Talk:Operation Change of Direction 11

Day one
7 werent killed in fighting. Media is reporting 5 IDF dead in 'clashes' and 2 IDF died when they were crushed beneath an IDF tank. RandomGalen 21:01, 12 August 2006 (UTC)

That info is about the day one of
That info is about the day one of the conflict by an Israeli media, showed in the reuters web site.We must wait until the conflict continues to get the real toll, and wait for the Official IDF casualties. Also try to understand that the casualties should be considered from non-hostile and hostile action because both are consecuenses from the Operation. Hezbollah IDF claimed casualties(40) does not number the non-combatant and combatant casualties it is just and aproximation (is very rare to infict 40 casualties exactly, no more no less).So we should keep the page intact, the Sunday 13 edition of 2006 Litani Offensive is not POV and with good sources so dont change it. Miguel

Victory in this offensive
Israel surely had a tactical victory, but some are claiming Hezbollah had a strategic victory. I would be interested to see if anyone has any oppinions on this? ~ Rangeley ( talk ) 21:20, 14 August 2006 (UTC)

Well, i don't think israelis can claim victory, their stated goal before the offensive was the destruction of Hezbolla fighting capabilities, in the final 48 hours of the conflict, Hezbolla killed around 30% of the israeli soldiers killed during the whole offensive, so Hezbolla is still militarily powerful as ever, as for their second goal which is destroying hezbolla's rocket launching abilities, in the last day before cease fire, the largest single day barrage of rockets hit into northern israel (250 missles), not to mention that the rocket launching campaign started after the israeli offensive began, so i don't think that stopping the katyushas would be considered as a legitimate reason for the 1 month war since the beggining of the war preceeded the katyusha launching. As for the 2 israeli soldiers held by hezbollah, well i believe they are still in hezbolla hands..of course the israelis will state that the lebanese army will replace hezbolla in south lebanon, but come to think of it, this process was already being discussed in the lebanese parliment before the war, so i think this war just gave more value to Hezbolla's presence. on the other hand, hezbolla now stands as a hero for arabs & muslims, nasralla is some sort of che, & the lebanese are united behind hezbolla for the first time since the syrian withdrawal of lebanon..i believe the war has acheived the exact opposite results it was waged for. 195.229.41.163 09:12, 15 August 2006 (UTC)Papi
 * That would be a discussion of the war itself, I am talking about this particular offensive, which was done as a mad rush to do as much as possible before the ceasefire. It is a tactical victory because Israel wasnt beaten back by hezbollah and gained territory on the battlefield. ~ Rangeley ( talk ) 15:09, 15 August 2006 (UTC)

The damage to the IDF's aura of invincibility could be considered a marginal strategic setback. But it may be too early to determine how the strategic situation has changed as a result. But it seems clear that the IDF's reputation has been knocked around a bit, despite their tactical victory, as the offensive has demonstrated Hezbollah's capability to inflict casualties, something many uninformed neutrals like myself did not expect. 71.123.31.93 21:53, 15 August 2006 (UTC)

You are right about That would be a discussion of the war itself, I was talking about the war, i don't think we can really set a result for a single operation, i mean this is a guerilla fight, it is not a traditional fight between 2 armies where the victor is the one controlling more land. When you have a force of 30,000 driving in tanks against a few hundreds you don't expect them to be driven back, don't forget that in this mad rush the IDF left resistence pockets all behind its back.. a rookie's mistake, this costed it more casualities in one day than it suffered in 2 weeks, hence they were forced to accept the cease fire. Of course this is my opinion, but i think if IDF thought operation litani was a success the fighting would just go on untill Hezbolla is no more. [User:213.42.2.11|213.42.2.11]] 04:54, 16 August 2006 (UTC)Papi
 * A tactical victory is "a success in battle without substantive or long-lasting gain." I think that that applies to this. Saying its a tactical victory doesnt imply they acheived all goals, but instead came out on top. ~ Rangeley ( talk ) 15:03, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

Came out on top of what exactly?!! am really not sure what exactly the IDF wanted to acheive in this offensive, am not sure they know either, Hezbolla can claim a tactical victory in the same sense, or even a strategic victory if they consider that the end of war came because of Israeli casualities during litani offensive, again, when the 4th army in the world loses 34 elite soldiers in 2 days, when they expose their backs to pockets of resistance all around them, this can't be considered a victory in anyway, this was a military failure.


 * When one side gains territory on the battlefield and is not pushed back, its still a victory. To the extreme extent, when one side gains territory but at a very high cost, its called a Pyrrhic victory. Such as the Battle of Thermopylae, which despite the high cost was still a Persian victory. This offensive wasnt such a high cost so as to call it Pyhric, but it certainly wasnt a big one either, hence the "tactical victory." ~ Rangeley ( talk ) 14:39, 17 August 2006 (UTC)

In the aftermath of the offensive Hezbollah still held Bint Jbeil and several strategic border towns. Further more the defense in depth tactics Hezbollah used for the battle all but preclude the use of territory as a barometer for victory. The fact is tactically neither force defeated the other and the attack itself seemed to stall. Hence the Stalemate aspect.Freepsbane 14:49, 17 August 2006 (UTC) When dealing with Asymmetric warfare it is unwise to use the same judgment scale as with set-piece battles, something known in military science. In that senario for determining the tactical victor you use a combination of body counts and the effectiveness(Intactness) of both fighting forces by the end of the engagement.Freepsbane 14:57, 17 August 2006 (UTC)

The result is israeli withdraewal - according to UNSC resolution. No one can deny it.

