Talk:Ontological argument/Archive 2

Deletions, OCT 16th
I'm sorry, but I'm upset about what happened here. There was no reason to delete every single addition I contributed on the 16th. Many of my arguments were not original (the predication argument underneath "Existence as a Property" was Kant, and the ninth argument of Miscellaneous, that of divine simplicity, was partially Aquinas, partially Plantinga, (ironically for both) and also various modern philosophers). As well, much of the page (the lengthy Miscellaneous section, for instance) neglects to cite anything, whatsoever, including the ontological argument responses to criticisms. I revised the page, again, editing my own comments to remain as neutral as possible, but I didn't cite sources. If it's absolutely mandatory I cite a source for every sentence (which is completely inconsistent with the overwhelming majority of the page), then I'll be doing this in the future. However, much of the rest of the page should also be removed then, such as, "Defenders of the ontological argument have replied to this objection that its conclusion does not follow from its premise," etc. Just deleting everything is not the appropriate way to handle such additions; first try modifying them. Second, remove only the unnecessary, frivolous, unfounded, and seemingly original comments (note: they can't all have been one of these). Finally, start a discussion (and if you have, please direct me; I missed it). I worked hard on those additions, and indiscriminately removing them ALL was careless and unjustified (at least to an extent, if nothing else). If you reply to me, here (can you do that?), I will certainly consider/include any of your objections/comments in my contribution. Thank you.


 * Don't be upset. You're right, a lot of the page is unsourced, but I didn't have time to reedit it all, but I'll get to it in the future. You can't point to another error to justify yours. All content in Wikipedia must be verifiable, and you're edits were not. Plus, is seemed many were simply your own arguments, and that is not what this site is for. Wikipedia is not our personal debating club or a place to publish original research. Any argument for or against it you add must come from a verifiable source from reputable philosophers. Kant's argument about existence not being a property is already in there. It just needs a cite from that page of Critique of Pure Reason. You do not need to cite every sentence, but you do need to cite every point. I'll go over your new edits on this page. Roy Brumback 07:15, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

I deleted these summaries of the argument:


 * In other words, one cannot imagine anything whatsoever and also claim it was imagined as an entity which didn't exist, as, if it was imagined by the subject, it was imagined to have existed (even if it did not have an existing counterpart outside the imagination). A final way of phrasing this is that, if existence is a property, then there exist a number of things that have the property of not existing.

I don't really agree with them, as it seems obvious to me that you can imagine something that does not exist except as an idea, and I don't really think that's what Kant was saying. I'll look through the book and see. And if existence is a property, why do there have to exist things without that property? I don't think that really follows. So these conclusions about the argument needs cites. And we don't need to continually resummarize the arguments with every editors' interpretation of it. It's already summarized, and I think in better language, so I think we should just leave it at that. Roy Brumback 07:27, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

Edits OCT 23rd
Thank you for responding. :) I appreciate it.

Okay, onto your points: For the above statement (wherein you respond to my passage), I don't understand why your disagreement should matter. Shouldn't Kant's argument be at least featured, even if it's blatantly fallacious? (Btw, the ontological argument I believe is discussed in CPR between pages 450 and 500; I don't own a copy, but Lawhead's Voyage of Discovery cites this particular argument on page 337). And, in his defense, I think you're misunderstanding the sentiment. If you imagine a unicorn, for example, which certainly does not feature a corporeal counterpart to the concept, you've still imagined a unicorn which, in the imagined concept, was existing, even if only for the sake of the hypothesis. In essence, it is impossible to imagine something which isn't existing in the concept, even if it is never instantiated somewhere in the universe. If you believe in God, and I'm assuming you do, then this would be comparable to imagining the universe before He created anything (even though many Judeo-Christians do not grant anything existed before God, per se; just suppose for a moment for my argument to work). It's unimaginable, to make a long story short. One final illustration: Imagine a unicorn which exists and imagine a unicorn which doesn't, standing side by side. You'll notice absolutely no difference. Go ahead and picture the one which exists in a realistic world filled with similar creatures, too; all this does is add an environment to the concept. The other one I guess is probably standing in a black void, or something, but that's just a difference in environment, as well.


 * This doesn't really have to do with the article, but as for the argument, I'll grant you that the existing and unexisting unicorn have the same image in my mind, but the image is not the sum total of the idea. For instance, I can imagine my grandmother, who is dead, and I can imagine her there, but the fact that she is not existing as a living  body is part of the total idea of my grandmother in my mind.  I therefore hold that her existence or nonexistence is part of the total idea of my grandmother in my head, and as such is a property, contra Kant. Roy Brumback 23:41, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

And while Kant's argument was already in there, I thought my own particular phrasing was better articulated; I'm open to dispute about such, though.


 * I just don't think you are quite accurately summarizing his point. Like I said, I'll check the book when I have time. Roy Brumback 22:49, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

I already noticed many of your edits, such as requesting citations at many key junctures, and I really appreciate this. However, seeing as how you did this, why couldn't my arguments be allowed to remain with similar requests? It's great that "defenders of the ontological argument" now mandates a source, but if it basically doesn't provide any more than mine, why weren't they deleted/why were mine deleted?

Though, you're right; I shouldn't justify negligence by fellow negligence (the four premises and conclusion example I used under Descartes was an original contribution, so I shouldn't have used it; although, I thought it was a powerful argument, if I do say so myself).

"Uncited, and how do you know infinity wasn't influencing him, or everything for that matter. You're just assuming infinity doesn't influence things. Why?"

True, I am assuming. However, Descartes was assuming the opposite. And, if the dialogue of philosophical debate is any indication, he faces the burden of proof (and not me by being skeptic), because he has made an affirmative claim (which is, incidentally, not empirically verifiable).


 * See, you are assuming. Original research.  If it's really so good, submit it to a philosophy journal.  If they publish it, then you can put it in. Roy Brumback 22:53, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

"All premises are statements of faith, as they can't be proven, but can be used to prove other things"

They can't be used to prove other things; they can be used in a logically valid argument without violating the truth function of the argument (valid, not necessarily sound, which is my dispute). A valid argument for God:

Either God exists, or unicorns exist. Unicorns do not exist. Therefore, God exists.

While the argument is certifiably valid, it proves absolutely nothing.


 * I don't agree with your characterization of Descartes argument being that silly as you make it sound, and as your assertion is thus disputable, it is not obviously true and therefore needs a cite. Roy Brumback 22:57, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

"Again uncited, and necessary existence can be part of an idea, necessary mathematical truths for instance."

Yes, but mathematical truths cannot be imagined to not have existed. It is impossible to hypothesize a world where two plus three equals six (unless 'two' and 'three' stand for other numbers and we face a nominal issue). I can imagine a world without God. Now, you might argue I cannot claim I can imagine a world without a 'necessary being,' but, again, the burden of proof is on you, because no pattern or empirical investigation suggests such a being exists, nor can contradictions be found (since the world exists; if it did not exist, we could argue we faced an inconsistency via indirect proof or reductio ad absurdum, but we obviously cannot).

Besides, using tautology to prove something is extremely weak, even for numbers, as it requires begging the question (again, even for numbers). Quine, Russell, Frege, and others made cases for the existence of numbers which were much more cogent than (although inspired by), "Numbers necessarily exist."


 * I'm not trying to prove anything. If certain philosophers have argued as you have, cite them.  Roy Brumback 23:00, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

"Uncited, and probably untrue as an inconceivable being can not be the greatest conceivable being by definition. If it's inconceivable, we can't conceive it."

I know, that's my point. To resolve your confusion, look at it this way. A being superior to any other couldn't be one we would be able to comprehend/perceive in any way, as one we could perceive would obviously be nearer to our own, finite existence than one of whom we could not conceive.


 * Again, you're assuming something not proved, that the greatest being can't be something we can conceive of but must be inconceivable. Why?  I can concieve of infinity, or following Cantor, infinite infinity and transfinite infinity.  The fact that we're talking about it proves we can conceive of it.  You are saying an inconceivable being is greater then a conceivable one.  Again, why?  Something could be inconceivable to us based on how people think but still not be the greatest thing there is.  You were saying an inconceivable being could be the greatest being we could conceive of, which is not true by definition.  It seems you're the one with the confusion. If a philosopher has argued the opposite, reinsert with that cite. Roy Brumback 23:13, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

I enjoy healthy debate, so please respond if you have the time. I really think I've made decent cases for retaining my contributions to the article; hopefully, you'll agree with at least one/some of these. If you do, I would immensely appreciate their reinstatement. Thank you.


 * In the end, all I'm really asking for is cites. As you've admitted much of your editing is your original research, it can't be allowed.  As encyclopediasts, were just summarizing knowledge, not generating new knowledge.  If you wish to personally argue this argument, do it in philosophy journals, not here.  I realize too much of the article already has such stuff, but it has been flagged for such a reason and is to be distrusted accordingly.  The solution is not to put in more unverified stuff.  Just find some reputable philosophers who have argued as you have and then they can be reinserted. Roy Brumback 23:20, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

Responses Cont.
Whoa, whoa; I've only said one thing was original. Where did you get that? In this particular discussion outside the article, I'm using original arguments to illustrate points which you appear (to me) to be misunderstanding. Don't use that against me.

And you still didn't answer why much of the article which doesn't cite anything more than I did was allowed to remain in tact (or why my contributions weren't). I think this really deserves addressing before I continue to your points.


