Talk:Odessa Offensive

The article is finally created
I've been wanting to create the article about this offensive for a long time and its finally done. My shout-out goes to "Kges1901" for assisting me in this. Both of us already added lots of detailed info about this offensive. Hopefully, this article will continue to develop at the same level of high quality.

I have a question to Kges1901. Recently you provided additional strength numbers for the 3rd UF at the start of this offensive:

"The 3rd Ukrainian Front's report on the operation, drawn up in August 1944, provides different figures for its strength on 28 March: 243,074 men, 42,512 submachine guns, 4,824 machine guns, and 344 tanks and self-propelled guns (only counting those in the 23rd Tank Corps and Cavalry-Mechanized Group), 2,112 mortars, 1,616 field guns, and 781 anti-aircraft guns."

Can you tell what exactly did the Soviet staffs wrote with the number of 243,000 men? Or alternatively, send me a link about it? This number is correct, but in its own way, same as the 470,000.

While nowhere near as extensive as the German terminology, the Soviets nonetheless had several main strength terms to describe unit strength. Some of them are:

Number of 'eaters' (Количество Едоков). It essentially mean unit's ration strength, that is, the total number of personnel- combat, combat support and various non-combat personnel in the rear area- that had to be provided with rations. Therefore, the number of 'eaters' refer to everyone in the unit, even if they have little or nothing to do with the actual combat (cooks, medics, repair crews, staffs, veterinarians etc.). The German equivalent is Verpflegungsstärke.

Combat forces (Боевые Войска). This one is not strictly defined in Soviet military, but nonetheless it can be said wth certainty that it refers to all combat personnel (infantry, artillery, tankers, engineers, reckon etc.) in the unit, even if some are in reserve or in the second-third echelon. Add to this are various combat support units, such as signal units, HQ's, parts of supply units directly delivering ammo, fuel, rations to these combat units.

Active bayonets (Активные Штики). Refers purely to frontline strength of all combat units (infantry, tankers, engineers). Thus, those combat units that are not at the front, as well as all rear services and non-combat personnel, are excluded from this count.

I'm 99% sure that the number of 243,000 refer to 'combat forces', while the 470,000 to the number of 'eaters'.

An example is the strength of the 2nd Ukrainian Front on 1 March 1944, at the start of Uman-Botoshany Operation, where I once again added all the figures. Thus, the number of 'eaters' was 691,000 in total, while the number of 'combat forces' was 480,000, a difference of 211,000. In other words, the tooth-to-tail ration was 70-30.

So with the strength of the 3rd Ukrainain Front on 28 March that's most likely the case too. The 470,000 would be eaters, while 243,000 combat forces. Its enough to say that on 1 March 1944, the number of eaters was 559,000.

Similarly the difference between 435 tanks and SPG's and 344 tanks and SPG's on 28 March can be explained by the fact that the former refers to the total strength, including those that are in various stages of repair, while the latter refer only to operational strength. Tai3chinirv7ana (talk) 19:01, 16 June 2023 (UTC)
 * There is no elaboration in the report, just "people." (людей) The figure is in a table comparing the ratio of Soviet and German forces. The tank strength is definitely due to it being the operational strength - Grylev's number likely includes the non-operational units that were rebuilding in the rear of the front. Given that, I'd agree it is probably the combat forces, not the ration strength. Kges1901 (talk) 19:11, 16 June 2023 (UTC)
 * Yes, that's a frequent occurence in the Sovet docs, with the x number being referred to simply as людей, without emphasizing what does it refer to.
 * Occasionally it can be found in the German docs as well, with the strength of x number of people being referred to simply as "Stärke", without specifying what does it mean- Verpflegungsstärke, Iststärke, Tagesstärke etc.- even though some hints can make it easy to understand what it refers to.
 * I'd be interested to know the strength of the Romanian units under the command of the 3rd Romanian Army. German documents occasionally do provide the strength of its Axis allies, but mainly if those units are under direct subordination of the German Armeeoberkommando (A.O.K.), like the Slovak 1st Inf. Div. here. For the start of April 1944, there's no data for the overall strength of the 3rd Romanian Army, even though there are strength reports on combat strength (Gefechtsstärke) of Romanian divisions, both with the A.O.K. 6 and A.O.K. 8.
 * Do you have anything on that? There's the Third Axis, Fourth Ally book by Axworthy, but there's no data on this particular matter. Tai3chinirv7ana (talk) 08:48, 17 June 2023 (UTC)
 * Unfortunately I don't have any information on the Romanian forces as I generally focus on Soviet units. The 3rd Ukrainian Front provides enemy strength estimates in the combat journals, but they are clearly an overestimate of enemy strength as comparison with the German archival data that you added shows. Perhaps there is Romanian scholarship or archival sources on this subject? Kges1901 (talk) 12:30, 17 June 2023 (UTC)
 * Too bad, but Romanian forces are of secondary importance anyways. The strength of the 3rd Army can be estimated with reasonable accuracy though.
 * In 1944, the authorized strength of the Romanian infantry division was 17,200 (according to Axworthy). Since at the start of April 1944 the three Romanian infantry divisions held the front in the areas of secondary importance, while one was not at the front, it would be safe to say that they had close to full complement of their authorized personnel, unlike German divisions of the 6th Army.
 * If to assume that all four of them averaged 15,000, then the overall strength would be around 65,000. Tai3chinirv7ana (talk) 15:44, 17 June 2023 (UTC)