'When one side gains territory on the battlefield its still a victory' this could be true if we were talking about a war between 2 armies, hezbolla is leading a guerilla war, their goal was declared by nasrallah ( we don't claim to be able to stop israeli invasion, but we promise to inflict casualities wherever they go), i think that is exactly what hezbolla have done, so i unlike IDF, hezbolla acheived its goals.

tactical victory??????
How is this a tactical victory??? Did the IDF even reach the Litani river? i think something is wrong —Preceding unsigned comment added by Babaganoushe96 (talk • contribs) 20:02, 29 July 2008 (UTC)

Possible copyright problem
This article has been revised as part of a large-scale clean-up project of multiple article copyright infringement. Earlier text must not be restored, unless it can be verified to be free of infringement. For legal reasons, Wikipedia cannot accept copyrighted text or images borrowed from other web sites or printed material; such additions must be deleted. Contributors may use sources as a source of information, but not as a source of sentences or phrases. Accordingly, the material may be rewritten, but only if it does not infringe on the copyright of the original or plagiarize from that source. Please see our guideline on non-free text for how to properly implement limited quotations of copyrighted text. Wikipedia takes copyright violations very seriously. --Mkativerata (talk) 20:49, 19 December 2010 (UTC)

Orphaned references in Operation Changing Direction 11
I check pages listed in Category:Pages with incorrect ref formatting to try to fix reference errors. One of the things I do is look for content for orphaned references in wikilinked articles. I have found content for some of Operation Changing Direction 11's orphans, the problem is that I found more than one version. I can't determine which (if any) is correct for this article, so I am asking for a sentient editor to look it over and copy the correct ref content into this article.

Reference named "CNN-08-16": From Timeline of the 2006 Lebanon War (mid August):  From United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701:  

I apologize if any of the above are effectively identical; I am just a simple computer program, so I can't determine whether minor differences are significant or not. AnomieBOT ⚡ 15:34, 6 November 2012 (UTC)

user:Mikrobølgeovn's edits

 * You can’t delete sourced material on the pretext that the source is an opinion column:

http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Operation_Changing_Direction_11&diff=521059472&oldid=521058834

and then 25 minutes later add a source that is an opinion column:

http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Operation_Changing_Direction_11&diff=next&oldid=521061452

Please revert.


 * You have repeatedly replaced a more neutral result summary of the battle with “Results disputed”, supplying two sources, none of which support this claim. Even if you could supply a link proving that both Olmert and Nasrallah claimed to have won, that is not really relevant. Wikipedia should preferably be based on neutral third party sources. Hezballah certainly claimed victory in these battles as well as the war. Reading mainstream Israeli or American sources it is apparent that no serious observer would claim that the final offensive was an Israeli military victory. The Winograd commission certainly didn’t. I see no reason why Wikipedia should.

I think that a battle article mainly should be evaluated on what took place on the ground. All account confirm that the IDF failed to carry out it assignments in EVERY front. It stopped advancing as soon as it faced opposition from Hezballah forces in spite of outnumbering them by a factor of anything between one to ten or one to one hundred.

Whether the operation actually had positive political effects for Israel is another thing. Such as changing the Security Council resolution. Since the first moves of the operation started an hour before Israel MFA received the final draft, it does not seem likely. Since it is refuted both by US UN ambassador Bolton and Israel’s MFA I think the “anonymous” American claim should be removed from the article. Please notice: You have accused me of “removing sourced information” which wasn’t true. I removed it from the summary and no more.


 * Please supply sources to your “alternative” Israeli polls or remove them.


 * Several of your links are dead. Please fix them or remove the claims.

http://www.haaretz.com/news/idf-troops-kill-5-hezbollah-gunmen-in-south-lebanon-1.195114 Unless you self-revert I will.
 * Hezbollah never agreed to “disarm” south of Litani. NOBODY believes this claim. Please remove your incorrect claim. Hezbollah agreed to hide its arms and nothing more. As is apparent from the source you yourself supplied:


 * Please replace the source www.globalsecurity.org. This is a blog and not a serious source. It seems to be based on entirely on IDF statements but no sources are supplied. The anonymous author does not seem to know his subject. For example he talks about "city of Tzor". There is no mention of Operation Change of Direction 11 or of ground offensive in the final days of the war.

Jokkmokks-Goran (talk) 20:04, 6 November 2012 (UTC)


 * I have found your CNN article here:

http://web.archive.org/web/20060824162734/http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/08/16/mideast.main/index.html

There was no Halutz quote there, as you claim. Please supply a source for the quote or it will be removed.


 * Also I found no mention of rocket attacks or the sound of explosions in your supplied source:

http://www.haaretz.com/news/idf-troops-kill-5-hezbollah-gunmen-in-south-lebanon-1.195114

Please remove false claims and be more careful with sources in the future.

