Talk:Nuclear program of Iran/Archive 4

pointless discussion
(thanks for proving my pint about your bias by using this label for this section)

The argument between me and an anonymous ranter on the legalities of Iran's nuclear program has grown totally pointless. My nameless adversary has not made a dent in my basic argument. Iran cheated on its safeguards obligations for 18 years. In particular, it concealed its enrichment pfogram from the IAEA, which reported a "policy of concealment" by Iran. The Board of Governors reported this non-compliance to the Security Council, acting under Article XII.C of the Statute which requires such reporting. I give up on discussions, but not on correcting the article. NPguy (talk) 02:19, 6 February 2008 (UTC)


 * You keep saying that XIIC "requires" reporting but you have not provided the sources to back up this claim (instead asserting your own "expertise" on the subject) and have insisted on refusing to acknowledge the cited sources that I have provided which show without a doubt that Iran was not in violation of the STatute since there was no diversion of nuclear material for military purposes. There is nothing "pointless" about this except your insistence on using Wikipedia to promote your own personal views. If you want to say that the BOG reported Iran to the UNSC, that would be an accurate statement of fact. If you're going to assert that the BOG was "required" to do so, that's a legal claim so you're going to have to back that up with something more than your own self-confidence.

The article itself shouldn't be judging the legality of Iran's nuclear program one way or the other. The article should provide the following (among other things) in an attributable and citable manner: So, the article should say what the Iranians say (attributing and citing) and note what appropriate UN organizations say (attributing and citing). It would be best to limit other sources accept for notability and balance. I would support rewriting anything in the article calling the program legal or illegal in favor of saying where the assertion comes from and then ranking its importance by the criteria specified. It is hard to argue the factual basis of something when it is clearly quoted and cited though, and I think most would be happy with this approach. --68.23.10.26 (talk) 06:00, 6 February 2008 (UTC)
 * the Iranian viewpoint
 * legality
 * mostly views of official organizations (IAEA, IAEA Board of Governors, UN Security Council, ..)
 * Iranian response
 * lesser amount of notable secondary opinion (US Gov, Non-Aligned Movement, ASIL, etc.)


 * Your interpretation of "legality" has no higher relevance or credibility than that of ASIL or the other sources cited which you characterize as "secondary."

You need only read Article XII.C to see that it requires a report: "The Board shall report the non-compliance to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations." The use of "shall" means there is a legal obligation. As for the ASIL article, I don't disagree with it, but you have misread it to apply to Article XII.C, when it refers explicitly to Article III.B.4.

Your proposd outline is defecttive in that it gives too much weight to Iran's self defense and not enough to neutral facts and other views. My preferred outline would be:

The final section would be a list of issues, and for each issue there could be a statement of fact, an Iranian position, and various alternate positions. The list of issues could include
 * History of Iran's program
 * Current activities
 * (2002-2005) Safeguards failures and the EU-3 process
 * (2005-present) Non-compliance finding, report and UNSC Sanctions
 * Legal basis for IAEA and UN actions
 * Peaceful use rights and the NPT
 * Indications of nuclear weapons (e.g. the hemispheres, polonium and the laptop)
 * etc.

I think discussions of what was known of Iran's fuel cycle activities could better go in the history section. It really doesn't stand up as a rebuttal to the claim that Iran failed to declare its enrichment to the IAEA. NPguy (talk) 04:08, 7 February 2008 (UTC)


 * Again, I have quite clearly outlined what "noncompliance" refers to, as defined by XII.c and Article 19, and I have cited several other sources to support the view that any breach does NOT require UNSC referral. Wikipedia is not the place for you to impose YOUR own legal interpretations of the law.


 * Stop mischaracterizng the claim. It is clear that Iran did not declare ALL enrichment activities (and several cites sources state why: because of US obstructionism, and not because of a weapons program as you suggest since the IAEA Itself has said there is no evidence of such a program) The history of Iran's nuclear program makes it clear that the Iranians were OPEN about seeking a nuclear fuel cycle -- including enrichment.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 12.26.54.10 (talk) 20:41, 7 February 2008 (UTC)


 * I am confident that a neutral person reading the IAEA Statute will judge my interpretation correct and yours incorrect. I agree that there was reason to suspect based on enrichment-related activities that Iran was interested in enrichment.   So what?  That doesn't change the fact that Iran concealed all actual enrichment activities from the IAEA. NPguy (talk) 04:26, 8 February 2008 (UTC)


 * You don't seem to understand that Wikipedia is not the place for your "interpretations". You can link to the Statute, but you cannot assert your own interpretations of it especially without regard to contrary views. The point is that the legal threshold for reporting Iran to the UNSC is "diversion for non-peaceful uses" (and I have provided multiple citations to back that up) and therefore your assertion that the IAEA statute "requires" the reporting of Iran, despite the IAEA's repeated assertion that there was no such diversion, is both legally and factually inaccurate.


 * We're both reading and interpreting the text of the Statute. My interpretation is the simpler one and is accepted in practice.  The Board of Governors, which is the authoritative body for interpreting compliance issues under the Statute, has used the interpretation I presented.  It has cited five countries (two of them more than once) under Article XII.C of the Statute when there was non-compliance without diversion, and under both Article XII.C and Article 19 of the safeguards agreement when there was either diversion or where the State prevented the IAEA from verifying non-diversion. NPguy (talk) 03:49, 14 February 2008 (UTC)


 * One more time: your "interpretation" is not relevant. And your claim that it is "accepted" is false as the multiple citiations I have provided prove. Stop trying to use Wikipedia to promote your own agenda. As I outlined, Artice XII.C. specifies what "compliance" means -- allowing inspections, allowing accounting for materials, abiding by health and safety requirements, not diverting material for military purposes. Other countries may have violated these provisions but Iran did not. I provided multiple cites to back that up, and here you are telling me about your "interpretation" of the matter. The role of Wikipedia is not for you to expound upon your own views. The sources I provided have to be cited. If you have contrary cites, provide them too. Don't editorialize and assert your own personal interpretations of the matter. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 12.26.54.10 (talk) 20:14, 14 February 2008 (UTC)

As I said before, we are both interpreting the Statute, so if there's no room for interpretation that applies at least as much to you as to me. Given that my interpretation is the one used by the Board of Governors, I think it has more standing. Here are three citations that are available on the web (I have others that aren't):

In a resolution adopted North Korea, February 12 2003, the Board 5. Decides to report, as provided for in Article XII.C. of the Statute, through the Director General, the DPRK’s non-compliance and the Agency’s inability to verify non-diversion of nuclear material subject to safeguards, to all Members of the Agency and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations; and in parallel stresses its desire for a peaceful resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue and its support for diplomatic means to that end; In a resolution on Libya adopted March 10, 2004, the Board 4. Finds, under Article XII.C of the Statute, that the past failures to meet the requirements of the relevant Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/282), identified by the Director General constituted non-compliance, and, in accordance with Article XII.C, requests the Director General to report the matter to the Security Council for information purposes only, while commending the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for the actions it has taken to date, and has agreed to take, to remedy the non-compliance; In a resolution on Iran adopted September 24, 2005, the Board 1. Finds that Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75, constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute; 2. Finds also that the history of concealment of Iran’s nuclear activities referred to in the Director General’s report, the nature of these activities, issues brought to light in the course of the Agency’s verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002 and the resulting absence of confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes have given rise to questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security; 3. Requests the Director General to continue his efforts to implement this and previous Resolutions and to report again, including any further developments on the issues raised in his report of 2 September 2005 (GOV/2005/67) to the Board. The Board will address the timing and content of the report required under Article XII.C and the notification required under Article III.B.4;

Note that in each case there was non-compliance, but only in North Korea was there also an inability to verify non-diversion. This is consistent with the well-known facts of each case. The decisions regarding Iraq in 1991, Romania in 1992, and North Korea in 1993 and 1994 are consistent with this pattern. For Romania there was non-compliance with no problem in verifying nondiversion. For North Korea there was both non-compliance and an inability to verify non-diversion, specifically citing Article 19 of the relevant safeguards agreement. The only anomaly is Iraq, where it was clear that the Agency was unable to verify nondiversion but the noncompliance resolution cited only artcle XII.C. But this was the Board's first ever non-compliance resolution.

Regarding your comment on the title of this thread, I think anyone bored enough to read this will either see a debate between two partisans or perhaps see you as the more intemperate one. NPguy (talk) 03:52, 15 February 2008 (UTC)


 * I am not citing MY interpretation. I am citing the intepretation of OTHERS and providing the cites, to ASIL for example, which supports the contention that not all breaches of safeguards are necessarily reportable, and instead there has to be evidence of diversion or non-inspection etc. You don't seem to get this fact: this isn't the place for our interpretaions of the law. Instead, on Wikipedia, we're supposed to provide cites to other authoritative sources. YOU are using wikipedia to promote your own views/interpretations of the law. I am citing 5 sources. Intemperate? Rightly so.


 * As for your cites above, they're not really relevant & not exactly sure what they prove as they're not relevant to Iran. One more time: the specific requirements of "compliance" as defined by Article XIIC and Art 19 of Iran's safeguards agreement set a specific threshold for reporting to to the UNSC, and as I and 5 other sources have pointed out to you - repeatedly - Iran's safeguard breaches did not meet that threshold.


 * You're perfectly free to interpret the law differently, but do so on your own blog. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 12.26.54.11 (talk) 21:34, 19 February 2008 (UTC)


 * Let's see, I've cited the IAEA Statute itself. I've cited John Carlson, a leading international safeguards expert.  And I've cited the entire history of precedents by the IAEA Board of Governors.  Your single citation does not even support your claim regarding Article XII.C, since it deals with Article III.B.4. NPguy (talk) 02:08, 20 February 2008 (UTC)


 * Umm. No. You've been citing your own personal "interpretation" of the IAEA Statute (as you keep saying, above) to support your own personal claim that Art XII.c. "requires" reporting Iran. You've provided nothing to back that up. This is exactly what you keep writing in the main article: " Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute[59] requires a report to the UN Security Council for any safeguards non-compliance" -- and you have not provided anything to support that contention except for your own claim that according to YOUR interpretation of XII.c, "any safeguards non compliance" is "required" to be reported -- despite the fact that, as I have repeatedly point out to you, the explicit language of XII.c does not support your contention.


 * And, rather than expecting you simply take my word for it, I have cited the article from ASIL, the statement by The Lawyers Committee, the expert testimony presented to the British Parliament, the article by Dr Sahimi --- all to the effect that "any" safeguards noncompliance is NOT required to be reported as you (and John Bolton) claim. And yet you insist on deleting anything contrary to your assertion.


 * Now, if you want to keep playing this game, go on. I'm not going anywhere, and I'll keep pointing out your bias. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.84.103.161 (talk) 03:17, 21 February 2008 (UTC)


 * I have pointed out repeatedly that not a single one of your citations supports the view you state, that Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute does not require a report of safeguards non-compliance to the UN Security Council.  As any lawyer can tell you, the use of the word "shall" in Article XII.C entails a legal requirement, and that is how the IAEA Board of Governors has applied it.


 * Two of your citations question whether safeguards non-compliance is tantamount to NPT non-compliance and one questions whether notification was required under Article III.B.4 of the Statute. Those are different issues from the Article XII.C requirement.  You have ignored this point repeatedly, which suggests that either you don't understan or you have no rebuttal NPguy (talk) 14:39, 21 February 2008 (UTC)


 * And I have repeatedly pointed out that what you call your intepretation of the Statute is exactly that, your own interpretation, and is not supported even by the text of the provision itself. The sentence "The inspectors shall report any non-compliance to the Director General who shall thereupon transmit..." refers to the previous sentences which defines "non-compliance" -- this is what it says, specifically:


 * (1) "accounting referred to in sub paragraph A-6 of this article", (2) "determining whether there is compliance with the undertaking referred to in sub paragraph F-4 of article XI, with the measures referred to in sub- paragraph A-2 of this article", and (3) with all other conditions of the project prescribed in the agreement between the Agency and the State or States concerned.


 * And since Iran has in fact complied with all those requirements for compliance, then Iran isn't in "non-compliance" and so the "shall report" sentence does not apply. I have explicitly pointed this out to you repeatedly, and you have instead claimed that your own "interpretations" should be applied -- and you have not in fact provided any cite to support your interpretations either. You insist on claiming that any safeguard breach necessarily requires reporting to the Board and the UNSC, and have not provided any support for that contention.


 * You don't seem to understand that the various provisions in the Statute are related to each other, and that a safeguard breach that does not involve a diversion for nuclear weapons or a refusal to account for fissile material or an violation of the explicit terms specified in Article XIIc or III.B. is neither a breach of the NPT, NOR reportable to the UNSC. Theses are related matters. My cites make it clear that not all breaches are reportable, as you claim.


 * Look, I don't care if you think that "I am confident that a neutral person reading the IAEA Statute will judge my interpretation correct and yours incorrect" --- this is simply not the place for your to force your own interpretations of the explicit text of the IAEA statute. If you and Bolton agree on that point, go chat with him about it, don't post it on Wikipedia.


 * Three points:
 * Not every safeguards breach is non-compliance, but all non-compliance must be reported.
 * "Non-compliance' is defined by XII.C as refusal to allow inspections or diverting nuclear material to non-peaceful uses. The IAEA has repeatedly ruled that out in the case of Iran. Therefore Iran was NOT "non-compliant". In fact, the IAEA reports quite specifically and repeatedly state that all nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for and NOT DIVERTED. Why do you suppose the IAEA keeps saying that?


 * You still don't have a single citation that supports a contrary interpretation.
 * You mean other than the text of the Article XII.C itself, Michael Spies of the Lawyer's Committee on Nuclear Policy, and the expert testimony provided to the British House of Commons -- all of which make clear that a breach of safeguards is not the same thing as "non-compliance" which is required to be reported to the UNSC?


