Talk:Operation Cobra/Archive 2

St.Lo
I think a battle with 5,000 American casualties deserves its own article ..... Why there is so few detailes about battle of St.Lo inspite of its importance for upcoming operation cobra ?--82.116.151.118 (talk) 09:58, 2 June 2009 (UTC)
 * As you've spotted this area is very much a work in progress. The article will undoubtedly be written in due course, though if you have sourced material available and want to start it yourself please go ahead. Unless you register you'll need someone else to create the appropriate page. It's also a dreadful truth that 5000 casualties is barely a blip on the radar compared to other battles of the campaign (and even more so on the Eastern front, where the Soviets sometimes didn't even record battles where only a few divisions were lost). EyeSerene talk 12:13, 2 June 2009 (UTC)

Operation Atlantic
I'm not sure but hasn't the brief comment about Atlantic conflated it with Operation Spring?Keith-264 (talk) 10:08, 15 March 2010 (UTC)
 * You're right. I've tried to clarify that paragraph - better? EyeSerene talk 15:24, 15 March 2010 (UTC)
 * "A counterstroke by two SS Panzer Divisions pushed the Canadians back past their start lines, and II Canadian Corps's commander, Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, had to commit reinforcements to stabilize the front." It was this bit. It reads as though Atlantic failed due to a counterattack. As far as I know it was the attempt at the end of the successful occupation of Caen on the south bank (Colombelles and Vaucelles) to advance onto Verrieres Ridge (Bourguebus) that got counterattacked and then that Spring got another taste of it?Keith-264 (talk) 16:27, 15 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Damn, missed the important bit. Yes, I'm sure you're right, that does read as though it's referring to the 2nd Pz and 9th SS Pz's attacks, which effectively ended Op Spring. Further revision upcoming :) EyeSerene talk 17:55, 15 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Until I checked I was confused about the end of Atlantic too. In the clarification you mention the numbers of tanks in the US and British sectors but are they the tank-StuG establishments of the divisions or their number of operational tanks on the eve of Cobra?Keith-264 (talk) 22:16, 15 March 2010 (UTC)


 * That I don't know - I didn't add that text (at least, not while I was tweaking yesterday). I have Hastings but not Jackson so can't be sure about the composition, though I'll check Hastings tonight if I remember. EyeSerene talk 08:56, 16 March 2010 (UTC)


 * I have Jackson's work; just to confirm what comment do we need checking and i will try and do it tonight.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 10:11, 16 March 2010 (UTC)


 * Keith will correct me if I'm wrong, but I think it's the numbers and composition of the German armour mentioned in: "Only two Panzer Divisions with 190 tanks now faced Bradley's First Army, while seven Panzer divisions with 750 tanks were positioned in the Caen area, far away from where Operation Cobra would be launched. " (from Supporting operations). EyeSerene talk 10:20, 16 March 2010 (UTC)
 * If the armour on the American front was in PzLehr and the 2nd SSPzDiv plus StuGs from 17th SSPzGrDiv then Zetterling gives 31, 103, 10 = 144 operational around 23rd July. Anglo-Canadian =111+?75+58+25+58+30+88=445 + 13+17+20 in the Tiger battalions=495. Zet takes a few swipes at Hitler Hastings in his tables http://web.telia.com/~u18313395/normandy/gerob/gerob.html.
 * Jackson, P. 384 has 109 tanks in the two armoured divs. Could '190' be a typo?Keith-264 (talk) 18:26, 16 March 2010 (UTC)
 * Jackson, p. 113 (i have the 2 books rolled into 1 version so there isnt even a page 384 in my book - there is two pages 1's thru to p. 105's however! :S) Enemy strength opposite US Armies (Secotr: Caumont-Cotentin)
 * Date - number of panzer divisions - tanks
 * 15 June - 1/2 - 70
 * 25 June - 1 - 190
 * 30 June - 1/2 - 140
 * 5 July = 1/2 - 215
 * 10 July 2 1/2 - 240
 * 15 July - 2 1/2 - 240
 * 20 July - 2 - 190
 * 25 July - 2 - 190
 * For the same dates the German tank strength facing the British sector raises from 4 to 7 panzer divisions (peaking at 7 1/1) and tanks raise from 520 to 750 peak strength 25 July.
 * Jackson notes that the tank figures for both sectors also include tank battalions and other Corps assests.
 * He doesnt say it but i would assume that these figuers include StuGs.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 05:02, 17 March 2010 (UTC)

