Talk:Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact/Archive 8

Stalin's speeches
I noticed someone tries to overemphasize the importance of the March and August Stalin speeches. I don't think reliable sources support that. For instance, Michael Jabara Carley (End of the 'Low, Dishonest Decade': Failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet Alliance in 1939. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2 (1993), pp. 303-341) mentions the March speech only briefly and doesn't mention the August speech at all.
 * "Stalin too warned in an often-quoted speech on 10 March that the Soviet government had no intention of 'pulling other people's [that is to say, French and British] chestnuts out of the fire'. Of course, warnings like this were old hat, and Bonnet's cables to Moscow were routine until 23 March, a week after the Nazi invasion of the rump of Czechoslovakia."

Robert Manne (The Foreign Office and the Failure of Anglo-Soviet Rapprochement. Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Oct., 1981), pp. 725-755) doesn't mention Stalin speeches at all.

Geoffrey Roberts (The Soviet Decision for a Pact with Nazi Germany Soviet Studies, Vol. 44, No. 1 (1992), pp. 57-78) tells the following.
 * "The 'Stalin speech' hypothesis is probably the best known account of the genesis of the Nazi-Soviet negotiations. Numerous writers have interpreted Stalin's attack on Western appeasement policies in a speech to the XVIII party congress in March 1939 as a signal to Berlin that Moscow was ready to do business with it.6 Often cited in support of this hypothesis is Molotov's toast to Stalin on the occasion of the signature of the Nazi-Soviet pact that it was the Soviet leader's speech the previous March that had brought about a reversal in political relations.
 * However, as Watt indicates, the substance of Stalin's speech was a declaration of non-involvement in intercapitalist quarrels. Only with hindsight can the speech be read in any other way. Certainly, as Watt points out, if the speech was intended to foreshadow a German-Soviet agreement then most diplomats in Moscow missed the message."

With regards to the August Stalin's speech, it cannot be discussed seriously because there is no solid evidence of its authenticity. Silvio Pons, a prominent Italian historian who worked extensively with de-classified Soviet archives argued that the French translation of this speech (that probably circulated in the Comintern circles) does not allow to establish its authenticity. Moreover, it is unknown if the Politbureau meeting (where this speech was believed to be made) took place in reality. (The source is: Silvio Pons "Stalin and the inevitable war: 1936-1941", Part 754 Volume 17 of Cummings Center series "Stalin and the Inevitable War: 1936-1941, Silvio Pons" Silvio Pons, Publisher Routledge, 2002 ISBN 0714651982, 9780714651989, p.190-191)--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:42, 2 September 2009 (UTC)


 * I earlier added a comment by Ohto Manninen to the article Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939. I suggest you could also add something; a source published after late 1990s (because of Moscow Archieves). The historicity of the speech is uncertain. Peltimikko (talk) 20:16, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:09, 3 September 2009 (UTC) Firstly, you probably noticed that Silvio Pon is an Italian historian, therefore, according to my knowledge, he is a European. (Of course, my knowledge may be obsolete, or it may be severely affected by Soviet propaganda, so, probably, the new, genuine European nations consider the Italians not to be Europeans...)  Secondly , why did you decide that you have a right to determine a reliability of the sources? Why Russian or some American sources are not appropriate? A large number of books and articles written by Soviet and Russian historians are being widely cited by their Western colleagues, so I see no reason for us, amateur historians, to reject the sources widely used by professionals. With regards to American sources, could you please explain me what does the word "some" mean? Which sources should be rejected? The sources you personally dislike?  Thirdly , if you have some doubts regarding the sources I or someone else use, feel free to report to the reliable sources noticeboard. If a consensus is achieved there that this source is unreliable, you may remove this source, along with the related text, from the article. Otherwise, do not distract others from their work.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:56, 3 September 2009 (UTC)
 * Only ignorants on the pre-war period history, or defenders of the Soviet Russian propaganda could talk such nonsense as they do: "there is no solid evidence of its [Stalin's speeches on March 10 and August 19, 1939] authenticity." or "The historicity of the speech is uncertain." See the solid European, not Russian or some American, sources, please. -- Mibelz (talk), PhD., 08:44, 3 September 2009 (UTC)
 * Well, did I understand you correct that you blame me and Peltimikko in ignorance and in defending the Soviet propaganda? If yes, let me remind you that my claim is supported by two reliable sources, whereas your claim is based on the dubious primary source and, therefore, is totally unsupported. In addition, one can interpret your words as a direct personal attack. You should either stop your attacks or support them with reliable secondary sources. Although any personal attack is a gross violation of the WP policy, I personally am tolerant to such attacks provided that, but only provided that they are supported with reliable sources. Otherwise, your uncivil behaviour will be reported to ANI. Regards,
 * PS. Re: "See the solid European, not Russian or some American, sources, please."
 * PPS. And, finally, let me point out that, although I can read Russian, Ukrainian and Belarussian sources, I am trying to avoid using them for my WP edits. The reason is that, although some of these sources may be quite reliable, it is sometimes hard to separate them from blatant pro-Soviet or anti-Soviet propaganda (the latter is quite common in contemporary Russia). In that sense, the Western sources are much more balanced, so they, especially the articles in peer-reviewed journals, provide really neutral point of view. By contrast, some new European sources (I mean those coming from "Central Europe") may be severely affected by nationalism, so the danger exists that they are far from neutrality.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:45, 3 September 2009 (UTC)

Regarding Stalin's March 10, 1939 speech at the Eighteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party, that speech certainly deserves emphasis. V ЄСRUМВА  ♪  04:24, 8 September 2009 (UTC)
 * Yes, it can be understood as a turning point in the Soviet policy. However, it is not clear what emphasis should be made? Should it be presented as a signal for Germany (as some sources do) or as just an abandonment of already failed collective security policy and declaration of "non-involvement in intercapitalist quarrels" (as other scholars believe)?--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:32, 8 September 2009 (UTC)

Issues to be discussed in background: Wiki criticism from Radio Free Europe
While I'm not heavily involved here, I thought it interesting that a recent article from the American Radio Free Europe noted that the English Wikipedia article on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact neglected an essential context through its "soft-pedaling" the Western policy of appeasement towards Hitler - which, indeed, was a major concern for Russia's fear of the West pushing Hitler to go against the USSR until the Pact's conclusion as an assurance, as testified to in various different sources. PasswordUsername (talk) 09:51, 5 September 2009 (UTC)
 * [:////:] --Illythr (talk) 11:02, 5 September 2009 (UTC)
 * You probably noticed that I already modified the Background section to show the connection between appeasement and MRP more clear. I believe additional modification are needed to demonstrate how French and British policy led to failure of the "Litvinov's line" in the USSR's policy.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:38, 8 September 2009 (UTC)

The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War: Russo-German Relations and the Road to War, 1933-1941. by G. Roberts Source: The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 69, No. 4 (Dec., 1997), pp. 785-797) on two books written by Roberts and Raack who belong to opposite schools.
 * Any German-speaking editors? Stalin's role in MRP are analyzed in books: "Bianka Pietrow Stalinismus, Sicherheit, Offensive & Reinhold W. Weber, Die Entstehungsgeschichte des Hitler-Stalinpaktes." Seems there are not much source material of the Soviet role in english non-fiction literature. Peltimikko (talk) 03:46, 8 September 2009 (UTC)
 * There is a lot of information in English scientific journals and books. What concrete facts are you interested in? I cannot copy-paste all sources I have because it would be a copyright violation, however, I can provide all summary information I can. What concrete fact on the Soviet role would you like to know?--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:23, 8 September 2009 (UTC)
 * I like the following quote from Ericsson (Karl Schnurre and the Evolution of Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1936-1941 Author(s): Edward E. Ericson, III Source: German Studies Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 (May, 1998), pp. 263-283)
 * "Historical judgments, therefore, have ranged from seeing the Soviets as far-sighted anti-Nazis, to seeing them as reluctant appeasers, as cautious expansionists, or as active aggressors and blackmailers. The Germans, by contrast, have been viewed variously as capitalist aggressors, ideological fanatics, wily opportunists, or defensive practitioners of preventive war."
 * In my opinion, this quote brilliantly summarised the whole range of historian's judgements on the subject. If we throw away extreme points of view (in the case of the Soviets they are "far-sighted anti-Nazis" and "active aggressors and blackmailers") as obvious obsolete or fringe theories, then we limit ourselves with the "reluctant appeasers vs cautious expansionists" dilemma. Majority sources I am aware of are more or less evenly distributed between these two points of view, for instance, Geoffrey Roberts, Gabriel Gorodetsky and Derek Watson seem to belong to the "appeasers" camp whereas Ericsson himself or R.C. Raack support "expansionist" POV. Therefore these two points should be reflected in this article and other articles related to the subject.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:45, 8 September 2009 (UTC)
 * Another quote may be helpful. This is a Haslam's review (Author(s): Jonathan Haslam (Cambridge, the UK) Reviewed work(s): Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945: The Origins of the Cold War. by R. Raack
 * "There are few unresolved questions concerning the origins of the Second World War that have provoked as much disputation as the issue of Soviet policy toward Nazi Germany. In the absence of a complete opening of the Politburo papers on foreign affairs and the personal and state papers of Stalin and Molotov, no one has yet been in a position to say the final word on the subject. Yet almost all scholars writing in this field do their best to make it appear that a definitive answer has now been given.
 * In Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945: The Origins of the Cold War; R. C. Raack tells us that "Stalin, quite as much as Hitler and Mussolini and the Japanese, wanted the war," whereas Geoffrey Roberts in The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War takes the view that the Russians consistently pursued a line designed to deter war in Europe and argues that there were no substantial differences on policy in Moscow.
 * Indeed, Roberts, with no access to Stalin's papers and without having consulted any Soviet foreign commissariat documents other than those published, goes so far as to deny that the Russians initiated any advances toward Berlin, even in 1939. "From Moscow's point of view the story of Soviet-German relations between May and August 1939 is one of persistent wooing by Berlin. Not until the end of July 1939 did the Soviets even begin to respond to these German overtures. Until then Moscow remained both skeptical and impassive in the face of numerous attempts by the Germans to initiate discussions about improving political relations between the two countries-and thereby drive a wedge between the USSR and the Western powers, who they knew were engaged in negotiations about an anti-Hitler coali- tion?'2 This is a bold claim, no less ambitious than that made by Raack. The fact that two historians can present two such divergent interpretations after so muchnew information has apparently been revealed from the archives is worrying, to say the least. In my opinion, neither is entirely right."
 * I believe these quotes may be helpful.--Paul Siebert (talk) 07:21, 8 September 2009 (UTC)

A quote from Hitler
I see no reason to remove the epigraph and simultaneously incorporate similar text into the section. The epigraph looks better. BTW I plan to introduce the quote from Stalin (the passage about "chestnuts") as a second epigraph, so the balance will be observed.--Paul Siebert (talk) 12:55, 24 September 2009 (UTC)