 * When it comes to interpreting the IAEA Statute, who are you going to believe, you or the IAEA Board of Governors?


 * Its YOU that I don't believe so don't hide behind the BOG. YOU say that Iran is "required" to be reported -- and I am still waiting for YOU to back that up.

NPguy (talk) 04:16, 26 February 2008 (UTC)


 * Three repudiations:


 * Yes, but Iran was not "non-compliant" with the provisions of Article XII.C that sets the threshold for reporting to the UNSC. I pointed out to you the explicit language of what "compliance" means according to that statute.
 * I have cited over and over many sources, and I have spelled out in detail the very words of the IAEA statute. You on the other hand, have failed to cite anything except your own alleged (and questionable) expertise, along with your "confidence" that your intpretation is more "believable" because it is "simpler". Note that I don't have to provide any sources at all, since I am not the one making the assertion that Iran "must be reported" nor have I appointed myself the editor of this entry. You're the one claiming that Iran was "required" to be reported ... and you refused to cite any authority for your contention other than yourself.
 * Ah, the old "who are you going to believe, me or your lying eyes" argument. The Board is a political entity, and subject to political pressures (such as the sweetheart nuclear deal made by the US with India) however that doesn't change what XII.C. says and means and has always meant. There are many provisions in international law which may not be obverved often, but they still exist.
 * The bottom line is this: if you want to write "the US claimed that Iran's safeguard breaches were required to be reported" that is fine -- it is accurate (That was Bolton's position) -- however if you're asserting a statement of (alleged) fact that "the statute requires Iran to be reported" then you're just going to have to back that up with something other than your own self-confidence, and you're going to have to show, with specificity, what part of XII.C. "requires" it because there's nothing in the statute that does. I have gone over that statute, section by section with you already twice. Should I do it again?


 * As I've said repeatedly, not all safeguards failures are non-compliance. The Board of Governors has responsibility for determining what is or is not non-compliance.  It decided that Iran's failures, which included an 18-year "policy of concealment" that failed to provide any reports on the most proliferation-sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities, were non-compliance under the terms of Article XII.C.  Once it made that decision, it had to report that to the Security Council.  The Board decided that problems in Egypt and South Korea were not so serious at to constitute non-compliance. NPguy (talk) 13:08, 27 February 2008 (UTC)


 * Again, utter nonsense. The STATUTE defines what is to be reported. It SPECIFICALLY requires either diversion of nuclear material to nonpeaceful uses, or a refusal to allow the accounting specificed by the Article. This is NOT a judgment call left to the BOG's discretion. And if you do think it is up to the Board to do so on a discretionary basis, you're going to have to back that up with citations because XII.C does CONTRADICTS your position.


 * Actually, I was the one who pointed out that not all safeguards breaches are non-compliance; you were arguing that all safeguards breaches are non-compliance that automatically had to be reported. And, as I have repeatedly pointed out, the BOG has to follow the IAEA Statute, which specifies what safeguards breaches constitute reportable non-compliance. The Statute sets the threshold, which binds the BOG. Under the explicit text of the XII.c., the threshold had NOT been met. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 12.26.54.11 (talk) 18:52, 12 March 2008 (UTC)


 * I have never said that all safeguards failures are non-compliance. But I wonder why you think you know better than the IAEA Board of Governors how to interpret the IAEA Statute. NPguy (talk) 03:00, 13 March 2008 (UTC)


 * So in other words, you don't have a source to cite to back up your position. Its YOUR "interpretation" of the Statute that I have a problem with. The text of Article XII.C is clear. Now, if you want to say that "the BOG referred (or "reported") Iran to the UNSC" that would be an accurate factual statement. However if you claim that the IAEA STatute "requires" reporting Iran then you're going to have to back that up with a citation because you're now making a legal claim based on what you admit is purely your own interpretation of the law.

European and US views should be separated
I have included several paragraphs that show how the European viewpoint actually varies from that of the US view, but in general the two deserve separate subheadings. The material I posted is being reposted below since the editor of this Wikipedia article cannot be trusted to maintain impartiality.

" In contrast with the US viewpoint, the Europeans have shown more flexibility on the question of Iran's nuclear enrichment capabilities and have suggested accepting a limited enrichment program in Iran.

In 2006 the Germans suggested that Iran would be able to operate their enrichment program, subject to IAEA inspections. The German Foreign Minister Franz Josef Jung stated that a ban on Iranian enrichment work was unrealistic, that "One cannot forbid Iran from doing what other countries in the world are doing in accordance with international law" and that IAEA oversight of any Iranian enrichment activities would provide the necessary assurances to the international community that Iran could not secretly divert the program of weapons use. Later, the Europeans reportedly also considered a compromise proposal where Iran would be allowed to continue spinning its centrifuges but would not feed any processed uranium hexafluoride (UF6) into the machines during the course of negotiations.

The Iranians had also indicated that they were willing to consider suspending large-scale enrichment for up to 2 years, but was not prepared to freeze enrichment entirely

The compromise ideas were reportedly shot down by the US, and Robert Joseph, the Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control reportedly told ElBaradei: "We cannot have a single centrifuge spinning in Iran. Iran is a direct threat to the national security of the United States and our allies, and we will not tolerate it. We want you to give us an understanding that you will not say anything publicly that will undermine us."

In June 2007, IAEA director Mohammad ElBaradei suggested that that Iran should be allowed limited uranium enrichment under strict supervision of the IAEA. His remarks were formally criticised by Nicholas Burns, the US Under-Secretary of State, who said: "We are not going to agree to accept limited enrichment"

In February 2007, Pierre Vimont, the French Ambassador to the United States, urged that the United States adopt a more flexible approach to Iran by accepting its regional role and recognizing that the nuclear issue has broad popular support among Iranians. "

This article is a mess
This article currently has no coherent structure. It goes from chronology to analysis to opinion and back several times. I propose to rearrange it on the following lines:


 * Overview (current section 1)
 * History
 * Pre-NPT (up to 1972) (mostly current section 2.1)
 * NPT-Revolution (1972-1979) (most of current section 2.2)
 * Revolution to current period (1979-2002) (sections 2.3, 2.4 and some of 2.5)
 * IAEA investigation (2002-2006) (part of 2.5)
 * UNSC period (2006-present) (end of 2.5.1.2, 4.1.1, 5.3.1, 4.1.2)


 * Current activities (section 6)
 * Legal issues (these are currently scattered through the history and views sections)
 * IAEA safeguards compliance
 * NPT compliance
 * UN Sanctions
 * Peaceful use rights and the NPT


 * Political issues
 * Iran's position (2.5.1.1 and 5.1)
 * Western views
 * EU3+3 (a.k.a P5+1) position (part of 5.3)
 * EU3 position (2.5.1.3 and part of 5.3)
 * U.S. position (part of 5.3)
 * Middle Eastern views (5.2)
 * NAM position (5.4)


 * End Matter (references, links)

At first I would just rearrange material, but over time this would provide the basis for eliminating duplication and gaps. Comments? Views? NPguy (talk) 18:19, 23 February 2008 (UTC)


 * Yes I have a comment. Your insistence on claiming -- without providing any support -- that Iran was required to be reported to the UNSC, and your obvious lack of familiarity with the professional literature on the history of Iran's nuclear program raise significant doubts about your qualification to touch this entry. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.84.103.161 (talk) 06:30, 25 February 2008 (UTC)


 * Actually, I think my proposed reorganization would be fair to oddball interpretations of international nonproliferation law because it would provide a specific place to address the legal question instead of having to add tangential caveats at random places in the article. NPguy (talk) 04:20, 26 February 2008 (UTC)


 * That does look like a good structure. Should add "Russion views" section, as Bushehr supplier is important. Useful to demark what should be here or in "Iran and weapons of mass destruction", to try to reduce duplication? Rwendland (talk) 16:01, 26 February 2008 (UTC)

NPT Compliance Report and NIE
The U.S. State Department Compliance Report, which covers the years 2002-2003, concluded that Iran had violated the NPT both by violating its safeguards agreement (which is not controversial) and by violating its obligation under Article II not to seek or receive assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons (which is controversial). The November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate concluded that Iran had halted one element of its nuclear weapons program -- weaponization activities -- in 2003. There is no contradiction between the two. In particular, whether Iran halted weaponization activities in 2003 has no bearing on whether it violated its safeguards agreement by systematically concealing (the IAEA cited Iran's "policy of concealment") its sensitive fuel cycle activities for nearly two decades. NPguy (talk) 01:23, 11 March 2008 (UTC)
 * If you are referring to this paragraph:"In 2005, the United States claimed that 'Iran is pursuing an effort to manufacture nuclear weapons, and has sought and received assistance in this effort in violation of Article II of the NPT'. [100] The November 2007 United States National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) alleged that Tehran halted a nuclear weapons program in fall 2003, and that it remained halted as of mid-2007.[101]"
 * then I believe it's main purpose is to document US opinion. I believe the NIE sentence is pointing out that the US (or atleast its intelligence community) did not believe any longer that Iran was currently "pursuing an effort to manufacture nuclear weapons" (though it believed Iran was keeping the option open to one at a minimum). I don't believe it is trying to make a judgement about Iran's adherence or non-adherence to its safeguards agreement (particularly with regard to recieving assistance from others). I also believe it makes sense to move this paragraph up slightly, to be centralized with the report it is discussing, so I am going to make this edit on the main page.. --68.21.95.247 (talk) 16:57, 11 March 2008 (UTC)

Mysterious disappearance of Israeli view
I added some material on the Israeli view but why was it eliminated in the first place? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 12.26.54.11 (talk) 18:47, 12 March 2008 (UTC)

cleanup
As I noted in previous comments, this article is a mess. I proposed to rearrange the contents in a more logical fashion, then clean up the content. Having taken a stab at that, it now looks easier to clean up the factual problems first, then reorganize the flow. This will take some time. As a start, I have removed three statements that are either ephemeral (they described the events that had no lasting impact) or outdated (the facts cited are no longer true). Some of this should be updated to reflect the more recent sharing by the United States and others with the IAEA of intelligence on Iran's nuclear program. NPguy (talk) 03:27, 6 April 2008 (UTC)
 * As the US and some other countries have constantly been sharing intelligence with Iran, it makes sense to document the history of it and to note that the US and others are sharing new information with the Agency. History and context is important for the article.. --68.253.35.13 (talk) 15:26, 6 April 2008 (UTC)

I would like to delete the following two points:


 * The IAEA has condemned the US over a report written by a congressional committee on the nuclear situation in Iran. The leaked report was called erroneous and misleading in a letter sent to Peter Hoekstra. Allegations in the report of why an inspector was dismissed were branded outrageous and dishonest. One unnamed western diplomat called it déjà vu of the false reports made by the US administration to justify the invasion of Iraq.
 * IAEA officials complain that most U.S. intelligence shared with the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency about Iran's nuclear program proved to be inaccurate, and none has led to significant discoveries inside Iran.

The first is an inaccurate bit of ephemera. One of John Bolton's henchmen, Fred Fleitz, found a job on the staff of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and drafted biased and inaccurate report on the IAEA role in Iran. it was not an official U.S. position. The IAEA should probably have ignored it but chose instead to complain. It was a tempest in a teapot with no lasting relevance and the hyperbolic reaction of an "unnamed Western diplomat" was way over the top.

The second is oversimplified and outdated. It would take a lot of work to find open sources to provide a more balanced description of intelligence sharing with the IAEA. I'll leave this one alone for the time being. NPguy (talk) 01:39, 7 April 2008 (UTC)
 * Adding more context from the sources certainly never hurts. The sources provide a viewpoint of something which is ongoing, as there are still allegations about Iran's nuclear program and allegations of over-selling. It is much better to put the information in context unless it is completely outdated though.
 * For example, it might be relevant to add if Fred Fleitz is no longer on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (though I do not know if this is the case). It might also be worth noting that the US and other countries have shared newer intelligence with the IAEA. We can add newer information, but we shouldn't delete sourced material unless it is completely irrelevant. --69.212.243.228 (talk) 15:58, 7 April 2008 (UTC)

So which is it?
Either Iran is or is not seeking a nuclear weapons capacity. The very first paragraph is very contradictory in this respect. Quoted in Overview:

"Gawdat Bahgat, Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Indiana University of Pennsylvania, asserts that Iranian's nuclear program is formed by three forces: one, perception of security threats from Pakistan, Iraq, Israel, and the United States"

"Contrary to Gawdat Bahgat's analysis (which the editor of this entry posts for some strange reason as if it is more authoritative than other such speculation) the Iranian authorities deny seeking a nuclear weapons capacity to deter anyone since their level of technological progress cannot match that of existing nuclear weapons states." —Preceding unsigned comment added by Fyyer (talk • contribs) 22:43, 17 April 2008 (UTC)


 * That's a hard question to answer, and the article is so afflicted by disagreement among editors that it won't help you figure out. My view is that Iran is seeking a "nuclear weapons capability," by which I mean that Iran is pursuing uranium enrichment so that it will have a capability to produce high-enriched uranium for weapons.  Iran's explanations for why it wants enrichment don't stack up.  Why else would Iran hide its enrichment program from the IAEA for nearly two decades, in violation of its NPT safeguards agreement, particularly when it has no current need for enriched uranium?


 * This pure nonsense. First of all, any country with a nuclear program can be accused of seeking a "weapons capability" since the technology for making weapons or generating fuel are the same, so this is a nonsense accusation. Secondly, Iran has made offers to impose restrictions on its program that would prevent it from even theoretically making bombs secretly -- for example by opening its nuclear program to multinational participation. Anyway, Wikipedia is not the place for speculation about intent. Your claim that Iran's statements "don't stack up" are laughable and show your bias. You're entitled to express your speculation on that point elsewhere. Iran enrichment was not hidden, it was common knowledge announced openly on national radio and dated to before the revolution. Some activities involved in that program were clandestine but only after the US prevented open acquisition of the technoloy to which Iran was entitled. If you don't agree with that, I don't care. Again, Wikipedia is not the place for this sort of thing in the first place. Secondly, Iran may have no current need for enrichment because it doesn't have reactors -- but it hasn't yet fully started up an industrial enrichment program either. It is still developing the program, and will hopefully have it ready when the time comes (as it is building more reactors) Again, if you don't agree with that, so what. You're no more qualified to judge the matter than anyone else.