Attn Editors: Wrong Unit!
The identification of a US Division is incorrect. A passage from the article says:

"By 28 July the German defenses across the US front had largely collapsed under the full weight of VII and VIII Corps' advance, and resistance was disorganised and patchy.[77] VIII Corps' 4th Armored Division, entering combat for the first time, captured Coutances but met stiff opposition east of the town,[77] and US units penetrating into the depth of the German positions were variously counterattacked by elements of the 2nd SS Panzer (Das Reich), 17th SS Panzergrenadier, and 353rd Infantry Divisions, all seeking to escape entrapment.[78] A desperate counterattack was mounted against the 4th Armored Division by German remnants, but this was a disaster and the Germans abandoned their vehicles and fled on foot.[78]"

The errors are in bold. While 4th Armored indeed captured Coutances, the American unit that engaged the German counterattack was the Combat Command B of the 2nd Armored Division. The fierce fighting and destruction of elements of the 2nd SS Panzer and 17th SS Panzer Grenadier referred to in this passage almost certainly described the Roncey Pocket and the night combat around St.-Denis-le-Gast. In other words, I believe after this passage misidentified the 2nd Armored with the 4th Armored, the same battle--one described by Hastings and the other by another source was treated as two seperate fights in the article. Not being an editor, I only changed the number of the unit and did some cosmetic work. The real editors must step in.

See EISENHOWER's LIUTANENTS, US OFFICIAL HISOTRY OF THE NORMANDY CAMPAIGN and Zaloga's COBRA. The rest of the passage is accurate.

Jonathan Chin — Preceding unsigned comment added by 140.109.140.133 (talk) 01:56, 28 October 2009 (UTC)

More material?
I have a study that has the following material. I wonder if they would make worthy additions to the article? I can provide the reference data if so.


 * It was the last occasion that a major campaign was fought in Western Europe by an army group-sized formation including British troops and under British command.
 * The breakout was also the culmination of the last successful invasion of western Europe. --Airborne84 (talk) 06:42, 27 November 2010 (UTC)

Mistaken bombing of July 25
I have included a sentence to balance out the sentence stating that Bradley "requested" a parallel approach on July 25. Actually, he thought it was a done deal, noting his pleasure after the planning conference that the Air Force was cooperating for once. This may or may not have been Leigh-Mallory's fault. The issue was apparently left hanging. The AAF's leaders strongly voiced their misgivings, but the errors made in the bombing were not due to any reluctance (since the operational airmen who made the errors were given an order and were not prone to doctrinal issues in their misgivings), much less duplicity, as Bradley later charged. The gist of the error--which overall was small in comparison to the weight of effort used--was a tragic combination of mistakes by a relatively few airmen and malfunctions of some equipment, poor weather, failure of Bradley (and Leigh-Mallory) to understand heavy bomber operations (including warnings that the fallback distance was too short), far too many infantrymen caught in the open, failures of coordination not uncommon in the complexities of Eisenhower's command, personality clashes, and sending in the fighter-bombers before the heavies instead of after. I did not include in my edit that Brereton, commanding the Ninth AF portion of the effort, was at the front with Bradley, hardly indicative of reluctance of effort or duplicity in planning. Both narrowly escaped death, as did Quesada, Hodges, Simpson, Ridgeway and all their aides, also present. Sullivan makes a good point that Bradley took a calculated gamble between entrenching his troops to protect them during the bombardment and making a swift assault as soon as it ended, and might have lost as many lives anyway, but bottom line, the responsibility for protecting the troops was Bradley's and his subordinate commanders.--Reedmalloy (talk) 18:59, 28 November 2010 (UTC)

hey is there a friendly fire incident involving the RAF in this?
I recently found this on a friendly fire section where it says" July 25, 1944, an Allied bombing mission near the western area of Saint-Lô carried out by the RAF resulted in heavy casualties on the 13th US infantry. This was carried out by British RAF Leigh Mallory. Anyone know this really happened?
 * I very much doubt it as A) Leigh Mallory was CinC of Fighter Command not Bomber Command and B) AVM generally don't fly combat missions. Wee Curry Monster talk 22:27, 6 March 2011 (UTC)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allied_Expeditionary_Air_Force L-M ran a bit more than Fighter Command for Overlord.Keith-264 (talk) 12:55, 7 March 2011 (UTC)