 * I said I will get to them later. They should not be allowed to stand. Roy Brumback 08:52, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

Existence as a property: As for your grandmother; I feel awkward discussing this example. I'm going to use the unicorn again, only because I really can't extend your example (show you its weaknesses) without being extremely offensive, potentially. But, the sum total of your idea, that is, either the sum total of your idea of the unicorn including existence or not, still hasn't changed the idea of the unicorn (and I'm not just referring to the image; I assumed the original mental projection would suffice, but I see you weren't convinced). Let's say we imagine a unicorn and a dead unicorn, complete with life spans, environmental contexts, and knowledge that the dead unicorn no longer survives as the living one does (existed in the past). We're still imagining an EXISTING unicorn (either we're imagining/conceptualizing his remains or we're imagining a unicorn that, at one time or another, was still alive). This hasn't solved the problem for you.

My sister died last Thanksgiving, but the concept of my sister, which has been modified to include her untimely death, necessitates that she was once living and is now dead. I'm not imagining her as not existing but not living. Living does not equal existing. The sum total of the idea, as you put it, includes now that her particles are no longer functioning in unity to sustain a living, breathing creature, but the particles still exist and, furthermore, they once existed as the traditional concept. Taking this a step further, if I imagined my sister the way she was two years ago, and I then imagined her the way she'll be 500 years from now, completely decomposed and no longer a unified entity, both concepts include existence. My sister couldn't have died without having had existed, same as your late grandmother. Likewise, neither can be imagined to be dead and not existing, as the former strictly requires existence.


 * Substitute dead thing x if a personal example is too much. I have no problem with it.  You can therefore extend it to an abstraction, showing it is not weak.  You are not your particles, as they continually change.  I am not the same matter I was yesterday, and yet I'm positive I'm the same person.  Otherwise, why do you keep debating me.  Are you from moment to moment debating someone totally different, as I am now different particles than I was yesterday?  I'm pretty sure you're still the same person.  You might disagree, but I'll take that as an axiom of mine.  So therefore I don't buy your argument about the particles or matter state of your sister.  As for the unicorn, imagining the unicorn that doesn't exist necessetates that not existing be part of the idea of the unicorn.  I can imagine the image, but ideas are not necessarily images, and many ideas have no image to them at all .  I'm not imaging an existing unicorn, I'm thinking of an unexistant unicorn.  As the unexistant part is a part of the total idea, it is a property of the idea.  The not existing or existing part does change the idea, as they are two different total ideas, even if they are not two different images. Roy Brumback 09:10, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

This particular discussion may not be relevant (at least directly) to the article, but my original contribution was, so I still believe it should be reinstated. Besides, even if Kant was WRONG (I don't think he was, obviously), that shouldn't prevent me from including it in the article. Trust me, Descartes, while eternally significant, has been disputed more than practically any other philosopher, so anything from him is also subject to scrutiny (and certainly more so than Kant), but yet everything he argued is included in the article.

If you're intending to include Kant in the future but just haven't done the research, that's fine, but I'm guessing not everything on the page was fact-checked before it was allowed to remain (restated, I'm guessing not everything was deleted just because someone hadn't personally read the respective author's writings, so I don't know why I'm being singled out). You're going to find I'm right (at least, if nothing else, about what he argued, even if you still dispute it), so it should be included. I can't cite CPR, but I can cite Lawhead, if that makes a sufficient difference for you.


 * Dude, Kant is already included. I'm disputing your summary of his argument.  CPR is available online.  Look it up and find it.  I don't have time now, but in a few days I will.  I "singled you out" because I just happened to check this article right after your edits, saw they were not verified and disagreed with many of them, showing they are not obviously true, and so needed cites.  That's why I deleted them.  If you wish, I will delete all unverified content quickly.  Are you arguing you can break wiki verifiability rule because others have? Roy Brumback 09:16, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

And finally, to definitively prove my point, here's something extremely significant Descartes himself said:

"Existence is contained in the idea or concept of every single thing, since we cannot conceive of anything except as existing. " (Descartes Axiom 10, Second Replies; AT 7:166)

As you can see, he contradicts himself and you, since we can't conceive of anything 'clear and distinct' (or defined in a relatively exhaustive way) which doesn't exist (so attributing existence to an entity such as God is definitively redundant). Critics like Kant have used this against him from day one. [And even if you begin to differentiate between contingent and necessary existence as properties, you can't provide anything but an arbitrary selectivism which only eludes the problem by making itself irremovable. Something like Plato's forms, which were posited to be necessary entities, are rarely used anymore (aside from neoplatonists and through mutations of the concept by other philosophers), but yet the majority of critics regularly deny their existence, so we seem to have a double standard. It seems we can deny necessary existence as being a property as well due to this, so that particular argument fails in its own virtue.]


 * I can conceive of something not existing except as a thought. Can't you?  Descartes point is you can't truely conceive of nothing, not something that only exists as an idea. Roy Brumback 09:24, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

Infinity: No no; you're taking my assumption out of context. I was making the assumption on behalf of the argument, not that I had conjured the argument on my own. The argument has been used by Hume, Russell, and Wittgenstein, for example, although, no, it wasn't directly cited. I'm sure some internet surfing could prove this. (Hume said in regards to infinite time, "An infinite number of real parts of time passing in succession...appears so evident a contradiction that no man whose judgement is not corrupted... would ever be able to admit of it." David Hume, Enquiry. xii. II 125. rpt in http://www.michaelhorner.com/articles/doesGodexist/notes.html#6)  Russell, I know (having recently studied him) used the concepts of predicate logic language and the principle of identity to discuss infinity. Though, infinity, perfect circles, and what not CANNOT be imagined by our finite minds, so I'm not sure how your point works against me. I acknowledged, first, that we can discuss infinity without actually comprehending it, so it does NOT follow that we couldn't conceive of a God who was by all means perfect without being influenced by Him. Sure, we can mathematically prove/utilize infinity for specific purposes, but we must place specific barriers like limits on subtraction and division, the one-to-one ratio (infinite library), the paradox of sets and the paradox of infinite regression without infinite progression (That is, it is impossible to have an infinite past, as we would need to be able to count to infinity to reach now. One cannot begin a set or function with negative infinity, etc.), and so forth. Besides, even though we can mathematically utilize the concept, it is never instantiated in reality, just like the perfect circle. So, maybe God is never instantiated in reality.

David Hilbert (an extremely significant contemporary mathematician) has said, "The infinite is nowhere to be found in reality. It neither exists in nature nor provides a legitimate basis for rational thought. The role that remains for the infinite...is solely that of an idea..." (David Hilbert, "On the Infinite", in Philosophy of Mathematics, ed. with an Intro. by Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam (Prentice-Hall, 1964) p. 151 as rpt on http://www.michaelhorner.com/articles/doesGodexist/notes.html#5)

THEREFORE, since I obviously did not just make up the argument, it should be included.


 * Then cite it dude, that's all I'm saying. And I can't quite understand what you're getting at here, as it seems a little jumbled.  Are you arguing infinity doesn't exist?  Why?  Are you sure the perfect circle doesn't exist?  How do you know?  And what does any of that have to do with the article? Roy Brumback 09:24, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

Of Unicorns: The argument is valid. I am REALLY, REALLY not trying to sound condescending, but what do you know about syllogistic logic? This should be common knowledge.

Either God exists or unicorns exist. Unicorns do not exist. Therefore, God exists.

This argument is absolutely valid in every conceivable way; it's a disjunctive syllogism. Validity does NOT equal truth, however, as you correctly perceived. Descartes was doing the exact same thing (with less obviously fictional entities than unicorns) by relying on faith/intuition/whatever to make a point, but he was DEFINITELY not PROVING anything. (The cap locks are for emphasis; I'm not yelling at you or assuming you're too asinine to catch my point.)


 * You are kind of insulting me "but what do you know", but as a Christian, I'll forgive you :) Validity does not prove truth, but a valid sound argument does.  I learned that day one in philosophy class.  It's impossible to have true premises yield false (i.e. not true) conclusions.  But what is this about?  The statement of faith thing?  All premises are statements of faith, as premises can't be proven, except by other premises, which themselves can't be proven except by other...ect. Roy Brumback 09:29, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

Necessary Existence: Including necessary existence as part of an idea is not proof of the truth of the idea. I can fabricate any number of imaginary entities which "necessarily exist," and you'll have absolutely no reason to believe they do. This argument has been stated over a hundred times in a hundred ways, which is why I didn't bother citing anyone (that, and I didn't see much point to citing things in this discussion until you insisted). In any case, I accused him of begging the question, which was an accurate accusation. Even if he were talking about numbers, he would still be begging the question (even if numbers are actually exactly as how you argue). There was no reason to remove this comment of mine, because it's true by virtue of the definition of 'begging the question.'

And as for citing philosophers...

Numbers and Citing Philosophers: "... existence, duration, size, number and all universals are not, it seems to me, modes in the strict sense ... . They are referred to by a broader term and called attributes ... because we do indeed understand the essence of a thing in one way when we consider it in abstraction from whether it exists or not, and in a different way when we consider it as existing; but the thing itself cannot be outside our thought without its existence..."

"The existence of a triangle should not be compared with the existence of God, since the relation between existence and essence is manifestly quite different in the case of God from what it is in the case of the triangle. God is his own existence, but this is not true of the triangle" (AT 7:383; CSM 2:263)

You know who said those? Descartes. (a response to your argument regarding the existence of numbers and/or mathematical necessities) (Btw, while those were quotes from Stanford's online encyclopedia, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-ontological/ I own all of Descartes' writings, so I figured it was okay for me to save substantial time this way)

There is no need to cite anyone to recognize that Descartes was begging the question (recognizing argumental fallacies has been done for literally thousands of years; I shouldn't have to cite anyone for this specific technique); he was begging the question according to the oral-tradition established definition of begging the question. I would cite philosophers (other than just naming them) if we were writing an article about numbers. However, since we aren't writing an article about the existence of numbers, I don't have time for that, seeing as how I've many other obligations in life which are already being burdened by this prolix debate.