 * But there are obvious problems with this conclusion. First, how can you prove intent?  Second, the issue has become more complicated as  it has become politicized.  It's now a matter of pride for the Iranian government and the Iranian people, who have legitimate historical grievances against the West in general and the United States in particular.  They resist what they see as Western coercion.  So whatever the motives when Iran started its enrichment program, they are more complicated now. NPguy (talk) 02:02, 18 April 2008 (UTC)


 * Again, utter nonsense. You DO NOT prove intent. That's an irrelevant question to the issue of Iran. The NPT recognizes the right of nations to nuclear programs, and those countries have mostly agreed to allow IAEA inspections. Rather than speculating on "intent" it is the specific job and purpose of the IAEA to monitor a country's nuclear program. This has been the case with Iran and "intent" doesn't enter into it.


 * Iran's intentions are indeed very hard to gauge now. It may be wanting energy independence when their country runs out of oil, it may seeking pride and the fulfilment of public opinion, it may be seeking the advancement of science, it may be for the perception of national security, etc. If you (Fyyer) do not like the wording in this particular area, it may make sense to propose your own here, and try to reach a consensus about a new wording.. --69.218.57.237 (talk) 02:52, 18 April 2008 (UTC)

To really get at this issue fairly, the article needs to be rewritten top to bottom. It should be organized around issues rather than positions and contested interpretations of the chronology, which results in a collection of dueling sound bites. But whenever I try to revise it thematically and write something that's not just a direct quote other editors screw it up by reverting to direct quotes. This article is Wikipedia at its worst. NPguy (talk) 01:53, 19 April 2008 (UTC)
 * Using direct quotes and adjusting the sectioning of the article seem to be two different issues. Editors usually only revert for the reasons you describe when they feel that the original meaning of something has been lost. Hence, you could first resection the article being careful not too make large sections of the current article disappear. Next (and as a separate process), you could change the direct quotes to simpler paraphrasings which are commonly agreed upon (assuming this is what you are proposing). The point here would be to make changes which can easily be seen, and to reword in a way that not just you are happy with. --69.218.57.237 (talk) 14:29, 19 April 2008 (UTC)
 * It's not as simple as rearranging the sections, as I found out when I tried to do this. The problem is that bits and pieces of the same issue are scattered throughout the article.  To really fix the article you'd need to bring them together in one place.  For example, Iran's safeguards violations and the Board of Governors' response only needs to be spelled out once in detail.  Iran's claim that the Security Council resolutions violate its NPT rights neeed only be addressed once.  And day-to-day ephemera - like a stupid report by the U.S. House of Representatives Intelligence Committee staff - don't need to stay once they have blown over.  But every time I try to prune some other editor says that if it's true and it's sourced it has to stay.  I don't think that's the right standard.  Significance and relevance also need to be considered. NPguy (talk) 16:13, 19 April 2008 (UTC)
 * Rearranging the sections would entail rearranging information which is scattered throughout the article to me. There shouldn't be much controversy here.
 * The controversy arrises when we remove "a stupid report by the U.S. House of Representatives Intelligence Committee staff" because how do we know that it is no longer significant or relevant? Are US charges of a weapons program relevant when even US intelligence believes the alleged programs were shut down? Are US charges of Iran violating Article III of the NPT relevant or significant when the IAEA had a chance to rule on the matter and did not? The point here is that there must be a consensus before one editor simply decides what is significant and relevant and what is not.
 * So, re-organizing the article and pruning are two separate issues..--69.218.57.237 (talk) 04:32, 20 April 2008 (UTC)
 * Rearranging scattered information into a thematic discussion would be (1) very time consuming and (2) quite controversial, because it will mean cutting back on the long and repetitive statements of Iranian, U.S. and other positions.
 * The "stupid" House intelligence report has alreacy been laregly forgotten and had no lasting impact, but lingers on wikipedia.
 * The IAEA did find violations of Iran's NPT safeguards agreement, in September 2005. This agreement is pursuant to Article III of the NPT, so Iran's violations are tantamount to an Article III violation.  However, the IAEA does not have the authority to make compliance findings on the NPT per se.  The allegations that remain unconfirmed are about violations of NPT Article II.  The IAEA has no legal authority and very limited technical capability to make findings directly relevant to Article II. NPguy (talk) 20:55, 20 April 2008 (UTC)

Link added
Hi. I just added a link I found recently covering the latest view of Iranien policy. It's a video interview taken by students during the Non-Nuclear-Proliferation Treaty PrepCom 2008 (ended yesterday - Fri-09 May). Ali Ashgar Soltanieh was the head of the Iranien delegation and is stating his country's views on particular topics. Jossejonathan (talk) 08:17, 10 May 2008 (UTC)

Double Standard?
We have been going back and forth on the added reference to Israsl's nuclear weapons program. In my view, this reference irrelevant to the substance of the section where it appears. Its purpose seems to be to imply a double standard or suggest hyocrisy on Israel's part. Rather than implying hypocrisy, I think it would be better to add text in a separate section making the point explicitly. One way to do this would be to add a section on nuclear weapons in the Middle East - possible arms race or domino effects; proposals for a nuclear weapon free zone or a WMD-free zone, etc. NPguy (talk) 01:52, 21 June 2008 (UTC)
 * The information is quite relevant to the article and this is the only section devoted to Israel in the article. Your proposal has some merit, but I question how relevant one could make an entire section about that in this article. It sounds encouraging if you can muster it.--208.111.26.71 (talk) 04:32, 21 June 2008 (UTC)
 * At present this information is presented in a way that is not directly relevant and, in its current context, inappropriate. I have suggested a way to include this information in a way that is relevant and appropriate, but I don't intend to do it myself, since I don't see it as particularly important. NPguy (talk) 04:01, 22 June 2008 (UTC)
 * The way you have suggested doesn't seem to warrant an entire section. Citable background information belongs in the article.--208.111.26.71 (talk) 04:25, 22 June 2008 (UTC)

I agree with the anon.

Lapsed Pacifist (talk) 12:58, 23 June 2008 (UTC)


 * If it doesn't deserve mentioning explicitly, it certainly doesn't merit the insinuation in the current approach. Either deal with it explicitly and honestly, or not at all.  NPguy (talk) 02:40, 24 June 2008 (UTC)
 * It is just providing background information. I'm not really sure how you are proposing to present it, and ultimatums don't work very well.--208.111.26.71 (talk) 11:38, 24 June 2008 (UTC)


 * This article is a jumbled mess, so it's hard to figure out how to fix just a part of it. My suggestion would be to try to write a new header for the Middle East section that addresses the implications of Iran's nuclear program for regional security.  Others in the region believe that Iran's enrichment program is intended either to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons or to provide a latent capability to do so.  Israel says so explicitly; others only privately.  Some have suggested that Iran's program is what stimulated interest in nuclear energy by virtually every Arab state in the region, also for purposes of a latent nuclear weapons capability.  In other words, Iran's program could stimulate a domino effect in the region in a way that Israel's has not.  Proposals for a nuclear weapons free zone or a WMD free zone in the Middle East would figure somewhere in that section.


 * This revision would take some effort to get right. I'll hold off on further edits if you want to work this through.  But I find it hard to believe that the current reference to Israel's nuclear weapons capability is just for background.  I don't think it does much to illuminate Israel's views, but it does suggest a double standard about nuclear programs in the region.  I don't mind addressing the issue of a double standard, but let's do it explicitly. NPguy (talk) 03:23, 25 June 2008 (UTC)
 * Rather than getting in to a debate about the unstated positions of states or officials or putting forward an unattributed theory, I will merely state that such a section has potential if it relies on balanced and citable material.--208.111.26.71 (talk) 22:15, 25 June 2008 (UTC)

US "planning" nuclear first strike against Iran?
The last bullet in Iran currently says


 * Iran has been repeatedly threatened with nuclear first strikes by the United States. The US Nuclear Posture Review made public in 2002 specifically envisioned the use of nuclear weapons on a first strike basis, even against non-nuclear armed states. Investigative reporter Seymour Hersh has reported that the Bush administration has been planning the use of nuclear weapons against Iran When specifically questioned about the potential use of nuclear weapons against Iran, President Bush claimed that "All options were on the table". According to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, "the president of the United States directly threatened Iran with a preemptive nuclear strike. It is hard to read his reply in any other way." Nevertheless, the Iranian authorities consistently insist that are not seeking nuclear weapons as a deterrent to the United States, and instead emphasize the creation of a nuclear-arms free zone in the Middle East.

I have some problems with this. First of all, none of the references directly says the US has threatened Iran with a nuclear first strike. I can't verify the third reference as it is a link to an empty abstract of a book. I've checked the other three references and there is no mention of an explicit threat of a nuclear first strike. Where did this statement come from?

My second issue is with the wording of this sentence:


 * Investigative reporter Seymour Hersh has reported that the Bush administration has been planning the use of nuclear weapons against Iran.

I think this sentence is misleading. What was said in the reference was that a pre-emptive nuclear strike against Iran was a possibility, and one plan of several proposed. To say the US is planning to nuke Iran is extremely sensationalist, I think. I'll go ahead and edit this section if no one has any complaints. AzureFury (talk) 21:50, 14 July 2008 (UTC)
 * I found the source which you were requesting. The section seems a bit sensationalist; however, the way the words have been percieved and reacted to is the way they should be reflected in the article. Minor rewording seems fine, but the general essence of the paragraph seems correct.--208.111.26.71 (talk) 23:21, 14 July 2008 (UTC)


 * In addition to your revision of the first sentence, I changed...


 * Investigative reporter Seymour Hersh has reported that the Bush administration has been planning the use of nuclear weapons against Iran


 * to...


 * Investigative reporter Seymour Hersh has reported that, according to military officials, the Bush administration chose to retain plans of a nuclear strike against underground Iranian nuclear facilities.


 * which I think is a more accurate summary of the source. This is very disturbing =\, and more disturbing that I never heard this on the news.  The Bush administration never ceases to horrify me. AzureFury (talk) 03:07, 15 July 2008 (UTC)

Indo-US nuclear deal
I added the section because it is very relevant to this topic considering the fact that the United States is pursuing nuclear trade with a country which did not sign NPT and has nuclear weapons but at the same time is opposing nuclear weapons being developed by another nation. Sounds ironic. And perhaps that's the reason why the section was expanded to include information regarding how the deal undermines the NPT and efforts to curb Iran's nuclear program. I've added information regarding the dubious nature of such claims. Also, someone cited a "research paper" written by David Albright while claiming that India was not a responsible nuclear weapon state. Albright has a history of making analysis from questionable sources (See, and ). Not surprisingly, that paper didn't have a single external source cited. Please provide credible and reliable sources while making such claims. Thanks --Emperor Genius (talk) 19:56, 15 July 2008 (UTC)


 * The judgment of credibility is not for you to make. It is for the readers. Speaking of unreliable sources, your Harvard piece simultaneously accuses Iran of "defying its obligations under the NPT" while inconveniently abiding by it. Rather than iran "defying" the treat, it is the editors of the Harvard piece who chacterize observing the treaty as "doctrinaire".
 * So, why should the editors of the Harvard piece be considered to be any more reliable than Albright?


 * Firstly, I do have the authority to remove unreliable sources under WP:Sources. Please read Wikipedia guidelines. And regarding the Harvard article, read the full sentence. It does not assert that "Iran is defying NPT obligations". You are purposely manipulating the sentence to support your case. It states "Iran purports to comply with the NPT by enriching uranium for ostensibly peaceful purposes". In fact, it states that "the core of the Western objection to Iranian nuclear ambition seems to be that regardless of what the NPT says, and regardless of what Iran says about the NPT, an Iranian nuclear program is still an unacceptable risk." To summarize, Western objections are not that Iran is not abiding to NPT guidelines, as popularly believed, but it has problems with Iran's regime. Please read the full article before jumping to conclusions. --Emperor Genius (talk) 06:21, 16 July 2008 (UTC)


 * And your this edit makes your true intentions obvious. To end, if you have any other reliable sources which state India has broken has taken part in nuclear proliferation, please add them. --Emperor Genius (talk) 06:48, 16 July 2008 (UTC)


 * I have read the full sentence, and in fact I know the author personally. Not sure what the "bias" you're mentioning is. Iran is not accused of "proliferating" nuclear weapons technology, or even civilian nuclear technology. In fact the whole sentence you've written about how India is not a proliferator "unlike Pakistan or N Korea" is not supported by the cite you've provided to the Wash Post article which doesn't say anything about Iran, Pakistan or N. Korea. You are perfectly free to place information in favor of the US-India nuclear deal, but not to delete references to albrights piece just because you don't approve of him or the content of his article. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.85.7.4 (talk) 05:20, 17 July 2008 (UTC)


 * Point taken regarding the Washington Post article. But if you want to include Albright's statement, include it in quotes. Don't say "some critics" etc. One critic does not make "some critics". --Emperor Genius (talk) 11:28, 21 July 2008 (UTC)

Words that editorialize
While reading through the article, I noticed a number of parenthetical statements, note that's, and however's that, while true, detracted from the neutral narrator tone that is the objective of Wikipedia. These violate Words to avoid. Examples include...


