Talk:Panjshir offensives (Soviet–Afghan War)

Errors
I don't think that Boris Gromov was the Soviet commander of the Panjsher Valley operations between 1981 and 1984. I'm pretty certain that Gromov was put in command of Soviet forces much later, in 1986 or 1987.

Also, it's not quite accurate to term the Panjsher Valley clashes as Mujahideen victories. As a rule, the operations were characterized by the Soviets driving the Mujahideen from the valley, followed by the Soviets destroying Mujahideen buildings, villages, and defensive bastions, and then the Soviets withdrawing from the valley without attempting to retain control of it. The Mujahideen would return to the valley after the Soviet departure, and then rebuild their preexisting infrastructures.

It's not entirely clear what the Soviet intentions were in the Panjsher Valley. Possibly they only sought to disrupt Mujahideen activity in that region over the short term. It's obvious that the Soviets never intended to permanently occupy the valley.

I believe that only one Panjsher operation, which happened early in the war, could be characterized as a Mujahideen victory. The other operations were Soviet tactical successes, although these victories were of a very limited nature and they didn't change the overall strategic picture in Afghanistan so that it definitely favored the Soviets.

My guess is that it's probably correct to call the Panjsher Valley operations "inconclusive", or "Soviet tactical victory, Mujahideen strategic success". Possibly the operations could be called "indecisive Soviet victories" with a footnote added informing the reader than in this type war, a Soviet "indecisive" victory translated into something of a Mujahideen strategic success (the Mujahideen were simply trying to perpetuate the war, and to not collapse under Soviet military pressure).

Massood's true accomplishment in the Panjsher Valley is that he succeeded in creating an elastic, recuperative political and military organization that could easily survive the trauma of Soviet military offensives. Thus, Massood succeeded in accomplishing the Mujahideen goal of ensuring that the resistance could make the war interminable for the Soviets.

Kenmore 04:16, 24 February 2007 (UTC)kenmore


 * Well that's one way of putting it... You say the soviets never intended to occupy the Panjshir. That is incorrect: during one offensive, (the 5th IIRC) they established a series of fortified outposts along the valley to secure control of the area. Some of these outposts were manned by DRA soldiers, many of whom deserted to the Muj; some outposts were captured by Massoud's men. In the end, the constant harssment by the Muj forced the Soviets to negotiate a truce with Massoud, in order to evacuate their garrisons. This was a significant victory for the Mujahideen, because at the end of the day, it was they who controlled the area. As I see it, the Soviet objectives were twofold: A: to eradicate the Mujahideen B: to secure control of the Panjshir for the DRA They were successful in neither of these aims, hence the "Mujahideen victory".Raoulduke47 00:27, 27 February 2007 (UTC)


 * I'm with Kenmore on this issue. -- Ghirla -трёп-  15:35, 27 February 2007 (UTC)


 * Really? This isn't a vote, so if you have an opinion, you should justify it with arguments. My point is, nothing in Kenmore's post proves convincingly that the Panjshir offensives were Soviet victories. His argument seems to be that the Soviets didn't lose because they didn't want to occupy the Panjshir anyway. But if that is the case why did they bother attacking in the first place? Also as i have said they did try to occupy the Panjshir, but were forced to withdraw. The reason for this is simple: the Soviet/DRA forces could not carry out proper resupply of their outposts, because the only road leading up the valley is narrow and winding, and supply convoys were regularly subjected to mining and ambushes by the Mujahideen. Any long-term occupation of the Panjshir would have become a logistical nightmare for the Soviets.


 * If, as Kenmore seems to be implying, some of these offensives were nothing more than a show of force, or a series of punitive operations against villages who supported the Muj, they can hardly be regarded as successful either. The Mujahideen were not frightened into submission, neither did the population turn against them because of Soviet reprisals. On the contrary, the inhabitants turned to Massoud for protection and support for him increased. The Soviets, it is true, sometimes occupied large swathes of the Panjshir, but their control never extended beyond the range of their rifles and the occupation was short-lived. They were able to do this because the Mujahideen didn't fight pitched battles against Soviet armour, which would have been suicidal. Instead they withdrew into the subsidiary valleys and carried out harassment raids until the Soviets pulled out: these are classical guerrilla tactics. Some Soviet units, notably the Spetsnaz, may have enjoyed local successes, but the overall result was an unmitigated Mujahideen victory, in that they fulfilled all of their objectives, whereas the Soviets failed to achieve theirs.