Jokkmokks-Goran (talk) 07:33, 7 November 2012 (UTC)


 * Most of my sources arrive from Timeline of the 2006 Lebanon War (mid August), which I advise you to have a look at. If there is anything wrong with my external links, it is absolutely unintended from my part.
 * As of your claim that we should simply define this as an Israeli failure in every aspect, I find this bordering to POV pushing. While Israel may have been unsuccesful in achieving some of its objectives, the Olmert government nevertheless claimed they scored a long-term victory through the ceasefire agreement when Hezbollah disarmed its forces south of Litani (which they in fact did, despite your claim of the opposite).
 * Also, I used the opinion column in a quite different way than you did. You can tell, can't you.
 * This article has certainly got numerous neutrality issues, as you seem completely fixated on blunders on the Israeli side. Even if you provide sources on such statements, this is nevertheless a breach of Wikipedia guidelines and should be modified so that the article reflects a more neutral overview on the operation. If you want to, we could adress the issue to other users rather than argue this one-on-one, as this may turn out rather unconstructive.
 * Short said, I tried to fix what I viewed as POV issues, and perhaps ended up making some mistakes in the process. This article should be reviewed by one or several third parties rather than limiting this to a discussion between you and me.
 * Best, --Mikrobølgeovn (talk) 15:59, 7 November 2012 (UTC)


 * Let’s try to solve the problem between us, if possible.
 * You are responsible for your own edits. If another Wikipedia article is full of crap you cannot plead innocence while doing a cheap cut and paste. My experience is that most articles on the 2006 Lebanon war are full of crap. Please check all sources before posting them. You can’t flood Wikipedia with crap and let other serious editors do the clean up.


 * Please remove your unsubstantiated claims or supply solid sources.


 * Please familiarize yourself with the subject before making changes based solely on your gut feeling of protecting the honor of the invincible IDF. That is POV pushing and nothing else.
 * I don’t know if you know Hebrew, but if you do, please read the Winograd report’s section on Change of Direction 11. I’m quite sure you will feel that the Winograd Commission was just as “fixated” as you claim that I am on Israeli blunders.
 * There is no serious source that claim that the 60 hours offensive was an Israeli success. The sources all agree that the IDF failed to achieve almost all of its targets in this operation.


 * Jokkmokks-Goran (talk) 22:34, 7 November 2012 (UTC)


 * And please explain your frequent revert on the summery box. Your sources for this claim are two: One report by a US military analyst describing the Israeli offensive as a complete failure and as "perhaps one of the most bizarre episodes of the war" and an article claiming that an "anonymous" US diplomat claimed that the offensive did change the wording of the UNSC resolution. But that this claim was disputed both by the Israeli MFA and US UN Ambassador Bolton. The resolution's final formulation was settled one hour after the 60 hour offensive was launched.
 * Jokkmokks-Goran (talk) 22:58, 7 November 2012 (UTC)


 * I suggest we refrain from drawing any conclusions on a highly disputed topic and let the future historians decide the exact outcome of this conflict. Until then, let's stick to "both sides claimed victory" and avoid POV pushing, you and me alike. Also, I would like to offer my sincere apologies for any inconvenience caused by my recent edits; I have reverted some of my obvious mistakes just as you requested. Best wishes, --Mikrobølgeovn (talk) 23:05, 7 November 2012 (UTC)

Mikrobølgeovn, I have removed all the spam you introduced into the article. Some of it may indeed be true but you must supply reliable sources supporting these claims in a controversial subject as this one. I don't particularly enjoy cleaning up after other persons making a mess.

Please feel free to contribute to this article in the future but I believe you do need some reading first. If you want to I can suggest some reeding material. As I said before, cutting and pasting in Wikipedia across articles is very risky business, especially if you are not familiar with the subject. That is especially true for the articles about the 2006 Lebanon war. Most of the links are dead and in some cases have never existed in the first place. As you can see most of your contributions had to be removed, because they did not hold water.

Take care, Jokkmokks-Goran (talk) 21:29, 8 November 2012 (UTC)


 * Thanks a bunch. I am confident you believe me when I say none of this mess was intended, and I apologize if I appeared less cooperative earlier. --Mikrobølgeovn (talk) 23:17, 8 November 2012 (UTC)
 * Apology accepted with gratitude. I hope we can cooperate more positively in the future. Jokkmokks-Goran (talk) 23:27, 8 November 2012 (UTC)

Change the name of the article?
No big deal but I think this article should be named "Operation change of direction 11" instead of its present title "Operation changing direction 11". The former being more active in tone. I think it's a better translation of its original Hebrew name. Though my Hebrew is far from perfect.

Also I have proposed here that this article Battle of Wadi Saluki should be deleted as being both awful and redundant. This battle is already covered in this article.

Any objections?

Jokkmokks-Goran (talk) 21:03, 19 November 2012 (UTC)


 * As far as I'm concerned, feel free to make any changes in the name of this article you find necessary. --Mikrobølgeovn (talk) 17:30, 22 November 2012 (UTC)

The number of destroyed Israeli armoured vehicles
Irondome (talk), please familiarize yourself with the subject of the article before making unwarranted changes. If you had read through the article (including Operation_Change_of_Direction_11) you would have discovered that by afternoon August, 14 "more than 20 IDF vehicles, including tanks and armored vehicles, which were hit during the fighting, were left on Lebanese territory."

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3290860,00.html

Which of course need not be the full number of Israeli armoured vehicles destroyed in the battle, since a number of them could have been repaired or towed away beforehand.

