Talk:Ordinary language philosophy

Series on Philosophy
This is a major portion of western philosophy, it should be included in the series on phil.

Untitled
Could we please have an article on Gilbert Ryle? Please?

We should most likely revise this article to include mention of the dispute about the early Wittgenstein's views... personally I think that to say Wittgenstein thought language had to be revised is completely wrong. His early philosophy is very different from his later work, it is primarily concerned with the limits of language and the nature of propositions, but it does not exclude poetry, metaphor and other forms of language as unimportant, in fact there is a good case for saying that Wittgenstein thought these were the MOST important. Recall his reading of poetry to the Vienna Circle in an attempt to get them to understand his work... which they notoriously failed in.

Revamp...
This article needs to be extended and elaborated upon by someone who knows enough about ordinary language philosophy. While not bad as it is, I think this article should be redone, and extended, so as to describe ordinary language philosophy in much more depth, and the various philosophers associated with it (insofar as the ideas are pertinent to the subject). Is anyone willing to do this? Kevin L. 06:18, 3 January 2006 (UTC)

I would be willing to make some significant edits to this article. Currently (Feb. 2013) the structure is unclear, jumping from philosopher to philosopher without reference or good reason. The descriptions of what OLP *is* are problematic, probably most especially the glib references to Wittgenstein.

I think the first task should be to clean up the description and add relevant references; it does indeed read like a college essay and that is unacceptable, in my eyes. If that seems reasonable, I can write up a new introduction. Brian.r.sorrell (talk) 00:14, 22 February 2013 (UTC)

Archive?
Is there a link missing to archived discussion? I thought I had entered discussion of the failure of ordinary language to describe the quantum world, but I don't see it or a link to an archive. David R. Ingham 05:48, 24 August 2006 (UTC)

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Please add this link to the article (it connects to what is easily the best Essay online on this topic):

http://www.helsinki.fi/~tuschano/writings/strange/

Rosa Lichtenstein 10:57, 24 June 2007 (UTC)

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Linguistic philosophy redirects here, why?

08:52, 19 January 2009 (GMT) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 138.251.244.161 (talk)

Incoherent paragraph
I am by no means an expert on "Ordinary Language Philosophy". But the description this article gives of it seems weird to me. Let me address this peculiar paragraph:


 * For example: What is reality? Philosophers have treated it as a noun denoting something that has certain properties. For thousands of years, they have debated those properties. Ordinary language philosophy instead looks at how we use the word "reality" in everyday language. In some instances, people will say, "It may seem that X is the case, but in reality, Y is the case". This expression is not used to mean that there is some special dimension of being where Y is true although X is true in our dimension. What it really means is, "X seemed right, but appearances were misleading in some way. Now I'm about to tell you the truth: Y". That is, the meaning of "in reality" is a bit like "however". And the phrase, "The reality of the matter is ..." serves a similar function — to set the listener's expectations. Further, when we talk about a "real gun", we aren't making a metaphysical statement about the nature of reality; we are merely opposing this gun to a toy gun, pretend gun, imaginary gun, etc.

This tries to reach conclusions about the word 'reality', without actually addressing how the word 'reality' is used. For the phrase 'in reality' is not the same as the word 'reality', as we can see:

He told us he was going to the supermarket, but in reality went to the movies. He told us he was going to the supermarket, but in fact went to the movies.

The above are certainly synonimous, because 'in reality' and 'in fact' are indeed synonimous, but

Your investment project would be fine for Europe, but the Chinese reality demands a different approach. *Your investment project would be fine for Europe, but the Chinese fact demands a different approach.

are certainly not synonimous (and the latter sentence seems to be grammatically wrong). That's because 'reality' and 'fact' are not synomimous at all, and indeed demand different adjectives and verbs to make sence.


 * And the phrase, "The reality of the matter is ..." serves a similar function — to set the listener's expectations.

Which says even less about the word 'reality'. Besides, the phrase 'The reality of the matter' (because "The reality of the matter is..." does not look to be a phrase at all) doesn't perform an adverbial function; it is a nominal phrase, apt to be used as the subject of a sentence:

The reality of the matter is that Wikipedia is not a good source.

and so it does not "serve a similar function" to 'in reality'.