 * I can't believe that this must be repeated, but would you please stop inserting a monster 8 sentence paragraph block quote from Adolph Hitler at the top of the Background section? This is a WP:Summary article that does not even block quote 8 sentences of the agreement itself, much less text from Hitler.Mosedschurte (talk) 03:05, 26 September 2009 (UTC)
 * I don't think the summary style is the best form for this article. Again, other articles devoted to political treaties (Entente cordiale, Polish-German non-aggression pact, Anti-Comintern Pact etc.) they never tell in detail about all events that took place during the period of pact's operation, otherwise, for instance, the Tripartite Pact article would have to contain the brief history of whole WWII (the pact ended in 1945). The article was artificially inflated by addition of number of events that belong to daughter articles, whereas the facts directly related to the article's subject were moved to Molotov-Ribbentrop negotiations POV-fork article. The article about the pact has to contain information about the pact itself: pre-history, circumstances of signing, immediate consequences and termination. Instead of that, the article became the Consequences of Molotov-Ribbentrop pact article. Again, if you think that the article is too long, feel free to remove Holocaust, Katyn and similar materials (of course, after adding necessary links). Again, the quote seems very informative and appropriate for the introduction. It tells about Hitler's ambitions, his hatred towards Slavs, inevitability of large war between Nazi and Slavs, and possibility of a tactical alliance between these natural enemies. This quote is more informative than the rest of the introduction.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:51, 26 September 2009 (UTC)
 * I am waiting for more or less reasonable arguments against this quote (the presented argument, in actuality, has to be understood like: "I don't like that"), or for alternative suggestions. Otherwise I'll restore the quote tomorrow.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:55, 26 September 2009 (UTC)
 * PS. A simple comparison of the quote
 * "We cannot in any way evade the final battle between German race ideals and pan-Slav mass ideals. Here yawns the eternal abyss which no political interests can bridge. We must win the victory of German race-consciousness over the masses eternally fated to serve and obey. We alone can conquer the great continental space, and it will be done by us singly and alone, not through a pact with Moscow. We shall take this struggle upon us. It would open to us the door to permanent mastery of the world. That doesn't mean that I will refuse to walk part of the road with the Russians, if that will help us. But it will be only in order to return the more swiftly to our true aims."


 * with the text you re-inserted:
 * "In 1934, Hitler himself had spoken of an inescapable battle against both Pan-Slavism and Neo-Slavism, the victory in which would lead to "permanent mastery of the world", though he stated that they would "walk part of the road with the Russians, if that will help us.""
 * demonstrates that the quote is only as twice as long as the removed text. However, the text carries less information that the original quote.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:32, 26 September 2009 (UTC)


 * Hitler's anti-slavism is just a issue among many others. It could be handled in the article Soviet–German relations before 1941. And also it is good idea to remember that realpolitik (trade relations, the MRP etc.) many times overran these anti-slavic ideas. Furthermore the Great Russian chauvinism did rise during the 1930s (starting from 1933, and in open forms from 1937), and Stalin wanted to recover borders of the Imperial Russia. Peltimikko (talk) 06:44, 26 September 2009 (UTC)
 * We already discussed the role of Great Russian chauvinism and I don't remember you provided any strong argument supporting the idea that it played more or less important role. One way or the another, the question is not in the role of anti-Slavism, but in the form Hitler's ideas should be presented. The only objection against the quote was that it was huge. However, a direct comparison between the quote and the text it replaced demonstrates that the difference was not dramatic, whereas the quote more correctly and completely transmits Hitler's ideas. In addition, the text is simply wrong, because Hitler told nothing about Neo-Slavism.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:40, 26 September 2009 (UTC)
 * The opinion that the Background section should shorten needs some supporting arguments. I, for instance, think it should be expanded (what I plan to do in close future).--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:20, 28 September 2009 (UTC)

Difference?
"an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe parliamentary resolution condemned both Stalinism and fascism for starting World War II ..." I do not understand why they condemn Stalinism and Fascism but not Communism and Fascism (and Nazism). ? I mean why not condemn Hitlerism and Stalinism and Mussolinism (whatever that means) ? Would this be because there still are communist nations in our time, and they did not want to insult them? Smells like a double standard to you? Qubix 89.44.243.118 (talk) 22:40, 25 September 2009 (UTC)
 * Re: "why they condemn Stalinism and Fascism but not Communism and Fascism" Because it would be incorrect to condemn Communism in general. For instance, during 1920s there were almost no political prisoners in the USSR (few tens thousand meant nothing for a country with 150 million population that experienced devastaning Civil war and intervention), anti-Semitism was being suppressed officially (a famous Sinclair Lewis criterion: "There is no greater compliment to the Jews than the fact that the degree of their unpopularity is always the scientific measure of the cruelty and silliness of the régime under which they live"), private property was allowed etc. Generally speaking, Stalinism is not Communism at all. To be perfectly honest, the same can be said about Fascism, because the difference between Fascism and Nazism was dramatic: the Jews were not being persecuted under Mussolini's rule, he killed almost no political opponents, etc. Therefore, I agree that the resolution was incorrect: it should condemn Stalinism and Nazism.
 * A couple general comments (i) could you please place your posts in chronological order; (ii) please, remember that the article's talk page is not a forum.--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:47, 25 September 2009 (UTC)

"Beginning of Soviet–German secret talks"
I couldn't find anything on beginning of Soviet-German talks in this section. I believe the section's title does not reflect what the section tells.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:06, 1 February 2010 (UTC)

Reactions to the Pact in the West
There should be a section on reactions to the pact, especially among communists in the West. It was George Orwell, I think, who wrote about about a communist public speaker calling for war on Nazi Germany who learned in the course of his speech about the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact; he then defended the pact without acknowledging that he was saying exactly the opposite of what he had said five minutes earlier. Marshall46 (talk) 11:35, 12 March 2010 (UTC)

Reaction to the Pact in Japan
Article totally misses the point that final document was signed the same day when Soviet forces encircled Japanese army in Nomonhan/Khalkhin-Gol. Simultaneous defeat and loss of the ally created a government crisis in Japan, where cabinet of Hiranuma Kiichiro resigned, and the new government ultimately took course on war with the US and Britan. --Tbma (talk) 17:33, 20 June 2010 (UTC)

Secret protocol authenticity
I am by no means an expert on the subject, and i do not feel educated enough to engage in a highly complicated and controversial subject as the authenticity of so called "secret protocol". But though it is not mentioned in the article, it is necessary to acknowledge the fact, that there are no originals, and the presented text is a photo copy of a document, which authenticity has not been proved. Most of information stated in parts of the original Wiki article as facts ( "Modifying the secret protocols", "The Soviet war with Finland and Katyn Massacre", "Secret Additional Protocols" and so on, the list is just to long ) - are pure speculations contradicting each other, or are still in discussion. Please, if you are interested in the history of the "Molotov-Ribbentrop pact", take more time to study the sources with at least a slight scepticism. There are many specialised books and articles available - mostly very emotional and, in my opinion, un-scientific ( as i consider history to be a science, and not a tool of ideology or propaganda ). In hope to raise your interest in the subject - I ask you to analyse, compare and prove, not blindly believe.

Inkins —Preceding unsigned comment added by 84.238.115.132 (talk) 17:20, 3 August 2010 (UTC)
 * The Soviet originals were declassified in 1992 and published in 1993. If you see any contradiction in the text of the article, please quote it here. --Illythr (talk) 20:26, 3 August 2010 (UTC)

Will you kindly present the source?..
 * Indeed, this part was not sourced in the article. Now it is. See reference №212. --Illythr (talk) 17:51, 7 August 2010 (UTC)

Essay and cleanup templates
Could anyone explain me why these templates are still in the background section? I see no problems with this section in its present form, so, if noone explain me what is wrong with background, I'll remove both these templates.--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:00, 7 August 2010 (UTC)

Eastern bloc map
Could anyone explain me what was the reason to include the map of Eastern Bloc (where post WWII border are shown) into the article that deals with pre 1941 events?--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:03, 11 August 2010 (UTC)
 * Assuming this is a serious question, it's the aftermath of what happened after the Soviet Union retook the countries ceded to it in the pact following the German invasion breaking the Pact. Most of the countries ceded to it under the Pact became Republics.  At it states in its title, it reflects the changes from 1938 to 1948, from before the Pact to after the defeat of Germany, which had broken the Pact.

article to broad for the title
The principle purpose of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact Page is to describe and analyze the Pact and its impact on geo-political configurations that deal with subsequent military strategy. All else is extraneous and needs and needs to be edited out. This article goes far too long through too much lead-up, shifting it from its main purpose to an extended and -- for its purpose -- irrelevant piece of "nazi-bashing" and "stalinism bashing". The lead-up should not deal with "sidebars" such as the Spanish civil war and other the alleged atrocities. These should be put into a separate article. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 64.56.235.32 (talk) 02:18, 27 October 2010 (UTC)

Photo
In the photograph at the top of the article, four appear whose names are not given. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.174.37.42 (talk) 12:40, 30 June 2011 (UTC)
 * One might be a translator. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.174.37.42 (talk) 13:03, 30 June 2011 (UTC)

WWII overlap
This era is now under discussion at Talk:World War II, where added input is most welcome. Thanks, -Chumchum7 (talk) 20:55, 18 July 2011 (UTC)

War Diaries, 1939-1945, of Field Marshall Lord Alanbrooke
The following may be of interest:

War Diaries, 1939-1945, of Field Marshall Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff during WWII.

Alanbrooke flew to Moscow with Churchill in August 1942 via Gibraltar, North Africa and Iran in a cortege of four Liberators to discuss the conduct of the war with the Russians. His diary entry for 16 August 1942 states:

"... they [Stalin and Churchill] became on friendly terms and began to ask why they had done various things in the past. Winston asked Stalin how it was that he double-crossed us at the beginning of the war when our mission was in Moscow apparently making good progress when suddenly he swung right over to sign an agreement with Ribbentrip? Stalin replied that he thought England must be bluffing, he knew we had only two divisions we could mobilise at once, and he thought we must know how bad the French Army was and how little reliance could be placed on it. He could not imagine we should enter the war with such weakness. On the other hand, he said he knew Germany was certain ultimately to attack Russian. He was not ready to withstand that attack; by attacking Poland with Germany he could make more ground, ground was equal to time, and he would consequently have a longer period of time to get ready. I should think that this was probably a fairly true statement of the reasons that led to his decision."

