Talk:Origins of the Six-Day War/Archive 1

WP:NOR and poisoning the well
Supreme Deliciousness has been inserting into the description of historian Michael Oren the fact that a couple of years later he became an Israeli ambassador, and now that he was also an Israeli soldier. This is obvious WP:NOR and a fairly transparent attempt at poisoning the well. Oren didn't become an ambassador until years after he wrote this, so it's not relevant to his view, and most Israelis are "Israeli soldiers", because there is a draft (just as there is in, for example, Switzerland). SD, could you please stop trying to insert this, or provide sources that show it's relevant in this specific case? Plot Spoiler (talk) 14:26, 27 April 2011 (UTC)
 * It doesn't matter if he became an ambassador after he wrote the book. That he is the Israeli ambassador to the US and that he was an IDF soldier is easily researchable and not OR as can be seen here: . The purpose is to show that he is a heavily involved person within the conflict, he moved to Israel from the US, he was an Israeli soldier and took part in the occupation of Lebanon before he wrote the book, and afterwards he was an IDF spokesman during the Second Lebanon War and Gaza and became the Israeli ambassador the US. Is this some kind of uninvolved person that only can be presented as "a historian"? Of course not. So the information shows that he is a part of one side of the conflict. To not have this important background information and present him only as a "historian" without showing his heavily involved background is not neutral and presents the reader with a faulty image. --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 15:08, 27 April 2011 (UTC)
 * Snooze fest Supreme. Real snooze fest. In the West, there is "objective" history even if the individual historian did play a role fighting for one army or the other. Stop trying to poison the well because you disagree with Michael Oren and move on... Plot Spoiler (talk) 15:14, 27 April 2011 (UTC)
 * "In the West"..what the hell does that mean ?  Sean.hoyland  - talk 16:00, 27 April 2011 (UTC)
 * SD, it's quite odd to claim that a job a historian got years after he commented on a topic is relevant to that comment he made years earlier. Do you have any WP:RS that make the same point in relation to this topic? You're quite blatant about wanting to discredit Oren on this point, but Wikipedia's policies don't allow editors to become advocates. Jayjg (talk) 00:23, 28 April 2011 (UTC)

Dublicate article
I'm not sure how this mirror article of "History of Arab-Israeli conflict" survived for so long without being contested for deletion, but i guess i have to tell the king is naked - this is just a copy paste.Greyshark09 (talk) 20:39, 17 June 2012 (UTC)


 * Clearly not - there is more here than in History of the Arab–Israeli conflict, which only has four paragraphs (three of them quite short) about the period covered by this article and doesn't mention, for example, the Rotem Crisis. You could nominate it at WP:Articles for deletion but it's likely to be kept. However, it may be possible to expand the "History of" article. Peter&#160;E.&#160;James (talk) 21:16, 17 June 2012 (UTC)
 * I created the article and can shed some light on its origin. It's a cut and paste from Six-Day War. The Origins was dominating and warping the discussion on that article so I cut it out and put it here to cut down on the distortion of that article. History of the Arab-Israeli conflict was a copy and paste (not by me) from what had been in the Six-Day war article at that stage. You've added 2 and 2 and made 5. As the above user said, it's also much expanded compared to History of Arab-Israeli conflict. But take it to AfD, I doubt there's much interest in deleting it however. DeCausa (talk) 21:29, 17 June 2012 (UTC)

Merger
Following the comments by the above editors, i withdraw the deletion but nominate it for merger into the History of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Six Day War articles .Greyshark09 (talk) 21:33, 17 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Oppose. That makes no sense. Which one do you want to merge it into - can't be both? It's too big for both anyway. silly suggestion. DeCausa (talk) 21:37, 17 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Correction - only the "History of the Arab-Israeli conflict".Greyshark09 (talk) 21:40, 17 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Comment - it should be merged into the "History of the Arab-Israeli conflict" article (currently only 51Kb size!), as we don't need huge and almost indentical background articles for each one of the Arab-Israeli wars (1948 war, Suez War, Six Day War, Attrition War and October War).Greyshark09 (talk) 21:39, 17 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Yes this article is over 90kb - it would completely swamp it and be disproportionate - the very definition of a need for it to be a separate article. King's looking good naked right now ;) DeCausa (talk) 21:42, 17 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Don't be rediculous, 93kb merged into 51kb article is much less than 144kb. I would guess only 10-20kb are worth merging, the rest is dublicated, unsourced or redundant.Greyshark09 (talk) 21:45, 17 June 2012 (UTC)
 * In addition, you are clearly reacting as an article owner, which is not responsible.Greyshark09 (talk) 21:46, 17 June 2012 (UTC)
 * LOL! It's not the total amount it's that 2/3 of the merged article will be on the origins of this war - that's disproportionate for an article on the entire Arab-Israeli conflict. I've got no ownership of this article. I never edit it. My interest was in the Six-Day War article and carving out all the nonsense which was the cause of so munch unnecessary contention. Anyway, I'll not post again and leave it to othrs. But I suggest you come up with a coherent rationale for the merger if you want it to be taken seriously. DeCausa (talk) 21:52, 17 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Strange... a few minutes ago you said you are the creator of this article.Greyshark09 (talk) 21:54, 17 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Yes, I did create it. So? DeCausa (talk) 22:07, 17 June 2012 (UTC)

Oppose:Topic is notable for a stand alone Wikipedia article, There is a vast amount of academic scholarship dealing with this issue. Dlv999 (talk) 08:57, 18 June 2012 (UTC)


 * Comment: I'm under the impression that shorter articles are usually merged, longer ones are split. Why not include a short section in History of the Arab-Israeli conflict with a link to this article, a bit as if this one was split out of that one? --Dailycare (talk) 19:36, 18 June 2012 (UTC)
 *  Support  This article could be considered content forking. Pug6666 20:31, 8 May 2013 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Pug6666 (talk • contribs)
 * Comment - seems there is no consensus and no public interest so far; i guess we can close this proposal as no merge.Greyshark09 (talk) 11:32, 1 September 2013 (UTC)

Dead Link
Note 76 is not a dead link. It needs a cookie. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 188.100.38.253 (talk) 18:19, 25 June 2012 (UTC)

Suez Crisis aftermath
I added the following "Despite the overwhelming support for Resolution 1000 in the UN General Assembly, Israel refused to allow UNEF forces onto its territory" because as it is it looks like Egypt was the only country involved in any part of the UNEF presence. Enquiringeric (talk) 17:10, 12 April 2013 (UTC)

The Straits of Tiran
[New to Wiki editing - hence the over-the-top caution] In the sentence referenced by [84] it states "Citing international law, Israel considered the closure of the straits to be illegal, and it had stated it would consider such a blockade a casus belli in 1957 when it withdrew from the Sinai and Gaza.[84]" I read the reference provided ... three times. 1) In Golda Meir's speech she does not refer to 'international law'. Can I change that, and if so do I need to prove in this Talk section that, amongst others, Eisenhower's words are not international law, nor are observations by the UN General Assembly? 2)Nor did Ms Meir address the concept of "casus belli" anywhere. I therefore plan to remove that. 3) Nor did she use the word "illegal". So I plan to remove that also. In fact nothing now remains of that sentence, so it would therefore seem reasonable to remove all of it. Yes? The only problem is that that speech is the cornerstone of Israel's justification for invading Egypt, so should I mention that but qualify it by noting that no international law nor warning of a casus belli was made? Enquiringeric (talk) 08:52, 11 April 2013 (UTC)
 * Hi Enquiringeric, welcome to Wikipedia. Thanks for looking into this. As you have identified, this is a poor citation as it does not support the associated material. Also it is a Primary source and for historical articles such as this one we should be using secondary sources such as modern academic scholarship on the topic.
 * I found an academic source which does discuss the speech as relevant to the topic and perhaps we could rewrite the sentence based on this source:
 * "Israel’s political ‘anchor’ in its efforts to prevent any disruption of freedom of shipping through the Straits was a statement by then Foreign Minister Golda Meir at the UN Assembly on 1 March 1957, while announcing her government’s decision to respond to the demand for withdrawal from Sinai and the Gaza Strip, to the effect that Israel would view disruption of free shipping through the Tiran Straits as an act of aggression and would reserve the right to react in accordance with Clause 51 of the UN Charter."
 * Dlv999 (talk) 09:33, 11 April 2013 (UTC)


 * Many thanks on all fronts Dlv999. That quote seems to be a far better contribution. The problem is that in Meir's speech she concludes that Israel "would view disruption of free shipping through the Tiran Straits as an act of aggression and reserve the right to react in accordance with Clause 51 of the UN Charter". Now Clause 51 does allow defence as follows "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations ..." So Meir cherry-picked the Charter by leaving out the rather important trigger to self-defence, namely "... if an armed attack occurs". I will look for a scholarly work to make this point. I think that John Quigley wrote about it a decade or so ago. Until then it is probably better to hold off with any alterations - yes? Enquiringeric (talk) 14:18, 11 April 2013 (UTC)
 * I checked Quigley's book. He does refer to the stipulation of an "armed attack" in clause 51, but with respect to the legality of a preemptive strike not over the issue of the straits of Tiran. It may be worth adding to the article elsewhere, but we can't use the source to make a point about the Tiran Straits that the author does not make himself. There maybe another source that makes the point in relation to the straits. In the meantime I don't see any reason why we can't add Gluska and amend the text so it is consistent with the source. We have to include the Israeli position anyway, even if we later find a source that criticizes it. Dlv999 (talk) 15:56, 11 April 2013 (UTC)
 * In that context, are you familiar with Eugene Rostow's critique of Quigley's 1990 book. That should be a pretty decent source for the view opposed to his, although a good modern article by a legal analyst would be preferable. All the more recent ones that I have seen tend to rely on accusations of 'revisionism' more than reason. Enquiringeric (talk) 20:01, 11 April 2013 (UTC)

The article has strong anti Israeli POV
The article is clearly biased against Israel, by omitting important facts, presenting anti Israeli propaganda and by lies.

The article does not mentioned the Arab leaders threats. e.g. We will throw the Israeli men into the sea.

The article does not mentioned the Soviet threat. When The Soviet ambassador in Israel was told to inspect the Syrian border himself and see that there are no I.D.F forces there, he refused and said that it is not his job to check it. He said that Israel is being punished for the alliance with the imperialism and loose the access to the Red sea. ( Oren, six days of war, p. 59)

The article does not say clearly that "Israeli diplomat went into action. The state department, the British foreign office, p any channel to Nasser, even U Thant- was utilize in assuring Nasser that Israel had no warlike intention…"( Oren, six days of war, p. 62)

The term invasion is used erroneously few times, instead of the word raid. Ykantor (talk) 18:05, 3 March 2014 (UTC)

Unfortunately, while you may have truth on your side, this does not qualify it for a NPOV dispute, WP:NPOV under the section titled: What is an NPOV Dispute, we see the essence "one side—who cares enough to be making the point—thinks that the article says something that other people would want to disagree with" so unless you want to point out something in the article that is untrue... Or rather we can focus on the thing you did list and say if you want the article to be less bias, find sources that support the claims you are making and contribute them to the article, that is what WP:BOLD is all about.

Also from the sectioning defining what an NPOV dispute is: "Everyone can agree that marking an article as having an NPOV dispute is a temporary measure, and should be followed up by actual contributions to the article in order to put it in such a state that people agree that it is neutral.

A NPOV dispute tag does not mean that an article actually violates NPOV. An editor should not remove the tag merely because he or she feels the article does comply with NPOV: The tag should be removed only when there is a consensus that the disputes have indeed been resolved."


 * Given we are already working on one specific dubious statement, I don't see any need for this flag, excepting the last example given here by Ykantor about 'raid' being the proper term instead of the misused 'invasion', however he is not very specific on where he sees this mistake or his sources that detail why it is so.

Also just kind of as an aside, I'm no history buff but one look at this and I understood 'things got tense, and eventually israel swept through in 6 days and whooped everyone' which isn't a very positive image for israel. I am not one to easily brush conspiracies aside but I don't think this article has an Israeli bias.... however some of the literature that has published on it very well may, as is common within the academic world and the West, yet as a tertiary source we have no role in commenting on this, we can trust our fellow intelligent people to understand that some of the views expressed are done some from a very narrow frame of view, and as editors we are doing our job simply by providing the source as well, but that really is a required part of the recipe: source: wp:rs Nolanpowers (talk) 18:51, 9 June 2015 (UTC)

Israel and Syria
In order to imply that Israel was the bad side, the article states that::
 * " Israel had provoked more than 80% of the border clashes with Syria in the lead-up to its April 7, 1967 invasion of Syria.". However-
 * 1) it does not state that even when Israel initiated the clashes, it was typically done by an Israeli agricultural tractor that started plowing in the disputed zones. The Syrians reaction was firing towards the Israel.
 * 2) At first, the Syrian bombarded Israel and only later Israel invaded Syria.


 * "Syria also claimed that Syrian shelling had always occurred in response to Israeli firing on peaceful Arab farmers or Syrian posts. This point, also raised by Dayan in his interview,[70] is further supported by the eye-witness accounts of Dutch UN Observer ". the bold text is a mistake. The given sources does not claim that "Syrian shelling had always occurred in response to Israeli firing".