 * My point is, the Soviets were not defeated,ie their forces were not routed in battle, but they clearly were not victorious, tactically or otherwise. The Mujahideen, on the other hand were victorious, because they still had control of the Panjshir when the offensives were over. Raoulduke47 19:52, 27 February 2007 (UTC)


 * From J. Bruce Amstutz; Afghanistan first five years of Soviet occupation p.132: "The most ambitious Soviet-DRA pacification effort was undertaken during 1982 - an attempt to reestablish government authority in the Panjshir valley. [...] In the biggest Soviet offensive yet atttempted, between 12,000 and 15,000 Soviet and DRA troops drove into the valley and confronted about 5,000 guerillas under the command of Ahmad Shah Massoud. the campaign lasted six weeks but the Soviet-DRA forces were unable to maintain their presence in the valley. these forces withdrew after suffering an estimated 3,000 casualties; up to 1,000 defections to the resistance side were reported, including a few Soviet soldiers."
 * Doesn't sound much like a victory... So if no evidence is produced to contradict this, i'll be reinstating the result as a "Mujahideen victory". Raoulduke47 17:45, 14 March 2007 (UTC)

Comments
'''His argument seems to be that the Soviets didn't lose because they didn't want to occupy the Panjshir anyway. But if that is the case why did they bother attacking in the first place?'''

It’s my understanding that the Soviets were merely seeking to disrupt Massoud’s political and military infrastructure in the Panjshir. This was not an easy thing to do – as you point out – because the topography of the Panjshir makes it difficult to overrun. Thus, each successive Soviet invasion of the Panjshir had limited objectives, with the Soviets becoming more ambitious and more successful in the Panjshir as the years past.

Also as i have said they did try to occupy the Panjshir, but were forced to withdraw.

Where did you read that the Soviets were in fact attempting to permanently occupy the Panjshir? Also, what are the sources that those authorities are basing this judgment on? I’ll bet that if we look closely at those sources, we’ll find that there’s no evidence whatsoever supporting the claim that the Soviets entered the Panjshir with the intention of establishing permanent positions there.

Any long-term occupation of the Panjshir would have become a logistical nightmare for the Soviets.

Certainly the Soviets would have known this very early in the war, and this would explain why they never intended to establish permanent posts in the Panjshir. All of the Panjshir offensives were raids, not serious attempts to conquer and retain possession of territory.

If, as Kenmore seems to be implying, some of these offensives were nothing more than a show of force, or a series of punitive operations against villages who supported the Muj, they can hardly be regarded as successful either.

It is known that the Soviet Panjshir offensives broke down Massoud’s operations temporarily. After most of the offensives Massoud was compelled to spend time rebuilding strength lost as a result of the Soviet attacks.

Some Soviet units, notably the Spetsnaz, may have enjoyed local successes, but the overall result was an unmitigated Mujahideen victory, in that they fulfilled all of their objectives, whereas the Soviets failed to achieve theirs.

Most of the Soviet units achieved success in the Panjshir, albeit success of a limited and often clumsy nature. The only problem was that these successes were of an indecisive nature, as the guerrillas were always able to flee the battle scene by retreating through the many mountain passes surrounding the valley. Spetsnaz forces were sometimes used by the Soviets successfully to close retreat routes. There was never any mujahideen tactical victory, let alone an “unmitigated” victory. The mujahideen were successful only in that they executed successful, skillful retreats from the valley, and in that the organization of their forces was not seriously damaged by the Soviet attacks.

Instead they withdrew into the subsidiary valleys and carried out harassment raids until the Soviets pulled out: these are classical guerrilla tactics.

True, but it was not the guerrillas harrassment raids that caused the Soviets to withdraw from the Panjshir. The Soviets always withdrew from the Panjshir as part of a preconceived plan.

(The mujahideen) fulfilled all of their objectives, whereas the Soviets failed to achieve theirs.

