Talk:Operation Epsom/Archive 1

A-class review stuff
I've done (yesterday and today) a light copyedit. I've left a couple of hidden comments in the text. I noticed the dates are mostly linked, though the climate at FAC is now for de-linking. The basic date formatting (under the links) is US (ie Month/day) and you may wish to change this to Commonwealth format (Day/Month) as this is a British operation. Do revert anything you don't agree with! Anyhow, good luck, -- R OGER D AVIES  talk 12:36, 16 September 2008 (UTC)

== Scottish Divisons losses ==

The Germans attackers were hit hard by British aircraft, artillery and anti-tank fire, but by the end of the day the 15th Scottish Division had taken more than 2,300 casualties holding its position

I would correct this right away however there is a citation with it, from what i have seen within Clark's and Jackson's books the division took casualties in this area over the entire operation not in a single day.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:39, 16 September 2008 (UTC) --EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 11:56, 17 September 2008 (UTC)

Paul Hausser
Clark p. 73 states that before II SS Panzer Corp actually got into the fight Hausser was appointed commander of 7th Army and Wilhelm Bittrich took command and thus lead them into battle. With that information i dont think Hausser should be in the info box.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 20:00, 17 September 2008 (UTC)


 * Hmm, quite strange, Williams p. 123 says: So relentless was the bombardment that the commander of II SS Panzer Corps, General Paul Hausser, was forced to postpone his attack until the afternoon [30 June]. Moreover, he cites Hausser's war journal, in which Hausser says himself:The murderous fire from naval guns in the Channel and the terrible British artillery destroyed the bulk of our attacking force in its assembly area. I think that Hausser was officialy replaced by Bittrich on 28 June, but he remained the de-facto commander of the II Corps until the end of the operation. --Eurocopter (talk) 20:13, 17 September 2008 (UTC)


 * That would make some sence. Clark states he became CO and Bittrich took command but he doesnt state he actually left but does mention all Corps activity from that point being blah blah Bittrich. Am confused now lol--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 20:22, 17 September 2008 (UTC)


 * I would be pretty sure that Hausser commanded the II Corps during the rest of the operation. One more strange thing, in the Wilhelm Bittrich article it is said that he commanded the II corps between 7 October 1944 and 8 May 1945. --Eurocopter (talk) 20:29, 17 September 2008 (UTC)


 * I think we need to call some reinforcements in lol --EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 20:44, 17 September 2008 (UTC)


 * I suggest we leave Williams123 there until we find some proper counter-sources. --Eurocopter (talk) 20:48, 17 September 2008 (UTC)


 * Right oh, it will also need to be reflected in the Order Of Battle, which i have constructed off Clarks work who states Mr B. I suggest we leave both the main article and OOB until we sort this out lol--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 20:56, 17 September 2008 (UTC)


 * Dalglish* p.103 "The immediate replacement of Dollman...confirmed in mid-afternoon of 28 June."
 * & note p.118 "The 7th army CoS...urged Hausser to complete preparations for the attack before moving on.

To whatever extent Hausser heeded this advice there is evidence of breakdowns of staffwork...."


 * Dalglish. I, 'Operation Epsom'. It seems reliable as a narrative, perhaps better than his Goodwood effort. from the quotes it can be seen that he doesn't squeeze ambiguous information too hard. Keith-264 (talk) 19:40, 21 September 2008 (UTC)


 * From the evidence we have then - he was in command for the first day or two and the other guy for the rest of the operation?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 10:20, 22 September 2008 (UTC)

German orbat
Williams (120) states that units from six armoured divisions were in line for the attack. Perhaps consulting the other sources and see if there is anything to be changed in the infobox? --Eurocopter (talk) 14:32, 21 September 2008 (UTC)
 * Based off what i have so far read in Clarks book the info box as it is, appears to be spot on or as close to. 9th, 10th and 12th SS were in the line. Kampfgruppes of the 1st and 2nd SS arrived but not the full divisions. Kampfgruppes of the 2nd and 21st Panzer also helped out and there was elements of the Panzer Lehr too. See OOB for more info.
 * Although the map on page 336 of Wilmots book shows 9SS as a full division in the attack and battlegroups from the 1st, 2nd, 10th SS, 2nd Pnz and 21st Pnz. The map appears a tad confusing and shows Panzer-Lehr and 12th SS not taking part - well one could interpret it that way.
 * Jackson, p. 19 (from 1945 bear in mind) shows 1st, 9th and 10th SS attacking supported by elements of the 21st Pnz. 2nd and 12th SS are shown holding the line where the attack as hit so implying they were invovled and no mention of the Pnz Lehr.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 14:51, 21 September 2008 (UTC)
 * Just checked, Williams' six divisions are the 1st, 9th, 10th, 12th SS, 21st Panzer and the Panzer Lehr (units of the Lehr division contributed to the initial defensives, alongside with the 12th and 21st). The 2nd SS is not mentioned at all in the Normandy theatre, while the 2nd Panzer is mentioned in the Caumont-Villers Bocage area. --Eurocopter (talk) 15:45, 21 September 2008 (UTC)


 * The information provided by Clark is the following:
 * 1st SS, Kampfgruppe Frey - elements of 2 Panzergrenadier regts and attached to 12thSS - no tanks of there own
 * 2nd Panzer - one kampfgruppe based around a tank battalion. - MK V Panthers?
 * 2nd SS - Kampfgruppe Weidinger - no tanks of there own
 * 9th SS - the whole division - MK IV and MK V Panthers
 * 10th SS - the whole division - MK IV and Stugs (unknown variant however)
 * 12th SS - the whole Division - MK IV and MK V Panthers
 * 21st Panzer - A Kampfgruppe based around a panzer battalion - tanks and Stugs, unknown variants - although i know that the 21st were equipped with MK IV i dont have a citation to back this up.
 * Panzer-Lehr - elements - MK IV and MK V Panthers?
 * I will double check all sources to make sure i havent cocked up and muddled 2nd SS and 2nd Pnz - although i dont think i have.
 * Does Williams provide additional information regarding the actual strength of the Panzer-Lehr involved in Epsom and likewise for the 21st Pnz?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 10:32, 22 September 2008 (UTC)

Just google booked 12ss div history by H.Meyer p. 409. 2nd SS Kampfgruppe arrived during the offensive and was attached to the Pnz-Lehr. However it doesnt let you look at the following pages so i dont know what they got up to following that. The article for the Kampfgruppe shows it attacking th 49th Div - so part of Martlet or Epsom, both? I have reflected the OOB to show the 2nd SS being attached to Panzer-Lehr for now.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:05, 22 September 2008 (UTC)


 * All Williams says is that the 12th, 21th and lehr divisions initially held the ground during the British attack. I suggest we leave in the infobox something like 3 divisions + various units from other divisions. --Eurocopter (talk) 13:11, 22 September 2008 (UTC)

Footnotes and citations
I am a little concerned about how the information in the citations has been split up from the page numbers. The way it was the author and page was shown with additional information, which to note i have never seen anyone raise as a problem with other article where i have done the same. Now they are both seperate which some could interpt as the "footnotes" being unsupported dubious informarion. Any advice on how to deal with this?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:13, 22 September 2008 (UTC)


 * Yes, simply add in brackets at the end of the footnote the citation which supports it. See Battle of Berlin. --Eurocopter (talk) 13:26, 22 September 2008 (UTC)


 * Ok will do :)


 * Is it necessery to have a citation and then a footnote if it is from the same book and page i.e. citation reading Bob, p. 1 and the footnote reading: blah blah (Bob, p.1). Could the former just be deleted?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 11:30, 23 September 2008 (UTC)


 * Not really, but that would be no problem, as it doesn't really matter. So, you should do whatever you want. :) --Eurocopter (talk) 13:42, 23 September 2008 (UTC)


 * Cheers for the info--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 14:31, 23 September 2008 (UTC)


 * I have another question regarding these now. I have used this split feature in another article I have been working on (Operation Brevity) however there are two footnotes, which contain the exact same information.  Is there a way of merging two footnotes together like you do with citations ala "ref name=”example”"etc ?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:20, 23 September 2008 (UTC)


 * Done it for you. --Eurocopter (talk) 11:30, 24 September 2008 (UTC)


 * Cheers Bud!--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 11:53, 24 September 2008 (UTC)

"appropiate image for an infobox"
Am sorry but how is the current image more appropriate for the info box. It does not convey over anything to do with the operation, is one sided (i.e only shows Allied forces, and being blown up at that). The previous image which was added - a map, showed the British advance and the German counterattacks. Not only does it lend to the info box an actual map of the battlefield but it also shows what each side did. I cannot see how that is not more appropraite.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:49, 29 September 2008 (UTC)


 * I think a image is far more suitable in an infobox rather than a map (it is more interesting, as it gives a nice view of how the battlefield actually looked like; meanwhile maps represent plans and are often quite hard to read for inexperienced readers, that's why I think "Planning" section is a good place for that map). Considering the fact that Epsom is a British offensive operation, I don't think it is one sided if we put an image with Brit armored carriers receiving fire from German artillery :). If I didn't convince you, check out other similar current FAs: Operation Varsity, Battle of Moscow, etc. --Eurocopter (talk) 14:03, 29 September 2008 (UTC)