 * The article fail to reveal that on 11 May 1967 U Thant could no longer to ignore the evidence of Syrian implication in the guerrilla attacks and denounced both the guerrilla attacks against Israel and the responsible government (i.e Syria). ( Oren, six days of war, p. 52)


 * Concerning the April 7 1967 incident, the article say misleadingly that: " The Israelis responded by sending in armor-plated tractors to continue ploughing, resulting in further exchanges of fire. The resulting tit-for-tat escalated, leading to tanks, heavy mortars, machine guns, and artillery". However, the Syrians planned in advance to extend the light arms fire to artillery and thanks against Israeli civilian settlements. (shemesh, six days war, p. 172)

Water dispute

 * It says:"In 1964, Israel began drawing water from the Jordan River for its National Water Carrier, reducing the flow that reached Hashemite territory". It falsely imply that Israel stole Jordanian water but fail to mention that both Israel and Jordan big water projects were financed mostly by U.S.A provided both would accept the Jordan Valley Unified Water Plan known as the Johnston water plan, initiated by the U.N., resulting in both countries sticking with their U.N recognized water quota.
 * It says:"The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) attacked the diversion works in Syria". it states that Israel attacked The Syrian diversion works without saying that Israel initiated it by the same tractor tactic, and the Syrian responded by shooting, so the Syrian were the first to shoot.

Egyptian Troop Build-up in Sinai

 * " Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser began the re-militarization of the Sinai, and concentrated tanks and troops there".
 * 1) But it ignores to state that that the trigger was a false Soviet report concerning an Israeli force encountering Syria, that Nasser sent his general to verify it, and this general reported that the Soviet report was a lie, but Nasser decided to continue the build up for an unknown reason.
 * 2) it ignores that this Egyptian buildup was a break of the 1956 international agreement
 * 3) it ignores that the Israeli army was very small and this buildup forced Israel to call the reserves, which left the economy in a poor situation, which could not last for a long period.


 * it says:"Major General Mattityahu Peled, the Chief of Logistics for the Armed Forces during the war, said the survival argument was "a bluff which was born and developed only after the war ".
 * However, the article does not mention the: "Israeli leaders, who believed they were fighting for their survival".
 * Some generals (e.g. Peled) pretend to know in advance that their army will win the war. However, the historic accumulated experience, proves that they are mostly wrong


 * it says:"on May 22 General Rabin reported to Israel's cabinet that the Egyptian forces were in a defensive posture, that they were not being deployed to attack", but does not mention:"Rabbin…informed …the straight … officially closed…that day… Nasser could…switching his forces disposition from defensive to offensive in a matter of hours" (oren, p. 88) Ykantor (talk) 21:30, 30 January 2014 (UTC)
 * Ykantor, it's not true that Israeli leaders thought they were fighting for survival. We know from documentary sources that Israeli assessments predicted a quick and easy victory, and US assessments (which were shared with the Israelis) agreed with this. If Israeli leaders had thought there was a risk of losing, they wouldn't have started with war. Cheers, --Dailycare (talk) 19:49, 31 January 2014 (UTC)
 * Concerning assessments, on 1973, both U.S and Israeli army were sure that Israel will easily win a war. However, once the 1973 war started, it became clear that these assessment were a fiction, and Israel had hard times. The 1967 Israeli prime minister, Eshkol was justifiably careful and did not believe the army predictions. It is a known phenomena that some generals tend to promise easy victories e.g. The powers at the beginning of the 1st world war. * As the charismatic general Moshe Dayan took over the security minister duty, about a week before the attack, the Israeli public and the soldiers mood was improved dramatically. He said that there was no need for a help of foreign soldiers, and although the Arab armies were bigger, the war fate depended at the war development.  * Yours:"If Israeli leaders had thought there was a risk of losing, they wouldn't have started with war". The Israel initial air strike was rather risky. Had the Egyptians guarding themselves with Mig-21 patrolling around, the attack could have been a failure. The Israeli airplane were heavily loaded, short on fuel  and not escorted by defending fighter aircraft ( e.g. During the WW2, the American bombers were always covered by fighters like Mustangs). With a failed air attack, it is difficult to predict the development of the war. The Egyptian soldiers were known to be brave and good in defending themselves. * The attacking side, has a big advantage, as happened in other wars. Had the Egyptians attacking Israel at the 27 May as planned, while coordinating with the other Arab countries, it could have been a severe blow to Israel. * As said in Defensive preparations "According to Michael Oren's account of the war, there was a sense of an approaching catastrophe in Israel, with talk of widespread bombings of Israeli cities and an entire generation of soldiers being wiped out". (BTW this section is not accurate). e.g. *** Jews abroad, phoned their Israeli relatives and asked them to save their children by sending them abroad. *** Ben Gurion, Israel previous leader, reprimanded the chief of staff general Rabin, and blamed him of being irresponsible for his share in the grave situation where Israel might to be involved in a war without an alliance with other power ( e.g. 1956 war). Following this meeting, General Rabin suffered a nervous breakdown and could not function for a couple of days. * Israel could not afford to continue with a mobilized army. Unlike the Arab armies, the Israeli  permanent army was small, and relied heavily on reserves. Nearly all men, buses, trucks etc.  were mobilized and the economy brought to a halt. The women, the elders and the pupils gave a hand but it was not sufficient. e.g. they had to milk the cow and to transport the milk to the city  while there were no trucks available. Ykantor (talk) 07:21, 1 February 2014 (UTC)
 * According to Richard Helms, the CIA assessment in 1967 was that "If the Israelis attacked first, it was going to be a short war; if the Egyptians attacked first, it was going to be a longer war, but there wasn't any question about who was going to win it" (source: Popp). This was shared with the Israelis, and as we see in the article, the Israelis has an identical assessment (although they claimed otherwise to the Americans and publicly whipped up a panic). Again, if there was a real risk of defeat, the Israelis would hardly have started the war which, as Begin concedes, was for them a war of choice. --Dailycare (talk) 11:26, 1 February 2014 (UTC)
 * As said, those assessment were proven to be wrong concerning the 1973 war. The C.I.A and the U.K army wrongly predicted an Arab victory before the 1948 war. On 1967, the cautious Israel prime minister has not trusted those assessments. That was changed on the last week preceding the war, as general Dayan took over the security minister duty. The public panic waned as the charismatic Dayan talk seemed to be self assured. ( e.g. Israel does not need the help of foreign armies ). Yours:"if there was a real risk of defeat". Israel, as a small nation could not afford anything but a short and clear victory. i.e. not a Pyrrhic victory or a heavy war of attrition. For instance, During 1973 war, Israel wanted a cease fire with the Egyptians because the army lost too many airplanes and tanks, and the Americans were not supplying replacements (yet). Such a ceasefire would have been a clear Egyptian victory, but Sadat refused, and only then the USA really started to supply Israel. During those weeks the Israeli economy was brought to a halt (since the men were recruited, no fuel supply through the Tiran straights), and with the Egyptian army concentrated near the Israeli border ,Israel had either to attack or to surrender, which was not a real option with the Arab leaders promising the annihilation of Israel. Ykantor (talk) 09:58, 2 February 2014 (UTC)
 * I don't see what any 1973 estimates have to do with the 1967 war, and I still don't see real evidence that the Israeli leaders would have been under the impression they were fighting for survival (which is what we're discussing here). They were fighting to capture more territory. They said it was a matter of survival publicly to whip up a panic, but we know that they were confidentially advised otherwise and made the decision to launch the war based on that advice, not their own public propaganda. Concerning 1948, the military balance was known and the end result of the war was known - had it been otherwise ben Gurion would not have started the war, simple as that, but that's out of scope for this article. --Dailycare (talk) 13:48, 2 February 2014 (UTC)
 * Concerning the assessments, they were proven wrong on 1948 and 1973 wars. they have proven right on 1967 war. Should the cautious Israeli leader like Eshkol thrust those assessments ? Definitely not.

** yours:"Concerning 1948, the military balance was known and the end result of the war was known - had it been otherwise ben Gurion would not have started the war". If so, how come that both the CIA and the UK chief of staff predicted an Arab victory? BTW As a matter of fact, the Arabs started the 1948 war. ** For the sake of the discussion, Let's assume that Israel have planned the war in advance in order to gain territories, according to you view. This assumption, contradict some events: **** ''"Following Eban’s May 25 warning to the Americans that an Egyptian attack was imminent, the United Stales administration sent a note to Kosygin asking him to restrain the Egyptians. Kosygin obliged. The Soviet ambassador in Cairo woke Nasir up at 03:00 on May 27 and told him not to commence military operations. saying that “Egypt must not be the party that initiates a military offensive otherwise world public opinion would turn against it.” Simultaneously the Soviet ambassador in Tel Aviv delivered an identical message to Eshkol at 03:30, demanding that the Israeli leader take all the necessary steps to avoid a military clash with Syria and Egypt, that is, to abstain from a preemptive strike. The note expressed the Soviet Union’s belief that Israel did not want war, and it called on Israel not to let itself be pushed into armed aggression because of pressure from interested parties. Although the ambassador tried to find out if Israel Intended to initiate hostilities, he failed to receive a direct answer. Eshkol invited him to visit the northern border and see with his own eyes if there were any Israeli troop concentrations there, but the Soviet ambassador declined. Kosygin also sent a message to Johnson warning that the Soviet Union would come to the aid of the Arabs if Israel attacked. The Russian leader asked the United States to exert its restraining influence on Israel in order to avoid a military conflagration, while he, Kosygin, promised to work toward the same goal on the Arab side. " (shemesh, six day war, p. 206). Hence, even the Soviets, Isreal's archenemy, the Soviet Union’s belief that Israel did not want war **** If Israel wanted a war, then why "Eshkol invited him to visit the northern border and see with his own eyes if there were any Israeli troop concentrations there, but the Soviet ambassador declined" ? **** Since Shlaim is anti Israel propagandist, I usually avoid his interpretation. But for this discussion, let's have a look at his quote: ' "Nasser responded by taking three successive steps that made war virtually inevitable: he deployed his troops in Sinai near Israel's border on 14 May; expelled the UNEF from the Gaza Strip and Sinai on 19 May; and closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping on 22 May."'' ( Shlaim, Avi (2012). The 1967 Arab-Israeli War, p. 106. ) It is used as footnote no. 22 of Six-Day War). Hence Nasser made the war inevitable, and not Israel. **** "''Eshkol decided to give King Hussein the benefit of the doubt. Through General Odd Bull, the Norwegian commander of UNTSO, he sent the following message the morning of June 5: We shall not initiate any action whatsoever against Jordan. However, should Jordan open hostilities, we shall react with all our might, and the king will have to bear the full responsibility of the consequences." King Hussein told General Bull that it was too late; the die was cast."'' ( Shlaim, 2000, pp. 243–244. It is used as note no. 2 of Six-Day War). Again, based on the the anti Israeli Shlaim, Israel tried to avoid a war with Jordan, up to the last minute. To be continued. Ykantor (talk) 19:14, 2 February 2014 (UTC)
 * Hi, I'm afraid you're getting a bit sidetracked. I haven't seen evidence for your earlier claim (which is what we're discussing) that Israeli leaders believed in 1967 they were fighting for their survival. What the Soviets claimed to believe is rather beside the point. Cheers, --Dailycare (talk) 20:43, 3 February 2014 (UTC)
 * The evidence is already here, at this section beginning, where I wrote : However, the article does not mention the: "Israeli leaders, who believed they were fighting for their survival". Presumably, it quoted Oren's book, who is an wp:rs. I'll try to find more sources, if you assist me and tell me what kind of support you would like to see. Other historians? newspaper of that dates? Ykantor (talk) 13:01, 4 February 2014 (UTC)
 * The NYT's claim is disputed by persons who were present in the Israeli leadership at the time: "To pretend that the Egyptian forces massed on our frontiers were in a position to threaten the existence of Israel constitutes an insult not only to the intelligence of anyone capable of analyzing this sort of situation, but above all an insult to Zahal (Israeli military).", see also "When we spoke of the war in the General Staff, we talked of the political ramifications if we didn't go to war — what would happen to Israel in the next 25 years. Never of survival today." You cite Peled in your own comments. He was there at the time and was in a position to understand the issues. And it's not just Peled, the US assessment, and the Israeli assessment wider than Peled's also concluded Israel would easily win. Regardless of the NYT's comment, it's plain that the best sources don't support the notion that Israeli leaders would have been under the impression their survival was at stake. Cheers, --Dailycare (talk) 20:10, 4 February 2014 (UTC)
 * The discussion is going backwards. You raised again the question " that Israeli leaders believed in 1967 they were fighting for their survival", which was dealt with at the discussion beginning. Then you repeated with Peled statement and other quote, which were replied previously too. I asked you what kind of suport might convince you, but there was no reply. If you are not ready to accept my points, it is fine, but then it is better to stop this futile discussion. Just to summarize my points: ** Israel did not want the 1967 war **Israel have not looked for more territories on 1967 ** A cautious leader should not thrust generals predictions, as proven by wrong assessments before the 1948, 1973 wars (and more ) ** Although the Egyptian forces were in a defensive posture close to the border, they could switch the forces disposition from defensive to offensive in a matter of hours ** Nasser acts forced Israel to fight. His warmongering decisions during those days (from 14 may 1967), were not related to prior Israel- Syria clashes (and with Jordan too), and contradicted his own prior statements. Nasser critical decisions were: **** the deployment his big army in Sinai, close to the Israeli Border ****to expel the U.N observers ****to shut Tiran straights for Israeli ships. **** Talking openly about Israel annihilation. e.g. "Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel. The Arab people want to fight . . . The mining of Sharm el Sheikh is a confrontation with Israel. Adopting this measure obligates us to be ready to embark on a general war with Israel." – Nasser, May 27, 1967 **** to attack Israel on 27 May (the decision was canceled at the last minute, because of a Soviet warning) Ykantor (talk) 21:08, 5 February 2014 (UTC)
 * I can only re-iterate: the NYT said Israeli leaders thought they were fighting for survival. Israeli leaders themselves say that wasn't the case. Therefore, I don't agree that the NYT's comment is an accurate summary of what the best sources say. Cheers, --Dailycare (talk) 19:52, 6 February 2014 (UTC)
 * It is not the NYT, but Nyt Oren's book review. If you click here, you will find it in Oren's book. yours "Israeli leaders themselves say that wasn't the case" is not true. The generals said so, not the leaders. Ykantor (talk) 21:26, 7 February 2014 (UTC)
 * Oren's book isn't even as reliable as the NYT. Oren isn't an academic historian, he's an Israeli diplomat whose job it is to explain things. I haven't seen evidence the generals would have substantially lied to the Israeli politicians concerning the level of threat, if anything they egged the politicians on to agree to the attack. And as I've repeatedly stated, also the Americans shared their assessment with Israeli diplomats before the war. Let's face it, you're beating a dead horse. Cheers, --Dailycare (talk) 21:49, 7 February 2014 (UTC)
 * Oren is a good historian, but if you prefer to avoid him, there are other historians who agree with him. As discussed, even the anti Israeli Shlaim, does not agree with some of your assertions. yours: "I haven't seen evidence the generals would have substantially lied to the Israeli politicians concerning the level of threat". They said it within their meetings only. The public did not heard it, with an exception of General Barlev known statement. How would you explain this phrase: "but he was recalled on the eve of the Six Day War in 1967 when he was made Deputy Chief of Staff. He brought with him much-needed calm at a time when his fellow generals, including the Chief of Staff, Yitzhak Rabin, were suffering from tension caused by Levy Eshkol's cabinet's hesitation before giving the green light for a pre-emptive strike."? Concerning assessments, as said, with such a poor record of success, who would thrust them? Ykantor (talk) 08:56, 8 February 2014 (UTC)
 * That Eshkol hesitated before signing off on the attack doesn't mean he thought Israel's survival was at stake. Blair hesitated before the 2003 Iraq invasion, too, but he wasn't under the impression Britain's survival was at stake. In fact, his advisers probably advised him Britain's survival wasn't at stake, just like Israeli advisers advised Eshkol that Israel's victory in any war in 1967 was a given. You don't have a source for your claim that Israeli generals wouldn't have shared their assessment with the civilian leadership. And in any case this isn't a forum for general discussion in the matter. Cheers, --Dailycare (talk) 22:30, 8 February 2014 (UTC)