"Again, you're assuming something not proved, that the greatest being can't be something we can conceive of but must be inconceivable. Why?  I can concieve of infinity, or following Cantor, infinite infinity and transfinite infinity.  The fact that we're talking about it proves we can conceive of it.  You are saying an inconceivable being is greater then a conceivable one.  Again, why?  Something could be inconceivable to us based on how people think but still not be the greatest thing there is.  You were saying an inconceivable being could be the greatest being we could conceive of, which is not true by definition.  It seems you're the one with the confusion. If a philosopher has argued the opposite, reinsert with that cite. " (You)

SO IS HE?!?!?!? (response to your first clause)

No, you cannot conceive of infinity. You can define it; you can utilize its properties in math; but you cannot actually conceive of it (likewise, you cannot draw or imagine a perfect circle). The fact that we're talking about it does not prove we can conceive of it; language is not proof but description (of concepts or descriptions of perceptions, or descriptions of ideas, or descriptions of any number of things; I'm using 'descriptions' in the broadest sense possible, by the way). As for infinity, I think I've already exhaustively explained how the concept of infinity (that we cannot fully realize) only reaffirms my point above in other sections. First of all, we can't conceive of it. Second of all, the fact that we CAN discuss it shows that we could conceive of a God which didn't exist who was omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, and omnibenevolent.


 * You can conceive of infinity, or a perfect circle. Just conceive of it.  Now you're done.  And a God that doesn't exist can't be anything, by definition.  It's like the dead person.  Once you add the non existant part, that necessitates that it have no properties, showing they are two different ideas.  But now were debating about the argument, not the article.  And I don't personally agree with Descartes proof.  I'm simply asking you to cite an established real philosopher for a counter to his point.  No matter how much you think your conclusions are obvious, something I don't, if they are ''you're' arguments, they are original research.  Cite your sources dude.  Let the concept sink in. Roy Brumback 09:42, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

Look, I understand what you keep saying about the conceiving-of-something-we-cannot-conceive bit; I KNOW IT'S PARADOXICAL. That's what makes it detrimental to his point. Kierkegaard, one of the foremost Christian philosophers in modern times, argues we cannot a) make substantial arguments for the existence of God and b) we can't know his nature, because He is an entity of faith.

Moses Maimonides wrote, "Glory then to Him who is such that when the intellects contemplate His essence, their apprehension turns into incapacity; and when they contemplate the proceeding of His actions from His will, their knowledge turns into ignorance; and when the tongues aspire to magnify HIm by means of attributive qualifications, all eloquence turns into weariness and incapacity!" (Philosophy of Religion, Second Ed. pg 122 Ed: Petersen, Hasker, Reichenbach, Basinger... etc. I don't have time to MLA this)  This argument basically says we cannot define God by attributes; he continues in the same article to say we can only conceptualize what things he is NOT.

Both Maimonides and Kierkegaard were Christians, btw; if you insist, I can start extracting comments from philosophers who were OPPOSED to Christianity as well (and with greater ease), but I figured arguing against the religious concept via religious quotes would best propel my argument with the least expenditure of energy.


 * Once again, you're argument. Don't you understand this page is not for you're arguments.  If it was, I'd insert my stuff.  But I don't, because that would be original research.  And I personally think Kierkegaard is wrong, about a lot of things.  If for instance someone, Moses for instance, actually talked to God, then he obviouly knew God by more than just faith. Roy Brumback 09:48, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

Final Comments: Fair enough, but as I've stated, I only included one original argument. Yes, I'm beginning to desire to write a book on these matters, as everything I say is questioned unless directly quoted at every instance. That's fine to a point, but many things I've said REALLY don't benefit from quoting (begging the question, for instance), and also I feel the paradigm is a restriction on original thought in the scholastic environment; this is of course irrelevant to our discussion here, as Wikipedia requires such no matter my opinion. I just thought I'd state my conscious objection to pedantic citations.

And also, I really feel singled out, as 'unverified' arguments are used all over the article (even though, now, they request citations) but remain in the article just the same. That simply isn't fair.

Maybe I've demonstrated a better-than-novitiate understanding of the material by now, and I've provided SOME quotes.

Responses Cont. II
EDIT: Before my response begins, I just wanted to thank you for some of the recent edits. If nothing else, you've demonstrated fairness with these. (Though, it's really too bad so much of the relevant and significant information had to be removed. Obviously, I would prefer we kept as many undisputed things as possible, but I realize this would conflict with the purpose of Wikipedia, so I submit.)

"Substitute dead thing x if a personal example is too much. I have no problem with it.  You can therefore extend it to an abstraction, showing it is not weak.  You are not your particles, as they continually change.  I am not the same matter I was yesterday, and yet I'm positive I'm the same person.  Otherwise, why do you keep debating me.  Are you from moment to moment debating someone totally different, as I am now different particles than I was yesterday?  I'm pretty sure you're still the same person.  You might disagree, but I'll take that as an axiom of mine.  So therefore I don't buy your argument about the particles or matter state of your sister.  As for the unicorn, imagining the unicorn that doesn't exist necessetates that not existing be part of the idea of the unicorn.  I can imagine the image, but ideas are not necessarily images, and many ideas have no image to them at all. I'm not imaging an existing unicorn, I'm thinking of an unexistant unicorn. As the unexistant part is a part of the total idea, it is a property of the idea. The not existing or existing part does change the idea, as they are two different total ideas, even if they are not two different images."

First of all, the continual change hypothesis (most formidably advocated by Bergson and Whitehead) does not support your conclusion. You're inclination to define 'yourself' without recognition of the particular particles is wishful thinking, as far as I'm concerned. You have different particles than you did when you first began reading this, but I still use the word 'you' to address the consciousness that the continually rotating/transmogrifying system of cells and synapses constantly maintains. Sure, by MY colloquial definition of a person, I'm still the same, but an objective and entirely neutral entity (let's say one which wasn't a being, so to speak) would not necessarily agree. This, of course, is bound to sound ludicrous at first. However, how are you anything more than an aggregate of atoms, particles, cells, and organs? What makes you so intrinsically different than an eroding rock? By 'sister,' I'm only defining the aggregate human creature, if you will, which I labeled with an exclusive title due to common origin and who was classified as female for all points of her traditional (recognizable) existence. She was a different entity everytime I looked at her, but our definition of person colloquially assumes these trivial changes aren't worth accounting for so that we have a practical language, not because they didn't occur. And, again, a sentient mind maintaining a personality (in so much that it responds with specific behaviors in specifc situations such as me addressing you as 'you' and getting a response from your aggregate) also contributes to our concept of a person. And for good reason. However, if we were to be REALLY scientific about this, we wouldn't succumb to an 'idol of the tribe,' as Bacon called it, and presume we are inherently different from the rest of the universe just because we want to be. And btw, you really need to address Descartes' quote, because he directly disagrees with you in the quote while you persistently try to defend him with the opposing view.


 * As I said, I don't agree with the change hypothesis, I hold you are the same thing. If something changes, the thing itself must still exist, otherwise it became something else, and didn't change, it was destroyed and something new took it's place.  I don't think I was destroyed, therefore I don't buy that hypothesis. Roy Brumback 10:03, 26 October 2006 (UTC)

It's time to put this unicorn debate to rest, once and for all...

I have no idea what you're trying to say about the unicorn. I'm serious. How can you differentiate between an 'existing' and 'nonexisting' unicorn?? (And btw, I'm NOT JUST TALKING ABOUT IMAGES) Since neither are instantiated, the only difference would be their definitions; that is, one is defined to exist, and the other isn't.  You can't imagine the subject, that is, a unicorn who doesn't exist, AS PART of the imagined concept. You can attribute the property of nonexistence (if we're willing to call nonexistence a 'property' for the sake of argument) to his definition, but you can't imagine the unicorn in any attributive way and also grant it nonexistence. In your concept, for example, I assume both unicorn's have horns, right? Well, how can the nonexistent unicorn have anything (and how can you say ANYTHING WHATSOEVER about it) if it doesn't exist? If you imagined it with horns, you imagined an existing unicorn having existing horns, even if you later decided such an imagined concept can't exist. If it doesn't exist, how can we even compare it to the concept of an existing unicorn? We would have no reason to believe they are even similar in such a way as to group them as the same creature! If you see a unicorn in your head, if you attribute any sort of property to it, and if you describe its metaphysical nature as we are doing now, you're not actually thinking of a nonexistent unicorn. You are imagining (not necessarily through imagery) a unicorn which DOES exist to which you're fallaciously assigning, or symbolically, the nonexistent property to further our discussion in a meaningful way. It's like imagining the number three as being lower than two. You can't imagine that. Sure, you can change the DEFINITIONS of two and three to make this work (two equals what we call four, for example), but you're just changing your definition without actually changing anything about the concept. Whatever name for the number which used to be "two" we would then use would still represent the number with the same magnitude in the number scale. Another example: if I'm taller than my father, but shorter than my friend, I can't meaningfully say that my friend is shorter than my dad. Sure, you can write this down on a piece of paper and say, "See? I included in my concept of my friend the property of being shorter than your dad," but it's just apodictically meaningless.

Even though the conceptual argument I have elaborated (not created on my own, just developed) to such an extent works on every level I can see, your other problem is the analysis of the language. Russell fought this his whole life. To counter meaningless phrases such as "nonexisting unicorns," he further developed Frege's predicate logic. In the case of the unicorn,

[S(x)=For all x, x exists. U(x)=For all x, x is a unicorn; Px=Function of x applies to all x. Ex=Function of x applies to at least one x.]  Sooo, what I'm saying is:

Px(S(x)Ex[U(x)])

Or...