 * However one photo (while a photo represents a thousand words) cannot give an overall view of the battlefield unless we are talking about Waterloo or something, which took place there enough on one field. Within this period of this battle there is bocage, cornfields, Hill 112, two rivers and the Odon Valley - the photo only shows a few British vechiles under fire and cannot (as i see it) help the layman understand the terrain or have a quick peek into the actual battle.
 * The Map in use, while not showing the German initial plans of attack or the British plans of attack (bar the two planned I Corps attacks) illustrate the area this operation was fought over, the gains made by the British during this operation and the counterattacks launched by the Germans.
 * The info box gives the bare basics of the article in question - who is fighting who, the strength of each side, the casualties and the result. One would suggest how a photo showing one specific incident helps expand this information. When reading actual texts the most helpful source to me is a map which is presented at the earliest possible moment as it, on the whole, illustrates everything.
 * Its because of these reasons, as i see it, that the map illustrates the operation better and why i tend to disagree with other articles showing anything other - i.e. while the varisty operation was an airborne one, that photo tells the layman nothing in support of the info box and likewise with the Moscow one.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 14:32, 29 September 2008 (UTC)


 * You're perfectly right in what you are saying the infobox gives the bare basics of the article in question, so in my opinion that map is far to complicated for an infobox. Look, the infobox image is the very first thing you are looking at when you open an article (even before reading that Epsom is a British offensive on Germans). In this case, a reader finds a map showing movements of unknown military units to unknown locations (as units and locations are presented far later in the article, so that map posted in the infobox is not useful at all for him) - to understand it someone needs to know what's actually happening in this op. This is the main reason I suggest that image should be posted somewhere after orbat and planning, while the image with the exploding APC remains the most appropiate available one we have in my opinion. --Eurocopter (talk) 15:04, 29 September 2008 (UTC)
 * P.S. I'm not going to insist on this matter, so I'd be happy if you'd consider my explanation above and next strong suggestion. Considering available maps and images, I think the best and most logic possible layout-friendly arrangement would be placing APC image in the infobox, new map somewhere at the end of the planning section and the coloured map in the operation section. --Eurocopter (talk) 16:28, 29 September 2008 (UTC)
 * Conceeded, excellent points.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 19:08, 29 September 2008 (UTC)
 * Cheers for understanding. --Eurocopter (talk) 18:06, 30 September 2008 (UTC)

Copyedit
Per request, I've now made a start. I'll post comments, questions etc below, and add to the list as I go along. EyeSerene talk 10:01, 2 October 2008 (UTC)

General

 * Can you leave the spelling of the Panzer lehr division as either: Panzer-Lehr-Division or Panzer Lehr Division as this is the way it is spelt in English sources as opposed to no spaces as seen in German sources. A tiny thing i know but it would easier for the layman to read imo and match up with sources.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 11:25, 2 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Agreed (I actually prefer it this way!) EyeSerene talk 14:58, 2 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Question regarding division titles. Should the full title be used at all times or is it ok to mix and match? I.e. 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division or 15th Division and likewise 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend or 12th SS/12th SS Panzer/Hitlerjugend etc?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 18:07, 6 October 2008 (UTC)
 * It's something I've tried to edit from a point of view of readability for the average English-speaking reader (hence, for example, my use of 'Hitler Youth' rather than 'Hitlerjugend'). I generally try to give the division title in full on the first mention, then a shortened version thereafter unless the meaning would be unclear (for example, if the division hasn't been mentioned for a few paragraphs, when I'd revert to the full name again). In my experience this makes the text less unwieldy, but I have no strong opinions either way. If you feel that we should be using the full official title each time, we can do that. EyeSerene talk 09:31, 7 October 2008 (UTC)
 * I've made a slight change to the main text regarding this. I have edited the first mention of the 12th SS to display "12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend ("Hitler Youth")". But otherwise i take your points on board and will edit with them in mind :). The only thing i dont agree with is abbreviating Panzer to pnz/pz and have changed these back.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:22, 9 October 2008 (UTC)
 * No problem. I hadn't realised I'd abbreviated some names (I plead force of habit) so thanks for catching that ;) EyeSerene talk 16:40, 9 October 2008 (UTC)

Lead

 * I'll leave this until last, as it may need to reflect changes in the article.
 * Agreed, this was the last thing i was going to do as it now needs a bit of a rewrite not just a CE.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 11:21, 2 October 2008 (UTC)
 * I've now re-written this; feel free to re-re-write as needed ;)

Background

 * I've added a little content re D-Day and Caen; I'll source this later when I have access to my bookshelves ;)
 * Sourced
 * Changed a few date formats to UK (day-month-year)
 * "...posting approximately seventy 88 mm guns in hedgerows and woods" I think we need to be more specific here; would it be accurate to say "posting approximately seventy 88 mm guns in hedgerows and woods covering the approaches to Caen."?
 * I just checked my source, the southern approaches to Caen would do. --Eurocopter (talk) 15:02, 2 October 2008 (UTC)


 * I have just expanded the info regarding the planning of an operation which was latter cancelled - it was called Dreadnaught. Anyone think there is too much info there, distracting?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 22:33, 15 October 2008 (UTC)

Planning

 * "In the third phase of the operation, Impetigo, the division would move forward to relieve all Scottish infantry north of the Odon." Which division is this referring to?
 * Wessex Infantry. Will correct this point in a mo.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:54, 6 October 2008 (UTC)


 * I have rearranged this entire section and added a bunch of info in. I think the rearrangements have strengthend the structure of the section but the new additions might need a quick check over if someone doesnt mind. Sorry my grammar sucks :p--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 22:35, 15 October 2008 (UTC)

Main attack

 * Nothing much here, bar the usual tweaks (where/were; there/their!!)

Results etc

 * I think this section might benefit from a more in-depth analysis, but otherwise no issues.


 * Me too, trouble is, the analysis requires sources or it will wade into npov. Sadly, analysis means more than a description of events, which I fear means making a fundamental decision about intention. Was EPSOM a 'bite-and-hold' operation which was couched as a relatively ambitious attempt to capture ground for reasons of expediency (which would have been gratefully accepted by Dempsey and Monty) or was it recast as such when it became obvious that the Germans weren't going to fold? I know what I think but the sources I've seen (D'Este, Dalglish, Clark, Saunders, Wilmot, Buckley, McKee and Hart) seem to either reduce their conclusion to a pro- or anti-Monty opinion from which all else flows or duck the issue. Does anyone know of any other sources which can throw light on it? Keith-264 (talk) 15:41, 9 October 2008 (UTC)
 * The only other source I've got is Max Hastings' Overlord, where he goes into an 11-page analysis of Epsom, Montgomery, Rommel, and all related matters. He treats it fairly neutrally, his main criticism of Monty being on the lines of "...it was not the doings of Second Army, but Montgomery's version of them, that became more and more difficult for his peers and critics to swallow." (p172) His basic conclusion is that Monty's plans were sound, but given the training and experience of the troops employed, the woeful inability of some of Monty's sub-commanders, the general lack of 'drive' and initiative shown by the British infantry (which was echoed in German combat reports of the time), and the apparent need to re-learn lessons of combined-arms operation that had been forgotten since North Africa, he argues that the execution of those plans was beyond the troops' ability... especially in the face of an enemy of the quality of the German Army, that was not yet sufficiently attrited to be broken. EyeSerene talk 16:37, 9 October 2008 (UTC)
 * I forgot about Hastings. He had some of his conclusions from his dad, always a dubious source. I find his analysis unconvincing these days because he uses sources like Hargest and German reports (like the one by Panzer Lehr and some from Italy) which have some accuracy as descriptions of British fighting methods but wrong in their conclusions (like 'the Tommy fights well under cover of his artillery but doesn't like hand-to-hand fighting or grabbing fleeting opportunities). These methods are rational ones for an army built around firepower, which does not have a Siegfried complex, has to be highly sensitive to casualties and which can't coerce its men by killing large numbers of them to make examples as did the German army. Buckley et al point out that if the British were so bad then why were their results better than the Germans? German armoured attacks foundered even more comprehensively than Allied ones for the same reasons - in the Normandy terrain infantry were separated from the tanks which succumbed to mines, hand held AT, AT guns, AFV's, naval and air bombardment. If you let firepower do the talking it is illogical to expect infantry fight their way forward with small arms since this guarantees high losses and means that they lack ammunition to repel counter-attacks, which were a German speciality and had been since 1916. Combined-arms operations; I think that this has been overstated. Despite French and Place's strictures on the British army's 'lack of doctrine' particularly combined arms, some writers are now suggesting that the lack of 'doctrine' ('theory for slow learners') was a liberating phenomenon which allowed the army to respond quickly to the unexpected need to fight for much longer in the terrain of Normandy, something which was a sign of the German army's weakness not its strength. Many of Monty's 'peers and critics' were good bureaucratic infighters but how many of them were squaddies?? For all of Monty's abrasiveness he took Tedder et al to the cleaners when he wanted to - all the more galling for them I suspect. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Keith-264 (talk • contribs) 17:40, 9 October 2008 (UTC)
 * I have all the books in the reference section (bar Williams) and will be drawing on all of them to form some conclusion on the operation - literally quoting stright from the books and putting that into some sort of narative.