 * You referred to Eshkol hesitation. Would you mind to refer to general Rabin "suffering from tension" (Actually he had a nervous breakdown at the 23.5. 1967) ? The Israeli generals shared their view with the government. Sorry for my previous vague sentence. Ykantor (talk) 06:50, 11 February 2014 (UTC)
 * As we now seem to agree the Israeli generals shared their assessment of easy victory with the politicians, we seem to also be in agreement that the Israeli leadership wasn't under the impression it was fighting for survival. As indeed we have sources that explicitly state the fighthing-for-survival aspect was in a scam invented after the war. In fact, if the article doesn't yet say that, we should add it, in properly attributed form. Cheers, --Dailycare (talk) 20:34, 11 February 2014 (UTC)
 * Not all the Israeli generals were so confident. The chief of staff, general Rabin, had a nervous breakdown at the 23-24.5.1967, just after the admired retired leader, Ben Gurion accused him of his share in the situation where Israel had no allies, in contrast to the 1956 war . **The Israeli generals demanded an attack, but the government, and especially Eshkol, were justifiably cautious. The Egyptian army was much bigger than the Israeli army, and together with the other Arab armies, the size difference was overwhelming. There was a risk that an Israeli aerial surprise attack would fail, or have limited success. In that case the war could have been developed to an long attrition war, for which Israel was not prepared. A war is hardly a piece of cake. ** As discussed, the record of military assessment was rather poor. One more poor assessment, resulted in the Egyptian planned attack of Israel at the 27.5.1967, that was cancelled in the last minute because of Soviet pressure. ** The fighthing-for-survival aspect, was shared by all of the Israelis including the leaders, except of some of the generals. If you look at newspapers archives of the period, you will find plenty of such reports. What are the "sources that explicitly state the fighthing-for-survival aspect was in a scam invented after the war"? Ykantor (talk) 10:33, 12 February 2014 (UTC)

The drift to war
The article does not mention that Israel told u.s that Egypt will attack at 27 may. The American warned the Egyptians, and asked the soviets to warn them too. (oren, p. 111) Ykantor (talk) 21:30, 30 January 2014 (UTC)

General discussion
And there are lot more problems. This is one of the worst article around. Ykantor (talk) 20:07, 11 January 2014 (UTC)


 * It seems nobody agrees with this ? Pluto2012 (talk) 06:01, 14 January 2014 (UTC)
 * Yankor, it is pointless you giving us your opinion on the topic. You need to cite source evidence and take into account the cited acadmemic sources supporting the content you don't like. Dlv999 (talk) 12:39, 14 January 2014 (UTC)
 * Ykantor, before you criticise the article for omitting details you should first read it. If you had done so you would have noticed that the tractors are indeed mentioned. Similarly, the Soviet report is mentioned as well ("Nasser received false reports from the Soviet Union"). The article is not without its flaws and certainly needs improvement, but this criticism is not helpful as it's based on mistaken assumptions. --Frederico1234 (talk) 13:16, 14 January 2014 (UTC)
 * Yes, and the quoted line and half on Israel drawing water from the Jordan is followed by 5 lines on the Headwater Diversion Plan (Jordan River). Ykantor, you appear to be determined to be offended by this article's "bias" ... regardless of what the article actually says. DeCausa (talk) 19:28, 14 January 2014 (UTC)
 * I apologize for reacting before reading every detail in the article. However, the same points are mentioned few times, so it is not a straightforward job to find all of the instances. e.g. : * The Israeli- Syrian border clashes are detailed along the first 30 lines (approximately) of the "Israel and Syria" section. The tractors are mentioned at the end of those lines, so the casual reader would have the impression that Israel is to be blamed, while when Israeli tractors have plowed the DMA, no one has been killed or wounded, but the Syrian reaction (and sometimes they initiated the clashes) to the tractor was shooting and bombardment which killed civilans. * The Soviet false reports are mentioned twice, in the "Summary", and in "Israel sand Syria", but it is not mentioned in the relevant section "Egyptian Troop Build-up in Sinai". Moreover, the Egyptian general Fawzi and his report that the Soviet warnings are incorrect, are not mentioned at all. * Concerning the Jordan water dispute, every word of mine is relevant. e.g. "It  falsely imply that Israel stole Jordanian water " This article is mainly an anti Israeli propaganda. Ykantor (talk) 20:08, 14 January 2014 (UTC)
 * If, after reading that whole paragraph a reader draws from it a main conclusion that it "implies that Israel stole Jordanian water", then I would conclude that reader is determined to see "anti-Israeli propaganda" where there is none. DeCausa (talk) 20:51, 14 January 2014 (UTC)
 * yes, It falsely imply that Israel stole Jordanian water. Moreover, it states that Israel attacked The Syrian diversion works without saying that Israel initiated it by the same tractor tactic, and the Syrian responded by shooting, so the Syrian were the first to shoot. Ykantor (talk) 03:57, 15 January 2014 (UTC)
 * "Who shot first", again ? I suggest we remove the pov-tag that is not justified. Pluto2012 (talk) 06:38, 15 January 2014 (UTC)


 * The article does not mentioned the Arab leaders threats. e.g. We will throw the Israeli men into the sea. Ykantor (talk) 21:36, 15 January 2014 (UTC)

The source of all this evil. Ramadan noted, was Nasser’s inclination to solitary decision making… the revolutionary regime led by the same individual—Nasser— repeated its mistakes when it decided to expel the international peacekeeping force from the Sinai Peninsula and close the Straits of Tiran in 1967. Both decisions led to a state of war with Israel, despite the lack of military preparedness. Ykantor (talk) 13:32, 21 April 2014 (UTC)


 * The article does not mentioned the Soviet threat. When The Soviet ambassador in Israel was told to inspect the Syrian border himself and see that there are no I.D.F forces there, he refused and said that it is not his job to check it. He said that Israel is being punished for the alliance with the imperialism and loose the access to the Red sea. ( Oren, six days of war, p. 59)
 * Well, do you have a specific edit in mind, supported by a WP:RS citation, which is pertinent to an NPOV and balanced telling of the origins of the war. If you do, put it forward for other editors to consider. Frankly, this whining about "Anti-Israel bias" without putting forward specific sourced edit suggestions is unconstructive to the point of being disruptive, as well as being tedious. DeCausa (talk) 22:23, 15 January 2014 (UTC)
 * The article does not mention the: "Israeli leaders, who believed they were fighting for their survival". However, there is a general Peled quote who deny it. But this quote is relevant to the Israeli generals opinions, and not to the Israeli leaders and to the public. Anyway, there are other war, where the generals promised easy victory but eventually they lost the war. Ykantor (talk) 12:46, 16 January 2014 (UTC)
 * The article does not say clearly that "Israeli diplomat went into action. The state department, the British foreign office, p any channel to Nasser, even U Thant- was utilize in assuring Nasser that Israel had no warlike intention…"( Oren, six days of war, p. 62)
 * The article is never going to look like Oren's account, because he is just one academic voice among many. You are perfectly entitled to include Oren's views and findings (properly cited), but Oren himself admits many historians dispute his findings. And you are also going to have to accept the inclusion of the large amounts of well sourced information and scholarly opinion that casts doubts on Oren's narrative of the events. See e.g : "Israeli misconduct during the border conflict with Syria was to a large extent responsible for the process of escalation that evolved into the May-June 1967 crisis. Moreover, the dominant role of the IDF in foreign and security affairs had important implications for the management of the crisis..."(pg82) "The IDF command was not too worried about an Egyptian surprise attack. Rather, the Key question was how to restore the credibility of Israeli deterrence..."(pg 89)
 * I think you need to understand that WP:NPOV means accurately representing views in RS in proportion to to how they appear in RS rather than having an article correspond to your own ideas about the topic. Dlv999 (talk) 17:27, 24 January 2014 (UTC)

to DeCausa : Yours- POV reorganisation
DeCausa said- "POV reorganisation. Creating the "ideology" section sets up "Arab ideology" as the cause of war. Also sections cut without edit summary"

I do not see any POV here. Could you please specify what is wrong? Bear in mind that the text remains the same. No text was added or deleted. Ykantor (talk) 22:59, 25 January 2014 (UTC)
 * You said you adopted the approach of Causes of World War II. That begins with an "Ideology" section that describes the ideologies of the Fascist powers. Those are the ideologies of the "aggressors" and is a key aspect of the origins of WW2 - that's generally an accepted point kf view amongst historians. What you've tried to do is recreate that same backdrop with "Arab ideology" as the ideology of the aggrssors replacing the ideology of the fascist powers. Except, there is not the same scholarly consensus for this war as there is for WW2. DeCausa (talk) 14:03, 26 January 2014 (UTC)
 * The rough idea is to mention the thinking of Nasser, the main Arab leader, and to clarify it. I guess that you agree with the content, since all this text was already in the article. It seems to be an important aspect that should not be buried somewhere. Would you propose another section header? or Another location in the article? Ykantor (talk) 15:16, 26 January 2014 (UTC)
 * Exactly, it's already in the article. You, however, wish to highlight and position it in such a way as to make it the overarching cause of the war. DeCausa (talk) 17:19, 26 January 2014 (UTC)
 * Would you propose another section header? or Another location in the article? Ykantor (talk) 18:05, 26 January 2014 (UTC)
 * No, I would propose leaving it as it is. DeCausa (talk) 18:14, 26 January 2014 (UTC)
 * This Arab opinion, that Israel should not exist, is important and should not be buried somewhere in the text. On the other hand, it is not claimed that this "anti" is the direct case of the war. We may add to this section a sentence e.g. It is not claimed that the ideology was the reason for the war. Would you accept it? Ykantor (talk) 19:12, 26 January 2014 (UTC)
 * Exactly what edit, based on which sources, are you proposing? --Dailycare (talk) 19:57, 27 January 2014 (UTC)

The diff page where DeCausa undid my edit. Note that my edit reorganized the sections but have not modified / deleted / added text. Ykantor (talk) 05:20, 28 January 2014 (UTC)
 * I was referring to the addition you mentioned in your comment timestamped 19:12 immediately above ("It is not claimed ..."), not the re-organization itself. Cheers, --Dailycare (talk) 18:18, 28 January 2014 (UTC)
 * It refers to the "Ideology" section. I proposed an additional sentence e.g. It is not claimed that the ideology was the reason for the war.When and if DeCausa accept it, I will look for a support. Ykantor (talk) 19:27, 28 January 2014 (UTC)

to Dlv999: "Diplomacy and intelligence assessments" split
Dlv999 said :" Introduced glaring grammatical errors and poor English. Perhaps the editor could explain the rational for the edit on talk"


 * Concerning poor English, you could have fixed it rather than undoing it. Besides, no text was added or deleted, so the scope for introducing a poor English was very limited.
 * The split rational: The section mixes the timeline with presenting the opposing sides attitudes. It seems that the reader may benefit from a split of the timeline and the attitudes. Ykantor (talk) 06:56, 26 January 2014 (UTC)

Nasser steps made the war inevitable
Dailycare deleted my edit while saying: " we know that most academics attribute the war to an escalation on both sides, whereas your lead edit lays the blame on Egypt, so clearly POV".

It is not correct that "most academics attribute the war to an escalation on both sides". Will you please support your claim? Ykantor (talk) 07:25, 8 July 2014 (UTC)
 * Hi Ykantor, see the addition I just made to the lead. This kind of source is in fact a favourite of mine, since it's a scholarly source that explicitly describes the overall scholarly view. Cheers, --Dailycare (talk) 18:01, 8 July 2014 (UTC)
 * See Maoz p. 111 : "it is most important to reiterate the conclusion of most scholarly accounts of this crisis: this was a process of unwanted escalation, which everybody wanted to prevent, but all were responsible for making this escalation unavoidable."-See Maoz p. 98 : "The existing literature...most of the blame for the outbreak of the war is placed on Nasser and the Egyptian decision making process. A small share of the blame is put on the Soviet.....Israel is absolved of the blame for its escalation. Israel faced an existential chalenge and handled the crisis well ... We must examine the roots of the Israeli Syrian crisis"- Those 2 conclusions seems contradicting at a first glance. But Maoz might have 2 different questions with their replies:
 * Who carry's the blame for the war itself
 * Who's fault is the deterioration toward the war
 * if so, the p. 98 is the reply for the 1st question, while p. 111 deals with question no. 2. The last sentence of the p. 98 quote, might hint toward this possible explanation. Anyway, it is not clear and it seems that at best Maoz's writing is sloppy.- What is your opinion concerning these contradicting sentences? Ykantor (talk) 20:09, 8 July 2014 (UTC)
 * Hi there, those quotations are in fact not contradictory at all. The "existing literature" also comprises non-scholarly material, which Maoz refers to as "conventional wisdom" on p. 83, and on p. 83 also points out that "Scholarly studies of the causes of the Six-Day War provide a more nuanced picture" than the "conventional wisdom". The p. 98 quote also refers to "Deficiencies in the existing explanations" (p.97). So what Moaz says is that the scholarly view is what we have in the article now, but that there is/was a "conventional wisdom" which blames Egypt, and which characterizes writings of some key Israelis (p. 83). Clearly, what we use on Wikipedia is what the scholars say, not what Israeli politicians say in their memoirs and what non-scholarly books say. Cheers, --Dailycare (talk) 19:06, 9 July 2014 (UTC)
 * Interesting. If that is so, then per WP:NPOV, the article should have some text that effectively says "conventional wisdom" attributes responsibility to Nasser but that the balance of scholarly opinion is that all parties were responsible for the escalation. I'm not sure we're quite there yet. DeCausa (talk) 19:14, 9 July 2014 (UTC)


 * Looking at Maoz's book:


 * It is rather clear that Maoz's text is sloppy. The differences among "who" and among "claims" are rather confusing. One should not use the p.111 version only, while ignoring the other 3 (page,96, 98, 98)


 * (In the end of May 1967, Nasser) "he claimed in a public speech to have been aware of all the implications: "Taking over Sharm El Sheikh meant confrontation with Israel. It also means that we ready to enter a general war with Israel. It was not a separate operation" (Shlaim 2012, p. 63) -"He was subsequently to imply- as during his speech of May 26 to Arab trade union leaders-that the whole sequence of moves, culminating in the closure of the straits, had been planned to trigger war with Israel, with the ultimate aim of “liberating Palestine." (Morris, 2001, p. 308, 306) -Maoz is aware of these shocking sentences (see page 93) but he ignores them in his thesis that Israel is blamed as well for the 1967 war. An historian should not ignore facts which contradict his thesis.


 * According to Wikipedia rules, one should not delete a well supported text, even if it contradict his preferred (and well supported) sentences. Those two different views should co-exist in the articles together. According to wp:due :" Wikipedia aims to present competing views in proportion to their representation in reliable sources on the subject."  Hence you reverted an edit which should be in the article, as it well supported, by a lot of resources. Please undo your revert and re-insert it to the article. Ykantor (talk) 19:28, 11 July 2014 (UTC)
 * Hi there, acting rationally isn't inconsistent with contributing to an unwanted multilateral escalation. Certainly e.g. Nasser acted rationally and didn't want a war, but his actions prompted reactions on the Israeli side that again... you get the point. I don't agree, and there is no policy to support the view that everything written in a book belongs to the lead of this article. The article should reflect the balance of what the best sources say on the subject, and the lead should summarize the contents of the article. My instinct here is that we can work in the body of the article with the "conventional wisdom" Moaz mentions. Cheers, --Dailycare (talk) 21:02, 12 July 2014 (UTC)


 * Yours " acting rationally isn't inconsistent with contributing to an unwanted multilateral escalation". The question is who was responsible to the war. According to Maoz's somehow contradicting sentences (see the above table), Israel did not wanted a war. Hence, a state that does not want a war, and behave rationally, can not be blamed for the war (rather then the escalation, which according to Maoz might be a different issue). - Moreover, Maoz's text around his sentence:"most of the studies suggest that Israeli decision makers behaved quite rationally during much of the crisis", clarify that Israel was not blamed for the war itself.
 * yours: "Nasser acted rationally" . The historians have a hard time trying to find a consistent logic in Nasser decision. Moreover, some are openly blame Nasser for being irrational. e.g. "the prominent historian and commentator Abd al-Azim Ramadan, ... criticized the Nasser cult, …. The events leading up to the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, as other events during Nasser’s rule, Ramadan wrote, showed Nasser to be far from a rational, responsible leader. ...Nasser— repeated its mistakes when it decided to expel the international peacekeeping force from the Sinai Peninsula and close the Straits of Tiran in 1967. Both decisions led to a state of war with Israel" ( Podeh 2004, p. 105-106)
 * Yours "we can work in the body of the article with the "conventional wisdom" Moaz mentions. ". So it is OK to add it to the content? Ykantor (talk) 15:26, 13 July 2014 (UTC)


 * Morris says: "''Israeli intelligence still believed that Nasser would halt at the brink, and on the morning of May 22 thought it “unlikely” that he would announce the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping.’ But around noon the same day, Nasser visited the Bir Gafgafa air base in Sinai and declared that Egypt was about to do just that, re-creating the situation that Israel bad always regarded as a casus belli. ‘Amr instructed his units to bar the Gulf of Eilat, from noon on May 23, to all vessels flying the Israeli flag and to all oil tankers bound for Eilat. That night, just after midnight, the formal announcement was made.In retrospect this can be seen as the decisive act that made war inevitable— though Nasser apparently did not realize it. He was subsequently to imply— as during his speech of May 26 to Arab trade union leaders—that the whole sequence of moves, culminating in the closure of the straits, had been planned to trigger war with Israel, with the ultimate aim of “liberating Palestine.” Not the Straits of Tiran but Israel’s “existence” was the issue, he said on May 29. (Morris, victims, p. 106)
 * Shlaim sentence can be softened by adding a Morris's text. Hence we may write: "Nasser responded by taking three successive steps that made war virtually inevitable: he deployed his troops in Sinai near Israel's border on 14 May; expelled the UNEF from the Gaza Strip and Sinai on 19 May; and closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping on 22 May." ( Shlaim, Avi (2012). The 1967 Arab-Israeli War, p. 106. ) In retrospect this can be seen as the decisive act that made war inevitable— though Nasser apparently did not realize it. He was subsequently to imply— as during his speech of May 26 to Arab trade union leaders—that the whole sequence of moves, culminating in the closure of the straits, had been planned to trigger war with Israel, with the ultimate aim of “liberating Palestine.” (Morris, victims, p. 106)"  Will you accept  it? Ykantor (talk) 10:32, 14 July 2014 (UTC)

My suggestion is the following: 1) leave the lead as-is. 2) insert somewhere in the body the following: "While according to a conventional narrative, reflected in memoirs of key Israelis, Israel's actions leading into the war were prudent and the blame for the war rested on Egypt, scholarly studies paint a more nuanced picture. According to these studies a process of unwanted escalation, which all sides wanted to prevent, but for which all were ultimately responsible, led to the war." This ok? Cheers, --Dailycare (talk) 19:38, 14 July 2014 (UTC)


 * It is rather frustrating, to spend time looking for sources, formatting it here (e.g. the table) while you do not refer to them. Will it be possible for you to elaborate on your usage of one of Maoz's sentences (The table's last one) while avoiding the other somehow contradicting Maoz's  sentences in the table? Could you please refer to Nasser's repeated claims, that he planned and wanted a war ? Ykantor (talk) 21:14, 15 July 2014 (UTC)


 * See Maoz on pages 111 and 83 for the sourcing, and my comments above concerning what you initially believed to be contradictions. The point in using Maoz as a source is that he is reliable for reporting what the balance of reliable sources say, which is far preferable to using individual comments by scholars (or even non-scholars). Especially using individual comments by Nasser should be avoided as they need to be placed in context, and the people who place them in context are scholars. Cheers, --Dailycare (talk) 18:32, 16 July 2014 (UTC)
 * -Maoz statements: I could not find a reply in Maoz Pages 83, 111 . Your previous explanation: "The "existing literature" also comprises non-scholarly material, " is not yet sufficient for the article, since it is a sort of wp:or. Will you please consider the table 1st line (most of the studies suggest) and the 3rd line (most analysts). And again: Will it be possible for you to elaborate on your usage of one of Maoz's sentences (The table's last one) while avoiding the other somehow contradicting Maoz's  sentences in the table? - Maoz own opinion can be quoted here since he is an wp:rs. However, his reviews of other literature is contradicting itself or at least confusing. In my opinion, if one want to quote his literature review, he either has to write all those 4 confusing sentences (see the table) or avoid it at all.
 * Nasser public speeches: yours-"Especially using individual comments by Nasser should be avoided as they need to be placed in context". Is this a new WP policy? if so, the the article contain other quotes like: "Menachem Begin also stated that "The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches did not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him.". So, whoever have inserted them was wrong? should we delete those quotes as well? If you provide a wp:rs who claims that Nasser have not said it, or Nasser did not mean it, then we can discuss whether Nasser quotes should not be included. Otherwise, I suggest to add them to the article, as a relevant, important and well supported text. Ykantor (talk) 21:14, 16 July 2014 (UTC)
 * Hi, please see my earlier comments in this thread. Maoz clearly says that 1) there is a body of work, which is in line with Israeli memoir-writers, that blames Nasser and 2) Maoz explicitly emphasizes ("It is most important to reiterate") that scholars have a different view. This is what the gist of the text needs to say. This is really rather simple. You cannot substitute Maoz' assessment of the overall scholarly and non-scholarly literature with a bunch of Nasser quotes. Concerning the 1st and 3rd lines in the table, I still don't see their relevance to this discussion at all. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Israelis would have decided months beforehand to start the war, they could thereafter have acted rationally and professionally to get the war hatched. What we're discussing is not the rationality of Israeli decision-makers. Cheers, --Dailycare (talk) 20:13, 17 July 2014 (UTC)
 * It is rather frustrating to repeat the same cycle of question marks and replies. I have already replied to all of your last post points, and there is no reason to reply again
 * - Yours "that scholars have a different view" is incorrect. Maoz said "Scholarly studies of the causes of the Six Day War provide a more nuanced picture" (p. 83). The usage of the word "different" is misleading.
 * - Your repeated claim that Maoz differentiate between "scholarly opinion" and "the literature" is debatable. Here Maoz interchangeably uses  both terms: "Scholarly studies of the causes of the Six Day War provide a more nuanced picture. Several alternatives have been suggested. .... Three principal explanations characterize the literature: ...".
 * - It seems that Maoz differentiate between "escalation" and "crisis". "Escalation" is used for the years before the war . e.g. "The inadvertent war explanation attempts to answer two questions. First, why did the process of escalation begin, when it appears that nobody had been interested in escalating?" (p. 88), while "crisis" describes the 4 weeks before the war: ""First, they gloss over the origin of the crisis—namely, the Soviet and Syrian claims of Israeli troop concentrations along the Syrian border." (p. 98). Hence your reason for  deleting the well supported text is not valid, as you refer to the escalation process while you deleted a text which deals with the crisis, which is a different period. Ykantor (talk) 21:59, 1 August 2014 (UTC)
 * Indeed I share your view that we seem to have already covered this. If a source says "Scholarly studies of the causes of the Six Day War provide a more nuanced picture. Several alternatives have been suggested", then are you seriously suggesting that your edit "Nasser took 3 successive steps that made the war virtually ineviteable" is a reasonable reflection of what sources say? Your reading of Maoz seems a bit spurious, to be frank, as Maoz explicitly states that scholars say the escalation was something all parties participated in, and Maoz also explicitly says that this is an important aspect. This is a point I've now repeatedly made. Cheers, --Dailycare (talk) 20:54, 2 August 2014 (UTC)
 * The sentence "Nasser took 3 successive steps that made the war virtually ineviteable" is important and supported and should be in the lead. Maoz's declarations are confusing. e.g. "most scholarly accounts of this crisis  this was a process of unwanted escalation" is contradicting  "Israel's conduct during the process get fairly good marks by most analysts" and "The existing literature  ...most of the blame for the outbreak of the war is placed on Nasser". Tzahy (talk) 09:37, 29 September 2014 (UTC)
 * Wow, you just landed here from Art versus Non art : Art out of Mind ;) nice. Concerning the points you mention, see my comment immediately above, timestamped 20:54, 2 August 2014. Cheers, --Dailycare (talk) 20:14, 29 September 2014 (UTC)
 * This discussion is continued at Dailycare talkpage Ykantor (talk) 16:53, 30 September 2014 (UTC)

Nasser steps made the war inevitable-2
Effort for neutrality to get the flag of dubiousness off this thing already. Have made failed attempts and send thanks to DeCausa and Largo_Plazo, would like change the phrasing to 'most of the blame', rather than simply 'the blame' as is written in the article now. This is both in concurrency with all of the excellent work shown above here, and gets rid of the illusion of speech that allows a reader to potentially interpret Egypt of being the only party at fault, which appears to be the main source of lingering dubiousness. I also believe 'some of the blame' would be appropriate, in fact anything that immediately clarifies that it is not simply ALL the blame but Egypt holds the blame, other parties hold blame too, but Egypt hold most of it. Otherwise I can't imagine why this writing would still be WP:AD flagged for this statement.Nolanpowers (talk) 03:40, 28 May 2015 (UTC)


 * - There is a subtle difference between "made the war inevitable" and between "fault" or "blame". This talkpage title is "Nasser made the war inevitable" since user:dailycare deleted this sentence and added "everyone was in the end responsible for making the escalation unavoidable.", which is clearly contradicting wikipedia policy Fringe theories :"Wikipedia summarizes significant opinions, with representation in proportion to their prominence. ". He deleted the sentence "Nasser made the war inevitable" for which there are plenty of wp:rs while inserting "everyone was in the end responsible for making the escalation unavoidable." which hardly has a support and it is misleading. (since Maoz differentiate between crisis and escalation. see pages 82-83, defending the holy land, Maoz).
 * - It is easy to remove the tag. We just have to follow the rules. that's it. wp:due :" Wikipedia aims to present competing views in proportion to their representation in reliable sources on the subject."   Ykantor (talk) 19:44, 28 May 2015 (UTC)


 * Ykantor, you're returning to your old theme without addressing NolanPowers specific point. Nolanpowers you've misread the sentence you are referring to: "While according to a conventional narrative, reflected in memoirs of key Israelis, Israel's actions leading into the war were prudent and the blame for the war rested on Egypt, scholarly studies paint a more nuanced picture." It's saying that "conventionally"/"the Israeli view" is that Egypt is to blame but that modern scholars say others are to blame too. So what you would turn it into would in effect make it say: "conventionally"/"the Israeli view" is that Egypt is mostly to blame but that modern scholars say others are to blame too. Do you see that your change is unnecessary and doesn't make sense. The point of the sentence is to say that putting all the blame on Egypt is wrong. DeCausa (talk) 20:07, 28 May 2015 (UTC)

Wow! Okay, in light of that, my immediate, knee jerk reaction here is the bare minimum the punctuation must change to clarify that, I propose "While, according to a conventional narrative reflected in memoirs of key Israelis; Israel's actions leading into the war were prudent and the blame for the war rested on Egypt, scholarly studies paint a more nuanced picture".
 * My perspective on this article is from quite a distance, if you'll allow, and I had indeed somewhat misconstrued my observed misconception of the ideas that are expressed, as DeCausa says; I am much less concerned now that I realize the expression I suggested changed was specified as the Israel governments official view, however I still have a remaining doubt that they either would place the entirety of the blame on one party in a way that merits such singularity as is applied here. I would like to reiterate now that my ease of concern would come with re-punctuating the sentence, and that as it stand I want my position clear that the dubious flag should remain. Wonderful thanks to Ykantor for his brilliant summary and citations.
 * In response to Ykantor's point, the Nasser steps admittedly made the war inevitable in some senses, and I agree this seems a potentially significant subject of note. However, this is a lead section, and it seems strange to me to mention the Nassar steps; elaborating: the new phrasing expresses that no one wanted war, yet we know that war happened obviously, so something had to make it inevitable. Further, I believe Ykantor goes to far in conceding 'responsibility' in place of 'blame'; these terms are pointedly different in meaning, and from what I am gathering the Nassar steps actually the blame or widely held fault, in the eyes of western scholarship? Academia is not above bias, and an intelligent reader knows this. Also, Maoz is the only source here, and we can't exactly just take his word for it that 'most of the blame for the outbreak was placed on Nassar', that isn't really the same thing if you say that sentence in a tertiary source it's because you have gathered those opinions yourself. Maybe Maoz makes this easy within his citations, but that doesn't make this article an exception to WP standards.

TL;DR : I don't see why Nassar Steps should be mentioned given they are never mentioned in the article from that point onward; if they are truly significant, which it does not appear to me they are (admittedly this is likely caused by ignorance above all else) why not just mention them in their own section. I see the POV issue with making that sort of statement, however, I don't see why you can't satisfy the same expression through some other information provided about the significance of the Nassar Steps. I imagine there are other options of adding more detail to the article, and a standpoint that the NEEDS to be in the lead section seems a bit hysterical, a lead section is there to summarize, and while this detail may be true in some senses as it was deleted, that doesn't mean you can't get the information across elsewhere, heck I would love to know a little bit about these steps, they aren't even mentioned on the page any more, the lead is for important things that you can go into detail on later and this seems like one of those details that should come later. The dubious flag isn't giving any side of this a better image.Nolanpowers (talk) 17:30, 30 May 2015 (UTC)
 * The Maoz reference is useful since he characterizes what most reliable sources have said on the matter. Our task as editors is to identify the weight of the evidence, and when a reliable source tells us where that weight lies, it makes our task much easier. Concerning the "Nasser made war inevitable" issue, that wording presupposes that Israel would consider the blockade of the straits a cause for initiating hostilities against Egypt. Of course, the blockade only made war inevitable since Israel had already decided to use it as a pretext for initiating the hostilities. It doesn't mean that Nasser was to blame, or at least solely to blame, for the initiation of the hostilities. Cheers, --Dailycare (talk) 19:12, 3 June 2015 (UTC)
 * True things, no argument here. However on the dubiousness of the statement, regarding the flag from WP:dubious


 * specifically, the separation of 'conventional narrative' and 'reflected in the memoirs of key Israeli's' by a comma creates ambiguity in the 'While' that starts the sentence. (While to indicate simultaneous action or while indicating discrepancy or contradiction).


 * Expression in question is 2 sentances; they compare the conventional narrative reflected in evidently multiple Israeli memoirs, and scholarly studies. As the one side's stance is clear the others' remains vague, until the next sentence continues more detailed.


 * there is no issue with WP:NPOV on the statement as it is, however there is still an obvious problem here in reference to WP:dubious as the expression contains information which is ambiguous and open to interpretation, either due to grammar, opinionated wording, so on.. let me be precise: within the expression, and in accord with WP:EP under section 3: Trying to fix problems, we can find some better ways to deal with this than just the two options that have so far been presented. A quick reminder :

Instead of removing content from an article, consider:
 * Rephrasing or copy-editing to improve grammar or more accurately represent the sources
 * Correcting inaccuracies, while keeping the rest of the content intact
 * Moving the content to a more relevant existing article, or splitting the content to an entirely new article
 * Adding other points of views to the existing points of view to make the article more balanced
 * Requesting a citation by adding the citation needed tag, or adding any other Template:Inline tags as appropriate
 * Doing a quick search for sources and adding a citation yourself
 * Adding appropriate cleanup tags to sections you cannot fix yourself
 * Repair a dead link if a new URL for the page or an archive of the old one can be located
 * Merging the entire article into another article with the original article turned into a redirect as described at performing a merge
 * Fixing errors in wikitext code or formatting

Ykantors sentence has reappeared down in the section that speaks on the closing of the straits of Tiran, I hadn't noticed it the first time, as for my interest the only thing I cared about, perhaps conveniently for this dubiousness flag, was where the ignition for physical conflict was, Ykantor citations of Maoz however paint a very clear picture that Maoz also recognizes the general view on Nassar's decision regarding control the waterways, as Ykantor cited


 * most of the studies suggest||that Israeli decision makers behaved quite rationally during much of the crisis.||p. 96


 * The existing literature||...most of the blame for the outbreak of the war is placed on Nasser ||p. 98


 * most analysts ||Israel's conduct during the process get fairly good marks by...||p. 98

This is just Maoz expressing the general view of the existing secondary sources he is building upon, notably that second one does seem important, here's why: it encapsulates the conflicting powers, and tells how the decision makers felt in taking the Nasser steps, and shows a true representation of if blame is placed by this literature, it is placed on Nasser. This last point above all puts Dailycare's actions in a very suspect light at the moment(or would if he wasn't so clearly an open book on the topic, however I would like to get him on board for making what he has explained to me visible in the lead section), as his second sentence paints a picture that academia has, so far, held all parties in more or less equal fault, or regards the belligerents as bearing relatively equal shares of blame. This is in direct contradiction with the observations of Maoz, as we can all see. The two sentences are also easily construed to be more related than they really are; the blame referred to in the first sentence is by no means equivalent to the responsibility held by all parties in the second sentence, yet that is what this new edit leads one to believe.

I suggest : While, according to a conventional narrative reflected in memoirs of key Israelis; Israel's actions leading into the war were prudent and the blame for the war rested on Egypt, scholarly studies paint a more nuanced picture.

Maoz has published summarizing the existing body of scholarly studies which reflects that this was a crisis which all wanted to prevent, but none did. Despite feeling it would trigger war Egyptian leaders blockaded the Straits of Tiran from Israeli vessel passage.


 * This would keep the punctuation changes in the first sentence as I suggested earlier and also changes the second sentence, making it a new topic to clarify the responsibility spoken of from the blame spoken of, and adding to it as I support what I find to be Ykantor's strongest point, which is that this decision, this moment, was the straw that broke the camels back or whatever, sorry for the cliché, anyways it is precipitous of the physical warfare that swept through, and that seems like convenient information to include in the lead section, especially when you are writing about one viewpoint's opinion of blame (Israeli memoirs), you really have no reason to exclude other viewpoints of blame (the existing literature, as Mao refer's to it; today's existing scholarship works). The sentences should certainly not remain as they are currently.Nolanpowers (talk) 21:20, 4 June 2015 (UTC)
 * Some notes referring to your proposal:
 * - "according to a conventional narrative reflected in memoirs of key Israelis". This text is misleading since I added plenty of wp:rs quotes who base this "conventional" view on
 * -Israeli, U.s.a, ex-secret documents.
 * -Soviet views and even some documents
 * -Egyptian high level officials as quoted by wp:rs and Egyptian wp:rs
 * - Hence, "reflected in memoirs of key Israelis" is misleading.


 * -"a crisis which all wanted to prevent, but none did.". This is not correct. Most historians (including Maoz) refer to the last 3 weeks before the war as the crisis, while the years before the war are the period of the escalation toward the war. It is correct that all sides share responsibility for the escalation process. Hoever,  the crisis period started at 13 June 1967, as Nasser massed his army close in the Israeli border to Israel, although forbidden by the international agreements of 1956, and although he knew that the supposed reason (Israeli forces allegedly positioned near Syria) is not correct.  Initially, Nasser did not want a war. However, later Egypt ordered the U.N forces removal from the Israeli border, blocked the Straits for Israeli passage, and  planned a surprise attack against Israel due to at 27 May 1967. Nasser himself said that when he ordered to block the straits,  he knew that a war is unavoidable.  No wonder that all(?) the historians says that those acts made the war inevitable. The war indeed broke at 6 June 1967 as Israel attacked Egypt.
 * - Maoz writing is sloppy at best and misleading at worst. According to Wiki-rules the wp:rs should be stated relatively to their significance. As the "conventional" view is based upon overwhelming amount of wp:rs while Maoz's view is not shared by anyone else, the article should reflect the relative significance, e.g. "Historians says that Nasser acts made the war inevitable, excluding Maoz who says..."'' Ykantor (talk) 13:34, 5 June 2015 (UTC)
 * I'm OK with Nolanpowers' suggestion, with the exception that I don't think it's necessary to name Maoz separately in the lead, since he's a historian and reliable to provide that assessment. I also don't see the need to mention the blockade in this context in the lead. I don't see a huge difference between the proposal (as amended as I suggest) and the current text, but I don't oppose the change either. IMO the "while" clearly indicates discrepancy, but I'm open to removing it along the lines you suggest. "Existing literature" and "analysts" are comprised in the "conventional narrative", as opposed to scholars. Concerning YKantor's theory of "crisis" vs. "escalation" in Maoz, I just don't see that. Maoz writes: "It is most important to reiterate the conclusion of most scholarly accounts of the crisis: this was a process of unwanted escalation, which everybody wanted to prevent, but all were responsible for making this escalation unavoidable" (p. 111). If one is on a long-standing mission to blame Nasser for the war, then Maoz' assessment of the balance of scholarly opinion must seem problematic and one might call him sloppy and confused. Further, this discussion is a bit academic. Senior Israelis are on the record saying that if Egypt hadn't blockaded the straits, they'd have used another excuse to launch the attack anyway. --Dailycare (talk) 20:47, 8 June 2015 (UTC)

Going to revise my suggestion, recapping first everyone seems fine with the identified WP:dubious as the expression contains information which is ambiguous and open to interpretation, either due to grammar, opinionated wording, so on..

Revised suggestion : While, according to a conventional view and memoirs of key Israelis; Israel's actions leading into the war were prudent and the blame for the war rested on Egypt, scholarly studies paint a more nuanced picture. According to these studies a process of unwanted escalation, which all sides wanted to prevent, but for which all were ultimately responsible, led up to the crisis. Despite feeling it would trigger war Egyptian leaders blockaded the Straits of Tiran from Israeli vessel passage.


 * Ykantor may notice this doesn't match is incomplete suggestion, as I have said before this is not my area of expertise so unless you come with sources, I certainly am not prepared to cite who you would when you suggest : Historians says that Nasser acts made the war inevitable, excluding  Maoz who says... if there are citations you can bring, then ok, however I would caution as I don't think your opinion actually is against Maoz': the idea that the Nasser steps made the war inevitable is not mutually exclusive in it's veritability from the Maoz quotes, that's to say just because the Nasser steps made the war inevitable doesn't mean Maoz statement that all were responsible for making the escalation before crisis has to be false, they can both be true. I did rephrase the first sentence as the use of 'reflected' was misleading, rather it seems like the idea is that these two parties more or less corroborate , or match up with each other, they are similar.

Honestly the most mind blowing thing for me at this point, although not surprised as just jaw-dropping, is Dailycare mentioning the high ranking Israeli leaders who have supposedly said these things... would make this seem like a silly way to sum things up; it's never simple summing up a war but this is a lead section so, on that note, if my revised suggestion still shows lingering misunderstandings please do say, again the dubious flag isn't helping anyone. Nolanpowers (talk) 18:29, 9 June 2015 (UTC)
 * - "ranking Israeli leaders who have supposedly said these things". user:Dailycare is repeatedly reshuffling the same claims, although proven wrong or misleading, and ignoring Wikipedia rules. So an Israeli General said so. A big deal! Israel is a democracy, and in democracy the government decides and not the generals. It is well known that at the later half of the 3 weeks crisis periods, the Israeli Generals pushed for a war while the cautions prime minister hold them back. During those weeks, the government voted few times whether to start a war and the decision was negative. Only at the last day of the crisis all the ministers without exception voted for a war.
 * -According to some historians, the Israeli government was driven mainly by the blockade, while the Israeli generals were motivated by the illegal concentration of the Egyptian army near the Israeli borders. Wikipedia is based on wp:rs and not necessarily on leaders declarations. e.g. Nasser said during those 3 weeks of the crisis, that when he decided to block the straits he knew that the meaning is a war. He said also that his purpose was destroying Israel. It does not matter for Dailycare. Rightly so?
 * - Do we have to base the article on one Historian - Maoz??? or should it be better to use plenty of wp:rs who claims otherwise? e.g. "according to memoirs of key Israelis" . This is simply wrong. Why should those wp:rs limit their sources to memoirs of key Israelis when there are plenty of ex-secret documents and evidence from archives of the powers, the UN, and Israel? What about evidence from Arab sources? to be continued. Ykantor (talk) 20:25, 9 June 2015 (UTC)
 * interesting observations and stuff. This is what the talk page is for, so Dailycare definitely isn't ignoring any rules... talk pages are to make mistakes so the article is not suffering in the way you complain this talk page is.
 * I have made a proposal for how to eliminate the dubiousness, and Dailycare has given it a thumbs up, and Ykantor as you are the only other actively present it would be nice if you could weigh in as well; so far your efforts seem focused on pointing out how much of a mess it currently is and that is not useful, do you think you could provide something to contribute? This is especially important when you claim something to be false, please provide sources, even on the talk page it is an essential part of an encyclopedic approach, as I have already said I am not well versed in the literature that exists and in any case the idea of being on the same page when you infer sources seems absurd, please just provide the sources that you are aware of, even informally, is better than nothing. Outside of sourcing, contributions would be appreciated: the goal here is to get consensus, and as we all know WP:dubious flags are a temporary measure, and we should all be working to eliminate them.

So far you have made one suggestion on how this expression that you have flagged as dubious because someone changed your expression, Ykantor, and it is an incomplete sentence that you end with an ellipses. You are the only person at this point who is here and not on board with my suggestion, and you are not specifying why(with sources), or providing any alternatives(how can we express better?), and I feel very frustrated by this.

For the umpteenth time I'm going to put this here WP:dubious as the expression contains information which is ambiguous and open to interpretation, either due to grammar, opinionated wording, so on.., mostly for Ykantor, who seems not to realize, I am not going to spend my time doing what he wants! I am only here to see this dubious flag gone, as I agree, the expression is a mess, but this bullet point that I've quoted here is the ONLY one that fits for this expression. I remind all that WP is a voluntary site maintained by a community that does this in it's free time, so if you want to make sure a specific piece of information is made available, really the only way is to do it yourself. With this in mind I'm going to go ahead and make the edit, and Ykantor you especially I encourage to reread WP: BOLD Nolanpowers (talk) 07:13, 11 June 2015 (UTC)

One more quick word to Ykantor : please don't forget this specific talk section is linked to the dubious phrase it is cited next to and only that one at present. you seem to be bringing some points up that belong in the section you created with a title that asserts the entire article has a POV problem. Wikipedia is a community, not an authority, this means that complaints are rather worthless without a follow-up idea that is a contribution towards replacing or fixing or adding, as you are expected to take care of your own things: there is no one responsible for this but us. That said, complaints about the entire article being a POV issue is very useless, you have to be specific when you say something is inaccurate, and if you want change to occur on the WP page you have to cite a source. Nolanpowers (talk) 07:20, 11 June 2015 (UTC)
 * - What do you mean by writing that dailycare is not ignoring rules? . The rule is clear- the views should be presented according to the relative weight of each view. There are plenty of [wp:rs] that claims that Nasser steps made the war inevitable, while dailycare quotes Maoz only, and deletes the very well supported other view. How come?
 * - What do you mean by "if you want change to occur on the WP page you have to cite a source. " ? . looking at this page, you find that I have cited a lot of sources, here and in the "Six days war" page. For instance. in this page: ( Podeh 2004, p. 105-106) ; (Morris, victims, p. 106); ( Shlaim, 2012, p. 106. )  ,(kandil 2012, p. 77 ), (Fahmy, 2013, p. 19) , (mutawi 2002 p. 95) etc. Please note that:
 * -- Podeh, Kandil, Fahmy, Mutawi are Arab or quote an Arab sources, who are not "suspected" of being pro Israel (an understatement),
 * -- Shlaim is ex-Israeli who is being considered by a lot of Israelis as anti Israel Historian.
 * -- Morris is one of the Israeli "New Historians", who criticize Israel a lot. Ykantor (talk) 23:41, 11 June 2015 (UTC)
 * - reading again my text, I apologize for the aggressive tone.
 * ---I feel like Wiki rules are being ignored. An overwhelming number of wp:rs are hardly mentioned, while 1 author's view (Maoz ), ruling the text.
 * --- It is frustrating to discover that my past claims and quotes, which I have already wrote few times, are not accounted for, so I have to rewrite it again.
 * - Anyway, I am prepared to write it allover again . Will it be helpful if I write about:
 * Inevitability Vs. blame?
 * Why the "Inevitability" issue should be mentioned in the lead?
 * Cite all the sources that support the "Inevitability" issue? (and there are more probably).
 * Show supports for the different time periods named as "escalation" or "crisis" ? (according to Maoz too)


 * - Here is a factual description of the periods leading to the war, with no interpretations or views mentioned:
 * --- Israel- Syria- an escalation of shooting events between both sides, where a lot of them were initiated by Israel, by sending a tractor to plow in the DMZ (De-militarized Zones). Syrian soldiers responded by shooting the tractor and bombarding Israeli civilian settlements nearby. The IDF (Israel defense force) reacted with bombardments, sometimes using the air force.
 * --- Syria openly declared that it supported and sponsored Palestinians armed infiltrations inside Israel, in order to promote a process of eventually destroying Israel. A lot of those infiltrations made deliberately from other Arab states (e.g Jordan)
 * Israel- Jordan: In response to those killing and sabotaging infiltrators raids originating from Jordan, Israel attacked selected Jordanian targets.
 * Israel- Epypt : The border was always quiet. Nasser declared that whoever who tried to advance a war against Israel was a traitor since the Arabs' armies were not ready. The timing of Israel's elimination should be set by the Arabs, when they would be ready.
 * The crisis period started on 13 May 1967, about 3 weeks before the war. Nasser was warned by the soviets and the by Syrians that big Israeli forces were supposedly concentrating near the Syrian border in order to attack Syria. Nasser responded by massing the Egyptian army in Sinai, near the Israeli borders, while violating the U.N sponsored agreement.
 * Within 24 hours Nasser verified that the alarm was false and even the Syrian army was not in a state of alert. Nevertheless, he continued to mass it's army in Sinai.
 * Few days later, on 16 May up to 18 May Egypt asked the U.N inspectors, to vacate their positions as a buffer zone in the border between in Sinai between Egypt and Israel. Within a couple of days the U.N stuff evacuated those positions.
 * On 23 May Nasser blocked the Straits of Tiran for Israeli shipping, while he was aware that the blockade was a Casus Beli for Israel.
 * Israel reacted mildly, sent secret messages to Nasser to ensure him that Israel wanted to avoid a war and asking the western powers to fulfill their 1957 promises to ensure free Israeli shipping through the straits. Some historians claim that Israel reaction were too mild and actually prompted Nasser to escalate it further.
 * On 27 May Egypt planned a surprise attack on Israel. The Attack was canceled in the last minute because of U.S and Soviet pressure.
 * Nasser and other Egyptian rhetoric became more militant e.g our aim is to destroy Israel.
 * On 30 May Jordan joined Egypt and appointed an Egyptian general as the commander of its army. At the first time since 1948 war it deployed its army in the west bank and threatened the "exposed soft belly" of Israel. The Egyptian army was already much bigger than the Israeli army, even before the joining of the Jordanian army to the alliance.
 * Iraq sent sizable portion of its army to Jordan in order to advance to the Israeli border. A lot of other Arab armies declared and sent expeditionary force to join the Anti Israel Alliance.
 * - On 5 June 1967 Israel attacked Egypt. In response, Syria and Jordan attacked Israel. Israel repeatedly asked the supposedly mild Jordanian king to avoid war, even after he started his attack against Israel, but to no avail. Ykantor (talk) 09:35, 12 June 2015 (UTC)
 * Indeed, he (Chaim Herzog) said Israel would have come up with another excuse to invade had Egypt not blockaded the straits. (J. Quigley, "The Six-Day War and Israeli Self-Defense", p. 83) In fact, they were already planning a provocation in the form of the ship "Dolphin", which was to sail through the straits in the hopes that Egypt would fire on it, initiating hostilities and giving Israel a pretext to invade. Israel's cabinet debated extensively on a need to come up with an "alibi" (a word used by them) to justify invading Egypt. Cheers, --Dailycare (talk) 20:42, 16 June 2015 (UTC)
 * - :- I'll appreciate it if you refer to my post of the 12 June. Thanks Ykantor (talk) 19:43, 18 June 2015 (UTC)

I'm going to reread this section a few times, think, and spend some time reading about sociology. I will be back soon.Thank, so far all. Nolanpowers (talk) 05:52, 23 June 2015 (UTC)
 * More specifically I may spend a great deal of time proceeding in the areas of social sciences such as social anthropology, political science, social policy, criminology and psychology; I believe you will both be happy in time. Cheers, chaps, stay well. ttys. Kind thoughts, and your favorite blessings, 'til we meet again soon. Nolanpowers (talk) 05:52, 23 June 2015 (UTC)
 * With any luck another sentient soul will join us.Nolanpowers (talk) 05:52, 23 June 2015 (UTC)

Stuff from Avi Shlaim
I have good faith reverted the edits. Please keep in mind that this is a topic on which many books have been written. It is not legitimate to assert in the lead that Egypt took steps which "inevitably" led to war, just because that is one scholar's interpretation. For instance, Zeev Maoz, in Defending the Holy Land, explicitly calls the war a "war of choice". Kingsindian &#9821;&#9818; 14:42, 3 October 2014 (UTC)


 * - If you do not agree to one sentence, why the rest of the supported text is deleted?
 * - According to Wikipedia rules, if there are different but supported vies, both of them should be mentioned. e.g. Shlaim and Maoz
 * - There are plenty of support for the "Egypt took steps which "inevitably" led to war", and it is not based on one scholar. Since there are claims that some Israeli researchers are biased, I have looked for Sources who can't be suspected as pro Israeli. e.g. Shlaim, Mutawi, Ramadan, and so on. to be continued Ykantor (talk) 18:17, 4 October 2014 (UTC)
 * -- When Egypt closed the straits, Nasser knew the it is a "Casus Belly". (Kandil)
 * --"the prominent historian and commentator Abd al-Azim Ramadan, In a series of articles published in AlWafd, subsequently compiled in a book published in 2000, Ramadan criticized the Nasser cult, …. The events leading up to the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, as other events during Nasser’s rule, Ramadan wrote, showed Nasser to be far from a rational, responsible leader. … His decision to nationalize the Suez Canal was his alone, made without political or military consultation. … The source of all this evil. Ramadan noted, was Nasser’s inclination to solitary decision making… the revolutionary regime led by the same individual—Nasser— repeated its mistakes when it decided to expel the international peacekeeping force from the Sinai Peninsula and close the Straits of Tiran in 1967. Both decisions led to a state of war with Israel, despite the lack of military preparedness"
 * --"Nasser single-handedly dismissed all rational analysis of the situation and took a series of irrational decisions. The compounded effect of these decisions was that events acquired a momentum of their own, and it became impossible for Nasser to slow down or back out. The result was that war broke out with the Israeli preemptive strike on 5 June, leading to a quick Egyptian debacle" (Fahmy)
 * -- ="On 26 May he declared, ‘The battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel’.” The same day Hasanayn Heyical, a close associate of Nasser, wrote an article in Al-A ahram explaining why war with Israel was inevitable: ‘The closure of the Gulf of Aqaba... means first and last that the Arab nation represented by the UAR has succeeded for the first time, vis-a-vis Israel, in changing by force a fait accompli imposed on it by force To Israel this is the most dangerous aspect of the current situation — who can impose the accomplished fact and who possesses the power to safeguard it. Therefore it is not a matter of the Gulf of Aqaba but of something bigger. It is the whole philosophy of Israeli security. Hence I say that Israel must attack.”7 He went on to say that the international situation was such that Egypt would have to allow Israel to strike the first blow and concluded, ‘Let Israel begin. Let our second blow then be ready. Let it be a knockout". (Mutawi)
 * -- General Aboul-Aez as Egyptian Air Force Chief: "Eleven days before the 1967 Six-Day War, Nasser asked Aboul-Aez, then governor of Aswan Province, for his opinion of the Egyptian Air Force. The general candidly warned Nasser on several tactical issues why Egypt could not wait for an Israeli first strike, and that Nasser’s saber rattling would lead to an Israeli response"(Jawadi)
 * -- General Mohammed Sadek—Director of Military Intelligence : "Amer and Nasser both felt that by sending a massive amount of forces ((into Sinai))would scare the Israelis and create a massive feint that would drive Tel-Aviv towards a course of action." (Jawadi) Ykantor (talk) 18:51, 4 October 2014 (UTC)
 * You made a bold edit, and I reverted it. This is how WP:BRD works. Some part of the edit may or may not be appropriate for the lead, that can be discussed. The issue is not that "two people disagree let's mention both of them". Note that the lead does not say that Israel entered into a "war of choice" either. The background of the war was of course much more complex and is discussed in the article.
 * The mention of the Operation Dawn in the lead and the Egyptian cancellation of it. That is a very marginal issue. There are some people who give it some weight, like Michael Oren. According to Tom Segev, even if Egypt did authorize an attack on May 27, it was very questionable that Israel was aware of these plans. Oren himself says that it is doubtful that Nasser even knew of such a plan. Let's assume the plan did exist. How can a plan which was canceled in May lead to a war in the beginning of June? This point has already been made by on this talk page. (I am not sure why this was not discussed on the article talk page, but on user talk page. And now we are repeating this discussion).
 * According to Benny Morris: the 1967 war was "in large part a product of error and mutual miscalculation." Shlaim's overall view is that 1967 "was the only one that neither side wanted". Avraham Sela attaches more responsibility to Nasser, but again stresses this point. See this.
 * As made clear in the article, the American intelligence was that Nasser was not going to attack, that if it did, Israel would "whip the hell out of them". This was accurate, and Israel agreed with this assessment.
 * Israel did regard the closing of the Straits of Tiran as a casus belli, no question about it. But as I said, there are tons of books written on the topic, and one cannot pick and choose what one likes. There are many interpretations of this. See the section "Israel: was the war imminent"? I can add that Nasser had already agreed to ships passing through the strait, provided they were with American escort. Very little of Israeli trade went through the straits (about 5%). Privately Israeli officials stated that the blockade was not important and was a political symbol or a means to justify an attack. See Gluska The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War page 186 and Tom Segev. Kingsindian &#9821;&#9818; 01:04, 5 October 2014 (UTC)
 * I will appreciate it if you reply to my view, as I answered your initial objection. I have had a bad experience with a user that avoided a true discussion (e.g. not referring to my arguments, coming back to issue that were already dealt with etc.) which left me frustrated. I prefer to avoid repeating it. Once we hopefully solve the differences, we will move to your other issues, which I mostly do not agree with. Ykantor (talk) 17:21, 5 October 2014 (UTC)
 * I was under the impression that I was replying to your arguments. If there are many scholarly opinions about the origins of the war, and you added one particular interpretation stating that Nasser's actions led inevitably to war, that is of course not correct. Kingsindian &#9821;&#9818; 11:48, 6 October 2014 (UTC)
 * -1. You opened this section with the issue of "Egypt took steps which "inevitably" led to war, just because that is one scholar's interpretation". I cited few sources and not only one as you stated. Moreover, all those sources are far from being suspected as pro Israeli, to say in understatement. If needed, I will add more sources. You know the rule which say that if a view is supported by a significant number of sources, it should be included in the article. So?
 * -2 There is a difference between those 2 question marks:
 * --a)Did Egypt took steps which "inevitably" led to a war?
 * --b)What are the origins of the war?
 * e.g. During the 1st week of the crisis period (from 14. May to 5 June), most commentators, including the Israeli intelligence, still realized that Nasser does not want a war. But in the 2nd week Egypt planned to attack Israel in 27 May. It was canceled in the last minute because of soviet pressure (The soviet ambassador waked up Nasser in 3 a.m. ! ). Hence it is a matter of fact that Nasser wanted a war at least during the days before the 27 May. (Note that some sources say that Nasser canceled it in 25 May. But if so, why he was hauled from his bed in such an urgent matter on 27 May?) Ykantor (talk) 18:36, 6 October 2014 (UTC)
 * Yours: " Oren himself says that it is doubtful that Nasser even knew of such a plan". This is incorrect. Oren claim the opposite view. (oren, 2002, Six Days of War, p. 119,120). Please check your other sources and verify . Ykantor (talk) 22:41, 6 October 2014 (UTC)
 * It was a parenthetical comment, but I was referring to this https://books.google.com/books?id=TcD1bCMAP6AC&q="nasser+even+knew+about+the+plan"#v=snippet&q="nasser even knew about the plan"&f=false on page 92. Oren puts more emphasis on Operation Dawn, many others consign it to a footnote. Again, I emphasize: a plan which was canceled in May, which it is very doubtful that Israel even knew about, can be only of marginal importance to a pre-emptive strike carried out in June. Kingsindian &#9821;&#9818; 14:17, 7 October 2014 (UTC)
 * Ykantor, Oren says "Egyptian sources are divided over (...) the degree to which Nasser even knew about the plan" (loc 2328). Oren himself makes the "plan" into a larger than life issue, but the bleedingly obvious point is that Egypt didn't attack Israel. Israel attacked Egypt. The decision that made the war inevitable was the Israeli decision to attack. In case you, for some reason, consider planning to attack, but then cancelling the attack, a more serious crime than actually attacking, then keep in mind that Israel cancelled a plan to attack Egypt a few days before the war. Concerning the telegrams sent to Eban in Washington, these according to Segev have nothing to do with "operation dawn", but with Israeli shenanigans to get a US OK for their plans to attack Egypt. Segev writes that the Israelis were first planning to simply inform the US that Israel was about to initiate an all-out assault, but Eshkol said that "Better say there is danger of an attack on Israel" (loc 4958). The telegrams were disbelieved in the US. --Dailycare (talk) 16:20, 7 October 2014 (UTC)

Sharm el Sheikh withdrawl
I inserted a "disputed" tag to the section, since this statement: "Initially, Nasser had not demanded a full withdrawal of UNEF but that they vacate the Sinai and concentrate in Gaza" is not correct. As I inserted the correct statement at the section beginning, "General Indar Jit Rikhye was told at the time that he must order the immediate withdrawal of United Nations troops from Sharm el Sheikh too". the source. Ykantor (talk) 12:23, 16 January 2015 (UTC)
 * Hi there. What is disputed here? Nasser's letter didn't mention sharm-el-sheikh so clarification was requested, and received. The emissaries requestes s-e-s withdrawal orally, which is recounted in the article as well. Cheers, --Dailycare (talk) 21:02, 18 January 2015 (UTC)

March 2014 reorganisation by Ykantor
In March 2014 Ykantor brought great value to the article by creating the "Retrospection" section and by incorporating poorly organized text into it in a logical format via a series of edits. The start edit had the following explanation; "cut sentences, to be positioned in the right section" [Revision as of 20:02, 3 March 2014]. Unfortunately you missed various prior pieces of text, which amounted to inadvertent deletions. I will be replacing those missed pieces of text over the next few days. Nonetheless, I understand that this might give rise to dissatisfaction given your discussions with other editors [ ]. One source of potential dispute might be that Ykantor favors Michael Oren's narrative while being dismissive of Avi Shlaims writings because the latter is, in Ykantor's POV, "an anti Israel propagandist". In my view this leads to a non-NPOV editing. Shlaim's 2014 edition of "Iron Wall" contains many new sources. Tom Segev's 2007 work contains data from archives not available to Oren in 2002. Quigley, Gluska, Maoz, Ben-Ami, Bar-On all provide valuable syntheses, some very recent, but I don't see this positively reflected in the Talk discussions; it is the earliest work - by Oren - that receives prime weighting. I suggest that this needs attention to achieve balance, and hence my adding back inadvertently deleted text in the knowledge that this might not be welcome. Erictheenquirer (talk) 16:24, 1 March 2015 (UTC)
 * Hi, I agree that the article shouldn't be based on only, primarily or even largely on Oren's account as he is only one source, and one source whose neutrality has been ridiculed by other writers. But what kind of edits, in detail, do you have in mind? --Dailycare (talk) 19:01, 1 March 2015 (UTC)


 * I am slowly gaining more experience as a Wiki editor and also increasing respect for the "Wiki process". As a result, I do not proposed to leap in and attempt to provide counterbalance in a rush. If you will bear with me I will do it piecemeal since, having to synthesize conclusions from all of the quoted top-line works is no trivial task.


 * - Yours: "[Revision as of 20:02, 3 March 2014]". Please read again my explanation: "cut sentences, to be positioned in the right section". That means, that this deleted text was later re-inserted, and it is probably still in the article.
 * -Yours: "it is the earliest work - by Oren - that receives prime weighting". It might be surprising, but Oren published this book in 2010 too. Moreover, your statements position Oren as having a POV which is different from the other sources like: Shlaim, Tom Segev's , Quigley, Gluska, Maoz, Ben-Ami, Bar-On. This is a bit strange, because Oren is within the consensus. What are the points in which he is contradicted by those other sources?
 * - Yours: " Ykantor favors Michael Oren's narrative". That is not true either. Whatever is my opinion, We accept wp:rs without a prejudice. Will you please show an example in which I supported Oren against most of those sources you mentioned?
 * - The problem is that some editors put to shame Wikipedia policy by ignoring the wp:balance and deleting views of a lot of respected wp:rs, and by adding a blatantly misleading text like the end of the lede: "While according to a conventional narrative, reflected in memoirs of key Israelis, Israel's actions leading into the war were prudent and the blame for the war rested on Egypt, scholarly studies paint a more nuanced picture. According to these studies a process of unwanted escalation, which all sides wanted to prevent, but for which all were ultimately responsible, led to the war". This text is based on Maoz only, while I brought plenty of respectable wp:rs who said that :"Nasser responded by taking three successive steps which made war virtually inevitable: he deployed his troops in Sinai near Israel's border, he expelled the United Nations Emergency Force from Sinai, and, on 22 May, he closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping" (Shlaim, 2012, p. 54). It is misleading to include Maoz's view, while ignoring a long list of opposite views, of a lot of wp:rs, including Arab sources, among them Nasser himself. Is it justified that editors ignores wp:balance? Ykantor (talk) 19:49, 1 March 2015 (UTC)


 * I will check again, but my comparisons currently reveal ommissions. Obviously I do not intend to insert duplicates.


 * The latter is a very pertinent question and is the crux of my intended review, which will be additional to the reinsertion of text.


 * Absolutely fair question. I don't want to pre-empt my detailed review, but even now I am concerned by your rejection of Shlaim's syntheses based on your view that he is "an anti Israel propagandist". If Oren stands alone on points against various eminent historians, international lawyers and analysts, then this is going to have to be considered - so I agree with you. As purely preliminary examples, I will be looking to see if Oren has fairly reflected the conclusions of UN observers on the Syrian and Jordanian borders; whether he gives the Syrian DMZ provocations due historical context; whether he addresses the breadth of the 'Syrian Syndrome' (e.g. Dayan's outrage at Rabins action); whether he provides a balanced synthesis of the impact of December 1966 and April 1967; and many more. If not .....


 * I fully agree regarding the Wiki process, but will note that it is not a one-way street. I also firmly disagree with you that the lede text that you cite is based on Maoz only. But let me not run ahead of the process; the time will come to quote Gluska, Segev, Ben-Ami, Quigley, etc. in addition to Maoz and Shlaim, on this topic. If Maoz's or Shlaim's views (or any other historian, including Pappé) are not going to be permitted, then neither that of Oren, clearly a ridiculous situation. I will also be particularly watchful that claimed Israeli opinion not be construed as being international law or conflict protocol that is binding on all parties.


 * Ykantor, I believe I've pointed out to you already in the past that the text in the lead explicitly mentions the views that the war was Egypt's fault. The text also puts those views into perspective, which is what we're here to do. Cheers, --Dailycare (talk) 19:23, 2 March 2015 (UTC)


 * - Is that fair to accuse other editor in general terms, without letting him know what is the problem? Moreover, once you have been asked for the details, you still keep it  for yourself: "I don't want to pre-empt my detailed review". I suggest you either clearly say what is the problem, or apologize and erase those blames.
 * - One accusation of yours which is is sufficiently clear is "your rejection of Shlaim's syntheses based on your view that he is "an anti Israel propagandist"". I have looked in this talkpage and could not find it. Moreover, I use Shlaim himself as a source in this talkpage. How come?
 * - Yours "I also firmly disagree with you that the lede text that you cite is based on Maoz only". Your beliefs are not relevant in Wikipedia, as well as mine. The relevant supports are those who are quoted here, which in this case is Maoz only. You say that it is supported on other sources as well, so it is suggested that you stand beyond your word and add those sources to the article.
 * - Yours: "I suggest that this needs attention to achieve balance". There are ample oportunities here for an editor who wants to balance the article, since the article is full of anti Israeli text. e.g
 * "Tension escalated, with both sides' armies' mobilising" (in the Lede). This is a clear misleading text since Egypt massed the Army in Sinai, starting at the 14 May 1967, formally demilitarized since the 1956 Suez war. Initially, Israel did not responded with mobilizing its army, and tried to play down the tension. After few days, at the 18 May (?) Israel mobilized a limited amount of reserve units, still trying to avoid over responding.  The correct sentence shouls state that Egypt massed it army in Sinai, and Israel cautiously responded later , at first with a limited mobilization and later a full mobilization.
 * "scholarly studies paint a more nuanced picture. According to these studies a process of unwanted escalation, which all sides wanted to prevent, but for which all were ultimately responsible, led to the war" . This is Maoz view, but as said, there are a lot of sources who says that although at the beginning of the 3 weeks crisis Nasser did not want war, later he closed the straits although he himself said that it will lead for a war,  and although he himself prompted Israel to start the war, and although an Egyptian attack at 27 May 1967 was canceled at the last minute because of U.S and Soviet warnings. According to wp:balance both views should be presented in proportion to their support. But the more supported view was repeatedly deleted here.
 * Will you please avoid splitting my writing. Ykantor (talk) 21:41, 2 March 2015 (UTC)
 * Ykantor, re Shlaim, see your timestamp "19:23, 2 March 2015". Maoz says that some sources lay the blame on Nasser's shoulders. He also says that most scholarly views are more nuanced. You're proposing, if I gather correctly, to edit the article predominantly based on the first sources so as to conceal the overall view from readers. Clearly, that won't fly. --Dailycare (talk) 20:58, 3 March 2015 (UTC)


 * Ykantor, re your objection regarding Shlaim, in [Timestamp 19:14, 2 february 2014] in Talk: [Egyptian Troop Build-up in Sinai] on one occasion your wrote “Since Shlaim is anti Israel propagandist, I usually avoid his interpretation” and later again “the anti Israel Shlaim”. I will be checking that no POV by anyone of Shlaim being anti-Israel has introduced any bias into the introduction into Wiki text of any of his analyses as a foremost (Israeli) research historian, especially where these might differ from Oren on the Origins of the War. These sources go well beyond just Moaz, and if valid, the lede should represent a balanced view. When Nasser "said" that he recognized that closing the Straits would galvanize Israel to attack, it did not signify valid justification for Israel to take those actions. There are expert legal views to fully support this position. "Views" do not convey rights (since well before WW1) as Austria found that out in 1914.


 * Another issue that has gained my attention is that Israeli ‘beliefs’, ‘claims’, ‘views’ are phrased in such a way as to portray them to have been a justification for Israeli aggression, and that Arab countries were bound to respect them. You are quite clear in your POV that it was Nasser’s acts that forced Israel to fight. That concurs with Oren’s presentation. However numerous Israeli and other researchers, historiographers, analysts, archival researchers and experts on international law, disagree with you and Oren. As I get available time I will be detailing, justifying alternative analyses and presenting draft text aimed at achieving a better balance.


 * I have now had the opportunity to check all of your complicated ‘cut-and-paste’ edits and found them to be complete. Well done. I was mistaken. My sincere apologies.


 * To be continued Erictheenquirer (talk) 17:10, 8 March 2015 (UTC)

Pluto2012 ignores the rules again
- The last edit of user:Pluto2012 is against Wikipedia policy wp:rs : "making sure that all majority and significant minority views that have appeared in those sources are covered". Moreover, he deleted the majority view while keeping a text based on a sloppy writing of one source. - The minority view which is found in the lead, is Maoz's text, discussed here, where I have shown its' drawbacks. - The majority view that Pluto just erased from the lead, is: "Both the decision to demand the removal of UNEF from Sinai and the decision to close the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping- commonly accepted as the point where war became inevitable-" Ferris2012p286, together with the nearly identical view that "Many commentators treat it (the six day war) as the locus classicus of anticipatory action in self defence." Szabo2011p147. . See also: "Terence Taylor…wrote in 2004…that "many scholars" considered Israel to have "conducted the (1967) action in anticipatory of self-defense". Quigley2012p135 .(Ykantor (talk) 12:06, 22 June 2015 (UTC)) This view is found in a lot of other wp:rs and even Arab sources:
 * Arab sources:
 * 1) "Amer raised the stakes once more. On May 21, he demanded the closing of the Strait of Tiran to Israeli navigation. When Nasser alerted him that Israel might consider this blockade a casus belli, Amer retorted that his troops in Sinai could not sit on their hands as Israeli flags flashed before them, and that if his wish was not granted, they might act recklessly, i.e., shoot Israeli vessels".Kandil2012p77
 * 2) - Egyptian intelligence estimates supplied to Nasser some months earlier to the effect that the removal of UNEF would lead to war. Golan1990p63
 * 3) In the end of May 1967, Nasser claimed in a public speech to have been aware of the Straits of Tiran closure implications: "Taking over Sharm El Sheikh meant confrontation with Israel. It also means that we ready to enter a general war with Israel. It was not a separate operation" (Shlaim2012p63)
 * 4) "On 26 May he declared, ‘The battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel’.”
 * 5) -The same day Hasanayn Heyical, a close associate of Nasser, wrote an article in Al-A ahram explaining why war with Israel was inevitable: ‘The closure of the Gulf of Aqaba... means first and last that the Arab nation represented by the UAR has succeeded for the first time, vis-a-vis Israel, in changing by force a fait accompli imposed on it by force
 * 6) "Following Nasser's speech of May 26, one of his close allies, Mohammed Heykal, wrote in the Cairo newspaper Al-Ahram that an armed clash between Israel and Egypt was `inevitable' " (gilbert, Israel – A History,a chapter of this book)
 * 7) -According to a book review, the Egyptian historian, Muhammad al-Jawadi cite :
 * 8) General Aboul-Aez as Egyptian Air Force Chief:  "Eleven days before the 1967 Six-Day War, Nasser asked Aboul-Aez, then governor of Aswan Province, for his opinion of the Egyptian Air Force. The general candidly warned Nasser on several tactical issues why Egypt could not wait for an Israeli first strike, and that Nasser’s saber rattling would lead to an Israeli response"
 * 9) General Mohammed Sadek—Director of Military Intelligence : "Amer and Nasser both felt that by sending a massive amount of forces ((into Sinai))would scare the Israelis and create a massive feint that would drive Tel-Aviv towards a course of action."
 * 10) -According to Sami Sharaf, Minister of State for Presidential Affairs, ...the decision (the closure of the Tiran straits) was known (to Nasser) to make war inevitable" .ShlaimLouis2012p64
 * 11) -in fact Sadat reports that he said: 'If we close the Straits war will be a one hundred per cent certainty. On 23 May Egypt ... The Russian Ambassador in Cairo woke Nasser at 3 a.m. on 27 May and begged Egypt to hold back (Hopwood2002p73)
 * 12) ...For reasons known only to him, Nasser single-handedly dismissed all rational analysis of the situation and took a series of irrational decisions. The compounded effect of these decisions was that events acquired a momentum of their own, and it became impossible for Nasser to slow down or back out. The result was that war broke out with the Israeli preemptive strike on 5 June, leading to a quick Egyptian debacle. (Fahmy2013p19)
 * 13) "the prominent historian and commentator Abd al-Azim Ramadan,...—Nasser— repeated its mistakes when it decided to expel the international peacekeeping force from the Sinai Peninsula and close the Straits of Tiran in 1967. Both decisions led to a state of war with Israel, despite the lack of military preparedness" (PodehWinckler2004p105)
 * 14) Mutawi
 * 15) To Israel this is the most dangerous aspect of the current situation — who can impose the accomplished fact and who possesses the power to safeguard it. Therefore it is not a matter of the Gulf of Aqaba but of something bigger. It is the whole philosophy of Israeli security. Hence I say that Israel must attack.”7 He went on to say that the international situation was such that Egypt would have to allow Israel to strike the first blow and concluded, ‘Let Israel begin. Let our second blow then be ready. Let it be a knockout.’5’ " (Mutawi, p. 95 )
 * 16) On 25 May Israel declared total mobilization..the Israeli economy ground to a standstill. ..soon Israel open a war because ...Israel could not tolerate such a total stoppage for very long (mutawi p. 111
 * 17) any military analyst should have recognized that the arrival of large numbers of Arab troops and Iraqi planes in Jordan would inevitably make Israel anxious swiftly to act against Jordan before these new forces were fully deployed. Therefore, Jordan should have realized that it was absolutely essential to avoid giving Israel any excuse to launch an offensive against it before those troops had reached their battle stations". mutawi p. 150


 * General
 * 1) - these considerations suggest that despite the seemingly inevitability of war after June 1, had Nasser indeed pursued an alternative strategy in the final days of the crisis, war might have been averted. Brooks2008p99
 * 2) - Nasser responded by taking three successive steps which made war virtually inevitable: he deployed his troops in Sinai near Israel's border, he expelled the United Nations Emergency Force from Sinai, and, on 22 May, he closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping.Woods-Shlaim1996p219
 * 3) - it was Nasser who, for all intent and purposes, fired the first shot on 22 May 1967 by illegally closing the straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. In doing so, he put the match to the barrel of gunpowder. ShlaimLouis2012p54.
 * 4) -Nasser responded on 18 May, demanding full withdrawal of UNEF forces. After that, the rush to war was unavoidable'....(4 June) Iraq joined the Egyptian= Jordanian defense alliance and other front line states- Algeria, Libia, the Sudan and Kuwait- reportedly began mobilizing troops to join the coalition. Gordon2012p68
 * 5) -The dynamics of the situation- the mass psychosis, concentration of forces and Egyptian blockade of the Tiran straits- rendered war inevitable- Gluska2007page-xv
 * 6) -When Nasser insisted on the withdrawal of UN peacekeeping forces from Sinai on I 6 May fears of a major attack appeared to be confirmed. Nasser ... His determination to crush the Israelis was further demonstrated by his blockade of the Straits of Tiran on 23 May after the UN forces had left, which made an Israeli response unavoidable'; hence the surprise Israeli attack on Egyptian and Syrian airfields. YoungKent2013p265
 * 7) -Yet in taking this step, Nasser and other Egyptian leaders understood that it would be considered a casus belli by Israel. ... Indeed, a number of senior Egyptian officials rightly concluded at the time that closing the strait to Israel made war inevitable.Tessler1994p392
 * 8) -... Nasser's decision to blockade the Straits of Tiran seemed to have been the straw that broke the camel's back. Shalom2012p123
 * 9) -By demanding recall of the UN Emergency Force, declaring a blockade of the Straits of Tiran, and moving his army into Sinai, Nasser had made "the war nobody wanted" almost inevitable Kerr1975p273
 * 10) -Later on at the ... In the course of the discussion it became known that the closure of the straits applied specifically to tankers transporting oil to Israel. The General Staff rapidly came to the conclusion that this Egyptian step required Israel to declare war at once, without waiting for further developments. Assuming that war was inevitable, the DMI was immediately requested to. RoiMorozov2008p126
 * 11) -It just so happened that the bluff President Gamal Abdel Nasser commenced on May 13, 1967, ensured that the inevitable war would commence sooner rather than later. By the time Nasser decided, and from then on, all the rest was byplay. Hammel2001p29
 * 12) -In closing the strait to Israeli shipping, Nasser turned an increasingly dangerous situation in the Middle East into a full-blown diplomatic crisis and probably made a third Arab-Israeli war inevitable.Kaufman1996
 * 13) -UNEF was not an international security guarantee, but a trip-wire. Removal of that trip-wire signaled Israel that it was on its own. War was inevitable; the only question remaining was who would strike first. Dombroski2007p67
 * 14) "It was obvious to everyone, and Nasser was no exception to this, that the withdrawl of UNEF would eventually lead to a war". Rikhye1980p179
 * 15) (p. 147) The sequence of events that led to the Israeli pre-emptive sttrike did indeed create a situation  where an armed attack seemed unavoidable. (p. 148 )
 * 16) -On 23 May Nasser seized Sharm al-Sheikh and closed the Straits of Tiran. War looked inevitable.. Shapira2007p309


 * See WP:LEAD. Pluto2012 (talk) 14:45, 22 June 2015 (UTC)
 * Ykantor, are you joking? I mean, writing that another user is breaking the rules, and then proceeding to break the rules by producing a long list of cherrypicked sources. We know the Israelis were in Washington begging the Americans to give them permission to attack Egypt. We know the Americans were reluctant to go along with that, since they didn't assess the Egyptians as planning an invasion and their assessment was that Israel wasn't in any danger. We know that was also the Israeli assessment. We know that eventually they got a yellow light from the Oval Office and actually did attack, implementing their carefully prepared invasion plans. We know Israel was planning provocations to get their war started. --Dailycare (talk) 18:54, 25 June 2015 (UTC)

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