Px S(x). (For all x, x exists, or, more accurately, x participates in existence.) Ex U(x). (There is an x such that x is a unicorn, and likewise.)

Sooo, what you're saying:

Px(~S(x)Ex[U(x)])  (notice the tilde)

Or...

Px~S(x). (There is not an x which exists.) ExU(x). (There is an x which is a unicorn.)

If you read the last two parentheticals aloud, you'll see what you were saying was self-referentially incoherent. Furthermore, here's something Russell actually said: "An important consequence of the theory of descriptions is that it is meaningless to say, "A exists," unless "A" is (or stands for) a phrase of the form "the so-and-so." If the so-and-so exists, and x is the so-and-so, to say "x exists" is nonsense.  Existence, in the sense in which it is ascribed to single entities, is thus removed altogether from the list of fundamentals.  The ontological argument and most of its refutations are found to depend upon bad grammer." (Russell, Bertrand. Ibid.  Rpt in The Twentieth Century to Quine and Derrida. Wadsworth/Thomson Learning: Belmont, CA.  1997.  pg. 187)  Right outta' the book. In fact, I don't even remember it being so DIRECTLY enforcing the point. Btw, he concludes that S(x), which prescribes existence, is therefore never to be used in predicate/sentential logic. But anyway.

Okay, seriously, if the argument isn't allowed in the article now, there will be no excuse for it.


 * You can quote Russell on ontological proofs. I never said you can't.  Just cite it, that's all I said.  Now, forget the unicorn.  Let's just say thing x exists, thing x doesn't exist.  We can not now imagine any image, and we have to use language and symbols.  These are obviously two different sentences with two different information contents, and sentences are ideas.  So the only difference between these two ideas is the existence/nonexistence parts, and so existence must be a property of these two ideas, or else they would be the same idea, which they are not. Roy Brumback 10:17, 26 October 2006 (UTC)


 * And, I'm not saying there exists a unicorn which doesn't exist, dur. I'm saying there exists an idea of a unicorn, which doesn't exist except as an idea.  And once I know it doesn't exist, the not existing part is part of the idea of the unicorn.  Your argument, or Russell's, is about existence of an external thing, not an idea. 69.104.244.187 11:38, 26 October 2006 (UTC)

"Dude, Kant is already included. I'm disputing your summary of his argument.  CPR is available online.  Look it up and find it.  I don't have time now, but in a few days I will.  I "singled you out" because I just happened to check this article right after your edits, saw they were not verified and disagreed with many of them, showing they are not obviously true, and so needed cites.  That's why I deleted them.  If you wish, I will delete all unverified content quickly.  Are you arguing you can break wiki verifiability rule because others have?"

Um, in a really passing reference he is. You have no reason to dispute my summary other than a personal disagreement with Kant's argument, which shouldn't affect whether it's included in the article. What you mean is you just want a citation.

Well, I understand then, what happened. But still, yes, you should have quickly deleted all unverified content; I appreciate the offer.

And no, it seemed to me that you were allowing others to break the verifiability rule, plain in simple, regardless of my passages (although, sure, the first time I wrote I was more concerned with my passages, but I haven't been since this discussion).

"I can conceive of something not existing except as a thought. Can't you?  Descartes point is you can't truely conceive of nothing, not something that only exists as an idea."

NO. I can't; you can't. Sure, we can define a perfect circle all we want. Sure, we can provide a function which will result in an almost accurate circle as the graph for all possible x. Sure, we can conceive of RIDICULOUSLY NEAR PERFECT circles; but the perfect circle is impossible to conceive, just as infinity. My guess is we can't conceive of 1000, let alone infinity (though, there are a number of differences between 1000 and infinity aside from our cognitive realization of the two, so don't take that as the crux of my argument or anything; I know we can conceptualize 1000, but it's not in the way you were suggesting for infinity). The concept of infinity, which I recognize as a mere definition and/or symbol related to lines, rays, number scales, and more, which can be applied to various mathematical functions and/or properties, is simply beyond my network of neural matter in my head. And worse, it is beyond logical consistency (in the sense that logical consistency orders our perceptions and ideas).

EDIT: When I reread this, I realize I was responding to something which you weren't discussing in the quote. Oops. Still, it applies to other things in our debate, so I'll keep it here.

And to actually address the quote: No, he's saying exactly what I'm saying. The quote really speaks for itself, I think, and I don't know why you made such a distinction from it.

"Then cite it dude, that's all I'm saying. And I can't quite understand what you're getting at here, as it seems a little jumbled.  Are you arguing infinity doesn't exist?  Why?  Are you sure the perfect circle doesn't exist?  How do you know?  And what does any of that have to do with the article?"

For the first question, I guess so, yeah, as in it is never instantiated, not that we can't mathematically define and use the concept. Though it was David Hilbert who directly stated such (so I defer the second question to him). Above for the third question; as for the fourth, refer to what I originally wrote in the article regarding infinity (which, since I've provided concurring arguments from other philosophers and mathematicians, I believe should be reinstated).

"You are kind of insulting me "but what do you know", but as a Christian, I'll forgive you :) Validity does not prove truth, but a valid sound argument does.  I learned that day one in philosophy class.  It's impossible to have true premises yield false (i.e. not true) conclusions.  But what is this about?  The statement of faith thing?  All premises are statements of faith, as premises can't be proven, except by other premises, which themselves can't be proven except by other...ect."

I think you misunderstand. I was actually asking, "what do you know about syllogistic logic?" I wanted to know because it occurred to me you might not know much of it. I WAS NOT, in other words, saying, "Oh, like you know anything about syllogistic logic," which, I gather, is how you interpreted the admittedly vague expression. Sorry about that.

And yes, it was about the statement of faith. The difference is that I have no reason to accept his statements of faith aside from baseless 'intuition.' Empirical evidence, a priori argumentation (since, as I've been trying to elucidate, his argument does not hold from a priori counter argumentation), etc. would at least support such an intuition, but he can't provide that. But anyway, I think you see how my unicorn disjunctive syllogism comparison was actually valid the whole time. Even though the argument is necessarily valid, I have absolutely no reason to accept its premises (just like Descartes' premises based on faith). Therefore, I made the comparison.

"You can conceive of infinity, or a perfect circle. Just conceive of it.  Now you're done.  And a God that doesn't exist can't be anything, by definition.  It's like the dead person.  Once you add the non existant part, that necessitates that it have no properties, showing they are two different ideas.  But now were debating about the argument, not the article.  And I don't personally agree with Descartes proof.  I'm simply asking you to cite an established real philosopher for a counter to his point.  No matter how much you think your conclusions are obvious, something I don't, if they are ''you're' arguments, they are original research.  Cite your sources dude.  Let the concept sink in."

No, you can't. (Hilbert, Russell, Wittgenstein, Kant, etc.)

Wait a second... "And a God that doesn't exist can't be anything by definition." Just like a unicorn? (Okay, that was smarta** of me, but come on.)


 * Yes, you can. You can't really conceive on anything fully, not even this desk my computer is sitting on, but you can still conceive of it in some way, just like infinity or the perfect circle.  Hilbert et al. are wrong.  And the God that doesn't exist has no properties as an object outside of my mind.  The idea of the God that doesn't exist has at least two properties, the property of being an idea and the property of being an idea about a thing that doesn't exist outside of my mind. Roy Brumback 10:30, 26 October 2006 (UTC)

No, it isn't like a dead person, as I already discussed. Living does not equal existing (even though the latter certainly entails the former, living does not entail existing; living belongs to existing, and not the other way around, as nothing can first be living and then be existing) You're defining a dead person as a unified collection of particles which, even though it regularly changes, seems to maintain identity in a subjective sense even though it no longer breaths and maintains its own organic structure. I might define a dead person as a collection of particles which exist. Done.

"Once again, you're argument. Don't you understand this page is not for you're arguments.  If it was, I'd insert my stuff.  But I don't, because that would be original research.  And I personally think Kierkegaard is wrong, about a lot of things.  If for instance someone, Moses for instance, actually talked to God, then he obviouly knew God by more than just faith."

OH COME ON!! When I said "my argument," I meant the ARGUMENT FOR WHICH I'M ARGUING IN THIS DISCUSSION, as in, THE ARGUMENT ON WHOSE TEAM I AM. NOT AS IN THE ARGUMENT I PERSONALLY INVENTED.

Anyway, you do know I was referring to a different Moses, right? In any case, assuming you did, I don't believe any mystical revelation experiences of God, so we'll just have to agree to disagree, there. Though, you're going to be VERY hard pressed to convince the average philosopher (or any secular one) of such experiences, as well; I think the burden of proof clearly lies in your court, for such an argument (hell, even if the revelations/miracles are TRUE).


 * Your team? I'm not trying to argue or convince you of anything dude.  I make that point as a reason one might disagree with Kierkeegaard, which is why one needs cites for things you think are true but others don't.  You keep wanting to argue the ontological argument.  This isn't a debate forum.  I'll admit I'm arguing the existence as a property point with you, but that isn't really what this page or article is for.  You have to act as an encyclopediaist here, not a debater or philosopher. Roy Brumback 11:55, 26 October 2006 (UTC)

"This isn't a scholastic enviroment. It's wikipedia, and it requires citations.  I kind of think Descartes was begging the question too, but you need a cite.  Which philosopher has argued that.  Are you an established philosopher?  Do you have articles and books published?  If so, cite them.  If not, get them published and then you can cite them.  If this format is crimping your "original thought" that's just the way it is.  Feel free to start a blog (but even then, blogs can't generally be cited, unless they state a fact or the edit says something like "Important person x said on their blog..."  I'm enjoying this debate, but this site is not really for our debating, only the accumulation of verified knowledge.  It's wikipedia, not wikiphilosophy.  Our only job here is to cite sources that further knowledge, not make original points.  It's the original points we cite, if they are accepted and verified. But you are right, it isn't fair, so I'm going to delete all uncited info in article. Fair enough?"