 * "Was EPSOM a 'bite-and-hold' operation which was couched as a relatively ambitious attempt to capture ground for reasons of expediency (which would have been gratefully accepted by Dempsey and Monty) or was it recast as such when it became obvious that the Germans weren't going to fold?"
 * Well first things first - Clark, echoing Ellis, tells us that it was initially planned as a pincer attack which was then redesigned due to circumstances into an attempt to circle round Caen with one Corps. VIII Corps believed it was an attempt to envelope Caen by the capture of the high ground south of the city. Throwing a slight spanner in the works is the claim by Williams that the attack was to preempt the II SS Corps attack. Wilmot sits somewhat in the middle - he repeats the basic plan of eveloping Caen but states the attack was to bring the SS Corps to battle. So the question should be was the operation an attempt to cut Caen off or bring the enemy to battle before they could launch there counterattack - or both? What does D'Este and Hastings say on this?
 * What are the books by Buckley, Dalglish, Hart and McKee?


 * "I know what I think but the sources I've seen...seem to either reduce their conclusion to a pro- or anti-Monty opinion from which all else flows or duck the issue."


 * I know D'Este is uber critical of the Anglo-Canadians in Normandy (and imo wrong in so many sections of his book and completely bais) and Hastings from what i have read, on forums etc, would make one wonder how on earth the Allies manage to defeat the invinable German uber soldiers.
 * However balanced in with other source material we should be able to cut out the pro/anti-Monty opinion, stick to the operation and form a neutral conclusion on what happened.


 * So what are the main points D'Este and Hasting raise, do we have any quotes of there main points?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 21:38, 9 October 2008 (UTC)


 * D'Este p.237-8 describes the delay due to the weather and the arrival of 1SPzDiv and the looming arrival of IISSPzK. In footnote 2 p.238 he quotes Crerars war diary that Monty called the storm 'a tragedy', 'exactly what the enemy needed as it has given him time to collect reserves'(cab106/1064). On p.242 he describes VIII corps' repulse of the German counter-attack of the night of 28 Jun as a rout. P.245 'While it is true that 'The enemy had suffered a sharp defeat,' this defeat was purely in terms of men and material.'Keith-264 (talk) 22:40, 9 October 2008 (UTC)

Further comments following new content additions

 * On the 30th we have 10th SS attacking Hill 112; do we know which British units were left defending it after 11th Armoured was withdrawn on the 29th?
 * During the night the armoured brigade and its infantry withdrew and as far as i can remember the Germans launched an attack on an abandonded hill - will double check sources when i get home though to make sure.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 09:02, 15 October 2008 (UTC)
 * That would seem to make sense - otherwise why abandon the position if a screen was going to left behind EyeSerene talk 09:08, 15 October 2008 (UTC)


 * Do we have a time for Dempsey's decision to close down Epsom?
 * Will have a nose later on and see if there is a time--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 11:52, 15 October 2008 (UTC)
 * No time is currently available.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 22:41, 15 October 2008 (UTC)


 * The final sentences of 1 July (12th SS Pz etc) seem a little disconnected to the rest of the section. Is there more information to come here?
 * At the mo - no. Thats all there is currently available, from my sources, dealing with other formations.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 11:52, 15 October 2008 (UTC)

Foothold over the Odon?
Why does the article still describe the British withdrawing to the north bank of the Odon?? Some of the tanks near Hill 112 withdrew and Gavrus was abandoned. The area of Baron was retained. Keith-264 (talk) 22:39, 5 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Because i havent got there yet, ive removed numerous errors in the article but in the end this is the wiki - not a one man show - so change if you have a ref to back it up.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 01:08, 6 October 2008 (UTC)
 * No need to infer criticism in a question enigma.Keith-264 (talk) 07:13, 6 October 2008 (UTC)
 * '...a shallow bridgehead over the Odon and give up the firm hold they had on Hill 112.' (Hill 112, Saunders T. p.34 2001)Keith-264 (talk) 15:41, 9 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Added this to the article ;) EyeSerene talk 17:17, 9 October 2008 (UTC)

Colleville
There are three articles i have so far found on the wiki regarding this name:
 * Colleville - has the same name but is near Le Harve
 * Colleville-sur-mer - a small village near "Omaha beach"
 * Colleville-Montgomery - a part of Ouistreham aka "Sword beach"

The Colleville in question appears to be part of Tourville-sur-Odon. It's a small village a few hundred metres north of the latter and has no article of its own - that i have yet found.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 09:34, 7 October 2008 (UTC)

Result
Tactically indecisive?? Do we have sources for this? As I really believe it was a clear German tactical victory (that's how you call it when an offensive force is hold on and then thrown backwards). --Eurocopter (talk) 20:26, 9 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Well the initial result stated the operation was indecisive and considering the strategic result according to many of the sources am so far reading (and will later cite within the article when i get to the final section) claim this op as a strategic victory - drawing in German reservces, halting there planned offensive etc and staying on the initative - i assume that who ever stated indecisive was talking about the tactical side of things.
 * So far without actually having reached the last day in mulpitle sources to gain a more wider impression of what historians want to call this battle on a tactical level - indecisive may be a good descriptive word. What one can so far say is that yes the Germans managed to eventually hold the attack but they didnt "throw it back".--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 21:07, 9 October 2008 (UTC)
 * The trouble with this is the definition of success - is anything short of a 'breakthrough' a failure? If you're into the 'blitzkrieg legend' then a breakthrough and a sweeping advance is the least that will do. If you favour the view that industrial war is inevitably ermattungskrieg then 'breakthroughs' flatter to deceive. What was the strategic result of Barbarossa? Disaster. What was the result of the slower grind to Berlin? Victory. A substantial advance is surely dependent on an inferior opponent. Has anyone tried to calculate the fighting power of the French army of 1940 with that of the Westheer of 1944 relative to its opponent? I think that EPSOM showed the Germans that they were heading for disaster in Normandy. The cost to them of stopping Epsom was crippling. Epsom was Prokhorovka in reverse. It was only Hitler's refusal to take Schweppenburg, Rommel and Rundstedt's advice ("make peace you fools!") that stopped the German army leaving Normandy after Epsom and that was due to the weakness of the Westheer not its strength. (I think a bloke called Badsey has written in these terms but I don't have a reference with me.) What we can do is describe the tactical, operational and strategic effects of the operation as it pertains to Monty and Dempsey's intentions and the realism of those intentions as they pertain to the German army (and the bureaucrats at SHAEF). According to Lloyd Clark and D'Este, Monty definitely intended Epsom to reach Bretteville and lever the Germans out of Caen. This might be considered an operational goal. If so it was not attained. Tactically the Germans lost men and equipment they couldn't afford and strategically the battle consumed the offensive power of II SS Pz corps. Not bad for a failure Keith-264 (talk) 21:49, 9 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Hmm, I don't really think that the defensive operations conducted by Germans can be considered failure. I mean when you manage to defend yourself and drive the attackers backwards, it's not a failure. However, we can stay with indecisive, due to German cassualties which were not necessarily high, but rather irreplaceable, and that counted a lot to the course of the war. --Eurocopter (talk) 16:35, 10 October 2008 (UTC)
 * The Germans didn't driver the attackers backwards, the British drove a salient into the German defences and then abandoned a small portion of it. The term 'indecisive' is only accurate if that was all it was. This isn't true, the fighting in Epsom was a stage in the destruction of the German army in the west. The Germans were forced to expend some of their most powerful units to stop the British advance. Schweppenburg, Hausser, Rommel and Rundstedt told Hitler that the game was up and Dollman shot himself. What's indecisive about that?Keith-264 (talk) 16:50, 10 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Small portion of it?! Caen was considered the key to Normandy and Allied advance into France, while Hill 112 was a point of high strategic importance. After the British were stopped and lost Hill 112, were forced to retreat - this means they were driven back by the defenders (in this case, the Germans). --Eurocopter (talk) 20:02, 10 October 2008 (UTC)
 * I think if we go by the operation's stated intention, it ought to count as a German victory, since Caen remained in German hands. There's no straightforward answer though; it seems we can find sources to support any position we choose. EyeSerene talk 19:39, 10 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Eurocopter, I think your simpflying a bit too much there. Just to note the British didnt retreat - they of there own free will, to be in a better position to hold agaisnt the German attacks - withdrew from Hill 112 and Baron.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 20:54, 10 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Yes, but they withdrew from that important points due to German counterattacks. Citing from the article: the Germans succeeded in recapturing Hill 112. With this commanding position lost, the British were forced to abandon most of the salient and pull back to the north bank of the Odon. "Forced to abandon" is not quite synonim with "their own free will". --Eurocopter (talk) 21:01, 10 October 2008 (UTC)
 * I would advise you to read through the, yet to be fully copyedited, June 29 section and to have a nosey at the quote from Hart below. They did indeed pull back of there own free will and the armour was withdrawn due to the knoweldge that a heavy German attack was about to come in agaisnt them.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 21:41, 10 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Eurocop, are you of the view that there was supposed to be a breakout at the east end of the bridgehead? Caen was the key to an advance into the lodgement not an advance out of Normandy, hence German willingness to make its retention their defensive priority. From what I can make out from D'Este et al, the slow advance in the east 'was a failure' because the defensive shield was supposed to be beyond Caen not short of it. This was to get on to the Caen-Falaise plain and to capture ground for the Allied air forces. It does seem clear that whatever Monty said at the time and after about this, he wasn't going to sacrifice soldiers for airforce priorities and he would use the barons as he saw fit. The breakout from Normandy was always intended to be made in the west end.Keith-264 (talk) 00:03, 11 October 2008 (UTC)