 * I doubt it. I'm not sure if the RAF did play a part in Operation Cobra since i tried and research it all up. Also i know it has nothing to do with this section or question but the Wikipedia article Iranian Embassy Siege. "Frank Collins claims this hostage was mistaken for the terrorist 'Salim' (codename for the leader) and believed to be carrying grenades> was it true that to colins that one name Ali Akbar Samadzadeh was killed by friendly fire from SAS? Collins﻿was an NCO. Secondly, he was a severely mentally ill man (more than likely psychotic and deluded) who took his own life. I don't trust that guys word. is is a reliable source of info in that that an SBS killed a hostage? I don't trust that guy cause i don't think that another hostage was killed by the SBS. BBC and most of the British newspaper only shows that one hostage was killed. i think all of them got shot by a kidnapper. anyone know this?Paulioetc (talk) 05:58, 7 March 2011 (UTC)


 * hey i check this one out: July 25, 1944, an Allied bombing mission near the western area of Saint-Lô carriedout by the RAF resulted in heavy casualties on the 13th US infantry. I seen this one on wikipedia and was removed several times. why do u guys remove that "RAF" thingy out of that context? well i'm putting them back in since my account been hacked so ya,JamesHawks (talk) 01:44, 9 March 2011 (UTC)

Timeline error
How can this be an FA when the first sentence is wrong? It says COBRA started 8 weeks after D-Day. D-Day was on June 6, so 8 weeks is Aug 6, yet it says the main attacks started 25 Jul (only 6 weeks later) and the "aftermath" started 1 Aug. Seven calendar weeks is more like it (6 Jun - 25 Jul) BarkingMoon (talk) 03:04, 28 May 2011 (UTC)

Removed from article
"General Omar Bradley later took credit for the planning of Operation Cobra in his memoirs. However, Bradley's plan resembles—with only slight revisions—an earlier concept devised by none other than General George S. Patton."

I've put the above here for two reasons: 1. the article already clearly implies that Bradley regarded Cobra as his idea, and 2. there's no indication that the second source is WP:RS. It seems to originate from an essay by the owner of a 'Patton' website, which may be okay if the author is a recognised expert in the field but even then we'd need to attribute to show that it's an opinion. Personally I think it may be rather a weak source for a featured article regardless. EyeSerene talk 20:00, 5 August 2011 (UTC)

Montgomery idea for operation cobra
I highly doubt this claim and the reference to Bradly taking credit, I find unbelievable. I will make a point of researching this claim. It is just me or does this page also have a bias ring to itJacob805 18:21, 5 August 2011 (UTC)

Also Quoting Montgomery's memoirs, please as this is being used a creditable source? Jacob805 18:25, 5 August 2011 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Jacob805 (talk • contribs)


 * Please do research the claim - the more information the better. However, unfortunately we can't really base content on what you find to be believable, only on what reliable sources say. However, I'm a little confused by part of your post. Perhaps you could clarify what you mean by "does this page also have a bias ring to it"? Edit: never mind - I've seen your post at Talk:Operation_Goodwood EyeSerene talk 20:11, 5 August 2011 (UTC)
 * To answer your second question: if you can suggest a better source for verifying what Montgomery claimed about events, please let us know. EyeSerene talk 20:08, 5 August 2011 (UTC)
 * Montgomery Diary notes 13 July 1944, "On the First Army front a heavy blow west of ST LO must aim at "writing off" all the enemy troops between that place and the west coast of the peninsula; having broken in, fresh divisions must pass through and swing right-handed towards COUTANCES and GRANVILLE.