   ←   ZScarpia  15:13, 3 March 2012 (UTC)

Names section
In my opinion "the names" section of the article should be completely removed as pure propaganda. In case it is not removed I consider introducing a similar section into the wiki article "Munich Agreement" quoting references from Soviet press and literature of the time. Something like "Nazi-British Pact" etc. How do you like that?ISasha (talk) 08:07, 5 May 2012 (UTC)

B-class
Confirmed for WP:POLAND. Actually, there are too many citation needed requests for some important claims. They need to be addressed before B-class can be confirmed. C-class. --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus&#124; talk to me 15:41, 3 June 2012 (UTC)

Latest addition
Re this expansion, is that reflected in the source cited for the rest of the statement of content? VєсrumЬа ►TALK 05:35, 30 December 2012 (UTC)
 * The source is focused on Molotov, however, it is clear from context that the major goal of the negotiations was to contain Germany. Other sources cited in the same para say the same.
 * Carley (cited in the next paragraph) says:
 * "On 18 March Litvinov proposed the calling of a six-power conference in Bucharest to discuss the 'possibilities of common action' against further Nazi aggression. Halifax replied to Maisky that a conference would be premature, but he had another idea: a four power declaration by the British, French, Soviet and Polish governments. Would the Soviet government agree to this proposal? Litvinov replied favourably on 22 March. British policy was scarcely a sea change; London was only inviting consultationa bout what might be done later. But this was still too much for Beck, who rejected the British proposal."
 * I believe it is sufficient.--Paul Siebert (talk) 06:33, 30 December 2012 (UTC)
 * Content has a way of creeping into articles, just checking what was added was also in the source. (That we'd agree your addition was correct was not the point, nor was I questioning validity.) Best wishes for a Happy New Year. VєсrumЬа ►TALK 16:31, 30 December 2012 (UTC)
 * Thanks.--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:32, 31 December 2012 (UTC)

Post hoc ergo propter hoc?
The article contains significant amount of information just tangentially related to the MRP. Thus, David Benn (International Affairs 87:3 (2011) 709–715) argues:
 * "It needs to be pointed out that Stalin’s worst and most uncivilized acts at that time had nothing directly to do with the pact. The Katyn massacre is one obvious example. Another, often forgotten example was the treatment of the Polish Embassy staff in Moscow following the Soviet invasion. The Polish ambassador was summoned to the Soviet foreign ministry at 3am on 17 September and told that since the Polish state had ceased to exist, the Polish Embassy staff had lost their diplomatic immunity. In the end they were saved by the intervention on their behalf of the German Ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg, the then doyen of Moscow’s diplomatic corps."

Similarly, I doubt beginning of the Holocaust is seriously linked to the pact by serious historians: the pact neither stipulated not triggered a start of the Holocaust. Annexation of the Baltic states, Bessarabia and Bukovina was seen by German as a hostile act:
 * "Hence, contrary to Ueberschar's assertion, the beginning of military planning (of German invasion of the USSR) was not a matter of anticipating Hitler's wishes, but a deliberate reaction and initiative by the OKH and OKW in view of Russia's activities in the Baltic countries and Rumania." H. W. Koch, Operation Barbarossa-The Current State of the Debate. The Historical Journal, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Jun., 1988), pp. 377-390.

Interestingly, later Hitler referred to Soviet expansion in Baltic and Romania as a primary reason of Barbarossa. Therefore, it is incorrect to represent all those events as implementation of the MRP.--Paul Siebert (talk) 07:23, 30 December 2012 (UTC)


 * To your last point, MR established spheres of influence. If we take Hitler and Stalin their actions, Hitler was not intending Soviet annexation of the Baltics (per his declaration regarding Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union); Stalin planned invasion all along (per maps printed prior to the Soviet invasion of the Baltic SSRs as well as the invasion of Finland following its rejection of a pact of mutual assistance). And so, we must acknowledge that Stalin intended MR all along to mean restoration of Russian territory lost after WWI--Stalin's words to the Latvian foreign minister Munters in Moscow were direct: sign (the mutual assistance pact) or be occupied. (However, occupation having already been decided per the aforementioned maps.)
 * So:
 * Pact = "spheres" of influence
 * Hitler = took "spheres" to mean territorial buffer regardless of spheres (Baltics, Romania)
 * Stalin = took "spheres" to mean annexation
 * Since Stalin invaded the Baltics and Romania based on his interpretation of the pact (and, viz., personal statement directly to Munters), it is nevertheless still correct to say that the USSR's invasions of the Baltics and Romania represented Stalin's implementation of the pact--that Hitler did not agree a priori to Stalin's implementation does not make it less of an implementation.
 * I'll add an "interestingly" as well. That is Hitler's "call home" was intended to move Germans out of Stalin's sphere of influence. The USSR then denounced the Baltics as Nazist for dealing diplomatically with Hitler--as if the MR pact didn't exist.


 * P.S. I recommend historian Prof. Dr. Vilnis Šveics 1989 monograph How Stalin Got the Baltic States as useful reading. VєсrumЬа ►TALK 16:59, 30 December 2012 (UTC)


 * Of course, this leads to Barbarossa not being Hitler's violation and abrogation of the MR as is simplistically portrayed; instead, Stalin's invasions and annexation of the Baltics and parts of Romania were the violation which abrogated MR and ultimately triggered Barbarossa. This leads to the observation, if not conclusion, that Hitler would have had no pressing reason to invade the USSR had Stalin not annexed the Baltics and Romanian territory. VєсrumЬа ►TALK 17:06, 30 December 2012 (UTC)
 * Yes, as Koch and other authors argued, Soviet annexations were interpreted by Hitler as abrogation of the MRP, which is a demonstration of my point. Gorodetsky and Roberts express the same opinion. Thus, the former writes:
 * "It is only too obvious that the assumption of control of the Baltic states on 15 and 16 June was connected with events in France. The anti-German aspects of the headlong transfer of troops to the western front, the overnight conversion of public institutions into military establishments and the transfer of the command of the Baltic fleet to the forward naval bases in Tallinn could hardly be concealed and were not lost on the Germans. In his memoirs Khrushchev vividly depicts the panic that seized Stalin when the news of the occupation of Paris reached the Kremlin: Stalin "let fly with some choice Russian curses and said that now Hitler was sure to beat our brains in". Relations reached a low ebb in the summer once Germany started its expansion into the Danube basin. Molotov repeatedly complained to the Germans about their intrusion, which he suspected was not done "entirely in good faith"." (Gabriel Gorodetsky. The Impact of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact on the Course of Soviet Foreign Policy Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1990), pp. 27-41)
 * Therefore, to describe such post-MRP events as Katyn massacre, Holocaust or Soviet annexations (except Poland) as implementation of the MRP is POV.--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:45, 31 December 2012 (UTC)