 * Ellis supports this statement - he claims [as stated by Monty]:
 * "[Second Army was] to secure and develop a bridghead south of the line Caumont-Caen and south-east of Caen in order to 'secure airfield sites and to protect the flank of the First United States Army while the latter captured Cherbourg' - p. 78
 * "....it was never exoected [allied armies] to reach the Seine in less than about three months" - p. 78
 * "Second Army would 'push its left out towards the general line of th eriver Touques' and at the same time would 'pivot on Falaise' and 'swing with its right towards Argentan-Alencon'. After this the armies would be directed on to the Seine. - p. 81
 * These quotes show that there was no "slow advance" in Normandy and they also show that plans were changed on the ground i.e. Second Army was suppose to advance and pivot on Falaise for the advance on the Seine - one must remember that the overall plan called for the encirclement of the German forces beyond that river if i recall correctly - in actual fact, 2nd Army was operating to the west of that city by the end of the campaign and it was use not as a pivot point but as a position to capture to encircle the German forces.


 * Anyhoo, Epsom - i think the best way to describe it would be on 3 levels.


 * Tactically - there is enough evidnce to show that it was a sort of draw. The Germans contained the advance, forced British forces back in places, retook others British troops had voluntary left but elsewhere were given a bloody nose - thus indesive.
 * Operationally - The level between the tactical and strategic - if my understanding is correct the Germans won an operational level victory as they stopped VIII Corp gaining there overall objectives by doing there best to halt the offensive.
 * Strategically - a British victory. They removed the threat to Bayeux, they kept hold of the initative - by pulling 11th Armour back and not keeping it on the frontline, they removed the initative from the Germans by forcing them to throw there armoured reserves into the frontline and by holding there armoured forces in place and writing them down.


 * Now if my understanding of the operational level isnt confused then the books all appear to support these conclusions, they just dont actually state it. The accounts of the tactical battles would appear to support the first point. The fact the sources tell use the Germans contained the offensive and Dempsey cancelled the op due to the belive of further counterattacks would possibly support the second and well evreything stated in the third point is all mentioned by without the authors stating clearing that it was a strategic success - well some do iirc.
 * Any thoughts?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 14:47, 12 October 2008 (UTC)


 * Which Ellis?
 * This Ellis: Ellis, Major L.F.; Lt-Col Warhurst & Butler, James [1962] (2004). Victory in the West Volume I: The Battle of Normandy, History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, Official Campaign History. Naval & Military Press Ltd. ISBN 1-84574-058-0. --EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 17:45, 12 October 2008 (UTC)

Your points seem logical but seem to me to reflect an implicit definition of success - that military operations are intended to capture ground. This I think is common in the historiography of the 1980's. There is no doubt that Epsom was intended to gain ground if you read the orders and comments later in memoirs etc but then I haven't seen any explicit orders about attrition operations; raids and spoiling attacks yes but commanders seem reluctant to disclose attrition as a main objective. They all seen couched in terms of advancing and capturing ground. It seems to me that the relative cost of Epsom was largely in the Allies' favour. I don't know what your library contains but I find substantial support for the 'German defeat' pov in SA Hart, Daglish, Buckley et al. I find these sources attractive because they seem to have let go of the post-war polemics between the British and US commanders and also seem relatively untainted by a desire not to upset potential buyers in America, which I fear has encouraged many writers to back-pedal endorsements of Monty's leadership. If you can get hold of DRZW vol vii, it relates the contemporary German view of the fighting at the east end of the bridgehead - which was that the Germans were throwing all they had into it because they thought that a breakthrough in the east would trigger the main invasion at Calais. Nonetheless, if Rundstedt et al wanted to abandon Normandy after Epsom can it really be called a failure whatever the original intentions and expectations of Monty and Dempsey? I'm sure that what we can agree is that there are several schools of thought about intentions, means and ends in the Normandy campaign. Perhaps that could be the basis for a separate article. Keith-264 (talk) 17:35, 12 October 2008 (UTC)


 * I have added Harts thoughts into the article, however he doesnt seem to sum up the operation rather provides a logical answer to some of the things Monty and Dempsey did which greatly counter other historians - such as Saunders - comments that they were daft moves. For example keeping hold of Hill 112 could have threaten the entire Corps position if the armour had not have been withdrawn however Saunders appears to not consider the stratgic implications in this move rather what the tactical situation would be like in following battles.
 * Do you have the full name of this: DRZW vol vii?
 * As for summing the operation up. The operation had several strategic objectives; namely the highground south of Caen, which clearly if that was the objective of the operation it failed to achieve. Now again if my understanding is correct, the issue between fighting towards these objectives - the tactical side, and gaining the objectives - the strategic side - is the operational level, this is clearly where the Germans won a victory if you will.
 * However that is the only part dealing with gaining ground, as you have stated there was more to the operation and this would the strategic sides of things which is where the German defeat lays - i would think.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 18:47, 12 October 2008 (UTC)
 * 'Germany in the Second World War' (dial Horst Boog into Amazon books and they'll come up) They are a sort of unofficial official history(!). I've been having another look at SA Hart who seems to give the ostensible objectives of Epsom et al short shrift. He also dwells on the effect of lack of replacements far more than most other writers then suggests that Dempsey and Monty were willing to tolerate high casualties in Epsom up to the capture of Hill 112. The consequences of not holding it were expensive from the point of view of manoeuvre warfare 'doctrine' but then, the Germans had to be fought somewhere after Epsom was stopped. Was this really a fault from the point of view of attrition warfare? Keith-264 (talk) 20:25, 12 October 2008 (UTC)
 * That book and well the series is a little out of my price range.

Inter-library loan will do the trick.Keith-264 (talk) 14:59, 13 October 2008 (UTC)
 * However, how does attitional warfare come into the overall outcome of the operation?
 * We know that Epsom had a material cost for both sides. The cost for the Germans crippled their offensive power when offensive operations were the only type that could save their position in France. The records from the time; Monty's analyses, operation orders etc clearly show that Epsom was to take the army over the Odon and the Orne to the area of Bretteville-sur-Laize, which would make the German hold on Caen untenable. There is a certain scepticism over whether these papers reflect Monty's real intentions, since with hindsight we can see that the eastenders fought a battle of attrition in Normandy, that they used tactics intended to deny the Germans an opportunity to turn the tables by emphasising flank security and staying in range of thier artillery, which is inconsistent with breakthrough operations and that the Anglo-Canadian forces fought under the cover of mass fire-power, which meant concentration which paradoxically allowed the Germans to counter-concentrate if circumstances slowed Allied operations (which they often did). We also know that Monty could be disingenuous in his assurances to SHAEF, so the literal meaning of his writings such as those on Epsom may not be the real one. My opinion is that Monty would have accepted a collapse of the German defences in the Odon-Orne area gratefully but ended the operation when it was clear that further advances would require a big infantry commitment that he couldn't risk and that the Germans were preparing to use IISSPzK, which would mean that they were going to hand him the defensive advantages of the terrain. What does seem to be a fact is that the Anglo-Canadian armies were equipped and organised for high-intensity firepower warfare where infantry operations were shielded as far as possible from the risk of high losses. Looked at like this and the fact that the Germans were not going to be a pushover (however weakened they were in mid-1944), hard fighting was inevitable. Political and Supreme Command tendencies to scapegoat commanders were not unknown to Monty, after all he owed his position to Churchill Stellenbosching ealier commanders in Africa, so not giving them an opportunity to stitch him up by misleading them as skillfully as he misled Rommel seems also to be plausible. Add to that the attractiveness of a 'manoeuvre myth' to people who had to answer to electorates for the cost of industrial warfare and attrition becomes the method that dare not speak its name. Keith-264 (talk) 09:05, 13 October 2008 (UTC)


 * I think you are mixing doctrine in with the outcome. Prehaps that needs to be explained in the article as well - although does anyone specifically state what Montys real intention of the operation was, as you have just done?
 * Overall i think we have confirmed that there was deffo a strategic victory for the allies - the removal of the German offensive capability etc as noted.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 19:36, 13 October 2008 (UTC)
 * I am sceptical of the value of 'doctrine' because I think it's a political football. I question how far we can take Monty's pre-Epsom writing at face value and I think that there is substantial circumstantial evidence that long-term factors in equipment and method indicate attrition as the foundation of the army's offensive practice. I've been looking at Hart again and saw this; 'As long as Anglo-Canadian forces avoided presenting the enemy with...opportunities to inflict...tactical setbacks,...Allied numerical superiority would...through attrition...bring[ing] the Westheer close to defeat. This was Materialschlacht.' (p.178) Clearly my opinion has an element of original work which isn't what Wiki is for but as I've tried to look at the details of various authors I do think I've seen some implicit support for the point of view and in Hart explicit endorsement of it. For the article I think it would be a good idea to stick in a brief(!) description of the difficulty in coming to conclusions because the old orthodoxies have weakened and haven't been replaced, rather challenged by recent work, then list the versions. Keith-264 (talk) 22:04, 13 October 2008 (UTC)
 * The versions ranging from the operation being a dismal failure ala D'Este to a "sort of draw" ala Clark? But overall when looking at works such as Hart (i think Wilmot mentions this allot too) of the strategic victory what was won (and appears not to be talken about much).--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:07, 14 October 2008 (UTC)