28. I saw Dempsey and Bradley and got them working on these plans. Actually, they have both been working up to these battles for some time and the business we now want to do is merely in accordance with my directive M. 510 dated 10 July". Montgomery and the Battle of Normandy, p. 204 (Ed. S. Brooks, Army Records Society 2008).Keith-264 (talk) 20:54, 5 August 2011 (UTC)

Bluecoat
Added a header about Bluecoat and link to synchronise with the earlier supporting operations section, using detail from the recent revision of the Bluecoat page.Keith-264 (talk) 21:38, 19 May 2014 (UTC)

Montgomery and Goodwood
There is some debate in the literature as to whether Montgomery intended Goodwood to be a diversion for the US forces as the main effort, or if Goodwood was to be a potential breakthrough by itself. Some authors assert that Montgomery offered only after Goodwood's disappointing gains that it was meant to support Bradley's operation. The article only presents one side of this though. Perhaps the addition of a sourced note would be sufficient to note the divergence of opinion in the literature? --Airborne84 (talk) 00:17, 12 October 2011 (UTC)
 * Considering that the two attacks were supposed to be closer together and considering that Goodwood was a success in the same manner of the previous 2nd Army attacks (i.e. attritional with some contingency planning in case it was the one which triggered a German collapse it's probably a mistake to see them in isolation.Keith-264 (talk) 08:24, 12 October 2011 (UTC)
 * I didn't mean they should be viewed in isolation. My point is that there are two views in the literature—in both primary and secondary sources: (1) that Goodwood was intended by Montgomery to be an operation by the British Army in Normandy with the aim of a breakthrough of the German defenses, and (2) that Montgomery intended for it to be a supporting effort for Bradley's 1st Army in Operation Cobra. The article, as it stands, only covers one of the two views. Readers are not informed that there is another possibility as stated in reliable primary and secondary sources. We'll probably never know Montgomery's true intentions for Goodwood, but Wikipedia is just a repository of reliable sources and should present multiple views if they exist. --Airborne84 (talk) 00:47, 13 October 2011 (UTC)
 * Airborne84, I agree, and some of the sources already cited in the article take the view you propose. Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 17:17, 21 November 2012 (UTC)
 * Period documents show what Goodwood was suppose to be. As original designed, a deep drive south. As launched, and confirmed by orders given out prior to the attack, a more limited attack to take the ridge it aimed for. Period documents, the corps and overall official histories and any decent modern look at the operation confirm this and quote the orders, usually, in full.
 * That some historians, it would appear from this discussion, disagree with this, is irrelevant to this article and should perhaps take up a short section in the Goodwood article.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 18:27, 4 December 2012 (UTC)


 *  My point is that there are two views in the literature—in both primary and secondary sources: (1) that Goodwood was intended by Montgomery to be an operation by the British Army in Normandy with the aim of a breakthrough of the German defenses, and (2) that Montgomery intended for it to be a supporting effort for Bradley's 1st Army in Operation Cobra. - the answer is "Both". Whatever happened depended to a great extent on how the Germans reacted to the British moves, if they had broken then the British forces would have advanced, however Montgomery knew that this was unlikely, so it is probable that he actually planned for the latter.


 * You cannot plan and implement operations against someone with the tactical competence of the Germans expecting the result to be exactly what one expected or planned. So one plans for a desired but unlikely result, with a back-up plan for the more likely actual result. The Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS were excellent at extemporising, and almost never withdrew, or got up and ran, so Montgomery is unlikely to have expected to advance much.


 * It is surprising how many historians (and even military people of the time) who didn't/don't seem to comprehend (or prefer to ignore) Montgomery's basic principle of battle: To cause the opposing forces to become off-balance (while maintaining balance in his own forces) and then tying-down, isolating, and then destroying the opposing forces. He states this in his memoirs. Perhaps more historians ought to have read them. I suspect few have.


 * BTW, I'm no fan of Montgomery but it does seem that so many of his critics seem to utterly fail to comprehend the tactical situations he was facing. Almost the entire German army in Normandy was facing him - not just a few divisions. And those facing him included the best Germany had to offer - the Waffen-SS Panzer Divisions. So when you hear others complaining about Montgomery's 'failures' bear in mind that they never had to face fresh up-to-strength Waffen-SS Pzr Dvs, but only ever encountered ones that had already been severely mauled by his forces. Most of his critics never faced even one.