 * The Baltic and Romanian annexations were implementation for Stalin, that (the so-called territorial "restoration") was his intent all along.
 * Katyn, from Stalin's standpoint, eliminated the Polish military command and therefore was part of implementation of control over Polish territory. It seems to me you postulate that documentary evidence is necessary that "X" was planned prior to or in conjunction with MR, anything after is not an implementation of MR. However, does "X" really need to have been planned in conjunction with/before MR to be considered implementation? Your exclusively linear thought process here nullifies opportunity in implementation.
 * Here is the crux of the problem: your
 * conclusion
 * of not implementation
 * is based solely on your
 * postulation
 * that implementation cannot be decided after the fact
 * and is therefore circular reasoning.
 * The Holocaust is too complex to deal with in a few sentences here with regard to MR implementation. VєсrumЬа ►TALK 06:42, 31 December 2012 (UTC)
 * We have the opinia of reputable scholars who say it was not implementation, and your opinion that it definitely was. How can I treat your words seriously in that situation? Regarding Holocaust, Soviet occupation postponed it. I am intended to remove "Start of the Holocaust" section and "Katyn massacre" section. Feel free to add few words about those events to "Post war commentary" sections (do not forget to provide sources that directly attribute those events to the MRP, and do not forget to add opposite opinia of Gorodetsky, Roberts et al).--Paul Siebert (talk) 08:16, 31 December 2012 (UTC)
 * Your contention that if something is not a specific implementation and is only a direct consequence of MR should be deleted from the article is what is POV. I also fail to see where the Soviet occupation of the Baltics, for example, is not Stalin's implementation of the MR pact. Lastly, wholesale deletions will be reverted. I suggest not starting the New Year with threats to evicerate content you disapprove of. Let's play nice in 2013. Your choice.
 * I should mention that once again you engage in XOR logic, that is, if Hitler says Stalin abrogated MR, then Stalin could not have implemented MR. That sort of POV pushing (my perception), your WP:SYNTHESIS (objectively), has no place in an encyclopedia. VєсrumЬа ►TALK 14:51, 31 December 2012 (UTC)
 * Not POV, but NPOV. This info should be moved to the "Aftermath" section, with an explanation that some authors (named explicitly) see them as implementation of the pact, whereas others do not. I'll do that if you will not provide exhaustive evidences that the POV yop advocate is a sole mainstream viewpoint.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:43, 31 December 2012 (UTC)
 * It seems a perpetual state of affairs that our POV-NPOV poles are reversed. That Hitler denounced Stalin for violating Hitler's violation of MR does not make the annexation of the Baltics not an implementation of MR. The MR is widely described as essentially providing for the disappearance of the Baltic states. You continue to argue "XOR" to try to push your POV. Please feel free to put your contentions of "not intended as part of MR" = "not in its implementation" in "Aftermath" or "Alternate viewpoints." VєсrumЬа ►TALK 01:16, 1 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Yes, MR created prerequisites for subsequent disappearance of the Baltic states (as well as for many other events), but it did not stipulate their occupation and subsequent annexation by the USSR. Those events are not considered as implementation of the secret protocol by many serious authors, and I already provided needed references and quotes. If you do not know how to deal with that, re-read our NPOV policy.--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:10, 1 January 2013 (UTC)
 * You should stop quoting policy as if it is a contendo ergo est of your position. Those events are considered implementation of the MR pact by far more scholars than say Stalin abrogated the pact, therefore, according to your interpretation, the events cannot be implementation. VєсrumЬа ►TALK 05:13, 3 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Historians do not vote, and the opinion of those historians who analyse some issue in details weigh much more then the opinia of those who just mention some event tangentially. By the way, our policy says the same. Again, you either present sources that refute Robrts', Stolfi's or Gorodetsky's opinion, or I change the article to reflect their opinion.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:25, 6 January 2013 (UTC)
 * (od) @Paul Siebert, fine, let's discuss your sources supporting your proposed changes to the article:
 * Geoffrey Roberts. A scholar upon whose kindnesses to Stalin other scholars have amply commented. Even as early as his initial writings based on availability of additional archival materials (early 90's), Roberts posited that in the absence of concrete indications in correspondence regarding MR that Poland was to be partitioned and Baltics annexed, there was no such plan. That ignores the maps of the Baltic SSRs being printed well before the Soviet invasion. Moreover, in the same writings, Roberts explicitly dismisses anything German archives say about Stalin's intent communicated at the MR negotiations which offer indications of Stalin's plans which run counter to Roberts' opinion. And even then he has to admit Stalin was "keen" on spheres of influence. Roberts "opinion" is a position in search for justification, jettisoning any archival evidence which is historically inconvenient. Roberts' descriptions of the content of archives is generally reliable, however, his conclusions based on said archives, being biased, are not. Informative reading as long as you are independently aware of the boundaries of scholarship vs. opinion.
 * R. H. S. Stolfi. To summarize, and taking Hitler at his word in announcing Barbarossa, Stalin wasn't supposed to annex the Baltics et al., and said annexation was/could well have been the straw that broke the proverbial camel's back in moving ahead to plan to invade the USSR. Hmm, Stalin consigns 23,000,000 Russians to their deaths at Nazi hands because he couldn't resist another chance at the Baltics, his 1920's Estonian putsch against Lenin's wishes having failed. There is nothing revelatory in Stolfi's account--or that proves Stalin did not plan to annex the Baltics.
 * Gabriel Gorodetsky. Well, if one is to read Gorodetsky, Moscow was, if anything, completely consistent in all its actions to: control the eastern shore of the Baltic (i.e., through the Baltic states) and entry points to the Black Sea. This, too, is not revelatory in any manner and does not preclude the annexation of the Baltic states et al. being Stalin's implementation of MR.
 * If a source says "X", by way of a generous sprinkling of Siebert's Special Blend of WP:SYNTHETIC XOR logic it means "Y." Feel free to include the aforementioned sources in the article, just not butchering changing the article with your personal synthesis. VєсrumЬа ►TALK 22:03, 6 January 2013 (UTC)
 * You seem to misunderstand me: I asked you to present sources, not your speculations. The sources say otherwise. Thus, Haslam criticized Roberts for trusting Soviet archives too much, however, he criticized Raack, who expresses strongly pro-Baltic views, even more seriously. The truth is somewhere in the middle, and Roberts seems to be closer to it.
 * Re Stolfi, the Hitler interpreted the secret protocol as German obligation not to interfere into the Baltic internal affairs (and symmetrical Soviet obligation to avoid any actions against Hungary, Slovakia or Romania (except Bessarabia) . Indeed, Germany did not occupy neither Romania nor Hungary, despite the fact that they felt into the German sphere of influence.
 * Regarding Gorodetsky, he clearly writes about the anti-German aspect of Soviet expansion in 1940, and everything else is just your own interpretation (quite a liberal one, by the way). Again, you either present sources, or I'll do what I planned to do. No more speculations, please.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:38, 6 January 2013 (UTC)
 * There would be something for me to counter if your sources supported your proposed narrative. They do not. VєсrumЬа ►TALK 23:37, 6 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Again, your personal contentions have zero weight when they are not supported by sources. --Paul Siebert (talk) 00:18, 7 January 2013 (UTC)
 * These mutual accusations of opinion not scholarship must be getting tiresome for the rest. That the USSR invaded Finland as soon as it refused Stalin's offer of a pact of mutual assistance gives the lie to Stalin not intending to annex the Baltic states all along. MR's guarantee of non-military action by the signatories against each other was the guarantee of invasion with impunity. Or so Stalin believed. As long as that was the case, annexation implemented MR. These are not my "personal contentions", they are simple facts. Nor do I dispute your sources (well, Roberts is a bit biased in ignoring German accounts of the negotiations), only your biased interpretation. VєсrumЬа ►TALK 01:37, 7 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Re Finland, read D. W. Spring (The Soviet Decision for War against Finland, 30 November 1939. Soviet Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Apr., 1986), pp. 207-226) and Timo Vihavainen (The Soviet Decision for War against Finland, November 1939: A Comment. Soviet Studies, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Apr., 1987), pp. 314-317). Spring argues that initial Soviet intents seemed genuine (they really wanted just to protect Leningrad and to get Hanko. The second author agrees with Spring that "the Soviet demands were not made in order to create an opportunity for intervention in a revolutionary style. Even the Finns have begun to consider them 'both rational and moderate', as does Spring, echoing A. F. Upton". The only contradiction between these two authors is in some nuances of Soviet behaviour during negotiations. In other words, don't mix the Baltic case and the Soviet-Finnish story. They have much less in common then someone thinks.
 * Re "Roberts is a bit biased in ignoring German accounts of the negotiations" He is not biased, he just compensated for 50 years long bias: since the end of the WWII, the only archival documents available to Western scholars were German archives, so the whole western historiography looked at this issue through the German prism. Roberts just brought needed balance.
 * Re "MR's guarantee of non-military action by the signatories against each other was the guarantee of invasion with impunity." That is exactly what I meant: it created an opportunity for invasion, however, it didn't stipulate it. Therefore, annexation of the Baltic states of Winter war were the consequences of MRP, but not its implementation. --Paul Siebert (talk) 03:56, 7 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Hmm, Paul, "implementation" is mentioned only once and in a sub-heading, what's the big deal? Just grab a thesaurus and suggest something better or change the word to "consequences". Clearly the events in question are recognized to be result of the pact by main stream historians, as you yourself just admitted, and as such should be granted a major place in the article. Xil  (talk) 08:37, 7 January 2013 (UTC)
 * I would say, the whole structure of the article creates a wrong impression that the pact was a kind of military alliance, and all actions of Stalin's and Hitler's regimes in Central Europe were implementations of this pact. The article should not discuss Holocaust or Katyn massacre (actually, Soviet occupation postponed Holocaust; Germans didn't know anything about Katyn, and they used it later as a tool to deteriorate relations between the Grand Alliance members), and it should not devote much space to the Winter war, Soviet annexations etc. They should be mentioned only in a context of the development of Soviet-German relations, and it it well known that Soviet annexations lead to deterioration of Soviet-German relations. --Paul Siebert (talk) 17:16, 7 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Nowhere in the article is this called an alliance, rather you seem to suggest that we should treat it as such by excluding any consequences of the pact that where not explicitly agreed upon by both parties. What they actually agreed upon was not to mess with each other's actions, especially in territories the other side was interested in, which allowed both of them to freely carry out their respective policies in their "spheres of influence", which is why what they did there is generally regarded as consequences and there are hardly any grounds to exclude them from article. I actually think I see where your original argument is coming from, but it is not for us to decide, if views presented in an article are logical fallacy or not Xil  (talk) 19:48, 7 January 2013 (UTC)
 * I essentially agree with most what you say (actually, you correctly formulated my own opinion). However, I newer wrote that the article calls it a military alliance. My precise wording was "the article creates a wrong impression that the pact was a kind of military alliance". In other words, whereas it does not say that explicitly, it implies the actions of the USSR and Nazi Germany were de facto implementation of some agreement (which obviously was not the case). Therefore, I think the article should focus mostly on signing the pact itself, and on immediate consequences of it. Everything else should just be briefly mentioned in the "Aftermath" section.--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:55, 7 January 2013 (UTC)
 * @Paul, unfortunately, by your suggested manner of doing things, we'd have to create an "aftermath of MR" article which would start off by being an alleged POV fork of WWII et al., that is, MR giving the green light to Hitler (and Stalin) commencing WWII, put us back on the "did the USSR send radio signals to guide Luftwaffe bombing Poland" or did they not, etc. To split the pact from its direct effects is the POV editorial viewpoint: the Soviet annexation of the Baltic states is the result of nothing but MR and nothing but Stalin's "implementation" of MR. None of your sources state otherwise. VєсrumЬа ►TALK 20:19, 7 January 2013 (UTC)
 * This could simply be solved by changing section title, without any need for shuffling anything around. Moreover there is no justification to remove this content, given that events in question are often presented as consequences of the pact (even if you feel this is a fallacy). Xil  (talk) 20:44, 7 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Re "the Soviet annexation of the Baltic states is the result of nothing but MR and nothing but Stalin's "implementation" of MR. None of your sources state otherwise". Read Roberts' "Stalin's War", p. 45 and p.55. He clearly says that, despite some author conclude from the 1940 events that Stalin intended to annex the Baltic states from the very beginning in 1939 he had no such intentions, and that sovetisation of Western Belorussia was not a rehearsal for sovetisation of the Baltic states; he also says that their annexation was a direct responce on German military success in France, and it was dictated by Stalin's fears of inevitable military conflict with Germany. The same author says in his "Molotov: Stalin's Cold Warrior" that MRP was not a "clear-cut agreement to invade and partition Poland as it might appear in retrospect" (p. 31). Regarding the Baltic states, Roberts is unambiguous: in a response to German success in France "Stalin responded by bolting the Baltic door to further German advances." (p.39) Hitler "saw Soviet action in the Baltic states and in Balkans as threatening" (p.40). I doubt more clear wording is possible: one "ally" creates a barrier against further advances of his vis-a-vis, and another on sees those actions as a threat - great "implementation" of the pact.
 * I can provide other sources, however, even the sources already provided by me are sufficient to move all material we are talking about to the "Aftermath" and "Post-war commentaries" sections.--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:55, 8 January 2013 (UTC)
 * This is actually not relevant, if he does not comment on the pact itself. What would be appropriate was if, say, you'd come up with some source stating the pact didn't have any impact on events that unfolded after it was signed and their eventual consequences in the first place. I propose changing the said title from "implementing" to "consequences of" Xil  (talk) 02:32, 8 January 2013 (UTC)
 * That is ridiculous: the pact had a profound effect on world history as whole, so it is impossible to find a claim that it had no effect on the fate of the Baltic states. Of course, it had. If we just replace "implementing" with "consequences", that would mean the pact had no effect on, e.g. the Battle of France, which is obvious nonsense. The consequences were global, not local. Thus, the change in French and British foreign policy, of of the policy of the USSR towards Komintern should also be discussed in the "consequences" section.--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:48, 8 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Well then how is your proposition to remove or diminish notion of there being such effects justified? If you feel section title is inappropriate, then there is no need to change everything else. As far as I gather the section deals with what happened in territories mentioned in section title, if you think this is not enough to separate it from effects elsewhere, you are welcome to suggest something that would Xil  (talk) 03:12, 8 January 2013 (UTC)
 * (od) Returning to Roberts for a moment, this is always the problem with historians leaving the territory of what happened to then ascribe motivations fulfilling their personal perspective of historical personalities. Roberts pointedly discounts Stalin's expressed interests in the Baltics during the MR negotiations. This allows for good story-telling later for Roberts' historical novel--Stalin invading Baltics a reaction (!) to Hitler, not intended or planned. But that is hardly the mainstream scholarship view which confirms the Baltics' fate was decided as early as August 1939, let alone also ignores the Baltic SSR maps printed well before the invasion. Roberts' view here is fringe at best. VєсrumЬа ►TALK 05:07, 11 January 2013 (UTC)
 * You simply didn't read Roberts carefully. Thus, he writes that in 8 August Soviet ambassador already described some major points of German proposal: "In return for Soviet disinterestedness in the fate of Danzig and former 'German Poland', Berlin would renounce any aspirations in the Ukraine and, in effect, would give the USSR a free hand in 'Russian Poland', Bessarabia and the Baltic States (except for Lithuania)."
 * Actually, not only Stalin expressed deep interest to the Baltic during MR negotiations, these two states, Estonia and Latvia, became the reason of failure of Anglo-Franko-Soviet negotiations, when the USSR requested to provide guarantees that these states would not be used as a bridgehead for German attack of the USSR, whereas Britain and France refused to provide such guarantees. "To express interest" and "To have intentions to occupy" are two different things.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:09, 11 January 2013 (UTC)
 * BTW, here is another mainstream source:
 * "The Soviet decision to make the non-aggression pact with Germany in August 1939 was not made out of sympathy for Germany or because of an identification with an authoritarian regime, but out of cool calculation that it was the best way to avoid involvement in a war which would be likely to bear heavily on Soviet efforts as it would start over Poland and would therefore be focused in eastern Europe. Hitler's pressure on Poland was the initiative to which the Soviet leaders had to respond if they were to come to an agreement with him. The Soviet leaders were not the initiators of the move for dynamic changes in eastern Europe. They were still the potential opponents of the Nazi regime. The agreement of 1939 had been entered into in order to avoid war with Germany. As an agreement between two such ideologically hostile opponents, the danger was that it would be interpreted on the German side as a sign of Soviet weakness. The agreement therefore necessarily influenced the style and character of Soviet actions on the international scene. Having entered the Nazi-Soviet pact the Soviet leaders needed to show their comparable virility as a great power, able like Germany to impose their will on smaller powers." (D. W. Spring, Soviet Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Apr., 1986), pp. 207-226)--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:14, 11 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Another quote:
 * " What followed in Eastern Europe was a consequence of the pact only in an indirect sense. The secret protocol drawn up in August only delimited spheres of interest; it did not arrange partition or control. The Soviet advance in Europe rode on the back of German military successes. Stalin waited until he was sure of his ground before moving. The rapid advance of German troops promised swift Polish defeat. Stalin did not want Germany to drive on to the Soviet border, disregarding the secret protocol entirely. On September 9, after much hesitation, Molotov agreed to German requests to invade Poland from the east. Little had been prepared, and not until September 17, shortly before the Polish surrender, did the Red Army begin rolling across the frontier. "
 * "If further proof were needed, in May 1940 German armies swept through the Netherlands and Belgium and in six weeks defeated the French army and drove the British from the Continent. The defeat left Stalin’s strategy in tatters. The whole object of the pact with Germany was to deflect the threat from Hitler westward for the foreseeable future. Stalin hoped that the war would develop like the war of 1914, and that Germany would emerge from it ‘so weakened that years would be required for it to risk unleashing a great war with the Soviet Union’. Instead the war was over in a matter of weeks, leaving the Soviet Union exposed to a German!dominated Europe and without allies. When news of the surrender terms came through to Moscow, Stalin was angry and incredulous. Khrushchev watched him pacing nervously up and down ‘cursing like a cab driver’. ‘How could they allow Hitler to defeat them, to crush them?’ (...) The sharp change in the strategic situation prompted Soviet leaders to take the remaining spoils assigned to the Soviet sphere under the terms of the secret protocols of the pact with Germany. On June 17, on the pretext that ‘acts of provocation’ from the Baltic states had to be met with force, half a million Soviet soldiers were sent into the three republics, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which were subjected to the same regime of lawless terror that had been imposed in eastern Poland. " (Richard Overy Russia's war).
 * Will you argue that this author is also non-mainstream? Please, provide the sources that refute Roberts, Gorodetsky and Overy, otherwise I'll re-arrange the article.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:20, 11 January 2013 (UTC)
 * What you just quoted says they seized their spoils still based on their interpretation of what the pact allowed them, while the first one doesn't really comment on events, which being result of this you question. So you still haven't shown how this is not a consequence and warrants rearrangement of the article in the way you proposed before. Xil  (talk) 18:00, 12 January 2013 (UTC)
 * No, just re-read the very beginning of the first quote: Overy said clearly and unequivocally that subsequent events in EE were just indirect consequences of the pact, which stipulated no annexations. Soviet Union seized "the remaining spoils assigned to the Soviet sphere" (not "seized the remaining territories that had to be annexed according to the pact"), so it is correct to say that the pact just gave them such a opportunity, but did not stipulate these annexations: "to have an opportunity to do something" doesn't imply "to have an obligations/intentions" to do so: if you have a knife you have an opportunity to kill, but you have no obligations to do so. We do not know for sure (and, probably will never know) if the Soviet desire to have just military bases in the Baltic states was their genuine desire in 1939, or it was a preparation for annexation. Similarly, we will hardly will know if the USSR annexed the Baltic states in 1940 because it was genuinely scared by German military successes (as Overy and Gorodetsky believe), or Stalin simply decided that that was a convenient moment for annexation, as Raack says (I personally believe the first viewpoint is more plausible, because I do not see which country could object against that: Britain and France demonstrated their total inability to do anything). Thus, Slovakia or Hungary fell into the German sphere of influence, however, Germany didn't occupy them in 1939. Hungary was occupied only in 1944, when Germany decided it to be necessary.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:17, 12 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Indirect consequences are still consequences and this is not even indirect in the sense that there was a chain of events where one thing caused another and yet another, but in that it was not originally known that certain issue will result in something in the future. Hence it is understandable that you argue that this one word is somewhat misleading as it may imply parties were obliged to do what they did. It is not clear to me why in your opinion this one word cannot be just changed, but rather you suggest part of this must be moved under "Aftermath", which currently deals with different topic, or removed (and what shall be removed, may I inquire?). There isn't really any use in removing notions why this pact had any historical notability from the article. Xil  (talk) 19:20, 12 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Indeed, the last part of passage from Roberts quoted by Paul states:
 * "The sharp change in the strategic situation prompted Soviet leaders to take the remaining spoils assigned to the Soviet sphere under the terms of the secret protocols of the pact with Germany."
 * In other words Hitler's military successes only meant Stalin had to take his assigned share more quickly than he would have had planned originally. --Nug (talk) 20:27, 12 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Firstly, the author we are discussing is Overy, not Roberts. Secondly, you seem to take this phrase out of context: read the quite in full, please, and you will see that Overy clearly says that the pact was connected to the later events only indirectly, and did "it did not arrange partition or control." Obviously, annexation falls into these categories.
 * Note, the secret protocol explicitly discusses the problem of existence of Poland as an independent state (" The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments. "), however, no such reservations was made in the secret protocol about other EE states. However, even in Polish case Overy describes Stalin's policy as follows: "Stalin did not want Germany to drive on to the Soviet border, disregarding the secret protocol entirely. On September 9, after much hesitation, Molotov agreed to German requests to invade Poland from the east. Little had been prepared, and not until September 17, shortly before the Polish surrender, did the Red Army begin rolling across the frontier." (I reproduce it again for you). In other words, Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland was a reaction on rapid German advance, and it was neither discussed in August, nor prepared by the USSR in advance. Of course, the same can be said about the Baltic states.--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:33, 12 January 2013 (UTC)
 * More on that:
 * "The sudden expansion of Soviet territory westward, although conceded in principle in 1939, produced fresh anxieties in Berlin. The Soviet-Finnish war had left Germany in a difficult position, for her sympathies were all with the Finns. After the end of the war German forces were stationed in Finland". (ibid)
 * In other words, Overy clearly says that, whereas by signing the secret protocol the Germans conceded that in principle the USSR had a right to occupy the territories within its sphere of influence, the protocol did not stipulate such occupations, and that Soviet step was interpreted as an unfriendly action. The same can be said about Finland.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:04, 12 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Regardless whether particular acts were interpreted as unfriendly by one side and in conformance with the pact by the other, the acts were still a consequence of the M-R pact. --Nug (talk) 21:26, 12 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Most events after 1939 were the consequences of the pact (in the same sense as the MRP itself was a consequence of the Munich agreement). However, you probably missed the point: "consequence" does not necessarily mean "implementation", and in this concrete case the sources provided by me persuasively demonstrate that 1939-40 annexations were not the implementation of the MRP.--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:16, 12 January 2013 (UTC)
 * And yet you object to replacing "implementation" with "consequences" for no obvious reason Xil  (talk) 00:55, 13 January 2013 (UTC)
 * The M-R pact explicitly divided up Eastern Europe into "Spheres of Influence". How these spheres were to be implemented was not defined in the pact but left open. Evidently Stalin decided that incorporation of the territory into the Soviet Union was the best way to implement his "sphere of influence" over that territory. --Nug (talk) 00:59, 13 January 2013 (UTC)
 * @Xil. I do not object, I simply want to achieve consensus before starting article's modifications. In addition, I think you would agree that renaming the section " Implementing the division of Finland and Central Europe" (btw, between whom was Finland divided?) to "Aftermath" would hardly resolve the problem completely. In any event, if you agree with that, I'll do that.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:58, 13 January 2013 (UTC)
 * @Nug. These are just your speculations. Overy says otherwise. We cannot reject his opinion, which is, without any doubt, mainstream.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:58, 13 January 2013 (UTC)
 * No, I would not agree - you haven't outlined any other problem than "implementation" and nobody objected to "consequences", while I said multiple times that "Aftermath" is not a good idea, because for one there is such section and secondly seeing how this section is about events of WWII or before, it would diminish importance of content and it appears to me that Vecrumba had similar concerns Xil  (talk) 06:12, 13 January 2013 (UTC)
 * I see several problems. Firstly "Consequences" section is written from the EE perspective: actually the effect of the pact was much broader. The major consequence of the pact was a start of the WWII, and a sharp change in the overall political situation in the world. Secondly, I do not think we need to discuss the individual actions of pact's signatories, such as repressions, killings, etc: we already have special articles that discuss these issues in details, and these actions had just indirect relation to the pact. We are not re-telling the history of the first phase of WWII here. The story should be as follows: (i) how the relations between the USSR and Germany were developing in 1930s, (ii) what events lead to signing of the pact (failed attempt to create a collective security system, Munich, tripartite negotiations), (iii) what were the immediate consequences of the pact's signing (start of the WWII, partition of Poland) (iv) what was the course of the events that lead to deterioration of the relations between the USSR and Germany (Winter War, Battle of France, annexation of the Baltic states, Bessarabia, failed Hitler-Molotov talks, etc) (v) termination of the pact (Barbarossa (very briefly)), (vi) Stalin's attempt to deny existence of the secret protocol ("Falsifiers of history", a myth of liberation of west Ukraine/Belorussia, a myth of "voluntary joining of the USSR by the Baltic states"), (vii) condemnation of the pact in 1990s.--Paul Siebert (talk) 06:33, 13 January 2013 (UTC)
 * I added geographical constraint to it, the section discusses nothing, but outcome for "influence spheres", there is a separate section on Soviet-Nazi relations, if you are unhappy with how other consequences are reflected expand upon them. Xil  (talk) 07:48, 13 January 2013 (UTC)
 * @Paul, any source that discusses the M-R pact discusses the events in the Baltics (including Finland), Poland and elsewhere in context of "spheres of influence", for example Roberts discusses these events in a chapter titled "Sphere of Influence". Your proposed scheme ignores a significant body of literature that views Stalin as pursuing an aggressive and expansionist foreign policy in the 1930s, achieved in part by the M-R pact and its secret protocol. By ignoring this viewpoint your proposal suffers from POV issues. The key significance of the pact is that it gave the Soviets a free hand without interference from the Germans, your proposal would obscure that. As the Latvian foreign minister was told by Stalin on October 2, 1939:
 * "I tell you frankly a division into spheres of influence has taken place.... As far as the Germans are concerned we could occupy you. But we want no abuse."
 * --Nug (talk) 08:15, 13 January 2013 (UTC)
 * What you are doing here is drawing conclusions from the sources. You know Roberts' opinion on that account: the pact stipulated no invasions or annexations. Regarding the quote, yes, this quote is a good demonstration of my point: Germany took an obligations not interfere in Baltic, so the USSR got an opportunity to occupy whatever they wanted within its sphere of influence. However, it was not obliged to do so, and Germany never agreed with such occupation explicitly. The most likely, the first clause of the secret protocol (which did not discuss an issue of Baltic states' independence) implied the following: the USSR was free to establish military bases there, and, probably, convert the Baltic states into its satellites (similar to what Germany did in Hungary, Slovakia or Romania). In connection of that, creation of military bases in Latvia and Estonia, and the attempt to obtain the bases in Finland, were more direct consequences of the pact. In contrast, subsequent occupations and annexations were not.
 * Of course, the story of Soviet and German activities in their spheres of influence does belong to this article, but it is not its major subject: each of those events has its own article. The major focus (besides the story about the pact itself) should be on the development of Soviet-German relations during the pact operation.
 * Actually, the discussion of Stalin's policy fits into my scheme pretty well (and I can explain how). However, currently, the opposite situation takes place: the article predominantly reflects the views of "Stalin as pursuing an aggressive and expansionist foreign policy in the 1930s". That is not what most mainstream sources (Overy, Roberts, Watson, Carley, Riese, Gorodetsky, Haslam, Ericsson et al) say. --Paul Siebert (talk) 17:59, 13 January 2013 (UTC)