 * Yes but I'd go further. The list of quotes you have below show quite a range of opinion but most seem to be judging Epsom from the 'manoeuvrist' view. I think that Hart's comment about materialschlacht goes back to mid-1916 as far as the British army is concerned and that it represents the 'warfare of abundance' that the Germans would have resorted to if they could. I think the model of 'tactics', 'operations', 'strategy' that Euro used above is helpful as long as potential confusion about attrition and manoeuvre being alternatives rather than forms of the same thing is avoided. I'll have a go at it soon and see what I can make of it.Keith-264 (talk) 16:10, 14 October 2008 (UTC)

Historians thoughts on the result of the operation

 * "On the battlefield, Epsom ended, rather ignominiously, in a sort of draw."
 * Clark, Operation Epsom, p. 100


 * "So in its original conception, Epsom failed. The strategic goal was not achieved and tactical failings [were] all too evident.... In their turn, the Germans also failed. Strategically, ... a reaction to the British initiative. Operationally, the principal...offensive force...[was] cast into battle prematurely...."
 * Daglish, Operation Epsom, p. 218
 * "By provoking German counter-attacks they were drawing key German formations onto killing fields...."
 * "...Normandy, a battle of attrition forcing the German army to commit force it could not afford to a locality it did not dare to give up". (This is like a paraphrase of Falkenhayn's reasoning over the Verdun offensive.)
 * p. 219


 * "No amount of pretence can conceal that the real object had been a short pincer movement to outflank Caen from the west and,[sic] like the Villers-Bocage ploy, it was a dismal failure."
 * D'Este, Decission in Normandy, p.245


 * D'este seems mesmerised by the German retention of Caen beyond the first day of the invasion, something he doesn't harp on about in respect of Carentan, Bayeux and St Lo. He quotes Dempsey, 'Monty had originally intended that Second Army should only be required to fight its holding battle for two or three weeks - just long enough to cover the period while the Americans were taking Cherbourg and were regrouping to attack southwards. (p.246) To 'seize and hold the critical terrain surrounding Caen'(p.246). He doesn't seem to account for US 'slowness' in his analysis, the failures to 'break out' before Cobra or describe what the Germans would have had to have done and what weather conditions were necessary to allow Caen et al to be captured on schedule (go for a picnic?). Keith-264 (talk) 09:37, 10 October 2008 (UTC)

-posted by Keith on my userpage.


 * "In one sense Epsom had failed .... But it had blunted the cutting edge of German armour so badly that there was no longer any chance of it mounting a comprehensive counterattack on the Allied bridgehead"
 * -Richard Holmes, The D-Day Experience p. 39


 * "In the event Dempsey was too cautious. VIII Corps had blundted the main German effort and the British had forestalled the last major attempt to launch a massed armoured attack agaisnt the landings. The fresh Panzer divisions had been fed into battle piecemeal, never allowed to concentrate for the planned big thrust. The other German armoured divisions already in the line had gradually been bled of their strength over the preceeding weeks, having been used to plug gaps in the front. Epsom had failed to achieve alsmot any of its objectives, but it could be credited with frustraing German plans to push the Allies back into the sea."
 * Ford,Caen 1944, p. 49


 * "Thus ended the second of the only two armoured offensives made by the Germans along the entire Normandy front during the vital days of June 1944. Both had been directed at the British part of the line, as the Allied strategists had hoped, and both had been thoroughly beaten there. And in their being beaten were destroyed the only effective troops available to the German High Command in the West"
 * Schulman, Defeat in the West, pp. 132-133


 * "It took most of six Panzer Divisions to stop Epsom sort of its final objectives"
 * Badsey & Trew, Battle for Caen, p. 28


 * "This operation [Epsom] ensured that Montgomery kept the initiative because it forced Rommel to commit the powerful II SS Panzer Corps to halt Epsom rather than to use it for his own planned counterattack"
 * Hart, Collosal Cracks, p. 108
 * [Talking about maintaining flank security]"Montgomery remained concerned about substantial German counterattacks on the flanks of Anglo-Canadian penetrations throughout the 1944-45 campaign. This fear prompted him in late June 1944 to halt the Epsom attack."
 * p. 118
 * [Talking about Dempsey as a commander]"Dempsey displayed this attitute [caution, the art of balancing forces and getting involved i.e. ordering the 11th armoured div's armour brigade back over the Odon] during Epsom when the VIII Corps had managed to get a footgold on the strategic Hill 112. Though Dempsey recongnised that to hold Hill 112, his form would elm have to hold Evrecey and Hill 113, he had insufficient troops to take hold these objectives because he "was convinced that the vital spot to hold was the Rauray gap." For he had calcuated that this "was where the Germans would strike," and hence "concentrat[ed] everything to give the Germans a sound beating when they came in," as they duly did."
 * pp. 140-141


 * "The Battle of the Odon destroyed whatever chance the Germans had had[sic] of launching a counter-stroke to Bayeux, and accentuated the maldistribution of their forces. By this timely trust Montgomery compelled them to commit their armoured reserves piecemeal and in haste; then by assuming hte timely defensive he was able to inflict upon the SS Panzer divisions a costly defeat; and finally, by withdrawing his armour into reserve at the height of the battle, he re-created the threat of a major offensive in the Caen sector.....The real danger zone was the Orne Valley, because, he [Rommel] said, "after taking possession of the area around Caen, the enemy's plan will be to advance on Paris.""
 * Wilmot, p. 348


 * [Saunders does not sum up Epsom but does critise the choise to abandon Hill 112]"With the historian's gift of hindsight, it is clear that those commanding the British battle had not fully appreciated the vvalue of Hill 112. They were conetent to hold a shallow bridgehead over the Odon and give up the firm hold they had on Hill 112. As we shall see, this decission was to have tragic consequences for the soldiers who were to fight for its possession over the following months".
 * Saunders, Hill 112, p. 34 - while he makes a good point, i believe the point Hart raises somewhat defends Dempsey decession.


 * "From the point of view of 8 Corps, if its contribution then did not seem unduly spectacular, certainly the evidence concerning it which has since come to light, together with the more detached considerations which only the passage of time can ensure, compel the re-valuation[sic] of its achievements. To have broke through a strongly entrenched enemy, carried out a fighting advance of upwards of six miles agaisnt ever increasing opposition through the most difficult country, and finally over a considerable water obstacle, and all this with open flanks, would at any time be regarded as cretitable for seasoned troops. However, for soldiers in battle for the first time in their lives, it was a very fine preformance indeed....[rambles on about the high state of training and period of co-operations between the Scots and 11th Armour back in England] The next stage, the decisive repluse of all enemy attacks, including the attempted grand offensive on 30th June....Finally, despite the salient which 8 Corps was left holding, the enemy was never successful, even for a moment, in distrubing the overall balance of the Corps, despite employing all available armour ot achieve this object."
 * Jackson, 8 Corps: Normandy to the Baltic p. 57
 * "Epsom had now achieved its maximum offensive usefulness, and hencefoward, by and large, activity on this part of the front would be allowed to die down for the moment, in conformity with his[Monty] strategy of alternate hammer blows in different sectors. The immediate aim became, of course, to free the armour from its present task for preciselt the same reasons von Rundstedt and Tommel had in endeavouring to extract their panzer divisions from an infantry role - to reform a mobile force with which to strike elsewhere. Fortunetely for the Allies, possessing the initiative and working to a definite plan, this was not difficult."
 * p. 53


 * "Epsom had failed...Many historians have dismissed this attack attack as a failure; but without it there is a strong possibility that the British would have secured 'the key to the back door of Caen' and then reached and even crossed the Orne. On the other hand, if Montgomery had not launched this costly operation, Hitlers strategy of driving a wedge between the Americans and the British with his Panzer Corps, abd then pushing each Army, into the sea, might well have succeeded."
 * Reynolds, Sons of the Reich, p. 31 - personally i think the latter bit is a going a little too far :p
 * "Epsom may have been costly for the British, but it also caused 'grievious losses' to the Germans."
 * p. 33


 * "To assess wheather Operation Epsom was a success or not one might merely examine wheather the offensive achieved its aims; the difficulty is, however, knowing exactly what those aims were. For while it is clear that the stated aims of Epsom - to cross the Orne and dominate the southern appraoches to Caen - were not achieved, it could be argued that the unstated aims were. Some, including Montgomery himself, have argued that these unstated aims were the truley important objectives for they had strategic implications that far outweighed the capture of Bretteville-sur-Laize. Others however, argue [that this is bollocks]....More importantly, Epsom further weakend the German hold on Normandy by sapping their strength.....[Monty insisted that] it was Second Army which attracted the bulk of the German armour to it in Normandy and, of course, that Epsom broke II SS Panzer Corps sword as it was being thrust towards Bayeux."
 * Clark, Operation Epsom, p. 104
 * "In the final analysis Operation Epsom failed .... However, when seen as part of Montgomery's series of rapid and consecutive blows agaisnt the German Army in Normandy, the importance of Epsom becomes more apparent and there is little doubt that it did play a significant part in the Allies' eventual success in the region."
 * p. 114


 * [in passing mention to the ongoing Operation Epsom]"By the end of June General Montgomery's plan to attract the German armour to the British front had succeeded, and the Second Army was holding all the German armoured divisions."
 * Gill & Groves, 30 Corps, Club Route in Europe, p. 30

More quotes are welcome but ive exhausted by sources with the above.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 22:49, 10 October 2008 (UTC)


 * Has anyone got a translation of DRZW vol vii handy? It is rather good on the German perception of events - particularly in the practical consquences of the German belief that British attacks at the east end were the first part of the main invasion from Dover so each 'repulse' there was a strategic success worthy of heavy losses. The latent danger in the west was discounted because of this. Keith-264 (talk) 23:03, 10 October 2008 (UTC)

images
The article imo needs some extra decent images to support the article. I was thinking of adding pics of each of the tanks in use but the ones of the commons dont really suit the needs of this article i.e. Finnish StuGs, knocked out Tigers, modern photos or Panthers and Cromwells etc.