 * And it is also worth pointing out that in the initial invasion planning for Overlord the British and Canadian beaches were chosen by Montgomery so that the brunt of the fighting would inevitably fall upon them rather than on their American allies, thus some less-charitable Americans could not turn round and accuse the British of giving them the dirtiest jobs with the heaviest losses. As is turned out, many even then failed to comprehend the difference in fighting that was going on in their respective areas. I suspect that some of it may have been due to the "Two nations divided by a common language". In other cases it was due to inexperience and having nothing previous to compare it to.


 * And if one reads his memoirs one sees that he makes no criticism of any of his officer colleagues, British or American, even though in several cases they committed errors such that, to paraphrase Alan Whicker, "If they had been German, Hitler would have had them shot". — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.148.220.15 (talk) 14:04, 20 January 2015 (UTC)


 * This may well be true but do you have reliable sources to tie it to? Enigma is right that records from before Goodwood show that a plan was made and then reduced to a smaller plan. Another view is that the real intention of Goodwood was to surround the I and II SS Pz Corps and that Greenline and Pomegranate were coordinated with it (but the book hasn't been written yet). Keith-264 (talk) 14:29, 20 January 2015 (UTC)


 * "And it is also worth pointing out that in the initial invasion planning for Overlord the British and Canadian beaches were chosen by Montgomery so that the brunt of the fighting would inevitably fall upon them rather than on their American allies, thus some less-charitable Americans could not turn round and accuse the British of giving them the dirtiest jobs with the heaviest losses."
 * Not so. The invasion beaches were unfortunately laid out in recognition of the port facilities each Army had to use to get there from the UK. The alternative was to try to have their respective convoys cross over each other during the invasion. The difficultly of the objectives had nothing to do with it. A glance at a map shows that the Germans had no choice but to concentrate most of their forces on the eastern allied flank. DMorpheus2 (talk) 20:02, 17 March 2016 (UTC)


 * Montgomery states:

"My master plan for the land battle in Normandy I have described already. Briefly, it was so to stage and conduct operations that we drew the main enemy strength on to the front of the Second British Army on our eastern flank, in order that we might the more easily gain territory in the west and make the ultimate break-out on that flank - using the First American Army for the purpose. If events on the western flank were to proceed rapidly it meant that we must make quick territorial gains there.

On the eastern flank, in the Caen sector, the acquisition of ground was not so pressing; the need there was by hard fighting to make the enemy commit his reserves, so that the American forces would meet less opposition in their advances to gain territory which was vital on the west.

In this master plan we were greatly assisted by the immense strategic importance of Caen. It was a vital road and rail centre through which passed the main routes leading to our lodgement area from the east and south-east. As the bulk of the German mobile reserves were located north of the Seine, they would have to approach our bridgehead from the east and would thus converge on Caen. To the south-east, between Caen and Falaise, was good ground for airfields. I was convinced that strong and persistent offensive action in the Caen sector would achieve our objective of drawing the enemy reserves on to our eastern flank: this was my basic conception. From the beginning it formed the basis of all our planning. Once on shore and firmly established, I began to get this strategy working and after the heavy battles in the Caen area, and the overrunning of the Cherbourg peninsular, it began to take shape.

I never once had cause or reason to alter my master plan. Of course we did not keep to the times and phase lines we had envisaged for the benefit of administrative planning, and of course, too, we didn't hesitate to adjust our plans and dispositions to the tactical situation as it developed - as in all battles. Of course we didn't. I never imagined we would. But the fundamental design remained unchanged; it was to that that I pinned my hopes and clung so resolutely, despite increasing opposition from the fainter-hearted. We did not capture Caen, for instance, till the 10th July and we did not finally clear the eastern suburbs till the 20th July. It had been my original intention to secure the high ground between Caen and Falaise as early as possible, as being a suitable area for the construction of airfields; but this was not vital, and when I found it could not be done in accordance with the original plan without suffering unjustified casualties, I did not proceed with that venture. This was not popular with the Air Command.