 * Note that Iran only promised to suspend enrichment on a temporary basis, which it verifiably did according to the IAEA, but did not make promise to suspend all nuclear research. - US and European viewpoint


 * However, Iran did not respond in kind by using chemical weapons against Iraq, even though it would have been entitled to engage in retaliatory strikes under then-existing international law. -Overview


 * However a 1974 CIA proliferation assessment had stated "If [the Shah] is alive in the mid-1980s ... and if other countries [particularly India] have proceeded with weapons development we have no doubt Iran will follow suit. -1970s


 * (enrichment is not a violation of the NPT) - 2000 - August 2006


 * (ie, low-grade uranium that cannot be used for weapons production) - Post-1979 Revolution

I don't dispute the factual accuracy or relevance of these statements, but the article reads right now like a pro-Iranian editor went through a previously objective article and inserted pro-Iranian comments to immediately refute anti-Iranian comments. My suggestion is that some of these statements are moved or rewritten and kept in their current paragraphs such that reading from one sentence to the next does not sound like a back-and-forth in a debate. AzureFury (talk) 18:36, 16 July 2008 (UTC)


 * Its not being "pro-Iranian" to state accurate facts on both sides of an issue. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.85.7.4 (talk) 05:15, 17 July 2008 (UTC)


 * Again, I don't dispute the accuracy of the statements. But the way these facts are stated gives special significance to these facts, which are supportive towards Iran, over the surrounding statements.  I'm not saying they should be removed from the article or even their native paragraphs.  Currently, however, they are violating WP:AVOID and WP:AVOID.  I'm just saying that to improve the article, they should be rewritten, maybe stated more bluntly.  Cut away the excessively argumentative language.  This is not a debate, it is an explanation. AzureFury (talk) 17:34, 17 July 2008 (UTC)

Speech on Orumiyeh
I just wanted to put in my two cents about this section. My family is from Orumiyeh and from personal knowledge Orumiyeh is by no means a center of the strongest supporters of the Presudent or a "provincial power base." Ironically the city used to be named Rezaiyeh, after the former Shah of Iran, showing it's loyalties, but the new regime changed it back. In addition it is quite a factional city, with multiple ethnic groups, and high tensions, therefore it is commonly considered a primary ground for civil strife if Iran were to be invaded. So I believe the portion "In front of his strongest supporters in one of his provincial power bases" should be taken out of the paragraph. "They should know that the Iranian nation will not yield to pressure and will not let its rights be trampled on," Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told a crowd August 31, 2006 in a televised speech in the northwestern Iranian city of Orumiyeh. In front of his strongest supporters in one of his provincial power bases, the Iranian leader attacked what he called "intimidation" by the United Nations, which he said was led by the United States. Ahmadinejad criticised a White House rebuff of his offer for a televised debate with President Bush. "They say they support dialog and the free flow of information," he said. "But when debate was proposed, they avoided and opposed it." Ahmadinejad said that sanctions "cannot dissuade Iranians from their decision to make progress," according to Iran's state-run IRNA news agency. "On the contrary, many of our successes, including access to the nuclear fuel cycle and producing of heavy water, have been achieved under sanctions." Xxinfinity (talk) 15:04, 22 July 2008 (UTC)xxinfinity

IP edits
I'm concerned about the amount of IP editting in this article. I don't think it's vandalism, but I frequently find myself restoring things deleted without explanation or deleting things violating WP:NPOV, WP:OR, or WP:CRYSTAL. Is this the same editor who for some reason refuses to make an account? I understand there was an edit war earlier between a user with an account and a user without. Is that accountless user the one making these edits? AzureFury (talk) 15:34, 30 July 2008 (UTC)
 * You have no basis for deleting the text about Iran's refusal to use chemical weapons against Iraq. This was directly relevant to the issue of Chubin's assertions, and the statement provided a cite but you deleted for no reason other than your own unsupported conclusion that Iran did not use chemical weapins ONLy for the reason that it did not have chemical weapons. in fact his is also false - Iran had an advanced petrochemical plants and could have easily developed chemical weapons if it wanted to retaliate in kind, and also captured Iraqi chemical weapons on the battle field. The Iranians specifically decided not to do so. If you're going to delete something, it has to be based on more than your own personal views and fantasies. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.85.7.4 (talk) 05:53, 4 August 2008 (UTC)
 * Observe that you did not say "Iran had chemical weapons." You only said "Iran could have developed chemical weapons and used them in the same war."  I am unconvinced, but I'll read the source and see what it says about the issue and re-add it myself if I'm convinced that Iran was being noble in their lack of use of chemical weapons.  Azure Fury   (talk) 06:12, 4 August 2008 (UTC)


 * I read this which says "There are no indications that Iran developed such weapons at the time." I am deleting the sentence again on the ground that it violates WP:OR by implying that Iran had the capability to retaliate and WP:CRYSTAL by guessing Iran's motivations.  In addition, as I stated previously, it violates WP:AVOID.  Azure Fury   (talk) 06:34, 4 August 2008 (UTC)


 * I should've read the whole thing before I responded, haha. The article also says this:
 * "Iran states that it accepted the cease-fire in August 1988 because it did not have the technological ability to retaliate in-kind, it feared Iraqi missile strikes against population centers with CW, and because of the great impact of massive Iraqi CW use during battles on the Fao peninsula in 1986."


 * Regarding the "moral high ground" you seem to believe Iran was taking, the article says this:
 * "Iran invoked the religious prohibition argument in order capture the moral high-ground. In addition, at least three schools of interpretation accept that military necessity can come before the religious prohibition."
 * So this person who was cited to show that Iran could have legally retaliated against Iraq also believes that the "observance" to Islamic Scripture was for show, and was not the deciding factor in Iran's lack of a response.  Azure Fury  (talk) 07:47, 4 August 2008 (UTC)


 * The technological capacity to retaliate is a reference to MISSILES not chemical weapons. Iran had the capability to develop chemical weapons, and did so by the end of the war. If you were actually informed on the topic, you'd know that Iran's declaration to the newly-formed OPCW stated that Iran had created 500 tons of chemical weapons which it destroyed in accordance to the new international treaty. Jean-Pascal Zanders, in the cited article, specifically refers to that, and also says that Iran had a pilot-scale program to develop mustard gas. It is you who are substituting your beliefs for the facts by trying to put your interpretions of Iranian intentions on "moral high ground". Stick to the facts and cited sources, please, and don't editorialize about who deserves the moral high ground or not. That's not for YOU to determine.


 * So far every comment you've made in this section includes an accusation of POV-pushing. Note that this is contrary to the assumption of good faith.  I took yet another look at the source.  It does not mention missiles anywhere in the section "Allegations of use" from where I took the quote, "There are no indications that Iran developed such weapons at the time."  I admit that I am not an expert in the field.  However, I do possess the ability to read.  You have yet to provide ANY source verifying your claim that Iran had chemical weapons during the war.  Observe that your position has changed to "Iran could have developed weapons if it wanted to" to "Iran developed weapons by the end of the war."  Also note that in the article I have not mentioned anything about "the moral high ground," nor did I describe my own position in my previous post to the talk page.  I simply quoted and interpretted the source.  Are your disputing that interpretation?  Azure Fury   (talk) 17:16, 4 August 2008 (UTC)
 * By 1985, US officials were telling the NY Times that IRan had chemical weapons, and in 1986, the Iranians themselves said it, and when Iran signed onto the new convention on chemical weapons, they destroyed 500 tons of chemical weapons. THe citation is the one you insist on changing. Cut it out.
 * Show me the link. Otherwise, I will continue to repeat the source saying, "There is no evidence Iran had chemical weapons."  Azure Fury   (talk) 00:30, 9 August 2008 (UTC)

Additional Citation?
Do we still need the additional citation tag on the whole article? There might be some citation needed stuff here and there, but I don't think we need to tag the whole article.  Azure Fury  (talk | contribs) 18:39, 19 August 2008 (UTC)
 * I concur, better to use the individual tags at this point.--68.251.191.149 (talk) 22:02, 19 August 2008 (UTC)

Restricting Enrichment Technology
This section is relevant to the broader article, but somewhat tangential. I have cut it back to address the main points that address the scope of this article. It would be better to have a separate article on fuel cycle controls and limit this article to a cross-reference. In that context, the historical proposals and reactions would be more appropriate. NPguy (talk) 17:13, 23 August 2008 (UTC)
 * It's a very good background for the Iranian argument of scientific and nuclear apartheid, nonetheless I see the space concerns given its (not so) direct relation to the article..--99.1.99.177 (talk) 05:25, 24 August 2008 (UTC)
 * Recent edits make it clear that we need a separate, new article on nuclear fuel cycle policy. There needs to be a thorough and balanced discussion of the history and issues, rather than trying to cram selected sound-bites into this article. NPguy (talk) 01:43, 26 August 2008 (UTC)

It is not "tangential" it is directly relevant to the cause and context of the conflict. Your insistence on deleting references to GNEP with a summary "not factual' nonsense is telling of your continued bias as well as your lack of substantive familiarity with the issues -- which was well displayed repeatedly previously. So, do you still have ANY site t hat says that Iran was "required" to be reported to the UNSC yet? You have now taken it upon yourself to completely eliminate reference to the NPT PrepComs as well as UNGA resolutions that favor Iran's positio, and instead you have added apologia for the Bush administration.
 * The issue of enrichment controls is relevant to the Iran article to some degree. However, it is a much more general topic and much more complicated subject that what is presented here.  The best thing in such circumstances is to have a brief discussion here of the relevant points but add a cross-reference to a new article to address the issue more completely.


 * Why do you think President Bush's proposal to restrict enrichment and reprocessing technology "is" GNEP? It simply isn't true.  Read his February 11 2004 NDU speech.  Read the GNEP web site.  You will see that there is some relation between the two, but they are far from the same thing. NPguy (talk) 02:22, 27 August 2008 (UTC)


 * First of all this section on restricting enrichment is HIGHLY relevant because it is the REASON for the conflict between the US and Iran which is 90% of this article. This is the ENTIRE CONTEXT of the issue. And if you have a reason to think that Bush's proposal and GNEP are significantly different, than that information has to be added to the article rather than any references to GNEP simply deleted. I have added a CITED SOURCE that defines GNEP: "Under GNEP, so-called 'fuel-cycle' nations would provide assured supplies of nuclear fuel to client nations, which would generate electricity before returning the used fuel" (http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/nuclearPolicies/Membership_of_GNEP_has_tripled_170907.shtml) -- and that matches the description of in this site which you keep deleting. All that happened between the 2004 speech and the 2006 "unveiling" of the GNEP and the 2004 proposal was that the name GNEP was added. Otherwise Substantively the two are the same, in so far as they envision restricting enrichment. So, GNEP and the 2004 NDU speech are NOT differnet, and it IS justified to have a link to GNEP here.


 * I can't comment on the technical issues here, but the current version's language needs to be neutraled up a bit if it's going to stick.  Azure Fury  (talk | contribs) 17:00, 27 August 2008 (UTC)
 * What does "neutraled up" mean? The language is derived directly from the cited sources. If you don't like what they're saying, that's a different issue. Not all FACTS are "neutral" nor should they be "neutered" in the name of fake "objectivity". —Preceding unsigned comment added by 12.26.54.11 (talk) 15:09, 28 August 2008 (UTC)


 * I've fixed this, yet again. Please let it rest for a while and stop introducing error and bias.  I've included an accurate reference to GNEP, which is not the same as the ENR proposal.


 * Instead of stating conclusory statements, why who explain how they're different? I cited several sources that explicitly state that under GNEP, the US wanted to restrict enrichment to a few countries. THat is precisely the same as the 2004 Bush proposal. You however keep saying GNEP is something else entirely, you never explain why, and you repeatedly delete references to GNEP instead. I am citing sources, YOU ARE USING YOUR OWN CONCLUSIONS.


 * You are wrong about the reason for the conflict (which is not just between the United States and Iran) over Iran's nuclear program. Iran created the conflict by pursuing a clandestine enrichment program for nearly two decades, and when it defied UN Security Council demands to give it up once it was caught cheating on its NPT obligations.  President Bush's proposal to restrict ENR technology grew out of the Iran conflict; it did not cause it.  In my view, it was counterproductive.  It took a particular case - Iran's cheating on its NPT obligations - and converted it into a general conflict between haves and have-nots.  The result was that countries that should have been united in opposing Iran are now divided over the issue of rights to nuclear technology, and Iran continues to move closer to developing the capability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. NPguy (talk) 02:55, 28 August 2008 (UTC)


 * First of all, how do YOU know that I am "wrong" about this? Do YOU have a direct line to God? WHO ARE YOU TO DECLARE WHO IS RIGHT OR WRONG? You're entitled to express your poorly-backed opinions on your own blog, not on Wikipedia. And Iran's "cheating" (not really) was a direct result of the efforts to deprive Iran of the right to enrichment -- efforts to deprive developing nations of enrichment know-how predates the Bush administration in fact, as cited sources on this VERY SAME wikipedia article indicate, and so does the conflict between developing and and developed states over the control of the nuclear fuel cycle. Once again, you're showing your bias when you insist on limiting the context of the issue and framing it as "Iran cheating" rather than "US monopolizing fuel" which the REAL context.


 * Furthermore, your insistence on deleting references to GNEP is just weird when cited authoritative sources REPEATEDLY say that the Bush administrations' position on enrichment matched EXACTLY the position of GNEP. DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING SOURCE THAT SAYS GNEP IS NOT THE SAME OR NOT, BECAUSE I HAVE CITED SEVERAL SOURCE THAT SAY THEY ARE THE SAME.


 * Let's try to keep this fairly linear here or reading will become impossible. Regarding the neutrality, this was from the version I commented on:
 * "Bush’s proposal conflicts with the key bargain of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)..."
 * ...which may be true, but I'm sure the Bush Administration disputes this, or has some lame hypocritical response. Thus we need to attribute a statement like this to someone, critics, etc.  Also, you include "guarantee" in quotes, lol.  Imagine someone explaining this to you and as they get to guarantee, they put their hands in the air and very pointedly make the quoting motion.  It becomes clear what the POV is.  Again, it's probably true, but we're supposed to write with a NPOV.  That's all I meant by neutraling up the language.