So any idea what should be used to support the article?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:13, 10 October 2008 (UTC)


 * I always think it's hard to justify pictures of weapons systems, like tanks, in articles that aren't really about that. There are some nice photos in the Imperial War Museum collection here though. EyeSerene talk 20:00, 10 October 2008 (UTC)


 * Scanning through the archive i was thinking of the following photos:
 * B 6010 - july 26 pic, infantry waiting to advance
 * B 6119 - july 28 - scottish infantry advancing through cornfields with tanks
 * CL 344 - july 30 villers-bocage being destroyed, illustrates the destructive power in allied hands --EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 09:21, 15 October 2008 (UTC)


 * The photo of Shermans of the 8th Armoured Brigade rolling past the knocked out Tiger, while not having anything to do the last section of the article in regards to dates, was there as a bit of a highlight regarding the heavy loss of tanks suffered by the German divisions and the loss of irreplaceable tanks such as the Tiger (i probably should have stated something like that in the caption).
 * There was a couple of photos to choose from but i thought this the most less in your face and staged i.e. Tiger on its side or a knocked out Panther with tommies charging past it.
 * What other type of photo could sum up the operation? The only pics i have seen, other then mentioned above or seen within the article, show on the whole British infantry advancing etc - which wouldnt really suit the summary.
 * Any thoughts? Theres a few hours before i am home and able to upload the final pic i was thinking of using within the article - a nebelwerfer for the 1 July section; they were used heavily in support of the German attacks, unfortually i couldnt find any of the damm things firing so only have a period pic of it being loaded - so if nothing has been said by then to counter the above ill move the photo back to the end section.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 14:35, 15 October 2008 (UTC)


 * My personal opinion is that the Nebelwerfer image should stay out (they aren't even mentioned in the text) as only marginally relevant - I'd question it if I came across it while reviewing. I think, as you suggest, the Tiger image can be justified, though of course we shouldn't overdo the non-free pics. EyeSerene talk 18:59, 15 October 2008 (UTC)


 * Well the rocket launchers were used quite a bit within Epsom, but as you have just pointed out there - i realised we hadnt actually mentioned them but i did have a referance speaking of the rather large number of casualties mortars inflicted - so ive hunted a semi decent pic down and threw that in. Image wise am done am just going to move that photo i was talking about earlier to the result section and throw a more detailed caption in with a citation.
 * The imperial war museam ones are all in the public domain according to the liscening and with a bit of luck i dont think the others are a problem! >.< *fingers crossed!*--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 19:11, 15 October 2008 (UTC)

1 July
If i'm correct, this operation ended on 30 June, so what has 1 July section to do with this article? --Eurocopter (talk) 16:02, 12 October 2008 (UTC)
 * It was the last day of major combat, Epsom closed down onthe 30th and the germans talked of ending counterattacks but they launched some biggies during the 1st before the front really settled down.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:04, 12 October 2008 (UTC)


 * Ok, if Epsom closed on 30 June, that means 1 July should be a subsection of the aftermath section in my opinion. --Eurocopter (talk) 16:07, 12 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Fair dos :)--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:11, 12 October 2008 (UTC)

Info required
To anyone who owns D’Este or Hastings work regarding Normandy, do they have anything to say regarding the planning of Operation Epsom, which hasn’t already been covered? Do they support that the operation was launched due to Ultra intercepts as a pre-emptive strike against the Waffen SS divisions – bring them to battle and wear them down, not let them strike at Bayeux ala Williams; or support that it was just to outflank Caen ala Jackson?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:35, 15 October 2008 (UTC)


 * Hastings writes "The principle achievement of Operation EPSOM on the 26th was to forestall a planned counter-attack by the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, newly arrived from the east, and to inflict serious losses upon them when they were belatedly thrown into the battle. (Overlord, p207)" He makes no mention of ULTRA (that I found), and gives no indication as to whether or not he thinks pre-empting II SS Pz Corps offensive was deliberate, or a fortuitous accident. Elsewhere he concentrates on portraying EPSOM as a genuine breakthrough attempt: "No sane commander could have mounted the kind of attacks that took place in June [...] without every hope of breaking through the German defences, of at least of causing the enemy to make substantial withdrawals" (p171). He acknowledges that Monty was "perfectly justified in telling Brooke that the German comittment of armour to create a defensive perimeter was in the long-term interests of the Allies" (p172), but interprets this as Monty spinning the results of an offensive that didn't entirely go according to plan. EyeSerene talk 19:17, 15 October 2008 (UTC)


 * I have added Hastings quote from p. 171 to the article - cheers--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 22:30, 15 October 2008 (UTC)

Er, did Hastings really write 'belatedly thrown into battle'? Was he referring to the Germans or the British? As for D'Este's comment '...no sane....' this is illogical and polemical not analysis. As for forestalling the IISSPzK, isn't this a perfect example of Montyesque 'balance'? Keith-264 (talk) 09:06, 16 October 2008 (UTC)


 * I believe all of the above quotes are from Hastings – who personally I do not rate as a historian as he simply isn’t! However unwise and shite I believe his opinion to be (i.e. Monty and Dempsey would have to be insane to launch an operation on this scale – what? A Corps attack is huge? (Goodwood was huge, Bluecoat was huge lol), I don’t think we should leave it out.


 * With that information, many sources compiled together to give an good look at the back ground, the German plans and the details of the British plans topped off with information from Wilmot, Williams and the meaty stuff from Ashley Hart I think readers will note that Hastings may be out of line a tad – especially when they get further down and it explains the reasons for calling the operation off.
 * But I wouldn’t like the article to be the position were some could claim that information/or point of view is being withheld because its shows criticism of Monty, Dempsey and the operation. It because of all of these things I through it was prudent to state that Hasting “completely” dismissed all those other thoughts when he made his comment.


 * Do we have any quotes from D’Este regarding the planning?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 10:41, 16 October 2008 (UTC)

Evidently my ageing eyes read 'elsewhere' as D'Este(!), apologies. I quite agree that there is a risk of some of the newer less familiar writing being taken for Monty apologia which would be unfortunate. Perhaps we can put writers' views in chronological order and possible add an observation that they have followed a pattern, roughly; unreflective celebration of victory-acknowledgement that there were ups and downs-old fart generals throwing mud at each other-credit grabbing anglo-USA rivalry-unwise lionising of 'German excellence'-emergence of historical objectivity at least in academic (if not in popular) history forcing a re-evaluation of some substantial parts of the 'historical narrative'. Keith-264 (talk) 12:46, 16 October 2008 (UTC)
 * I recall Ashley Hart mentioning these stages, you dont happen to have a page number do you?
 * However the unreflective celebration stage is were Wilmot comes in - now that stage titling imo reflects poorly on Wilmot as he does dosh out the criticism where its needed and isnt too overly in your face about the Allies being the bees knees.
 * Although correctly worded i think the point can be made that these stages are generlisations.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:09, 16 October 2008 (UTC)

I'd put Wilmot in the 'ups and downs' group. Hart? That's thirteen then. I didn't know I was paraphrasing him. I intended the wording as a generalisation since I think it's a useful paradigm.


 * D'Este on Epsom
 * P.233 The extreme eastern point of the Orne brigehead...most logical place....

...the delay in landing VIII Corps would neccessitate postponement...,time Montgomery did not have.
 * P.234 Montgomery's options were reduced to an attack on the Odon...west of Caen.
 * P.235 After the fiasco[sic] of Villers Bocage...could not afford another failure.
 * P.245 ...an operation of immense intentions which were not attained.
 * P.247 'Eisenhower had expected the breakout on the left, on the shortest road to Paris, and regarded Montgomery's program[me] as a change in the basic plan, brought on by his unsuccessful attempt to get Caen.' (In Ambrose 'The Supreme Commander' 1971 p.428) Keith-264 (talk) 15:37, 16 October 2008 (UTC)


 * Pages 16-17 Colossal Cracks - the point is made that D'Este and Hastings fall into the 1980s revisitist period exposing the "unpleasant truth".
 * the 90s to now sees historians probing into the information which came to light due to the previous stage - finding out why such weakness in the allied forces existed and if they could have been recifited earlier - with a parrell movement rather then dwelling on the "unpleasant truth" demonstrating how these were actually appropriate measures being taken etc etc--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 00:30, 17 October 2008 (UTC)


 * In responce to "Perhaps we can put writers' views in chronological order and possible add an observation that they have followed a pattern".
 * In this late hour, bored, i have wrote a rather short version of Ashley Harts 2 page detailed explanation on the subject; one thought prehaps use this or an edited version of this as footnote to place after the quotes sumerising the actual intention the operation and possibly again in the results section once that gets expanded.


