Talk:Napoleon III/Archive 2

Recent edit's by an IP
I'm attempting to understand what wants to say. I've invited him to discuss on this talk page, but so far he has refused. So I decided to create a new section. From what I gather, the main points he wants to convey are:
 * 1)  Bonaparte refused to set aside the restrictions of the Treaty of Paris on Russian control of the black sea, hindering his ability to create an alliance with Russia
 * 2)  Bismark's promise to help set aside these restrictions played a crucial role in keeping Russia out of an alliance with France.

He quotes a Russian source to support the first point, and makes the the second point twice with two different sources (one of which is a memoir). Is this a reasonable summary? Putting aside the somewhat awkward grammar and questionable sources, would anyone know if there are there good sources backing up these points and if so should we include these points in the article?

Personally, I see some merit of including a mention on the second point (if it is true and can be adequately sourced). I'm somewhat confused on the first point. Unless there is some evidence that Bonaparte considered this action, I don't see how it is relevant. What a Russian thinks Bonaparte should have done seems tangential to an article about Bonaparte if it was never discussed by or with Bonaparte. ---- Work permit (talk) 15:53, 3 July 2019 (UTC)
 * It can be added, if the edit isn't too essay-like. Nigos (t@lk • Contribs) 00:19, 4 July 2019 (UTC)
 * Thanks. Do I understand the two points correctly? If you do, and they are valid, I could try my hand at finding additional sources and adding them ---- Work permit (talk) 00:34, 4 July 2019 (UTC)
 * The question of life France was unable to gain any allies against Germany is an important one & all historians writing in French or English have covered it in detail. The issues of the Crimean war treaty were not especially relevant-- France and Russia became friends by 1860. As far as Russia concerned by far the main stumbling point was the status of Poland. Jelavich in the standard history of Russian foreign policy says in the late 1860s "the renewal of ties with St. Petersburg foundered as usual on the rocks of the Polish problem and the [Polish] revolution. In 1867 the Czar visited the Paris exhibition... Not only was he coolly received by the French crowds, but he was also shot at twice by a Pole." [Barbara Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow:  Tsarist and Soviet foreign policy 1814–1974  pp 154-55.]  Walter Moss says that in 1863 During the revolt in Poland, "Napoleon III had made requests and demands in behalf of the Polish rebels. He joined with Great Britain and Austria to put pressure on Russia, and it proved fruitless. It'd only angered Russia and cooled the more cordial relationship that had been developing between Russia and France."  Bismarck supported Russia on the Polish question. For more details see  Rjensen (talk) 02:07, 4 July 2019 (UTC)


 * I doubt the Russians would have expected to have the Black Sea Clauses lifted in the early 1860s - it was very soon after the war, and it would have been like Streseman trying to get the Treaty of Versailles lifted in 1924. Clearly there was a lot of friction between France and Russia over Poland, but these things aren't always barriers to alliances being formed when deeper issues of realpolitik are at stake - compare the Franco-Russian Entente, between ideological polar opposites, of 1893, and the British ententes with France (1904) and Russia (1907), with both of whom Britain had areas of friction. Specifically, it's by no means impossible that there might have been exploratory Franco-Russian feelers in the late 1860s, especially after the Prussian victory in 1866, and that for the sake of argument they stumbled on Napoleon III's refusal to give up any of what he saw as his gains at the Treaty of Paris in 1856. We'd need a source though. Bismarck had of course been keeping the Russians sweet over Poland since the Alvensleben Agreement of 1863.Paulturtle (talk) 01:21, 8 July 2019 (UTC)

I welcome everyone and I will speak in more detail if this topic is of interest.

Of course, Napoleon III sought to emulate the foreign policy of his great relative. For example, an attempt to conquer Mexico directly resembles the expedition of Napoleon I to Egypt. And the support of Poland directly aimed to recreate the Duchy of Warsaw of 1807. But we must remember that the military clash between France and Prussia was directly on the agenda after 1866 and everyone in Europe was waiting for it. Therefore, after 1866, France concentrated all its forces for the future war with Prussia and all the adventures of Napoleon III stopped. Every division he needed was at the front, not in Mexico or against Russia for freedom of Poland.

The support of Poland by the great powers in 1860s was very conditional. Yes, they filed protests, but there was no joint performance. Each power served its own. And besides, it is on the verge of a joke, when France together with Austria protested for the freedom of Poland. When Austria itself had its slice of Poland. Obviously, Austria was very angry with Russia and therefore the temptation to say nasty things against Russia overpowered everything.

A brief summary of the following - France after 1866 have been concentrating their forces for a future war with Prussia and did not want to start a new adventures. Especially after the complete failure of the past in Mexico. France needed every division against the Prussians. The question of an Alliance with Russia is therefore on the agenda. But as I said - France and Napoleon III did not want to meet Russia and cancel the restrictive clauses of the Paris Treaty of 1856. Simply because France's foreign policy in 1860s COMPLETELY failed. Therefore, for reasons of prestige, they (Napoleon III and his command) did not want to cancel the Paris Treaty of 1856, even to the detriment of today's interests. That is, they were going to new defeats and disaster in 1870 at the Sedan.

Of course, Russia wanted to abolish the restrictive clauses of the Paris Treaty of 1856. As Bismarck said (and he had the experience of communicating with Russia) - "Russia knows how to wait, to wait persistently, stubbornly. Do not rely on paper contracts torn by force from her. It was a waste of paper". Russia considered the terms of the Treaty of 1856 unfair and it was only a matter of time for Russia, Russia only waiting for the right time to oppose it. And this moment came in 1870, when after the surrender of the French army, surrounded in Metz, France finally lost hope to change the course of the war in their favor and everyone understood it. That's when Russia announced refusal to comply with the restrictions according to Treaty of 1856.

— Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 07:23, 9 July 2019 (UTC)


 * That’s a bit of a crystal ball argument. Yes, France’s diplomacy was faulty at times, but during the 1860s they still were one of the (if not the) acknowledged dominant military powers on the European continent, and they had good reasons to think they were ready for a war against Prussia. It’s only after the Austrians’ defeat in 1866 at Konniggratz that they started to see Prussia as a real threat to French interests. Which gave France little time for them to acquire new allies against Prussia until war suddenly broke out during the summer of 1870 after they were goaded into it by Bismarck. Remember that for all European countries in 1870 the War came as a surprise. Most countries were because of its sudden start to not ready to intervene on one side of the other.


 * Plus they had to make some choices as to who might be their allies: who was more likely to aid them? Russia who they had fought only 15 years ago, whose monarch had close familial ties to the Hohenzollerns and who already heavily politically sympathized with Prussia because they had supported him during the Crimea War and even military aided him during the Polish Rising of 1863 (because they had to safeguard their own interests in the Prussian part of Poland)? Not likely at all. So why give up some terms you recently fought for and get nothing in return for it? Or might Austria, even then still a first class power, and which had only just lost the war for German dominance from Prussia in 1866, be a more likely prospect. France thought it more likely that the Austrians would join their cause, especially given the fact that count Beust was giving them signals that they would do so if French arms were successful during the early stages of the war. Which everybody expected. And thus French diplomatic efforts concentrated on Austria.


 * Plus France erroneously thought that states like Bavaria, Saxony and Wurttemberg (who in 1866 had fought on the Austrian side and were as a consequence of that dfeat forced under Prussia's dominance) would use the opportunity of a Franco-Prussian war to get more independent from Prussia. And had French arms be successful, that scenario might very well have unfolded.


 * What French diplomacy could not foresee was 1.	the extraordinary lightning speed of German mobilization, which was unheard off for the day and was mainly aided by the newly constructed advanced railroad network. 2.	that the new Prussian military system of using all reserve troops (even second and third line) in the front line (which went against all military practice of the day) would be so effective and give them numerical superiority on the battlefield. That was a military gamechanger. 3.	the effectiveness of the newly acquired and reformed Prussian rifled artillery guns on the battlefield (only four years earlier the Austrian artillery outclassed the outdated Prussian field guns, which were often still smoothbore) 4.	the rise of German nationalism in the southern German states which coupled with the early military success prevented the sovereigns of Saxony, Wurttemberg and Bavaria of trying to shake of the Prussian “yoke”. France had counted on them to “rebel” but given the military situation that did not and could not come to pass.
 * And of course the military blunders the French hoisted on themselves mainly through incompetent leadership.


 * More likely the early French defeats at Spicheren, Wörth, and Sedan were to explain French diplomatic isolation as the lightning start of the military campaign and it’s disastrous results for France prevented other countries to step in on the French side. That’s what really poisoned the well against France, not its diplomatic inadequacy. It also clearly dampened Austrian enthusiasm for a new war against Prussia… after all why align one selves with a side that was clearly losing. –- fdewaele, 9 July 2019, 12:35 CET.

Answer: — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 11:32, 9 July 2019 (UTC)

You repeat the French arguments of the pre-Sedan era. These arguments, of course, have their own logic and, to some extent, credibility. But the reality is they are completely broke at Sedan in 1870. You should not try to revive the dead, especially after 150 years in the grave.

France did not want to meet Russia halfway and cancel the Paris agreement of 1856. This is a historical fact. Why did France insist on preserving a Treaty that was not necessary? This is also a historical issue. My opinion - I repeat - is simply because France's foreign policy in 1860 COMPLETELY failed. Well, if she had at least a minimal success and at least somewhere - undoubtedly, Napoleon III would have gone to meet Russia for an ally against Prussia.

Well, at least in Mexico, well, at least with Poland, well, at least the smallest piece of land on the Rhine or at least in Luxembourg - this would allow for the world and France to imagine that everything is going well. But in fact - on the contrary, everywhere a complete failure and deception. The whole world sees that Napoleon III is a complete loser. Therefore, even to a minimum extent to abandon the past achievements of Napoleon III did not want to somehow maintain its prestige. That is, the road to disaster in 1870. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 11:30, 9 July 2019 (UTC)


 * Once again you are employing faulty crystal ball logic and your own personal opinion. It is easy to state today what they should have or should not have done in the past but alas for Napoleon III neither he nor his advisors were equipped with a crystal ball. He had to go on the assessment by his advisors of the political and military state of Europe and he could not foresee/predict how events would unfold on the battlefield or what secret schemes other countries were involved in. And up to 1866 everything inside the European continent was seemingly going his way (Crimea, Italy in 1859). Mexico was merely a long distance sideshow which didn’t really affect European continental politics. It’s the sudden and complete Prussian victory over Austria in 1866 and its consequences which changed the political landscape of Europe overnight (and this to the detriment of France) and which amounted to a real political card shuffle. That’s what necessitated a French political and military realignment. Unfortunately for him (read for instance Michael Howard's book with regards to those reforms) he let himself by the arch-schemer Bismarck be prematurely goaded into a war before all the reforms (which were due to internal political opposition not fully implemented but were downsized from its original plan) that were being implemented could take root. Besides what would have cancelling the Paris treaty have brought the French? Politically speaking? At that time nothing... as the Russia of the day was definitely not going to intervene on the French side against Prussia. It would take a catastrophic German diplomatic blunder under Wilhelm II and the growing of a unified Germany as a threat to Russia some 25 years later to have the Russians change alliances. But in 1860-1870 that was certainly not in the cards. His only possible allies were Austria – which was itself rather suspicious of Russian intentions in the Balkan – and Italy. Given those facts and the fact that Britain was not ready to dump the treaty at that time either, abrogating the treaty would have gained France nothing but would have made alliances with for instance Austria more difficult. –- fdewaele, 9 July 2019, 14:10 CET.