Your contention that because the pact did not actually stipulate any invasions or annexations means we cannot discuss those events, even though every source I have ever seen discusses these events in context of those secret protocols, that is incredible. All the authors you cite still mention these events in detail when discussing the M-R pact, I even linked a chapter from Roberts' book where he groups those events under the title "Spheres of influence". Your approach of wanting to only discuss the development of Soviet-German relations while ignoring the development of relations between the SU/Germany with the countries mentioned in the Secret Protocols is contrary to any treatment of the topic in any published source and therefore would constitute OR. --Nug (talk) 21:04, 13 January 2013 (UTC)
 * My argument is that because the pact did not actually stipulate any invasions or annexations we should not devote so much attentions to them. I think relatively more attention should be given to Poland, the "mutual assistance" treaties should also be discussed in a context of the secret protocol (as well as the Winter war). However, 1940 annexations should be more closely connected with deterioration of Soviet-German relations. And, by the way, I do not propose to ignore anything, just to shift accents.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:10, 13 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Paul, your argument was that the pact itself does not discuss much possible consequences. You have, though, by now proved yourself that there were serious consequences from how each party interpreted the pact, even if it was not in the pact this warrants it coverage here (matter of fact invasion of Poland also is not mentioned there, it says of Poland exactly same thing as of other countries). What you suggest here is like describing hurricane Katrina in terms of wind speeds as it mot certainly did not intend to cause any damages. There seems to be rather clear consensus against you scheme, although certainly no one would mind, if you expanded on consequences elsewhere, which you seem to be suggesting, but not doing Xil  (talk) 21:36, 13 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Katrina was a natural disaster. The MRP was an international treaty. Don't you see a difference?
 * The pact has very serious consequences, however, the way these consequences are described in the article is totally unsatisfactory. The description is blatantly primitive: "Stalin and Hitler decided to divide East Europe, and they did that. After that, Hitler decided to attack Stalin, and broke the pact". Actually, the sequence of the events was the following: (i) Stalin and Hitler agreed not to attack each other; (ii) Stalin and Hitler agreed that each party does not interfere into other party's sphere of influence, and each party had carte blanche in their own sphere; (iii) each party acted independently in their own sphere of influence; these actions were partially a response on each other's actions, and partially were dictated by quite different reasons; (iv) historians disagree about the motives of Stalin's actions: some of them argued that they were dictated by security reason, others believe Stalin's genuine motif was expansionism.
 * Regarding consensus, what I see here is a responces like: "your sources do not say that". However, it is easy to demonstrate I am right: just move this discussion to NPOVN.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:04, 14 January 2013 (UTC)
 * So consequences of a natural disaster deserve a mention, but consequences of man-made disaster do not? To your 3. point - please show where the section suggests they did not act independently.
 * Yes, and go ahead with your threat, although this seems to be merely an editorial dispute where one user is not coming up with a whole lot of reasons for intended editing, I reckon the required conciseness for carrying it out may result in some revelations Xil  (talk) 09:50, 14 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Who said consequences of MRP do not deserve mention? I thought I was clear enough: although the consequences do deserve mention, the way they are currently described in unsatisfactory. Therefore, this your argument is pure straw man.
 * Re "please show where the section suggests they did not act independently" - the article implies concert actions, and ignores the fact that the actions allegedly made in accordance with the pact lead to complete deterioration of Soviet-German relations.
 * Re "threat", you probably mixed RSN with ANI: to go to RSN is a normal way to resolve editorial dispute (actually, that is what this noticeboard is needed for), so I recommend you to calm down. Noone here is going to request any sanctions, or to do any other steps beyond a normal editorial dispute. At least, I believe my all vis-a-vis have no such intentions.--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:28, 15 January 2013 (UTC)
 * No doubt there was friction in the alliance, but Hitler only decided to launch Barbarossa after the failed German–Soviet Axis talks with expansionist Soviets demands of Finland, hegemony and military bases in Bulgaria, the oil resources of the Middle East, the coal and oil of Sakhalin and control of the Turkish Straits. --Nug (talk) 10:38, 15 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Soviet "expansionist" demands were that Germany had to withdraw her troops from Finland. Is that expansionism? Regarding oil, afaik, it was a German idea to divert the USSR to India and Middle East. Poor Hitler! Apparently, he started Barbarossa just to save Bulgaria and Turkey...
 * Speaking seriously, Overy says:'
 * " Now, instead of a powerful Germany dominating Eastern and Central Europe following Poland’s defeat, Germany was engaged in an unpredictable war against the British Empire, while the Soviet Union was free to extend its influence unchecked. The occupation of Bessarabia was a final blow. A few weeks later Goebbels wrote in his diary: ‘Perhaps we shall be forced to take steps against all this, despite everything, and drive this Asiatic spirit back out of Europe and into Asia, where it belongs.`"
 * Regarding the Molotov-Hitler talks, Overy says:
 * "Molotov was so abrupt with Hitler that their meeting on the first afternoon became heated, and Hitler refused to attend the evening dinner to welcome the Soviet party. Hitler and Ribbentrop hinted that the Soviet Union should turn away from Europe towards British India. They talked in generalities, Molotov in details. His instructions were to discuss points that closely concerned Soviet security in Europe, but he found that the Germans were trying to get the Soviet Union embroiled in the war with Britain. There could be no agreement on this basis."
 * I think, no comments are needed.--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:12, 16 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Again you only present a partial picture. With regard to Finland it was more than just removal of German troops. Molotov wanted German acquiescence in a Soviet settlement of the "Finnish issue" in accordance with the Soviet-German treaty. Lunde states:
 * "When asked by Hitler what this meant Molotov stated bluntly that they wanted a settlement along the same lines as the one with Bessarabia - occupation - and he asked Hitler for his opinion, apparently in an effort yo soften this exceedingly blunt statement".
 * In other words the Soviets were asking Hitler's permission for a second attempt in occupying Finland "accordance with the Soviet-German treaty". --Nug (talk) 06:52, 16 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Interesting. I never read about that. Can you give me an exact reference, I would like to read about that.
 * Nevertheless, that does not change my main point: Overy clearly says that the USSR refused to get embroiled in a conflict with Britain, which eventually lead to a failure of the negotiations.--Paul Siebert (talk) 07:13, 16 January 2013 (UTC)
 * See page 33 of Finland's War of Choice: The Troubled German-Finnish Coalition in WWII by Henrik Lunde. On that same page Lunde discusses the same meeting where Overy states "Molotov was so abrupt with Hitler that their meeting on the first afternoon became heated", the meeting became heated over Molotov's abrupt statements regarding Finland. Lunde states that Ribbentrop attempted to change the subject by trying to entice the Soviets into joining the break-up of the British Empire. --Nug (talk) 10:48, 16 January 2013 (UTC)