Jokkmokks-Goran (talk) 18:38, 3 September 2013 (UTC)
 * Which does not equate to "dozens of tanks" destroyed. Your understanding of knocked out, damaged, mobility kill, appears hazy. It is also extermely POV. Therefore I wish for it to be reverted. Destroyed means completely urrecoverable. The total was 4. It will be marking all claims dubious if not reverted, for consensus. Several appears the most sensible option. The YNET source btw was from a couple of hours after the ceasefire. Hardly a source which provides clarity seven years on. Irondome (talk) 18:43, 3 September 2013 (UTC)


 * How about “dozens damaged and immobilized”? If you can find a source about how many Israeli armoured vehicles were left "completely urrecoverable" in this battle, you may add that piece of information to the text. But please indicate if that number includes those bombed by the Israeli air force. Jokkmokks-Goran (talk) 21:23, 3 September 2013 (UTC)
 * "4 tanks destroyed and several dozen APCs destroyed or damaged" I would support that compromise. Remember, 4 tanks destroyed is the total in the entire operation, not just this offensive. A total of 51 tanks were destroyed or damaged throughout the campaign. The APC loss and damage rate would be certainly several dozen. We should find some cites here to tighten this. In the meantime, I think that is a bridging compromise. Cheers Irondome (talk) 21:43, 3 September 2013 (UTC)
 * You have to provide sources for all your claims (including the 4 of 51 tanks, if relevant). As far as I know we have seen no tally of destroyed/damaged APC's, nor of D-9's. You cannot just make up your own statistics.
 * This article is about Change of Direction 11 and not about the entire war. So please leave out the general statistics. The definition of a "destroyed" tank is not uncontroversial. I believe most people would consider this tank, for example, as destroyed even if the Israelis could salvage pieces of the hull to build a new one. Jokkmokks-Goran (talk) 06:52, 4 September 2013 (UTC)
 * Go and check the references cited for losses in the Merkava article. I am making nothing "up". So saying that, I agree with the new edit. It is an acceptable compromise. Irondome (talk) 22:28, 5 September 2013 (UTC)

Disruptive editing
I am reverting recent disruptive edits made by Avaya1 (talk) on this and several other Wikipedia articles.

Avaya1 made 5 massive changes in 7 minutes to 2006 Lebanon War, then spent 2 minutes making changes on Operation Change of Direction 11, 1 minute on Battle of Bint Jbeil and a further 2 minutes on Battle of Ayta ash-Shab.

The changes were whole-sale deletions of all the additions made after a particular date, selected for unclear reasons. Some of the changes he deleted had been agreed upon by other editors in talk page discussions. A lot of well-sourced material has been deleted. In the case of Battle of Bint Jbeil meticulously added references has been deleted and replaced with. None of the changes were explained in summaries or in talkpages. Avaya1 has previously made intermittent contributions to 2006 Lebanon War but has not previously been involved in the editing of the other articles.

Any well-sourced addition to this article is welcome as are deletions if they are clearly explained in the talkpage. I return the page to where it was before Avaya1's deletions.

Jokkmokks-Goran (talk) 21:49, 7 October 2013 (UTC)

External links modified
Hello fellow Wikipedians,

I have just modified 4 external links on Operation Change of Direction 11. Please take a moment to review my edit. If you have any questions, or need the bot to ignore the links, or the page altogether, please visit this simple FaQ for additional information. I made the following changes:
 * Corrected formatting/usage for http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/matthewsOP26.pdf
 * Added archive https://web.archive.org/web/20080215135534/http://asia.news.yahoo.com/060813/3/2of6v.html to http://asia.news.yahoo.com/060813/3/2of6v.html
 * Added archive https://web.archive.org/web/20120830094827/http://go.ynet.co.il/pic/news/vinograd/vinograd.pdf to http://go.ynet.co.il/pic/news/vinograd/vinograd.pdf
 * Added archive https://web.archive.org/web/20120830094827/http://go.ynet.co.il/pic/news/vinograd/vinograd.pdf to http://go.ynet.co.il/pic/news/vinograd/vinograd.pdf

When you have finished reviewing my changes, you may follow the instructions on the template below to fix any issues with the URLs.

Cheers.— InternetArchiveBot  (Report bug) 01:46, 31 December 2016 (UTC)

Helmer article
Not Quite Counterinsurgency A Cautionary Tale For Us Forces Based On Israel’s Operation Change Of Direction *

Captain Daniel Helmer


 * This article first appeared in Armor, January-February 2007. Reprinted by permission.

Australian Army Journal, Volume V, Number 2 Winter 2008

On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah fighters, possibly led or directed by Imad Mughniyeh, once the world’s most wanted terrorist, began a diversionary rocket attack on military targets in Northern Israel before launching a lightning attack across the border against Israeli soldiers in armored HMMWVs. The attack resulted in killing three soldiers, wounding two others, and capturing two prisoners. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) dispatched a quick-reaction force, led by one of the world’s most advanced tanks, the Merkava. Hezbollah militants, armed with a proficiency they would demonstrate throughout the war, ambushed the quick-reaction force, blowing up the lead tank with a several-hundred pound pitcharge-type improvised explosive device (IED). All four crew members in the tank were killed instantly (the tank reportedly was blown more than 10 feet into the air). One soldier was killed by Hezbollah sniper fire as an armored force with infantry support attempted to extricate the quick-reaction force. 1

page 118

These were the opening volleys in a month-long war in which Hezbollah demonstrated that the spectrum of warfare for which regular forces must be prepared is larger than the two poles of counterinsurgency and maneuver warfare. It is vital that we not regard Hezbollah’s 30-day performance as a fluke unlikely to be encountered by the U.S. military. Indeed, while elements of the war are unique to the Israel- Lebanon conflict, such as Hezbollah’s positioning on a border adjacent to Israel and its capability to terrorize the Israeli population with rockets and missiles, at the tactical and operational levels, other enemies of the United States can learn much from the Hezbollah experience. The fact of the matter is that Hezbollah leaders, an avowed if not active enemy of the United States, who likely have agents working in our country, believe they have arrived on an exportable model of Islamist insurgency, and other terrorist organizations are already openly seeking to gain lessons learned from the conflict. 2 Given that there are real limitations on garnering a full understanding of what happened in Lebanon so soon after the 14 August 2006 ceasefire, this article, using interviews with a number of key observers and open source reporting on the war, seeks to explain the possible lessons and implications for the mounted maneuver warrior of what Israel came to call “Operation Change of Direction.”

