Talk:Mind–body dualism/Archive 1

Analogy: Mental:physical::software:hardware
Consider feelings and thoughts as patterns in the electric/chemical messages. They have very similar properties to languages or binary codes used in computers.

To translate code into action, you just need sensors programmed to respond to certain codes. A switch mechanism in computer or electrical circuit may be triggered by a sensor which reacts to code.

No doubt a "finger HOT" message causes a very primitive/frantic burst from nerve endings. Muscles respond to frantic bursts of electrical energy as evidenced by cleching muscles in electrocution, or impulses used for cardiac arrest.

Of course information cannot be measured in terms of mass and velocity. The meaning of an encrypted stream of data may be a fraction short of impossible to deode, but we rely on it's existence when we pay for something over the net...

What's so difficult to comprehend?

Eugene Blom Alice Springs


 * Eugene: what you're describing sounds a lot like functionalism, one of the approaches to the mind/body problem, and probably one of the most popular in recent times. It has all sorts of issues for philosophers who don't accept determinism and other problems as well, but is of course the basis for the AI movement, and can at least be a useful way to look at minds, whether or not it represents their reality.
 * Seth Mahoney 20:39, 27 Oct 2003 (UTC)


 * My two cents Eugene -- I don't see the mind/body dichotomy as analogous to software/hardware. One reason is the aging process itself.  Computer hardware might be said to age, but that's indifferent to the software.  The software is information, which doesn't properly-speaking age at all and which could be easily transferred to alternative hardware if the earlier unit becomes unreliable, burns out circuits, or whatever.


 * But my mind ages with my body, in respects both good and bad (I get warier of dangers, which is good -- I also get tired more easily than I did when young -- which is bad). Furthermore, and a closely related point, no one has yet devised a reliable way to transfer the mind of yours truly to some younger body as this one becomes unreliable.  We ARE our history, in ways that aren't true for AI creations, and this makes the type of solution to the mind/body problem you propose very problematic.

--Christofurio 16:58, Mar 22, 2004 (UTC)

Descartes and dualism - was in the article, isn't anymore because it was in the "arguments for dualism" section, which it is not. It should be in the article though! If the original author or someone else wants to start a section briefly discussing Descartes' dualism or maybe as an add-on to the intro section where it talks about Cartesian dualism, stick it there.

How can mind and body, two drastically different kinds of things, interact with each other? Descartes relies upon theology to answer this question. Above and beyond creating mental substance and physical substance, there is a third kind of creation. According to Descartes, God creates a union between these two different substances, a union that constitutes human nature. 

--Seth Mahoney 00:56, 7 Mar 2004 (UTC)

Hi, two points:


 * 1) The discussion about how mind and body can interact seems to dismiss the idea based on the principle of conservation of energy. But my understanding is that quantum physicists have a model that involves randomness at the subatomic level. Couldn't patterns in the random fluctuations of electrons be a conduit for communication between the mind and the body? No new energy required.
 * 2) The biggest argument for dualism that I know is the experience of life. The physical universe could exist, in its infinite complexity, without observers. Computers, planetary systems, weather formations, human legs, all these systems interact and react to their surroundings, but we don't ascribe to them the conciousness we apply to ourselves. There are three counterarguments I've heard to this:
 * 3) The human brain exhibits conciousness because of its level of complexity. Other things are less concious in proportion to their complexity. This counterargument relys on being able to judge complexity. To say we are more complex than a cloud is a strange thing if you believe the world is a purely physical mix of atoms and quarks.
 * 4) Everything is concious. Well my conciousness has boundaries, and structure. Mine is the conciousness of a certain part of my brain. The bit that performs the "higher thought" routines. If everything has conciousness, there would be no boundaries between the conciousnesses and there would equally be a "me" out there that has the conciousness of half my higher thought routines, and a large slab of my skull. Alternatively, maybe "me" is just one electron in one neuron somewhere and every other quark has its own experience of the world. Well, you'd get a very fragmented perception of the world if you only percieved through a single neuron. My world is too detailed for this to be true.
 * 5) Nothing is concious. Counterexample: I'm concious. I can't prove I'm concious to anyone else, but it's self-evident to me. People say "you're tricked into believing your own conciousness"... but that implies there's a me to trick.

Ben Arnold 03:51, 1 Apr 2004 (UTC)

---

I think an intersting thing to consider is the physiology in all of this. In a nerve cell to create a sensation like burning your finger requires the stimulus to reach the threshold potential. Then an action potential is created and the heat on the finger is felt. If it is not hot enough to get past the threshold potential then nothing is felt. What does dualism say about this? Another interesting aspect of physiology of nerves is the lag time before any type of action potential is created. When you burn your finger there is a certain amount of time where nothing happens. The burning is happening for maybe a fraction of a msec but it is indead taking place. Physiology explains it because there is not enough stimulus for depolarization to occur. What does dualism say of lag time? Why would an emotion have to have some type of physical event to occur if it is mental?

User:Akeldamma 23:17, 20 Jan 2005 (CST)


 * Do not forget dualism is about explaining consciousness. If there is no consiousness, dualism is superfluous. Then there are only physical events, emotion is just one of these and the relationship to other physical events is obviously physical also. The problem is that we know about emotion and pain by experiencing them and this experience does not seem to have the quality of a physical object. If we solve this problem by assuming we simply err in our judgment, we create a new one: error itself seems impossible to account for in purely physical terms. Your use of words as "sensation" and "felt" seem to indicate at least a naive acceptance of these realities. So you yourself are probably a quality dualist. Substance dualism is absurd. Quality dualism is merely problematic in the sense every philosophical position is: it is so as a virtue. The real problem is not that physical objects have some mental quality - that could hardly be otherwise within any coherent version of the underlying ontological monism - but why this particular object should only have that mental quality.

--MWAK 13:11, 18 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Attempt to Clean Up
I've started changing the tone of the article to try to make it less pro-dualism, putting in some links to cognitive psychology, etc. (The pineal gland bit might be historically interesting.)

I think the article could use subheadings and division into a) definition(s) of dualism, explanations, etc. b) a brief history of philosophical dualism and c) the different arguments for and against (particular types of) dualism.

So, I'll start there unless someone thinks of a better organization scheme. I've got a feeling this will take awhile, too, and ANY HELP AT ALL WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

WhiteC 09:37, 31 May 2005 (UTC)


 * I just split up the article into two sections for much easier reading.--EatAlbertaBeef 13:44, 3 Jun 2005 (UTC)


 * Yes, most definitely. Many thanks.  WhiteC 02:46, 4 Jun 2005 (UTC)


 * Apologies to those who have worked on the article since May 23 2005. It was vandalized by an anonymous editor working from a University IP address.  That is why the article was in such sad shape.  I reverted it to the most recent good version.  So now you can redo those edits which improve the artice, and there will hopefully be less lost material and restructuring needed.  You can check the article histories if you need to retrieve any material that may have been lost. (I had made some of those lost edits earlier today before I figured out what had happened.) --Blainster 02:53, 4 Jun 2005 (UTC)


 * Ah, well that looks a lot better. Most of my edits were attempts to fix things that no longer need to be fixed.  Maybe this won't take anywhere near as long as I thought :-)  But I think the article could still use something about Platonic dualism (forms) and the Cave example.  WhiteC 03:05, 4 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Awkward wording in 'arguements for'
The part beginning with "A final argument, to be explored in depth, is that the mental and the physical seem to have quite different and perhaps irreconcilable properties." and continuing to the end of the section of arguements for dualism was very awkwardly-worded. Almost the entire section was in the first-person, and many sentences were redundant. Some paragraphs also ended with remarks along the lines of 'and this is another reason why pro-dualism is right', which I figured was a given, since the title of the section is "Arguements for dualism". I didn't change or delete any information for the most part, I just took some time to make it sound less opinionated and more formal.