I know it does; I said that in my last post. However, I still don't understand why a citation is needed for begging the question. He just is. Again, I must acknowledge how many statements are already made in the article which assume self-evidence. No one is citing someone to prove the opening sentence of the article, for instance. Because, who would one quote to define the ontological argument? (Maybe Anselm, but he didn't invent the term) And who would one quote to define an 'argument for the existence of God?'  They're common concepts.

The 'original thought' aside was COMPLETELY tangential, and I think I made that clear enough, so there's no need to discuss it.

No, the site isn't intended for debate, but this is the discussion page, after all. Anything relevant and appropriate can be said, it would seem to me. Besides, we wouldn't be having a debate assuming A) I provided sources for everything I said (when doing such certainly wasn't the universal tradition when I initially posted) and B) you didn't argue with the philosophers' sentiments when I did provide them (such as Descartes or Kant; though you said you'd post citations of the latter amid your arguments against him).

As for your last comment, I really, really, really appreciate your flexibility and ability to compromise. I know I've probably been really heated in this post, but I'm replying passage by passage, so I don't necessarily consider statements like the last of yours the entire duration. I deeply thank you for it (though, hopefully my comments won't sound out-of-place in the article when/if you accept them all). I imagine I still have debating to do to get my own comments INTO the article, so I guess I'll see you next time.


 * You don't have to debate anything to get it into the article. Just cite your sources.  That's all.  Can't you find any philosopher who thinks Descarte was begging the question?  If you take the word God out of the proof, it's like this:


 * 1. I can imagine a perfect being.
 * 2. I am a nonperfect being.
 * 3. A nonperfect being can't truly conceive of a perfect being.
 * 4. That idea therefore must not have come from me.
 * 5. Only a perfect being can create the idea of a perfect being.
 * 6. A perfect being therefore created the idea.
 * 7. Therefore a perfect being exists.


 * Now, only if one assumes the idea of a perfect being doesn't have to come from a perfect being is this begging the question. I personally disagree with the first postulate, because I don't think you can fully conceive of a perfect being, but if you can then one has to reject postulate 3 and or 5, which you may or may not do, to defeat the argument.  It isn't begging the question to say, "only x can do y, and y happened, therefore x exists" but one can dispute whether only x can do y.  There are therefore good reasons to argue this isn't begging the question, and so it isn't obvious, and needs a cite.


 * So, as we shouldn't be arguing the argument itself, I'll say that you simply need cites. If you think something is obvious throw it out here and wait a few days and then maybe insert it if no one counters you.  Otherwise, be an encyclopediast and gather knowledge, don't argue or try to create new knowledge.  Have fun. Roy Brumback 12:37, 26 October 2006 (UTC)

Responses Cont. III
"As I said, I don't agree with the change hypothesis, I hold you are the same thing. If something changes, the thing itself must still exist, otherwise it became something else, and didn't change, it was destroyed and something new took it's place.  I don't think I was destroyed, therefore I don't buy that hypothesis."

It was destroyed? Why would you ever think that? Just because something changes, it doesn't destroy its former identity; the identity itself has just adapted to a new construction. When two hydrogen atoms join with an oxygen atom, the former identities of the atoms don't change (otherwise the properties of H2O would be entirely unpredictable, but they aren't), they just metamorphisize into a new entity. You can hold that I'm the same thing all you want, but you're arbitrarily maintaining such a claim, since I'm different every time I look in the mirror. So, you don't believe anyone is a different thing than the particular way they were born?? Do you REALLY mean to say that? So, a born again quadrapalegic Christian evangelist is the same thing as a juvenile murderer once unfamiliar with the teachings of Christ? You think that when someone has had a sex change, they themselves haven't changed? Once I've switched political parties or religious agenda, you're saying I still adhere to my previous definition of self?

Our physical components continuously change, and as well, our minds and ideas change practically every time we perceive something. It sounds to me that you're perfectly content pretending we don't change our identities when we do. I'm guessing you would concur that rocks change. And, I'm guessing you would concur that people's attitudes, opinions, ideas, and knowledge change, constantly. So what is it which preserves our previous state even though it no longer remains? And to keep this from becoming nothing but arguments based on faith, keep 'souls' out of this, as they "ain? And again?  And again?... Suddenly, we're left with a single splinter of wood.  Wait; what happened to the table?  It's gone!

And even if YOU didn't buy the hypothesis, what right does that give you to edit the comment? Now that I've provided quotes, the argument should be reinstated, plain and simple.


 * What argument dude? This has nothing to do with the article.  Please quit using this page to rant.  I already told you what I believe and why.  And particles do change, as do atoms, they are wavefunctions of probability that are constantly changing, and yet they are still the same thing, the particles. Roy Brumback 20:09, 26 October 2006 (UTC)


 * And one last thing dude. A proton is always a proton, alone or in an atom.  Saying it's changed is like saying I have changed by going from outside to inside and becoming part of the set of things in my house.  And you dodged the question.  If I am not the same person I was just a second ago, no change has occurred, as change can only happen to a thing that is still the thing, otherwise you can't say it changed, as there has to be an it that is still there.  According to you, there was a person called Roy.  That thing was then totally destroyed and a new thing, Roy2, came into being the next instant, then was destroyed and Roy3 took it's place, ect...  There is no thing called Roy that continually exists from moment to moment, and so Roy can't change, as he can't exist for more than an instant.  Now you can whip this argument up to the entire universe and say the universe is continually destroyed and a new universe takes it's place.  I find such a conclusion absurd, and so by the reductio absurdem I reject the premise.  As for the desk, you prove my point.  If you paint it, it's changed, but is still the desk.  If you break it apart, it's no longer the desk and has been destroyed, showing change and destruction are two different things.  You can't now change the destroyed desk as it no longer exists.  I can only change it if it's still there.  If you wish to say all change is really destruction that's fine, but then we have the universe thing, which I reject.  Roy Brumback 21:31, 26 October 2006 (UTC)

"You can quote Russell on ontological proofs. I never said you can't.  Just cite it, that's all I said.  Now, forget the unicorn.  Let's just say thing x exists, thing x doesn't exist.  We can not now imagine any image, and we have to use language and symbols.  These are obviously two different sentences with two different information contents, and sentences are ideas.  So the only difference between these two ideas is the existence/nonexistence parts, and so existence must be a property of these two ideas, or else they would be the same idea, which they are not. "

Language and symbols have no correlation with reality (beyond being tools with which we communicate our ideas and perceptions), so you're point is in no way progressive. Oh, so sentences are all ideas, huh? So: There is an existing round square;  there is a non-existing round square. Whoa, look at that! Neither of those sentences present ANY IDEA WHATSOEVER, as they are both MEANINGLESS (sure, we can imagine a square, and we can imagine roundness, and we can even articulate attempts to reconcile the two concepts; however, the end product is self-referentially incoherent, because we are trying to establish the existence of an impossible object). Even though I've stressed SEVERAL TIMES now that I'm NOT just relying on imagery, you're bound to claim I'm using pictures/images to justify my point again (though, even if I am, the point isn't ANY LESS cogent, so I don't know why you think you can just avoid it), so I'll come up with another one. In fact, I already have: Another example: if I'm taller than my father, but shorter than my friend, I can't meaningfully say that my friend is shorter than my dad. Sure, you can write this down on a piece of paper and say, "See? I included in my concept of my friend the property of being shorter than your dad," but it's just apodictically meaningless. (Russell, Frege, G. E. Moore, Kant, Hume, Descartes, Wittgenstein, Spinoza, Leibniz, Reid, etc. have ALL SAID such sentences are "meaningless," so eventually, once you realize your existence/non-existence claim is utterly analoguous to one of these examples (as Russell, Frege, Wittgenstein, etc. have all said it was), you're going to have to admit it)


 * It isn't meaningless to say something doesn't exist. Dur.

"And, I'm not saying there exists a unicorn which doesn't exist, dur. I'm saying there exists an idea of a unicorn, which doesn't exist except as an idea.  And once I know it doesn't exist, the not existing part is part of the idea of the unicorn.  Your argument, or Russell's, is about existence of an external thing, not an idea."

I'M NOT SAYING YOU'RE SAYING THERE EXISTS A UNICORN WHICH DOESN'T EXIST, DUR. I'M SAYING YOU'RE THINKING OF A CONCEPT WHICH REQUIRES EXISTENCE IN ORDER TO BE THOUGHT ABOUT.

Hmmm... let's think of something which doesn't exist. Well, in order to do that I MUST PRETEND it DOES exist, IF ONLY FOR THE SAKE OF THE CONCEPT IN MY HEAD SO THAT I CAN MAKE ANY CLAIM ABOUT IT.


 * The term idea occurs nowhere in that argument. Dur.