A New Model

Six years after Israel’s ignominious withdrawal from south Lebanon and six years after the beginning of the Second Palestinian Intifadah (the al Aqsa Intifadah), IDF forces remained woefully unprepared for a new fight in Lebanon. In the final 15 years of the occupation, only a small cadre of IDF soldiers experienced the terrible uncertainty of asymmetric war in Lebanon’s south. The rest of the IDF, according to two-time IDF Lebanon veteran and respected historian, Michael Oren, trained to win the conventional surprise encountered during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. 3 Subsequent to the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifadah in 2000, the IDF leadership realized that it was illprepared for the fighting against Hamas, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and other extremist forces that held the hearts and minds of much of the populations of Gaza and the West Bank. “When the Intifadah broke out, the IDF went on a massive retooling [effort]… we went to be an urban anti-terrorism force, like a large SWAT team… and became the most advanced large scale anti-terrorism

… only a small cadre of IDF soldiers experienced the terrible uncertainty of asymmetric war in Lebanon’s south.

page 119

force in the world,” explains Oren. 4 From 2000 through 2006, although skirmishes occurred from time to time on the Northern Border, including kidnapping and attempted kidnapping of several IDF soldiers, as well as shelling and sniper fire in the disputed Shebaa farms area, the Hezbollah threat went largely ignored. Responses to Hezbollah provocations were extremely limited, and similar to the United States’ focus on conventional war against the USSR after Vietnam, the IDF was determined to focus on a different enemy than the one to which it had just ceded an 18-year struggle. 5

The core combat competencies required for the urban fight in the occupied territories were significantly different from those required for the fight in which the IDF would find itself in Lebanon. By 2006, the IDF excelled at conducting cordon and search operations, door-to-door searches, hasty raids, and identifying and capturing or killing suspected Palestinian terrorists and guerrillas. Through a network of collaborators exploited since the 1970s, the IDF gained extensive intelligence information on Palestinian terror organizations. Israeli control of the borders of Gaza and the West Bank meant that Palestinian fighters often possessed inferior weapons and were forced to fight in a virtually untenable situation. Israeli information dominance made training difficult for Palestinian forces. Meanwhile factionalization prevented a unitary military effort against the Israelis. In effect, the IDF, like the U.S. military, was a seemingly militarily superior counter-terrorist/ insurgent force fighting a militarily inferior terrorist/insurgent enemy.

Meanwhile, Hezbollah, flush with their 2000 victory, did not rest on its laurels. Believing that another showdown with the Israelis was looming, it began the arduous task of exploring lessons learned from its 17-year open war with Israel, while simultaneously supplying inspiration, technical help, and weaponry to the Palestinians. 6 According to a senior analyst with Defense News, understanding that a future conflict would likely be a defensive action against an Israeli incursion seeking to destroy them, Hezbollah leaders studied the historical model of the Viet Cong as inspiration for establishing an advanced tunnel network, extending through the main avenues of approach into southern Lebanon. 7

Working secretly, Hezbollah built up weapons stockpiles, particularly short and medium-range rockets and antitank guided missiles (ATGM), and developed reinforced, highly camouflaged bunkers throughout their area of operations—all in spite of extensive monitoring by UN observers and Israeli intelligence. Confronted after the war with the location of a football-field-sized bunker complex, with meterthick, steel-reinforced concrete on an open hillside in Labboune, one UN observer remarked that Hezbollah must have brought in cement by the spoonfuls. The bunker complex was situated only two-hundred meters north of the Israeli border and only several kilometers from UN headquarters in an-Naqurah; neither the UN nor IDF realized the extent and sophistication of the bunkers, and the IDF was unable to

page 120

destroy them or force the fighters to evacuate them during fighting. 8 Unlike in the occupied territories, neither signal intelligence nor human intelligence could successfully penetrate Hezbollah before or during the war.

Throughout the six years of relative quiet, Hezbollah focused on extensive intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), monitoring IDF units to its south by eavesdropping on IDF soldiers’ cell phone calls; using criminal networks of mostly Bedouin drug dealers, other criminals, and malcontents to provide information on IDF movements and plans; and by inconspicuously taking extensive notes on Israeli movements for months at a time. As Timur Goksel, the former chief spokesperson for UNIFIL (the title of the UN observers), describes Hezbollah, “What was really significant is the amount or quality of staff work that goes into their activities that renders them different from any other guerrilla outfit.” 9 Although Hezbollah launched the surprise raid on 12 July and “was itching for a fight and got a fight,” it did not anticipate the tremendous Israeli response to the kidnapping of two soldiers. 10 As a result, the IDF possessed the initiative in the first hours and even days of the war when it focused excessively on the use of its air force. When the IDF launched its ground incursions, they anticipated (just as the U.S. anticipates in Iraq and Afghanistan) that when confronted with a regular force on the offensive, Hezbollah would essentially melt into the countryside. In fact, previous to 2000, this had been the doctrine of Hezbollah. 11 Yet, Hezbollah doctrine had evolved, and Hezbollah prepared to encounter the IDF unlike any guerrilla force in history. In the words of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, “The resistance withstood the attack and fought back. It did not wage a guerrilla war either… it [Hezbollah] was not a regular army but was not a guerrilla in the traditional sense either. It was something in between.” “This,” he said, “is the new model.” 12