It was indeed a fundamental object of my strategy on the eastern flank to establish a force strong in armour to the south-east of Caen in the area about Bourguebus; this was the key to ensuring that we kept the bulk of the German armour on the eastern flank, and thus helped the American expansion on the west. We did not get on to this high ground until Second Army launched Operation GOODWOOD on the 18th July, with armoured forces. As soon as the armoured advance came to a standstill because of determined enemy resistance, and also because heavy rain turned the whole area into a sea of mud, I decided to abandon that thrust. Many people thought that when GOODWOOD was staged, it was the beginning of the plan to break out from the eastern flank towards Paris, and that because I did not do so, the battle had been a failure. But let me make the point again at the risk of being wearisome. There was never at any time any intention of making the break-out from the bridgehead on the eastern flank. Misunderstandings about this simple and basic conception were responsible for much trouble between British and American personalities."


 * The original COSSAC plan called for a breakout from the Caen-Falaise area on the eastern flank. Montgomery hadn't liked this plan so he had changed it.

"'All through the fierce fighting which took place in Normandy, there was never any intention of breaking out on the eastern flank towards the Seine; reference to all the orders and instructions which I issued makes that abundantly clear. This false conception existed only at Supreme Headquarters, and none of the senior officers responsible for the conduct of the actual fighting in Normandy, Bradley included, had any doubt about the true plan. The misconception led to much controversy and those at Supreme Headquarters who were not very fond of me took advantage of it to create trouble as the campaign developed.'"

"'By the middle of July there developed a growing impatience on the part of the Press; it appeared to them that stagnation gripped our lodgement area. Bradley's first attempt at the break-out, made towards Coutances early in July had failed. Then came Operation GOODWOOD in the Caen section and the Press regarded this as an attempt to break out on the eastern flank; and as such, that operation too, appeared to have failed. This was partly my own fault, for I was too exultant at the Press conference I gave during the GOODWOOD battle. I realise that now - in fact, I realised it pretty quickly afterwards. Basically the trouble was this - Both Bradley and I agreed that we could not possibly tell the Press the true strategy' [to draw off the enemy reserves onto the British sector] 'which formed the basis of all our plans. As Bradley said, 'We must grin and bear it.' It became increasingly difficult to grin.'"

"'The enemy had attempted to 'rope us off' in the 'bocage' country some 15 to 20 miles inland from the assault area. For a time this policy was successful; but it was only successful by a continuous expenditure of reserves to plug holes in his defences and at a heavy cost in men and materials. These enemy reserves prevented any substantial gain on our part east and south of Caen, but in doing this they were not available to counter the thrusts on the western flank. In short, they were being committed. As at Alamein, we had forced the enemy to commit his reserves on a wide front; we were now ready to commit ours on a narrow front, and so win the battle.'"


 * In short, it would seem that although deemed to be of immense importance to both the German defenders, and to some of the Allied High Command, Caen was considered by Montgomery himself merely as being a convenient place in-which to tie-down the German Panzer divisions, and its reserves, and to destroy them. The airfields that were deemed so important to Coningham, were deemed desirable by Montgomery, but not essential.


 * So GOODWOOD whilst not achieving what many of the critics thought it was meant to achieve, nevertheless did serve its purpose as fas as Montgomery was concerned. It forced the Germans to keep sending, and then using up, their panzer reserves in the area around Caen and thereby prevented these reserves being deployed in the west against Bradley and his Americans.


 * The confusion and controversy that has since arisen is due to Montgomery's critics judging his actions in terms of tactics, where he himself was actually operating using strategy.

Planning
I suggest we might have a better sense of the COBRA planning process if the following two existing paragraphs were reversed in order:

"The originator of the idea for Operation Cobra is disputed, according to Montgomery's official biographer, the foundation of Operation Cobra was laid on 13 June. Planning was immensely aided by detailed Ultra Intelligence which supplied up-to-date decodes of communications between Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW, the German armed forces high command) and Hitler's generals. Montgomery's plan at that time called for the U. S. First Army to take Saint-Lô and Coutances and then make two southward thrusts; one from Caumont toward Vire and Mortain and the other from Saint-Lô toward Villedieu and Avranches. Although pressure was to be kept up along the Cotentin Peninsula towards La Haye-du-Puits and Valognes, the capture of Cherbourg was not the priority. With the capture of Cherbourg by VII Corps (Lieutenant-General Lawton Collins) on 27 June, Montgomery's initial timetable was soon outdated and the thrust from Caumont was never adopted.