--User:Capibara 06:29, 12 July 2005 (UTC)

In a mess
I think this page is not so good. I don't think the arguments for dualism are nice. These don't look like the arguments for dualism in philosophy, but in arguments for a "soul" in pop philosophy and religion. This really needs improvement. --Exa 06:40, 14 October 2005 (UTC)


 * Done. Check the new version.--Lacatosias 09:51, 17 February 2006 (UTC)

Biological Naturalism
Are biological naturalism and the emergent materialist theory of property dualism similar? 20:18, 30 October 2005 (UTC)~


 * They are clearly similar, but not identical. Here's a link to a discussion of precisely that point.

http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/132/PropertydualismFNL.doc --Christofurio 00:11, 8 November 2005 (UTC)

Additions Forthcoming
I'm probably going to add another argument for dualism. It's a contemporary argument developed by David Chalmers but it has it's roots in Descartes. It should be fun so I hope no-one minds. Fabulist 23:45, 14 January 2006 (UTC)

i don't know how to put this.
This article is an absolute abomination. Please take a look at the new version that I and Kripkenstein have been working on at User:Kripkenstein/Sandbox. If you were to hand this ....thing... in as a Philosophy of Mind 101 paper over here in Europe, I would give all of the authors a failing grade. Period!!--Lacatosias 14:48, 15 February 2006 (UTC)


 * BTW, check out the new portal!! --Lacatosias 17:19, 15 February 2006 (UTC)

I have removed the NPOV warning
I have the removed the NPOV warning because it's no longer relevant. I think the new veriosn of the article (most of which I've written myslef) does a good job of represneting the pro-dualist side. As for the arguments againts dualism, there should be no problem finding them all over the place. But if you want me to write that too.....ohhhhh heavens. I think I mist've broken a record ir something as it it. I've accumulated nrealy two thousand edits in less than two monghts of usinf Wikipedia and I still get no respect!!--Lacatosias 09:59, 17 February 2006 (UTC)
 * I don't know what you mean by respect, but you certainly have my respect. I will try to creat some subsections on "arguments against" as soon as I have time. --Kripkenstein 15:41, 17 February 2006 (UTC)

Lead
According to WP:LEAD, could the lead of this article be increased? Thanks, AndyZ 23:36, 21 February 2006 (UTC)
 * Good point. Will be done. --Kripkenstein 00:19, 22 February 2006 (UTC)


 * Done.--Lacatosias 18:02, 22 February 2006 (UTC)

Ok, that's it
Alright, that's it. I will edit my artciles in Word with a spell checker first (as I started out doing with the Fodor artcile) and then post them. I've gotten itnot the bad habit of typing (with my sloppy one-finger technique) directly into the Wikipedia editor and then trying to catch the innumerable errors afterward by quickly scanning through once or twice.--Lacatosias 08:23, 25 February 2006 (UTC)

simplicity counterargument
The argument is that materialism is a simpler assumption than dualism, and that dualism is simply unnecessary to explain anything--materialism is sufficient (Ockham's razor). I am surprised that this isn't in the criticisms anywhere. WhiteC 16:05, 25 February 2006 (UTC)


 * yes, I'm perfectly aware of it. Indeed, it's one of my favorite arguments againts dualism (. I just got tired of writing up the artcile and have gotten sidetracked with other things. Please add it if you would like. Or, if you're nor confident or shy or something, I will get around to it eventually.--Lacatosias 16:32, 25 February 2006 (UTC)


 * An appeal to Ockham's razor is an opinion, not an argument. While it is often true that the simplest explanation for an observed phenomenon is correct, simplicity is neither necessary nor sufficient for correctness.  Wave/particle duality in physics is  similar (at least metaphorically) to mind/body dualism in philosophy, yet while some might think it more aesthetically satisfying to have a simpler underlying explanation which eliminated duality, experimental evidence has not yet provided a path to such an explanation and thus duality stands.  Nature is what nature is; an opinion about the proper form of a solution has no significance and cannot constitute an element of an argument.
 * An appeal to Ockham's razor is an opinion, not an argument. While it is often true that the simplest explanation for an observed phenomenon is correct, simplicity is neither necessary nor sufficient for correctness.  Wave/particle duality in physics is  similar (at least metaphorically) to mind/body dualism in philosophy, yet while some might think it more aesthetically satisfying to have a simpler underlying explanation which eliminated duality, experimental evidence has not yet provided a path to such an explanation and thus duality stands.  Nature is what nature is; an opinion about the proper form of a solution has no significance and cannot constitute an element of an argument.


 * Secondly, I do not believe we have sufficiently defined what "mind" is or classified states of consciousness (I use "states" in the physical, not mystical sense) to the point at which science is even ready to apply the Ockham's razor test to competing explanations of the phenomenon of mind.--Paul H. 19:25, 19 February 2007 (UTC)


 * Wrong. An appeal to Occham's razor is neither an opinion ("I think ( or belive) that dark chocolate is better than milk chocolate" is an example of an opinion. An opinion is just a sort of verbalized, linguistitic expression of a private, subjective propistional attidtue, nor a (deductive/inductive) argument. It is simply a, often very useful, heuristic device which may be used as one element (or premise in an argument) in deciding between two or more competing hypotheses. It is an aesthetic element of conventiality certainly. But it is far from subjective. Over the last 40 years or so indeed, the philososhy and history of science have come to regard such conventional (in the sense of objective, socially-determined conventions) criteria as playing a fundemantal and decisive role in the choice of which scientific theories are ultimately more liklely to provide fruitful predictions, explanations and generalizations. Other examples, besides theoretical simplicity are elegance, ontological parsimny, fecundity, fertility, beauty, etc, etc... Simplcity, for example,  is not always decisive, but I don't think any serious scientist doubts that such "convential" non-subjevtive condireations almost ALWAYS come in to play in deciding between the superiority of one theory over another. I don't have time to find examples right now. Anyway, all of his has nothing to do with the article. It is just pointed out that Ocham's razor is often used to defend monism versus dualism. Not that the argument is decisive. (Is anything decisive in philosophy?) This should be obvious.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 10:27, 20 February 2007 (UTC)


 * Good heavens. I almost forgot to clarify about the wave-particle example. Now, no physicist (or philosopher of physics) in their right mind would seriously make the claim that the photons that go through the various slits in the double-slit experiment are MORE THAN ONE ENTITY. They are photons (elementary particles of electromagnetic radiation with certain properties such as a limiting velocity, mass/energy and so on). The most that could possibly be extracted for the current topic  from this example of "dualism" is that the electron seems to have properties similar to wave-like phemomena at some point p at time t and properties that resemble particle-like behavior at point p1 and at time t1. But these properties do not coincide. In other words, there is nothing like neural state N with the the set of physical characteristics SP and the set of phenomenal, qualtiaive, whatever charcterstics Q at the same time in the same place. So even here the analogy breaks down.

What is true of the photons oin the expriment is that they exhibit both wave-like behavior and particle-like behavior. As Feynmann on pointed out, " there is no duality here. This is something else.It is nether wave nor particle." It is some (one) new thing that is totally different, and that exhibits both what we tradtionally associated exclusively with wave-like things and what we tradtionally associated with particle-like things.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 09:23, 21 February 2007 (UTC)

Argument from biological development
Nice inclusion, Lacatosias. That's actually my favourite counterargument against dualism. -- Kripkenstein  τ κ


 * Yeah, well, it's an important one anyway, though most theologians and such will just respond that "the ensoulment takes place whenever god wants it to" or something. But this is not the place to get into all that. This article needs some cutting back now, I think. As much as I hate to cut anything back (I really love the length of Stanford Encylopedia articles, personally), it's pretty big for the Wiki. I thnk that we can leave a one paragraph summary for "interactionism" and "parallelism" and cut back the length of the first argument against dualism (have it focus in just qualia, say). What do you think? Do you see any alterntive cuts to make?--Lacatosias 15:31, 5 March 2006 (UTC)


 * I've cut out a subtantal amount and it still stands at 35K!! I'll leave it alone for the time being.--Lacatosias 15:56, 5 March 2006 (UTC)


 * I disagree about all the cutting. Most excellent Featured Articles are pretty long anyway. Also, when you cut something out (like the explanation on biological naturalism) make sure that information will not be missed. I'm going to create an article right now with the stuff you cut out about biological naturalism. -- Kripkenstein  τ κ


 * Actually, I wasn't so much concerned about biological naturalism. I'm convinced that it doesn't belong here and needs a separate article. Iìm glad you have started on it with the material from here. I cut one part out which I really do regert though in retrospect: the argument about conservation of energy in the interactionism section. I will find this material and put it back in under the arguments againt dualism. It's an important and modernistic type of discussion. As to length, I really don't know. the general approach is to create sub-pages, as I did on Fodor. Howvere, in this case, we basically merged three pages into one. Perhaps one of the articles substance dualism or Cartesian dualism should be recreated, but not both. --Lacatosias 08:10, 6 March 2006 (UTC)

Argument from brain damage
A counter-argument would be something, like:

The brain's job is just to communicate the "amaterial" world with the material world. If it is damaged, it doesn't mean that the user lost, or damaged his conscious, but maybe he's not able to make the connection between these two worlds anymore. Basically, the organ that makes such communication between the "mind world" and the material world wouldn't be able to do it anymore.