 * Look, Paul, if you cannot demonstrate how your perception is true, the rest of us don't have any reason to conclude there is anything more to it than your perception. And who said I need to calm down? To me this "dispute" looks more or less resolved as it is, unless you can come up with evidence that something is wrong - there was one word that could be misinterpreted, it was changed Xil  (talk) 13:29, 15 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Who said you need to calm down? I said that, because speaking about going to NPOVN as "threat" is ridiculous. I saw no threats during this discussion so far. Regarding the dispute (without quotation marks), I do not think you have addressed my concern: currently, the article is biased towards the opinia expressed by the authors similar to the author cited by Nug.
 * Regarding your request to demonstrate that my perception is true, what concretely do you mean?
 * I admit the problem is partially at my side: maybe, I simply did not explain clearly what I propose. I'll try to change the article according to what my sources say (of course, you are free to revert that), and that probably will give you a clue on what concretely I mean.--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:12, 16 January 2013 (UTC)


 * Paul, don't agree with your "shift in accents", it is contrary to the way it is treated in the sources. The M-R pact is more than just about relations between the SU and Germany, it is also about relations between the SU and Germany on one hand and the Baltic states (including Finland), Poland and other countries named in the Secret protocols on the other hand, and that is the way it is treated in the sources. --Nug (talk) 21:40, 13 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Just read Overy or Gorodetsky. They treat it exactly as I describe.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:04, 14 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Overy and Gorodetsky add nothing new, the idea that the incorporation of the three Baltic states in 1940 was not a direct consequence of the M-R pact was first formulated by Soviet authorities in 1989 when they admitted the existence of the secret protocols for the first time. With regard to your point that the M-R pact did not specify any invasion or incorporation, Alfred E. Senn writes:
 * "The Nazi-Soviet agreements, however, did not specify a Soviet occupation, however the participants might have envisaged the future."
 * "There appeared to be an understanding, rather than a formal agreement, between the Nazis and the Soviets that the Soviet Union would annex the Baltic states. The communications between the German diplomats in October 1939 spoke openly of the prospects of the Soviets' sending troops into the Baltic and even foresaw Soviet annexation of Lithuania. The secret protocol of September 28 implied this, declaring that when "the government of the USSR takes special measures for the protection of its interests on Lithuanian territory, the territory which lies to the southwest of the line shown on the map will pass to Germany". Schulenburg spoke of delaying the German claim to Lithuanian territory "until the Soviet Union actually incorporates Lithuania, an idea on which, I believe, the arrangement concerning Lithuania was originally based." The German-Soviet division of Lithuania made no sense without the assumption that the Soviet Union planned to incorporate its share, just as Germany would incorporate its share. Few could foresee how Stalin would outmanoeuvre the Germans and eventually persuade them, for a price, to give up their claim to a piece of Lithuania."
 * "In sum, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, providing for the division of Eastern Europe between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, laid the foundation for the Soviet Union's incorporation of the Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. There was, to be sure, probably no detailed plan as yet, but the ultimate intention of the Soviet leaders would seem to have been clear." (Senn, Lithuania 1940: Revolution from Above, 2007)
 * Therefore your argument that because the pact did not actually stipulate any invasions or annexations we should not devote so much attentions to them simply does not follow. Senn conclusively shows that having any such stipulations of invasions or annexations in the pact is not necessary when an understanding already exists. --Nug (talk) 09:12, 14 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Cannot agree. What we have here are two different interpretations of Soviet intentions: some authors believe expansionism initially was not genuine Soviet intent, whereas others conclude that, since the USSR eventually occupied most countries within its sphere of influence, then Soviet policy was expansionist ab initio. By the way, Senn also agrees that there was no plans for annexation, and it is not clear from his writings when those plans were created.
 * One way or the another, your argument is standard: since sources exist that support your POV, this POV (and only this POV) should be represented in the article. In contrast, I suggest to reflect both viewpoints, fairly and proportionally. Can you guess whose position (your or mine) is in accordance with our policy?--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:37, 15 January 2013 (UTC)
 * I don't think you can achieve the reflection of both viewpoints by removing the factual consequences of the pact. --Nug (talk) 10:38, 15 January 2013 (UTC)


 * I wonder why it was not noted somewhere in the article that WM pact has been described as a classic example of Crime against peace, the point made in the introduction to the Black Book of Communism, for example? My very best wishes (talk) 23:08, 13 January 2013 (UTC)
 * This (highly controversial) opinion belongs to the section devoted to modern condemnation of the pact.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:04, 14 January 2013 (UTC)
 * But there was in fact an agreement between USSR and Germany to attack/occupy third countries? There are no any doubts about this. Right? My very best wishes (talk) 23:37, 14 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Overy says the opposite (see above). One may argue that Roberts could be a revisionist or non-mainstream author, but Overy is a mainstream source without any doubts. I would suggest you to read more serious historians and less propaganda. --Paul Siebert (talk) 01:19, 15 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Not unsurprisingly you appear to have mis-construed what Overy is saying. You seem to think that he is one of the authors who believe expansionism initially was not genuine Soviet intent, whereas he writes in the previous paragraph to the one you quote:
 * "Above all Germany offered something the Soviet Union could only dream about in 1939: the possibility of rebuilding the old Tsarist empire in Europe. The fact that it came with German approval did not diminish the offer. The fact that it would bring a common German-Soviet border, instead of the network of small buffer states, was bearable. Stalin saw only profit."
 * In other words Overy is actually saying that expansionism was always the intent and Stalin's advance into Eastern Europe was on the back of Germany's military successes. --Nug (talk) 10:38, 15 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Strictly speaking, neither Poland nor Finland were integral parts of Russia: they were possessions of the Russian Emperor (I think the analogy with Jersey is pertinent), they had their own constitutions, and politically they were separated from the rest of the Empire. Therefore, expansion (in Russian empire's style) did not necessarily implied full absorption. In addition, you forget that post 1920 Soviet-Polish border was drawn after Soviet defeat, and the Poles took a significant part of Belorussian and Ukrainian land. It was quite understandable that Stalin wanted this land back. Or you do not recognise the right of conquest only when the USSR was a conqueror?--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:23, 17 January 2013 (UTC)


 * @My very best wishes Technically what they agreed on paper looks like this, it would appear it is up to anyone to decide what that means. One thing though is clear - it violates Polish right for self-determination as they agree to make decisions on their independence. Meanwhile "crime against peace" is waging a war for purposes other than defense, so if you were to see this document as part of preparations for such war... Xil  (talk) 13:29, 15 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Well, with regard to Poland, the agreement tells: "In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state, the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narev, Vistula and San.". And that is what had actually happened afterwards, as we know. This is just a matter of fact, rather than a matter of opinions by historians. And of course that kind of agreement to occupy 3rd countries is a "crime against peace" simply by definition of the term. If even such obvious things are disputed by contributors around here, I am not sure this discussion is going anywhere. My very best wishes (talk) 22:51, 16 January 2013 (UTC)
 * These things have been disputed by the authors we use. Overy writes that Stalin moved his troops when the collapse of Polish army became obvious, and there was a danger that Hitler would take whole Poland. Roberts supports that too. Other sources (such as George Ginsburgs. The Soviet Union as a Neutral, 1939-1941. Soviet Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Jul., 1958), pp. 12-35) say that the USSR referred to the state of debellatio in Poland. BTW, this author concludes that the USSR was careful to remain de jure neutral in the European war, although some steps, made in secrecy, were a violation of neutrality. However, the fact is that all WWII participants considered the USSR as neutral during the pact's operation.--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:23, 17 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Paul, you appear to be synthesising these sources to advance a novel view that diminishes the importance of the secret protocols. Obviously Stalin was concerned that Hitler may take whole Poland, that was not what was agreed in the secret protocols, thus he moved his troops in after a two week delay in order to give the appearance of "neutrality". --Nug (talk) 19:42, 18 January 2013 (UTC)

...thus allowing Stalin to concentrate on Japan in the battles of Khalkhin Gol (Nomonhan).
I generally agree with Nug's attempt to make a lede shorter, although I found some other repetitions, which I removed. In addition, I made some other changes, I believe the reasons are clear from edit summaries. Regarding this words "thus allowing Stalin to concentrate on Japan in the battles of Khalkhin Gol (Nomonhan)" I have a double feelings: by Sept 1 the Nomonhan incident had been more or less resolved (at least, militarily). Therefore, it is not clear for me how could the pact help Stalin to concentrate on Japan in the battle that had already been won. In connection to that, I am asking for your opinion: do we need to say that (I personally am neutral)?--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:02, 15 January 2013 (UTC)
 * No man, you removed words: "The agreement gave Hitler the go ahead to invade Poland", which was actually the main purpose of the agreement and led to the beginning of WW II. That is important to notice from the beginning. New version is much worse and POV. My very best wishes (talk) 23:06, 16 January 2013 (UTC)
 * The USSR was not in position to "go ahead" anything: the major players were Britain, France, and other Western powers. The only thing the USSR could guarantee was its own neutrality: it could not neutralize Britain or France. In addition the statement: "The agreement gave Hitler the go ahead to invade Poland" is simply untrue. Actually, invasion of Poland lead to very severe consequences for Hitler: as Overy said, as a result of the invasion he found himself embroiled in the war with France and Britain, the war he didn't expect and didn't want. See, for example, Overy's opinion:
 * "After the pact was safe Stalin told Nikita Khrushchev, the young Ukrainian ex!peasant and a rising star in the Party, ‘I know what Hitler’s up to. He thinks he has outsmarted me, but actually it is I who have outsmarted him.’ Seven days after the pact was signed German armies invaded Poland. Two days later, on September 3, Britain and France, against Hitler’s (and Stalin’s) expectations, declared war.  Stalin had a breathing space; Hitler had a war he did not want.  " (Overy. Russia's War (emphasis is mine))
 * The words ""the agreement gave Hitler the go ahead to ..." are applicable to, for example, Munich agreement, which paved a way for occupation of Czechoslovakia (which had no negative consequences for Germany), but not to the MRP. Again, that would be true had the USSR been able (and willing) to neutralise Britain and France. I think my explanations are clear enough, so I revert you. Remember, my edit is supported by Overy, which is a mainstream source.--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:00, 17 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Exactly how does Overy conclude Hitler intentionally starts a war Hitler does not want? That rather begs logic. Hitler surmised, correctly, that neither France nor Britain had the appetite or means to honor their treaty commitments related to the protection of Poland. MR insured Hitler could invade with impunity, as Stalin would merely stand by and then claim his piece.
 * As for neutrality, how does a "neutral" USSR invade "neutral" Baltic states and remain "neutral"? The USSR was kicked out of the League of Nations for its attack on Finland, so let's not pretend any country considered the USSR "neutral." VєсrumЬа ►TALK 01:33, 17 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Peters, that is obvious: it is generally believed that Hitler thought invasion of Poland would proceed according to Czech scheme: the Western powers would limit themselves with protests, and there would be no other consequences. He was surptised that Britain declared a war, and he asked Ribbentrop angrily: "Now what?" Hitler's anger was understandable, because Ribbentrop assured him that Britain and France would not declare a war (Bloch, Michael (1992). Ribbentrop. p. 260). In other words, the MRP did not stipulate neutrality of countries, others than the USSR, in the prospective European war, and, retrospectively, this pact did not prevent the European war to start. Therefore, it did not "give Hitler the go ahead to invade Poland" neither de jure, nor de facto (the war was declared, and that forced Hitler to re-consider his strategy). Again, had France and Britain not declare a war on Hitler, I (along with most authors) would totally agree with this wording.
 * Regarding the "neutral" Baltic states, there was no war between them and the USSR, so this annexation was not a sign of non-neutrality. And, importantly, it was not a sign of co-belligerence with Germany, because the latter did not took any hostile actions against the Baltic states in 1939-40.
 * To make your life more difficult, I'll give you another example: by the moment when MRP was signed, full scale hostilities took place between the USSR and Japan. However, that did not affect Soviet neutral status, and did not make it an Ally.--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:43, 17 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Well, Ribbentrop almost had it right considering Britain had to shame France into declaring war, after which we had the "phony war".
 * You forgot Finland, the Bsltic states were following the same model, only by acquiescing to pacts did they only stave off the inevitable. Your "there was no declaration of war" unfortunately smacks of Russian Duma proclamations which purport there wasn't any occupation, either.
 * Lastly, you mix apples and oranges as that particular iteration of the Russo/Soviet-Japanese border conflict had already started in 1938, predating everything we speak of here. VєсrumЬа ►TALK 02:03, 17 January 2013 (UTC)
 * "Phoney war" ended with a full scale war that eventually lead to Hitler's defeat and deaths. French and British war declarations had a direct relation to that.
 * Regarding Finland, this issue was already raised (and addressed): Finland had never been an Ally; Finland was supported by Germany since mid-1940; therefore, even if we consider the Winter war a part of the WWII, which camps the USSR and Finland should be assigned to? Actually, the answer is that Finland and the USSR were two non-aligned states that waged a separate conflict (although the world community provided Finland with moral and diplomatic support; interestingly, not only Britain and France were Finnish sympathizers, but Germany too).


 * Re apples and oranges, you yourself do that too: again, neither the Baltic states not Finland were the Allies, so, even if we consider all of that as a part of WWII hostilities, it would be impossible to describe that in terms of two bloc war. However, I suggest you to forget about the Baltic states in that context: again, they never were the Allies, their population provided Hitler with significant support (of course, you may argue it is incorrect to use retrospective arguments, but you yourself are doing that very frequently).--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:30, 17 January 2013 (UTC)

@Paul. You made significant changes without consensus. I explained above my opinion and reverted per WP:BRD. Now, I would like to see what other people who currently edit this article have to tell about this (there are several of them) and will respond in more detail later. Thanks. My very best wishes (talk) 02:25, 17 January 2013 (UTC)
 * I just continued a series of significant changes started by Nug. Regarding consensus, if you have any arguments, feel free to present them. Currently, your position can be formulated as "I don't like that". That is unproductive and disruptive. Again, if you have rational arguments supported by sources, feel free to present them. Otherwise, please, self-revert: you cannot revert me if you have no counter-arguments to present. If other users have something to say, they will do that. However, that gives you no right to revert me without explanations.--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:33, 17 January 2013 (UTC)
 * @Paul, your changes significantly change the purpose of MRP. Ostensibly it was a non-aggression pact but its purpose was to divide Eastern Europe into Nazi and Soviet spheres. Your changes purport that non-aggression was, indeed the primary purpose, and reduces the division of Eastern Europe to ancillary status. I do not support your changes, that is not the mainstream view of MRP's primary objectives or repercussions and fully support their being reverted.
 * I should mention the only official act of sovereign Latvia was to put its maritime fleet into the service of the Allies. where it served with distinction, so, unfortunately, an Ally.
 * Lastly, your significant support of Hitler is straight out of Soviet propaganda purporting those deported were all prostitutes, criminals, and Nazi sympathizers. Do not confuse your bias with historical facts. VєсrumЬа ►TALK 02:45, 17 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Its purpose was seen differently by different parties. and Overy explains that. Therefore, my edits are supported by reliable sources, and your contention is not. Of course, non-aggression was a primary purpose, and it was this non-aggression (from the Soviet side) which made the outbreak of WWII possible. Your arguments are too local and seem to reflect some national POV.
 * Regarding Latvia, it is a subject of a separate dispute. I don't see what relation does it have to the current discussion.
 * Regarding your "lastly", my statement is based on what reliable Western sources say. I can support that by citations and quotes. However, I do not understand what relation does it have to my recent edits.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:18, 17 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Overy doesn't even deal with the USSR and WWII before 1941 in his magnum opus, so not the best source for discussing MRP. You can do better than playing the nationalist card. Don't do so again unless you wish to share and discuss your own personal ethnic and national origins and whether or not they color your personal POV, at least that way the conversation can be two sided instead of your tiresome insinuations. Latvia is part of the territory affected by MRP so relevant. And lastly, let's see your mainstream sources that Latvians were Nazis. I did respond to not agreeing to your recent edits, any comments there? VєсrumЬа ►TALK 03:33, 17 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Really? Have you read the chapter 2 (The Hour Before Midnight: 1937-1941)?
 * Latvians (in general) were neither Nazis, nor Communists (not Buddhists, and so on). However, many (but not majority of) Latvians voluntarily participated in the Holocaust, defended Hitler from the Red Army, etc. You may argue that their real intent was to defend their own independence - and I will fully agree with that. However, by accepting your point we would have to accept that the genuine intent of most Russians (and other Soviet people) was just to repulse Nazi aggression, not to enslave EE - and that will also be true... You are trying to force me to play nationalist card, but I am not going to allow you to do that.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:58, 17 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Your argument does not follow. The USSR was not a democracy, the intent of the Soviet leadership to enslave EE does not mean that the Russian people's intent to repulse Nazi aggression was not genuine. The Russian people were the first to be enslaved by Stalin. --Nug (talk) 08:02, 18 January 2013 (UTC)


 * I too object these unilateral changes by Paul for two reasons. (1) the older version clearly tells in 1st paragraphs that Pact allowed to secretly divide Eastern Europe into Nazi and Soviet spheres of influence. This is very important to tell right in the 1st paragraph, and this is something hardly disputed by anyone. (2) Older version tells that the agreement allowed Hitler to invade Poland. Yes, that was something directly written in the text of the agreement and actually accomplished. Yes, this is very important to emphasize as something which directly led to WWII. Who finally outsmarted whom, the role of Latvians, and some other things above are not really important. My very best wishes (talk) 05:47, 17 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Whereas the secret protocol was important, the pact itself had much more important effect. The effect of the pact (start of WWII) was global, the effect of the secret protocol (division of EE onto spheres of influence) was local: it affected just Romania, Poland, three Baltic states and Finland. Therefore, it is much more reasonable to subdivide these two effects, otherwise it would be local national POV pushing. The first paragraph should tell about the pact, the separate paragraph should be devoted to the secret protocol (in actuality, we already have a para devoted to this issue, so I don't undertsand why do we need to duplicate the same information; your rationale is unsatisfactory).
 * The pact was not a permission for Hitler to invade Poland, it was just a guaranty of Soviet neutrality during this invasion (and I've already explained that; you provided no satisfactory counter-arguments). Therefore, my wording is correct and your is not. I provided sources to support my wording, and you provided nothing (even if you will be able to provide some sources, that would not be sufficient, because your wording will be much more narrow). Please, provide real counter-arguments, otherwise I'll restore my edits.--Paul Siebert (talk) 06:08, 17 January 2013 (UTC)
 * WP:LEADSENTENCE is sufficient counter argument against your edit. The secret protocols are a significant part of the overall pact. --Nug (talk) 08:14, 17 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Understood and agreed. However, that argument is applicable to only one of the edits I made, so I'll restore all other changes.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:26, 17 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Upon re-reading WP:LEADSENTENCE I realised that these guidelines are not obvious counter-argument. I found only one relevant clause there: "If its subject is definable, then the first sentence should give a concise definition: where possible, one that puts the article in context for the nonspecialist." However, other clauses say: "For topics notable for only one reason, this reason should usually be given in the first sentence." Since MRP is notable for at least two reasons, there is no need to mention the secret protocol here, especially because the neutrality of the USSR in the European war is not discussed in the first sentence. Could you Nug explain please what concretely in the MOS serves as an argument in support of your version?--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:10, 17 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Paul, please don't waste our time with these tiresome arguments, it is the fact of the secret protocols that makes this pact so notorious, non-aggression pacts were quite common in the 1930s. As Mullerson states:
 * "For example, the notorious secret protocols to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 whereby the USSR and Germany divided their respective spheres of interest (the territories of Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bessarabia)"
 * so please do not attempt to argue otherwise. --Nug (talk) 07:50, 18 January 2013 (UTC)
 * "Notorious" is not necessarily "notable". The pact was important primarily because it lead to outbreak of WWII, and the secret protocol added nothing to that. In other words, the pact was notable because it pre-determined the course of the European WWII, and it was notorious because it contained the secret protocol that determined the course of the events in EE: obviously, the latter is more local. In connection to that, I see absolutely no reason to repeat the same information twice, and I don't see how did you infer from MOS that we should do that. Please, explain, otherwise I'll modify the opening sentence.
 * PS. Your wording is unsatisfactory, because it makes more emphasis on the division of EE, which was of secondary importance (at least, Britain, France, and later the US didn't care much about that).--Paul Siebert (talk) 13:28, 18 January 2013 (UTC)
 * That's just your personal synthesis. However the mainstream view holds that the division of EE was the most significant part of the Pact which ultimately led to the Cold War. As Melanie Kühn writes in Iron Curtains on Paper - The Origins of the Cold War 1917 - 1947:
 * "Orthodox writers defined the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact as a clever step to expand Soviet borders and thus, to spread communism without risking a war."
 * It was the division of EE that led to the outbreak of WW2, as sources have shown it was after Molotov's blunt demands in November 1940 for a second attempt to occupy Finland that Hitler decided to proceed in attacking the USSR. --Nug (talk) 19:28, 18 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Wrong casual linkage: the WWII started first, and only after that division of EE occurred. Just look at the timeline of the events. Regarding Molotov-Hitler talks, do you seriously claim that the WWII started because good Hitler tried to protect poor Finland from Bolshevik hordes? If that is what you want to say, I strongly recommend you to refactor this your statement.
 * Speaking seriously, the reason of the failure of Nov 1940 talks was quite different, according to Overy, Roberts and others:
 * "Molotov arrived by train on November 12. Two days of discussion followed which satisfied neither party. Molotov was so abrupt with Hitler that their meeting on the first afternoon became heated, and Hitler refused to attend the evening dinner to welcome the Soviet party. Hitler and Ribbentrop hinted that the Soviet Union should turn away from Europe towards British India. They talked in generalities, Molotov in details. His instructions were to discuss points that closely concerned Soviet security in Europe, but he found that the Germans were trying to get the Soviet Union embroiled in the war with Britain. There could be no agreement on this basis. In the middle of an embassy banquet on the 13th, Molotov found himself forced to take shelter from a British bombing raid. Taking advantage of the interruption, Ribbentrop presented Molotov with a draft treaty delimiting the Soviet ‘New Order’ ‘in the direction of the Indian Ocean’. With the noise of guns and bombs in the background, Molotov dismissed the suggestion and told Ribbentrop that what the Soviet Union really wanted was hard talking about Bulgaria, Turkey, Sweden, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Greece." (Overy, ibid.)
 * Note, Finland is not even in the list of the countries that were a subject of "hard talking".--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:56, 19 January 2013 (UTC)
 * Overy's 1999 book is a bit dated and he does not give us much detail. However see page 33 of Henrik Lunde's book Finland's War of Choice: The Troubled German-Finnish Coalition in WWII . Lunde discusses the same meeting Overy mentions, that meeting became heated because of Molotov's abrupt statements regarding Finland where he wanted the same settlement as Bessarabia - occupation. Lunde states that Ribbentrop attempted to change the subject by trying to entice the Soviets into joining the break-up of the British Empire. I've said this all before but is seems you have ignored this. --Nug (talk) 02:36, 19 January 2013 (UTC)
 * I cannot rule out a possibility that Lunde has much more expertise in Finnish-Soviet relations then Overy does, however, his narrow spacialisation may have an obvious drawback: he can easily pay exaggerated attention to his own field of interest. You must agree that Overy's vision is much more global, so he gives much more balanced overview. In addition, the very idea that the Germano-Soviet split occurred in Nov 1940 is not shared by majority authors. I would say, the meeting in Berlin was a last attempt to preserve Germano-Soviet relations, which had been severely damaged after Soviet annexation of the Baltic states and Bessarabia. The latter, by the way, is described by Overy as the last step that affected Hitler's (and, independently, the OKW's) decision to start preparations for invasion of the USSR. You should have remembered that Hitler's and Ribbentrop's intentions were different in Nov 1940. Whereas the latter was genuinely obsessed with the idea to create four powers anti-British continental bloc, Hitler was much more skeptical about that. It is not clear if Hitler expected anything more from the meeting than to test real intentions of the Russians.
 * Regarding the year of Overy's book, can you please tell me what new archival documents, memoirs or other data, which were not available by 1999, did Lunde use in his book?--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:50, 19 January 2013 (UTC)