresented Candrakirti or Tsongkhapa - I have studied these texts alongside many scholars for several decades, and I am working very hard not to misrepresent them. I will consider in your claims in more detail. It would be of great assistance if you can demonstrate with specific texts just what the issue with existence and the Catuskoti is that you feel is currently misrepresented or misapplied in the article. (20040302 (talk) 19:27, 29 January 2012 (UTC))

Of course I find the tetralemma important. It is you who takes the opposite position, editing it out of the article. Nice try to flip our positions. The fact that you actually tried to flip our respective positions, is something which admins need to take a look at. Regarding sources, read your own book starting on page 189, which is the second part of chapter 15. LOL User:CO2Northeast|CO2Northeast]] (talk) 19:42, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

Continuation - Rational Analysis, Catuskoti, and mere existence.
Before we continue with this technical discussion, I would like to point out that I believe that there is indeed a dispute between us, which I would consider to be fairly called a basic disagreement. There is clearly no established consensus WP:CON yet between us, and again I suggest that we find a means to resolve this, such as a third opinion WP:3O.

I trust that we share the common belief that the use of the word 'tetralemma' is a directly recognisable translation/synonym of 'catuskoti'. I am also glad that we can share the text - and that we both accept the text as a WP:RS regarding the position of the Madhyamaka.

My understanding of your position is that you are stating that the Madhyamikas use the catuskoti to dispute conventional existence. Is that correct?

One of the statements from the book which we both recognise is ""A refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma– things exist, things do not exist, and so forth- is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena ". However, we both appear to read this in a different manner.  My understanding of the sentence is this (I paraphrase) "A refutation developed through the tetralemma is not legitimate for conventional phenomena".  Hence my consternation.

As you suggested, I am reading from page 189 - the discussion of the tetralemma. First of all, I find no mention of the 'subtle object of negation' that you repeatedly have asserted. The section that I am reading is titled A refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma– things exist, things do not exist, and so forth- is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena.

Qualm: The Madhyamaka text refute all four parts of the tetralemma– a thing or intrinsic nature (1)exists [...], and (4) neither exists nor does not exist. Reason refutes everything, as there are no phenomena that are not included among these four. Reply: As indicated earlier "thing" has two meanings. (note 383 indicates that 'earlier' is referring to 597.16: page 145, para 2) Between these two, we refute the assertion that things essentially exist in terms of both truths; however at the conventional level we do not refute things that can perform functions. [...] Thus you should understand that all methods for refuting the tetralemma are like this, involving some qualifier such as 'essentially'. Suppose you refute the tetralemma without affixing any such qualification. You refute the position that things exist and you refute the position that things do not exist;

Continuing, on page 190, I read: Here in the Fundamental Treatise'', "empty" and "non-empty" refer to being empty and not empty of intrinsic nature, and they are used in this way throughout the entire text, from beginning to end. ''  For me, this is clear evidence that Madhyamikas do not use the tetralemma to dispute conventional existence.

Likewise, as mentioned above, Candrakirti's commentary on The Four Hundred Stanzas (13.11) says: ...because our analysis is intent upon seeking intrinsic nature. makes it clear to me that the analysis of Madhyamikas is intent on seeking intrinsic nature.

I am still waiting from you for Madhyamaka sources that disclose a 'subtle object of negation', or an assertion that the Catuskoti is used to dispute conventional existence. (20040302 (talk) 10:08, 30 January 2012 (UTC))
 * Like I have said before, you are confusing the 4 extremes with the 2 truths and the 2 objects of negation. Do you agree that the 4 extremes are existence, nonexistence, both and neither? If so the argument is concluded. CO2Northeast (talk) 15:37, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
 * Madhyamaka accepts conventional existence. This is the 2 truths. I already said this in my second comment on the page. For example a pea pod will become a pea plant, and not a maple tree. But this has nothing to do with the 4 extremes. CO2Northeast (talk) 15:49, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

What are the 4 extremes?
What are the 4 extremes? Simple question. CO2Northeast (talk) 15:42, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

For the Madhyamika, the four extremes are the extremes of inherent existence, inherent non-existence, inherent 'existence and non-existence' and inherent 'neither existence nor non-existence'. The reason why I am explicitly mentioning that this is to do with inherent existence is due to the cite above: p190: Here in the Fundamental Treatise, "empty" and "non-empty" refer to being empty and not empty of intrinsic nature, and they are used in this way throughout the entire text, from beginning to end. For me, this is clear evidence that Madhyamikas do not use the tetralemma to dispute conventional existence. Moreover, A refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma– things exist, things do not exist, and so forth- is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena indicates clearly that the tetralemma is not to be used as a refutation of conventional phenomena.