 * If you can provide a citation, then it could be added to the article. In philosophy, there are arguments and counterarguments ad infinutum. One has to break off somewhere at some arbirtariily chosen point even thouhg being aware that there almost never really is a last word on the matter. And this IS fundmentally different from writing about science and other empriricaly based disciples with generally accpted truths and verifiable or falsifiable facts. --Lacatosias 09:39, 25 March 2006 (UTC)

Do you know what I'd suggest if this were a philosophy course?
I want pro-dualists to go out and find the most convinving, powerful, irrefutable arguments they can againts dualism, and anti-dualists to do the opposite. Actually, I am an anti-dualist and have aleardy taken care of the latter part. Now, let's see some powerful and convincing anti-dualist arguments from pro-dualists. That would be extremely impressive. There must be no counterarguments to the arguments, BTW, just arguments against dualism. Sfido!! (that means "I challenge" in Italian).--Lacatosias 16:53, 26 March 2006 (UTC)

You get the idea??
Go through the article and ask yourself, for every sinlge sentence, if it is common knowledge or not. If it is NOT, it needs a reference (using the WP:CITE format). This not makes evrything verifiable and accurate, but ensures that no new material can be included without a cite from a peer-revied journal or book. Thanks to User:Piotrus for this idea. --Lacatosias 10:45, 29 March 2006 (UTC)

Notice the difference
Notice how easy it now becomes to pinpoint arguments or assertions which lack a referecne. For example, "David Chalmers invented a thoutht expreiment based on the Matrix". Where? When? Refernce please.

"Quantum entaglement is not realted to dualism because blah, blah, blah". Who says so? Where? --Lacatosias 12:34, 30 March 2006 (UTC)

Naturalistic dualism
Is there any information on the naturalistic dualism that Chalmers is a proponent of? 71.250.4.126 02:09, 1 May 2006 (UTC)

scientific arguments for dualism
I think a subsection discussing scientific arguments for dualism should be added, based on this study;

http://www.iands.org/dutch_study.html

and this associated research;

http://iands.org/research/vanLommel/vanLommel.php


 * The internation assocation for Near-death experiences? Is that a reputable, scientifically-acknoeldged source, like Mind and Brain or Brain and Behavorial Studies, etc..?? I'll ask my neuroscientist friends about that one, but I seriously doubt it! The idea would be, in any case, that these (extremely controversial) studies somehow demonstrate that there may be something like an "afterlife"? If that's so, what kind of afterlife? The eternal paradise for the good and eternal torture for the wicked foreseen in the Christian bible or the reincarnation/transmigration of Buddhism or the shadowy Sheol of ancient Judaism or what? These are obviously religious arguments, not scientific ones. Please remember also: that fact that something has not yet been adequately explained naturalistally does not even come close to entailing that there is NO naturalistic explanation for the phenomenon. To abandon the search for naturalistic explanations and invoke mysterious supernatural processes would be to abandon science. Period. For example, why do many people with these so-called NDE's share many of the same experiences? Beats me. This has not yet been adquately explained by scientific reserach yet? So what? Does one just give up and say: "oh, this is difficult, it must be supernatural." I think not. At the very least, that would be a very unscientific way of going about the business. "It must be supernatural" is subject to neither confirmation nor falsification through the methods of science. the topic should be deal with in articles on afterlife or what have you. --Lacatosias 09:38, 15 July 2006 (UTC)


 * The scientific study was published in The Lancet;


 * Near-death experience in survivors of cardiac arrest: a prospective study in the Netherlands van Lommel P, van Wees R, Meyers V, Elfferich I, The Lancet - Vol. 358, Issue 9298, 15 December 2001, Pages 2039-2045


 * and the scientific research here;


 * Brain Death and Disorders of Consciousness. Machado, C. and Shewmon, D.A., Eds.  New York, Boston, Dordrecht, London, Moscow: Kluwer Academic/ Plenum Publishers, Advances in Experimental Medicine and Biology Adv Exp Med Biol.  2004; 550: 115-132.


 * Both of them are indeed reputable sources. "Afterlife" is not relevant to the issue, nor to the conclusions regarding dualism. There was no reference to anything supernatural. I think it's unlikely that you even read the study and the research. Bizarre Entity 10:55, 15 July 2006 (UTC)


 * I have read the Lancet study and find that it simply casts some doubt on the tradtional views about the causes of NDE (anoxia, psyhcological phenomena and so on). Does this establish that the only reamining explanation is tht there is some, in the word of the authors themselves, "transcendent" extra-physioliogical phenomenon going on. Of course not. It does not follow logically from the fact that there has not yet been a satisfatory explanation in naturalistic terms, that there is no such explanation to be had. More importantly, since this is an encylopedia, we must go with the consensus opinion of the scientific establishment on this question. If you can prove that the neuro-scentific consensus is that NDE's prove the existence of a separate ontological entity called "mind", "soul", "transcendent being" or whtaver else you like to call it, then it might be appropriate to add some mention in the article. Otherwise, it is not relevant. BTW, I write this as someone who feels a great deal of sympathy toward arguments from irreduble subjectivity, qualia, intentionality and so on for some form of emergent materialism (property dualism) ala David Chalmers et al. I don't find anything meaningful in these studies, howeverand I don't have time to go into the subject of near death experience.--Lacatosias 07:45, 16 July 2006 (UTC)


 * Should I include the following studies as proof of physicalistic monism then:


 * 
 * 
 * 


 * I could go on. There is simply NO consensus about what the implications of these experiences are for the question of physicalism versus dualism because there is no consensus about what causes these experineces at all. --Lacatosias 08:08, 16 July 2006 (UTC)


 * You may argue for the inclusion of anything you want in any article on physicalistic monism. I've no particular interest in it at this point. If we could return our focus to the article in question, I feel you may have misinterpreted the findings of the study, and I also noted with concern that you did not address the findings of the research paper. To help you understand the findings, I draw you attention to still another paper by the author of the Lancet study, which was published in response to criticism appearing in Scientific American;


 * http://www.skepticalinvestigations.org/whoswho/vanLommel.htm


 * It clarifies some of the findings which you may have misunderstood, and presents them in a more accesible format for the layperson. It also states, with reference to many documented cases of independently verified out of body experience;


 * "The study of patients with NDE, however, clearly shows us that consciousness with memories, cognition, with emotion, self-identity, and perception out and above a life-less body is experienced during a period of a non-functioning brain (transient pancerebral anoxia)"


 * This is especially pertinent to your disregard for the subject of NDE, which leads me to question your neutrality, as well as your respect for reason and scientific method!


 * Your statements about the "meaning" of NDE show an ignorance of the issues. For the purpose of disscussing dualism I don't think we need to assign them any more meaning than "a form of conscious experience(either hallucination or accurate sensory peception)", which I'm sure most people will agree they are!