 * The quoted language about how the Bush administration proposal conflicts with the NPT is taken directly, word for word, from the cited article by the Arms Control Association. "guarantees" is again also the precise language used. If you consider this to be a case of 'scare quotes' that's your own reading of it. What, you don't believe the Bush administration when it "guarantees" things? When you don't use the quote marks, you are essentially vouching for the statement yourself. You could of course instead say "the bush administration SAYS..." and that would resolve the problem of potential scare-quotes. But it should be clear that Wikipedia isn't asserting something, the Bush administration is asserting it.
 * I don't doubt it's the exact language used, I thought that might be the case as I read through it. I think the first statement needs to be attributed to the source because it sounds like the Wiki editor making the assertion rather than the source.  "The Bush Administration says" is good to me, we use "so and so says" a lot in this article already because so many things are disputed.  Azure Fury   (talk | contribs) 20:06, 28 August 2008 (UTC)
 * Attributing and providing a small amount of background information is a fairly common good practice in these articles.--149.166.191.48 (talk) 22:28, 28 August 2008 (UTC)

Let's cut with the intending. First, an observation, when you write in ALL CAPS, it looks like you're shouting and it comes across as a bit deranged. You might appear more rational if you refrained form that.

When I said "you are wrong" about the reason for widespread opposition to Iran's enrichment program, I am speaking from personal knowledge of decision making within the U.S. Government and the IAEA Board of Governors. You don't have to believe me.


 * Your personal anecdotes do not interest me in the least, nor do they have a place on Wikipedia.

With respect to GNEP, I suggest that it is more reliable to look at primary sources - for example, the U.S. and international GNEP web sites. The secondary sources you cite reflect the biases and interpretations of outside analysts. The secondary sources that claim that GNEP is identical to President Bush's 2004 proposal to restrict enrichment and reprocessing are, quite simply, wrong. Their claim is not supported by the primary sources.


 * You have failed to explain what it is about the primary sources that backs up your conclusions that pretty much everybody is "wrong" except you.

With respect to whether President Bush's proposal conflicts with the NPT, the Arms Control Association has unfortunately oversimplified the issue.


 * Oh, I see. So they're "wrong" too, huh? Notice a trend here?

The statement is correct if you read the word "conflict" as a conflict of interest - i.e. a conflict between the interest in nuclear cooperation and the interest in preventing nuclear proliferation, both of which are reflected in the NPT. But the statement is incorrect if you read "conflict" as implying that President Bush's proposal is inconsistent with the NPT. Conflicts between the purposes of different provisions of law are common, and are generally resolved by reasonable compromise. I won't go into further detail now, but it's something we could discuss further.

I don't mind putting "guarantees" in quotes as long as the quote is accurate and in context. NPguy (talk) 01:27, 29 August 2008 (UTC)

I find CreazySuit's version more detailed and neutral. VartanM (talk) 05:37, 1 September 2008 (UTC)

Recent edits
Ok, this is directly from the source. "HERSH: What you just read says this. If you're giving the White House a series of options, and the option is to get rid of an underground facility -- the facility I'm talking about is Natanz, 75 feet under hard rock -- if you want to tell the White House one sure way of getting it in a range of options is nuclear, what happened in this case is they gave that option, the JCS, the Joint Chiefs [of Staff]." It's one of several plans. I'm changing the US section back. If you disagree, put up an RFC, because there is no possible way you can dispute this.  Azure Fury  (talk | contribs) 05:37, 1 September 2008 (UTC)


 * "is planning" or "has a plan" is no different to me, so that's fine with me. But please don't change the overview section's structure. In formal writings, the conclusion should be at the end of the paragraph, not the beginning. --CreazySuit (talk) 05:56, 1 September 2008 (UTC)


 * I hope this last edit is acceptable. The version maintains the structure and contains every fact, including the fact that the DoD is the one alleging that Iran had 2000 tons of chemical weapons (we know how reliable they are).  Azure Fury   (talk | contribs) 06:02, 1 September 2008 (UTC)
 * it just doesn’t flow and read well. I really don't understand why you're being so stubborn about this. "Nonetheless" is meant to convoy the point that weather or not Iran had chems (which is disputed), they didn't use it. There is nothing POV about it, it's all factual. --CreazySuit (talk) 06:11, 1 September 2008 (UTC)


 * It's a word that editorializes. You're making a point.  This is what you're saying, "they didn't respond even though they could have."  But we don't know if they could have.  I wanted to put both statements at the top so that it would be action, debate.  I don't know anything about a professional format, but I thought it would read the best that way.  Azure Fury   (talk | contribs) 06:15, 1 September 2008 (UTC)


 * Actually, it sounds like you're the one who is editorializing by saying that "they didn't respond - because they couldn't". The historical fact, incidentally, is that Iran didn't have the capability to manufacture chemical weapons until late into the war -- and did not develop the capability because they had already ruled out the option of using chemical weapons at all, not because they were just not capable of doing so as you seem to want to insist. The bottom line is that Iran could have responded in kind, and did not, and so the speculative opinion of the professor *still inexplicably so prominently featured in the opening paragraph, about why Iran would theoretically want nukes* -- does not compute. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.85.7.4 (talk) 07:20, 3 September 2008 (UTC)


 * I just added a "however" to your version, for better flow of the sentence. --CreazySuit (talk) 08:29, 1 September 2008 (UTC)

Regarding the planning thing, the difference between "is planning" and "chose to retain plains" is the difference between being stranded on a mountain and pouring ketchup on someone while food remains and saying "if we run out of food, and one of us dies, we'll eat that person." My point being, they're considering it as a last resort. There are, of course, other things they will try before they nuke Iran. That's my point.  Azure Fury  (talk | contribs) 06:25, 1 September 2008 (UTC) "International Reaction" to uranium restriction has 2 paragraphs that are duplicative and both refer to the NPT review conferences etc. -- I tried deleting one but someone put it back. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.85.7.4 (talk) 07:01, 3 September 2008 (UTC)

"Required to be reported"
The language which asserts -- without foundation or citation -- that the IAEA was "required" to report Iran's "non-compliance" with to the UNSC is false. If you are going to make the legal claim about what was "required" you'll need to back it up.

Here's what the Article XIIc of the IAEA Statute says plainly (note what "noncompliance" refers to)

"C. The staff of inspectors shall also have the responsibility of obtaining and verifying the accounting referred to in sub paragraph A-6 of this article and of determining whether there is compliance with the undertaking referred to in sub paragraph F-4 of article XI, with the measures referred to in sub- paragraph A-2 of this article, and with all other conditions of the project prescribed in the agreement between the Agency and the State or States concerned. The inspectors shall report any non-compliance to the Director General who shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of Governors. The Board shall call upon the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred. The Board shall report the non-compliance to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations."

As plainly visible to anyone who has basic English reading comprehension, this paragraph sets out THREE REQUIREMENTS that must be complied with, and then sets out the ways to deal with non-compliance on those three points ONLY. It does NOT state that any noncompliance in general is "required" to be reported to the IAEA board and the UNSC. The word "noncompliance" as used here refers specfiically to the three requirements in the preceeding sentence.

These three requirements are:

1- "obtaining and verifying the accounting referred to in sub paragraph A-6"

2- "whether there is compliance with the undertaking referred to in sub paragraph F-4 of article XI"

3- "measures referred to sub-paragraph A-2 and all other conditions in the project"

Now, what do these mean, and has Iran violated any of them?

The first item in "sub-paragraph A-6" is the requirement for countries to allow inspectors to visit sites and account for nuclear material. The IAEA has repeatedly stated that Iran HAS allowed this, and nuclear material has been accounted-for.

The second item in "paragraph F-4 of article XI" is about "Agency Projects" -- nuclear projects undertaken jointly with the IAEA, and so this does not apply to Iran's enrichment program since the US forced the IAEA to back out of cooperation with Iran's enrichment program in 1983.

The final item "measures referred to in subparagraph A-2" is a reference to health and safety standards -- and there is no claim that Iran has violated health or safety standards.

In short, Iran HAS COMPLIED with all three elements in Article XII(C) of the IAEA Statute, and there has been no "noncompliance" The biased and unsupported assertion that Iran was "required" to be reported to the UNSC therefore is simply false.

Contrary to what has been alleged here, any safeguards breach is not reportable -- it HAS to involve a diversion of nuclear material (or refusal to permit the IAeA to account for nuclear material) before a safeguards breach amounts to "non-compliance" which would be reportable to the UNSC.

THIS MUST BE FIXED. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.85.7.4 (talk) 08:02, 3 September 2008 (UTC)

This is really tiresome. The Statute is clear that the agency "shall" report noncompliance to the security council, among others. That's a requirement. Article 19 of the safeguards agreement is an additional option for reporting in a different circumstance. Just rtead the text. The IAEA Board of Governors has decided this issue definitively. NPguy (talk) 03:46, 6 September 2008 (UTC)


 * Indeed it is tiresome since the Statute defines non-compliance as non-compliance specifically with the three elements I listed above. You are making up nonsense WITHOUT ANY CITIATION OR BACKING. The IAEA board has NOT decided this issue, and if you're going to say that something is legally required you're going to have to back it up. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.85.7.4 (talk) 13:00, 6 September 2008 (UTC)
 * It would be better to include an outside expert or finding which indicates what you are saying, or to directly quote what you are referring to; otherwise it may appear to be original research or analysis.--99.130.168.83 (talk) 17:46, 6 September 2008 (UTC)


 * Exactly my point. If you want to say that the BOG found Iran non-compliant and decided to refer Iran to the UNSC, and provide a cite for that, fine. I have no issues with that. However if you assert a legal conclusion that Art XXIc "requires" this or that, you'll have to back that up with something other than your own reading of it. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.85.7.4 (talk) 00:10, 7 September 2008 (UTC)


 * This is tiresome because these issues have all been raised and rebutted fully in previous discussions. As noted above, Article XII.C requires a finding and report for non-compliance "with all other conditions of the project prescribed in the agreement between the Agency and the State or States concerned."  That is, any violation of the safeguards agreement is non-compliance.  That is how the IAEA Secretariat and Board of Governors have interpreted this provision in every noncompliance case, beginning with Iraq in 1991 and inclouding North Korea, Romania, Libya and Iran. NPguy (talk) 00:47, 7 September 2008 (UTC)


 * You did not "rebut" anything. You claim that something is "required" -- so prove it. Provide a citation to back up your assertion. As far as interpretting the Article, you most obviously have ABSOLUTELY NO IDEA what you're talking about because the language you're citing has ABSOLUTELY NOT RELEVANCE to the issue -- Iran's enrichment program was not an "Agency project". If you want to say the BOG decided something, fine. If you're saying something is "required" then I'm sorry but you'll just have to provide a cite. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.85.7.4 (talk) 04:58, 8 September 2008 (UTC)


 * The word "shall" in the Statute entails a legal obligation to report non-compliance, once the Board finds that non-compliance has taken place. The Board did make that finding.  Therefore, the report is "required."  It's that simple. NPguy (talk) 01:27, 9 September 2008 (UTC)
 * Oh, yet another novel legal theory by you! No, sorry, this one doesn't fly either. "Non-compliance" is defined in the Article, and neither elements has been met. Therefore the "Shall" statement does not apply. But in any case, no one is interested in YOUR interprettations. As I said, if you want to say that the BOG reported Iran, fine. But If you claim something is "required" then you'll simply provide the citation to back up your assertion. Go on, prove it.


 * You seem to be arguing that the Board was wrong to find Iran in non-compliance. That's your opinion, but it's not the standard understanding.  As I have explained, it is based on an incomplete reading of Article XII.C.  The language of that Article ("all other conditions") clearly applies to general non-compliance with safeguards agreements; that is how the Board has applied Article XII.C in every other non-compliance case.  So you have the Statute, precedent, and the decision of the Board itself against your lonely claim.


 * I've added a reference to the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, which fully supports my position. Read it and weep. NPguy (talk) 02:40, 11 September 2008 (UTC)
 * Ummm...sorry, but that's only your interpretion and actually if you knew the law, you'd know that the glossary supports MY position -- it requires a report for either a diversion OR a failure to declare material that was required to be safeguarded under the terms of the country's safeguards agreement. Note that the IAEA statute is not an independent basis for referral to the UNSC(as you seem to wrongly think) and only implements the particular country's safeguards agreement (Which is why Artice XII itself says it applies "where the Agency is requested by the parties concerned to apply safeguards") -- and Article 19 of Iran's safeguards agreement says clearly:


 * If the Board, upon examination of relevant information reported to it by the Director General, finds that the Agency is NOT able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under this Agreement, to nucle ar weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, it MAY make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute of the Agency...
 * And note further that under Article I of Iran's safeguards, the purpose of teh IAEA safeguards is for the "EXCLUSIVE purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."


 * And this is also the reason why other countries who violated their safeguards are not automatically reported to the UNCS. However, I'll let the matter lie there since people can now have a cite to check and decide for themselves, as a detailed discussion of the law is outside the scope of Wikipedia and things as they are, are within the sort of accuracy expected of Wikiepdia.--12.26.54.11 21:03, 12 September 2008

Let me get this straight. You asked me to provide a reference supporting the natural and standard interpretation of the IAEA Statute on the issue of non-compliance. I didn't think that necessary because the interpretation is natural and straightforward. But I cited an authoritative source, the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, which directly contradicts your strained interpretation of the Statute. This comes from a highly authoritative source - the IAEA itself. It completely refutes your argument.

Here's the key excerpt:

2.2. Non-compliance Violation by a State of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Examples would be:
 * (a) Under an INFCIRC/153-type safeguards agreement, the diversion of nuclear material from declared nuclear activities, or the failure to declare nuclear material required to be placed under safeguards;
 * (b) Under an INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreement, the diversion of the nuclear material or the isuse of the non-nuclear material, services, equipment, facilities or information specified and placed under safeguards;
 * (c) Under an additional protocol based on [540], the failure to declare nuclear material, nuclear activities or nuclear related activities required to be declared under Article 2;
 * (d) Under all types of agreement, violation of the agreed recording and reporting system, obstruction of the activities of IAEA inspectors, interference with the operation of safeguards equipment, or prevention of the IAEA from carrying out its verification activities.

In the event of non-compliance, pursuant to Article XII.C of [ST], the IAEA Director General shall report to the IAEA Board of Governors, which would call upon the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred, and would inform all members and the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.

In particular, 2.2(d) says that "violation of the recording and reporting system" constitutes non-compliance. Iran's systematic policy of failing to report its enrichment program, as well as certain other fuel cycle activities, constitutes such a violation.

You also misconstrue the relationship between Article 19 of Iran's safeguards agreement and Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute. The Statute is a binding treaty that defines obligations of the IAEA and its Member States. Article XII.C defines binding obligations of IAEA inspectors, the Director General, and the Board. It poses no particular obligation on Iran, unless Iran happens to sit on the Board. It deals with non-compliance.

Article 19 of Iran's safeguards agreement provides an additional authority under which the IAEA may report safeguards problems of a different type - inability to verify non-diversion. This often goes hand-in-hand with non-compliance, but it is not the same thing.

So please, give it up. NPguy (talk) 02:36, 13 September 2008 (UTC)

September 2008 report
The new section describint the September 2008 IAEA report is very misleading. It takes selected quotes out of context to convey the impression that Iran has been given a clean bill of health. That completely misconstrues the tone of the report, which is to blame Iran for refusing to cooperate in resolving credible and partially corroborated allegations of weapons-related activities. I don't have time right now, but someone ought to take a heavy editorial pen to this section. NPguy (talk) 02:47, 17 September 2008 (UTC)
 * The tone of the document varies from reader to reader, but it may be best to resolve this through specific quotes from the source.--70.236.79.188 (talk) 23:24, 17 September 2008 (UTC)


 * Most of the report deals with Iran's refusal to cooperate in resolving questions about "alleged studies" of weaponization. If I had to pick a single excerpt to summarize, it would be
 * 23. The Agency, regrettably, has not been able to make any substantive progress on the alleged studies and other associated key remaining issues which remain of serious concern. For the Agency to make progress, an important first step, in connection with the alleged studies, is for Iran to clarify the extent to which information contained in the relevant documentation is factually correct and where, in its view, such information may have been modified or relates to alternative, non-nuclear purposes. Iran needs to provide the Agency with substantive information to support its statements and provide access to relevant documentation and individuals in this regard. Unless Iran provides such transparency, and implements the Additional Protocol, the Agency will not be able to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.
 * 24. Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities, having continued the operation of PFEP and FEP, and the installation of new cascades and the operation of new generation centrifuges for test purposes. Iran has also continued with the construction of the IR–40.
 * 25. The Director General urges Iran to implement all measures required to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme at the earliest possible date.
 * Another key issue is Iran's unilateral abrogation of the legally binding undertaking in the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement to provide access to facilities under construction.
 * And even the statement in the summary most favorable towards Iran:"'The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran."
 * should not be misinterpreted, since it refers only to "declared" nuclear material. The whole problem began with Iran's failure to declare nuclear activities, facilities and materials, which can only be remedied if Iran implements the Additional Protocol.  Technically, such failures are considered "diversion" of material that Iran was required to declare.  Any summary that overlooks these key points is missing the point. NPguy (talk) 00:49, 18 September 2008 (UTC)

Gareth Porter reference
Someone has added citations to a paper by Gareth Porter, Documents linking Iran to nuclear weapons push may have been fabricated, TheRawStory, November 10, 2008. I think this paper has dubious credibility. In particular, it makes an argument about the credibility of documents (with handwritten notes) provided to the IAEA by a third country, based on the fact that Iran provided the same documents (without the notes) to the IAEA. I would read it the opposite way, namely that the fact that that the documents match enhances the credibility of the document with the notes, as well as the other information provided by third parties. Read the paper, and the cited notes from ISIS, for more background. I'm inclined to delete this reference, but I wanted to get the views of others first. NPguy (talk) 02:51, 15 December 2008 (UTC)


 * I took a look at the article to make sure it wasn't a blog and it wasn't. I didn't read the entire article but I'm ready to believe pretty much any accusation of misinformation directed at the Bush Administration at this point.  Don't delete it yet, I'll actually read through the article and see what I think.  Azure Fury   (talk | contribs) 03:50, 15 December 2008 (UTC)


 * I really don't think this "handwritten notes" stuff really proves anything. But there are other things that people may find interesting in that story.  The fact that people involved are beginning to suspect forgeries (not just the author of the story) leads me to believe that the story should remain in the external links, and even possibly be summarized in the article.  Azure Fury   (talk | contribs) 04:14, 15 December 2008 (UTC)


 * I had added the reference at issue. Several brief remarks are in order. Firstly, Mr Gareth Porter is an investigative journalist of impeccable reputation. Secondly, the title of the article includes the words "may have been", and not "have been". Thirdly, if you read the article at issue carefully, then you will realise that Iran does not known what documents America has in possession; it is the IAEA officials who have found the letter in question in a pile of documents recently received from Iran (Iran had for a long time stated that if they were to be shown the so-called "incriminating" documents in the possession of America, they would be able to comment on them; America has never released any of these documents, stating that that would disclose the identities of the people who had provided them with these documents). The fact that this letter in all details, minus the hand-written text, coincides with that which is in the possession of America is remarkable: Iranians cannot have faked the latter. Fourthly, the letter at issue belongs to a mining company which in fact has nothing, whatever, to do with the Iranian nuclear technology. Viewed logically, the hand-written text on this particular letter makes no sense at all! Why should someone have written those remarks on this very specific letter? It makes sense only from the perspective (and this has now been established by the IAEA) that the original letter is indeed a genuinely Iranian letter, issued by the above-mentioned mining company. Fifthly, and this fact has been appropriately emphasized by Gareth Porter, official letters containing secret information have serial numbers and each number brings the letter in connection with its recipient. As it happens, this letter has no serial number! You should realise that when official agencies of a state put secret matters in writing, they carefully keep track of what subsequently happens to the secret information. This is incidentally common practice with the prints that painters make of their paintings or drawings (mostly etchings): if you ever have encountered any of these, then you should know that in some corner of these there is a hand-written text of the form "n/N", where "n" is the number of the print at issue, and "N" the total number of prints made of the work at issue; one sees for instance 27/99, meaning that the artist has issued a series of 99 etchings, and the etching at hand is the 27th in this series. Lastly, those who have followed this whole saga (and I consider myself as belonging to this group) know the provenance of these documents. The documents originate from Mossad. They first tried to convince Reza Cyrus Pahlavi to bring these documents to the public attention, however given the fact that such an act would result in a serious loss of confidence in him on the part of Iranians (many Iranians would come to see him as a traitor &mdash; it has been reported that Reza Pahlavi's closest adviser, Shahriar Ahy, seriously advised him against having any role in this issue), he declined to have anything to do with these documents. Having failed to persuade Reza Pahlavi, Mossad approached the MEK. Not surprisingly, the latter obliged and presented themselves as the source of these documents. And it was thus that these documents came in the possession of the American intelligence community. Now, to appreciate the depth of MEK's depravity, please watch the following video, showing the leader of MEK, Massoud Rajavi, shaking hands with and kissing Saddam Hossein in 1986: YouTube. To appreciate the significance of 1986, I recommend you to consult the Wikipedia entry concerning Iran-Iraq War (September 1980 - August 1988). In fact, if you know Persian, you will feel nauseated by listening to the text accompanying the above video (it is truly on a par with an ode to Hitler by a devout Nazi - it praises Saddam Hossein, in a very flowery language, as the nicest person on the face of the planet Earth). --BF 05:31, 15 December 2008 (UTC)
 * I don't suppose any of us has seen either the original letter or the one with handwritten notes, so we make any argument about its contents. Yet Gareth Porter is prepared to make this astonishing claim:
 * "Given that Kimia Maadan’s role in procurement for the conversion facility was both unrelated to its technical work for the AEOI and part of a covert effort to get around U.S. restrictions, it seems unlikely that they would have made multiple copies of the letter. Even if multiple copies were made, the firm would certainly have taken normal security precautions for a document of that type, marking each copy with a number or name."
 * I don't believe this assertion, which Mr. BF repeats above. To my knowledge, this is not standard practice, and given the availability of photocopy machines and scanners, such methods could not prevent the letter from leaking out, without any numbered copy being missing.  So to me this argument about authenticity simply falls apart on its face, and the statement that the annotated letter in other respects matches one provided by Iran would seem to enhance its credibility.  Even if someone "forged" the handwritten notes on the document, they must have started from an authentic original.  And by the way, how does Porter know whether either document has a serial number?
 * I looked up Gareth Porter and found a Wikipedia article, which notes that Porter for a long time denied evidence of the Pol Pot's Killing Fields in Cambodia. So he may have been right to oppose U.S. policy in Southeast Asia, but so convinced of his rightness that he dismissed contrary evidence.  Maybe something similar is happening here.
 * I'm not sure what Mr. BF's last point is supposed to prove. Whatever you think of the MEK, some if its information has turned out to be correct, in particular the information on Iran's clandestine enrichment and heavy water reactor programs.  And I'm not aware that MEK has been linked to these documents.
 * As for the comment from AzureFury, it is a sad legacy of the Bush Administration that it has damaged U.S. credibility so thoroughly. NPguy (talk) 04:00, 16 December 2008 (UTC)


 * Dear NPguy, firstly, I should be grateful if you changed my name into BF, which is the name that I use on these pages, before this page gets absorbed into Google.


 * Secondly, it is well-known to the IAEA people (long since) how Iran has in the past used various front companies to get around the US sanctions (for instance for obtaining programmable hardware), however IAEA has never found any evidence that any of the acquired restricted material has been used to go beyond 4% enrichment. If you carefully study the IAEA reports, as I have done, then you will realise how thorough-going IAEA has been. For instance, they have gone through the history of any mass spectrometer that they have located inside Iran; they even have asked, and provided with, documents related to the purchase of these (down to the details showing the names of the transport companies that have delivered them to Iran). For instance, they have inspected the logbooks of all the experimentalists who have at some point in time worked with these machines; in the cases where these machines had been used for educational purposes (in university laboratories), IAEA have asked to be given the course materials as well as the texts of the experimental problems that students had to deal with while working with these machines. These are all additional to the samples that have been taken from these instruments in order to establish the chemical compounds that these machines had come in contact with. To my best knowledge, Iran has never been shown to be lying to IAEA - they may not have been volunteering facts, however whatever statement that they have made to IAEA has been shown to be consistent with the wealth of the data that IAEA has been gathering in Iran ever since inspection of Iran's nuclear facilities began in full force.


 * All the hype about experimenting with implosion devices is utterly irrelevant: the bulk modulus of Uranium being relatively large, it does not lend itself to building implosion nuclear devices (if Iran had the same nuclear reactors as India has, then experimenting with implosion devices would indeed be suspect). Some facts are relevant here: Uranium has four isotopes, of which U-233 is artificially made. In nature one finds the three isotopes U-234 (natural abundance 0.005%), U-235 (0.72%) and U-238 (99.275%). The latter is not fissile. Of the remaining two, U-234 has the smallest critical mass (15 kg at atmospheric pressure) and U-235 the largest (52 kg at atmospheric pressure). Since U-234 is about 150 times less abundant than U-235, in exchange for some 3.4 times smaller critical mass, it is logical that if Iran were to build a nuclear device, it would be based on U-235. A calculation that I did last summer for a blog discussion, shows that isotropically compressing the volume of a ball of U-235 by a factor of 2, reduces its critical mass from 52 kg to 37 kg. For this, the last-mentioned ball must be subjected to a pressure of approximately 7 * 10^5 atmospheric pressure (i.e. 70 GPa). For comparison, the pressure in the centre of the Earth is 360 GPa and the highest pressure that can be achieved in laboratory today (using diamond anvils, and the pressure is applied over an area of approximately 1 mm^2) is 250 GPa. There are some warmongering fantasists who claim that 15 kg of pure U-235 would be enough to build a functioning nuclear device (I have encountered such people, so they really exist). My calculations show that for this to be the case, one needs to be able to subject a ball of U-235 to a pressure of the order of 10^8 atmospheric pressure, i.e. of the order of 10,000 GPa, or 10 TPa, that is of the order of some 30 times the pressure in the centre of the Earth.


 * In July 2008 it was reported that Iran had produced between 700-800 kg of U-235 enriched to 4%. If Iran had the technical capability to purify this amount to 100% (which is not as trivial as we are led to believe &mdash; the fact is that the remaining 96% of the enriched material does not consist of U-238; if this 96% consisted of pure U-238, then through the conventional process of isotope separation one would relatively straightforwardly separate U-235 from U-238; this 96% consists of traces of almost all elements in the periodic table), Iran would end up with between 28-32 kg of pure U-235. To make, let us say, 30 kg of U-235 critical, one needs pressures in excess of 300 GPa. Aside from the fact that it may not be feasible to build a cavity large enough to contain some 30 kg of U-235 and strong enough to sustain in excess of 300 GPs of a pressure for long enough time in order for the core to go critical, the all-important question to be asked is whether Iran is at present capable of such technological feat. To my best judgement, the answer to this question is an unequivocal No. Iran is at present not even capable of building an oil refinery, making it necessary for her to import the bulk of the refined fuel required for Iran's internal consumption from Saudi Arabia. Security analysis cannot be based on the limits of what can be achieved in principle, it must take into account a host of factors that must come together in order to make an abstract idea into a functioning device.