The contention is this: You wrote Nagarjuna reasons that dependently originated phenomena do not arise as existents in the first place, thereby removing claims that there are existents available to perish I disagree with this sentence, unless we gloss it to be explicit that it is inherent existence that we are talking about, and inherent perishing. Madhyamikas accept conventional existents and conventional perishing. I am far more happy with the following sentence: Nagarjuna reasons that dependently originated phenomena do not arise as inherent existents in the first place, thereby removing claims that there are existents available to inherently perish. (20040302 (talk) 16:39, 30 January 2012 (UTC))


 * I am still waiting for a Madhyamaka source that explicitly describes the two objects of negation. Most especially using the language 'coarse object of negation' and 'subtle object of negation'. (20040302 (talk) 16:41, 30 January 2012 (UTC))
 * Hahahaha. No.  The four extremes are exactly what your source says.  And what Wikipedia says here. And I am not claiming anything about the objects of negation in the article. CO2Northeast (talk) 18:36, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
 * CO2Northeast: Some of your comments on this talk page are not in keeping with WP:CIV and WP:NPA: For example: Referring to another editor's comment as "bullshit" and calling them "deceitful" are not in keeping with these WP behavioral policies. Would you be able to stick to content, not the contributor? Also, I have restored the previous article content (prior to the above dispute) please leave the article alone until the discussion is concluded here. Edit waring will be sanctioned. Sunray (talk) 19:25, 30 January 2012 (UTC)


 * CO2Northeast, the citation at Catuskoti maybe somwhat correct for the Ch'an/Zen lineage of Nagarjuna, who do not recognise Candrakirti, however, there is a strong opposition to academic rigour in the Zen tradition, whereas the Himalayan tradition that follows Candrakirti - and this include Tsongkhapa do not accept that the Catuskoti is a valid method for refuting conventional phenomena, including conventional existence. Therefore, we cannot accept that the Madhyamikas refute conventional existence. I am rather dismayed that you haven't actually read Chapters 12-15 of the text that we share, otherwise we would not be continuing this dispute. The Catuskoti analysis is a major feature of the Madhyamaka analytical approach - and Tsongkhapa writes extensively on (1) how the Catuskoti does not dispute conventional existence, (2) how it would defeat the Madhyamaka if it did, (3) how it is solely intended to be used to refute inherent existence.  Meanwhile  you still haven't produced any evidence for your assertions regarding 'two objects of negation'.  I have family commitments this evening, but I will continue this discussion tomorrow morning.  (20040302 (talk) 19:36, 30 January 2012 (UTC))
 * Again, I never claimed any of these things you bring up. My sole claim is that the 4 extremes are existence, nonexistence, both and neither.  Your source says it, and wikipedia says it. Its really that simple. CO2Northeast (talk) 19:38, 30 January 2012 (UTC)


 * I really have to get to my family, and I will deal with this tomorrow. Here: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Talk%3AMadhyamaka&diff=474047291&oldid=474009470 is where you mentioned objects of negation. I do not dispute the catuskoti - of course I do not. What I do reject is that they are eligible to be used for the refutation of conventional phenomena, as has been pointed out by Tsongkhapa. Because the Catuskoti cannot be used to refute conventional phenomena, the Madhyamaka do not deny existence. They deny inherent existence. (20040302 (talk) 19:51, 30 January 2012 (UTC))
 * Not in the article. I am not claiming anything about the objects of negation in the artice, and never have. I yield all claims to that. CO2Northeast (talk)  —Preceding undated comment added 19:53, 30 January 2012 (UTC).
 * I'm not clear exactly what is in dispute. Would each of you be able to describe, briefly, your point of view on this matter? Sunray (talk) 20:21, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
 * The only thing that is in dispute, besides the new dubious tags just put up, is what the 4 extremes are....which is not really controversial at all. I completely with my whole heart accept conventional existence like 20040302 does. CO2Northeast (talk) 20:23, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

Sunray, what are the 4 extremes?
Just settle the argument. I say the 4 extremes are existence, nonexistence, both and neither. What are the 4 extremes Sunray?CO2Northeast (talk) 19:46, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
 * I'm unclear what is in dispute here. Sunray (talk) 20:31, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
 * What are the 4 extremes of Madhyamaka? And if you can provide a source, that would be best. CO2Northeast (talk) 20:34, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
 * It seems to me that you are in dispute over the interpretation of a source. Am I right about that? Sunray (talk) 20:43, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
 * Not at all. I have the source and can quote it verbatim. Would you like that? It is not a matter of interpretation in the slightest. CO2Northeast (talk) 20:45, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
 * Or you can find another source. It doesn't matter to me in the least.  All sources agree with what the 4 extremes are. CO2Northeast (talk) 20:48, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
 * You have said that the four extremes are: Being; Non-being; Both being and non-being; Neither being and non-being. Is that in dispute? Sunray (talk) 20:50, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
 * Yes that is in dispute very clearly if you look above. CO2Northeast (talk) 20:53, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
 * It would be good to get 20040302's take on what the dispute is all about. Let's wait until he returns. Sunray (talk) 20:56, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
 * But that doesn't have to stop you from stating what the 4 extremes are. Thats is just factual information, not a matter of argument. CO2Northeast (talk) 20:58, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
 * There is a lot of text, above. I value simplicity. Would you be able to show me where 20040302 disputes what you have said were the four extremes. A diff would be nice. Sunray (talk) 22:45, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
 * Here you go my friend — Preceding unsigned comment added by CO2Northeast (talk • contribs) 22:49, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
 * I have never seen anyone state the 4 extremes like that. It is certainly not supported by even Tsonkhapa's commentary. CO2Northeast (talk) 23:09, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
 * That seems to be an issue that we could discuss when 20040302 returns. Sunray (talk) 23:12, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
 * Well if you read the diff I cited, it is merely based on 20040302's deluded arguments. He refers to page 190, but nothing on page 190 even resembles what he types. CO2Northeast (talk) 23:16, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
 * How about removing the word "deluded"? You might say: "... based on 20040302's arguments which I consider incorrect." :) Sunray (talk) 23:20, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