 * Honestly, I don't think I'll add any more to this. This debate has become very silly and I really don't have the motivation to continue. If other contributors feel they should add a section to address this, I encourage them to do so. Bizarre Entity 16:12, 16 July 2006 (UTC)


 * No, I don't think I've misunderstood anything at all. This: "The study of patients with NDE, however, clearly shows us that consciousness with memories, cognition, with emotion, self-identity, and perception out and above a life-less body is experienced during a period of a non-functioning brain (transient pancerebral anoxia)" is exactly what is contested by the authors of the other studies and on which there is surely nothing even remotely resembling a scientific consensus.  If there were a scientific consensus on this affermation of dualism, then indeed the discussion of monism vs. dualism would be over!! Dualism would have been proven scientifically beyound any doubt. That is indeed SILLY. Also, what I meant to say about the other studies was "shall I include them in THIS ARTICLE as ARGUMENTS AGAINT DUALISM?". No? Well, then it would obviously be compeltely inappropriate to include those (one or two) dubious studies which favor the dualistic interpretation. If all were to be included, the article would end up becoming a debate about the implications of near-death experiences. That would be more appropriate for the article near death experiences than for an article on the philosophy of mind. Others are more than welcome to discuss the issue!! Indeed, I have put up a notice on the Philosophy of mind and Mind and Brain Portals inviting others to offer they're thoughts, comments or edits (obviously, if appropiate, anyone can edit the article to include important info. I would just add that all sides MUST be included if they do in order to maintain Wiki standards). I will neither edit war nor discuss this issue anymore. If someone truly insists on adding this nonsensical "argument" for dualism, I will add the corresponding evidence/argument against dualism. Any argument or evidence in favor of ANY monism is obviously an argument againts dualism and viceversa. Ciaooooooo!! --Lacatosias 07:31, 17 July 2006 (UTC)

OK. I think I should clarify that science is inherently physicalist, because it considers empirical evidence to be the only valid evidence. A scientific study into NDE's, for example, would ONLY be able to study the FACT that people "experienced" NDE's. It can also study things like neurology to try to give explanations for NDE's, because those are the only things it CAN study. There are plenty of rational ways to support dualism, but those aren't technically considered scientific. All science is rational, but not all reason is scientific. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.1.119.179 (talk) 01:54, 8 October 2007 (UTC)

Pleasant Surprise
I'm pleasantly suprised, indeed almost stunned speechless, by the fact that this article has not yet been hijacked by the kinds of cranks, fundamentalists, neo-gnostic mystics and other types who controlled it before I and some others rewrote it very close to its current form back in Januray or something. And I haven't even kept an eye on it in all that time!! Good going, folks!! There may be some hope yet for the Wackipedia.--Lacatosias 07:51, 17 July 2006 (UTC) Bold text

error?
Hi I was just scanning through the document and I noticed an error under the Historical Overview... or at least to my knowledge i believe it to be wrong, i just don't want to edit it right off. I'll quote it here from under Plato and Aristotle

"On the other, if we say that the particulars merely resemble, or are copies of, the Form, we seem to need an extra form to explain the connection between the members of the class consisting of the-particulars-and-the-form, and so on, leading to an infinite regress. This is what Aristotle referred to as the "third man argument". [3]"

All of this seems well and good but it seems to suggest that Aristotle created the third man argument, which was actually written by plato himself, later refuting his own theory enough so that he did not include it in his The Laws.


 * You are correct indeed. I think I left it in their because I didnìt think anyone would notice.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 08:59, 27 July 2006 (UTC)

i noticed but im dead, so if i notice and you do too, are you dead? sicko:P


 * Why are you dead, too? I've never really been alive. Indeed, I'm not sure what the distinction is.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 07:45, 26 September 2006 (UTC)

Article strongly biased in favor of dualism
This article is now strongly slanted in favor of an extreme minority position: dualism, of course. Too bad, it used to be half-way decent too. But such is the hopless madness of Wiki, I ain't gonna even try to fix it. --Francesco Franco 09:28, 3 November 2006 (UTC)

Definition of "Cartesian dualism" needed
This has been mentioned before, but I'll mention it again. I was redirected to this page from "Cartesian dualism", but I did not find any satisfactory definition of Cartesian dualism here. Some people use "Cartesian dualism" as a generic expression for all forms of dualist belief, including those existing before Descartes. I do not know whether this usage is correct, or whether "Cartesian" should refer only to Descartes' own formulation of the problem. The redirection in Wikipedia suggests implicitly that "dualism" and "Cartesian dualism" are identical. Mtford 09:49, 14 November 2006 (UTC)


 * Cartesian dualism (general) = ontological substance dualism + interactionism. It's that simple. the article desceribes this. dualism of Descartes (specific details = the above + pineal gland as the locus of interaction     with the usual diagram, et..  of the immaterial with the material. I will take a look again, but I think this is carefully spelled out in the article.--Francesco Franco 10:14, 14 November 2006 (UTC)

No original research!
The latter part of this article appears to violate the Wikipedia policy of No original research. Specifically,
 * "It introduces an argument, without citing a reputable source for that argument, that purports to refute or support another idea, theory, argument, or position."

The last two arguments against dualism (biological development and simplicity) have no references whatsoever; most of the other arguments also contain too much persuasive explanation from the editor, and not enough reference to published arguments. The references should be mentioned explicitly in the text ("Fred Smith has argued that..."), not just as a single footnote at the end of a long paragraph. I realize it is difficult to write a factual encyclopedic article on such an abstract subject, but currently this looks far too much like a discussion forum. Mtford 10:22, 14 November 2006 (UTC)


 * No, those are all extremely common and easily documented arguments. I just don't have the time to do it and haven'ìt been working on wikipedia lately. Calm yourself. I was one of the first people who started insisting on references in Wikipedia back in the days when articles really WERE just a bunch of lecture notes. --Francesco Franco 10:33, 14 November 2006 (UTC)


 * Thanks for your quick reply, and for your input to the article - I didn't intend to launch a personal attack! Of course, I know that this article doesn't include any really original research - there are probably thousands of people around the world discussing these arguments at this very moment. However, I think there are still differences between an encyclopedia and a textbook. An encyclopedia should not use sentences written in the first and second persons (e.g. "So let's look at a second problem...", "Here you might reply...", etc.), as these suggest a direct argument from the editor to the reader. Also, detailed analogies such as the printer argument should not be used without explicit acknowledgement of the source. If the analogy is new, this surely constitutes original research and should not be used; if it is not new, the source can very easily be acknowledged. Mtford 11:02, 14 November 2006 (UTC)


 * (edit conflicted) Off the top of my head, I would think of J.J.C. Smart, U.T. Place and W.V.O. Quine as people who would have made exactly these arguments (especially e.g., Quine's "category error"). I don't really have time to look up exact quotes right now, but I agree with Francesco that this is easily documented, and *far* from discussion material.  In fact, inasmuch as physicalism explicitly rejects dualism, I am surprised that these prominent physicalists are not already cited.  I'll try to add a couple of cites later today.  Edhubbard 11:06, 14 November 2006 (UTC)


 * I do not disagree with anything you're suggesting. There is much room for revision in tone and many references are still lacking. I just added one for a disputed passage on some Protestant view of afterlife. I'm not sure it really beling in here in the frist place, but I've added a source. --Francesco Franco 11:18, 14 November 2006 (UTC)

Occam's razor
The Occam's razor argument, in this case, seems rather circular. We wish to find the simplest possible explanation for our observations - but first we have to agree what we mean by an observation. Descartes argued that he could doubt the existence of his body (and of all other minds and bodies), but not the existence of his own mind. Wouldn't it therefore be simpler, and more logical according to Occam's razor, for me to conclude that my mind is the only thing in existence, and everything else is just a dream? Mtford 21:53, 21 November 2006 (UTC)


 * Yes, one could obviously formulate the argument somewhat along those lines. But the result is the same: an argument AGAINST dualism and in favor of monism. Certainly that sort of solipsism is not where Descartes, in particular,  wanted to go. Occham's razor just suggests that one is less than two, no pronlem of intreation between material and immaterial, etc.. Ontological, eplanatory AND epistemolgocal simplication. I don't want to get into the problems of prviliged access and why it is actually more problemtaic to believe confidently in the existecne of one's own mental states (see semamtic and epistemic externalism) than to believe justifiably in the existence of third-person verifiable physical events, but the doubting self is an exceedingly problematic notion, at the very least.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 09:51, 22 November 2006 (UTC)

GA review
I've listed this article at Good article review because of the uncompelling prose. ShadowHalo 08:16, 25 February 2007 (UTC)


 * I'm warning you to take it off. I WILL kill myself under the circusmtamces, and you will be partly responsible for it!! --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 09:29, 25 February 2007 (UTC)


 * Oh thanks. I really needed that!! I've been depressed to the point of suicidal intentions since tha last time that someone insulted my "uncompelling prose" on this bullshit pseudo-encyclopedia.  You want some compelling prose: kiss my fucking ass, you fucking Wackipedia clowns.  Better yet, come over here and say it to my fucking face. You coward!! You want to die, eh?? Well, I DOOOOOOOOOOOOOO!! Come on over, motherfucker!! Come on!!--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 09:28, 25 February 2007 (UTC)


 * Alright, I obviously got carried away as usual. I apologize. Things are not going very well at the moment. I think I made some significant improvements yesterday to address the prose problems you mentioned, though. If you still think it needs review, that's fine as well. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 08:40, 26 February 2007 (UTC)

John Searle seems to have disappeared from this article entirely. He is a very notable theorist whose work clearly belongs here. I'm open to suggestions about how he might best be worked (back) in. --Christofurio 17:23, 7 March 2007 (UTC)


 * Searle is an interesting case indeed. Someone apparently removed all references to Searle a long while back because he/she found it POV to even discuss the possibility that Searle's views might be considered a form of "property dualism" or have anything to do with dualism. Searle's views should be discussed somewhere in here. I don't object to adding something along the lines: "Searle espouses a unique form of physicalism called biological naturalism. In this view, ontological irreducibility of mental states does not equal causal irreducibility of properties. Since causal irreducibility is what counts for inter-theoretic reduction, Searle claims that the mental will ultimately be explained in neuroscientific terms. Other philosophers, A,B,C, think that Searle's position is essentially a version of property dualism and faces the same sorts of problems. Just a broad outline. I'm sure someone will object though. This is wikipedia. Use your best judgment. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 09:21, 8 March 2007 (UTC)


 * Thanks for the encouragement. I've introduced such a passage to the property dualism subheading of this article. --Christofurio 20:14, 8 March 2007 (UTC)


 * That seems fine to me. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 11:48, 9 March 2007 (UTC)

Long occasionalism edit
I have removed the following text, not because it was bad (indeed, some of it is even very good), but rather because with it occasionalism dominates that section of the article. This might be a good starting point for a fork, retaining the overall summary style on this page, and providing more space for ocassionalism in it's own entry. Edhubbard 23:25, 21 March 2007 (UTC)

Deleted text follows: Occasionalism is a philosophical theory about causation which says that created substances cannot be efficient causes of events. Instead, all events are taken to be caused directly by God Himself. (A related theory, which has been called 'occasional causation', also denies a link of efficient causation between mundane events, but may differ as to the identity of the true cause that replaces them).[1] The theory states that the illusion of efficient causation between mundane events arises out of a constant conjunction that God had instituted, such that every instance where the cause is present will constitute an 'occasion' for the effect to occur as an expression of the aforementioned power. This 'occasioning' relation, however, fell short of efficient causation. It was not that the first event caused God to cause the second event: rather, God first caused one and then caused the other, but He chose to regulate such behaviour in accordance with general laws of nature.

One of the motivations for the theory is the dualist belief that mind and matter are so utterly different in their essences that one cannot affect the other. Thus, a person's mind cannot be the true cause of his hand's moving, nor can a physical wound be the true cause of mental anguish. In other words, the mental cannot cause the physical and vice versa. However, occasionalists generally also held that the physical could not cause the physical either, for no necessary connection could be perceived between physical causes and effects. Thus, Occasionalism brought in God to fill this gap, since what God willed was taken to be necessary.

The doctrine first reached prominence in the Islamic theological schools of Iraq, especially in Basra. The ninth century theologian Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari defended the notion of an utterly omnipotent God who could will absolutely anything (even that a perfectly good man could be sent to hell), and that nothing can endure for more than one instant without being recreated by God. These Ash'arite occasionalist doctrines were continued by Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazali, an 11th century philosopher based in Baghdad. al-Ghazali, a fierce critic of Islamic Neo-Platonists such as al-Farabi and Avicenna, is famous for his claim that when fire and cotton are placed in contact, the cotton is burned directly by God, not by the fire.

The doctrine is, however, more usually associated with certain seventeenth century philosophers of the Cartesian school. There are hints of an occasionalist viewpoint here and there in Descartes's own writings, but these can mostly be explained away under alternative interpretations.[2] However, many of his later followers quite explicitly committed themselves to an occasionalist position. In one form or another, the doctrine can be found in the writings of: Johannes Clauberg, Claude Clerselier, Gerauld de Cordemoy, Arnold Geulincx, Louis de La Forge, François Lamy and (most notably) Nicolas Malebranche.

The occasionalists' negative argument, that no necessary connections could be discovered between mundane events, echoed certain arguments of Nicholas of Autrecourt in the fourteenth century, and were later taken up by David Hume in the eighteenth. Hume, however, stopped short when it came to the positive side of the theory, where God was called upon to replace such connections, complaining that 'We are got into fairy land [...] Our line is too short to fathom such immense abysses.'[3] Instead, Hume felt that the only place to find necessary connections was in the subjective associations of ideas within the mind itself. George Berkeley was also inspired by the occasionalists, and he agreed with them that no efficient power could be attributed to bodies. For Berkeley, bodies merely existed as ideas in percipient minds, and all such ideas were, as he put it, 'visibly inactive'.[4] However, Berkeley disagreed with the occasionalists by continuing to endow the created minds themselves with efficient power. G.W. Leibniz agreed with the occasionalists that there could be no efficient causation between distinct created substances, but he did not think it followed that there was no efficient power in the created world at all. On the contrary, every simple substance had the power to produce changes in itself. The illusion of transuent efficient causation, for Leibniz, arose out of the pre-established harmony between the alterations produced immanently within different substances.


 * There is useful info here. The occasionalism section could be expanded [b]slightly[/b]. Most of this, obviously, should go into the article occasionalism, if it is verifiable. I don't know anything about the Isliamic history, for example. In the meantime, I will try to save the salvagable and reach a reasonable compromise.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 09:47, 22 March 2007 (UTC)


 * Ah, I see that this was copied over from the occasionalism article. Well, there you are.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 10:19, 22 March 2007 (UTC)


 * Thanks, I missed that it was copied over from occasionalism. Perhaps we can find some way to slightly expand the occasionalism, and then look to see where we should include  tags, so that we can make it clear that the dualism article leads into a loto of other topics, with various other entries (of varying quality!).  I'll start adding some mains shortly.  Edhubbard 15:57, 22 March 2007 (UTC)


 * Yeah, fair enough, it should have the main tags, even if most of the other articles are an abomination.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 09:30, 23 March 2007 (UTC)

Occasionalism
I made some changes yesterday, touching on occasionalism, which have since been reverted. So please permit me to explain these changes.

1. I removed the reference to two articles by Steven Nadler at the end of the occasionalism section. This was a reference that I myself had added to the main article on occasionalism, to provide a source for the doctrine of 'occasional causation'. This latter doctrine was, as far as I know, first so named by Nadler in these articles, and consequently a citation seemed to be appropriate. Material which I had added to the occasionalism article was subsequently copied into this one: but the footnote was retained even though the discussion of occasional causation was removed. Indeed, the reference was shifted to give the impression that it was to be regarded as a source for the information on occasionalism that was getting retained here. It is not. As these Nadler articles make clear, occasional causation is not the same doctrine as occasionalism. It is true that Nadler does make reference to both doctrines in these articles: but, if a source for information on occasionalism should be desired, there are dozens out there that are more general, more compendious, and consequently more useful. Personally, I cannot see why a citation should be required anyway. Wikipedia policy states: "Editors should provide a reliable source for quotations and for any material that is challenged or is likely to be challenged". I cannot see anything in this short paragraph that would not command immediate and universal assent within the scholarly community.


 * Two articles?? Am I going nuts or what? You removed the reference to ONE article. Fine. No big deal. I will find another reference obviously. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 13:23, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

2. I also removed a schematic diagram representing the occasionalist doctrine from the section on 'Descartes and his disciples'. Since there seems to be a vogue for copying material into this article from the one on occasionalism, where the same diagram also appeared (until I removed it), I shall simply copy the comment I made about it on the talk page there:

"The schematic is badly wrong. For a start, the arrows aren't labelled, and it's not at all clear what they're actually supposed to be representing: but, no matter how one chooses to interpret them, at least some of them will be going the wrong way. If, as seems most reasonable, we interpret them as signifying efficient causation, then all four of them should be pointing away from God. If they are supposed to signify some sort of 'occasioning' relation, then none of them should point away from God -- either make them all point towards Him, or drop the ones on the right altogether, or just have them lead directly between the events on the left and the ones on the right. My own feeling is that even a revised diagram isn't going to add very much to the article, and that it might as well be dropped altogether: but it certainly shouldn't be left in its current garbled and misleading form." Hce1132 11:49, 2 May 2007 (UTC)


 * What the hell diagram are you TALKING ABOUT?? There is NO diagram at all in the section on occasionlism. Look at the page!! I don't see anything there. Where is this bloody diagram you keep talking about. I can't judge whether it's inaccurate or not, since I DON'T SEE the damned thing. What's going on here.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 13:23, 2 May 2007 (UTC)


 * I have reverted to the last version which you edited. There is NO DIAGRAM here either!! WTF?? Where is this alleged diagram, for heaven's sake? Is this availabale only in IE or something? What's happening?--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 13:28, 2 May 2007 (UTC)


 * Ah hah, I was looking in the wrong section. That diagram is rather bizarre. No, it looks like nonsense, actually. Sorry.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 13:34, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

New section on neuro-dualism is not bad
There's some good material, and a very important insight about possible subtle dualism in some neuroscience in the new bottom section that was recently added here. I would like it to be a bit more condensed and less essay-like, howevere. --Francesco Franco 16:52, 12 June 2007 (UTC)

Too many long quotes and so on, I think. --Francesco Franco 16:53, 12 June 2007 (UTC)

Emergent Dualism - William Hasker
William Hasker, a philosopher of the mind, has developed a theory called emergent dualism in his book The Emergent Self. It has significant advantages over Cartesian dualism, reductive materialism, and idealism. It's also a theory to which I subscribe, which is one reason in particular that I'd like to see its addition to Wikipedia. It could be said to be a sister to property dualism, which states that properties emerge from complex physical arrangements. However, unlike property dualism, it accounts for the unity-of-consciousness, which one might call a soul. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.1.119.179 (talk) 23:09, 4 October 2007 (UTC)


 * There already is a William Hasker article and that publication is mentioned there. But perhaps you could research the topic more and either extend this article or start a new one for that idea. - Owlmonkey (talk) 01:14, 1 April 2008 (UTC)

Big Problem
Why does substance dualism link here? This is not the only possible type of substance dualism. For instance, dualism that proposes 2 substances exist, physical and mathematical, as opposed to physical and mental. I checked the "Platonic realism" article before coming here and it didnt quite get to that topic either. I feel wikipedia needs an article describing that viewpoint, which is well known and has been held by a great many thinkers. its howdy doody time !!! (talk) 13:09, 17 August 2008 (UTC)


 * There is a general dualism article that is supposed to cover the more general types of metaphycial dualism you are taking about. Otherwise,The best thing to address that might be to create such an article, apart from this one which deals with mind/body dualism, and either link it to general dualism or substance dualism and turn substance dualism into a disambiguation page (linking to Cartesian dualism and the dualism you are describing).--Francesco Franco (talk) 09:06, 18 August 2008 (UTC)

Argument from Brain Damage.
In the section "Argument from brain damage" could somebody more capable than me consider adding the perspective that the physical body is the tool of the "spirit."

In essence I suppose you would be saying that if the physical brain is the tool through which a thinking being interacts with the world, and this tool were to be damaged or incomplete, then the degree to which this thinking being could interact with the manifest world would be diminished.

This view is espoused by those followers of the occasional philosopher and polymath from the early 20th century Rudolf Steiner. I am myself such a person, so I would like others to comment on the relevance of such a passage and to have a hand in constructing it, in order to maintain some unbias. I am of the understanding that this is a significant objection, (albeit it may ruffle feathers due to its spiritual   implications) to the brain damage argument, and obviously points toward the mind being so much more than that espoused by property dualists.

any thoughts? be gentle!

Joeharris200882 (talk) 16:10, 11 September 2008 (UTC)Joe.

Argument from Reason
This is a new section added today by an IP editor -- I would like to explain the copy-editing I have done. First, I removed a link to a blog site, because blogs should not be used as sources for Wikipedia. Second, I converted two cquote's into blockquotes, because the manual of style (wp:mos) tells us only to use cquote for "pull quotes", which these are not. I also consolidated two of the refs. Regarding the content, it seems pretty well written, but I'm not keen on the word "ground", which I think most readers will have a hard time understanding -- could "premise" perhaps be used instead? looie496 (talk) 19:02, 23 November 2008 (UTC)

Comments
The "Arguments against dualism" section is now a little weird, because it's almost entirely about Cartesian dualism. It'd be nice to integrate some more universal objections. --Ryguasu 03:27 28 January 2003 (UTC)

I have a piece by Jerry Fodor that seems to imply that dualism, especially Cartesian dualism, was basically the only way people in "the West" looked at the mind-body problem until the 1920s, when behaviorism came on the scene. Can anyone confirm this? It's probably true, though I find it hard to believe, given how surrounded I am by monists. --Ryguasu 04:34 28 January 2003 (UTC)

Ryguasu, there have been many more thoughts and positions on the mind-body problem pre-1920, some dualist, some monist, and some ascribing to a dual-aspect theory. It is one of the richest fields of philosophy. --Tom Chance, 11:02 Oct 14, 2003 (GMT) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 62.253.96.42 (talk) 22:04, 14 October 2003 (UTC)

Section in Italics
I'm doing some research on dualism right now, and I'd be glad to pitch in on "arguments against," but I was wondering about the paragraph in italics in that section of the article. I'm assuming that was a note Larry made to himself in the text? If it is, there's a very clear error. The author points out that "some dualisms maintain that the mind resides in a particular place, say, in the pineal(?) gland," the latter being a clear reference to Descartes, who thought that the soul was non-extensional, and thus was in no place in the body, but interacted with the body through the pineal gland. There may be other examples of dualism for which the description is accurate, but the reference to the pineal gland should be removed whenever this text is edited (unless someone knows of a specific theory this would accurately describe). Anthony Mohen 19:32 PM, 7 Feb 2005 (EST) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 192.246.227.150 (talk) 00:33, 8 February 2005 (UTC)

Ryle
What about including within the article Ryle's arguments from The Concept of Mind —Preceding unsigned comment added by 62.249.242.232 (talk) 07:46, 30 October 2005 (UTC)

Recursive link to Substance_Dualism
The link in the intro to Substance_Dualism redirects back to the same page. Should the redirect be removed and a new page in place, or just remove the link altogether. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 83.70.250.232 (talk) 13:59, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

EXTERNAL LINKS FOR THIS PAGE
With respect to the external link 'Online Papers on Materialism and Dualism'. Strictly Chalmers. Isn't that a little prejudice? (rhetorical question).

How about adding an external link to this paper:

Duality : A Bridge Between Physics And Philosophy?

Abstract

A generalized view of Duality is offered as a bridge between physical sciences and the more abstract philosophical dimensions bordering on mysticism. To that end several examples of duality are first cited from from conventional physics sectors to illustrate the obvious powers of this principle. These include items from reciprocity in Newtonian mechanics to the problem of measurement duality that characterizes quantum mechanics. It is also noted that the latter has acquired a renewed interest in recent times, consequent on the emergence of new experimental techniques for testing the actual laboratory outcomes of traditional gedanken experiments, hitherto taken for granted. Against this background, the Duality principle is sought to be extended to the mystical domain, with convincing examples from various human level experiences.

http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2006physics...5107M

The above paper retrieved from:

The SAO/NASA Astrophysics Data System The Digital Library for Physics and Astronomy.

