Talk:Nuclear facilities in Iran

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This is an automated message regarding an image used on this page. The image File:Ahmadinejad at Natanz.jpg, found on Nuclear facilities in Iran, has been nominated for deletion because it does not meet Wikipedia image policy. Please see the image description page for more details. If this message was sent in error (that is, the image is not up for deletion, or was left on the wrong talk page), please contact this bot's operator. STBotI (talk) 16:07, 28 December 2008 (UTC)

one map image
please someone make a map which include all of these plants in one map.(or satellite image) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Babak902003 (talk • contribs) 11:16, 12 March 2011 (UTC)

Neutrality of tone regarding Fordow
Iranian disclosure of the Fordow site near Qom was followed by international condemnation, particularly by the United States, France, and the UK. Western intelligence officers said they knew of the site's existence before the Iranian disclosure and presented evidence that they had maintained surveillance of the site (the Times article does not say for how long, but describes Fordow as a "multiyear" Iranian effort). Iran maintains it fulfilled all its obligations to the IAEA in the timing of its disclosure.

The current Wikipedia text states that Iran disclosed the site "only after it was discovered by western intelligence and just four days before it was revealed to the public in a joint appearance by the leaders of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom." This text is problematic for two reasons:

1) By using the phrases "only after..." and "just before," Wikipedia's encyclopedic article on Iranian nuclear facilities is strongly suggesting that Iran was "caught" in illegal activity; that their disclosure was an attempt to "save face" when forced to; that Iran's only motivation for disclosure was the impending condemnation.

2) The phrases suggest that the United States was going to reveal the existence of the site in a few days anyway, but this is contradicted by the New York Times article cited.

What the New York Times article does write is that "Mr. Obama’s hand was forced... after Iran, apparently learning that the site had been discovered by Western intelligence, delivered a vague, terse letter to the International Atomic Energy Agency on Monday disclosing that it was building a second plant, one that it had never mentioned during years of inspections."

The Iranians deny this version of events. The New York Times provides no evidence that Iran "apparently" learned of the site's discoveries, and it's not clear if this sentence is meant to reflect the views of the Obama Administration, the New York Times, or anyone else. I personally suspect it's true, but a simple statement of the facts can allow readers to reach this conclusion, without actively encouraging them by using editorial commentary. "Only after" and "just before" is editorial commentary, and potentially misleading.

Lastly, it should be obvious to everyone that Wikipedia is a neutral reference source for this and all other matters.-Darouet (talk) 16:43, 1 March 2012 (UTC)


 * Iran was caught, and the citation (the NYTimes is a reliable source) supports the claim. NPguy (talk) 20:50, 2 March 2012 (UTC)


 * Your recent changes to the article are far more neutral in tone, but you haven't addressed any of my points above with your brief statement above. -Darouet (talk) 22:50, 2 March 2012 (UTC)


 * Not sure what else there is to respond to, other than Iran's claim that it didn't have to declare the facility earlier. Iran agreed to early declaration of planned facilities in 2003.  It later reversed itself unilaterally, despite the provision in its safeguards agreement that such changes (to Subsidiary Arrangements) can only be made by agreement between Iran and the IAEA.  The IAEA maintains that Iran remains bound to early declaration, and that Iran's failure to do so is inconsistent with its safeguards obligations. NPguy (talk) 23:33, 4 March 2012 (UTC)

Iran's obligation to report on the Natanz facility
To NPguy-

I see you reversed my removal of the statement of Iran's NNPT obligations to reveal the Natanz facility.

I agree that the Subsidiary Arrangements in place at the time imposed an obligation to report facilities 180 days prior to introduction of nuclear material. However it is not clear that this nullifies the requirement in the main text of the Safeguards Agreement (http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc214.pdf) to provide design information “as early as possible before nuclear material is introduced into a new facility.”

The IAEA appears to take the view that it is not appropriate to simply ignore the "as early as possible" and hang one's hat strictly on the 180 day requirement:

"Pursuant to Article 42 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, the time limit for the provision of design information on new nuclear facilities is to be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, but in any event it is to be provided 'as early as possible before nuclear material is introduced into a new facility.'" (http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf)

I readily agree that this leaves some ambiguity as to what Iran's obligations were, but I think this ambiguity makes it inappropriate to include an unqualified statement that there was no obligation, contrary to the plain text of the Safeguards Agreement and an interpretation that IAEA appears to believe merits consideration.