The unicorn doesn't exist. Well, that sentence is meaningless if you don't know what a unicorn is, right? Wait, how could you know what something is if it doesn't exist? Oh, that's right, because I can define a unicorn as a horse with a horn. They still don't exist, but my IDEA of it, which is just a horse with horns imagined on it, does exist, right? Okay, now, since it doesn't exist, I have to make my imagined concept also not exist. "It doesn't exist." Oh wait; when I say the horse with horns doesn't exist, I must be referring to something other than my concept, because if I can imagine a horse, and I can imagine horns, they OBVIOUSLY ARE ALREADY EXISTING (IN MY CONCEPT). Like I said before, you can write on a piece of paper, "See? I wrote 'DOESN'T EXIST' underneath the definition of the non-existing unicorn," but you're just talking analoguously/equivocally/symbollically about the horse with horns which you were imagining to exist so you have something to talk about in the first place. The unicorn idea exists in your head; the non-existing unicorn does not. The non-existing unicorn is the same as the unicorn, except that we're frivolously (not meaningfully) attaching a 'non-existence' attribute to it, which is pointless because you wouldn't be able to imagine it if it didn't exist in the idea you had. All your thoughts, including those regarding "non-existing" concepts, are thoughts about things which MUST EXIST in the ideas at least, or you would not be able to say ANYTHING WHATSOEVER about them. Does the unicorn have any differences from the non-existing unicorn? We'll never know, because we can't know ANYTHING about the non-existing unicorn. But why can't I know it has a horn or that it's a vertebrate? Because in order for it to have horns or be a vertebrate, it must be compatible with EXISTING PROPERTIES OF IDEAS, and those existing properties, even if they are ONLY BEING APPLIED TO MENTAL CONCEPTS contained within the various ideas, cannot describe something which doesn't exist at least as part of its idea. "Redness," for instance, cannot be attributed to something which doesn't exist enough to even have a color. Things which can't exist even as ideas are, by definition, things which are impossible to imagine (as imagination obviously requires ideas about actual concepts so the ideas can be attached to something, such as redness being applied to an obviously fictional 'planet-sized' apple [which exists in the concept]). And you're going to have to come up with better logical reasoning than, "There! I just imagined it," because you don't realize what you actually are imagining.


 * You don't have to make your concept unexist to say it doesn't exist outside of an idea. We know one thing about the unicorn, it doesn't exist.  Are you actually saying you don't know unicorns don't exist?  Dur. Roy Brumback 20:40, 26 October 2006 (UTC)

"Yes, you can. You can't really conceive on anything fully, not even this desk my computer is sitting on, but you can still conceive of it in some way, just like infinity or the perfect circle.  Hilbert et al. are wrong.  And the God that doesn't exist has no properties as an object outside of my mind.  The idea of the God that doesn't exist has at least two properties, the property of being an idea and the property of being an idea about a thing that doesn't exist outside of my mind."

So, you're a rationalist, are you? Well, okay, that makes sense considering, but if I really wanted, I could attack you on like a dozen different new levels, if you're willing to commit to the regime.


 * Attack from a dozen different levels? Commit to the regime?  I'm laughing dude, I really am. Roy Brumback 20:40, 26 October 2006 (UTC)

Do you realize what you're saying? First of all, you know what makes infinity and the perfect circle different from the desk? We have no evidence they exist, and they CERTAINLY aren't instantiated, ANYWHERE (especially not as far as we know). Second of all, even if I COULDN'T conceive of the desk, which I don't grant, comparing it and the other two is an error of equivocation, because you're using "conceive" in different ways (from my side of the argument), as, since I don't believe they exist and that they are both beyond the capabilities of human imagination, you CAN'T conceive of them except through extention. Sure, we can define them, but you can also define my friend as being shorter than my dad when I'm taller than my dad and still shorter than the friend. Just because you can SAY something, it doesn't follow that it means anything. Sure, I believe infinity can be meaningfully used in, let's say, Cantor's Diagonal, but the reason it works is because we're referring to entities which are not instantiated (and when we say the diagonal set is larger than the infinite set, we're obviously judging from extention as opposed to onstention). We only imagine infinity insofar as it's an assumed category for those quantities which cannot be limited to a finite magnitude, so its more or less a negative definition (much like Moses' faith in God; it could only be positive if we could experience the subject). In no way, whatsoever, can we actually comprehend the infinite in a cognitive way, and neither can we conclude that the infinite exists in the actual world as opposed to the conceptual.


 * Nope, I'm using conceive in the same way. It's simply to think about it.  And please quit labeling me.  You can only conceive of the desk through abstraction and extension too, as it's a desk you're talking about, not a bunch of wood, which is what it materially is. Roy Brumback 20:40, 26 October 2006 (UTC)

I'm about to quote a prodigiously lengthy quote from Kant (CPR) the next time this is brought up, so I'm warning you ahead of time. :)


 * I told you, I don't agree with Kant, I've already read the book. Don't waste space on this page. Roy Brumback 20:40, 26 October 2006 (UTC)

"Your team? I'm not trying to argue or convince you of anything dude.  I make that point as a reason one might disagree with Kierkeegaard, which is why one needs cites for things you think are true but others don't.  You keep wanting to argue the ontological argument.  This isn't a debate forum.  I'll admit I'm arguing the existence as a property point with you, but that isn't really what this page or article is for.  You have to act as an encyclopediaist here, not a debater or philosopher."

Yes, my team..? And what the HELL makes you think I have no reason to argue for these points other than to prove I'm right? I'm arguing for them, ON BEHALF OF THE PHILOSOPHERS (i.e. not my own points), SO THEY CAN BE INCLUDED IN THE ARTICLE. I know the article isn't for debating, but we're not IN THE ARTICLE when we debate like this (and we're debating about argument inclusion, not whether the ontological argument is correct, but the debate naturally flows in said direction via giving context to the arguments and because you keep disputing whomever I'm referencing). And whenever I actually cite someone (RUSSELL), which is becoming more and more frequent as this argument continues, you don't seem to be willing to include them in the article. Besides, would you rather have me just keep going back into the article without giving you a chance to respond (though, yeah, you could just keep deleting things, and I could just keep reinstating them)?


 * When did I say that can't be in the article? Roy Brumback 20:40, 26 October 2006 (UTC)

"You don't have to debate anything to get it into the article. Just cite your sources.  That's all.  Can't you find any philosopher who thinks Descarte was begging the question?  If you take the word God out of the proof, it's like this:"

First of all, apparently I have to do considerably more than just quote a philosopher, because you're just going to post in here and say something utterly ridiculous like, "That's not what he meant." WHAT DO YOU MEAN THAT'S NOT WHAT RUSSELL MEANT??? Have you EVER read Russell? The quote really, really, REALLY speaks for itself. How could you act like I was misrepresenting him; he must be rolling in his grave. That's absolutely outraging; I'm not kidding or exaggerating. That is just absolutely absurd. What could I possibly do to get the argument in the article if you won't even except the citations as evidence (direct evidence, for that matter) of the established scholarly history of the dispute? So now I have to quote at least three people or something? You're reneging on me, and it's quite disrespectful.


 * Never said that either. Roy Brumback 20:40, 26 October 2006 (UTC)

I don't need to cite for begging the question. As you're about to see, it can be done in a matter of minutes; it's just the unfair treatment I'm getting which stirs my rebellious side. BEGGING THE QUESTION WASN'T INVENTED OR PRIMARILY PROMOTED BY ANY ONE DISTINCT ENTITY IN HISTORY; IT'S JUST USED BY NEARLY EVERYONE AFTER ARISTOTLE TO DESCRIBE A COMMON ARGUMENTAL FALLACY (and the name for the term is not the origin; its just Aristotle's moniker for such an obvious fallacy used by so many philosophers [sophists]). But anyway, I'll just send you to Wikipedia's very own begging the question page. Um... you can use Aristotle's quote, I guess, since I already mentioned him. If you want, you can quote anyone on the page or any of the references. Doesn't matter to me. It's all there... already on Wikipedia (this is what I meant when I said you should revise my comments before deleting them all, since you could have just hyperlinked "begging the question" to the Wiki).

"1. I can imagine a perfect being. 2. I am a nonperfect being. 3. A nonperfect being can't truly conceive of a perfect being. 4. That idea therefore must not have come from me. 5. Only a perfect being can create the idea of a perfect being. 6. A perfect being therefore created the idea. 7. Therefore a perfect being exists.

Now, only if one assumes the idea of a perfect being doesn't have to come from a perfect being is this begging the question. I personally disagree with the first postulate, because I don't think you can fully conceive of a perfect being, but if you can then one has to reject postulate 3 and or 5, which you may or may not do, to defeat the argument. It isn't begging the question to say, "only x can do y, and y happened, therefore x exists" but one can dispute whether only x can do y. There are therefore good reasons to argue this isn't begging the question, and so it isn't obvious, and needs a cite."

What you said was perfectly coherent and reasonable... but it was unfortunately irrelevant. I wasn't saying this was begging the question; I was talking about:

"1. Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive to be contained in the idea of something is true of that thing. 2. I clearly and distinctly perceive that necessary existence is contained in the idea of God. 3. Therefore, God exists."

Now maybe I can't find someone who lists these three premises, as being derived from Descartes, and says they beg the question (not sure on that, really; I'll have to check the MLA International Bibliography when I'm back on campus, tomorrow), but I know I can find dozens of philosophers who say ALL ontological arguments beg the question. (Now, before you criticize me for using original argumentation for not specifically citing a specific person who specifically said those specific premises were specifically begging the question, I don't think it is unreasonable to make a particular application of a generalized rule made by someone of clout. Such that, if Plato says all objects participate in their forms, essentially, I can say a blue egg participates in the form of blueness in reference to Plato without him using the specific illustration or even giving so much as a single example, even though I have no idea how I'd understand his sentiments if he never did, but anyway).