The SAO/NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS) is a Digital Library portal for researchers in Astronomy and Physics, operated by the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory (SAO) under a NASA grant. The ADS maintains three bibliographic databases containing more than 7.5 million records: Astronomy and Astrophysics, Physics, and arXiv e-prints. The main body of data in the ADS consists of bibliographic records, which are searchable through highly customizable query forms, and full-text scans of much of the astronomical literature which can be browsed or searched via our full-text search interface. Integrated in its databases, the ADS provides access and pointers to a wealth of external resources, including electronic articles, data catalogs and archives. We currently have links to over 8.1 million records maintained by our collaborators. Research recommendation (talk) 13:10, 13 March 2009 (UTC)
 * Um, first of all, the list is not a list of papers by Chalmers. It is a list of hundreds of well-known, important, and generally recognized papers by hundreds of different philosophers, which was compiled by David Chalmers.  That is, Chalmers was the one who was willing to take on the hard work to actually make up this list of papers.  Additionally, all of the papers included in Chalmers' list have been peer-reviewed and published in reliable sources.  The paper that you are suggesting we add is published only (as far as I can tell) on a pre-print server, has not been peer-reviewed, and has not made any impact on the broader field of philosophy.  So, um.... no.  The link you are suggesting here is completely inappropriate for inclusion in the external links section, while the list of key papers compiled by Chalmers is quite appropriate. Edhubbard (talk) 16:56, 13 March 2009 (UTC)
 * Additionally, the fact that you are trying to get the same link added in multiple places (Talk:Quantum_mysticism) suggests that you are perhaps trying to get this added because it conforms to some sort of pre-existing belief on your part, rather than because you think it would be the best thing for the page in question. Edhubbard (talk) 17:05, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

I see no evidence that all of the papers in Chalmer's list have been peer-reviewed and published in reliable sources. I think that is what YOU think - that quantity equals quality without doing your homework. What I see is Chalmers linking to work that supports his own theories (exactly what you infer my actions do). I sought to add my link to this page because there are new developments in SCIENCE - experiments that integrate scientific data and the human experience and philosophy of Duality. Critical thinking and objective research is totally absent at wiki - or at least from what I have observed as new editor member. What I observe at wiki are biased assessments and ego. Research recommendation (talk) 15:25, 15 March 2009 (UTC)


 * I agree with Edhubbard here: the link to an archive of hundreds of papers -- which definitely don't all support Chalmers, far from it -- is appropriate; the link to a single unreviewed preprint is not.  If arXiv had a section relating to dualism, that might be an appropriate link, but it doesn't.  You should be aware that issues like this arise very frequently -- somebody wants to insert a link to a favorite paper that isn't usable for the article -- and we are forced to be very systematic in dealing with them.  You aren't going to win here. Looie496 (talk) 17:59, 15 March 2009 (UTC)

I see your point. But many of the papers in Chalmer's collections are published by The University of Oxford (if you check into it - connected to their own work - Phil and Chalmers). There are no links to other resources for PAPERS. Just Chalmer's efforts. My point here is your link to PAPERS on this page. Strictly a Chalmers collection. This is a Phil and Chalmer's work/collection - there should be an alternative source. By listing a sole link to their collection, it gives the impression their collection is the difinitive source. Research recommendation (talk) 18:38, 15 March 2009 (UTC)

BTW: what happened to that link? It is not working now. Research recommendation (talk) 18:46, 15 March 2009 (UTC)
 * The link to the Chalmers archive? It just tried it, and it worked for me.  As a check of coverage, I searched on the Chalmers site for Daniel Dennett, who opposes Chalmers in pretty much every respect, and it showed 76 papers.  So while I wouldn't claim without detailed investigation that the site is completely balanced, it seems to be at least trying to be comprehensive. Looie496 (talk) 19:18, 15 March 2009 (UTC)

Thanks for checking. I tried that link just now and it still does not work. But I found it here: http://consc.net/online/1.3 I did a brief search for another source, and have not yet turned one up as comprehensive. If I ever do I'll add it here. The history of Dualism is esoteric - goes way back and includes Alchemy. Research recommendation (talk) 19:58, 15 March 2009 (UTC)

Susan Greenfield's work and bio: http://www.fortunecity.com/emachines/e11/86/duncan1.html Research recommendation (talk) 11:51, 16 March 2009 (UTC)
 * However, I discoverd that Chalmers list includes only ONE paper by Susan Greenfield (she has over 150). She is a professor of pharmacology at Oxford University and the first female director of the Royal Institution.  Here is an item that illustrates my point about being careful to include a balance of views.  It states Chalmer's point perfectly, and will show you what I mean regarding offering a balanced view at wiki - IF you regard your work as a good source for information. http://www.livescience.com/health/050808_human_consciousness.html
 * Hi Research recommendation,
 * There are several different points in your comments about the links that I want to respond to, so I guess I'll number them.


 * 1) Regarding your complaint that "Critical thinking and objective research is totally absent at wiki".  I think that you have to bear in mind the whole purpose of wiki-pedia, the online encyclopedia.  It is to do the same thing as other encyclopedias.  To assemble a body of relatively agreed upon basic knowledge that someone should have in a given field.  Think of the dusty set of encyclopedias on your bookshelf at home.  Wikipedia strives to have that same level authority, but to be less out of date than the paper versions, simply because we can update in response to new developments more quickly than paper encyclopedias.  On the other hand, wikipedia (like any other encyclopedia) is not aimed at publishing or developing the latest theories.  We require that things be generally accepted, or in cases where they are not, that the debate be clearly explained (see About).
 * 2) Because anyone can edit wikipedia, and rational well-intentioned people can and will disagree, we, the users and editors here, have come up with a set of rules to help resolve disagreements about what should and should not be included here. These rules include that information be verifiable and published in reliable sources.  This has led to what is called the BRD cycle and also to the three revert-rule.  In my opinion, the most powerful part of wikipedia is the talk page, where we can discuss issues like whether or not a particular text addition, reference or should be included and come to a consensus.  You suggested a link, and I gave my reasons for not believing that it was appropriate, based on the guidelines for reliable sources.  It seems that other editors agree with my reasoning on this, so we will leave this as settled for now.
 * 3) In addition to suggesting a link, you complained about the link Chalmers' list, which in the spirit of wikipedia, would suggest that perhaps this is not an appropriate external link.  Looking into it, I saw that it included a list of peer-reviewed articles, many with the mast-head of the journal they were published in, and the page numbers included.  This then would suggest that the list edited by Chalmers' passes this criterion, and the fact that it contains a list of articles by numerous authors suggests that it is not just a portal for Chalmers' personal views. I may have been too quick to assume that, and there you rightly complained.  Then Looie checked and found a substantial number of papers from Daniel Dennett, who is well-known to disagree with Chalmers', again arguing that the the list was not just a portal for Chalmers' views.  I checked myself, and saw that there are only three papers by the Churchlands (Pat and Paul), another group who debate with Chalmers.  So, the list is imperfect, but it is, at least a list of many papers and this would hopefully allow readers to make up their own minds about the debate, which then means that the list corresponds to a neutral point of view, albeit imperfectly. As you yourself note, you have "not yet turned one up as comprehensive."  If you do, please do add it, as it would be an important addition to the article.
 * 4) You have additionally complained about the absence of Susan Greenfield from the list of papers that Chalmers has edited on the philosophy of the mind, pointing out that only one of her more than 150 papers is included, and use this to argue that Chalmers' list is again incomplete, or biased.  However, it should be noted that the vast majority of Greenfield's papers are real, nitty gritty pharmacology stuff, and while they may have some indirect relevance to philosophical problems, Greenfield herself only makes this relevance explicit in a few papers.  We should not expect a list of philosophy papers to include every single empirical paper that might have some bearing on philosophical questions.  If we did, then the list could include just about everything.  Chalmers' list is imperfect and incomplete, but it is certainly guided by some general principles.  Papers like these (from Greenfield's faculty page at Oxford): Bond C E and Greenfield S A (2007) Multiple cascade effects of oxidative stress on astroglia.  Glia. or Collins T FT, Mann E O, Hill M RH, Dommett E J, and Greenfield S A (2007) Dynamics of neuronal assemblies are modulated by anaesthetics but not analgesics. Eur J Anaesthesiol, 24(7):609-14.  Are important, but are not directly related to philosophical debates on dualism and so, probably should not be included in Chalmers' philosophy list. As far as I can tell, this is not evidence of bias but rather is evidence that Chalmers was listing only philosophy papers.
 * 5) Finally, following on all of this, I might suggest that we consider adding a link to another list, also edited by Chalmers, but open to all users to upload papers, that includes 18460 entries including not only purely philosophical work, but also empirical work in psychology, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and physics that is relevant to questions of the mind. The link is here http://consc.net/mindpapers/ and might be appropriate for inclusion here on this page, and perhaps on other related pages.  This list includes quite a large number of papers by philosophers like Dennett and Churchland, but also includes a half-dozen publications by Greenfield and many other people working on the empirical sciences that are relevant to consciousness. It partially duplicates things on the older, more focused list, but it also expands on this previous list by a large margin.  What do other people think about adding this link?
 * Cheers, Edhubbard (talk) 15:11, 16 March 2009 (UTC)
 * I just want to add that external links to papers that express original ideas are generally not good -- if the ideas are supported, they should be discussed in the article and the link used as a reference. The sort of thing that justifies external links is sites that cover material from the article neutrally and at substantially greater length -- these are useful because there is a severe limit to how long a Wikipedia article can be. Looie496 (talk) 17:39, 16 March 2009 (UTC)
 * Oh, and I agree with the suggestion of linking to Mindpapers. Looie496 (talk) 17:42, 16 March 2009 (UTC)


 * Adding the mindpapers would be ok - IF (!) you add another source that is not related to Chalmers and colleagues who comprise this network. I still maintain it is important to add another source if only to reflect there ARE others (even though the source may not be as complete).  There are so many papers the Chalmer's group have compiled it would require a great deal of time and research to determine if their list reflects a true diversity of views.