Answer:

Well, we always act on the basis of the information that is available now, not later. So here Napoleon III is not alone in this circumstance. And Bismarck acted as he could not know what will turn his trickery of Napoleon III. Who knows? Maybe in 1870 it will come back times Jena und Auerstedt?

Imagine that in the 1860s in the foreign policy of France everything went well - you can today in 2019. I will repeat - at least the minimum success and though somewhere would allow Napoleon III to represent it then to the French. But even the minimum success was not. The complete failure of French foreign policy in the 1860s is a historical fact.

And you're wrong when you write " But in 1860-1870 that was certainly not in the cards.". Judging by this, you can not imagine the situation in 1870s. When Prusso-Germany decided to completely destroy France and prevent its revival as an enemy. In this case we are talking about "he War-Scare Of 1875".

Very soon Russia was for France the only world power that could help her against the attack of Prusso-Germany. In 1875 Prusso-Germany compeled the signature of a treaty ceding Belfort to Germany, imposing limitations on the French military establishment, and providing for an indemnity of 10 milliards to be paid in installments covering a period of not less than 20 years". "The military party in Germany, still dissatisfied with the treaty of Frankfort, has decided that the time has come to remedy its defects and to put an end forever to the possibility of a recovery on the part of France. Only Russia stands in a position to veto their schemes...". — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 12:35, 9 July 2019 (UTC)
 * What Napoleon should have done is an interesting question for scholarly articles and history forums. What he actually did is what belongs in this article.  Do you have any evidence he seriously considered approaching Russia?---- Work permit (talk) 12:55, 9 July 2019 (UTC)


 * The Franco-Russian temporary rapprochement in the mid-1870s was a direct consequence of the Treaty of Frankfurt and the establishment of the German empire and its annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. On the one hand a weakened France was desperately seeking new allies. On the other hand those same events worried many European countries, including Russia, to some extent. As a consequence of its victory over Austria and France the German empire had become a unified state but also due to its size became a potential military threat to all neighboring countries. Those annexations and unifications had seen, what in effect was the Prussian military, double in numbers. The annexations first of former Austrian allies (Hannover, Nassau, Holstein,…) and later on the unification with independent southern German states as Bavaria, Saxony, Wurttemberg, Baden, Hessen,… had in itself added some 16 infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions to the German (read: Prussian) army’s roster, which was due to the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine augmented even more with an extra two infantry divisions and extra territory. And in the intervening years that army had grown further with the creation of new army corps. But that were a sequence of events that nobody – especially not France - had foreseen in the 1860s. The stance of Russia and France towards each other in the mid-1870s thus does not say anything about how those countries looked at each other before the dramatic events of 1870. It’s cause and effect. You can’t transpose events from a decade later to an earlier political equilibrium. Also, at that time it certainly was not to the benefit of neither Austria, Russia or the UK to see the new German empire start another war in western Europe against France which could only lead to more territorial loss for France and an even stronger position for Germany, or could lead to a general conflict. So they poured cold water on those German intentions in 1875. It’s a rare case of Bismarck overplaying his hand but the League of the Three Emperors which was formed in 1873 remained for some years in effect. -- fdewaele, 9 July 2019, 15:42 CET.

Answer:

Look, if you don't even do anything, you do something. In this case, you do nothing. What I want to say can be formulated as follows:

1.Napoleon III did not make any serious attempts to negotiate with Russia. Although Russian-French negotiations were a fact (there was a visit of the Russian Emperor to Paris in 1868.

2. Obviously, Napoleon III sought only to put pressure on Bismarck, scare him with an Alliance with Russia, to force him to make concessions to the territory. But Napoleon III himself did not want to make concessions to Russia, because he understood that in return Russia would demand the abolition of the restrictive clauses of the Paris Treaty of 1856.

3.The foreign policy of France in the 1860s was completely unsuccessful and therefore Napoleon III did not want to give up past achievements in the name of prestige.

4.The Franco-Russian Union took place only after the abolition of the restrictions of the Paris Treaty of 1856 and immediately proved its usefulness. When Russia did not allow the second defeat of France in 1875 and the transformation of France into a German vassal like Austria. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 13:10, 9 July 2019 (UTC)

Answer:

You wrote: "But that were a sequence of events that nobody – especially not France - had foreseen in the 1860s". I agree only with the indication "not France".

"Napoleon III's clique soared in the clouds of Sevastopol glory, not sinking in thoughts to the sinful earth, and was not capable of analysis from the standpoint of geopolitical realism, neglected cooperation with Russia, unleashed a war with Prussia. The thirst for territorial gains did not leave her until the end, and she did not keep her thoughts about the need to break foreign policy priorities and turn to the needs of a partner".