 * "Since the conclusion of the war there have been several phases in historical literature. During the 1950s through the 1960s, following a rift between the Allied commanders following the publications of memoirs, American historians were critical of Montgomery’s actions while pro-Montgomery historians set out to reject the American criticisms. This period also the saw the publication of national official histories of the Second World War; while good examples of historical research they, on the whole, lacked detailed critical analysis of the 1944-45 North-West European campaign's most controversial issues. During the 1980s historical literature entered a revisionist phase with historians aiming to expose the unpleasant truth of the Anglo-Canadian forces and their conduct of the campaign. During the late 1990s to the present day historical literature has entered a post revisionist phase with two parallel schools of thought; those attempting to expand on the work of the 1980s and provide more detailed analysis and those who attempt to demonstrate the opposite and that the Anglo-Canadian forces employed appropriate techniques."


 * With something like the following as a footnote i believe readers can fully appreciate the wild variation of opinions and make up there own mind?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 01:01, 17 October 2008 (UTC)
 * I think that puts it rather well.Keith-264 (talk) 08:08, 17 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Yes so do I, you've got all the viewpoints covered; I'm wondering if we still need that last paragraph in Planning, as what you've got above seems better, and it might be best to keep the speculation for the end of the article. Also, if no-one objects, I'd like to change Results to Analysis (or Outcome or some such), to give a more descriptive heading for all this. It's an important part of the battle - look at the space we've devoted to it here on the talkpage - and perhaps over the weekend I'll try to pull everything together and expand the section. EyeSerene talk 13:07, 17 October 2008 (UTC)
 * I have no objections to section name changes.
 * I have already pasted the info above, in a somewhat edited format, into the planning section as a footnote but if you think it more wise to have that information along with the praise/critism of the planning in another section am good with that.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:52, 17 October 2008 (UTC)

Short, sharp and to the point, very much like Epsom.[;-)Keith-264 (talk) 22:56, 17 October 2008 (UTC)

Conclusion
Drawing upon all the quotes posted above and in line with what EyeSerene said about having that planning bit at the end, how is this for a rough draft to replace the last section of the article?

Operation Epsom has been analysed to varying degrees by many prominent military historians and commentators. The post-war publication of memoirs by the leading Allied generals led to rifts along partisan lines during the 1950s and 1960s, with American historians generally critical of Montgomery and the actions of the Anglo-Canadian forces, while "pro-Montgomery" historians set out to reject these criticisms. Also published during this period were the national official campaign histories, which although thoroughly-researched, for the most part avoided detailed critical analysis of the 1944–45 north-west European campaign's most controversial issues. During the 1980s, historical literature underwent a revisionist phase concentrating on the deficiencies of the Allied performance, and from the late 1990s to the present, historians of the campaign have entered a post revisionist stage with two parallel schools of thought: those attempting to expand on the revisionist work by providing a more detailed campaign analysis; and those who have attempted to demonstrate that the techniques employed by the Anglo-Canadian forces were appropriate to conditions in Normandy.

VIII Corps, in battle for the first time, had broken through strongly entrenched German positions and advanced nearly six miles. The Germans however, throwing in their last available reserves, had been able to achieve a defensive success at the operational level, containing the British offensive. Just over 4,000 casualties had been inflicted upon the British Army but the German forces took more than 3,000 casualties themselves. The German commanders had been forced to commit their armoured reserves piecemeal to meet threats as they developed, and to counterattack at a disadvantage. As a result, over 120 German tanks were destroyed, the organisation of their forces was significantly disrupted, and their combat ability degraded. Furthermore, as there were few infantry divisions available to relieve them, the panzer divisions had to assume a defensive role, being forced to remain in the front line rather than pulling back into reserve.

According to Carlo D’Este, the most logical point for the British to launch an attack at this stage of the campaign would have been out of the Orne bridgehead on the extreme eastern flank of the Allied beachhead, but a planned attack in this area had already been vetoed by Montgomery, Dempsey and O’Connor as being unrealistic; instead, Second Army turned its attention west of Caen. One of the more contentions points amongst historians is the question of what Operation Epsom was intended to achieve. Some historians claim that the aim was simply to gain ground, while others have suggested that the operation had wider objectives. Andrew Williams argues that due to ULTRA intercepts, Montgomery was aware of Rommel's planned attack towards Bayeux and Epsom was launched to pre-empt this offensive. Chester Wilmot states that the operation was to draw the I SS Panzer Corps and the newly arrived II SS Panzer Corps into battle around Caen. Ashley Hart notes that Montgomery wanted to retain the initiative at the operational and strategic level, to prevent German armoured forces either being redeployed to face the American forces or being relieved and passed into reserve. The arrival of the II SS Panzer Corps acted as powerful incentive to launch Epsom, thus retaining the initiative by forcing the German command to commit the II SS Panzer Corps to battle rather than use it for their own planned attack. These views are completely dismissed by Max Hastings, who claims that "no sane commander" would mount an attack on the scale of Epsom without "every hope of breaking through the German defences, or at least of causing the enemy to make substantial withdrawals". D’Este supports this view, stating "No amount of pretence can conceal that the real object had been a short pincer movement to outflank Caen".

Lloyd Clark writes: "On the battlefield, Epsom ended, rather ignominiously, in a sort of draw." However, the overall result of the operation has also seen several varying conclusions. Clark notes that examining the results of the operation is difficult when there is no agreement about its intentions; although Montgomery's written orders&mdash;to advance across the Orne River and capture the high ground south of Caen&mdash;were not achieved, he argues that there were also un-stated objectives that had strategic implications, which far outweighed the capture of ground. Ambrose sees Operation Epsom as veering off-course from its original plan, while D'Este goes so far as to say that Epsom was "an operation of immense intentions which were not attained", calling it a "dismal failure". However, Simon Trew notes that this 'failure' "took most of six Panzer Divisions to stop Epsom short of its final objectives", and Michael Reynolds adds that, without the commitment of these six divisions, it was highly likely that the British offensive would have reached its overall goals. Daglish claims that, while the original concept of Epsom to advance beyond the Orne River had failed, the British had nevertheless won a strategic victory. By withdrawing the 11th Armoured Division back across the Odon and then into reserve, the 21st Army Group had re-created the threat of a major offensive in the Caen sector, and by the end of June all German armoured forces in Normandy were concentrated on the Second Army's front. Shulman states that, with the defeat of its second armoured counterattack during June, the German command had thrown away their most effective troops, and Reynolds admits that while the operation was costly for the British, it also "caused grievous losses" to the German force. VIII Corps, in its final analysis of the offensive, concluded that Operation Epsom failed in its stated goal, but "when seen as part of Montgomery's series of rapid and consecutive blows against the German Army in Normandy, the importance of Epsom becomes more apparent and there is little doubt that it did play a significant part in the Allies' eventual success in the region." D'Este however dismisses the idea of wider strategic implications, claiming that the losses inflicted on the German force were "purely in terms of men and material".

Terry Copp has tried to explain the varying interpretations of Epsom by suggesting that too much emphasis has been given to a 'win-lose' narrative, and that a 'cost-benefit' analysis provides more useful conclusions. Describing the standard German practice of launching local counterattacks when driven from a position, he writes: "One such counter-attack on 22 July resulted in 10SS regaining control of the Bon Repas[sic]-Evrecy road, a clear victory in a win-lose narrative but a typical German defeat in any cost – benefit analysis."

--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 11:53, 21 October 2008 (UTC)

Terry Copp has tried to explain the varying interpretations of Epsom by suggesting that too much emphasis is given to a ‘win – lose’ narrative and that a ‘cost – benefit’ analysis gives opposite conclusions: ‘One such counter-attack on 22 July resulted in 10SS regaining control of the Bon Repas[sic]-Evrecy road, a clear victory in a win-lose narrative but a typical German defeat in any cost – benefit analysis. (The Normandy Campaign 1944 Ed Buckley J. 2006 Ch 1 p. 18) I think this sums it up rather well. Keith-264 (talk) 18:05, 21 October 2008 (UTC)


 * I can't see any mention of the D'Este, Daglish, Shulman, Copp and Ambrose books in the References section. However, I've copyedited the above, and I'll stick it in the article. Please feel free to amend/revert etc as necessary! EyeSerene talk 09:08, 23 October 2008 (UTC)

I prefer the inclusion of names over 'a historian' (or in Hasting's case 'a writer'). Has anyone noticed a basic source that most if not all the writers draw on? Quite a few of the sources are 2y and 3y. Keith-264 (talk) 09:56, 23 October 2008 (UTC)


 * Yes, it's been standard practice on other FAs I've worked on to attribute quotes and opinions directly; it seems to work better, and naming lots of historians helps to justify the 'widely analysed and disagreed upon' statement towards the start of the section. Regarding sources, we still need to add those books I've mentioned above into the references section, but I haven't got access to any of my stuff at the moment so I'm not sure what the primary sources are. I'd guess the official campaign history, and probably Wilmot (he's still fairly definitive I think), but I can't be much help with the rest ;) EyeSerene talk 10:34, 23 October 2008 (UTC)


 * Hmmmm, I wondered because when I read 'The Rise and fall of the German Air Force' (HMSO), I realised that it provided the empirical basis of just about everything else I'd ever read. Wilmot seems a fair bet for ground operations in Normandy with the OH. I was thinking about it historiographically since Buckley, Hart et al seem long overdue. I put some references on this page but they seem to have gone phut so here they are again.