But with respect to body of this article, I think you do need to add The Tao of Physics. It might seem that this belongs in the Quantum mysticists article, but there is an important aspect of duality in the Tao that is missing from this article. Here is an brief excerpt:

This ancient wisdom of duality is the essence of the Tao. It also appears to be the essence of physics.

"Every explicit duality is an implicit unity." Alan Watts

Heraclitus the Greek philosopher also realized that all opposites have a unity and relativity. "The way up and down is one and the same," and "God is day night, winter summer, war peace, satiety hunger."

Science and religion also represent a complimentary pair of polar opposites residing within a highly complex paradox. If we view these opposites as the ends of the light spectrum, we have a diverse range of human culture and ideals. These cultural dimensions in this range quantify the ideal of "unity of diversity", biologically, ecologically and sociologically. In "The Wisdom of Thich Nhat Hanh", he eloquently says, "Realizing the interdependent nature of dust, flowers, humans, we see that unity cannot exist without diversity. Unity and diversity interpenetrate each other fully."

The full magnitude of the paradox disappears in the light of diverse duality.

"Life starts with the knowledge of diversity, but the awareness of unity is the pinnacle of life." Hazrat Inayat Khan

I took the excerpt from the source below, but I notice your wiki entry for The Tao was missing a lot - including duality (all that is noted is the yin/yang simbol with no explanation of it).

http://www.starstuffs.com/physcon2/freqamp.html

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Tao_of_Physics Research recommendation (talk) 15:42, 17 March 2009 (UTC)

His wisdom follows in excerpts from the Kybalion. The parallels to "modern" thinking are astounding.
 * You should probably include Hermes Trismegistus and The Kybalion too. The Kybalion encompasses the study of "The Hermetic Philosophy of Ancient Egypt and Greece".

"Everything is Dual; everything has poles; everything has its pair of opposites; like and unlike are the same; opposites are identical in nature, but different in degree; extremes meet; all truths are but half-truths; all paradoxes may be reconciled."

"The same Principle manifests in the case of "Light and Darkness," which are the same thing, the difference consisting of varying degrees between the two poles of the phenomena"

"The "Art of Polarization becomes a phase of "Mental Alchemy" known and practiced by the ancient and modern Hermetic Masters. An understanding of the Principle will enable one to change his own Polarity, as well as that of others, if he will devote the time and study necessary to master the art."

"The teachers claim that illustrations of this Principle may be had on every hand, and from an examination into the real nature of anything. They begin by showing that Spirit and Matter are but the two poles of the same thing, the intermediate planes being merely degrees of vibration. They show that THE ALL and The Many are the same, the difference being merely a matter of degree of Mental Manifestation. " Research recommendation (talk) 15:55, 17 March 2009 (UTC)

Research recommendation (talk) 16:13, 17 March 2009 (UTC)
 * Hermes (also built several pyramids) reportedly taught the great mathematician Pythagoras.


 * Duality is not the same thing as dualism. It's been many many years since I read The Tao of Physics, but I don't recall it discussing dualism very much.  Anyway, I think a lot of the things you have brought up more properly belong in the dualism article than in this one. Looie496 (talk) 22:03, 17 March 2009 (UTC)
 * I agree with Looie on this one. Although the current article is on dualism, it is on dualism in the narrow sense that it has been discussed within philosophy of mind, and its relation to the mind-body problem. The things that you are discussing here are part of dualism in the broader sense, and not part of dualism in the narrow sense that it is discussed here.  Indeed, a quick look at that page shows that there is already significant discussion of taoism (although, no mention of the Tao of Physics itself).  I do think that you could make some useful contributions to that article, but these general discussions of duality and dualism are beyond the scope of this article.  Edhubbard (talk) 22:59, 17 March 2009 (UTC)

"In philosophy of mind, dualism is a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter".
 * Thanks. But if I may point out the lead in sentence to this page is:

Hermes Trismegistus and The Kybalion isn't about Duality only - it is also about Dualism of mind and matter:

"The teachers claim that illustrations of this Principle may be had on every hand, and from an examination into the real nature of anything. They begin by showing that Spirit and Matter are but the two poles of the same thing, the intermediate planes being merely degrees of vibration. They show that THE ALL and The Many are the same, the difference being merely a matter of degree of Mental Manifestation. " Research recommendation (talk) 00:14, 18 March 2009 (UTC)

Dubious statement
The last paragraph of the Causal Interaction section states:

"The effects of such indeterminacy decohere at larger scales, where events become for all intensive purposes deterministic, and most physicists do not consider them to have any measurable consequence on the deterministic nature of higher level sciences such as neuroscience."

This is unsourced, and I don't believe it is correct. Many physicists believe that there are lots of large-scale systems whose dynamics are chaotic, and therefore governed by the so-called butterfly effect. The brain in particular is likely to be such a system, because of the way neural dynamics amplify small differences. Looie496 (talk) 17:47, 19 April 2009 (UTC)


 * I agree that you are probably right (The above statement is actually believe it or not a less biased version than what was there originally) - but do you have a source? In the meantime I will make a modification Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 07:24, 22 April 2009 (UTC)


 * The "Overview" section of the Chaos theory article lists a few good sources. There is a ton of literature on chaotic dynamics in neural networks -- this paper gives a not-too-old overview.  Basically the unpredictability of brain activity arises from the fact that a tiny difference in input to a neuron makes the difference between firing or not firing an action potential.  This sensitive dependence gives rise to a huge amplification of even very small amounts of randomness.  None of this is at all controversial in the physics community, by the way -- the mathematics of dynamical chaos is very well established. Looie496 (talk) 17:12, 22 April 2009 (UTC)


 * I am aware of this (and probably agree with you but I am not yet convinced this has been established scientifically). Ie, I understand how the combination of a) small scale interactions (ion entry/exit pathways within neuron shell being on atomic scales ~ 1nm), b) all or nothing neuron firing (based on total ionic charge), and c) chaos, could possibly lead to intrinsic indeterminisim in neuroscience.


 * NB The original was worded "Most scientists, however, insist that the effects of such indeterminacy decohere at larger levels." I changed this to "The effects of such indeterminacy decohere at larger scales, where events become for all intensive purposes deterministic, and most physicists do not consider them to have any measurable consequence on the deterministic nature of higher level sciences such as neuroscience." This is actually less biased than the original. I have never heard a physicist say quantum mechanics (specifically) leads to a "measurable consequence" on neuron interactions - ie whether or not a system can be measured to behave in a way different to what it would behave without quantum mechanical indeterminism - note it might well behave differently, but whether or not this difference could be measured is another question. On the other hand, I have heard physicists such as Paul Davies suggest that quantum mechanics do not affect neural interactions.


 * I will look at the articles you have mentioned - Cheers - hopefully we can find some discussion on this issue. Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 04:20, 23 April 2009 (UTC)

Removed an uncited and disputed fact.
I removed the following: Nevertheless, there remains a practice, invisible but widespread in the social and biological sciences, in which a logic of dualism persists, and where an assumption of dualism can be demonstrated. 71.72.235.91 (talk) 00:53, 12 May 2009 (UTC)