You see, it was a clash with reality in 1870 for France. After that, France began to look at the world more adequately. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 14:22, 9 July 2019 (UTC)


 * What you are proposing is adding your own crystal ball interpretation to the article as to what Napoleon III should have done. As said by another editor: that has no place in a biographic Wikipedia article. And I agree with that stance because much of that is based on hindsight. Nor do you provide concrete evidence of concrete French political/diplomatic negotiations with Russia in the late 1860s. As at that time Prussia and Russia were supporters of each other, that would have been most unlikely. Secondly: it's not because France ultimately chose an Austrian policy over a Russian rapprochement (because at that time both were exclusionary), that at that time diplomatically and military speaking they made the wrong choice. Given Austria’s defeat in 1866 they were a if not the logical potential (military) partner vis-a-vis an inimical Prussia whereas Russia was not. It was the rapidity of the military events of the summer of 1870 and the collapse of its armies which lead to the downfall of the 2nd Empire and that made all French diplomatic steps towards Austria suddenly moot (plus Russia which had since the Crimean war – and what they saw as Austria’s “betrayal” - a more or less antagonistic view of Austria began threatening to intervene on the Prussian side if Austria would intervene on the French side).


 * With regards to point 4: whatever the Third Republic years later did has no bearing to what Napoleon III and his regime should have done in the 1860s. In effect it's a cause and effect situation because the republic's actions could only come as a reaction to the unexpected French defeat. It also took place in an entirely different geopolitical situation. Had Napoleon III known what was waiting for him he undoubtably with the benefit of hindsight would have steered another course that summer.  But he didn’t. -- fdewaele, 9 July 2019, 16:24 CET.

Answer:

You surprise, when you write: Nor do you provide concrete evidence of concrete French political/diplomatic negotiations with Russia in the late 1860s.

First, the talks were held during the visit of the Russian Emperor to Paris in 1867. And secondly, in life it is considered not only what is done, but also what is not done. Napoleon III did not want to bind himself with specific promises, and sought only to scare Bismarck that he still gave at least something of the land that promised Napoleon III before 1866.

And what could be done in 1875 could be done in 1868 or 1869. Isn't it? Here simply over you and all other dominates historical knowledge. We all know that the next time the old opponents met in 1914, we think it could not have been otherwise. And could be and immediately in 1875. When Russia though with the Tsar who liked Prussia, but Russia warned Germany that doesn't trust Germany and won't allow new defeat of France. And the Germans retreated. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 14:41, 9 July 2019 (UTC)


 * Again, history is about what happened, not about what could have been. In international politics the old adagium of Palmerston and De Gaulle rules supreme: "No nation has friends only interests." And those interests can - sometimes rapidly - change with the years and the circumstances. The geopolitical world of 1914 was not that of pre-1870, 1870 or 1875 or 1878. And France's and Russia's position, interests and needs pre-1870 were different from those in 1875, 1878 or 1914.-- fdewaele, 9 July 2019, 18:21 CET

Answer:

"You can't enter the same river twice." Is that what you're saying? That's a long time ago. It is also said that "history is the teacher of life." Therefore, it is possible and necessary to compare historical situations and make conclusions. Even after 150 years. My opinion is that you still do not quite want to admit that France in 1860s had a complete failure in foreign policy. And this failed policy is a historical fact. Well, who is responsible for this situation? It is also obvious - Napoleon III himself. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 18:40, 9 July 2019 (UTC)


 * And my opinion is that you seem to be pushing a personal point of view with regards to Russia, and keep engaging in crystal ball comparisons. Comparisons to what happened in 1875 and so on are not relevant to a biography of Napoleon III (and especially not as to what happened in the run-up to the War of 1870), who by then was not only out of power but was also very much dead. Writing whole paragraphs with regards to what he should have done with regards to Russia is not only undue weight, as compared to the dipolamtic engagements with the other great powers mentionened in the article, but the way it is written also reeks as original research, which is also not allowed on wikipedia.
 * Besides I never said that French diplomacy was successfull, it at times clearly was faulty as I explicitly stated... but they did have to make certain calls as to which nation to court and which not. They didn't have the luxury we have today because historians nowadays have access to all sorts of archives in all those countries involved, have thus a 360° view and have the benefit of hindsight. And sometimes the situation on the ground evolves in a way that diplomats did not anticipate. Nobody in Europe expected the Germans to so decisively defeat the French imperial army in so short a time. Between the start of the war and Sedan were only about 5 weeks. And the suddeness of the onset of the war and the rapidity of the German military campaign made many an embryonic political and diplomatic maneuvre by the French moot. Nobody joins a loser.
 * Russia was also not the only power in Europe and pusuing an alliance with a certain country meant that an alliance with other countries was not compatible. For instance Austria and Russia had been at political loggerheads with each other since the Crimean War and never fully trusted each other (not even when later on allied through the "Dreikaiserbund"). Deciding that Russia was a lost cause anyway and not really worth courting, whereas Austria might have given more hope (especially due to Beust's shenanigans) may very well have been a sensible point of view at the time. French diplomacy thus worked - somewhat naively - towards that goal: Austria. Unsourced questioning as to what Napoleon and his diplomats should have done, based on what happened years later when the geopolitical situation was different, is thus not helpfull. Besides if we engage in whatifsms: what if he had pursued Russia to the detriment of a possible Austrian alliance and they ultimately gave him the cold shoulder... then you now might very well be writing that he should have engaged in diplomatic maneuvers to get the Austrians on his side. "What ifs" might make good literature, but they are bad history. -- fdewaele, 9 July 2019, 23:10 CET

Answer:

Still, it turns out I'm right. You don't want to admit the obvious, total failure of French foreign policy in the 1860s. Like, "Yes, something was wrong but generally speaking - it was not so bad". Yes? Because Napoleon III sought at least the smallest piece of territory well, at least where, even on the Rhine, even in Belgium, even in Luxembourg. Even such a small success in obtaining territory would allow him to imagine for his French and for the world that everything is going well. But even the smallest success did not happen. Napoleon III himself and France were completely deceived by Bismarck and received NOTHING. Complete failure. Even the smallest success even in Mexico, even with Poland would allow to speak - "Everything is not so bad as it seems". But the small success was not. "There are no more mistakes that you could make, because all possible mistakes have already been made by you" - these words Thiers addressed to the Emperor of the French in 1867 is wrong? Do not try to deny the obvious, especially after 150 years.