 * I think he was begging the question here too, all I said is find a cite. Dizam. Roy Brumback 20:40, 26 October 2006 (UTC)

"So, as we shouldn't be arguing the argument itself, I'll say that you simply need cites. If you think something is obvious throw it out here and wait a few days and then maybe insert it if no one counters you. Otherwise, be an encyclopediast and gather knowledge, don't argue or try to create new knowledge. Have fun."

... I'm on my own, then? Well, just so you know, everything in this debate I've said with citations is soon to be implemented once again in the article, even if you disagreed with it (which I'm detecting you're encrouaging me to do). If I can't find something REALLY specific regarding Descartes' question-begging, I'm also going to be reinstating my comment with a hyperlink to "begging the question," again, because many make generalized criticisms of the argument which prescribe such a particular and justified criticism in application without specifically addressing either Descartes' particular wording or contribution to the ontological argument (instead addressing others who have used nearly identical arguments). Or, I may find remarkably similar ontological arguments and discuss how they've been addressed by various critics over time.

Will do to the best of my ability.


 * Nope, no cite, no agreement on talk page among many editors, no stay in article. And that's about it dude.  This page isn't for personal debate.  Edit the article with cites or throw a specific edit out here and see if agreement is reached.  Please quit posting your debates with me about things other then what to include on this page, such as the existence as property thing, which is already in the article anyway, and I'm not trying to delete it am I?  If you want a debate partner, find a friend or join a discussion group or something.  Quit filling up this page with your ranting. Roy Brumback 20:40, 26 October 2006 (UTC)

Responses Cont. IV
"What argument dude? This has nothing to do with the article.  Please quit using this page to rant.  I already told you what I believe and why.  And particles do change, as do atoms, they are wavefunctions of probability that are constantly changing, and yet they are still the same thing, the particles."

I never said it did; you were arguing with me, and if you trace my points all the way back, you'll find I was trying to convince you, ORIGINALLY, about the damn unicorn/dead person argument. Oh, yeah, cause I'm just ranting for no reason. I'm just crying like a baby, aren't I? I obviously wasn't trying, a long time ago before we started arguing about it, to get something into the article. Nope; I'm just a compulsive narcissist with a penchant for frivolous debate with random strangers. Yeah, thanks a lot. >:(

"And one last thing dude. A proton is always a proton, alone or in an atom.  Saying it's changed is like saying I have changed by going from outside to inside and becoming part of the set of things in my house.  And you dodged the question.  If I am not the same person I was just a second ago, no change has occurred, as change can only happen to a thing that is still the thing, otherwise you can't say it changed, as there has to be an it that is still there.  According to you, there was a person called Roy.  That thing was then totally destroyed and a new thing, Roy2, came into being the next instant, then was destroyed and Roy3 took it's place, ect...  There is no thing called Roy that continually exists from moment to moment, and so Roy can't change, as he can't exist for more than an instant.  Now you can whip this argument up to the entire universe and say the universe is continually destroyed and a new universe takes it's place. I find such a conclusion absurd, and so by the reductio absurdem I reject the premise. As for the desk, you prove my point. If you paint it, it's changed, but is still the desk. If you break it apart, it's no longer the desk and has been destroyed, showing change and destruction are two different things. You can't now change the destroyed desk as it no longer exists. I can only change it if it's still there. If you wish to say all change is really destruction that's fine, but then we have the universe thing, which I reject."

First of all, I didn't realize that was what you were asking. Your phraseology in the last post was much less clear; I wasn't dodging any question.

Secondly, I never said I wasn't the same general thing as a second ago; if you remember, I argued about the constant mass of the universe. "I'm" not the 'thing' that's changing, the particle arrangements are. "Thing" is relative, is my point. If your definition of chair includes no less than 1000000 particles, then maybe it will never stop being a chair until it loses enough to hit the threshold. If a 'chair' simply has to look and function like one to you, that's fine. What I'm saying is the actual entity, in a world where we didn't have names for things, and we didn't compare objects/people/whatever to our conceptions of them, there would be no reason for objective evaluaters to suggest the 'chair' was at all the same as it was three seconds ago. What if we were beings without depth perception and we absolutely couldn't determine the extention of the chair? Or even the shape? How would we know when it changed? What if all we could make of the world was a giant, hazy blue impulse, so that everything seemed a part of everything else and wasn't differentiable? Would we still think the chair (that is, the thing we point out as a place to sit with our current perception and awareness of the world) was remaining the same, "thing" when it looked like a part of a wall and suddenly someone sat on it? If we could all see each and every atom in each and every thing, would ANYTHING in the world seem like it WASN'T always changing?

Wow; you're taking everything I said completely out of context. Yes, YOU'RE A DIFFERENT ENTITY THAN THE ONE FIVE SECONDS AGO. Just because the entities share an extremely similar body and extremely similar mind does not make them identical. EVERYTHING IS ALWAYS UNDERGOING A PROCESS. When I say "Roy," I'm referring to the collection of particles which APPEARS the same as it used to be (but really isn't) so I can easily address it without always having to account for the new change. It's colloquial; not scientific.

Third of all, you completely misunderstood my point about the universe. The universe has constant mass. That. Doesn't. Change. No destruction, no nothing. However, the universe's rearrangement of particles CONSTANTLY changes. So, even the UNIVERSE is constantly changing, vis a vis. Instead of destruction, I would use "rotate." Yes, every time you speak, you're a new rotation of particles, which, yes, replaces the old configuration (destruction has such an inappropriate connotation, I don't know why anyone would use it, not that they don't). SO WHAT?

"It isn't meaningless to say something doesn't exist. Dur."

Now, see, you're acting like all I was talking about was the actual existence of unicorns, when I was talking about the ideas of them. No need for the dur, especially since you're wrong (or rather, misrepresenting my argument).

"The term idea occurs nowhere in that argument. Dur."

What the hell happened to you? I used to look forward to your next post, but apparently you're determined to make this personal..?

Um, but did you even read it? I said "CONCEPT IN MY HEAD," implying it was an idea!?

"You don't have to make your concept unexist to say it doesn't exist outside of an idea. We know one thing about the unicorn, it doesn't exist.  Are you actually saying you don't know unicorns don't exist?  Dur."

Oh you got me with that cunning "dur," again. I really am out of my league.

Okay, you are not understanding that I was referring to the existence CONTAINED WITHIN THE IDEA. Of COURSE unicorns don't actually exist; I never said they did!!!!!!!! If I can't make an argument without clarifying that I'm talking about existence IN THE IDEA OF THE UNICORN (as in, NOT IN ANY WAY RELATED TO THEIR ACTUAL EXISTENCE), then I probably can't help you understand the point behind it. (Note: in this particular post, you haven't disputed my arguments; you've drawn a red herring out of each one [except the one I misinterpreted before] which is unrelated to my actual point)

"Attack from a dozen different levels? Commit to the regime?  I'm laughing dude, I really am."

That shows your ignorance. First of all, you're OBVIOUSLY spinning 'regime' into some region of definition I certainly didn't intend (a regulated system or pattern of philosophical thought); it was a figurative use, not literal like a government regime or something. Sheesh. Blow something stupid out of proportion, why don't you.

And yeah, I could attack it from a dozen different levels. You don't think I could? Empiricists. Oh, wow, that's like two or three dozen major philosophers right there. Skeptics. Oops, there's another bunch. Soft rationalists. Geez, a hit from home turf. Materialists (not necessarily empiricists, and with different emphasis even if). Cynics. Stoics. Epicureans. Logical Positivists. Process. Pragmatists... ETC.

I'm glad to know you're laughing. I'm glad to know you're no longer interested in this serious debate (...about getting arguments [as proposed by certain philosophers] into the article). If you still are, I'm doubting it, and that isn't a good sign. Come on; just stop. :(

"Nope, I'm using conceive in the same way. It's simply to think about it. And please quit labeling me. You can only conceive of the desk through abstraction and extension too, as it's a desk you're talking about, not a bunch of wood, which is what it materially is."

No, you THINK you're using it the same way. And, I KNOW THAT ALREADY. I already said we conceive of things in abbreviated ways so we can readily use them as concepts. I already said this.

"I told you, I don't agree with Kant, I've already read the book. Don't waste space on this page."

What? Weren't you also the one who said these?:

"and I don't really think that's what Kant was saying. I'll look through the book and see."

"I therefore hold that her existence or nonexistence is part of the total idea of my grandmother in my head, and as such is a property, contra Kant."

"Dude, Kant is already included. I'm disputing your summary of his argument. CPR is available online. Look it up and find it. I don't have time now, but in a few days I will."

"Cite your sources dude. Let the concept sink in." [several like this]

"Hilbert et al. [including Kant] are wrong"

"Once again, you're argument. Don't you understand this page is not for you're arguments." (This didn't have to do with Kant, but it's clear that if I develop any sort of argument to any degree, I am going to be faced with a quote like this. Therefore, to prevent it, I was intending to quote Kant, again.)

And yes, I know you've said you disagree with Kant, it just seems you aren't going to allow my summary of one of his arguments without agreeing to it, so I have to draw attention to this.

And anyway, how am I wasting space if you keep arguing with me? You won't let my version of Kant's summary into the article, so HOW ELSE am I supposed to convince you other than with definitive passages from his work? So now I'm not even allowed to 'waste space' with citations? DO NOT say I'm just repeating myself. Like I said, I apparently have to convince Roy Brumback that Kant said something specifically along the lines of my own terms (which were different than what was already featured in the article) in order for it to be posted. I'm really losing confidence in the process here; there appears to be a problem.

"When did I say that can't be in the article?"

You didn't; you said this:

"Your argument, or Russell's, is about existence of an external thing, not an idea."