Buckley, John [2004] (2006). British Armour in the Normandy Campaign 1944. ISBN 0-4154-0773-7.

Buckley, John (Ed.) [2006] (2007). The Normandy Campaign 1944, Sixty Years on. ISBN 0-415-44942-1. Keith-264 (talk) 11:01, 23 October 2008 (UTC)


 * Copp, Terry. Ch1 p18. 'The 21st Army Group in Normandy: towards a new balance sheet.' In 'The Normandy Campaign....' Buckley, J. (Ed.).

Daglish, Ian [2007]. Operation EPSOM, Over the Battlefield. ISBN-10: 1844155625. Keith-264 (talk) 11:32, 23 October 2008 (UTC)


 * So "Copp, p. 18" is a comment by quoted by Buckley in his book?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 12:03, 23 October 2008 (UTC)

No, that's the book of essays edited by Buckley (60 yrs on) Copp wrote ch1 '... a new balance sheet'. Apologies for lacking clarity.Keith-264 (talk) 12:19, 23 October 2008 (UTC)


 * Its ok, ive added the book - ive stated it is authored by Copp for now, Buckley as editor and a small note saying each chapter has a different author.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:01, 23 October 2008 (UTC)
 * I think some references are needed in the second and last paragraphs of the Analysis section, ca somebody add some? By the way, nice work with it! --Eurocopter (talk) 20:31, 23 October 2008 (UTC)
 * I dont see the point of having any more in the last para, it starts with Copp states XYZ and ends with a citation to where he said it. As for the second to last para - where about?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 21:17, 23 October 2008 (UTC)
 * I was refering to the 1st,2nd,3rd senteneces of the 2nd para, and 1st sentence of the last para. --Eurocopter (talk) 11:54, 24 October 2008 (UTC)
 * I did wonder about that. I assume the description of the different phases of historical analysis of Epsom (in para 2) has been taken from Hart; in which case, if the cite at the end of the paragraph covers the whole paragraph we may not need any more. Duplicating the cite for the sake of it seems unnecessary... but I can see where Eurocopter is coming from. Maybe if we do what we've done with the rest, and attribute the description to Hart, we can avoid the impression of OR in that paragraph? EyeSerene talk 12:10, 24 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Addendum: I've added something on these lines to the start of the second paragraph - hopefully it's ok (and more to the point, accurate!) EyeSerene talk 12:28, 24 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Yea it was Hart who rambled all that out - well he did go for like 2 pages, that was the shortend down version :) --EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:52, 24 October 2008 (UTC)
 * :D EyeSerene talk 14:00, 24 October 2008 (UTC)

(←) I've tagged the sentence in the last paragraph that Eurocopter mentioned above (someone got access to Copp...?) The whole of para 2 is covered by the 2-page cite to Hart, so are we OK now or do we need to be more specific there? EyeSerene talk 14:29, 24 October 2008 (UTC)
 * MeKeith-264 (talk) 14:42, 24 October 2008 (UTC)

It's the reference from Buckley (Ed.) above. I've added ** to identify it.Keith-264 (talk) 14:45, 24 October 2008 (UTC) Oddly the ** looks like a little blue square.Keith-264 (talk) 14:47, 24 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Rightho, I've added that (I'm aware it's repeating the last ref, but it does help to avoid the impression of WP:OR). Incidentally, starting a new line with a * acts as a bullet point in wiki-markup; anywhere else and you get the asterisk (see WP:CHEAT). EyeSerene talk 16:28, 24 October 2008 (UTC)

Woot Woot Woot! :D--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 22:36, 31 October 2008 (UTC)


 * Congrats on the FA! Nice work all ;) EyeSerene talk 13:24, 3 November 2008 (UTC)

Comment on grammar
The article uses passive voice extensively - something that I was given a particularly difficult time over in another article that I recently took through FAC. Can some of these be rephrased in the active voice? Also, verb tense is not consistent.  Socrates2008 ( Talk )   09:41, 9 June 2009 (UTC)

Traditional hyphenation vindicated
Right at the top left of Wikipedia's main page, today's featured article began thus:
 * Operation Epsom was a Second World War British offensive that took place between 26–30 June 1944, during the Battle of Normandy. The offensive was intended to outflank and seize the German occupied city of Caen, which was
 * Operation Epsom was a Second World War British offensive that took place between 26–30 June 1944, during the Battle of Normandy. The offensive was intended to outflank and seize the German occupied city of Caen, which was

Caen was not a German city that was occupied. Caen was a city that was occupied by Germans. So I changed it:
 * Operation Epsom was a Second World War British offensive that took place between 26–30 June 1944, during the Battle of Normandy. The offensive was intended to outflank and seize the German-occupied city of Caen, which was
 * Operation Epsom was a Second World War British offensive that took place between 26–30 June 1944, during the Battle of Normandy. The offensive was intended to outflank and seize the German-occupied city of Caen, which was

You couldn't ask for a better example or occasion to defend traditional hyphenation. The use of hyphens in this way has only very slowly been dying out for a long time. It's usually no longer used in advertising or packaging, but it's still (usually) followed by magazines, newspapers, and book publishers, so people are accustomed to understanding it, even though many educated people are not to using it. This is a really clear-cut case of its utility, in a conspicuous place. Michael Hardy (talk) 01:02, 30 June 2009 (UTC)
 * ....and then I fixed the incorrect dash between 26 and 30. Michael Hardy (talk) 01:03, 30 June 2009 (UTC)


 * Not to seem stupid or anything but how exactlly does adding in the hyphen make the meaning of the sentance differ in anyway? :S--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 01:04, 30 June 2009 (UTC)

I assume you meant "in any way", since "anyway" is a different word that means a different thing.

To answer your question: Caen was not a German city that was occupied. I already said that above. If you call it a "German-occupied city", with a hyphen, that cannot mean a German city that was an occupied city. Michael Hardy (talk) 02:31, 30 June 2009 (UTC)
 * Enigma: For more information, look up compound adjective. &lt;&gt;Multi-Xfer&lt;&gt; (talk) 06:41, 30 June 2009 (UTC)


 * There is an argument here that, had the sentence meant "German city, occupied" it would have been written as "...to outflank and seize the occupied German city of Caen". "German occupied city" would be poor grammar if the first meaning was intended because it's so ambiguous; in the context of the surroundings, the German occupation of the city is the only logical inference of the sentence, hyphen or not. I'm not advocating the hyphen's removal as it does resolve a minor ambiguity, but (as a wider issue) neither do I always believe in Canute-like stances against the tide of linguistic change ;) EyeSerene talk 09:00, 30 June 2009 (UTC)
 * Aye, verily. There is verismilitude to thy musing, EyeSerene. --Dweller (talk) 12:04, 30 June 2009 (UTC)
 * Thou art kind, to have spake thus of my musing... when 'twas clearly rambling. EyeSerene talk 13:36, 30 June 2009 (UTC)

EyeSerene: There's nothing conservative or Canute-like in my thinking on this matter. That's a strawman. Michael Hardy (talk) 15:33, 30 June 2009 (UTC)

....I find the phrase "Iraqi holy city of Najaf" on the web. EyeSerene: Your explanation of why only that interpretation fits, even without the hyphen, applies only because of the particular meanings of words in the present case and their way of fitting into the context. Change the words a bit and your argument vanishes. It's like arguing against the use of question marks by citing one particular question as a case where they're not needed. Michael Hardy (talk) 15:41, 30 June 2009 (UTC)
 * I completely agree; in this instance, the hyphen is helpful (if not obligatory). In others it may be absolutely necessary for a sentence to be unambiguously parsed. I think you might have misunderstood my earlier comment - I wasn't implying you personally are emulating our wet-footed king, just making a general observation that language is a living, evolving medium and will change over time despite efforts to resist. What we regard as proper usage probably won't be regarded as such by our great-grandchildren, just as many now regard 19th century phraseology as wordy and convoluted. Actually I'm a bit of a grammar stickler, so I certainly wasn't arguing against using proper punctuation... although I admit I was perhaps indulging in a little Devil's Advocacy. I also have no idea what a strawman is, though for some reason I'm getting visions of the Wizard of Oz ;) EyeSerene talk 16:25, 30 June 2009 (UTC)

Oi, hands off Cnut you cads! What has the North Sea ever done for us?Keith-264 (talk) 16:50, 30 June 2009 (UTC)