I'm not only bringing my personal point of view here. This view is generally accepted in Russia. In a rebuke to France from Russia constantly is the fact that Napoleon III did not seek allience with Russia, and only allowed the fog and trying to scare the Bismarck that Bismarck still gave any of the territories that he promised to Napoleon III, to 1866.

"But Napoleon III, not understanding all the dimensions of the danger that grew up at the Eastern border of France, did nothing to make at least an attempt to get closer to St. Petersburg. When in the autumn of 1870 Thierre rushed to St. Petersburg to ask for Allience and help, it was too late. After the Sedan, neither Alexander II nor Gorchakov wanted to hear about it".
 * IP just stated he fact that Napoleon III did not seek allience with Russia that is false even though it is cited to a 1959 Soviet history book. The problem with Soviet historiography from 1959, is that very few Soviet scholars were allowed to Do research outside the USSR. Furthermore the Soviet historians were all required to follow the same party line on every major issue, and indeed every minor issue. That was all still true when I was a visiting history professor at Moscow State University in 1986. Scholars who did have access to the archives come up with a different interpretation: After the Crimean war ended, Napoleon III tried hard to reach a friendly entente with Russia, and succeeded in so doing in 1858. However, when revolt in Poland broke out in 1863, France sent a series of notes to Russia demanding reforms and broke the entente. In Prussia, Bismarck took a friendly position toward Russia on Poland and other issues, and made sure that when war broke out between France and the German states in 1870, Russia was neutral. see  A.J.P. Taylor,The struggle for mastery in Europe, 1848-1918 (1954), pp 97, 105, 138, 206-7. Rjensen (talk) 07:17, 10 July 2019 (UTC)
 * Indeed, after all Napoleon III had to content with internal French politics as well: he always had to navigate between the demands of hardcore ultramontanist Catholics and royalists on the one side, and the intellectual heirs of the old Republic on the other side. And France from the days of Louis XV on always had a sympathetic view with regards to Poland, which was enhanced by the fact that France being a mainly Catholic nation they saw their fellow Catholics being oppressed by the Orthodox Russians. Given the strength of both the court of public opinion and the internal opposition in France he simply couldn’t afford to offend the Catholics too much. And those internal matters off course directly influenced his foreign policy, especially during the 1860s with regards to the Roman question in Italy and France’s attitude towards Poland/Russia. As they say: all politics is local. Often even international politics.
 * The biggest political blunder of Napoleon in fact was not his diplomatic endeavors post-1866 but was clearly underestimating Bismarck’s machinations, Gallic overconfidence and letting himself be goaded into a sudden war against Prussia before the (much scaled down because Napoleon “lost” the same internal political battle with regards to army reforms which years earlier Bismarck and Wilhelm I had “won” in Prussia) reforms of the late Marshal Niel were fully implemented and could fully take effect. And that was Bismarck’s main goal: go to war against France at the time and conditions of HIS choosing instead of a later time when France would have become stronger and might have found allies against him. The entire Bismarckian policy from 1866 on had been to diplomatically try to isolate France and at the same time goad the French into a war where France seemed the aggressor so the other German states - who only grudgingly accepted the new Prussian dominance - would unite against the French aggression. In that he clearly succeeded.
 * In fact it is the underlying same argument that a generation later drove Imperial Germany towards the path of war: because their estimations of the ongoing Russian reforms stated that the Russian army and economy would get much stronger from 1916 on, so the timing of 1914 seemed “opportune” to the German military to force a war before their opponents grew much stronger.
 * Also, once more his comparisons to what happened after Sedan are not useful with regards to the situation before the War. After all the situation had changed dramatically pretty much overnight. As stated repeatedly: nobody had expected the quickness, fullness and magnitude of the French imperial defeat during those first 5 weeks of war. That was the true international gamechanger. So of course the new French regime of Gambetta, Thiers & company were desperately seeking new allies wherever they could find them. And of course neither Russia, Austria or any other country would tie themselves to a losing cause at that time. But the fact that later on France of the Third Republic was emasculated by the Treaty of Frankfurt and a new powerful player – the Second reich – had arrived on the international stage upset the balance of European power and created certain “opportunities” later on, which weren’t there before. --- fdewaele, 10 July 2019, 10:31 CET.

Answer:

I can only encourage you and everyone to discuss the topic, not to express opinions about the historians referred to. We all have personal opinions who are considered authoritative historians, and who can not be considered so. I have it different than you. I can also express my opinion about the historians you refer to (if you ask), it will be different and you will not like it, as I think. Therefore, I urge to discuss the stated topic and come to some consensus. If we only express our opinions, there will be no consensus.

The point of view that I present and argue is not only my own. And I cited a reference to the authoritative work of 1959 as proof of that. This opinion has existed in Russia for a long time. And today the situation is the same. I can give you modern sources that say the same thing.

No Alliance between France and Russia was concluded in 1860.

"Gorchakov reported to the Emperor: "Nor the services we have to him (Napoleon III) provided, neither friendly representations, nor visit of Your Majesty to Paris weren't able to establish between us and France that serious Union which would promote preservation of balance and the peace in Europe"

The question of Poland, of course, complicated relations between France and Russia. French society sympathized with the independence of Poland, and Napoleon III himself undoubtedly meant the restoration in some new form of the Duchy of Warsaw in 1807. But in general, the Polish question did not play a major role. Later in 1870s there was a rapid rapprochement between France and Russia with the formation of a military Alliance in the end. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 07:55, 10 July 2019 (UTC)

Answer to fdewaele:

I can only say that for a bunch of particulars can not miss the main thing. But the main thing was - inadequate perception of themselves and the world. In the summer of 1870 for France there was a tough clash with reality. And to this France was not six months or a year. And all 1860s from one failure to another France was on road to a disaster. Do not pretend that "there were some mistakes, but in general - it was not so bad as it seems". — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 08:59, 10 July 2019 (UTC)


 * I never said that France diplomacy in the 1860s was stellar. I’ve already umpteenth times said it was clearly faulty and even ruinous. But this discussion started about your “what ifs” with regards to Franco-Russian relations. You make it seem as if that would have solved Napoleon’s political and diplomatic conundrums but that’s pure conjecture as both countries at the time had reasons for the political and diplomatic course they each chose to follow on the European theatre. Which does not mean those courses in the short and long term were ultimately successful. Sometimes your own (in)actions create the monster that later on bites your own hand (for instance Russia-German Empire).
 * Besides had Franco-Russian relations improved, as you conjecture, then that would have had automatic consequences with regards to its relations with other countries like Austria and the UK, and might have created other diplomatic conundrums. But that scenario did not unfold and is merely alternative history. And that is the main problem with regards to your position: with regards to those points it’s conjecture and not facts.
 * For what it was worth France post-1866 got “played” and isolated by Bismarck, while simultaneously France tried (ultimately unsuccessfully) to get Austria on her side with regards to a Franco-Prussian conflict. But it’s an indisputable fact that the French sudden military collapse was an international game changer which was diplomatically speaking a reset button. Nobody joins a loser, whereas often countries join a winner of even interfere in a stalemate out of opportunistic reasons. And that’s what French diplomacy - enticed by count Beust’s winks and nods - thought Austria would have done (just as they did with regards to Russia during the Crimean War) in 1870. And what France also had planned to do in 1866 with regards to the Austro-Prussian War. But in both 1866 and 1870 the rapidness of the military situation on the ground prevented those scenario’s to unfold. – fdewaele, 10 July 2019, 11:49 CET.
 * IP states there was no French Russian treaty signed in 1860. Mistaken--It was signed in 1859 and was in operation in 1859-63 when France ended it.  Here are two detailed articles.1) "ON 3 March 1859 was signed in Paris a secret Franco-Russian treaty which represented the  result of Napoleon III's efforts to secure for himself such Russian aid as was possible in the forthcoming war with Austria" see B. H. Sumner "The Secret Franco-Russian Treaty of 3 March 1859" The English Historical Review  Vol. 48, No. 189 (Jan., 1933), pp. 65-83 online; and  2) John Knox Stevens, "The Franco-Russian Treaty of 1859: New Light and New Thoughts." The Historian 28.2 (1966): 203-223. online AJP Taylor p 106 says the 1859 treaty "Was a triumph for Napoleon; and indeed it alone made possible the liberation of Italy". The treaty stated in article 1: "in case of war of Piedmont and France against Austria, the Emperor Alexander will, from the moment of the declaration of war, adopt a political and military position most clearly demonstrating his benevolent neutrality towards France." [Stevens 1966 page 221 has the full text]. The secret treaty was published in 1938 for the first time --Krasnyi Askhiv 88 (1938) p 199.  Rjensen (talk) 10:49, 10 July 2019 (UTC)
 * As I said before circumstances often dictate diplomatic evolutions. And that can make positions change on a short notice. A fact that was very obvious during the middle part of the 19th century. After the Russian defeat during the Crimean War relations between Austria and Russia remained very strained, so a denouement between France and Russia to the detriment of Austria would not have come as a surprise. In fact Russian public opinion during the late 1850s was more anti-Austrian, than anti-British or anti-French. After all Russia at that time was feeling very betrayed over what they saw on the one hand as Austrian ingratitude (after saving them from revolution and Hungarian insurrection in 1848) and on the other hand as Austrian perfidy over Austria’s actions during the Crimean War (the Austrians first had staged an armed neutrality, then forced the Russians out of Wallachia and occupied those Danube regions themselves, and they had ultimately even threatened to join the Allies which forced the Russians to accept the Treaty of Paris). So that was a breeding ground for a temporal French-Russian denouement: France sought an ally against Austria with regards to Napoleon's Italian policy, and Russia saw an opportunity to try to get out of some of the restrictive clauses of the Treaty of Paris, while at the same time getting “revenge” for Austria’s earlier behaviour. But by 1863 the political situation in Europe (both external as internal) had changed again (amongst which the Polish situation), which saw both countries go in different directions again. –- fdewaele, 10 July 2019, 13:35 CET.

Answer to Rjensen:

You yourself write that the agreement recorded from Russia "benevolent neutrality towards France". No more than. Russia was not going to agree with the leadership of Napoleon III and embark on his adventures. In Russia immediately understood the whole foreign policy adventurism of Napoleon III and didn't want to be with him somewhere in Mexico. Russia's position was very, very cautious.

If we believe you, it turns out that it was Napoleon III who refused to honor Russia with his favors in 1863. Not at all. "And what, talked Gorchakov, instead of destruction of the European balance? To Russia was proposed "Galicia, but the price for it - the war with an unknown outcome; as for painful conditions for us, 1856, we were promised at the conclusion of the peace - eventual support, due to circumstances utterly beyond rational accounting".

That is, Russia from the very beginning put a condition for the Franco-Russian Union to abolish the restrictions of the Paris Treaty of 1856. But Napoleon III did not promise anything concrete, only vague phrases. Therefore, the Franco-Russian Union died before even being born. The question of Poland here is not the main one, although he, of course, also played against it.

— Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 17:38, 10 July 2019 (UTC)

Answer to Fdewaele:

Historia magistra vitae est.History is the teacher of life. Let us proceed from this. We study history for the purpose not to repeat past mistakes. I understand that you just do not want to talk a lot about the mistakes of Napoleon III and France (of course). That's why you seek to reduce his mistakes somehow. Like, Yes, he could not know how it would end. Anyway, it wasn't that simple. And Bismarck tricked him, and Prussians too quickly done in summer 1870. And all you have to what? To repeat old arguments pre-Sedan era. Again, these arguments have own logic and to some extent convincing. But! They ran out of 1 September 1870 at Sedan. This is reality. You should not try to revive the dead, especially if the dead man spent 150 years in the grave. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 19:24, 10 July 2019 (UTC)

In addition on the subject of the Franco-Russian Alliance, 1859:

Russia agreed a treaty with France on 3 March 1859, but promised no more than `benevolent neutrality` in the event of Franco-Piedmontese attack on Austria. The treaty also stated that if war broke out in north Italy other countries were to be informed that this struggle cannot endanger the interests of great mutual powers, whose balance of power will not be affected. Having signed the treaty, Russia went on trying to solve the Italian problem through diplomatic channels. (...) the cardinal problem, from the point of view of Russian diplomacy, was no longer the intensification but the localization of the Italian crisis.

That is, Russia's cooperation with France was very limited. Russia very careful looking at Napoleon III, didn't want to become a junior partner of his and participate in his adventures. For fear of being somewhere in Mexico. Russia did not assume any direct obligations to participate in the war or even in military demonstrations against Austria. Even against Austria, which in Russia then directly hated and relations with which were spoiled finally. Until the end of both empires in 1910s, Russian-Austrian relations were bad. But even against Austria, Russia was not going to participate in the war. All the promises of Napoleon III to give a piece of Austria to Russia (Galicia) - Russia rejected and put a condition of the Franco-Russian Union, the abolition of restrictions of the Treaty of Paris of 1856. But here Napoleon III only says vague phrases and Russia refused a serious Franco-Russian Union — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 07:37, 12 July 2019 (UTC)

More information on the topic:

The Russians immediately set about establishing good relations with Sardinia and France, a radical break from previous Russian foreign policy. The Russian ambassador told the Sardinian prime minister, Count Camillo di Cavour, “Our two countries must be good friends because they don’t have interests that divide them, and they have common grudges that bring them together.”94 Then, in 1858, Russia entered negotiations with France to cooperate in the impending war between Sardinia and Austria that France planned to join. Russia was willing to concentrate sufficient forces on the Austrian border to occupy 150,000 Austrian troops and press other powers to remain neutral, and it would have been willing to do more in return for French support in repealing the Bessarabian cession or the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris. In the course of negotiations, Tsar Alexander II told the French he would not intervene militarily but would rather employ “the tactic followed by Austria during the Crimean war.”[95] France and Russia were never able to come to agreement on the points that would have led to the most intimate relations, but a vague secret agreement was signed on 3 March 1859 in which Russia agreed to benevolent neutrality toward France and to exert pressure on neutral states on France’s behalf in the event of a Franco-Austrian war. Russia also led France to expect a troop demonstration that would tie down Austrian troops in Galicia. With these assurances, France and Sardinia fought the Italian War in which Austria lost the northern Italian province of Lombardy.

That is, Russia acted very, very cautiously. For the Alliance with France was immediately put forward the condition of the revision of the Treaty of Paris in 1856, and when France did not go for it, the cooperation with France was severely limited. Russia did not take any direct obligations even in terms of military demonstrations, There were only some oral agreements between the Russian Tsar and Napoleon III, but in any case Russia did not want to bind itself with any clear obligations until France, in turn, also did not express clearly its position on the abolition of the restrictions of the Paris Treaty of 1856. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 10:35, 12 July 2019 (UTC)

More information on this topic.

Since Crimean war events had shown that despite its apparent logic, there were great obstacles in the path of a Franco-Russian alliance. To be sure, neither of the powers could succeed in the mayor objectives without support from the other: France in the revision of the settlement of 1815 and Russia in the revision of that of 1856. Without Russia`s benevolent neutrality Napoleon would have hesitated to move against Austria in 1859 and without French assistance Russia had little chance of liquidating the restrictions placed on her sovereignty in the Black Sea. Yet Napoleon was reluctant to part company with London; he feared British sea power for which Russia could supply no substitute. Furthermore Czar Alexander was much to conservative to relish entering into a genuinely revolutionary compact with Napoleon. After the annexation of Nice and Savoy he became increasingly cool to the idea. But Gorchakov was incorrigible. Even in the midst of the conservative rapprochement of 1860 he continued to hold out an arm to Paris eager for the most feeble handshake.

That is, Russia from the very beginning put a condition for the Union with France - revision of the Paris Treaty in 1856. But Napoleon III refused. It is clear why - the Treaty of 1856 was beneficial for England. France did not need the sovereign rights of Russia on the Black sea. But it was necessary to favor England. Because his overseas adventures might have taken place at all if England had approved them, even reluctantly and tacitly. But Napoleon III wanted it overseas adventures - in Mexico, Vietnam, Syria and so on. That's why he let the fog in conversations with Russia and delayed time. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 14:12, 12 July 2019 (UTC)

Dear interlocutors, maybe a fragment of the text should be as follows:

French policy at that time can be described in the following words: "He (the Minister of foreign Affairs of France in 1870 Gramont) merely presumed that the Austrians and Danes would spontaneously join a Franco-Prussian war, that Italy would come along sooner or later, and that Russia would not budge". It can be concluded that the Alliance with Russia was not planned at all. This seems rather strange if you know what role the Alliance of France with Russia played in the future, eventually formalized into a military Alliance, since 1907. The alliance with Russia was possible only after the abolition of the restrictions of the Paris Treaty of 1856. But France under the leadership of Napoleon III did not want to do this. “Since Crimean war events had shown that despite its apparent logic, there were great obstacles in the path of a Franco-Russian alliance. To be sure, neither of the powers could succeed in the major objectives without support from the other: France in the revision of the settlement of 1815 and Russia in the revision of that of 1856. Without Russia`s benevolent neutrality Napoleon would have hesitated to move against Austria in 1859 and without French assistance Russia had little chance of liquidating the restrictions placed on her sovereignty in the Black Sea. Yet Napoleon was reluctant to part company with London; he feared British sea power for which Russia could supply no substitute. “Odious for the Russian side, his clauses remained an insurmountable obstacle to the agreement of the two countries". "Nobody expected the Black Sea clauses restricting Russian power to last very long after the Treaty of Paris of 1856. In every European diplomatic crisis for the next 14 years every state (except Britain) offered support for ending the restriction in return for a quid pro quo that was important to them at the time. Napoleon III was the first to do so during the talks about a Franco-Russian alliance in 1858-1859. He had no real interest in supporting the clauses which always meant much more to the British than to French. Neutralization of the Black Sea survived until the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71".

Initially, Napoleon III refused to revise the Treaty of Paris in 1856, because he feared to cause dissatisfaction with Britain and it could interfere with his plans for colonial conquests (in 1860-1867 years were military expeditions to China, Indochina, Mexico, Syria, etc.). Then the situation changed, in 1860s France faced a number of diplomatic defeats in Europe from Prussia. Actually the crisis around Spain in 1870 also had no serious significance for the military security of France, because Spain was not a serious enemy, and Prussia had a small military fleet compared to the French. This shows how France's foreign policy was devoid of manoeuvre, since any new failure, even the smallest one, or what can be thought of as a failure, was perceived painfully by public opinion in France. France's foreign policy was so unfortunate that it was forced, for reasons of prestige, to hold on to past achievements to the detriment of today's interests. Thus, the Alliance with Russia by France was excluded. In contrast, Prussia was ready for rapprochement with Russia. Prussia was the only world power that supported Russia in the demands of the revision of the Treaty of Paris of 1856. Prussia promised Russia support in canceling the terms of the Paris Treaty of 1856. Bismarck, having declared it impossible to keep 100 million Russians in a humiliated position without sovereign rights to their Black Sea coastline, supported Russia in the abolition of the Treaty of Paris, and in return achieved freedom of action against France in 1870-71.

"Bismarck had bought Tsar Alexander II’s complicity by promising to help restore his naval access to the Black Sea and Mediterranean (cut off by the treaties ending the Crimean War), other powers were less biddable".

Thus Prussia got rid of the "nightmare of the war on two fronts" (which Prussia was able to do in 1866 against Austria by Italy), secured freedom of action against France in 1870. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 06:49, 17 July 2019 (UTC)

Possible date mixup in section "Growing opposition and liberal concessions (1860–1870)"
In this section, reforms from Dezember 61 are discussed, then in Feb 61 'further reforms' are enacted. It seems likely to me that the second date should be Feb 62, but I can't be sure.--91.64.37.35 (talk) 20:07, 9 November 2021 (UTC)
 * there is more wrong with this section, the presentation makes me doubt another date. I will add a cleanup template.--91.64.37.35 (talk) 20:13, 9 November 2021 (UTC)

Special Constable in London?
I recall from a book about the relations between Napoleon III and Queen Victoria that Napoleon III liked recounting to Victoria that while in exile in England late 1830s-most of 1840s he had volunteered as a special constable during the 'Chartist riots'? (Not seen mentioned in this article.) Is there published evidence preferably nearer his own lifetime that he was sworn in to serve? I am also (because of the decades since I read it) uncertain which one it was -1839, 1842 and 1848 stand out in my mind as the years Chartist demonstrations in London occurred.Cloptonson (talk) 14:52, 15 December 2021 (UTC)

Image
I have noticed that the lead image seems to bounce around these three paintings:

Personally, I prefer 2, as it seems to have been used the most (from browsing the page history) and, I believe, was his wife's favourite painting of him. Please give your opinions. Tim O&#39;Doherty (talk) 16:10, 17 July 2022 (UTC)


 * I prefer the Winterhalter, which shows him at the peak of this regime, and is a brighter and clearer image, over the Flandrin or Cabanel, in second place. But they're both pretty good. The French Wikipedia uses the Flandrin, I believe. Cordially, SiefkinDR (talk) 17:38, 17 July 2022 (UTC)
 * I'm very late to this but as he is best know for being an emperor I'd go with 1 as the most regal. BogLogs (talk) 12:41, 7 November 2022 (UTC)

Online Regulation Account
Demo Accounts 109.245.35.217 (talk) 14:58, 26 March 2023 (UTC)


 * auto-replacement@acount-user.data 109.245.35.217 (talk) 14:59, 26 March 2023 (UTC)