“We were caught unprepared.” 13

The IDF encountered innumerable problems with Hezbollah’s “new model.” In a city that became a showcase for the IDF’s tactical failures during the war, despite repeated incursions and air attacks aimed at the Lebanese Shiite city of Bint Jbail throughout the war, the IDF was unable to take the city, allowing Nasrallah to claim it as Hezbollah’s Stalingrad. As Goksel puts it, “in one day in 1982 they [the IDF] reached Beirut; here, in six or seven days, they couldn’t go more than a few miles.” 14

… neither signal intelligence nor human intelligence could successfully penetrate Hezbollah before or during the war.

page 121

Among the most disturbing concerns to U.S. Army armor and mechanized infantry forces should be the large losses taken by the IDF’s much vaunted armor corps. During operations in Lebanon, approximately 10 percent of the IDF’s 400 Merkavas were damaged by an enemy without a single armor or helicopter platform. Thirty tank crewmen, comprising 25 percent of the IDF’s total dead, were killed during the war. Of the 40 tanks damaged, half were actually penetrated by ATGMs or rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) with tandem charges, resulting in the deaths of 24 of the 30 tank crewmen killed. 15

While the exact details of Hezbollah’s arsenal are difficult to determine, due to conflicting battlefield reports and the fact that both the IDF and Hezbollah held their cards close, various reports indicate that Hezbollah possessed either originals or Iranian versions of the AT-3 Sagger, the AT-4 Spigot, the AT-5 Spandrel, the AT-13 METIS-M, and the AT-14 Kornet-E, as well as the RPG-29. In addition, Hezbollah expertly employed various mortar and other antipersonnel systems, as well as command-detonated IEDs. Many of the weapons were provided or purchased from Iran or Syria, although a substantial cache of small arms and explosives were stolen from the IDF over the years.

Throughout the war, the toll taken on readiness by occupation duty in the West Bank and Gaza was evident. Infantry, artillery, and armor coordination, once the focal point of Israeli doctrine, was significantly degraded.

Tactical expertise and innovation were almost entirely absent—all along the border, where Hezbollah had spent six years preparing for a defense in depth, IDF forces launched frontal attacks. 16 The IDF reserves, on which the IDF relies heavily, had not received maneuver training since the inception of the Intifadah in 2000—they were too busy with occupation duty. Even the active duty forces had not completed a major maneuver training operation in more than a year. 17 During mobilization, reserve forces received three to five days of training. It should have been no surprise that the IDF performed poorly at the tactical level against its formidable enemy: its soldiers were, on average, 10 years younger than enemy forces, they had little experience or training, and faced an enemy who was extensively prepared for this moment.

Hezbollah demonstrated surprising tactical innovation. Knowing that the AT-3 was incapable of doing damage to Israeli armor, they used it effectively as an anti-infantry weapon. From distances well outside the engagement range of IDF infantry, Hezbollah would use indirect fire, including ATGMs, to scatter the infantry. As the infantry moved closer to the towns where Hezbollah fighters were

… a substantial cache of small arms and explosives were stolen from the IDF over the years.

page 122

fighting, IDF infantrymen would often take cover in barns and other buildings on the outskirts of the city. Hezbollah would then hit houses with the AT-3s; on 9 August 2006, nine IDF infantrymen were killed in Bint Jbail in a single attack using this technique. 18 In addition, Hezbollah regularly employed snipers, a tactic they had not used prior to 2000. Artillery, which the IDF used to suppress Hezbollah fighters as infantry moved in, was ineffective against the bunkers and tunnels in which Hezbollah was fighting. In fact, undisciplined use of artillery and close air support (CAS) in built-up areas, not only failed to achieve tactical results against Hezbollah, but also earned the approbation of much of the international community for the IDF’s destruction of civilian areas. 19 When artillery fire lifted, Hezbollah fighters took it as a signal that the infantry was about to move in and would commence firing on them. 20

Hezbollah units worked almost exclusively in their hometowns, thus allowing effective coded communications over unencrypted radios. A typical Hezbollah transmission might be no more than, “let’s go meet by the house of the girl who broke your heart 20 years ago.” The IDF, while able to hear and understand the communication, could gain no actionable intelligence from it. 21 Hezbollah, while possessing some night-vision equipment, accepted Israeli dominance of the night. To overcome this, they went to ground at night while the Israelis shot at designated targets; they would resurface at or after dawn (BMNT) with full knowledge of the composition of the IDF forces in the area.

On the morning of 10 August, Hezbollah fighters disabled two tanks withdrawing from al-Khiyam ridge with ATGMs just after dawn, killing one crew member. Hezbollah fighters then mortared the two tank crews and were sending an infantry squad toward the soldiers when the soldiers were rescued, almost an hour after their tanks were disabled. Evidencing the problems the IDF had during the war with training and coordination, the tank crews, which included a company commander who had operational radios, failed to call for suppressive fire on the ridge, despite knowing it was the source of the mortars. 22

The battle of Wadi Saluki from 11 to 13 August illustrates the tactical and operational problems faced by the IDF throughout the war. Eleven of the twenty-four Merkava IVs employed by the 401st Armor Brigade during the battle were hit by ATGMs or RPGs; eight tank crewmen were killed, as were four infantrymen of the Nahal infantry brigade, jointly accounting for 10 percent of all IDF killed in the war. The battle took place as a result of the IDF’s desire to control

… they would resurface at or after dawn with full knowledge of the composition of the IDF forces in the area.

page 123

the Litani River, the former high-water mark of their occupation zone. 23 Division 162 was ordered to take the town of Ghandouriyeh, a village at the intersection of a major east-west road, and a road leading to a bridge north over the Litani. The village also provided significant overwatch of the Litani, making it a key location for controlling south Lebanon.