 * Further, when we talk about a "real gun", we aren't making a metaphysical statement about the nature of reality; we are merely opposing this gun to a toy gun, pretend gun, imaginary gun, etc.

But again, 'real' is quite a different word from 'reality', and performs no adverbial function like 'in reality' nor nominal roles like 'reality'. Indeed, this last sentence very ironically uses the word 'reality' in a way that has nothing to do with the adverbial expression 'in reality' or the adjective 'real':


 * we aren't making a metaphysical statement about the nature of reality.

(my emphasys)

And this is certainly one of the "ordinary language" uses of the word 'reality' - more or less synonimous with 'the world', as we can see:

The world is all that is the case. Reality is all that is the case.

So, is this paragraph actually a good description of "Ordinary Language Philosophy" (in which case I would have to conclude that "Ordinary Language Philosophy" is a method that pretends to "look at how words are used", but in fact does something quite different - apparently trying to determine the use of one word by its etymology)? Or is this one of the miriads of Wikipedia's own blunders, and "Ordinary Language Philosophy" is innocent of such sophistry? And in this case, can this paragraph be rewritten, so that it conveys what "Ordinary Language Philosophy" actually is? Ninguém (talk) 23:19, 23 December 2011 (UTC)


 * Half a year later, I see that no one has addressed such issues, either in the article or here in the Talk Page. So I am inserting some tags into the article, in hope that this will bring some more responses. Ninguém (talk) 12:39, 1 September 2012 (UTC)

- No, this is a good description of "Ordinary Language Philosophy", and I don't think it is sophistic (at least in regard to your criticisms). There are a few issues which I think are the source of your confusion, but please feel free to clarify your position if you feel my response has missed the mark in some way.

Firstly, a key view in ordinary language philosophy is that meaning of words are not determined by necessary and sufficient conditions (i.e. a closed definition, like 'man is a rational animal'), but by how they are used. Hence, your criticism of the "reality as setting the listener's expectation" observation as "saying less about reality" misses this difference in their approach to examining language. For to them, by examining how this word is actually used, they think they can determine its meaning and function within a sentence, and thus to criticize ordinary language philosophy, you have to attack their more basic principle that 'meaning is use'. Otherwise, they will just disagree with you and argue that to "say more" by offering some kind of closed definition of the word 'reality', then use this definition in trying to understand this situational use of the word, would only serve to obscure how it functions, and lead to philosophical confusion.

Secondly, I think your criticism about how the author does not actually examine the use of the word reality is subject to your very same criticism. For in saying that "in reality" and "reality" are two different expressions, and hence one cannot conduct an analysis of the use of "reality" by using an "in reality" example, the same can be said for "Chinese realty". For both "Chinese" and "in" modify the word reality in a way that changes the meaning of the word 'reality' within their respective sentences. Remove the word "Chinese" from your sentence and you will see that, although the grammar becomes a little stilted, the word reality now expresses a different idea. Hence, I don't see what the issue is in using modifications of words like "reality" as examples of the different ways it is used.

Thirdly, ordinary language philosophers have no interest in saying something like "the word 'reality' is synonymous with 'fact', but that in some uses of the word 'reality' it functions like the word 'fact', while in others it serves like x, still further others y, etc.. The whole point is that they don't want to offer a closed definition of words, but to understand their myriad of (sometimes conflicting) uses, and what functions they serve in a sentence. To return to my second point, perhaps the word 'reality' only ever initially appeared in sentences where it was modified by some other word, and it is only after taking this word out of context and ignoring its function within them that philosophers began to be puzzled about what 'reality in itself' refers to.

Also, I'm not sure what you mean by "determine the use of one word by its etymology", or "this last sentence very ironically uses the word 'reality' in a way that has nothing to do with the adverbial expression 'in reality' or the adjective 'real'". Would you mind clarifying these arguments? Luthias7 (talk) 03:34, 8 September 2012 (UTC)

-

Well, if this is a good description of Ordinary Language Philosophy, then I can only conclude that Ordinary Language is, besides very confuse, actually bogus. And I don't think I am confused at all on this instance. Let's see:


 * a key view in ordinary language philosophy is that meaning of words are not determined by necessary and sufficient conditions (i.e. a closed definition, like 'man is a rational animal'), but by how they are used

I have no problem with such idea; indeed, the meaning of words is contextual, and I actually do not know anyone who stands for an opposite view (it seems to be quite commonplace knowledge among linguists). What I am saying is that what is described in this article as "looking at how words are used" is clearly not looking at how they are used; instead, what is done there is to look at two or three different lexical entries that relate to the word "reality" only in an ethymological sence, and try to arrive at conclusions about the word "reality" in such a contorted way.