New Dubious tags
I guess someone is bringing up new issues. Very well. If you look at Jay Garfield's translation of the MMK, on page 220 it says "Essence by definition is eternal and independent". Nagarjuna is equating svabhāva with bhāva in this portion of chapter 15. CO2Northeast (talk) 20:18, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
 * I've removed the disputed tag and gone back to an earlier (stable) version. Sunray (talk) 02:04, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

Please no partisan Tibetan material
Please no partisan Tibetan material. Thank you. CO2Northeast (talk) 22:12, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
 * Would you be willing to elaborate on what you mean by partisan? Sunray (talk) 22:39, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
 * Well Tsongkhapa, one of the most divisive figures in Tibetan Buddhism, certainly is partisian. I have no problem with the way the 4 extremes are stated in 20040302's book at all on page 189. I have this book too. But Tsongkhapa's following interpretation, in the next section, is not germane to this article. CO2Northeast (talk) 22:45, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
 * You take issue with Tsongkhapa's interpretation? What are your concerns? Sunray (talk) 22:56, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
 * Actually I don't. My point is that it is partisan, and has nothing to do with a general article. CO2Northeast (talk) 22:59, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
 * Well, Tsongkhapa was an important figure. It may be hard to leave him out. WP:WEIGHT requires that we fairly represent all significant viewpoints that have been published by reliable sources. Sunray (talk) 23:09, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
 * Sure, but like I said above, 20040302 misrepresents even Tsongkhapa's position. The book is very clear. I can type sections out. CO2Northeast (talk) 23:10, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

Abhidharma
The funny thing is the "disputed article" does not even contain my edits. Please add my edits regarding Abhidharma. Thank you. CO2Northeast (talk) 23:37, 30 January 2012 (UTC)
 * What I've now done is reverted to the last stable version (i.e., before the dispute began). I hope we can settle the differences quickly so we can all get back to editing. Sunray (talk) 02:03, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

What are the 4 extremes? (continued)
Hi, everybody. I'm afraid I have to agree with March 2nd on this one, who said above: "For the Madhyamika, the four extremes are the extremes of inherent existence, inherent non-existence, inherent 'existence and non-existence' and inherent 'neither existence nor non-existence'."

I would like to quote from Nagarjuna's Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way (28:8), wherein he also puts forth a 'positive' tetralemma, followed by Jay Garfield's commentary:

"Everything is real and is not real,

Both real and not real,

Neither real nor not real.

This is the Lord Buddha's teaching."

Jay Garfield: "This is the positive tetralemma regarding existence. Everything is conventionally real. Everything is ultimately unreal (that is, not unreal in just any sense, but unreal when seen from the ultimate standpoint). Everything has both characteristics--that is, everything is both conventionally real and ultimately unreal. Nothing is ultimately real or completely non-existent. That is, everything is neither real in one sense nor not-real in another sense."

Likewise, when reading the Heart Sutra, one should qualify all the no's as being "no inherent _____". For example, "Therefore, Shariputra, in emptiness there is no [inherently existent] form, no [inherently existent] feeling, no [inherently existent] discrimination.... Likewise, there is no [inherent] suffering, [inherent] origin, [inherent] cessation, or [inherent] path...." Amplifying Life (talk) 02:11, 31 January 2012 (UTC)
 * I'm sorry but Jay does not use the word "inherent" at all. Does he? Jay is talking about the two truths. Things conventionally exist, but ultimately not so. Thats why Jay says "Nothing is ultimately real" and "everything is ultimately unreal". Madison34563 (talk) 03:07, 31 January 2012 (UTC)
 * There are a number of places wherein Garfield uses non-inherent existence synonymously with ultimate truth. This occurs throughout his book, and I'll quote one below. On page 120, he explicitly says, "...the nonexistence of things (where "existence" is read "inherent existence")...", for example. Keeping this in mind, on page 230, there is this from Garfield: "Neither nirvana nor samsara are inherently existent. Ultimately both are nonexistent. So, what, Nagarjuna asks rhetorically, are they? The answer is that they are conventionally real, dependently arisen phenomena that are empty of inherent existence."
 * Thus, the tetralemma directly relates to the two truths, by considering the two truths individually and also combined together, making four permutations: (1) conventional truth = conventional existence, (2) ultimate truth = non-inherent existence, (3) both conventional truth and ultimate truth together, and (4) neither inherent existence nor utter non-existence together. So, a few pages later (p. 250), when you get to the positive tetralemma, you can correlate the 4 with the 2:
 * (1) Everything is [conventionally] real and (2) is not [ultimately] real,
 * (3) Both [conventionally] real and [ultimately] not real,


 * (4) Neither [ultimately] real nor not [conventionally] real.


 * This is the Lord Buddha's teaching."
 * Again, this synonymy between ultimate truth and non-inherent existence is shown on page 88, which reads: "This dual thesis of the conventional reality of phenomena together with their lack of inherent existence depends upon the complex doctrine of the two truths or two realities--a conventional or nominal truth and an ultimate truth--and upon a subtle and surprising doctrine regarding their relation." Thus, there are two truths (i.e., two initial assertions): (1) C = conventionally real / conventionally existent, and (2) ~U = not ultimately real / not [inherently] existent, from which we can logically deduce via adjunction: (3) C & ~U, and via De Morgan's Laws: (4) ~(U v ~C). If you just consider #1 and #2, that's the two truths. If you deduce from them #3 and #4, then altogether you have the four-fold tetralemma. Amplifying Life (talk) 05:43, 31 January 2012 (UTC)
 * Again Jay does not use the term "non-inherent existence" at all on page 88 where he describes the 2 truths. The phrase is simply not on the page. What Jay actually says is that the nominal truth is the relative truth.  Which is exactly what I wrote in the "two truths" section, regarding the "tree".  The "tree" is a nominal label. Madison34563 (talk) 06:05, 31 January 2012 (UTC)
 * Okay, he says "lack of inherent existence" instead of "non-inherent existence" ("no inherently existent phenomena," p. 303, n. 115). What is the semantic difference between these two? There are many ways to express "absence of inherent existence" -- same as "empty of inherent existence" (p. 243). Amplifying Life (talk) 14:12, 31 January 2012 (UTC)


 * Thanks for your comments, Amplifying Life. I like the fact that you have backed up your views with reference to Garfield. It is usually helpful for editors to use sources, quotes and diffs to help settle disagreements on these pages. I hope you will stick around. Sunray (talk) 02:31, 31 January 2012 (UTC)
 * This is Reifingam, who made the original edits. I can't log back in for some reason. Jay Garfield does not use the word "inherent" at all in this quote. This supports my position entirely. Jay even specifically says "Nothing is ultimately real" and "everything is ultimately unreal". — Preceding unsigned comment added by Madison34563 (talk • contribs) 02:45, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

Suggested Resolution
Create a section on the two truths. Its pretty obvious by now, that this should have been done at the inception of the page. Madison34563 (talk) 03:38, 31 January 2012 (UTC)
 * Madison34563, your suggestion is welcome, but it's not a resolution. There is the two truths article. Please wait until the discussion has been concluded.

"The Buddha's teaching of the Dharma is based on two truths: a truth of worldly convention and an ultimate truth. Those who do not understand the distinction drawn between these two truths do not understand the Buddha's profound truth. Without a foundation in the conventional truth the significance of the ultimate cannot be taught. Without understanding the significance of the ultimate, liberation is not achieved."

- Nagarjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārika 24:8-10 (Ref:Jay L. Garfield,Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: pp. 296, 298)

There are no deadlines, right? (20040302 (talk) 09:59, 31 January 2012 (UTC))
 * No deadlines that I know of. Sunray (talk) 16:03, 31 January 2012 (UTC)
 * I should add that it usually helps to take it slow, keep it brief, and to try to stick to one thread. A Buddhist approach is good :) Sunray (talk) 16:08, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

March 2nd's view of what is in dispute here
Since I started the dispute, I think that I better make myself clear what it is I am disputing, and what I am not disputing. On the 27 January, Reifingam made a few changes to the article. (see http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Madhyamaka&action=historysubmit&diff=473435515&oldid=470911728 ) These were the assertions made by Reifingam
 * "Nāgārjuna equates svabhāva (essence) with bhāva (existence) in chapter 15 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā"
 * "The two extreme views are (1) 'existence' ..."
 * "In chapter 21 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Nagarjuna reasons that dependently originated phenomena do not arise as existents in the first place, thereby removing claims that there are existents available to perish."


 * I dispute that Nāgārjuna equates svabhāva (essence) with bhāva (existence) in chapter 15 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.
 * I counter that Verses 15.8,15.10,15.11 are the only verses of that chapter that mention existence - and in none of them does he equate essence with existence. (Garfield translation pp223-224).   (20040302 (talk))


 * I dispute that the first extreme (of which the middle way avoids) is existence.
 * I counter that the Madhyamaka view is that it is essential existence (or 'inherent existence', or 'intrinsic reality', or 'independent existence' - in this context the terms are synonymous) which is the first extreme, which is what the original text stated. I am convinced that the two extremes are to do with the the middle way, not the Catuskoti.  (20040302 (talk))


 * I dispute that Nagarjuna reasons that dependently originated phenomena do not arise as existents in the first place, thereby removing claims that there are existents available to perish (MMK:21).
 * I counter that Nagarjuna reasons that dependently originated phenomena do not arise as inherently existents in the first place, thereby removing claims that there are inherent existents available to perish. (20040302 (talk))

As I stated at in my original post, 'existence' is not disputed by Nagarjuna - only inherent existence is disputed. If there were no existents, then all objects would have the same ontological significance as the horn of a hare, a hairy tortoiseshell, etc. karma would not function. Madhyamaka would be a nihilist school. (20040302 (talk))
 * Jay says "Nothing is ultimately real" and "everything is ultimately unreal". So Jay disagrees wih you. The hairy tortoiseshell is used in the opposite way than what you are suggesting. It actually means that there are no existents like God, atman etc. Madison34563 (talk) 12:46, 31 January 2012 (UTC)
 * Along these lines, you say above "Things conventionally exist, but ultimately not so." This could be re-worded as "Things conventionally exist, but ultimately things do not conventionally exist." Is this what you are getting at? If so, check out Garfield (pp. 298-299, 305). The two truths are establishing the lower and upper limits of existence, and one does not speak to the other. By analogy, conventional truth is like me saying "I have at least $5 in my pocket," and ultimate truth is like me adding "But no more than $5." The second statement alone does not imply that I have no money at all in my pocket; it says nothing about values equal to or less than $5. In the same way, conventional truth says that things exist; ultimate truth says that things do not exist inherently. The second statement alone does not imply that things do not have any existence at all. It is important to not that the English word merely (as in "Ultimately, things are merely conventional") is a negation, i.e. "Ultimately, things are not more than conventional." This is true for both existents and non-existents, but only conventional truth can tell us whether things are less than conventional (e.g., the horned hare). Amplifying Life (talk) 14:20, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

Sorry Madison34563, your statement appears to me to be a non-sequitur. Please show me how "nothing is ultimately real" is a disagreement with anything I have said. (20040302 (talk) 14:44, 31 January 2012 (UTC))
 * Jay gives the 4 extremes as shown above. "Inherent" is not even part of it. There is not one book on Google Books that says "inherent existence" is an extreme of Madhyamaka. So you have to provide a source for that. Madison34563 (talk) 17:00, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

If you look at Chapter 21 of the MMK, the whole thing is about arising and existence, which both have the same sanskrit word Bhava. Madison34563 (talk) 17:21, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

Madison34563, the text that you have linked to is an extensive commentary by Mabja Jangchub Tsöndru. In this text, he does not always qualify existence as representing essential existence. In the forward of the book, on page IX/X, the Dalai Lama states: ''Nagarjuna's Root of the Middle Way presents a clear, firm philosophical thesis with respect to things' lacking true existence. It argues that just as sentient beings are devoid of innate existence, so are all Buddhas, the cycle of existence, and the tranquility of nirvana''. I accept that statement. Can you? (20040302 (talk) 18:19, 31 January 2012 (UTC))

My dispute has nothing to do with the Catuskoti
CO2Northeast mentioned the Catuskoti as some defence for Reifingam's edits. My dispute did not - and really does not - revolve around the Catuskoti. The one regret that I have is to respond to CO2Northeast implicitly accepting the Catuskoti as four extremes. I do not find references to the Catuskoti as four extremes, but merely as piece of Buddhist dialectical apparatus offering four exhaustive alternatives. I agree that Nagarjuna uses the Catuskoti, but he does not depict them as four extremes. The middle way of the Madhyamaka are between the two extremes of essentialism and nihilism. Garfield p304 states "This defines the straits between which the middle path must be found, as well as the presupposition that generates both extremes" (My emphasis) (20040302 (talk) 11:01, 31 January 2012 (UTC))

I am now reasonably persuaded that the editors Reifingam/Madison34563 and CO2Northeast are conflating the Middle Way (which has two extremes to avoid) with the Catuskoti (which have four exhaustive alternatives). This conflation is a mistake, as the two serve totally different purposes within the Madhyamaka. The two truths are likewise distinct from either of them. (20040302 (talk) 11:14, 31 January 2012 (UTC))
 * No they are actually the same thing. Do you know the reason why "both" is there as one of the extremes?  Because one ancient Indian philosophy accepts that existence and nonexistence can arise at the same time. Do you know what that is? Madison34563 (talk) 12:43, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

Let me briefly attempt to demonstrate why the conflation of the Catuskoti with the Middle way is incorrect for the Madhyamaka. (Let us remember that the purpose of the Madhyamaka is to achieve insight, which leads directly to liberation from Samsara). A (Madhyamaka-defined) essentialist believes that phenomena are efficacious - they are seen as valid sources of happiness; for example: Someone who believes that they will be more happy by being rich. A (Madhyamaka-defined) nihilist is someone who disbelieves in causality and therefore there is no need to be responsible for one's actions; for example: Someone who disbelieves in rebirth. It is completely possible for an individual to hold to both of the extremes which are to be avoided. Meanwhile, the first two points of the Catuskoti/tetralemma are diametrically opposed: existence vs. non-existence. In Madhyamaka, the purpose of the tetralemma is to expose the essencelessness of phenomena. Above I have extensively cited Tsongkhapa and Candrakirti on these points. (20040302 (talk))

(Addendum; 16:28, 31 Jan) My reading of the MMK 24.16 actually supports the view that someone who falls into the first extreme - that phenomena are efficacious - will likewise entail a wrong view regarding karma, and so also fall to the other extreme - a disbelief in causality. (Garfield, 302 trans.) If you perceive the existence of all things in terms of their essence, then this perception of all things will be without the perception of causes and conditions. So we can see that not only do Madhyamikas assert two extreme views to avoid (essentialism / nihilism), but that these views actually give rise to each other.

I should probably point out that I am aware of the caturanta - but I do not believe that Nagarjuna conflates the Caturanta with the Catuskoti, although I am aware that some Tibetan scholars may have asserted that. (20040302 (talk))


 * Thank you for your clarity. Comments by others? Sunray (talk) 16:05, 31 January 2012 (UTC)
 * Since you avoided my question, I will answer. Nagarjuna includes "both" as an extreme because of Jainism. Jainism asserted that existence and nonexistence can emerge at the same time. Madison34563 (talk) 16:56, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

Another suggested resolution
Swith the word existence with eternalism. Since the specific Madhyamaka use of "existence" is actually closer to eternalism in meaning......Madison34563 (talk) 17:44, 31 January 2012 (UTC)
 * I went ahead and switched all instances of existence with eternalism. So this should resolve all disputes. Thank you. Madison34563 (talk) 17:56, 31 January 2012 (UTC)


 * Madison34563, I know you are new to Wikipedia but you cannot do this. I dispute this edit. Most especially the idea that essentialism implies 'permanent unconditioned things'.  Candrakīrti says: When knowing selflessness, some eliminate a permanent self, but we do not consider this to be the basis of the conception of "I" It is therefore astonishing that knowing this selflessness expunges and uproots the view of self. (Madhyamakāvatāra 6.140). Or are you actually not new to Wikipedia? Are you yet another sock-puppet of the well-known sock-puppeteer User:Thigle, who also argued for 'Eternalism'? 20040302 (talk) 18:09, 31 January 2012 (UTC)
 * Eternalism is frequently used as an extreme. For example here. Eternalism was used in this article as far back as 6 years ago, if you click here.....Madison34563 (talk) 18:14, 31 January 2012 (UTC)
 * In fact it looks like eternalism was always used in this article from the beginning. Look at the history going back 8 years. Madison34563 (talk) 18:22, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

Your link points to the front cover of a book which does not include the word 'Eternalism' on it. And thank goodness that Wikipedia can be written better than it was. The fact that WP used 'eternalism' 6 years ago is no evidence. (20040302 (talk))
 * When you pull up the book, type "eternalism" in the box. Thank you. Madison34563 (talk) 18:27, 31 January 2012 (UTC)
 * No, I want the page please. This is another behaviour that is very similar to that of User:Thigle. Again, I ask you - are you a sock puppet of User:Thigle?

Far more importantly, how do you respond to Candrakirti? (20040302 (talk) 18:28, 31 January 2012 (UTC))
 * Sure. Please look at pages 4, 37, 87, 125 and 198. And no I am not a sockpuppet of "Thigle." Madison34563 (talk) 18:36, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

pg. 87 "Emptiness is, Nagarjuna claims, the famous Buddhist Middle way betweeen eternalism and nihilism."Madison34563 (talk) 18:44, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

I have read enough of this text now (David F. Burton's 'Emptiness Appraised'). Burton is an accomplished academic, but he stands apart from Candrakirti, and says as much in his papers. For me, we cannot depend upon such a radical, even if rather qualified, view - as Burton is definitely in a minority, and possibly a minority of one. WP:UNDUE. I should point out that even Burton no longer uses the term 'eternalism' in his recent works, but instead uses 'essentialism'. Although I may accept other publications of Burton, I do not accept 'Emptiness Appraised' as a reliable source. Certainly not in this context. (20040302 (talk) 20:12, 31 January 2012 (UTC))
 * I'm confused. You didn't provide a quote of Candrakriti talking about the extremes, only about selflessness.  I am a Westerner in Dharmasala, India with all the Tibetan Lamas, and I can assure you that the extremes are existence, nonexistence, both, neither. 182.72.170.14 (talk) 20:15, 3 February 2012 (UTC)

The quote from Candrakirti (Madhyamakāvatāra 6.140) demonstrates that 'eternalism' does not suffice. I am grateful to hear that you are among Tibetan scholars. Ask them what the specific difference is between mu zhi and ta zhi - at first they may well say 'they are the same' - so ask why are there two separate phrases, and how they differ in purpose. The Sanskrit words are caturanta and catuskoti. They may still say 'it's the same', so then ask 'are the two extremes of the middle way the same as the first two extremes of the mu-zhi?' they may still reply 'yes', in which case ask 'so for those proponents of the first extreme, do they assert the opposite of those who assert the second extreme?' if the answer to that is yes, then cite MMK 24:16, otherwise ask them if it is not opposite, how do the catuskoti exhaust all logical alternatives. If the reply is 'via the third and fourth extreme' then ask - so why do the scholars talk about the middle way as avoiding two extremes, not four? Alternatively, ask if the purpose of the catuskoti in the MMK is to (1) demonstrate emptiness through analysis, (2) to demonstrate the extremes to be avoided, (3) both, or (4) neither/something else. Again, one can ask 'As an extreme, does the first of the catuskoti (caturanta), "it exists" refute conventional existence?' if the answer to this is Yes, then your Lama disagrees with Tsongkhapa, and we will need to find some sort of scholarship that supports this to demonstrate that your Lama is holding a significantly supported view. On my side I have recently (two weeks ago) discussed most of this with a Lharampa Geshe, and he supported my views, although we was swiftly able to demonstrate that my understanding of the Cittamatra is far less clear. (20040302 (talk) 13:13, 4 February 2012 (UTC))

Just now I have once again talked with a Lharampa Geshe who is also a professor of Indian philosopy. He suggests that, within the context of the Madhyamaka, the terms མཐའ་བཞི (caturanta) and མུ་བཞི (catuskoti) are somewhat similar and are, at times, used as synonyms. However, he agrees with me and categorically states that the first two of the མུ་བཞི are not to be confused with the མཐའ་གཉིས - the two extremes to be avoided in the middle way, and that these things are completely different. (20040302 (talk) 18:54, 4 February 2012 (UTC))


 * The quote from Candrakirti (Madhyamakāvatāra 6:140-141) states (trans. Gyatso in Ocean of Nectar, p. 317):
 * 'When selflessness is realized, a permanent self is negated';
 * But this is not held to be the basis of grasping at I.
 * Therefore it is amazing that you say that the view of self
 * Is eradicated through knowing the non-existence of self!


 * It would be like someone who sees a snake in a hole in the wall of his house
 * Having his anxiety quelled, and losing his fear of the snake
 * By someone saying 'There is no elephant here!'
 * Alas, he would be the laughing stock of others.


 * Therefore, I wanted to affirm consensus with 20040302. Also, in Understanding the Mind (pp. 217-281) Gyatso is crystal clear:


 * "Although the I cannot be found under analysis, and therefore lacks inherent existence, it nevertheless exists conventionally. The I, therefore, is free from the extreme of existence in that it is not inherently existent, and free from the extreme of non-existence in that it is not completely non-existent. Moreover, the I is not a permanent unchanging entity that survives death unchanged, nor is it completely annihilated at death. Therefore, the I is free from the two extremes of permanence and nothingness, and so extreme view is mistaken."


 * There are two pairs of extremes here: the extremes of existence and non-existence, and the extremes of permanence (eternalism) and nothingness (annihilationism). They are two different topics, even though they are tackled in a similar (middle) way. I agree that using eternalism in place of [inherent] existence is inappropriate. It may not be comparing "apples and oranges" but it is still "tangerines and oranges." Amplifying Life (talk) 01:37, 5 February 2012 (UTC)


 * Hi Amplifying Life, just to be clear on your last statement, in the Madhyamaka the "extreme of inherent existence" (the first of the མཐའ་གཉིས / dvayānta / the two extremes) cannot be called an 'extreme of permanence' or 'eternalism' (as Candrakirti points out in MT 6:140 above).  There are many ways in which this can be demonstrated. For instance, it is the innate conviction in the efficacy of phenomena (specifically in their ability to act as valid objects of clinging and grasping - the most powerfully binding phenomenon being the notion of an efficacious self) that keeps all sentient beings in samsara. Although a belief in a phenomenon's permanence entails a belief in it's efficacy as an object of grasping, one may still recognise a phenomenon's impermanence and yet still hold onto it having some efficacy..  If this were the not the case, then we would not need three marks of existence, but two - as Anicca would be enough to liberate us, whereas actually we must also understand Anatta. The Madhyamikas concentrate their energy on Anatta rather than Anicca. Anyhow, Candrakirti disputes permanence as a basis of self-grasping, and even ridicules those who would think that. Therefore, it is clear (from Candrakirti's view) that recognising the absence of a permanency is not enough, we must also understand the absence of essence/inherent-existence. Likewise, see (the excellent) chapter 16 titled "Not Negating Enough" of the Lam Rim Chen Mo which goes into this in detail (ISBN 1559391669, pp194-201). Also See Napper's excellent discussion of this (with the same title) at  (ISBN 0861710576, pp67-100)  (20040302 (talk) 14:53, 5 February 2012 (UTC))


 * Yes, I agree with you 100% that these two should not be conflated. I think that grasping at a permanent self is an intellectually-formed delusion that we are not born with but which we adopt from mistaken philosophy, whereas grasping at an inherently existent self is an innate delusion that we have carried with us from life to life. Simply put, we are not born thinking of ourselves as permanent but are taught so by different philosophies and religions that teach an immortal self, for example. If grasping at at permanent self (= extreme of eternalism) was what was meant by self-grasping (= extreme of [inherent] existence), then young people would experience nirvana until they were old enough to have been taught otherwise and believe in a permanent self! Amplifying Life (talk) 18:51, 5 February 2012 (UTC)


 * Hi Amplifying Life I have been thinking a lot about your response since yesterday and I am not convinced that grasping at a permanent self is merely an acquired delusion (arising from mistaken philosophy). I am pretty sure that, we have an innate tendancy to grasp onto constancy, whereas I would hold that Anicca asserts inconstancy, and I believe that this innate view is indeed a cause of gross clinging/grasping. Moreover (as I argue more thoroughly below) a view of permanence/eternalism entails a view of an efficacious self, and likewise a view of an efficacious self may well entail some form of view of permanence. I would not discount a view of permanence as merely an acquired view. It is very pernicious! (20040302 (talk) 11:48, 6 February 2012 (UTC))


 * Indeed! Worldly people, in general, do assert gross impermanence such as people and things growing and dying, seasons changing, etc. However, worldly people do not assert subtle impermanence, which demonstrates that things are changing moment by moment. If someone rejects even gross impermanence, this is only because of an acquired view. Amplifying Life (talk) 14:07, 6 February 2012 (UTC)

Avoid editing article
Users who are discussing issues on this page are requested to avoid editing the article until all disputes are resolved. I've reverted to the last version prior to this dispute. Please leave it at that. Sunray (talk) 19:03, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

Are all disputes are resolved?
CO2Northeast, Madison34563 - having weighed the arguments above do you have anything further to add regarding the three disputes I have delineated above, or anything to add regarding the dispute that I have made (in light of Candrakirti) against the use of the word 'eternalism' ? Or can I close this particular discussion? (20040302 (talk) 10:50, 3 February 2012 (UTC))
 * I am travelling to Ajanta (famous Buddhist pilgrimage), so I am going to make this quick. You are wrong.182.72.170.14 (talk) 20:30, 3 February 2012 (UTC)
 * Would you be able to back up this statement with evidence in the form of quotations from a reliable source? Sunray (talk) 21:23, 3 February 2012 (UTC)

Here is something182.72.170.14 (talk) 22:41, 3 February 2012 (UTC)
 * We need the actual quotation. Sunray (talk) 05:08, 4 February 2012 (UTC)

These the disputes that I (20040302 (talk)) am aware of. Which (if any) of these may we consider closed? Are there any other disputes that I have not included
 * I dispute that Nāgārjuna equates svabhāva (essence) with bhāva (existence) in chapter 15 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.
 * I dispute that the first extreme (of which the middle way avoids) - the first of the dvayānta - is existence.
 * I dispute that Nagarjuna reasons that dependently originated phenomena do not arise as existents in the first place, thereby removing claims that there are existents available to perish (MMK:21).
 * I dispute that, for the Madhyamaka, the word 'Eternalism' may be used as indicative of the innate belief that phenomena are efficacious objects of craving and clinging

On Eternalism
In the talk above, and previously, I (and others) have vigorously opposed the use of 'eternalism' for the Madhyamaka article. But there is some strong provenance for the term, and what I want to do is to examine that here. I know that WP is not an area for WP:SYNTH. However, I don't think it's fair to voice such a strong opposition to eternalism without some basic justification.