Positioned in the vicinity of the northern Israeli city of Metulla, Division 162 had known for a week that it was to take Ghandouriyeh; however, its orders were canceled several times. The main axis from Metulla to Ghandouriyeh is on a major road that first runs through the village of Qantara; to move from Qantara to Ghandouriyeh, an invading force must cross Wadi Saluki. The area of the Wadi is covered with dense undergrowth, consisting of juniper bushes, scrub oak, and other thornbushes, confining vehicles to the partially built road that runs through the Wadi. The Saluki, a tributary of the Litani, runs through the Wadi and provides a natural obstacle for both tracked and wheeled vehicles. A couple of bridges run across the Saluki on the road between Qantara and Ghandouriyeh; the terrain does not allow for the bridges to be bypassed, except with great difficulty. The Wadi is surrounded by high ground consisting of limestone rock with many natural caves, and surrounding hills, which provide excellent fields of fire onto the Wadi.

Hezbollah believed for a long time that the road between Qantara and Ghandouriyeh presented a likely avenue of approach for invading forces. Knowing that Wadi Saluki, and particularly the bridges that ran over the Saluki, provided a good choke point for an ambush on invading forces, they established permanent defensive positions overlooking the Wadi, including one west of Beni Hayan. Any element of surprise about the location of the IDF’s advance on the Litani was eliminated by Division 162’s week in waiting. When paratroopers of the Nahal Infantry Brigade performed an uncontested air assault outside the cities of Ghandouriyeh and Farun on the evening of 11 August, any remaining uncertainty in the minds of Hezbollah fighters as to the timing and direction of the attack was eliminated. They soon established a hasty defense of the Wadi using mines, ATGMs, and possibly some previously built-up positions.

Using the same methods as those used in the occupied territories, Nahal infantry soldiers claimed to have control of the high ground over Wadi Saluki after they had seized key buildings on the outskirts of the two cities in the early hours of 12 August. The 401st Armor Brigade sent a column of 24 tanks toward the town to link up with paratroopers and give the IDF control of key roads. As the tanks maneuvered on the partially built road in the Wadi, Hezbollah fighters detonated a mine just north of the bridge on the road between Qantara and Ghandouriyeh, killing the entire crew of the lead tank, including the company commander. Hezbollah then launched swarms of rockets of all different types onto the Israeli tanks. As one crew member described it, “You should understand that the first missile which hits is not the really

page 124

dangerous missile. The ones which come afterwards are the dangerous ones—and there always follow four or five after the first.” 24 Hezbollah fighters used ATGMs, small-arms fire, and mortars to suppress the Nahal Brigade, preventing them from providing effective infantry support for the armor forces. Not a single tank crewman in all 24 tanks thought to deploy the tanks’ smoke grenades while they were being ambushed, further evidence of failing to train with their weapons.

Lack of coordination between armor, infantry, close air support, and artillery meant that initial calls for fire were denied because of the potential for fratricide. Only after all forces gained situational awareness on 12 August was the IDF able to synchronize its overwhelming firepower and take the high ground in Ghandouriyeh by the morning of 13 August. The IDF claims to have killed more than 80 Hezbollah fighters in the course of fighting; yet this claim seems based on battle damage assessments from close air support that dropped countless cluster munitions on 12 August. This time, as in much of the war, Hezbollah’s dead proved as elusive as its living fighters. Hezbollah, which in the past has celebrated its “martyrs,” including the son of Hassan Nasrallah, still claims that only 150 members were killed during the entire war. Israel claims it killed closer to 600 fighters. 25

When fighting ended on 14 August, fighters from Division 162 were ordered to withdraw from Ghandouriyeh, due to the ceasefire. Guy Zur, commander of Division 162, walked away “astonished” and told the press that Hezbollah was the world’s best guerrilla group. 26 Goksel says of the terrain at Wadi Saluki, which he visited innumerable times during his duty in south Lebanon, that “anyone dumb enough to push a tank column through Wadi Saluki should not be an armored brigade commander but a cook.” 27

The 401st Armor Brigade could have bypassed the Wadi to the south or on the more northern road leading to Farun; its failure to do so allowed Hezbollah to win another propaganda victory in the last day of fighting.

Lessons for the United States

A number of issues for U.S. forces emerge from the IDF’s experience in Lebanon. Obviously, the effectiveness of “swarming” ATGMs and RPGs against the Merkava is a tactic that should be of concern; using the AT-3 as an anti-infantry weapon is a tactic of which all cavalry and mechanized units should be aware.

“You should understand that the first missile which hits is not the really dangerous missile.”

page 125

While it is important that U.S. forces continue to dominate the night, Hezbollah has demonstrated the need to make certain U.S. forces do not cede control of the day. Also, if Hezbollah exports its sophisticated ambushes and combined arms attacks, it could pose new challenges in the Global War on Terrorism. The possibility must not be discounted; Hezbollah’s leaders have provided arms and training to the Palestinians and publicly expressed a desire to export their “model” elsewhere. It is not impossible to imagine that in certain areas, such as Anbar Province, variants of Hezbollah’s tactics may be developed by local insurgents as they await the reinforcement of the relatively small number of U.S. forces now in the area.

