Talk:Monadology

What is a monad?
Under the "What is a monad" section, it says that monads "exist in space" and "are metaphysical points". Both of these claims are false. Leibniz is clear that monads have no extension, so they are not in space. Space and time, according to Leibniz, are illusions. They are not "metaphysical points" either. It does not make sense to speak of them as points at all, since they have no extension. They are metaphysical simples, not points. - Jaymay 04:24, 19 August 2006 (UTC)

Unfortunately the phrases "non-extended" and "metaphysical simple" is (I assume) a term of art in philosophy. It would be helpful if this could be rephrased in a way that was comprehensible to the lay reader, obviously without becoming inaccurate.

From context and without any background reading I would guess that "non-extended" means that it doesn't have a particular size or extent in space and that saying it's a "simple" means it's not made of anything else.

- Ian Jackson 2007-07-27

A point is, according to Euclid, "that which has no part". Even though this comes from a treatise on geometry, that definition itself has nothing to do with space. 198.228.199.172 (talk) 12:10, 17 July 2011 (UTC) Collin237

Leibniz clearly states that monads are not merely metaphysical. They do in fact "exist in space" in the way you are thinking, but the idea of "space" does not, according to monadology, because there is no "empty space". Your conceptualization of "space" is ironically composed of an infinite number of non-extendable monads. --Acantelopepope (talk) 05:15, 4 July 2009 (UTC)

Grammar
English is not my first language. If you find some grammar mistakes, please feel free to correct them in the body of the article. --Fedro

Saved from Monads article
Monads should redirect to Monad which should have a link here. Monads has a paragraph on Monadology so I'll save it here in case it will inspire someone: --TuukkaH 22:03, 26 March 2006 (UTC) In the writings of the philosopher Gottfried Leibniz, monads are atomistic mental objects which experience the world from a particular point of view. Leibniz's theory&mdash;first described in 1695&mdash;does not posit physical space; rather, physical objects are constructs of the collective experiences of monads. This way of putting it is misleading, however; monads do not interact with each other (i.e., they are not "windowless"); rather, they are imbued at creation with all their future experiences in a system of pre-established harmony. The arrangements of the monads make up the faith and structure of this world, which to Leibniz was "the best of all possible worlds".

A vital distinction
At no point does Leibniz say that Monads "are matter", like one part in this article says. It is precisely because they aren't matter, that they do not have spatial properties, and thus, monads are infinite and are not divisible (as an extended object would be, which Leibniz understood). --Knucmo2 17:03, 1 November 2006 (UTC)

At various points in the Monadology, Leibniz clearly states that monads are NOT matter. I would advise anyone reading this article to disregard the entire thing. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 142.1.147.96 (talk) 01:30, 22 January 2008 (UTC)


 * The entire "paradoxes" section seems to violate 'no original research' policy. Though I personally dislike taking out natural observation, if there were some intrinsic paradox that didn't come from an elaborated theory & original research for example. Though it appears this section also contains fallacy understanding the subject (i.e. claiming Monads *are* matter). So something should be done. Nagelfar (talk) 08:13, 29 April 2008 (UTC)

"What is a Monad" section is hopelessly opaque
Both of "non-extended" and "simple" (as a noun) and perhaps also "soul-like" need unpacking if the section is to stand a chance of being comprehensible to anyone without whatever background it is that is required to understand the text as it stands. The apparent contradiction between "soul-like" and "every material [..] is composed entirely of monads" also needs explaining.


 * Don't you see that this is the monad of this article? It's not comprehensible to anyone. That's the whole point. KWATZ! —Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.91.18.181 (talk) 10:38, 21 July 2008 (UTC)

Theodicy
Taking a quick glance at this work I see that it seems to be missing any references to the Theodicy. As the work contains several references to the Theodicy, and indeed is not fully complete outside the framework provided there, its role should be discussed in this article. --TS 22:45, 28 November 2008 (UTC)

Rather Original: needs rewriting
The article does not conform to Wikipedian encyclopedic standards, it is more like an essay. References are badly needed to convince that most of the interpretation is not just POV. Hence the tags.al (talk) 10:09, 3 February 2009 (UTC)

Removed commentary
This criticism was just dumped in the article at one point:

[Why is this? Elaboration requested here. This is a rather weak attempt at creating a non-existent paradox(and can be analogized and reduced to the following sentence: matter has a form, and thought not (this is not to be confused with it being non-physical), exceedingly; thoughts exists in matter, thus matter is, but bound to be nothing but exactly: "thought", or at least not to be differentiable from matter, and must thus also be confined to the properties that be those of matter) created, presumably, merely for the sake of criticism, since there can be found at least one possible border in the virtual between the extended and the unextended, even though a border holds no functions, it marks a physical relation to at least two different locations, for since it is already given that there can be an extended part, object or substance in the physical, then is thus also given that at least one function exists for that object, namely; 1. Its creation, 2. It's destruction/reconstruction. Is it impossible for these skepticists to imagine an entity with principal parts that are lesser in functional potential, than that of its components in sum. Therefore, this criticism must have to be re-formulated, so that the meaning is changed in its predicative and linguistical functions, in order to work as a valid and proper argument, in short, two differentiable and principal functions, locations or entities can easily, and very aptly have at least one different property, despite possibly sharing theoretical infinite values]

67.91.189.225 (talk) 15:12, 10 December 2010 (UTC)

Laplace's demon
Would not the Monadology's concept of the 'monad of monads' (God) show the same necessity for which Leibniz argued God to have, by virtue of God's all knowing intellect, in the modern quantum theory called Laplace's demon? Nagelfar (talk) 06:10, 10 July 2011 (UTC)

Fractals???
Can anyone explain why fractals are referred to so extensively (or at all) in this article? This should be a description of a fundamental concept elucidated by Leibniz. Someone's personal observation of a possible parallel to fractals really doesn't seem to belong here. If at all, then maybe in a final subsection with proper references.

Tcolgan001 (talk) 15:47, 25 May 2012 (UTC)

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The section "Substances simpler than monads" seems very problematic
I think the section "Substances simpler than monads" as it is now is highly problematic. The arguments made in the section don't make any sense to me. How can a substance be with the attribute of existence and not any other attributes? It is not clear why such a substance should be considered possible, since such a substance would have no causal interaction with anything in the real world, and is thus no different from a fictional thing for any conscious observer of the universe - it makes sense to think that the attribute of existence cannot be had by a substance that does not have any other attributes, for otherwise we would be declaring that a substance ("substance") which is basically "nothing at all" somehow exists, which makes no sense.

The section discussed the matter of whether there exists substance simpler than a monad, but Leibniz merely called a monad a "simple substance" and did not even use a notion of "simple-ness" that would allow the degree of "simple-ness" be compared in this context. It seems to me that for Leibniz, the notion of a "simpler substance" simply does not exist.

The discussion regarding the application of Occam’s Razor assumes that it is possible for a substance to have the attribute of existence and no other attributes, an assumption which is as briefly argued, unjustified. In addition to that, the [notion of simplicity with respect to which the Occam's Razor was applied] was not defined, and the choice of the implicitly assumed notion of simplicity in this context not justified. In what sense is the possibility that "the simplest substance is one which contains a single attribute" simpler than the possibility that "the simplest substance is one which contains multiple attributes"? Why should we assume this notion of simplicity rather than other notions of simplicity when applying Occam's Razor?

I think this section should be deleted unless someone can clarify the issues I raised. 2001:569:BD85:7200:A812:4546:BF3B:58B1 (talk) 01:57, 5 May 2021 (UTC)


 * I concur that this section has problems. Leibniz grants that monads are not simple in some respects. Each monad has an infinitely complex nature or essence. But monads are not material composites, so they are simple in the sense that they cannot be divided up into smaller parts. Since they are not material or spatial at all, it is indeed difficult to see how other substances could be "simpler than" monads in the specific sense of material composition. Even God is not simpler than a monad in the sense of material composition; God and a monad are equally simple in that respect. Furthermore, this section resembles an essay or piece of original research in tone and content. It does not seem to be a neutral exposition of Leibniz's conceptions of monad, substance, etc. 131.234.207.186 (talk) 15:19, 19 June 2021 (UTC)

I deleted that and one other section.

Not only does the argument make no sense, but the use of Occam's Razor was completely backwards as the author posits an unnecessary substance that has no tangible effect on the world whose only quality is existence. The whole point of Occam's razor is to do away with such substances. Knick Early Bird (talk) 06:20, 25 November 2021 (UTC)