How do you know what the Soviets’ objectives were in the Panjshir? I’d be interested in reading that source…whatever it is, I’ll bet that the author is speculating about the Soviet objectives, and that he has no hard evidence backing up his contentions.

The Mujahideen, on the other hand were victorious, because they still had control of the Panjshir when the offensives were over.

The mujahideen regained control of the Panjshir only when the Soviets left. The Soviets, in accordance with their plans, left the Panjshir after attaining their limited objectives.

'''From J. Bruce Amstutz; Afghanistan first five years of Soviet occupation p.132… Doesn't sound much like a victory... So if no evidence is produced to contradict this, i'll be reinstating the result as a "Mujahideen victory"'''

Note that Amstutz wrote his book in 1986, long before the fall of the USSR and the partial opening of the Soviet military archives to academic scrutiny. I wonder then how Amstutz could have known that the Soviets were indeed attempting to take control of the Panjshir in 1982. I’ll bet Amstutz is speculating as to what the Soviets’ objectives were.

In my opinion, the coldest, most balanced and objective studies of the military situation in Afghanistan in the 1980s have been done by Mark Urban. In the future, I'll reference Urban's work so you can see where I'm coming from. I'll be interested in seeing what your replies are to Urban's claims, and maybe we can agree to amend some of the passages in the Panjshir article.

Keep in mind that many of the studies done on the 1980s Afghanistan situation are unreasonably anti-Soviet, based largely on speculation and distorted, overreaching interpretations of the available evidence.

In any case, however, I will not attempt to edit your articles without consulting you first, so that we can both review all available evidence and come to a mutual conclusion about how the article should read. I hate it when people unilaterally edit my stuff, and I'm careful about not imposing that kind of grief on any other editors.

Kenmore 23:40, 18 April 2007 (UTC)


 * Hello again Kenmore!
 * Sorry if my previous posts appeared overly polemical and contentious, but I was a bit nettled by Ghirlandajo's "vote", that didn't bring anything to the discussion. As you say we must try and remain cold and analytical!


 * As regards the end result of these battles, i have changed it to "tactical stalemate, mujahideen strategic victory". I hope we can all live with this.


 * On the tactical side, the Soviets were able to occupy the valley, but not to defeat Masoud decisively, while the mujahideen were not able to evict the Soviets from their positions: this was a stalemate, notwithstanding various engagements favourable to one or the other side.


 * The strategic outcome is that, when the Soviets left, for whatever reason, the mujahideen could regain control of the Panjshir. This was, for a guerilla force, a victory, according to Henry Kissinger's maxim: "The guerrilla wins if he does not lose; the conventional army loses if it does not win", meaning that for a guerilla force, continued existence is in itself a success. The control of a strategic area greatly increases the scope of that victory.


 * You say that these operations were only raids, and that their objectives were limited. This is true...but only for the first four offensives. The fifth one was conducted on a larger scale, and once the Soviet/DRA force occupied the valley, they built bases in order to control the area. There were three main bases at Rukha, Bazarak and Anava, supported by other minor outposts. This information is confirmed by Soviet/Russian sources. These bases were, according to the mujahideen, well fortified and protected by minefields and heavy weapons. The nature of these installations signifies clearly that the garrisons were there to stay. The Soviet occupation of Panjshir lasted 8 months(May 1982-January 1983) until the beginning of the truce, when the garrisons were evacuated. It also means the Soviets had reverted to defensive tactics, that were unlikely to threaten Masoud's mobile guerilla units. I hope this answers your questions about the permanent nature of the Soviet presence in the Panjshir: it was supposed to be "permanent" until the mujahideen were decisively defeated, and as it so happened, lasted until such a defeat appeared impossible.


 * Concerning the Soviets' objectives, I have some information, coming from an article by military historian Aleksandr Lyakhovskiy, who as a former Soviet soldier, is unlikely to exhibit this systematic anti-Soviet bias that you accuse me of ;-). According to him, the 5th-6th operation was carried out on Babrak Karmal's insistance, with the objective of destroying Masoud's forces. For the 7th offensive, Karmal was even more explicit: during a meeting with S. Sokolov, Soviet minister of defense, he stated that "the destruction of all who live there, must be of a total nature". If we are to belive this(and i see no reason not to) then the Soviet/DRA objective was not simply to disrupt Masoud's operations, but to eliminate his forces completely, and if necessary also all the civilians who lived in the Panjshir.


 * Concerning the sources, I know that some of them are biased, like Amstutz's book, that I didn't use much. Instead I tried to strike a balance between Soviet and Mujahideen sources, but some bias may have crept in all the same. I would indeed be interested to hear Mark Urban's views on this subject, though I take it you are not referring to his War in Afghanistan, that was published in 1988. And thk you for not modifying this article out of hand, it took me some time to put together.
 * Raoulduke47 19:59, 19 April 2007 (UTC)

Tactical Victory
Who am I to say that? I'll tell you: I wrote that whole article and collated all the necessary sources so I can speak with a little more authority of this than some random user whose contributions are limited to messing with the infobox to satisfy some nationalistic POV. "In the end" refers both to the tactical and the strategic outcome, and neither was favourable to the Soviets. At the time, the Soviet military presented the battles as victories because they briefly occupied certain positions, but that is certainly not a measure of success in counterinsurgency, or even in conventional warfare. According to this reasoning, Napoleon must have won the Russian campaign, because he captured Moscow! The net result of the panjshir battles was: In short, the Panjshir operations achieved nothing, and by all accounts they cost the Soviets severe losses. So, pray explain according to what scale of military success you judge them to have been victories? Raoulduke47 (talk) 22:56, 30 January 2008 (UTC)
 * The Soviets did not destroy the resistance forces, nor even inflict significant casualties
 * They did not pacify the area, or bring it under government control
 * In the end they vacated the area, leaving it completely under insurgent control


 * Well, being some foolish random user, I don't want to go against your infinite knowledge, but…
 * So I am the one being nationalistic? It seems that you are so concerned that the result stays in the infobox. Why, because it makes your heroes look good?
 * You have a hard time understanding what is tactical as opposed to strategic.
 * How are the battle results not favorable to the Soviets? The rebels retreated every time. How is retreating not losing tactically?
 * Yes Napoleon won tactically but lost strategically.
 * And how many times must you be told that the Soviets did not want to occupy that area?
 * If you want to believe that they had severe losses while not causing significant casualties to the Mujahideen, do so, but even if it was true, it does not matter when talking about tactical victory.
 * I thought my last edit was a compromise, but I see that you are upset to be reminded that your rebels retreated…
 * -YMB29 (talk)


 * So Napoleon won tactically eh? Well, I hope you've imparted this brilliant theory to all the academics and historians who, until now, have been labouring under the delusion that the russian campaign was one of the greatest military disasters in history. I know the difference between tactics and strategy, thank you very much. Rather, you seem to be confused about what a tactical result is, as you seem to think it is whatever minor aspect of a campaign you can cherry-pick to support your position. Certainly, the mujahideen did not stay put to get destroyed by Soviet firepower, and they withdrew from the path of Soviet offensives. You can call that a retreat if you want, but they were only following the basic tenets of guerilla warfare: "The enemy advances, we retreat. The enemy camps, we harass. The enemy tires, we attack. The enemy retreats, we pursue. For a guerilla force, a withdrawal is not necessarily a defeat, it is simply a Fabian strategy, a way of trading space for time. It's rather ironic that the priciples of guerilla war were laid out by communists such as Mao and Che Guevara, but that the Soviets didn't adapt to them. Anyway the result of a battle can only be judged after it is finished, and at the end neither force was able to defeat the other decisively. That is a stalemate.


 * As for the idea that the Soviets didn't try and hold the Panjshir, well that's plain wrong. Most people think only of Panjshir V, that lasted two weeks, but there were nine attacks in all and a variety of tactics were used, like digging in to fortified bases and outposts, as can be seen on this photo: . Raoulduke47 (talk) 22:48, 31 January 2008 (UTC)


 * Small bases and outposts are not proof that they tried to seriously occupy it. Obviously if they really wanted to occupy it they would not have withdrawn all or most of their forces.
 * You are just being silly. You still can't understand the difference between tactical and strategic. Guerrilla warfare is not about tactical victories, but strategic. The campaign to destroy the rebels in Panjshir was indecisive and a stalemate, but the actual battles were not. Again, how can it be a tactical stalemate if one side retreats?? We are talking about the immediate result of the battle ("only a limited or immediate end in view").
 * Napoleon’s campaign was a disaster strategically (any campaign is always judged in a strategic sense as in a "completion of a strategic plan"), but he won the battle of Borodino because the Russians retreated.
 * -YMB29 (talk) —Preceding comment was added at 19:06, 1 February 2008 (UTC)


 * Just to clarify things: when you oppose stratregy and tactics, you're not opposing contradictory principles of warfare, but simply different levels of command. Whille the tactical result is defined by the situation at battlefield-level, the strategic result is defined by the consequences at campaign-level, or theatre of operations-level. Indeed Napoleon won the battle of Borodino, but he lost the campaign, because his army was destroyed(tactical defeat), and he failed to occupy Russia, or obtain a favourable peace treaty(strategic defeat). The campaign didn't end after Borodino, but only after Napoleon had been defeated. The result of a campaign, or battle, cannot be judged until it is finished, and not half-way through, or whenever is convenient to prove a point. The same applies here: the outcome of the Panjshir battles was not settled at the height of the Soviet attacks, when the mujahideen had withdrawn, but only once the bulk of Soviet forces had left. And, I don't see why a temporary mujahideen withdrawal(which you persist in calling a retreat) should be considered a defeat, while a permanent Soviet withdrawal should be considered a success.


 * Indeed, by virtue of the relative movement of opposing forces, and the amount of occupied territory, the mujahideen had the advantage in the end, but I think the tactical outcome is best described by the fact that both opponents fought in a way that prevented a decisive defeat(the Soviets by massing huge combat power, and the insurgents by using guerilla tactics), ie it was a stalemate. And, as you've mentioned strategic plans, it might be worth pointing out that the fighting went exactly according to a plan drawn out by Massoud, who, at the beginning of the war had envisaged a first defensive phase in the Panjshir, followed by a phase of expansion during which he extended his influence over neighbouring provinces. This he did, after 1983, without being hampered by Soviet offensives, and thus not only preserved but enhanced the mujahideen's strategic advantage. Raoulduke47 (talk) 22:52, 2 February 2008 (UTC)


 * If you are going to talk about the Panjshir offensives as battles then they were each won by the Soviets tactically. Again, if one side retreats, whether it is a tactical retreat or not, they lose the battle tactically, and it does not matter if they come back later. A tactical stalemate is when neither side can advance, and this was not the case. Each offensive or battle was over when the Soviets left, after the rebels retreated. Coming back when the enemy leaves does not make a recent battle a tactical stalemate.
 * Withdrawal and not retreat? Well I guess the Mujahideen just left because they had something better to do, and it had nothing to do with the Soviets?
 * Napoleon was eventually defeated tactically, but tactical defeats were not the main reason he lost.
 * -YMB29 (talk) —Preceding comment was added at 19:02, 4 February 2008 (UTC)
 * Your narrow-minded and simplistic views do not very well cover the complexities of couterinsurgeny warfare. In fact the objective of Soviet operations was not to force the insurgents to retreat, quite on the contrary, as their plan was to encircle and destroy them(not a strategic objective, but very much a tactical, battlefield-level objective). The fact that the insurgents were able to retreat safely was a serious setback for the Soviets. Moreover, neither the mujahideen nor the Soviets (according to you) had any intention of holding their ground at all costs. In a mobile battle, where neither side is committed to gaining or holding ground, a retreat is not significant.


 * And no, the fighting didn't end magically when the Soviets decreed their operation was over. A battle or campaign isn't over until the fighting has ended, not when oneside decides to call it quits.


 * I don't know where you picked up your definition of a stalemate, but the relevant meaning here is "any unresolved situation in which further action is impossible or useless", it has nothing to do with advancing or retreating. --Raoulduke47 (talk) 20:47, 11 February 2008 (UTC)


 * Talking to you seems like hitting one's head against a wall. You still can't or don't want to understand what tactical and strategic mean. You are still talking about a campaign as though it is judged tactically...
 * And how do you know exactly all the tactical objectives of the Soviets? Who told you that the rebels always retreated safely and no objectives were fulfilled?
 * Again, a stalemate may have nothing to do with advancing or retreating in a strategic sense, but retreating to safety from a battle does not magically make it a tactical stalemate.
 * -YMB29 (talk) 18:04, 19 February 2008 (UTC)


 * Actually, I have already explained the difference between tactics and strategy, whereas you have persistently failed to make your point in a cogent way, despite claiming to understand it better. If you can't be bothered to make a coherent argument, then you shouldn't expect to convince anyone. How do I know the Soviet objectives? Easy, I've done some research, and you would be well advised to do the same, like that you might actually know what you're talking about, instead of just making vague and pointless generalisations. From the Soviet after-action report of Panjshir V (in The Soviet-Afghan war, by the Russian General Staff): "...the Soviet command concluded that there was a strong enemy force in the valley and decided to destroy it"(p.75). Clearly, the objective was not to drive the insurgents away, but to destroy them completely, or at least enough to impair their fighting capability. This is not what happened: "the Soviet/Afghan force slowly displaced the enemy form his occupied positions, but did not inflict significant casualties on the mujahideen", etc... If an operation failed to achieve its tactical goals it cannot be regarded as a success, despite that Panjshir V was probably the most successful for the Soviets. Once again, these were mobile battles, each side had attrition as their tactical goal, not the conquest of insignificant positions. In this context, who advances or retreats has little importance. In fact talking of a retreat is abusive, as it implies that the mujahideen packed their weapons and left the area massively, which is not what happened. In fact, they continued to operate in the area throughout the period.


 * Others have described the Panjshir offensives as raids, which is true to some extent, but the success of a raid is measured by what it has destroyed, and no operation ever destroyed anything fatal for the mujahideen. That they safely escaped each attack is easily assertained(besides that many sources attest to it) by the fact that after each operation, the Soviets and the DRA were forced to mount a new offensive, which itself was a failure, and so on until they realised the complete futility of such exercises. --Raoulduke47 (talk) 22:39, 20 February 2008 (UTC)


 * Well Mr. know-it-all, the Soviet objective was not only to kill many rebels, but also to drive them out and to destroy their positions and supplies. The Soviet commanders viewed their operations as tactical successes and it is often mentioned that the enemy had heavy or significant casualties.
 * Is it that hard for you to understand what I am saying? You have not explained anything convincingly. You try to explain your point but I think you even know that you are wrong; you just don't want to accept it.
 * Once again, continued offensives indicate strategic failure, not tactical.
 * Look at all the tactical stalemates in history. Where do you see one where one side just retreats without having achieved any tactical goals?
 * -YMB29 (talk) 18:33, 3 March 2008 (UTC)

The entire article needs to be rewritten. It is loaded with misinformation. Kenmore (talk) 02:53, 9 September 2008 (UTC)


 * Yes?? And where exactly is this heinous propaganda is supposed to be nested? --Raoulduke47 (talk) 21:06, 25 September 2008 (UTC)

The latest version of this article is excellent (2021)
I read the entire article today. I think it is superb. Kudos to whoever did the rewriting and editing. It's a factually accurate, objectively cold account of the 1980 to 1985 military operations in and around the Panjshir. The piece is very well written; the sentences are concise without being vague or over-general. The paragraphs provide just enough substantiation to the main points without being overwritten or overparticular (as many Wiki articles, lamentably). The 3D map is very helpful too. IMO, this article shouldn't rate as a "starting" article. It should probably be nominated for very high Wiki rating.Kenmore (talk) 17:38, 24 August 2021 (UTC)

Modifying name of this article
I suggest we name this article “Panjshir offensives of the Soviet–Afghan War”. That would clarify scope, so as to exclude current offensives by the Taliban against rebels in Panjshir.&#32;Anythingyouwant (talk) 00:27, 3 September 2021 (UTC)
 * I went ahead and did that.&#32;Anythingyouwant (talk) 00:57, 3 September 2021 (UTC)
 * No disagreement on principle with the move but this is not the proper form for disambiguating an article: the title should be Panjshir offensives (Soviet–Afghan War), as shown in WP:DAB. --RD47 (talk) 11:19, 3 September 2021 (UTC)
 * Done.&#32;Anythingyouwant (talk) 19:19, 3 September 2021 (UTC)