 * Hence, your criticism of the "reality as setting the listener's expectation" observation as "saying less about reality" misses this difference in their approach to examining language.

I am sorry, but to me the sentence is utterly incomprehensible. What does it mean to "set the listener's expectation", and how does the (pseudo)phrase "the reality of the matter is..." perform such task? And I would like to remark that I never said anything like says less about reality; what said is (and it has a very different meaning) says less about the word reality. Use and mention distinction here.


 * For to them, by examining how this word is actually used, they think they can determine its meaning and function within a sentence, and thus to criticize ordinary language philosophy, you have to attack their more basic principle that 'meaning is use'.

That doesn't follow. If they think that they can determine the meaning and function of a word within a sentence by examining how the word is actually used, but then fail to examine the way the word is used, then they can be properly criticised by sayinhg that they don't actually use the method they claim. Which to me is very clearly the case here: the analysis provided as an example is not an analysis of how the word reality is used (not in general, and not even in the particular case of the phrases "in reality" or "the matter of the reality" - which are not actual examples of use of the word "reality"; they are, again, different lexical items).


 * Otherwise, they will just disagree with you and argue that to "say more" by offering some kind of closed definition of the word 'reality', then use this definition in trying to understand this situational use of the word, would only serve to obscure how it functions, and lead to philosophical confusion.

I am not interested in offering a closed definition of the word 'reality'; what I have done is to provide clear examples of actual (and very commonplace and "ordinary language", not "philsophical" at all) uses of the word "reality" that the article seems unable to analyse (albeit actually using the word in one of these ways).


 * For in saying that "in reality" and "reality" are two different expressions, and hence one cannot conduct an analysis of the use of "reality" by using an "in reality" example, the same can be said for "Chinese realty". For both "Chinese" and "in" modify the word reality in a way that changes the meaning of the word 'reality' within their respective sentences.

No, you miss the point. "Reality" and "in reality" are different independent lexemes. "Chinese reality" is not an independent lexeme. The adjective "Chinese" modifies the meaning of the word "reality" in a predictable systematic way, which does not happen with prepositions like "in". So there is no proper analogy here. Saying it differently, if I had never heard or read the phrase "Chinese reality", but was acquainted with the words "Chinese" and "reality", I would immediately infer its meaning; but knowing the use of the words "in" and "reality" cannot help anyone to undertand the meaning of "in reality".


 * Hence, I don't see what the issue is in using modifications of words like "reality" as examples of the different ways it is used.

Since the meaning of words is contextual, it seems evident that different contexts correspond to different meanings, and so the modifications of words (which is to say, its uses in different contexts) are what constitute the different ways they are used.


 * ordinary language philosophers have no interest in saying something like "the word 'reality' is synonymous with 'fact', but that in some uses of the word 'reality' it functions like the word 'fact', while in others it serves like x, still further others y, etc.

Nor did I ever say or imply that the words "reality" and "fact" are synonimous. What I said is that the phrases "in reality" and "in fact" are synonimous. As previously stated, the uses or misuses of the expressions "in reality" and "in fact" have little to do with the uses or misuses of the words "reality" and "fact" (now there may possibly be some contexts in which "in fact" and "in reality" are not synonimous, but if they exist they don't look usual or trivial). If the relation (or lack thereof) between the the word "reality" and the phrase "in reality" is correctly understood, then things fall into place with ease.


 * The whole point is that they don't want to offer a closed definition of words, but to understand their myriad of (sometimes conflicting) uses, and what functions they serve in a sentence.

If so, then the text in the article is a very poor example of OLP reasoning. It sticks with three supposed "uses" of the word "reality", none of which are actual uses of the word, then uses the word in its probably most ordinary sence, in order to... deny that such most ordinary sence is even an acceptable sence of the word (when we talk about a "real gun", we aren't making a metaphysical statement about the nature of reality)!