Following the conclusion of Operation Charnwood and the cancellation of the First Army offensive towards Saint-Lô, Montgomery met with Bradley and Dempsey on 10 July to discuss plans for the 21st Army Group.Bradley admitted that progress on the western flank was very slow but that plans had been laid for another breakout attempt, codenamed Operation Cobra, to be launched by the First Army on 18 July. Montgomery approved the plan and that the strategy would be to draw German attention from the First Army to the British and Canadian sector. Dempsey was instructed to "go on hitting, drawing the German strength, especially the armour, onto yourself—so as to ease the way for Brad[ley]". To accomplish this, Operation Goodwood was planned and Eisenhower ensured that both operations would have the support of the Allied air forces with their strategic bombers."

The US official history has Bradley presenting a not-yet-fleshed-out tentative COBRA plan to Montgomery on July 10; Montgomery endorsing the idea; Dempsey and Montgomery then planning GOODWOOD as a partner to COBRA. Flipping the order of these two paragraphs with perhaps some light editing would fix this. In particular, Collins' contributions should be mentioned. DMorpheus2 (talk) 17:27, 23 August 2016 (UTC)
 * The first para discusses June and the second is set in July, will it really help to swap them? Keith-264 (talk) 22:07, 23 August 2016 (UTC)


 * With some edits, yes. It makes sense to me first to describe the situation, then Bradley's outline plan, then the meeting with Montgomery, then the critical modifications by Collins. *Then* whether there is a dispute with regard to whose idea it was. DMorpheus2 (talk) 16:28, 25 August 2016 (UTC)
 * Are these facts or assertions?Keith-264 (talk) 16:54, 25 August 2016 (UTC)


 * Facts.


 * It is a bit odd to *begin* the planning section, not by describing the plan, but by saying a controversy exists about whose idea it was. DMorpheus2 (talk) 17:31, 25 August 2016 (UTC)


 * Montgomery in his memoirs merely states that he had endorsed the COBRA plan:


 * "'By the 18th July Operation COBRA, the final break-out on the American front, was planned and I had approved the scheme."


 * "I should mention at this stage that the weather was generally very much against us. Between the 19th and 22nd June we had a gale of unprecedented violence. Just when we needed fresh divisions to proceed with our plans and retain the initiative, those divisions were in ships anchored off the beaches and unable to land. On the 20th June we had four divisions in that situation, two American and two British. The First American Army suffered particularly badly; the American artificial harbour (the 'Mulberry') off OMAHA beach had to be abandoned, American ammunition expenditure had to be rationed, and Bradley became a week behind schedule in his planned build-up.'"


 * "'Meanwhile the First American Army was working itself into a position from which it could stage the break-out operation. We had hoped originally to launch the operation from the line St. Lô-Coutances. This concept had to be given up and Bradley finally decided to launch it from the general line of the road St. Lô-Périers, Our hope was to reach this by line by D+5 (11th June); it was not finally reached till the 18th July.'"


 * "'Operation COBRA was due to be launched on the 20th July; this was the day on whch I had ordered Operation GOODWOOD on the eastern flank about Caen to be closed down. But again the weather delayed us and COBRA was not actually launched till the 25th July."


 * "It was clear to me that as the American attack gathered momentum there would be severe repercussions all along the enemy front. The enemy line would be bent back and he would try and re-establish a front based on certain strong hinges. I decided those hinges would be three in number:"


 * 1. At Caumont.


 * 2. On the River Orne.


 * 3. The high ground between Caen and Falaise.


 * "I therefore planned to knock out in succession the key rivets in the north on which, I reckoned, the enemy would try to 'hinge back' his left flank. I gave orders accordingly, and the Second Army began at once to re-group and to transfer its weight from its extreme left south-east of Caen to its extreme right at Caumont. This movement was a major undertaking and Second Army organised it beautifully."


 * "The attack at Caumont (Operation BLUECOAT) was to be delivered by six divisions on the 2nd August. But because of the unexpected speed of the American advance, with Dempsey's agreement I advanced the date to the 30th July.'" — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.241.32 (talk) 14:18, 2 September 2016 (UTC)