 * Unfortunately, my experience is that many of the Think-Tanks in the USA (the ones with the loudest voices) are peopled by scientifically rather illiterate people (this is not a rhetorical statement, but one that is based on personal experience); none of them prove to be able to support their wild speculations with a scientific paper published in a peer-reviewed journal (they even prove incapable of naming the names of the most prominent scientific journals in the field of nuclear physics). This is a sad reality for the entire humanity. Personally, I sincerely believe that proliferation is a real problem that has to be tackled, and tackled seriously, but this cannot be achieved so long as the policy makers lend their ears to a band of highly vocal individuals who, on close inspection, prove to be utterly ignorant about the technical issues pertinent to nuclear physics and nuclear devices. I have seen official reports by a highly vocal US Think-Tank in which the result of even a simple multiplication of two numbers turns out to be incorrect. No matter what similar reports say, they are simply not credible to me. Checking the educational backgrounds of the authors of these reports, one comes to the astonishing conclusion that a large number of them have not had the slightest exposure to even the rudiments of physics and/or chemistry; they mostly turn out to have academic degrees in literature, philosophy or law.


 * As for the role that MEK have supposedly played in exposing some of Iran's secret facilities, I am afraid that you are insufficiently informed. Please read the open literature of some 20-25 years ago and you will realise that there is nothing that we know today but did not know 20-25 years ago with regard to Iran's nuclear activities. Unfortunately, I have no time to go through the pile of my old papers, but I can tell that I vividly recall that in the 1980s the satellite images of Iran were being discussed in some detail in one of the Issues of Physics Today (published by American Institute of Physics); at the time, one knew perfectly well what Iran was doing in such place as Natanz. The heavy-water reactor in Arak was also no secret to those familiar with the satellite imagery of Iran (the facility is built above the ground). To my best understanding, MEK is just a non-entity (for now a convenient public front to be credited with things that no other Iranian organisation would want to be associated with in public - if you have the opportunity for, please talk with them, and you will have a first-hand experience of them and their thinking), which is not to say that MEK is not a vicious organisation. Mind you, they were fighting alongside Saddam Hossein's army against their Iranian brethren, and it seems utterly foolish to me to think that such an organisation has somehow a soft spot for the USA and shares USA's concerns, whatever they may be.


 * Kind regards, --BF 13:08, 16 December 2008 (UTC).


 * I don't intend to try to rebut every claim, but here are a few points.


 * Your formula for the effect of compression on critical mass is wrong. The mean free path of a fast neutron should scale inversely with density, and the critical mass should scale as the density times the mean free path to the third power, so the critical mass should scale inversely as the square of the compression.  Instead of reducing the critical mass from 52 kg to 37 kg, doubling the density would reduce it from 50 kg (the standard figure) to just over 12.5 kg.  I won't comment on the compressibility of uranium.


 * Iran was legally required to report its enrichment activities - as well as uranium imported from China - under the terms of its safeguards agreement. It's submission of incomplete declarations to the IAEA was a deliberate lie.


 * There is no technical barrier between enrichment to 4% and to 90%. The configuration of a centrifuge cascade might need to be adjusted, but the same centrifuges will do the job.  In fact, over half the separative work to enrich to 90% is done by enriching to 4%.


 * I don't believe there was any open publication concerning an Iranian enrichment program before NCRI publicized Natanz in 2002. If you disagree, find a specific citation. NPguy (talk) 04:36, 17 December 2008 (UTC)


 * Could you kindly change your direct reference to my name ("Mr. ...", x2), as I requested you earlier? --BF 09:59, 17 December 2008 (UTC)


 * Actually my formula was not wrong; there was an error arising from using my Windows calculator, which I almost never use: rather than talking the square of the density, I had taken the square root of the density. As for my formula, in the linear elasticity theory, for the isotropic pressure one has: P2 - P1 = B ln(V1/V2), where B is the bulk modulus (Pi is the pressure in state i, i=1,2, and Vi the corresponding volume). For Uranium, B =100 GPa = 1 Mbar (see the main Table in "Uranium"). With n denoting the density, one has 1/n = V/N, where N is the number of particles. Thus n2/n1 = V1/V2 for N constant. For V1/V2 = 2, ln(V1/V2) = 0.7, so that P2 - P1 = 70 GPa (coinciding with what I had indicated in my previous comment). For V1/V2 deviating too much from 1, the above-indicated expression is not accurate. A calculation based on the Thomas-Fermi theory (by relying on the assumption that the bare protons formed an ideal gas of uniformly-distributed charged particles) shows that for V1/V2 not too close to 1, one has to use the following (also approximate) expression: P2 - P1 = (3B/5) [(V1/V2)^(5/3) - 1]. That this expression is approximate should be evident from the fact that it is expressed solely in terms of B. For V1/V2 = 2, (3/5) [(V1/V2)^{5/3) - 1] = 1.3 so that according to the more accurate expression, reducing the volume of a ball of U-235 by a factor of 2, requires 130 GPa of externally-applied pressure, nearly twice the amount predicted by the first expression in this paragraph. Correcting for my calculational error of taking the square root, instead of the square, of the density n, and using the expression P2 - P1 = (3B/5) [(V1/V2)^(5/3) - 1], as well as B = 100 GPa, for reducing the critical mass from 52 kg to 15 kg, one has V1/V2 = (52/15)^{1/2} = 1.9, so that P2 - P1 = (300 GPa/5) [1.9^{5/3} - 1] = 115 GPa, that is some 1.2 * 10^6 times the atmospheric pressure. For completeness, calculating the square root, instead of the square, of the density, leads to V1/V2 = (52/15)^2 = 12, so that P2 - P1 = (300 GPa/5) [12^{5/3} -1 ] = 3.7 TPa (please see my reference in my previous comment to "of the order of" "10 TPa"). My apologies for the error (arising from not clicking on "Inv" before clicking on "x^2" on my Windows calculator).


 * As for Iran failing to inform IAEA about her nuclear activities (as required by the explicit terms of the NPT), I have never stated that Iran did the right thing. So, there is no point of contention between us on this issue. I should however remind you that Iran was involved in a devastating war until almost 1990. In this war all the neighbouring Arab countries, as well as many Western countries, were directly helping Saddam Hossein (ironically, it was Israel, from all countries, that came to Iran's help by selling Iran sophisticated weaponry); remarkably, it was the financial anti-Iran help that Kuwait gave to Saddam Hossein that turned out to contain the seed that grew into the First Golf War and ultimately to the Second Golf War and the consequent downfall of Saddam Hossein. Had Iran under the conditions declared her enrichment-related activities, there is a good chance that Iran-Iraq war would have turned into a major international conflict, as opposed to a local war, even though a devastating one, between two neighbouring countries; in the ideal case for Iran, Iran would have been forced to sign away all her rights under the NPT.


 * There is a technical barrier and it is due to the fact that the mass spectrum of a mixture of which 4% is U-235 is nearly a continuum. In the ideal case, where the 96% of the 4% enriched U-235 would consist of U-238, the task of further enrichment would be relatively easy: in such case, a simple process of isotope separation would extract U-235 from the mixture. Compare the cases of throwing a die and throwing a smooth ball on which one point has been marked. In the former case, there is a 1/6 probability of getting any desired number between 1 and 6 face up. In the latter case, on the other hand, the probability of the radial vector of the marked point pointing exactly to, say, the North is zero (view the ball as a die with n identical faces, with n infinitely large). Likewise, the more atomic species and isotopes one has in a mixture, the more difficult it is to separate one from the rest. Please talk with the experts on the issue. My understanding is that even though theoretically enriching U-235 beyond 4% can be achieved by means of the conventional process of isotope separation (using centrifuges), in practice this process is useless: the centrifuges get clogged by the host of the atomic species in the remaining 96% the moment they are switched on. To go beyond 4% (or perhaps 8%), the 4% enriched material must be subjected to a series of chemical processes, none of which can be carried out by Iran at the present time --- the technical details of these processes are all classified and no intelligence agency has thus far shown that Iran had access to these details. I therefore disagree with your assertion that "There is no technical barrier between enrichment to 4% and to 90%".


 * As I wrote earlier, you could go through the old issues of Physics Today. Right now I have no time to find the relevant references for you, however should I come across any of these I shall let you know. Be it as it may, whatever MEK may or may not have done, the entire thing it totally unrelated to the issues discussed by Garth Porter in his pertinent article. --BF 09:26, 17 December 2008 (UTC)


 * I recognize that Iran suffered horribly in its war with Iraq, and that Iraq was the unprovoked aggressor. I do not see how that is relevant to this discussion.


 * I repeat there is no technical barrier between enrichment to 4% and 90%. It is well know that enrichment to 4% is actually a harder step.  Each stage in a centrifuge cascade changes the U-235/U-238 ratio by a fixed factor, typically on the order of 1.1.  But as the enrichment increases the number of centrifuges required at each stage decreases in proportion to the decreased quantity of material.


 * Finally, the IAEA itself says that Iran concealed its enrichment activities. If there had been public information about such activities, the IAEA could - and I'm convinced would - have request a special inspection.  So the burden of proof is on those asserting that this information was publicly available, and I give such claims no credence. NPguy (talk) 04:19, 18 December 2008 (UTC)

Edit war on economics of enrichment
Three times in the last two days a user (Saxnax) has deleted the following text from the section on U.S. and European viewpoints

"The Economist magazine argued that 'learning to enrich uranium&mdash;a hugely costly venture&mdash;still makes questionable economic sense for Iran, since it lacks sufficient natural uranium to keep them going and [they] would have to import the stuff.'"

The last time, this user ignored my request to address the issue on the discussion page before deleting again. In my view, the text in question is not just relevant to the section in question, it is a central part of the Western argument against Iran's enrichment program. If you disagree, please discuss here. Do not just revert. NPguy (talk) 02:57, 11 January 2009 (UTC)
 * I am not Saxnax, but I have added a little bit more information from and about the source to help put it in context as one Western argument against Iran's nuclear program.--76.214.153.120 (talk) 18:14, 13 January 2009 (UTC)

Iran's refusal to implement Additional Protocol or additional transparency measures
An editor has questioned the use of the word "refuse" to describe Iran's failure to ratify and/or implement the Additional Protocol. The word "refuse" is important because the international community, through the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council, has called on Iran to take these steps. An alternative might be to say that Iran has "rejected" international calls to take these steps, but that longer and more convoluted than necessary. NPguy (talk) 02:38, 17 January 2009 (UTC)


 * Just find a citation which directly supports your assertion.--68.248.152.92 (talk) 05:57, 17 January 2009 (UTC)


 * I believe these facts are outlined elsewhere in the article. It is not necessary to footnote or quote directly every word of every post, and it's not clear what you're asking to document.  Take a look at these UNSCR 1737 and GOV/2006/14.


 * I fully concur with the statement that "refuse" is inappropriate. As for the so-called "international community", this is one of the most abused of all terms. Ms Margaret Thatcher, the former Prime Minister of the UK, has been much maligned for having once said "And, as you know, there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families." (for society read community, or international community for that matter). The older I become, the more I appreciate the wisdom contained in these small number of words. --BF 01:11, 18 January 2009 (UTC)


 * What word would you use to explain that the relevant international authorities (the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council) have asked Iran to take these steps to correct its previous nonproliferation violations, and Iran said "no"? "Refuse" seems accurate and straightforward. NPguy (talk) 04:30, 18 January 2009 (UTC)
 * Refuse has a specific definition and connotation which should be supported by sources if it is going to be used. If this is so straightforward then just present the source.--68.248.152.92 (talk) 05:12, 18 January 2009 (UTC)


 * You are the one changing settled text and changing it to make it look like there is nothing special about Iran's rejection of international calls to adopt the Additional Protocol and other transparency measures. This is ahistorical and misleading.  Gotta go now, but I will fix this tomorrow. NPguy (talk) 04:11, 19 January 2009 (UTC)
 * The settled text was the one which you altered without providing any sources to support your assertions. Anyways, I am happy you are now providing sources to support your edits and would simply remind you that we shouldn't interpret our own point of view in to them (as expert or inexpert as it may or may not be).--68.248.152.92 (talk) 05:25, 20 January 2009 (UTC)


 * Not true. The text long said in two places that Iran "refused" to implement the Additional Protocol.  Someone (it's impossible to tell who with anonymous editors) decided to change that.


 * I guess there is no completely settled text on WP, but the newer wording seemed more settled because it was more recent and had been sitting there for a reasonable amount of time. I think it is better to paraphrase the sources you have provided and to not worry about the old wording. Anyways, for the wording now in the article:
 * "Iran suspended its previous voluntary and non-legally binding implementation of the Additional Protocol" paraphrases"The meeting was called in response to the announcement by Iran of its decision to resume from 9 January 2006 “R&D activities on the peaceful nuclear energy programme which has been suspended as part of its expanded voluntary and non-legally binding suspension.”"
 * "since Iran has not voluntarily answered calls from the IAEA Board of Governors and urgings from the UN Security Council" paraphrases from "Therefore, the Director General again urges Iran to implement the Additional Protocol at the earliest possible date" and "and calls upon Iran to ratify promptly the Additional Protocol".
 * I am not sure if there is any dispute with the last area, I would just note that none of the sources provided use the word rejected and that it carries a specific connotation which should be supported if it is going to be used.
 * --68.248.152.92 (talk) 00:35, 21 January 2009 (UTC)
 * The deletion of "refused" was recent, and I questioned it immediately. It had never been "settled."  As for the others, I linked to the wrong citation in one place and have since fixed it. NPguy (talk) 16:44, 23 January 2009 (UTC)
 * The insertion of "refused" was also recent, and did not appear in previous versions of the article. Anyways, WP wants the content to come from a reliable source and not someone's own original analysis. If you can find a reliable source then add it, but it looks like the IAEA doesn't have the same connotations as your edits.--68.248.152.92 (talk) 21:01, 23 January 2009 (UTC)

Iran and the Additional Protocol
The reversion war is getting tedious. I've tried various formulations to correct the inaccuracy of an anonymous editor's changes, and that editor keeps reverting to reflect his/her POV.
 * Iran's "refusal" to ratify the Additional Protocol. The Board of Governors and Security Council both called on Iran to ratify.  Iran didn't do it.  Instead, it stopped implementing the protocol.  That satisfies any reasonable definition of "refusal."
 * Is Iran in the same category as other states that have an Additional Protocol for which the IAEA has not yet reached a conclusion on the absence of undeclared activities? No.  First of all, Iran is no longer implementing the Additional Protocol.  Second, Iran is unique in being subject to an ongoing investigation for past safeguards violations, including responding to "alleged studies" of weaponization.
 * Should Iran's implementation of the Additional Protocol be considered "voluntary"? That is Iran's position.  But the IAEA Board has deemed it "necessary" for Iran to cooperate with the IAEA, going beyond the requirements of the Additional Protocol (GOV/2006/14) and the UN Security Council decided under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that this and other "necessary" steps were legally binding requirements (UN Security Council Resolution 1737).
 * By the way, the IAEA has drawn the conclusion of the absence of undeclared nuclear activity for Canada and the Czech Republic, so that particular false claim is particularly egregious. NPguy (talk) 02:58, 29 January 2009 (UTC)


 * In 2004, Iran was in the same category of other nations which had entered the Additional Protocol in to force but had not had a conclusion on the absence of undeclared activities reached. The IAEA investigation and calls are also mentioned and attributed. If you want to provide direct attribution from the sources then this would be fine. But I am pretty sure the sources are being quoted correctly, and if they aren't then just edit the portion which is wrong.--69.208.138.130 (talk) 04:42, 29 January 2009 (UTC)

Wrong. In 2004, Iran's status was not the same as Canada or the Czech Republic. The conclusion that applied to Iran was: "Three States had been found to have been previously engaged in nuclear activities of varying significance which they had failed to report. Corrective actions are being taken by these States. Verification of the correctness and completeness of their respective declarations is ongoing." Those three states were Iran, Libya and South Korea. Investigations of Libya and South Korea have since been completed. In any case, the status in 2004 is not particularly relevant to the point in question. NPguy (talk) 01:10, 30 January 2009 (UTC)
 * Actually it was material which was in the article from an extended time ago, and I for some reason assumed someone would have caught that given the amount of time that it managed to remain in the article. If you would like to include the other category that would be fine as well. I apologize for the long misunderstanding and you were very correct. Providing sources makes it easier for other editors to verify what you are adding, and the sources you have added/cited have been very helpful.--69.208.138.130 (talk) 01:27, 30 January 2009 (UTC)

"'Safeguards activities were implemented for 61 States1/ with both comprehensive safeguards agreements in force and additional protocols in force or being otherwise applied .. For 37 States, evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities remain in progress.'" "Additional protocols continued to be applied, pending entry into force, in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) and Libya." For historical purposes, Iran was one of 37 states in 2004 which had an Additional Protocol in force but had not had an evaluation regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Iran was of course in the other category discussed as well. Secondly, Iran's implementation of the Additional Protocol was voluntary and non-legally binding in 2004. There is of course a different situation now, but this is speaking from a historical perspective.--69.208.138.130 (talk) 23:44, 30 January 2009 (UTC)

Iran was not among those 37. The Safeguards Statement says there were 61 states where Additional Protocols were being implemented. Of those, it drew conclusions about the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials in 21 countries. Evaluations remained in progress in 37, and for the remaining 3 "verification of the correctness and completeness of their respective declarations is ongoing." Do the math: 21 + 37 + 3 = 61. NPguy (talk) 18:17, 31 January 2009 (UTC)
 * If they weren't in 2004, then they were in 2005:"Seventy States had both comprehensive safeguards agreements in force and additional protocols in force or being otherwise applied .. For 46 of the States1/, the Agency found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities .. Of these 46 States, the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) had been found to have been previously engaged in undeclared nuclear activities'." Iran of course ceased (atleast what was) voluntary cooperation after the Board of Governors statement, but it was implementing its Additional Protocol for a short duration (most likely due to pressure in regard to its recently discovered actions, no less).--69.208.138.130 (talk) 14:04, 1 February 2009 (UTC)

Economist op-ed
There are two relevant passages from this op-ed:"IF YOU are locked eyeball to eyeball with an adversary as wily as Iran, it does not make much sense to do something that emboldens your opponent and sows defeatism among your friends. But that, it is now clear, is precisely what America's spies achieved when they said in December that, contrary to their own previous assessments, Iran stopped its secret nuclear-weapons programme in 2003.""In his final state-of-the-union speech this week, George Bush called on Iran to suspend uranium enrichment “so negotiations can begin”—a far cry from the fiery “axis of evil” speech he unleashed against Iran, Iraq and North Korea six years ago. This will add to Iran's belief that the NIE has made it harder for Mr Bush to brandish the military option that he has insisted remains “on the table”. The threat of force had put some steel into the six-power diplomacy. Presuming Mr Bush's guns to be now truly spiked, his critics at home are cheering along with the Iranians." Criticizing the American intelligence community and advocating the threat of the usage of force are perfectly acceptable, but they give this op-ed a stance which clearly isn't in-line with the official position of at least the intelligence portion of the American government. If this isn't going to be under a section entitled "US and European viewpoint", then it seems perfectly reasonable to point this out.--75.2.7.232 (talk) 05:51, 17 February 2009 (UTC)


 * Objections to edits by 75.2.7.232. I think the grammatical changes you made to the articled were nonconstructive at best, at worst they changed the meaning of the sentences.  To make the article easier to read, and to include all the information of the original grammar, I just reverted the whole edit.  I also object to the method in which you inserted this quotation.
 * An op-ed published in January 2008 in The Economist, critical of the American intelligence community for doing "something that emboldens your opponent and sows defeatism among your friends", opined that "learning to enrich uranium&mdash;a hugely costly venture&mdash;still makes questionable economic sense for Iran, since it lacks sufficient natural uranium to keep them going and [they] would have to import the stuff."
 * The wording you chose to use, and how you chose to intertwine the quotations add unneeded POV to the article. I think if you wish to include the economic opine from the economist fine, but craft a better way of framing the "something that emboldens your opponent and sows defeatism among your friends" part or leave it out.

The info you added about the yellow cake is good, it just does not belong in that section. The fact needed tag was a good addition and I would not object to its inclusion. TWilliams9 (talk) 06:04, 17 February 2009 (UTC)
 * So could you provide a specific wording from the article which you find acceptable and which conveys its viewpoint? Adding its advocation of the treat of usage of force seems perfectly acceptable to me, but I was hoping you would propose something you find acceptable instead of simply saying what doesn't work.--75.2.7.232 (talk) 06:06, 17 February 2009 (UTC)
 * Another sample proposal:"An op-ed published in January 2008 in The Economist, which saw threats of force against Iran as beneficial to the negotation process, opined that 'learning to enrich uranium—a hugely costly venture—still makes questionable economic sense for Iran, since it lacks sufficient natural uranium to keep them going and [they] would have to import the stuff.'"Also, the quote seems to be fairly redundant with the ISIS report, so removing it would be another option to me.--75.2.7.232 (talk) 06:10, 17 February 2009 (UTC)


 * Both of those are fine with me, as the particular part of the quotation i was objecting to is gone. I didn't like the "something that emboldens your opponent and sows defeatism among your friends" part, you have now worded that in a much better manner. TWilliams9 (talk) 06:16, 17 February 2009 (UTC)
 * I just removed it since this is mutually acceptable, it seems redundant with the ISIS, and it is not completely representative of the U.S. and European viewpoint since it criticizes some of their stances.--75.2.7.232 (talk) 06:20, 17 February 2009 (UTC)

I disagree. The article does not duplicate the ISIS report. The Economist op-ed argues on the grounds of cost that Iran's enrichment program does not make sense as part of a nuclear power program. The ISIS report points out that Iran lacks sufficient proven uranium resources to fuel a nuclear power program. I have restored the citation.

As to the question of whether this is a "western" view, I think it accurately reflects the dismay in many countries - including the U.S. government - that the poorly worded NIE was misinterpreted as saying Iran was no longer pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. So I continue to believe that the qualification is unnecessary and irrelevant in the paragraph in question. It is relevant to the discussion of the NIE, and it would make sense to insert it there.

I would also like to complain that IP editor 75.2.7.232 felt he or she had sufficient basis for deleting this citation based on the discussion above. Since I was the person objecting to the change, and had not yet participated in the discussion, I found this presumptuous. Even without my participation, I don't see anything in the discussion to justify that conclusion. NPguy (talk) 04:03, 18 February 2009 (UTC)
 * The Economist is clearly a Western view as it is a Western source, but the point that it is in disagreement with the American intelligence community (which it opines is "emboldening the opponent" and "sowing defeat among friends"), and the American intelligence community has since reaffirmed most of the major findings if you are to believe Dennis Blair's testimony before Congress. I also believe almost all the Western governments have come out against threats of force as a way to manipulate Iran (which the article clearly espouses). The content was removed because I proposed this or another wording and TWilliams said either proposal seemed okay to him. I will just tag the material until we can find a mutually acceptable wording (any proposal you have about characterizing the op-ed would be welcome, or you could refer to three proposals which have already been put forward).--75.2.7.232 (talk) 04:52, 18 February 2009 (UTC)


 * The article was clearly in line with western thinking about Iran - more so than the U.S. NIE. The idea that the threatened use of force can be constructive may not be the mainstream view, but the United States has consistently refused to rule out the use of force.  In any case, the argument quoted - that Iran's enrichment program does not make economic sense - is the consensus of western governments. NPguy (talk) 04:02, 19 February 2009 (UTC)
 * As much as you may argue an op-ed is representative of official governmental policy in a number of countries, the op-ed directly contradicted and criticized the [still official stance] of the United States of activities within Iran. It is also worth noting that "failing to rule out" is not the same as advocating a threat of force, and that even if it were European governments have taken exception with even "failing to rule out". The op-ed is and wants to be out of sync with the governments, so we should characterize its opinion as such.
 * I've made three proposals so far. A fourth proposal would be for you to just cite the governments which you claim say this.--75.2.7.232 (talk) 05:09, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

On the point for which this quote is being used - the economic illogic of Iran's enrichment program - it reflects western views. The other issues are not relevant to the point at hand. I see no problem. NPguy (talk) 01:17, 20 February 2009 (UTC)
 * You aren't providing a source to show it is in-sync with the Western viewpoint and it is not in-sync with the Western viewpoint on a host of other issues. It should either be pointed out that it disagrees with the Western viewpoint (at least on a host of other issues), or another source which is more reflective/shows it is the Western viewpoint should be used..--99.130.160.222 (talk) 03:21, 22 February 2009 (UTC)

OVERVIEW INACCURACY AND BIAS
The claim that the UNSC's demand that Iran abandon enrichment is just as "In every previous case of safeguards non-compliance involving clandestine enrichment or reprocessing" is patently false and shows an agenda. BOTH N KOREA AND LIBYA HAD A WEPONS PROGRAM, UNLIKE IRAN, AND SO THE COMPARISON IS NONSENSE. SIMILARLY, BOTH S. KOREA AND EGYPT HAD ENGAGED IN UNDECLARED WEAPONS-RELATED ACTIVITIES, BUT WERE NOT EVEN REPORTED TO THE UNSC. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 12.26.54.10 (talk) 16:11, 20 February 2009 (UTC)


 * The statement as written was correct and not misleading. North Korea, Iraq and Libya were found in violation of their safeguards agreements not for weaponization work but for pursuing undeclared enrichment and/or reprocessing (ENR).  These are the fuel cycle technologies that can be used to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons, which is why doing them in secret has generally been considered prima facie evidence of a nuclear weapons program.  Weaponization is a relatively small step, and evidence of weaponization has never been considered a requirement for finding a safeguards violation.  In particular, North Korea was found in violation of its safeguards obligation on three separate occasions, in 1993, 1994 and 2003, with no direct evidence of weaponization.  The 1994 Agreed Framework called for an end to all ENR activities.


 * The safeguards failures by South Korea and Egypt were relatively minor, and they were not found in non-compliance with their safeguards obligations. Egypt's did not involve enrichment or reprocessing.  South Korea's included undeclared ENR experiments in the 1980s and undeclared laser enrichment experiments in 2000.  Some have agued that these should have been considered non-compliance.  Even if they had been, this would not be an exception to the general statement because the undeclared ENR activities were (or already had been) halted.


 * Finally, the words "UNLIKE IRAN," suggest that the author knows that Iran does not have a nuclear weapons program. This negative claim is unprovable, and there is significant circumstantial evidence (undeclared ENR) against it. NPguy (talk) 03:57, 21 February 2009 (UTC)


 * The FINAL AUTHORITY on the matter -- the IAEA itself -- has repeatedly and consistently stated that the undeclared activities in Iran HAD NO RELATION TO A WEAPONS PROGRAM and here you are claiming that it is "circumstantial evidence" of something. Your attempt to portray the UNSC as being evenhanded in dealing with Iran also portrays your bias especially compared to your previous statementsi n which you claimed that ALL safeguards non-compliance has to be reported to the UNSC and when everyone knows that Egypt, S Korea and Taiwan were all involved safeguards noncompliance that was NOT reported. Your attempt to equate Iran with Libya, Iraq and N Korea is simply not justifiable. Also, your insistence on simply removing citations to articles that cast doubt on the legality of UNSC resolutions against IRan further prove your bias. YOU ARE BIASED AND SHOULD NOT BE EDITING THIS ENTRY.


 * ALSO I fixed the BIAS in the overview which only presented the US claim as the basis of the controversy. Sorry, this controversy has at least 2 sides, Iran's included. And, only PORTIONS of Iran's enrichment program were not declared. Iran's uranium mines, and plans to build coversion and enrichment facilities etc were ALL PUBLIC and announced openly on the radio. Thus it is FALSE to suggest that the entire enrichment program was undeclared.