 * To return to my second point, perhaps the word 'reality' only ever initially appeared in sentences where it was modified by some other word, and it is only after taking this word out of context and ignoring its function within them that philosophers began to be puzzled about what 'reality in itself' refers to.

If the meaning of words is contextual, it follows that all words are only used in sentences where they are modified by other words. In any way, the text of the article itself gives us a good example where "reality" is not immeditately modified by adjective or prepositions: we aren't making a metaphysical statement about the nature of reality. It is hard to see how this quite ordinary use would puzzle intelligent people about "reality in itself"...

I know OL philosophers (or people who like to quote them, anyway) like to make such unwarranted philosophical (and very metaphysical) leap of thought: philosophers are lead into mistake by abstract substantive nouns like "reality" or "freedom" by abstracting them from their context in ordinary use (while someone less metaphysical might put up the idea that reality (in its very ordinary use, ie, the world) is a complicated thing that does not offer itself to our comprehension with ease). It just happens to be philosophical speculation as bad as any other, though. What I don't know is whether such misunderstandings about reality are due to actual misunderstandings about the world in the works of Wittgenstein, etc., or to misunderstandings about the works of Wittgenstein, etc., by those who quote them.

For instance, is this article (mis)take on the word reality based on actual work by an actual OL philopher (name, book, page, etc?), or is it merely Original Research (OR)? The text doesn't give any reference, so I am willing to bet the latter.


 * Also, I'm not sure what you mean by "determine the use of one word by its etymology", or "this last sentence very ironically uses the word 'reality' in a way that has nothing to do with the adverbial expression 'in reality' or the adjective 'real'". Would you mind clarifying these arguments?

As pointed above, the only relation between the word "reality" on one hand and the word "real" and the phrases "in reality" and "the reality of the matter" is etymological. No valid conclusion can be reached about the use of one by the examination of the use of the others, except if there is a hidden premise that etymology determines use and consequently meaning.

As for the comical use of the word reality in the way most people would think of it, within what seems to be an effort to (mis)characterise such use as "metaphysical", I think I have clarified it above, but anyway, again, that is the only place in the article in which the word "reality" is used in its most ordinary acception, and ironically it is within a sentence that seems intended to say that such ordinary use is metaphysical and unwarranted.Ninguém (talk) 18:09, 10 September 2012 (UTC)

When ordinary language philosophers examine how words are used, this does not necessarily mean that they will offer descriptions of words based on their dictionary entry, but will see what function or role the word plays within a sentence. Allow me to offer you an example. Wittgenstein compares language to a game, and the most important aspect of this analogy for our purposes is that both games and language are rule governed. So, when playing chess, if I want to move the bishop, it is a rule that I can only move the bishop diagonally. Similarly, if one wishes to express the notion "while x seems to be the case, it is in fact y", within a language game it is an appropriate move to say "in reality". Now here is where the confusion arises. For if one were to take the use of the word reality in this sentence out of context, it might seem like we are talking about some property of reality, which then could lead us to thinking and debating about what "reality" in itself is, as though it were a property of existence. This could account for the discussion of "being" that is discussed by many philosophers (the property of existence). Similarly, it would be like then moving a bishop and wondering "what a diagonal chess move, in itself, is", as though it were a property of the chess piece, forgetting that it is just a rule of the game that governs us in how we properly move that kind of chess piece.

Thus, when OLP examines how a word is used, they are interested in trying to figure out what 'move' a word like 'reality' makes within our language game, and that that is its real meaning (of which there can be many depending on the context). For example, in the dictionary entry for 'reality', one definition offered is "the quality possessed by something that is real". However, when we examine how the word is used in the context of its 'move', we see that "expressing a quality of realness" is not the intended move. Hence, when you say 'Chinese reality', the move you are making is to express the notion of "the state of affairs in china", or something along those lines. Your Chinese reality example is perfectly in line with an OLP stance on language, and hence he is really combating the view of 'reality" is being some kind of "quality possessed by something that is real", which he thinks stems from a misunderstanding of language. As such, I suspect that your argument unfortunately amounts to a straw man.

I hope this new information helps to clarify things, as it seems that your "etymology" view of OLP is not at all what they are up to. They don't wish to define 'reality' by way of examples which use similar words, like 'real', but to examine what moves the use of the word 'reality' makes within a language game which, as we can see in your 'Chinese reality' example, is not to express the notion of some property of reality that things possess. Furthermore, when the author says "we aren't making a metaphysical statement about the nature of reality", the move that the word 'reality' makes here is to express "things that exist", rather than some property of existing things. Luthias7 (talk) 20:28, 10 September 2012 (UTC)


 * When ordinary language philosophers examine how words are used, this does not necessarily mean that they will offer descriptions of words based on their dictionary entry, but will see what function or role the word plays within a sentence.

But this is what dictionarists do; they look at how words are used in ordinary (and, of course, "non-ordinary") usage and list the most significant or obvious uses. Of course they will always miss the most obscure (and the newest) usage, but that is another matter.


 * So, when playing chess, if I want to move the bishop, it is a rule that I can only move the bishop diagonally. Similarly, if one wishes to express the notion "while x seems to be the case, it is in fact y", within a language game it is an appropriate move to say "in reality".

The problem here is that, if "reality" is a bishop and can move diagonally, then "in reality" is a rook, that can only move horizontally or vertically.


 * Now here is where the confusion arises. For if one were to take the use of the word reality in this sentence out of context, it might seem like we are talking about some property of reality, which then could lead us to thinking and debating about what "reality" in itself is, as though it were a property of existence.

But, of course, the word reality is commonly used in ordinary English to refer to a property of a given object - the property of existing or not existing - or to refer to all things that exist, taken as whole:


 * Unicorns do not belong in reality.
 * John's dreams became reality.
 * People who drink are trying to escape reality.
 * Scientists once believed in aether, but have now concluded that it has no reality.

Nothing of this is confuse or "metaphysical". What the article seems to do is to stick to limited (and indeed bogus, as they are not actual uses of the word "reality") uses, and claim that those are the only correct uses, anything else being "metaphysical" - in direct contradiction to what we would see if we actually looked at how the word is used.


 * This could account for the discussion of "being" that is discussed by many philosophers (the property of existence)

In which case perhaps the article would do better in discussing the use of the word "being", to which such criticism seems much more appliable.


 * For example, in the dictionary entry for 'reality', one definition offered is "the quality possessed by something that is real". However, when we examine how the word is used in the context of its 'move', we see that "expressing a quality of realness" is not the intended move.

If we actually look at a dictionary, we will se that "the quality possessed by something that is real" is ust one, among many, possible (and contextually dependent) interpretations of the word. If we actually look at how the word is used, we will see that it is often used as "the quality possessed by something that is real", as easily demonstrated in the examples I gave above. Evidently, when it is used in a different context, it means something different - that is the reason that the dictionary lists several different meanings for each word. You can't really have a fight against the dictionarist because each of his several meanings cannot fit each and all real world uses.


 * Hence, when you say 'Chinese reality', the move you are making is to express the notion of "the state of affairs in china", or something along those lines.

Evidently. Which any dictionary will acknoledge and list as a possible meaning of the word ("real things, facts, or events taken as a whole; state of affairs", for instance, making "Chinese reality" a way to say "the real things, facts and events pertaining to China, taken as a whole", or "the state of affairs in China").


 * Your Chinese reality example is perfectly in line with an OLP stance on language, and hence he is really combating the view of 'reality" is being some kind of "quality possessed by something that is real", which he thinks stems from a misunderstanding of language.

Well, the difference is that, just because I know that "reality" can be used as in such example, it doesn't mean that I think it cannot be used as in "there is no reality in the concept of Phlogiston", or that such use stems from metaphysics, or is the cause of metaphysics, or that is a misunderstanding or misuse of language.


 * it seems that your "etymology" view of OLP is not at all what they are up to. They don't wish to define 'reality' by way of examples which use similar words, like 'real', but to examine what moves the use of the word 'reality' makes within a language game which, as we can see in your 'Chinese reality' example, is not to express the notion of some property of reality that things possess.

If trying to guess the "actual" (or should I say "real"?) meaning of a word through its etimology isn't what OLP is about (and I don't doubt it isn't), then the article does a bad job in explaining it, because what the article does is to try to explain the meaning of the word "reality" by looking at a word ("real") and two phrases ("in reality" and "the reality of the matter") that only relate to the word "reality" through etymology.

But then comes the dogmatic part, which is to deny that the word "reality" is in fact used in denoting "some property of reality" that things may or may not possess. Or perhaps to say that such use, while in fact existing, is "metaphysical" or "grammatically" wrong, or some other normative dictatum about how to use language.


 * Furthermore, when the author says "we aren't making a metaphysical statement about the nature of reality", the move that the word 'reality' makes here is to express "things that exist", rather than some property of existing things.

Or, in other words, things that have the property of existing, or of being real. But even if the case could be made that such use is actually irreductible to anything relating to the "property of being real", the fact remains that in other contexts it is used exactly to refer to such property, as shown above. Ninguém (talk) 16:39, 11 September 2012 (UTC)

OLP will not dispute the fact that "reality" is often used to mean "some property of reality"; they wish to claim that this particular usage stems from a mistaken understanding of how the word reality is otherwise used in sentences. Hence, I don't really see where you are going with this line of argumentation. For not only is your sentence "Or, in other words, things that have the property of existing, or of being real" fallacious because it simply assumes what is actually up for discussion, but the fact that sentences can refer to this property doesn't mean that such a property is an actual quality that objects have. We can also talk about Santa Clause, yet no Santa Clause actually has to exist in order for such sentences to make sense. Similarly, we can use reality in sentences to mean "a property of existence" in a way that makes sense to use, but that doesn't mean it is an actual property of existing things in the same way that colour is a property, and OLP wishes to show how this confusion in talking about things arises from how we otherwise use the word reality.

Furthermore, I don't at all buy your argument about how using "in reality" does not constitute a use of the word "reality"; enough so that, at the least, in the chess analogy it would necessitate using a different peace. For to use the phrase "in reality" you must at the very least invoke the concept of "reality", while when using a rook one does not need to invoke the use of a bishop.

On the whole, I don't think you are offering a very charitable view of OLP, nor do I find your arguments against it particularly compelling. This quote is indeed a good summary in my opinion, but like all brief summaries it is of course lacking in some of the finer details, as your response attests to. However, the purpose of this brief article is certainly not to offered a detailed and complex survey of OLP's main views, but to simply offer a general overview of its main goals and philosophical aims. In that respect, I think it succeeds, and hence I think this quote should stay. Luthias7 (talk) 08:23, 12 September 2012 (UTC)


 * Well... then please provide reliable sources that show that this line of argument indeed pertains to Ordinary Language Philosophy. Ninguém (talk) 12:58, 12 September 2012 (UTC)

Update
I've tracked down a number of sources and provided details of where to find them, provided sources for citation requests, and added some statements from these new sources. It looks to me as though these changes address the problems that led to the warning templates at the top of the page, so I have removed them. If someone thinks they still apply, please provided some guidance as to your reservations here on the Talk page and don't just add a template without commenting. Brews ohare (talk) 15:12, 22 May 2013 (UTC)

IMO the article is long on criticism of ordinary language philosophy and doesn't do much to explain its contributions. Although the claim is made and supported by citations that ordinary language philosophy is more or less 'over', the point remains that the primary problem of the critique of the reference of language to reality has not been put to bed, nor abandoned. Brews ohare (talk) 15:17, 22 May 2013 (UTC)

What Sally Parker-Ryan says
In this revert, Snowded removes the statement:
 * Ordinary language philosophy is one of two branches of linguistic philosophy, the other being logical positivism.[1]
 * [1]

The reason Snowded provides for his objection is: "Source does NOT support a general statement about the field". Now, Sally Parker-Ryan says: "" Linguistic philosophy includes both Ordinary Language philosophy and Logical Positivism, developed by the philosophers of the Vienna Circle. These two schools are inextricably linked historically and theoretically...""

- Sally Parker-Ryan

I would conclude that the removed statement can be made exactly parallel to the source if put in this form:


 * Ordinary language philosophy is a branch of linguistic philosophy closely related to logical positivism.[1]
 * [1]

Perhaps Snowded will find this version acceptable? And, if not, perhaps Snowded can elucidate? Brews ohare (talk) 04:24, 25 May 2013 (UTC)
 * That's fine, but it still reads like an essay overall Snowded  TALK 04:48, 25 May 2013 (UTC)

Original research
There is now somewhat of an edit war about the templates. They should remain, I think. The section titled "Central Ideas" reads basically as "Original Research". It is a series of flawed arguments that attempt to establish some philosophical truth about the word "reality" by very clearly not looking at how the word 'reality' is used, but instead by extrapolating through a superficial analysis of the word 'real' and the phrase 'in reality'. There is nothing there to suggest that actual "ordinary language" philosophers actually adhere to such naive analysis - which is the reason it remains unsourced - and I very much doubt they do (if so, please link to actual quotes from at least one of them reducing the meaning of 'reality' to the use of 'real' or 'in reality'). Ninguém (talk) 09:51, 19 June 2013 (UTC)

New attempt at article
I'm surprised at how obscure this article appears in places, and how uninformative it is in others. OLP is not a tightly defined movement like some in the history of philosophy are so I understand why this problem maybe occurs, however I don't know how useful anyone will ultimately find this entry. There are some good references cited, but as noted in other comments here, it reads like an essay/editorial in places (for example "Of course, this was and is a very controversial viewpoint").

Those general points out of the way, I have some more specific concerns.

First, the third paragraph in the introduction (quoting Grayling) - I'm not sure really what the relevance of this for someone who looking for an introduction to what OLP is. It is at best an afterthought and doesn't really address anything philosophically or historically pertinent to an introduction to OLP. If I read that in an essay I would assume it was to bolster the word count. I would propose this be removed or moved to the end somewhere.

Second, I find the Central Ideas section to be most unclear in setting out the central ideas of OLP. I would propose that this be rewritten in its entirety.

Third, no mention of the idea that 'ordinary language is correct language' or of the paradigm case argument or of the difficulty in defining OLP?

I'm happy to slowly add edits in to make this a better article as it is most unhelpful in its current format. I'd start with the above three changes and then suggest some more. If anyone has any objections please let me know.

143.167.254.160 (talk) 15:42, 12 July 2016 (UTC)

Further to my notes above, I have now removed the following from the introduction having checked the source:

''The Wittgenstein scholar A. C. Grayling says that, despite the fact that Wittgenstein’s work might have played some "second or third-hand [part in the promotion of] the philosophical concern for language which was dominant in the mid-century", neither Gilbert Ryle nor any of those in the so-called "Ordinary Language philosophy" school that is chiefly associated with J. L. Austin were Wittgensteinians. More significantly, Grayling asserts that "most of them were largely unaffected by Wittgenstein’s later ideas, and some were actively hostile to them". ''

I will reuse some of this later in the article but I think where it was is a little unhelpful for an introduction in which the reader is primarily interested in a short statement of what OLP actually is/was rather than some minutiae about how Wittgenstein was regarded by Austin and Ryle. Its brevity is also slightly misleading too. Earlier OL philosophers were congenial to Wittgenstein's ideas (the Cambridge group were his friends and contemporaries in his post-1929 time in Cambridge), it is also misleading in that the hostility referred to in the truncated quote is not specifically OL philosophers, but as Grayling says "None of the people who at the time were prominent in philosophy (in addition to Ryle and Austin there were, for example, Moore, Broad, Russell and Ayer) were Wittgensteinians; most of them were largely unaffected by Wittgenstein’s later ideas, and some were actively hostile to them". I think this is indeed a useful quote, and also from the same page "There is no doubt that Wittgenstein's views had some part in promoting the philosophical concern for language which was dominant in the mid-century, even if only in part and at second- or third-hand; but it is equally certain that Wittgenstein would have found aspects of 'Ordinary Language Philosophy' uncongenial." I think both of these can be used in some way later in the article under a new heading discussing some of the central figures involved in OLP.

So in addition to my proposals above, I think a section discussing the philosophers who could be considered to be proponents of an OL method should be included. This may help to get around the difficulty one has in trying to elaborate on a clear definition of something that wasn't a clearly defined philosophy, but rather was a more holistic methodological commitment, this might help make the Central Ideas section seem a little more focused too.

As I mention above, I will gradually add edits in as my own research on the topic progresses and when I have time.

PJConnolly1 (talk) 09:24, 15 July 2016 (UTC)