SteveL — Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.9.78.138 (talk) 18:15, 22 March 2012 (UTC)


 * It's good to work this out by reviewing the IAEA guidelines for conduct, but we will also need to find secondary sources arguing either point. -Darouet (talk) 19:42, 23 March 2012 (UTC)


 * There may be a slight ambiguity, but not much. According to a standard safeguards agreement like Iran's, the Subsidiary Arrangements "enter into force," a term of art that means they are legally binding.  They are essentially an implementing agreement for the underlying safeguards agreement.  They don't change the underlying agreement, but they specify how it is to be applied and interpreted.  When the safeguards agreement itself says the details are to be spelled out in the Subsidiary Arrangements, that gives precedence to the latter.  As you note, the IAEA's first Iran report explains this.  After the excerpt you quote, it says:
 * "The Subsidiary Arrangements General Part in force with Iran from 1976 to 26 February 2003 included what was, until 1992, standard text which called for provision to the Agency of design information on a new facility no later than 180 days before the introduction of nuclear material into the facility [...]."
 * You can argue that "as soon as possible" implies an obligation to declare a facility earlier, if possible, but as a legal matter the IAEA would have no basis for claiming a violation unless the state introduced nuclear material less than 180 days after providing design information on the facility. And an undeclared facility would not become a clear-cut violation until nuclear material was introduced.
 * The IAEA adopted a new standard for early declaration of facilities in 1993, building on lessons learned from Iraq's clandestine nuclear activities. The fact that it felt the need to change the standard represents an recognition that the IAEA needed a stronger legal framework for dealing with undeclared facilities.  Iran remained subject to the old, weaker standard until February 2003.
 * This is a fairly arcane topic, but I suspect there are articles in specialized journals/conferences (for example from INMM and ESARDA conferences and publications) on the development of the IAEA's "strengthened safeguards system" under "Programme 93+2." There may also be articles in the IAEA Bulletin.NPguy (talk) 23:32, 24 March 2012 (UTC)

__________________________________ Thanks for the responses. I am aware of the points you raise and agree with much you say above, NPguy. However, the IAEA quote I cited indicates that IAEA believed that the "as early as possible" standard was binding (though perhaps difficult to enforce as a practical matter) and that the 180-day standard was a minimum that applied in addition to -- rather than in place of -- the ASAP standard. The subsequent language you cite discusses the "no later than 180 days" standard, but it does not say that this is the only obligation residing with signatories, and such an interpretation is plainly contrary to the preceding text. It seems to me that IAEA's view here is highly relevant and that it would be desirable to establish in greater detail whether IAEA believed that, as a general matter, the "as early as possible" standard represented a signatory's obligation, regardless of whether this facilitated enforcement as a practical matter. I would be interested to see the precise text of the subsidiary arrangments, though I expect that these are not public.

I agree that "as early as possible" is not a standard with respect to which violations can be definitively established, and that IAEA found it desirable to alter the standard subsidiary agreements language in the 90s to reduce ambiguity. Neither of these things, however, means that an "as early as possible" obligation did not exist, and I think the presence of this unqualified assertion in the article is a disservice to users. I note that I am not arguing for asserting that Iran did face such an obligation -- only for removing the contrary assertion that I think has not been adequately substantiated. I would suggest either removing this statement, or qualifying it by noting that it is the position of some observers.

SteveL — Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.9.78.138 (talk) 04:14, 1 April 2012 (UTC)

Quds facility
There is also a Quds underground nuclear facility several miles WNW of Fordow. You can find it on the W side of rte. 17 about 2 miles SSW of the W end of the landmark airstrip. Look around the region SE of Quds to see a zillion missile bunkers. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.50.211.111 (talk) 08:56, 26 May 2013 (UTC)

Natanz mined
Did you read the Aljazeera article that says timed explosives were found on more than one centrifuge at Natanz? http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/iran-israeli-drone-2014824132116380133.html 71.163.117.143 (talk) 18:40, 24 August 2014 (UTC)

Lavizan-3
Although no coordinates are public, have added reports on Lavizan-3. Cpsoper (talk) 05:03, 25 February 2015 (UTC)

External links modified
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