While the combined arms battalion (CAB) structure may naturally alleviate some of the coordination issues experienced by the IDF, it is vital that CABs train as such. Perhaps most importantly, the IDF’s experience demonstrates the need to retain core combat skills, even as the United States takes on anti-terrorist missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. Army must carefully consider whether the training it undergoes to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan would result in tactical success against a determined enemy such as Hezbollah—an enemy that exists in the gray area between insurgents and the regular armies that U.S. forces traditionally train to fight.

Endnotes

1 Unless otherwise noted, all foreign media reports were accessed through OpenSource.gov (formerly the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service). All documents cited in this article are open source, available to the general public, not listed as for official use only, and unclassified. Reports on the Hezbollah kidnapping garnered from numerous sources, including “Hezbollah terrorist attack on Israeli’s northern border: eight IDF soldiers killed and two abducted,” Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, Tel Aviv, Israel. Although all reports on Imad Mughniyeh are instantly suspect, he is as much of a boogeyman as exists in the world today, the report on his involvement comes from Ronen Bergman, “The Executor,” Yedi’ ot Aharonot (original in Hebrew), Tel Aviv, Israel, 16 July 2006. 2 Maryam al-Bassam, “Interview with Lebanese Hizballah leader Hasan Nasrallah.” Beirut New TV Channel in Arabic, date of interview unknown, aired 27 August 2006. On agents in our country and anti-American nature of Hezbollah, see Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah Financing Terror through Criminal Enterprise,” Testimony to the U.S. Senate committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, 25 May 2005.

page 126

On groups seeking lessons learned from the conflict, see Ibrahim Humaydi, “Abu Marzuq to ‘Al-Haya’: ‘HAMAS’ Discussing Cloning ‘Hizballah’s’ [sic] Experience, Denied There Is ‘Anything New’ in Israeli Soldier Deal,” Al-Haya, (original in Arabic), London, United Kingdom, 30 August 2006. 3 Author interview with Michael Oren, September 2006. 4 Ibid. 5 For a discussion on willful blindness to the lessons of Vietnam, see T.X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century, Zenith Press, St. Paul, MN, 2006. 6 Hezbollah really only arrived on the scene in 1983, although Israel’s war against the Palestinians in Lebanon began in 1982. Although helping the Sunni Palestinians might seem an odd task for Shiite Hezbollah. It is worth noting that Imad Mughniyeh, a Shiite Lebanese, began his long terrorist career working for the Palestinian al-Fatah, rather than for any of the Lebanese militant groups, and is believed by numerous sources to have had contacts with Osama bin Laden or other agents of al-Qaeda. 7 Author interview with Riad Kahwaji, September 2006. 8 Author interview and e-mail exchanges between author and Nick Blanford, September 2006. 9 Author interview and e-mail exchange with Timur Goksel, September 2006. 10 Interview with Hassan Fattah, senior Middle East correspondent for the New York Times, September 2006. 11 Reported by Ehud Ya’ari based on a translation of the doctrines transmitted by Haj Hallil, Hezbollah’s 1996 director of operations. “Hizballah: 13 Principles of Warfare,” The Jerusalem Report, 21 March 1996. 12 Maryam al-Bassam. 13 An anonymous soldier from the 401st Armor Brigade on the fighting at Wadi Saluki, as reported by Nava Tzuriel and Eitan Glickman, “The Canyon of Death,” Yediot Aharonot, Adam Keller (trans), published variously, including online at http://www.kibush.co.il/. 14 Interview with Goksel. 15 Information on casualties from author interview with Yaakov Katz, September 2006; and Yaakov Katz, “Wadi Saluki battle—microcosm of war’s mistakes,” Jerusalem Post Online Edition, 29 August 2006, online at http://www.jpost.com. 16 Interview with Oren. 17 Interview with Katz. 18 Interviews with Blanford, Kahwaji, and Katz; and “IDF Report Card, Jerusalem Post Online Edition, 24 August 2006, online at http://www.jpost.com. 19 Interview and e-mail exchange with Goksel, September 2006. 20 Interview with Kahwaji. 21 Interview with Blanford.

page 127

22 Jonathan Spyer. “On the El-Khiam Ridge,” The Times, 30 August 2006. 23 The purpose of the push to the Litani is an interesting question. Many in Israel see the battle for Ghandouriyeh as having had little strategic value, especially as the bridge crossing the Litani had been destroyed by the IDF earlier in the war. A number of soldiers have demonstrated against IDF leaders for what they believe was a wanton sacrifice of life for little strategic advantage; however, judgment on the strategic ramifications of the battle remain outside the purview of this article. 24 Tzuriel and Glickman, “The Canyon of Death.” 25 Information on the battle remains unreliable. This narrative is based on a compilation of interviews and e-mails with Goksel, Oren, Blanford, Katz, and Kahwaji, September 2006; Tzuriel and Glickman; Katz, “Wadi Saluki battle—microcosm of war’s mistakes;” and Amos Harel and Yair Ettinger, “Why did these soldiers die?” Haaretz, 23 August 2006, online at http://www.haaretz. com. 26 Interview with Katz. 27 Interview with Goksel.

The Author

Captain Daniel Helmer is currently at Fort Riley, Kansas, preparing for a Military Transition Team in Afghanistan. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, and as a Rhodes Scholar, he received a Masters in Philosophy from Oxford University. He has served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States and while deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom.