Talk:Metaphilosophy/quotations

The contents of this page were originally added by User:Philogo to the main Metaphilosophy article. They completely overwhelmed the rest of the page and are not well-formatted, but they are valuable quotes which clearly took some effort to compile so I didn't want to just delete them. Thus I moved them (or attempted to move them) to a subpage, here, for eventual integration into the actual article. (I've since been informed of the no-subpages policy). I never meant for this to be a proper article page at all.

I fully support the transwiki'ing of this to wikiquote and the deletion of this page from Wikipedia. We can then refer to the wikiquotes page from the main article, rather than this page. --Pfhorrest (talk) 22:20, 24 February 2009 (UTC)
 * Out of interst where is the no sub-page policy to be read?--Philogo (talk) 14:09, 25 February 2009 (UTC)
 * Try Naming conventions--Rumping (talk) 18:31, 25 February 2009 (UTC)
 * See also Subpages. --Pfhorrest (talk) 01:47, 26 February 2009 (UTC)


 * I've just moved this into the Talk: namespace since the transwiki process is taking so long. --Pfhorrest (talk) 01:10, 19 December 2009 (UTC)

Aristotle
Judged by all the tests we have mentioned, then, the name in question falls to the same science; this [philosophy] must be a science that investigates the first principles and causes; for the good, i.e. the end, is one of the causes. (Metaphysics Book I chapter 2).

Metaphysics (Book II)

[993a] It is right also that philosophy should be called knowledge of the truth. For the end of theoretical knowledge is truth, while that of practical knowledge is action (for even if they consider how things are, practical men do not study the eternal, but what is relative and in the present). Now we do not know a truth without its cause; and a thing has a quality in a higher degree than other things if in virtue of it the similar quality belongs to the other things as well (e.g. fire is the hottest of things; for it is the cause of the heat of all other things); so that that causes derivative truths to be true is most true. Hence the principles of eternal things must be always most true (for they are not merely sometimes true, nor is there any cause of their being, but they themselves are the cause of the being of other things), so that as each thing is in respect of being, so is it in respect of truth.

Metaphysics (Book VI)

One might raise the question whether first philosophy is universal, or deals with one genus, i.e. some one kind of being; for not even the mathematical sciences are all alike in this respect,-geometry and astronomy deal with a certain particular kind of thing, while universal mathematics applies alike to all. [Si igitur] We answer that if there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature, natural science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. And it will belong to this to consider being qua being-both what it is and the attributes which belong to it qua being.

The point of our present discussion is this, that all men suppose what is called Wisdom to deal with the first causes and the principles of things; so that, as has been said before, the man of experience is thought to be wiser than the possessors of any sense-perception whatever, the artist wiser than the men of experience, the masterworker than the mechanic, and the theoretical kinds of knowledge to be more of the nature of Wisdom than the productive. Clearly then Wisdom is knowledge about certain principles [982a] and causes.

Now of these characteristics that of knowing all things must belong to him who has in the highest degree universal knowledge; for he knows in a sense all the instances that fall under the universal. And these things, the most universal, are on the whole the hardest for men to know; for they are farthest from the senses. And the most exact of the sciences are those which deal most with first principles; for those which involve fewer principles are more exact than those which involve additional principles, e.g. arithmetic than geometry. But the science which investigates causes is also instructive, in a higher degree, for the people who instruct us are those who tell the causes of each thing. And understanding and knowledge pursued for their own sake are found most in the knowledge of that which is most knowable (for he who chooses to know for the sake of knowing will choose most [982b] readily that which is most truly knowledge, and such is the knowledge of that which is most knowable); and the first principles and the causes are most knowable; for by reason of these, and from these, all other things come to be known, and not these by means of the things subordinate to them. And the science which knows to what end each thing must be done is the most authoritative of the sciences, and more authoritative than any ancillary science; and this end is the good of that thing, and in general the supreme good in the whole of nature. [Ex omnibus] Judged by all the tests we have mentioned, then, the name in question falls to the same science; this must be a science that investigates the first principles and causes; for the good, i.e. the end, is one of the causes.

Aquinas
From commentary on the Metaphysics (Book I)

Deinde cum dicit ex omnibus concludit ex praedictis conclusionem intentam; dicens, quod ex omnibus praedictis apparet, quod in eamdem scientiam cadit nomen sapientiae, quod quaerimus; scilicet in illam scientiam, quae est theorica, idest speculativa primorum principiorum et causarum. Hoc autem manifestum est quantum ad sex primas conditiones, quae manifeste pertinent consideranti universales causas. Sed, quia sexta conditio tangebat finis considerationem, quae apud antiquos non manifeste ponebatur esse causa, ut infra dicetur; ideo specialiter ostendit, quod haec conditio est eiusdem scientiae, quae scilicet est considerativa primarum causarum; quia videlicet ipse finis, qui est bonum, et cuius causa fiunt alia, est una de numero causarum. Unde scientia, quae considerat primas et universales causas, oportet etiam quod consideret universalem finem omnium, quod est optimum in tota natura.

Sapientia est scientia quae considerat causas primas et universales causas; sapientia causas primas omnium causarum considerat' – wisdom (i.e. philosophy) is the science which considers first and universal causes; wisdom considers the first causes of all causes'.

Illa scientia, quae sapientia est, vel philosophia dicitur, est propter ipsum scire

Sapientia vero considerat causas primas [et et universales]

Illa scientia quae universalia considerat, causas primas omnium causarum considerat: unde patet quod ipsa est maxime doctrix.

Notandum est autem, quod cum prius nomine sapientiae uteretur, nunc ad nomen philosophiae se transfert. Nam pro eodem accipiuntur. Cum enim antiqui studio sapientiae insistentes sophistae, idest sapientes vocarentur, Pythagoras interrogatus quid se esse profiteretur, noluit se sapientem nominare, sicut sui antecessores, quia hoc praesumptuosum videbatur esse; sed vocavit se philosophum, idest amatorem sapientiae. Et exinde nomen sapientis immutatum est in nomen philosophi, et nomen sapientiae in nomen philosophiae. Quod etiam nomen ad propositum aliquid facit. Nam ille videtur sapientiae amator, qui sapientiam non propter aliud, sed propter seipsam quaerit. Qui enim aliquid propter alterum quaerit, magis hoc amat propter quod quaerit, quam quod quaerit.

From commentary on the Metaphysics (Book VI)

Cicero
Sed nescio quo modo nihil tam absurde dici potest quod non dicatur ab aliquo philosophorum.

There is nothing so absurd that some philosopher has not said it.

(De Divinatione II. 58)

Descartes
'Philosophiae voce sapientiae studium denotamus' - By the term philosophy we denote the pursuit of wisdom, where 'sapientia' means 'cognitio veritatis per primas suas causas' - knowledge of truth by its first causes. [exact source needed].

Hobbes
But this privilege [of reason] is allayed by another; and that is, by the privilege of absurdity; to which no living creature is subject, but man only. And of them, those are of all most subject to it, that profess philosophy. For it is most true that Cicero saith of them somewhere; that there can be nothing so absurd, but may not be found in the books of the philosophers. [Leviathan, 'Of Reason and Science'].

Bacon
Nor let any weight be given to the fact that in [Aristotle's] books on animals and his problems, and other of his treatises, there is frequent dealing with experiments. For he had come to his conclusion before; he did not consult experience, as he should have done, for the purpose of framing his decisions and axioms, but having first determined the question according to his will, he then resorts to experience, and bending her into conformity with his placets, leads her about like a captive in a procession. So that even on this count he is more guilty than his modern followers, the schoolmen, who have abandoned experience altogether. (The New Organon Book I.63)

Reid
10. A natural philosopher may search after the cause of a law of nature; but this means no more than searching for a more general law, which includes that particular law, and perhaps many others under it. This was all that Newton aimed at by his ether. He thought it possible, that, if there was such an ether, the gravitation of bodies, the reflection and refraction of the rays of light, and many other laws of nature, might be the necessary consequences of the elasticity and repelling force of the ether. But, supposing this ether to exist, its elasticity and repelling force must be considered as a law of nature; and the efficient cause of this elasticity would still have been latent.

11. Efficient causes, properly so-called, are not within the sphere of natural philosophy. Its business is, from particular facts in the material world, to collect, by just induction, the laws that are general, and from these, the more general, as far as we can go. And when this is done, natural philosophy has no more to do. It exhibits to our view the grand machine of the material world, analysed, as it were, and taken to pieces, with the connexion and dependencies of its several parts, and the laws of its several movements. It belongs to another branch of philosophy to consider whether this machine is the work of chance or of design, and whether of good or of bad design; whether there is not an intelligent first Mover who contrived the whole, and gives motion to the whole, according to the laws which the natural philosopher has discovered, or, perhaps, according to laws still more general, of which we can only discover some branches; and whether he does these things by his own hand, so to speak, or empoys subordinate efficient causes to execute his purposes. These are noble and very important enquiries, but they do not belong to natural philosophy; nor can we proceed in them in the way of experiment and induction, the only instruments the natural philosopher uses in his researches.

12. Whether you call this branch of philosophy Natural Theology or Metaphysics, I care not; but I think it ought not to be confounded with Natural philosophy; and neither of them with Mathematics. Let the mathematician demonstrate the relation of abstract quantity; the natural philosopher investigate the laws of the material system by induction; and the metaphysician, the final causes, and the efficient causes of what we see and what natural philosophy discovers in the world we live in.

[Thomas Reid, letter to Lord Kames, collected works. p. 57]

Kant
Lectures on logic, Introduction.

As concerns philosophy according to the world concept [Weltbegriffe], however, (in sensu cosmico), one may call it a science of the highest maxim of the use of our reason, if by maxim one understands the inner principle of choice among different ends.

For, in the latter meaning, philosophy is the science of relating all cognition and every use of reason to the ultimate end of human reason, to which, as the supreme end, all others are subordinated and in which they must be joined into unity.

The field of philosophy in this cosmopolitan (Verkunftkünstler – literally 'artist of reason') meaning may be summed up in the following questions:

1. What can I know? 2. What ought I to do? 3. What may I hope? 4. What is man?

The first question is answered by metaphysics, the second by morality [die Moral], the third by religion, and the fourth by anthropology. At bottom all this could be reconed to be anthropology, because the first three questions are related to the last.

The philosopher, therefore, must be able to determine

1. the sources of human knowledge 2. the extent of the possible and advantageous use of all knowledge, and finally 3. the limits of reason.

The lst is the most urgent byut also the most difficult task, of which the philodoxus, however, takes no notice.

Two things, primarily, make the philosopher. (1) Cultivation of talents and skill to use them for various ends. (2) Readiness in the use of all means to any ends one may choose. Both must be united, for without knowledge one never becomes a philosopher, but knowledge alone will never make the philosopher, unless these is added a purposeful joining of all cognitions and skills into unity, and an insight into their agreement with the highest ends of human reason.

No one at all can call himself a philosopher who cannot philosophise [philosophieren]. Philosophising, however, can be learned only through practice and the use of one's own reason.

Ueberweg
System of Logic, §6. Logic is an integral part of the system of philosophy. Philosophy may be defined as the science of the universe, not according to its individual existences, but according to the principles which condition every individual, or the science of the principles of what is to be known in the special sciences. The principles are in the absolute or relative sense the first elements on which the series of other elements depend.

Bradley
Appearance and Reality Chapter XXV: Philosophy, as we shall find in our next chapter, is itself but appearance. It is but one appearance among others, and, if it rises higher in one respect, in other ways it certainly stands lower. And its weakness lies, of course, in the fact that it is barely theoretical. Philosophy may be made more undoubtedly, and incidentally it is more; but its essence clearly must be confined to intellectual activity. It is therefore but a one-sided and inconsistent appearance of the Absolute.

Russell
From History of Western Philosophy: 'Philosophy' is a word which has been used in many ways, some wider, some narrower. I propose to use it in a very wide sense, which I will now try to explain. Philosophy, as I shall understand the word, is something intermediate between theology and science. Like theology, it consists of speculations on matters as to which definite knowledge has, so far, been unascertainable; but like science, it appeals to human reason rather than to authority, whether that of tradition, or that of revelation. All definite knowledge – so I should contend – belongs to science; all dogma as to what surpasses definite knowledge belongs to theology. But between theology and science there is a No Man's Land, exposed to attack from both sides; this No Man's Land is philosophy.

On Scientific Method in Philosophy 1914. Of the notion of the universe and the notion of good and evil are extruded from scientific philosophy, it may be asked what specific problems remain for the philosopher as opposed to the man of science? It would be difficult to give a precise answer to this question, but certain characteristics may be noted as distinguishing the province of philosophy from that of the special sciences.

In the first place a philosophical proposition must be general. It must not deal specially with things on the surface of the earth, or with the solar system, or with any other portion of space or time. It is this need of generality which has led to the belief that phiosophy deals with the universe as a whole. I do not believe that this belief is justified, but I do believe that a philosophical proposition must be applicable to everything that exists or may exist. It might be supposed that this admission would be scarcely distinguishable from the view which I wish to reject. This, however, would be an error, and an important one. The traditional view would make the universe itself the subject of various predicates which could not be applied to any particular thing in the universe, and the ascription of such peculiar predicates to the universe would be the special business of philosophy. I maintain, on the contrary, that there are no propositions of which the 'universe' is the subject' in other words, that there is no such thing as the 'universe'. What I do maintain is that there are general propositions which may be asserted of eadh individual thing, such as the propositions of logic. This does not involve that all the things there are form a whole which could be regarded as another thing and be made the subject of predicates. It involves only the assertion that there properties which belong to each separate thing, not that there are properties belonging to the whole of things collectively. [...]

This brings us to a second characteristic of philosophical propositions, namely, that they must be a priori. A philosophical proposition must be such as can be neither proved nor disproved by empirical evidence. Too often we find in philosophical books arguments based upon the course of history, or the convolutions of the brain, or the eyes of shellfish. Special and accidental facts of this kind are irrelevant to philosophy, which must make only such assertions as would be equally true however the actual world were constituted.

Philosophy, though unable to tell us with certainty what is the true answer to the doubts it raises, is able to suggest many possibilities which enlarge our thoughts and free them from the tyranny of custom. Thus, while diminishing our feeling of certainty as to what things are, it greatly increases our knowledge as to what they may be; it removes the somewhat arrogant dogmatism of those who have never travelled into the region of liberating doubt, and it keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect. (The Problems of Philosophy)

I think the importance of philosophical grammar is very much greater than it is generally thought to be. I think that practically all traditional metaphysics is filled with mistakes due to bad grammar, and that almost all the traditional problems of metaphysics and traditional results- supposed results-of metaphysics are due to a failure to make the kind of distinctions in what we may call philosophical grammar with which we have been concerned in these previous lectures. (Philosophy of Logical Atomism lecture VII)

I cannot emphasize sufficiently how important this point is, and how much error you get into metaphysics if you do not realize that when I say "The author of Waverley is human" that is not a proposition of the same form as "Scott is human." It does not contain a constituent "the author of Waverley". The importance of that is very great for many reasons, and one of them is this question of existence. As I pointed out to you last time, there is a vast amount of philosophy that rests upon the notion that existence is, so to speak, a property that you can attribute to things, and that the things that exist have the property of existence and the things that do not exist do not. That is rubbish, whether you take kinds of things, or individual things described. (Philosophy of Logical Atomism lecture VI)

A great deal of traditional philosophy depends upon the assumption that every proposition really is of the subject-predicate form, and that is certainly not the case. That theory dominates a great part of traditional metaphysics and the old idea of substance and a good deal of the theory of the Absolute, so that that sort of logical outlook which had its imagination dominated by the theory that you could always express a proposition in a subject-predicate form has had a very great deal of influence upon traditional metaphysics. (Philosophy of Logical Atomism lecture II)

The point of philosophy is to start with something so simple as not to seem worth stating, and to end with something so paradoxical that no one will believe it (Philosophy of Logical Atomism lecture II).

We may note one peculiar feature of philosophy. If someone ask (sic) the question what is mathematics, we can give him a dictionary definition, let us say the science of number, for the sake of argument. As far as it goes this is an uncontroversial statement... Definitions may be given in this way of any field where a body of definite knowledge exists. But philosophy cannot be so defined. Any definition is controversial and already embodies a philosophic attitude. The only way to find out what philosophy is, is to do philosophy." (Wisdom of the West, p.7)

Wittgenstein
Notes on logic 1913. In philosophy there are no deductions; it is purely descriptive. The word 'philosophy' ought always to desginate something over or under, but not beside, the natural sciences. Philosophy gives no picture of reality, and can neither confirm nor confute scientific investigations. It consists of logic and metaphysics, the former its basis. Epistemology is the philosophy of psychology. Distrust of grammar is the first requisite of philosophical philosophising. Philosophy is the doctrine of the logical form of scientific propositions (not primitive propositions only). A correct explanation of the logical propositions must give them a unique position as against all other propositions.

Tractatus 4.111 – Philosophy [die Philosophie] is not one of the natural sciences. (The word 'philosophy' must mean something which stands above or below, but not beside the natural sciences.

4.112 The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a theory but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. The result of philosophy is not a number of 'philosophical propositions' [philosophische Sätze], but to make propositions clear. Philosophy should make clear and delimit sharply the thoughts which otherwise are, as it were, opaque and blurred.

6.53: The right method of philosophy would be this. To say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the other – he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy – but it would be the only strictly correct method.

Zettel 458 (cf Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology 949). Philosophical investigations: conceptual investigations. The essential thing about metaphysics: it obliterates the distinction between factual and conceptual investigations.

Philosophical Investigations 109: We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognise those workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.

Philosophical Investigations 121. One might think: if philosophy speaks of the use of the word "philosophy" there must be a second-order philosophy. But it is not so; it is, rather, like the case of othology, which deals with the word "orthology" among others without then being second order.

PI 309. What is your aim in philosophy? – To shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle.

Ayer
The Problem of Knowledge (Introduction). It is by its methods rather than its subject-matter that philosophy is to be distinguished from other arts or sciences. Philosophers make statements which are intended to be true, and they commonly rely on argument both to support their own theories and to refute the theories of others; but the arguments which they use are of a peculiar character. The proof of a philosophical statement is not, or only very seldom, like the proof of a mathematical statement; it does not normally consist of formal demonstration. Neither is it like the proof of a statement in any of the descriptive sciences. Philosophical theories are not tested by observation. They are neutral with respect to matters of fact.

Modern Philosophy Departments
The following are the URLs plus relevant quotations, of the first 19 philosophy departments that came up on the Google search on "philosophy department"+"what is philosophy" run on 31 January 2007. (I took the first 20 hits, then rejected the one link that was not a philosophy department - Brian Leiter's blog).

"Philosophy is not a body of knowledge but an activity: the activity of seeking a reflective understanding of ourselves and of the natural and social worlds we inhabit. We do philosophy by critically examining the assumptions made and the conclusions drawn by natural and social scientists, writers, historians and thinkers of all kinds. Although philosophers notoriously differ greatly in their fundamental views, it remains characteristic of philosophy (as opposed to, say, literature) that the search for truth is central, that we begin by assuming that there are right and wrong answers to the deepest questions, and that its method for discovering the truth is rational argument (as opposed to scientific experiment or mystical intuition). "

"A student of philosophy is practiced in the close reading of texts, in the extraction from them of positions and arguments, and in the construction and criticism of lines of reasoning."

"It is perhaps simplest to say that philosophy concerns fundamental issues that are important to human beings, and seeks to find the strongest arguments in connection with those topics."

"In philosophy however, the questions rather than the answers stand in the foreground. At the Department of Philosophy, students train their ability to think critically, to argue logically and to avoid lingustic traps."

"Philosophy is different from many other Arts subjects in that to study it you need to do it. To be an art historian, you needn't paint; to study poetry, you needn't be a poet; you can study music without playing an instrument. Yet to study philosophy you have to engage in philosophical argument (reasons or evidence leading to a conclusion)."

Philosophy also develops skills that are widely transferable to other areas of study and to the professional world outside the university. Because of its unique emphasis on clarity, argumentation, and critical evaluation, even a single course in Philosophy develops students' powers of reasoning, improves their ability to critique the views of others, teaches them to get to the heart of an issue, and to distinguish it from less important matters, clarifies and improves their communication, both written and spoken, helps them to organize their thoughts rationally and present them in a clear, coherent manner.

"Unlike many other fields, in which the memorization of facts or the inculcation of received theories figures prominently, Philosophy is devoted to free inquiry, and originality and creativity as well as the ability to express oneself clearly and to argue convincingly are valued."

The fundamental task of philosophy is the analysis of concepts and the criticism of beliefs.

"Whereas historians, physicists, etc., generally agree about what constitutes their proper field of study, philosophers do not. Some philosophers have even maintained that there is no proper field of study for philosophers. This extreme position fortunately is not held by too many philosophers, but it illustrates perhaps the most distinctive feature of philosophy, namely that it leaves nothing unquestioned. This explains why philosophers do not accept any authority but their own reason."

This is a blog, not a phil dept.

This is one of two that do not mention a rational, critical approach.

"What is Philosophy? It is thinking clearly and logically about deep questions"

Philosophy, from the Greek for "love of wisdom," is a special passion to understand. It involves a mode of inquiry that emphasizes questioning fundamental assumptions, arguing logically, and, more generally, thinking things through as completely as possible.

"Philosophy is critical and creative thinking about fundamental questions"

"PHILOSOPHY is a controversial subject which deals with the most fundamental aspects of reality and value. A good philosophical answer is one that is backed up by well-ordered and clear arguments; indeed an answer without supporting argument is worthless and sometimes barely intelligible."

"Philosophy is concerned with the most general and fundamental problems that confront human beings in their attempt to understand reality; problems concerning human nature itself, as well as the physical and social world we inhabit. To make headway with difficult abstract questions, one must learn to think, speak and write clearly and systematically, argue vigorously and question deeply-held assumptions."

In order to understand philosophy you must not only grasp its subject matter, such as metaphysics and ethics, but also its method. In western philosophy the method to obtain knowledge is rooted in the philosopher's ability to form and evaluate arguments. In Asian philosophy there is greater emphasis on knowledge of the Way (Dao) to live a life harmonizing the individual with her natural and social world. But in all cultures philosophy requires that we think critically: to be clear, precise, well-organized, truthful, complete, and able to handle objections. The study of critical thinking is called logic.

"Philosophy asks about our foundations as human beings. These foundations are the most basic elements of conscious life. They are the most basic questions we can ask and the most basic answers we can give. Because all of our usual, familiar thinking depends on these basic questions and answers, philosophy has to dig far down into and through our familiar thinking to get to them. As a result these most simple questions call for the deepest, most challenging reasoning we can give for our answers. We try to teach this kind of thinking, with the aim of living most fully as human beings."

The second one not to mention reason, critical approach.

"Philosophy addresses the most fundamental and pressing concerns of human existence: its nature and that of the world around it, its meaning, and its possibilities. Central to the study of Philosophy are the development of careful reasoning, a commitment to meaningful living, and the capacity for creative thought.  Further, the study of Philosophy is particularly effective for enhancing critical reading and writing skills.  Training in sound reasoning, critical reading, and effective writing is central to every course offered by the Department."

W.V.O. Quine
I see philosophy not as f groundwork for science, but as continuous with science. I see philosophy and science as in the same boat - a boat which f we can rebuild only at sea while staying afloat in it. There is no external vantage point, no first philosophy. All scientific findings, all scientific conjectures that are at present plausible, are therefore in my view as welcome for use in philosophy as elsewhere (Natural Kindsî, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays)

His Shortest Definition of Philosophy
The shortest definition, and it is quite a good one, is that philosophy is thinking about thinking. That brings out the generally second-order character of the subject, as reflective thought about particular kinds of thinking - formation of beliefs, claims to knowledge - about the world or large parts of it. -- The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, p. 666 (1st ed.)

His longer definition
Philosophy is rationally critical thinking, of a more or less systematic kind about the general nature of the world (metaphysics or theory of existence), the justification of belief (epistemology or theory of knowledge), and the conduct of life (ethics or theory of value). Each of the three elements in this list has a non-philosophical counterpart, from which it is distinguished by its explicitly rational and critical way of proceeding and by its systematic nature. Everyone has some general conception of the nature of the world in which they live and of their place in it. Metaphysics replaces the unargued assumptions embodied in such a conception with a rational and organized body of beliefs about the world as a whole. Everyone has occasion to doubt and question beliefs, their own or those of others, with more or less success and without any theory of what they are doing. Epistemology seeks by argument to make explicit the rules of correct belief formation. Everyone governs their conduct by directing it to desired or valued ends. Ethics, or moral philosophy, in its most inclusive sense, seeks to articulate, in rationally systematic form, the rules or principles involved. ibid

John Campbell
Philosophy is thinking in slow motion. It breaks down, describes and assesses moves we ordinarily make at great speed - to do with our natural motivations and beliefs. It then becomes evident that alternatives are possible (Philosophers)

David Lewis
One comes to philosophy already endowed with a stock of opinions. It is not the business of philosophy either to undermine or to justify these pre-existing opinions, to any great extent, but only to try to discover ways of expanding them into an orderly system f It succeeds to the extent that (1) it is systematic, and (2) it respects those of our pre-philosophical opinions to which we are firmly attached. In so far as it does both better than any alternative we have thought of, we give it credence. (Counterfactuals)

Thomas Nagel
Philosophy is different from science and from mathematics. Unlike science it doesnÍt rely on experiments or observation, but only on thought. And unlike mathematics it has no formal methods of proof. It is done just by asking questions, arguing, trying out ideas and thinking of possible arguments against them, and wondering how our concepts really work. (What Does it All Mean)

Robert Nozick
The word philosophy means the love of wisdom, but what philosophers really love is reasoning. They formulate theories and marshal reasons to support them, they consider objections and try to meet these, they construct arguments against other views. Even philosophers who proclaim the limitations of reason all adduce reasons for their views and present difficulties for opposing ones. (The Nature of Rationality)

Karl Popper
I think that there is only one way to science - or to philosophy, for that matter: to meet a problem, to see its beauty and fall in love with it; to get married to it, and to live with it happily, till death do ye part - unless you should meet another more fascinating problem, or unless indeed you should obtain a solution. But even if you do obtain a solution you may then discover to your delight, the existence of a whole family of enchanting though perhaps difficult problem children for whose welfare you may work, with a purpose to the end of your days. (Realism and the Aim of Science)

Warnock
What is the aim of philosophy? To be clear-headed rather than confused; lucid rather than obscure; rational rather than otherwise; and to be neither more, nor less, sure of things than is justifiable by argument or evidence. (Philosophers)

Some Contemporary Textbook Definitions of Philosophy
These are an arbitrary sample of current introductory textbooks in the field, all written by current or former professors of philosophy. (All emphases in the originals.)

Clark Glymour
Philosophy is concerned with very general questions about the structure of the world, with how we can best acquire knowledge about the world, and with how we should act in the world.

[...]

The questions seem somehow too fundamental to be answered in the sciences; they seem to be the kind of questions that we just do not know how to answer by a planned program of observations or experiments. And yet the questions don't seem unimportant; how we answer them might lead us to conduct physics, psychology, mathematics or other scientific disciplines very differently. These are the sorts of questions particular scientific disciplines usually either ignore or else presume to answer more or less without argument.

Thinking Things Through: An Introduction to Philosophical Issues and Achievements (MIT Press, 1992), pp. 3 and 4.

A.C. Grayling
The aim of philosophical inquiry is to gain insight into questions about knowledge, truth, reason, reality, meaning, mind, and value. Other human endeavours, not least art and literature, explore aspects of these same questions, but it is philosophy that mounts a direct assault on them, in the hope of clarifying them and, where possible, answering them.

'Philosophy' is derived from a Greek word literally meaning 'love of wisdom'. But it is better and more accurately defined as 'inquiry' or 'inquiry and reflection', allowing these expressions their widest scope to denote thought about general features of the world and human experience within it.

In its earliest days, at a time when few distinctions were drawn between the pursuits we now label 'natural science', 'social science', the 'humanities', and the 'arts', philosophy was the study of almost everything. The Greeks of the classical period are credited with the beginnings of Western philosophy, in this sense, because they inquired freely into all aspects of the world and humankind, starting not from religious or mystical principles, but from the belief that human reason is competent on its own account to formulate the right questions, and to seek answers to them, concerning every matter of interest or importance to humanity.

[omitting two paragraphs synopsizing the history of philosophy to the modern era]

[...] in effect philosophy consists in inquiry into anything not yet well enough understood to constitute a self-standing branch of knowledge. When the right questions and the right methods for answering them have been identified, the field of inquiry in questions becomes an independent pursuit. For example: in the suppositious history just sketched, as soon as philosophical reflection on the nature and properties of the physical universe identified appropriate ways of asking and answering questions—chiefly, in this case, by empirical and mathematical means—it ceased to be philosophy and became science.

Philosophy 1: A Guide through the Subject, Oxford UP, 1998, pp. 1-2.

Jenny Teichman and Katherine C. Evans
Philosophy is a study of problems which are ultimate, abstract and very general. These problems are concerned with the nature of existence, knowledge, morality, reason and human purpose.

Academic philosophy divides the subject as a whole into different branches. The major traditional branches are metaphysics, ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of science and logic[.]

[...]

Broadly speaking, philosophy can be studied in one or other of two ways. Either the philosopher attempts to define and analyse abstract concepts and to investigate many possible interpretations of questions involving such concepts, or else he or she attempts to construct a very general, and, if possible, completely self-consistent theory which will somehow explain the abstract ideas (like the ideas of existence and knowledge) which are the main concern of philosophy.

Philosophy: A Beginner's Guide, 3rd ed, Blackwell, 1999, p. 1 and 5.

Ed. L. Miller and Jon Jensen
Perhaps, finally, we may pose a working definition of philosophy, one that does some justice to what we have seen to be both its theme and its variations: Philosophy is that attempt to think rationally and critically about the most important questions. Questions that Matter: An Invitation to Philosophy, 5th ed. (McGraw-Hill, 2004), p. 16:

Theodore Schick and Lewis Vaughn
We all have a philosophy, for we all have beliefs about what is real, what is valuable, and how we come to know what is real and valuable. ... The goal of philosophical inquiry is to determine whether these views are viable. ... To arrive at the truth, we have to reason correctly. Philosophers have always appreciated that fact and have made the study of correct reasoning -- logic -- one of their central concerns. Doing Philosophy: An Introduction through Thought Experiments, 3rd ed. (McGraw-Hill, 2006), p. 25, 27:

Mark Woodhouse
Philosophical problems involve questions about the meaning, truth, and logical connections of fundamental ideas that resist solution by the empirical sciences. We might add '...or by appeal to religious authority,' too, but will reserve [that] discussion ... for the next chapter. A Preface to Philosophy, 8th ed. (Wadsworth, 2006), p. 2 (In the subsequent chapter, Woodhouse makes the case for adding that clause.)

William Lawhead
If we summarize the discussion thus far, we have a multidimensional, working definition of philosophy. ... Philosophy is the
 * 1. Search for self-understanding.
 * 2. Love and pursuit of wisdom.
 * 3. Asking of questions about the meaning of our basic concepts.
 * 4. Search for fundamental beliefs that are rationally justified.

The Philosophical Journey: An Interactive Approach, 3rd ed. (McGraw-Hill, 2006), pp. 7-8

Steven M. Cahn and Maureen Eckert (eds.)
All scholars must engage in reasoning, but it is the mainstay of work in philosophy. A brief but quite accurate description of philosophical method is that we do not observe or experiment, we construct chains of reasoning. Because of its central role in their discipline, philosophers have tried to make their reasoning explicit and to discover the principles underlying good reasoning. Philosophical Horizons: Introductory Readings (Wadsworth, 2006), p. 1

Nils Ch. Rauhut
In a broad sense, philosophy can therefore be understood as the attempt to develop a 'big picture' view of the universe with the help of reason. Ultimate Questions: Thinking about Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Pearson, 2007), p. 3

Monroe & Elizabeth Lane Beardsley
Philosophical questions grow out of a kind of thinking that is familiar to all of us: the thinking that we do when we ask ourselves whether something that we believe is reasonable to believe. 'Reasonable' has a broad, but definite, meaning here: a reasonable belief is simply a belief for which a good reason can be given. Reasonable beliefs are logically justifiable. "What Is Philosophy?", in Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology, 2nd ed. (OUP, 2005), p. 3

Louis Pojman
Thus, philosophy is a practice of giving reasons in support of one's beliefs and actions. Its ultimate goal is to arrive at a rationally justified position on one's beliefs about the important issues in life, including what is the best way to live one's life and organize society. Philosophy consists in the rational examination of worldviews, metaphysical theories, ethical systems, and even the limits of reason. Philosophy: The Pursuit of Wisdom, 5th ed. (Wadsworth, 2006), p. 9:

Nigel Warburton
Philosophy is an activity: it is a way of thinking about certain sorts of question. Its most distinctive feature is its use of logical argument. Philosophers typically deal in arguments: they either invent them, criticise other people's, or do both. They also analyse and clarify concepts. ... They often examine beliefs that most of us take for granted most of the time. They are concerned with questions about what could loosely be called 'the meaning of life': questions about religion, right and wrong, politics, the nature of the external world, the mind, science, art, and numerous other topics. ... These are philosophical questions.

Philosophy: The Basics, 2nd ed. (Routledge, 1995), pp. 1-2:

Categories: Metaphilosophy