Which is completely false... absolutely false, I might add. And anyway, you seem to be the authority for the ontological argument article in this argument (at least, I've agreed to consider your opinion for everything so far, and I've kept from modifying the article in light of this never-ending debate), so I'm waiting for you to say I CAN use it. When you dispute things he [Russell] says, I get the impression you're just going to delete it, if I use it.

"Never said that either."

That was a joke (dur). Now, can we stop using "dur" in this? It's pretty damn childish, after all.

"I think he was begging the question here too, all I said is find a cite. Dizam."

Are you regressing into your preadolescence or something? What's your problem? You used to be at least somewhat formal until now.. "Dizam?" Is that a Christian way to avoid cursing or something? I don't even know what I said in the passage to which you were responding which frustrated you so much...?

I know you want a cite, but what if I can't find anything more specific than a general rule (all ontological arguments beg the question, for instance)? I guess I'll just cite someone arguing about question-begging and stick it somewhere else in the article.

"Nope, no cite, no agreement on talk page among many editors, no stay in article. And that's about it dude.  This page isn't for personal debate.  Edit the article with cites or throw a specific edit out here and see if agreement is reached.  Please quit posting your debates with me about things other then what to include on this page, such as the existence as property thing, which is already in the article anyway, and I'm not trying to delete it am I?  If you want a debate partner, find a friend or join a discussion group or something.  Quit filling up this page with your ranting. "

What are you TALKING ABOUT!? The ONLY one disagreeing with me is YOU; if I would've posted, and you wouldn't have been here, then what do you think would have happened? Whether it's a good or bad thing, I can't just 'post an idea and watch how it floats,' like you keep telling me.

Why am I the one responsible for these debates? And why are you forgetting the original purpose behind nearly every single argument we've had? Trace. it. back. Do it. All of them originated from me trying to get comments/arguments/whatever INTO the article. You've totally lost your decorum by calling this ranting (like I would have any trouble just starting a blog if that was my purpose for crying out loud). Are you trying to pull an argumentum ad hominem? I'm not some evil person sitting around trying to provide arguments without cause. Do Wikipedia a favor and show a smidgeon more respect. As you know, and as I've said a few times now, I've managed to resist editing the page without your consent, thus far. Maybe I sound angry at times; maybe I sometimes pose rhetorical questions like, "Do you know what you're saying?" However, I only do this after I perceive repeated misuse of an argument/description/whatever which actually makes me wonder. However, I don't jump around saying "DUR" all over your arguments, and I don't just pretend like you're a "ranter/troll/n00b/whatever internet slang you want" because you don't agree with me. If you remember, I ASKED you to debate in the first post; if you no longer desire to do so, I'm not coercively forcing you to continue in any way. And again, I'm not ranting. I've provided GOOD arguments, EVEN IF YOU DISAGREE WITH THEM, so far for the particular comments deleted in times past. And you've done the same for the converse, although, obviously, I still disagree as well..


 * Yawn. The only thing that happened to me is I got sick of the endless pointless debates, most of which are not even about the article.  Dude, it's simple, what cited info about the ontological arguments for God do you wish to include in the article? Roy Brumback 07:20, 27 October 2006 (UTC)

Potential Citations/Inclusions
Well, okay; I can deal with that. Aside from 'yawn,' I'm assuming all you're saying is that if I present a citation for a point, even one with which you disagree, we can then implement it in the article assuming it's appropriate, relevant, and properly document/referenced?

Okay, so what I'm going to do, eventually when I get the time, is search through my previous posts, take all any of my quotes/links/citations and collect them all down here. Also, there are several quotes in the above discussions (oops; I mean now archived) from other users I was contemplating including, so I might find examples of these which provided sources, as well. I also found a couple of quotes from Wittgenstein and Kant (in my books) I'd like to use in the article. I'll just take all of these, and any future findings, post them somewhere in here, and ask, "[Where] Should I put these in the article?"

In which case, objections could then be announced, such as someone demonstrating the argument is already in the article, or that it's inappropriate, or that its too obscure, etc. if the case may be. Our personal concurrence/disagreement with the quotes won't matter, right?

Alright. So no more of me making arguments which I don't cite; no more arguing about whether you agree with them or not (and no deleting them if you don't [not saying you actually did this, just eliminating the possibility]). So, if I properly provide citations, an argument is basically automatically allowed into the article, again, assuming it's relevant, hasn't already been said, is taken in account of its context, and was derived from a reputable source, right? I find them; I post them; I can edit the discussed result into the article. (I know you've been encouraging this very thing all along; I just want to verify that you won't delete something, say from Russell or Hilbert [if it's relevant, again], if you don't agree with it). Okay then! Back to our lives. ;)


 * Good enough then. Although I don't really know what Hilbert's opinion on infinity has to do with the argument, and I missed where Russell's argument talked about an idea. Roy Brumback 21:02, 27 October 2006 (UTC)


 * His argument did refer to ideas, as well, but don't worry about it; I'll do my best to find clear and relevant citations.


 * Where is the term idea in his argument? Roy Brumback 11:30, 29 October 2006 (UTC)

Deletions
A lot of content has been deleted recently. And the talk page if FILLED with nonsense. I just wanted to point out Avoiding common mistakes I ask Roy to Assume Good Faith for the time being. Some of the recently deleted content has been in the article for YEARS. That means, before inline citations were requirements. The material may well be sourced by the citations in the reference section. We just don't know because the inline citations weren't provided. The best thing to do is to restore the content, tag it, and try and track down the original editor (if they are still active on wikipedia) if not, go to a library and get the cited sources and try to find the inline citations. However, blanking longstanding content like this is not assuming good faith, and is not productive to the article. This issue has come up a lot on wikipedia because there is a large number of Featured Articles that were made FA before inline citations were the norm. Should we just go and blank content from these FA? Of course not. So we shouldn't do it here. (note: the main sections I am refering to are "Philosophical assumptions underlying the argument" and "Miscellaneous").--Andrew c 00:39, 28 October 2006 (UTC)


 * Nothing deleted would be difficult to restore; as you said, one trip to the library would probably be enough.


 * I don't like it, either, but if rules don't apply to certain sections of Wikipedia merely because of antiquity, then how can we maintain a fair a balanced system? (People could just rush to post inappropriate/unfounded things before a new rule was instated so they wouldn't be affected by it.)


 * Besides, I wasn't arguing the uncited material should be deleted (initially); I was arguing my contributions should just receive equal treatment. I would have immensely preferred my arguments remained in the article with similar requests for citations (and I said so on several occasions), but the decision was made independently of me to delete them (and consequently, to be fair, the others as well). —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 71.127.104.111 (talk • contribs) 12:29, 28 October 2006.


 * If Assuming Good Faith applies to various uncited materials, then my contributions should also be given the benefit of a doubt, at least for some amount of time. Had I seen, "Citation Needed" to the right of my contributions, I'm sure I would've provided every single piece of evidence required by now. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 71.127.104.111 (talk • contribs) 12:34, 28 October 2006.


 * First of all, please sign all talk page entries by typing four tildes ~ . I do not know much of your personal situation, and it sounds like you may be a victim of being bit. However, please be aware that any new content that is added to articles can be deleted. Sure, it is better to take things to talk and tag items first before deletion, but this is not a matter of WP:AGF, it is a matter of WP:V. (specifically read Verifiability) You should at least now be aware of our policy. Any new or contriversial content needs a citation. There is no excuse for not having one, so maybe you could move the content to a sandbox in your own user space and work it up with sources until it is ready to go live again. I honestly do not know the specifics of your personal conflict, and I do not want to get involved because of the vast amount of garble that has been written above. Seeing a talk page so full is intimidating, and I for one do not want to sift through it. Yes, we have a double standard. Older, longstanding content gets better treatment because our policy was more lax (plus, they had citaitons back then, just not inline citations). New content is held up to a higher standard. It's much more easier to control what is going into articles than to regulate what has been in articles for along time. Maybe that isn't fair, but it is just the way things are. Hope this helps.--Andrew c 18:18, 28 October 2006 (UTC)


 * That does explain a lot. Okay, well, it seems you're right.  Thank you for all of the Wiki links; I'm now familiar with the formal policy.  I'm looking for sources and citations as we speak, so eventually I'll add my arguments again with proper documentation/reference. (Thanks for the understanding about the 'bit' thing; I do believe the term refers to my experience) 71.127.104.111 20:43, 28 October 2006 (UTC)


 * Bit? Deleting unverified disputed content?  Please!  And I see no reason or policy where "old" content is different than "new" content.  This article has already been tagged for the very reason of having unverified content.  Why should it be left in, as we are then using a double standard?  It can be reinserted any time it becomes verified, so what's the big deal? Roy Brumback 11:22, 29 October 2006 (UTC)


 * And another thing, I didn't assume bad faith, I simply asked for cites. He asked why other uncited material was allowed, I agreed it shouldn't be, and that's why I deleted it. Roy Brumback 11:49, 29 October 2006 (UTC)


 * I wasn't trying to start anything, Roy. It's my opinion; he didn't know the story, so I told him how I felt about it.  If you indeed "bit" me, I'm not saying it wasn't for justifiable causes, or that it was even intentional.  Calm down.


 * Personally, I COMPLETELY agree with your above inclinations. The largest deterrent for new posters is easily the double standard, if you ask me, and it couldn't be difficult to verify almost anything which was deleted.  However, I wasn't aware there was a somewhat formal policy dictating for such a paradigm, so at least there's precedent.  Now, I'm definitely with you if there's any hope of this changing, but I understand from where Andrew is coming, for the time being.71.127.104.111 01:31, 30 October 2006 (UTC)