There are several prototype sutras for the Madhyamaka view, such as SN 12.17 or, and SN 12.15. These express two extreme views: (Pali: sassatavāda / ucchedavāda ; Skt: śāśvatavāda / ucchedavāda; ) which themselves are commonly translated as 'Eternalism' and 'Annihilationism'. In SN12.17, we see ... the eternalist statement, 'Existing from the very beginning, stress is self-made.' , likewise SN 12.15 states: "'Everything exists', this is one extreme; 'nothing exists,' this is the other extreme." and the footnotes state: ''Atthitaa: "is-ness." The theory of "Eternalism" (sassatavāda). / Natthitaa: "is-not-ness." The theory of "Annihilationism" (ucchedavāda). ''

These two extremes are known as the (Skt: dvayānta, Tib: མཐའ་གཉིས) which are namely (Skt: śāśvatānta/ucchedānta, Tib: རྟག་མཐའ / ཆད་མཐའ). The (skt) term 'śāśvata' (which prefixes śāśvatavāda, śāśvatānta, and other related phrases) translates to "eternal, constant , perpetual, for ever more, incessantly", so in many ways it is fair to accept eternalism as a literal rendition of the traditional term.

However these terms have been repeatedly raised by historical scholars and academics as well as modern academics. It is because of this that Candrakirti and many other Madhyamikas are so vehement (MT 6:140) about the issue, and they have been at pains to point out that Nagarjuna - and the Madhyamaka movement in general - uses the term śāśvatavāda to describe a view that holds onto inherent existence or essential existence rather than permanent or eternal existence. Candrakirti also states (in Bodhisattvayogacaryācatuḥśatakaṭikā 256.1.7 The self is an essence of things that does not depend on others; it is an intrinsic nature. The non-existence of that is selflessness.).

In SN12.17, Lord Buddha defines his meaning of sassatavāda: ""'He who performs the act also experiences [the result]' [...] this amounts to the sassatavāda.". My reading of this is that a view of an efficacious self (he who performs.. experiences) entails (amounts to) sassatavāda. In this sense, Lord Buddha may be stating that a notion of inherent existence entails a belief in some form of permanence. But as Candrakirti points out, a belief in permanence is not the basis of grasping/clinging that keeps us bound to Samsara.

Although a belief in a phenomenon's permanence entails a belief in it's efficacy as an object of grasping (likewise, if we accept my reading of SN12.17, then we can also say that a notion of inherent existence, or an efficacious self, entails a belief in some form of permanence) one may still recognise a phenomenon's impermanence and yet still hold onto it having some efficacy. In other words, understanding it's impermanence alone is not enough to free us from Samsara. If this were the not the case, then we would not need three marks of existence, but two - as Anicca would be enough to liberate us, whereas actually we must also understand Anatta (and Dukkha, of course).

Therefore, although a very literal translation of śāśvatānta would be "the extreme of eternalism" - I believe this to be non-contextualised, in that it describes an entailment of an innate view, rather than the problem itself. The Madhyamaka literature repeatedly distances itself from a reading which holds onto the idea that all one must eliminate is a view of eternalism, and I remain convinced that we would be making a mistake if we imply that here. Certainly, we could consider adding a section to the article which explores this. I welcome further discussion on this though, and do not consider the matter closed yet. (20040302 (talk) 11:20, 6 February 2012 (UTC))


 * To be inherently existent would be to exist permanently/eternally, whereas to be permanent does not necessarily imply that something exists inherently. Permanence is potentially only one aspect of what it means to exist inherently, so the use of the term 'eternal' (and hence 'eternalism') is not exhaustive enough, because things can be thought of to exist not just independent of their causes but also of their parts and of the mind. I say potentially because there are some things that are permanent but are not inherently existent! So, even though sometimes at some levels there is some overlap, the two terms are definitely not synonymous. Amplifying Life (talk) 14:15, 6 February 2012 (UTC)

Yes, definitely. An example of something which is permanent and not-inherently existent would be a cessation. I am saying that the 'eternalism' aspect of the innate grasping onto the continuation/constancy of things, and the suffering that is present when they end is very powerful but it is distinct from the 'selfhood' / 'inherence' / 'essence' aspect of the innate grasping onto the inherent existence of things, which is even more powerful and insidious. However, we have to accept that the traditional name given to the extreme of essentialist grasping is śāśvatavāda - which translates to 'eternalist view' (which, when talking about positive phenomena, normally indicates lack of momentary change, rather than everlasting existence). Just as I cannot imagine a view of 'eternalism' which does not also imply some form of 'essentialism', I also cannot imagine a view of 'essentialism' that does not imply some form of 'eternalism' - though I am willing to be shown an example of either. However, I CANl imagine a view of 'non-eternalism' which does not entail 'non-essentialism', and possibly a view of 'non-essentialism' which does not entail 'non-eternalism' (eg, via dependence upon parts). (20040302 (talk) 17:03, 6 February 2012 (UTC))